HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY

OVERVIEW

A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is the recommended method for identifying
hazards and problems that present safe and efficient operation. The technique is based
on the principle that several experts with different backgrounds can interact in a creative,
systematic fashion and identify more problems when working together than when working
separately and combining their results.

The essence of the HAZOP Analysis approach is to review process drawings and/or
procedures in a series of meetings, during which a multi-disciplinary team uses a
prescribed protocol to methodically evaluate the significance of deviations from the
normal design intention.

The primary advantage of group participation in a HAZOP Analysis is that it stimulates

creativity and generates new ideas. This creativity results from the interaction of a team
with diverse backgrounds. Consequently, the success of the study requires that all
participants freely express their views, but participants should refrain from criticizing each
other to avoid stifling the creative process. This creative approach, combined with the
use of systematic protocol for examining hazardous situations, helps improve the
thoroughness of the study.

The HAZOP study is focussed on specific points of the process or operation called "study
nodes," process sections, or operating steps. One at a time, the HAZOP team examines
a study node using a set of established guide words to identify potentially hazardous
process deviations. One purpose of the guide words is to ensure that all relevant
deviations of process parameters are evaluated. Sometimes, teams consider a fairly
large number of deviations (i.e., up to 10 to 20) for each section or step and identify their
potential causes and consequences. Normally, all of the deviation for a given section or
step are analyzed by the team before proceeding further.

Table 1 lists terms and definitions that are commonly used in HAZOP Analysis. The
guide words shown in Table 2 are applied to process parameters such as those shown in
Table 3.

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 TABLE 1

Common HAZOP Analysis Terminology

Term Definition
Process Sections (or Study Nodes) Section of equipment with definite boundaries (e.g., a line between
two vessels) within which process parameters are investigated for
deviation. The locations on P&IDs at which the process parameters
are investigated for deviations (e.g., reactor)
Operating Steps Discrete actions in a batch process or a procedure analyzed by a
HAZOP analysis team. May be manual automatic or software-
implemented actions. The deviations applied to each step are
somewhat different than the ones used for a continuous process
Intention Definition of how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of
deviations. Takes a number of forms and can be either descriptive or
diagrammatic (e.g., process description, flowsheets, line diagrams,
P&IDs)
Guide Words Simple words that are used to qualify or quantify the design intention
and to guide and stimulate the brainstorming process for identify
process hazards
Process Parameter Physical or chemical property associated with the process. Includes
general items such as reaction, mixing, concentration, pH, and
specific items such as temperature, pressure, phase, and flow
Deviations Departures from the design intention that are discovered by
systematically applying the guide words to process parameters (flow,
pressure, etc.) for each process section. Teams often supplement
their list of deviations with ad hoc items
Causes Reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has been
shown to have a credible cause, it can be treated as a meaningful
deviation. These causes can be hardware failures, human errors,
unanticipated process states (e.g, change of composition), external
disruptions (e.g., loss of power), etc.
Consequences Results of deviations (e.g., release of toxic materials). Normally, the
team assumes active protection systems fail to work. Minor
consequences, unrelated to the study objective, are not considered
Safeguards (Protection) Engineered systems or administrative controls designed to prevent
the causes or mitigate the consequences of deviations (e.g., process
alarms, interlocks, procedures)
Actions (or Recommendations) Suggestion for design changes, procedural changes, or areas for
further study (e.g., adding a redundant pressure alarm or reversing
the sequence of two operating steps)

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 TABLE 2

HAZOP Analysis Guide Words and Meanings

Guide Meaning
Words
No Negation of the Design Intent
Less Quantitative Decrease
More Quantitative Increase
Part Of Qualitative Decrease
As Well As Qualitative Increase
Reverse Logical Opposite of the Intent
Other Than Complete Substitution

TABLE 3

Common HAZOP Analysis Process Parameters

Flow Time Frequency Mixing Sampling

Pressure Composition Viscosity Addition Inspection
Temperature pH Voltage Separation Maintenance
Level Speed Information Reaction Control

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Each guide word is combined with relevant process parameters and applied at each point
(study node, process section, or operating step) in the process that is being examined. The
following is an example of creating deviations using guide words and process parameters:

Guide Words Parameter Deviation

No + Flow = No Flow
More + Pressure = High Pressure
As Well As + One Phase = Two Phase
Other Than + Operation = Maintenance

Guide words are applied to both general parameters (e.g., react, mix) and specific
parameters (e.g., pressure, temperature). With the general parameters, it is not unusual to
have more than one deviation from the application of one guide word. For example, "more
reaction" could mean either that a reaction takes place at a faster rate, or that a greater
quantity of product results. On the other hand, some combinations of guide words and
parameter will yield no sensible deviation (e.g, "as well as" with "pressure").

With the specific parameters, some modification of the guide words may be necessary. In
addition, analysts often find that some potential deviations are irrelevant because of a
physical limitation. For example, if temperature parameters are being considered, the guide
words "more" or "less" may be the only possibilities.

The following are other useful alternative interpretations of the original guide words:

• Sooner or later for "other than" when considering time

• Where else for "other than" when considering position, sources, or

destination

• Higher and lower for "more" and "less" when considering levels,
temperature, or pressure

When dealing with a design intention involving a complex set of interrelated plant
parameters (e.g., temperature, reaction rate, composition, and pressure), it may be better to
apply the whole sequence of guide words to each parameter individually than to apply each
guide word across all of the parameters as a group. Also, when applying the guide words to
an operating instruction (e.g., procedural step), it may be more useful to apply the sequence
of guide words to each word or phrase separately, starting with the key part that describes
the activity. These parts of the sentence usually are related to some impact on the process
parameters. For example, in the procedural step "The operator starts flow A when pressure

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B is reached," the guide words would be applied to:

• Starts flow A (no, more, less, etc.)

• When pressure B is reached (sooner, later, etc.)

The guide word/parameter combinations are selected by the HAZOP leader.

HAZOP Consideration of Pipeline

A pipeline for our purposes here is one that joins two main equipment items; for example, we
might start with the line leading from the feed tank through the feed pump to be the first feed
heater.

A series of guide words are applied, in turn, to this line:

• None • Part of
• More of • More than
• Less of • Other than

None, for example, means no forward flow, or reverse flow when there should be forward
flow.

We ask:
• Could there not be flow?
• If so, how could it happen?
• What are the consequences of no flow?
• Are the consequences hazardous or do they prevent efficient operation?
•If so, can we prevent no flow (or protect against the consequences) by changing the
design or operating method?
• If so, does the size of the hazard or problem (that is, the severity of the consequence,
times the probability of occurrence) justify the extra expense?

The same questions are then applied to reverse flow and we then move on to the next guide
words, more of. Could there be "more flow" than that designed? If so, how could it arise?
And so on. The same questions are asked about "more pressure" and "more temperature,"
and if they are important, about other parameters such as "more radioactivity" or "more
viscosity." Table 2 summarizes the meanings of the guide words, while Figure 1 summarizes
the whole process.

In studying a batch plant, one must apply the guide words to the instructions
(whether written or on a computer) as well as to the pipelines. For example, if an
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instruction states that 1 metric tone of A has to be charged to a reactor, the team
should consider such deviations as:
• Don't charge A.
• Charge more A.
• Charge less A.
• Charge as well as A.
• Charge part of A (if A is a mixture).
• Charge other than A.
• Reverse charge A (that is, can flow occur from the reactor to the A container?).

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 FIGURE 1

Flowchart of the Procedure for Carrying Out a HAZOP

Select line

Select deviation
(e.g., more flow)

Move on to next No Is more flow possible?

deviation

Yes

Is it hazardous or does it No Consider other

prevent efficient operation? causes of more
flow.

Yes

What change in plant No Will the operator know that

will tell him? there is more flow?

Yes

What change in plate or Consider other

methods will prevent the changes or agree
deviation, or make it less likely, to accept hazard.
or protect against the
consequences

Is the cost of the change No

justified?

Yes

Agree to change(s). Agree who

is responsible for action.

Follow up to see that action

has been taken.