MONICO K. IMPERIAL, JR., G.R. No.

191224
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 4, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,[1] filed by petitioner Monico K. Imperial, Jr., from
the December 10, 2009 decision[2] and the February 5, 2010 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101297.

The Factual Antecedents

On October 19, 2005, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) administratively charged the
petitioner, then Branch Manager of the GSIS Naga Field Office, with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service[4] for approving the requests for salary loans of eight
GSIS Naga Field Office employees who lacked the contribution requirements under GSIS Policy and
Procedural Guidelines (PPG) No. 153-99,[5] giving them unwarranted benefits through his evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross negligence, and causing injury to the pension fund. [6] He was required to
answer and was preventively suspended for ninety (90) days.

On July 21, 2006, Atty. Manuel T. Molina, the petitioners purported counsel, filed
an unverified answer in behalf of the petitioner, who was then in the United States of America. Atty.
Molina explained that the petitioner granted the loan applications under an existing board resolution,
with the approval of then GSIS Vice President Romeo Quilatan; the loans were fully paid, without causing
any prejudice to the service.

In a July 26, 2006 order,[7] Hearing Officer Violeta C.F. Quintos set the pre-hearing conference on August
17, 2006 at the GSIS Legazpi Field Office. A week later, in an August 2, 2006 order,[8] the Hearing Officer
modified her previous order and set the venue at the GSIS Naga Field Office.

Atty. Molina filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that the GSIS Rules of Procedure set
the venue of pre-hearing conferences at the GSIS Main Office in Pasay City. The Hearing Officer denied
the motion for reconsideration in her August 11, 2006 order,[9] stating that the prosecution requested the
change of venue. Copies of the order were duly sent via fax and regular mail. Atty. Molina received the
faxed copy on August 14, 2006, while he received the registered mail on August 18, 2006.

At the scheduled August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference, the petitioner and Atty. Molina failed to
appear. Atty. Molina likewise failed to submit the petitioners verification of the answer and to submit a
letter of authority to represent the petitioner in the case. On the prosecutions motion, the Hearing Officer
declared the petitioner to have waived his right to file his answer and to have a formal investigation of his
case, and expunged the unverified answer and other pleadings filed by Atty. Molina from the records. The
case was then submitted for resolution based on the prosecutions submitted documents.[10]

GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[11]He noted that the evidence presented by the
prosecution clearly showed that the petitioners approval of the requests for salary loans of eight GSIS
Naga Field Office employees was improper because they lacked the contribution requirements under PPG
No. 153-99. He also noted that the pleadings filed by Atty. Molina, as the petitioners purported counsel,
were expunged from the records, but he, nonetheless, discussed the defenses raised in these pleadings
and found them unmeritorious.
Noting that this was the petitioners second administrative offense (he had previously been
suspended for one [1] year for gross neglect of duty for failing to implement the recommendations of the
Internal Audit Services Group pertaining to the handling of returned-to-sender checks, resulting in a
GSIS Naga Field Office Cashier defrauding the GSIS of checks), Garcia imposed the penalty of dismissal
with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government. On the same date, the GSIS Board of Trustees
approved the decision.[12]

In a June 6, 2007 resolution,[13] Garcia denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration, noting
that Atty. Molina had no authority to appear for and in behalf of the petitioner, having failed to submit
any formal written authority; that the petitioners answer was unverified; and that, in any event, the
petitioner had no evidence sufficient to overturn the evidence presented by the prosecution.

The petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), reiterating his arguments of denial
of due process and the lack of evidence against him.

The CSC rejected the petitioners claim of due process violation, finding that the petitioners filing of a
motion for reconsideration cured whatever procedural due process defect there might have been.[14] It
noted that the records of the case showed that the petitioner approved the loan applications despite the
patent ineligibility of the loan applicants. The CSC thus affirmed the petitioners dismissal for grave
misconduct, but added as an accessory penalty the prohibition from taking any civil service examination.

The petitioner elevated his case to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court.

In its December 10, 2009 decision,[15] the CA dismissed the petition, and denied the subsequent motion
for reconsideration,[16] finding no reversible error in the challenged CSC Resolution.

The Petition

In the petition before us, the petitioner argues that he was denied due process when the August 17, 2006
pre-hearing conference was conducted in his absence without prior notice of the August 11, 2006 order
denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of change of venue, since Atty. Molina received by
registered mail a copy of the August 11, 2006 order only on August 18, 2006, or a day after the August
17, 2006 pre-hearing conference. The petitioner pleads good faith in approving the loans based on an
existing GSIS Board Resolution which authorizes branch managers to approve loans for meritorious and
special reasons; the loans were cleared by the Commission on Audit and settled by the borrowers. He
contends that the penalty of dismissal is too severe in the absence of any wrongful intent and given his 40
years of government service.

The Case for Respondent GSIS

The GSIS submits that the petitioner was not denied due process because Atty. Molina received
on August 14, 2006 a fax copy of the August 11, 2006 order. On the merits of the case, the GSIS
maintains that the evidence on record duly established the petitioners administrative culpability for acts
inimical to the interest of the public, warranting his dismissal from the service; the penalty of dismissal
was warranted since this was the petitioners second administrative offense.

The Issues
 The issues are: (1) whether the petitioner was denied due process, and (2) whether there was
substantial evidence to support petitioners dismissal from the service.

The Courts Ruling

We PARTIALLY GRANT the petition and modify the findings of the CA pertaining to the
petitioners administrative liability.

The Procedural Due Process Issue

Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that notice and an opportunity
to be heard be given before judgment is rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the
opportunity to be heard.[17] A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary.

In this case, while the petitioner did not participate in the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference
(despite receipt on August 14, 2006 of a fax copy of the August 11, 2006 order), Garcias decision of
February 21, 2007 duly considered and discussed the defenses raised in Atty. Molinas pleadings,
although the answer was ordered expunged from the records because it was unverified and because Atty.
Molina failed to submit a letter of authority to represent the petitioner.

What negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration
which cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the
petitioners case.[18] Again, Garcia duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for
reconsideration when he rendered the June 6, 2007 resolution.[19] Thus, the petitioner was actually heard
through his pleadings.

Findings of facts of administrative bodies accorded finality when supported by substantial

evidence

Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. Misconduct has been defined as an intentional
wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government
official.[20] A misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule are present.[21] Otherwise, a misconduct is only simple.

No doubt exists in our mind that the petitioner committed misconduct in this case. The records
clearly show that the petitioner committed the acts complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for
salary loans of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who lacked the necessary contribution
requirements under PPG No. 153-99. After a careful review of the records, however, we disagree with the
findings of the GSIS, the CSC and the CA that the petitioners acts constituted grave misconduct. While
we accord great respect to the factual findings of administrative agencies that misconduct was committed,
we cannot characterize the offense committed as grave. No substantial evidence was adduced to support
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule that
must be present to characterize the misconduct as grave.

We are aware that to the CSC, the mere act of approving the loan applications on several
occasions proves the element of flagrant disregard of established rules to constitute grave
misconduct. Thus, it said:
The act of the appellant in approving salary loan applications of his subordinates
over and above the prescribed rates under the GSIS policy, not only once but several
times, indicates his flagrant and wanton transgression of the said policy. He, in fact,
abused his authority in doing so.[22]

Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon. It has been
demonstrated, among others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of a customary
rule;[23] in the repeated voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies; [24] in the
practice of illegally collecting fees more than what is prescribed for delayed registration of
marriages;[25] when several violations or disregard of regulations governing the collection of government
funds were committed;[26] and when the employee arrogated unto herself responsibilities that were clearly
beyond her given duties.[27] The common denominator in these cases was the employees propensity
to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we do not see the type of open defiance and
disregard of GSIS rules that the CSC observed. In fact, the CSCs findings on the petitioners actions prior
to the approval of the loans negate the presence of any intent on the petitioners part to deliberately defy
the policy of the GSIS. First, GSIS branch managers have been granted in the past the authority to
approve loan applications beyond the prescribed requirements of GSIS; second, there was a customary
lenient practice in the approval of loans exercised by some branch managers notwithstanding the existing
GSIS policy; and third, the petitioner first sought the approval of his immediate supervisor before acting
on the loan applications. These circumstances run counter to the characteristic flagrant disregard of the
rules that grave misconduct requires.

Thus, the petitioners liability under the given facts only involves simple misconduct. As Branch
Manager of the GSIS Naga Field Office, he is presumed to know all existing policies, guidelines and
procedures in carrying out the agencys mandate in the area. By approving the loan applications of eight
GSIS Naga Field Office employees who did not fully meet the required qualifications, he committed a
serious lapse of judgment sufficient to hold him liable for simple misconduct.

The Revised Uniform Rules of the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) classifies simple misconduct as
a less grave offense. Under Section 52(B) (2), Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, the commission of simple
misconduct is penalized by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first
offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. While records show that this is not the
petitioners first offense as he was previously suspended for one (1) year for neglect of duty, we believe that
his dismissal would be disproportionate to the nature and effect of the transgression he committed as the
GSIS did not suffer any prejudice through the loans he extended; these loans were for GSIS employees
and were duly paid for. Thus, for his second simple misconduct, we impose on the petitioner the penalty
of suspension from the lapse of his preventive suspension by GSIS up to the finality of this Decision.[28]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition for review on

certiorari and MODIFY the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Monico K.
Imperial, Jr. is found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the time the
preventive suspension that GSIS imposed lapsed, up to the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Some jurisprudence on administrative cases involving grave misconduct

By
Toni Umali, Esq.
-
February 22, 2015
OUR last column discussing a hypothetical case on dishonesty generated several comments and requests
for us to discuss other offenses that may have been committed by the “respondent” in said hypothetical
case.
So our hypothetical case is about a government official supposedly signing a document
“without authority” and/or “without any legal basis” as the attached documents are either inexistent or
falsified. The facts of the case also indicate that there is no evidence to establish the government official’s
intent to lie, cheat, defraud or steal (and no evidence to prove that it is the respondent, who falsified the
attached documents or the respondent knows that the said documents are falsified).
In the previous column, we mentioned that there is no dishonesty. However, for this column, we wish to
add that there may be some other offenses committed (though not dishonesty) depending on the facts of
the case.
For example, the additional facts of the case is that the respondent government official (let’s call him “Mr.
X”) under the aforementioned situation knows that the authority to sign that document lies with the head
of his division and that he is just claiming that it is okay for him to sign such document because the head
is “absent or is on leave.” Mr. X’s colleagues said, “he should wait for the head of the office to sign the
document,” but he insisted since “the same document shall be reviewed by some other higher authorities
in the region anyway and so it is now up to such higher authorities to disallow the act he has done.”
What happened now in our hypothetical case is that the “higher authorities in the region” approved the
document signed by Mr. X, and then authorized some payments to some third persons based on that
document, since the “higher authorities in the region” just approved the document signed by Mr. X
without even reviewing the document that he is approving. (Please take note that Mr. X is not even
designated as the “officer in charge” of his division.)
Without discussing the liability of the “higher authorities in the region,” Mr. X may be held liable here for
Grave Misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules which must be
proved by substantial evidence. [Please see Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521,
September 30, 2005, citing BIR v. Organo, 424 SCRA 9 and CSC v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486 (1999)]
In this case, Mr. X knew that he has no authority to sign. Mere absence of the head of the office does not
necessarily give Mr. X the authority to sign the documents that may only be validly signed by the head of
such office. Mr. X’s contention—that “the same document shall be reviewed by some other higher
authorities in the region anyway and so it is now up to such higher authorities to disallow the act he has
done”—is totally misplaced and has no legal leg to stand on.
Thus, the aforementioned circumstances should demonstrate Mr. X’s willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules making him liable for grave misconduct.
As previously stated, under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS)
promulgated in November 8, 2011, by the CSC, administrative offenses are classified into grave, less
grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
Thus, under Section 46, Rule 10 of RRACCS, grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal
from the service. “Simple misconduct” is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and
one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
Misconduct may be considered simple if the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
law or to disregard established rules are not present. (Please see also Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No.
178454, March 28, 2011)

G.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-VISA YAS AND EMILY ROSE KO LIM CHAO, Petitioners, v. MARY ANN
T. CASTRO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
(Ombudsman) against respondent Assistant City Prosecutor Mary Ann T. Castro (respondent), assailing
the decision1 and resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 13, 2006 and May 2, 2006,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78933.
BACKGROUND FACTS

Sometime in 2001, Mariven Castro (Mariven) purchased on credit a Fuso Canter vehicle from KD Surplus.
Mariven executed a promissory note, and then issued six (6) post-dated checks to KD Surplus. The
checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented for
encashment. Mariven inquired from Emily Rose Ko Lim Chao (Emily), the owner-manager of KD Surplus,
if it was still possible to just return the vehicle in exchange for the issued checks.3

At around 2:00 p.m. on September 16, 2002, Mariven's wife, Rosefil Castro (Rosefil), accompanied by his
(Mariven's) sister, herein respondent, brought the Fuso Canter to KD Surplus' yard for appraisal and
evaluation. Emily inspected the vehicle and found out that it had a defective engine, as well as a rusty
and dilapidated body. Emily thus refused to accept the vehicle.

Rosefil requested the security on duty, Mercedito Guia (Guia), to register in the company's security
logbook the fact of entry of the motor vehicle in the premises of KD Surplus. Guia refused to do so as it
was already past 5:00 p.m. Upon the prodding of Rosefil, Guia inserted an entry on the upper right
portion of the logbook's entry page for the date September 16, 2002, stating that the vehicle had been
"checked-in" on that day. This entry was signed by Rosefil.

The respondent then left the premises of KD Surplus, but returned there a few moments later on board a
Philippine National Police-Special Weapons and Tactics (PNP-SWAT) vehicle. The respondent signed on
the inserted entry in the logbook as a witness, and then brought this logbook outside of KD Surplus'
premises. The respondent again left KD Surplus in order to photocopy the logbook. She returned on board
the PNP-SWAT vehicle after 30 minutes, and handed the logbook to the security guard. The respondent
also asked Emily to sign a yellow pad paper containing a list of the issued checks, and told her to return
these checks. When Emily refused, the respondent threatened to file cases against Emily; the respondent
also threatened Emily's staff with lawsuits if they will not testify in her favor.

On September 26, 2002, Emily filed an administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713
(the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) against the respondent
before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas). The case was docketed as 0MB-V-A-0508-1.

The respondent essentially countered that the case Emily filed was a harassment suit. She further
maintained that the police arrived at the premises of KD Surplus ahead of her.

The Ombudsman's Rulings

In its decision4 dated May 6, 2003, the Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and imposed on her the penalty of "three (3) months suspension from the
service without pay." The Ombudsman held that the respondent's act of summoning the PNP-SWAT to go
with her to KD Surplus, and riding on their vehicle, overstepped the conventions of good behavior which
every public official ought to project so as to preserve the integrity of public service. It added that the
respondent had encouraged a wrong perception that she was a "dispenser of undue patronage." 5 The
Ombudsman reasoned out as follows:
To our mind, the presence of SWAT in the vicinity was totally uncalled for as there were neither serious
nor even a slight indication of an imminent danger which would justify their presence. Verily, we cannot
string along with the complainant's attempt to justify her aforesaid act as an act of prudence because it is
very clear that her recourse to the military by calling some members of the SWAT PNP to go with her to
complainant's shop was a display of overbearingness and a show of haughtiness. Certainly, respondent
cannot deny that if she were not Asst. City Prosecutor Mary Ann Castro, it would be impossible for her to
get in a snap of a finger the services of this elite police team whose assistance she availed not for a
legitimate purpose but for her personal aggrandizement. Her power and influence as a public official had
indeed come into play which she had abused by not using it properly. Hence, we cannot make any other
conclusion except that the presence of the SWAT was purposely intended to brag of her clout in the
military to possibly bring about fears and apprehension on the part of complainant and the latter's
employees.6

The respondent moved to reconsider this decision, but the Ombudsman denied her motion in its
Order7dated July 14, 2003.

Proceedings before the CA

The respondent filed a petition for review before the CA challenging the May 6, 2003 decision and July
14,2003 order of the Ombudsman. In its February 13, 2006 decision, the CA modified the Ombudsman's
ruling, and found the respondent liable for simple misconduct only.

The CA held that the Ombudsman's suspension order was not merely recommendatory. It also ruled that
the respondent was not denied due process since she submitted a counter-affidavit where she refuted,
among others, Emily's claim that she went to the premises of KD Surplus on board a PNP-SWAT vehicle.
The CA also held that the respondent was not suspended for her act of calling for police assistance, but
for abusing her position as the Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu City. According to the CA, the
respondent used her office's influence, prestige and ascendancy to use the PNP-SWAT for a purely
personal matter.

The CA thus found the respondent liable for simple misconduct only, and reduced the penalty of
suspension imposed on her to one (1) month and one (1) day. It held that the respondent's acts were not
characterized by the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rules.

The respondent and the Ombudsman filed their respective motions for reconsideration. In its resolution of
May 2, 2006, the CA denied these motions for lack or merit.

The Present Petition and the Respondent's Comment

In the present petition for review on certiorari,8 the Ombudsman essentially argued that the respondent's
act of using her office's influence to use the PNP-SWAT for a purely personal matter constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It argued that the respondent exhibited irresponsibility and
corruption, and showed her lack of integrity when she took advantage of her position as Assistant City
Prosecutor to summon the assistance of the elite SWAT Team in order to pressure and harass Emily.

In her Comment,9 the respondent countered that she had been denied due process since the act of calling
for police assistance was not one of the specific acts cited in Emily's complaint as constituting abuse of
authority.
OUR RULING

After due consideration, we modify the assailed CA decision and resolution. We agree with the
Ombudsman's ruling that the respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, but modify the imposed penalty.

No denial of due process

We clarify at the outset that contrary to the respondent's claim, her act of seeking police assistance and
riding on a PNP-SWAT vehicle when she went to the premises of KD Surplus formed part of Emily's
allegations. In Emily's affidavit-complaint, she mentioned that she saw the respondent on board the
SWAT vehicle twice: first, when the respondent first arrived at the premises of KD Surplus;
and second,when she returned there after photocopying the company's security logbook.

We emphasize that the respondent refuted these allegations in her counter-affidavit: she admitted that
she asked for police assistance while on her way to KD Surplus, but maintained that she was on board a
Revo car owned by one Jojo Obera. According to the respondent, she sought police assistance because of
a possibility that a trouble might ensue between the parties. The respondent also stated that the police
arrived at KD Surplus ahead of her.

To us, the respondent would have found no need to state that: (1) she was on board a Revo vehicle when
she went to KD Surplus; (2) point out that the police arrived ahead of her; and (3) explain why she sought
the help of the police, if Emily did not allege that she (respondent) was on board a SWAT vehicle when she
went to KD Surplus on two occasions.

Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. Due process is simply the opportunity given to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.10

As earlier stated, the respondent refuted Emily's allegations in her counter-affidavit. The respondent
cannot now feign ignorance of the fact that her act of calling for police assistance vis-a-vis riding on board
the SWAT vehicle, was not among those included in the charge against her. In addition, the security
guard on duty, Guia, stated in his affidavit11 (which was attached to Emily's affidavit-complaint) that the
respondent "arrived riding in a SWAT PNP vehicle with Body No. 240, x x x she signed the logbook as a
witness on the inserted entry."12 Since these allegations formed part of Emily's affidavit-complaint, the
Ombudsman has the power to determine the respondent's administrative liability based on the actual
facts recited in this affidavit complaint.

The Court's ruling in Avenido v. CSC13 is particularly instructive:

The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an
information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge
against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the
offense.

We reiterate that the mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long as the respondent was given the
opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily
complied with; what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 14

Notably, when the case was called for a preliminary conference, the respondent opted to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the evidence on record.

The respondent's liability

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.15 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe
that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.16

In the present case, the respondent's acts of seeking out the assistance of the SWAT and riding on their
vehicle on two occasions en route to KD Surplus are factual matters that the Ombudsman and the CA
have passed upon. It is settled that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are
affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to review evidence on record
and assess the probative weight thereof.17 The task of this Court in an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari is limited to the review of errors of law that the CA might have committed. The issue that
remains to be resolved, therefore, is whether the CA correctly found the respondent liable for simple
misconduct.

To our mind, the respondent's acts of involving an elite police team like the SWAT in a matter purely
personal to her and riding on their vehicle in going to and from the premises of KD Surplus are uncalled
for: these were a haughty and an excessive display of the influence that she could wield, ultimately aimed
at helping Mariven and Rosefil to compel Emily to accept the "depreciated" vehicle, and to return the bum
checks issued by Mariven. These send the wrong impression that public officials could use and exploit the
police force for their personal interests.

While it may be true that the respondent merely wanted to ensure the safety of the parties in the event
that an untoward incident may happen between Emily and Rosefil, the calling of the SWAT was clearly an
overkill; there was also no justification for her to ride in a SWAT vehicle. By calling out the SWAT to the
premises of KD Surplus and by riding on their vehicle, she clearly wanted to project an image of power
and influence meant to intimidate, bully, and/or browbeat Emily. How the respondent managed to
convince an elite police force like the SWAT to accompany her, and to allow her to use their vehicle in a
matter purely personal to her, does not favorably reflect on her as well as on the police.

However, we do not agree with the CA that the respondent is guilty of simple misconduct.

Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."18 In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rules, must be manifest and established by substantial evidence. Grave misconduct necessarily includes
the lesser offense of simple misconduct. Thus, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable
for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as
grave.19

We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be

connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.20 The
respondent in the present case summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid her brother
and sister-in-law. There was no link between the respondent's acts and her official functions as a city
prosecutor. In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr.,21 the Court explained that:
x x x Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these
words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal
definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only
as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary
to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x It is settled that misconduct,
misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and
be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x."

The respondent's actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, an
administrative offense which need not be related to the respondent's official functions. 22 In Pia v.
Gervacio,23 we explained that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as
long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. Additionally and contrary to the CA's
ruling, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service may or may not be characterized by
corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. 24

In Manhit v. Office of the Ombudsman (Fact Finding & Intelligence Bureau),25 the Court had the occasion to
define "gross" and "prejudicial" in connection with the offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, as follows:
The word "gross" connotes "something out of measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant;
shameful" while "prejudicial" means "detrimental or derogatory to a party; naturally, probably or actually
bringing about a wrong result."26

In Mariano v. Roxas,27 the Court ruled that the offense committed by a CA employee in forging some
receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations, was not misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service because her acts had no direct relation to or connection with the performance
of her official duties." We similarly ruled in Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian Reform28 that the offense
committed by the employee in selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his
officemates during office hours was not grave misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.

Notably, the Court has also considered the following acts or omissions, among others, as constituting
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of
office, failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to safekeep public records and property,
making false entries in public documents and falsification of court orders. 29

In these lights, we hold that the Ombudsman correctly ruled that the respondent's acts of seeking the
assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board a SWAT vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and not misconduct, since there is no nexus between these acts and her official
functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her public office,
the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. 30

With regard to the other acts alleged by Emily in her affidavit-complaint, the Ombudsman and the CA
already ruled that the respondent is not administratively liable for her acts of taking the company logbook
outside of the premises of KD Surplus; and for handing a yellow paper containing a list of the checks
issued by Mariven to Emily for the latter's signature. We see no reason to overturn their findings and
conclusions in the absence of any showing that these had been arrived at arbitrarily.

We additionally note that Guia, stated in his affidavit that the respondent "borrowed the security logbook
for the purpose of securing a photocopy" and later returned it to him. We thus find unpersuasive Emily's
claim that the respondent took the security logbook outside of the company's premises without
permission.

Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave offense with a corresponding
penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the
penalty of dismissal for the second offense. Since this is the first time that the respondent had committed
these acts, we deem it proper to impose on her the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated February 13, 2006 and May 2, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78933. Respondent Mary Ann.
T. Castro is declared guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is suspended from
service for six (6) months and one (1) day.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174321 October 22, 2013

ROLANDO GANZON, Petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO ARLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A government employee who is found guilty of grave misconduct may be dismissed from the service even
upon the first offense.
The Case
Petitioner Rolando Ganzon, an employee of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),
seeks the reversal of his dismissal from the service and the accessory penalties on the ground of grave
misconduct.
Antecedents
The DILG Regional Office in Port San Pedro, Iloilo City held its Christmas party on December 17, 1999 at
the office parking lot. When the Christmas party was about to end at 7:30 in the evening, respondent
Fernando Arlos (Arlos), then the OIC Provincial Director of DILG, left to get some documents from the
Office of the Operations Division located at the second floor of the building. While Arlos was making his
way to the stairs, Ganzon suddenly approached and pulled out a short firearm of unknown caliber from
his waist and with no provocation pointed the firearm at Arlos, angrily shouting in Ilongo: Nanding, hulat
anay. Diin ang boss mo? Nga-a nga wala man nya ako guin-patawag?1 Arlos responded: Ato ti sir Orendez
sa may program. May kuhaon lang ako sa ibabaw.2 Arlos parried Ganzon’s firearm-wielding hand and
tried to proceed towards the stairs, but Ganzon blocked his path, pushed him back, and again pointed
the firearm at Arlos’ chest. Sensing that Ganzon would shoot him then, Arlos quickly warded off Ganzon’s
firearm-wielding hand. At that instant, the firearm exploded and the bullet hit the floor. Ganzon again
aimed the firearm at Arlos, prompting the latter to run away as fast as he could. Ganzon followed Arlos,
and when they got to the gate of the building, Ganzon once more pushed him back and pointed the
firearm at him, saying: Patay ka!3 Ganzon held the firearm close to his waistline to conceal it from the
view of the other people present at the time.
At around 9:45 in the morning of December 21, 1999, Arlos went to the DILG office to see the Regional
Director upon the latter’s instruction. Ganzon, who was then standing near the entrance to the building,
shouted upon seeing Arlos enter the gate: O, ti ano?,4 obviously still referring to the incident of December
17, 1999. Arlos answered: Ang kadto ko diri indi away, kundi makigkita ako sa kay Director. 5
The incidents of December 17, 1999 and December 21, 1999 impelled Arlos to administratively charge
Ganzon with grave misconduct.
On his part, Ganzon denied the charge and elected to undergo a formal investigation. During the formal
investigation conducted by Regional Office No. 6 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC Regional Office),
the parties agreed that in order to dispense with the presentation of witnesses and other evidence, they
would just adopt the evidence presented in the pending criminal prosecution for attempted homicide
(Criminal Case No. 648-2000 entitled People v. Ganzon ) in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (Branch 1) in
Iloilo City arising from the same incident.6 Accordingly, Arlos was directed to submit the complete
transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 648-2000.
The witnesses for the Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 648-2000 were Arlos, DILG employee Nestor
Sayno, DILG Provincial Director Eliseo Orendez, and Fernando Totesora, Jr., the security guard then
assigned at the DILG Regional Office. They attested to what had transpired in the evening of December
17, 1999, specifically, that Ganzon had threatened and aimed a firearm at Arlos.7
In his turn, Ganzon presented himself and two others, namely, Bobby Pepino, also an employee of the
DILG Regional Office, and Voltaire Guides.8 They described a different version of the incident, to wit:
ROLANDO GANZON testified that he is presently assigned with the Planning Unit of DILG. He has been
connected with the DILG for twenty-five (25) years. From 1994 to 1999 he was assigned as DILG Officer of
the Municipality of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo. In September 1999, he transferred to the Regional Office. On
December 17, 1999, about 7:30 in the evening, he was with Bobby Pepino and Voltaire Guides waiting for
the drinks to be served to guests in their Christmas Party. Fernando Arlos arrived and asked them what
they were doing at the lobby. He answered that they were waiting for the drinks to be served.
Fernando said that they should be getting better performance ratings. He immediately responded that
sometimes performance ratings are disregarded or even changed. Fernando got angry, and in order to
avoid further discussion, Rolando stood up. At that time, guests were starting to arrive. Fernando pushed
his body against Rolando at the same time raising his right hand. Rolando held his hand; Fernando
raised his left but again Rolando held it. They then pushed and shoved each other to the gate.
At the gate, Fernando immediately left. Rolando went back to the administrative office to take his dinner.
After eating, he went to the quadrangle to watch the program. At the quadrangle, he saw Provincial
Director Orendez, Regional Director Reyes, and Presidential Consultant Jonathan Sanico. He stayed there
up to 2 o’clock in the morning. During that time no policeman came to arrest him.
He further testified that before the incident he had no grudge or ill feeling against Fernando Arlos. He also
testified about the hole located at the lobby of the Regional Office. He said that no shell or slug was
recovered in connection with the subject incident. He testified about the change made on his performance
rating and that he would often meet Fernando Arlos and no altercation or heated argument transpired
between them.9
Ruling of CSC Regional Office
On February 7, 2002, the CSC Regional Office rendered its decision finding Ganzon guilty of grave
misconduct, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, Rolando Ganzon is hereby found guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished Fernando Arlos, Rolando Ganzon, Atty. Virgilio Teruel, Atty. Rey
Padilla, Director Rexdito Reyes of DILG Regional Office No. 6, Iloilo City, the GSIS Branch Manager in
Iloilo City and Director Purita H. Escobia of CSC Iloilo Provincial Office at their known addresses.10
Ruling of CSC Main
Ganzon appealed to the Civil Service Commission Main Office (CSC), which affirmed the contested ruling
of the CSC Regional Office on January 27, 2004, to wit:
WHEREFORE , the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED . The decision of the Civil Service Regional Office
No. VI finding Rolando Ganzon guilty of grave misconduct and penalizing him with dismissal from the
service, is affirmed in all aspects. It should be understood that the penalty of dismissal as imposed in this
case carries with it such accessory penalties as forfeiture of retirement benefits, and disqualification from
public employment.11
Ganzon moved for a reconsideration, but his motion to that effect was denied through the resolution
dated November 9, 2004.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Ganzon appealed by petition for review in the Court of Appeals (CA), submitting the following issues,
namely:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER WAS
ESSENTIALLY CONNECTED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFENSE CHARGED CAN BE CONSIDERED AS SERVICE
CONNECTED DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT ESSENTIALLY CONNECTED WITH THE
OFFICE OF THE PETITIONER AND WAS NOT PERPETRATED WHILE IN PERFORMANCE OF HIS
OFFICIAL FUNCTION.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CAN HOLD LIABLE THE PETITIONER
FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT DESPITE HIS ACQUITTAL IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FILED AGAINST
HIM.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IS UNJUST AND EXCESSIVE.12
On February 15, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision affirming the ruling of the CSC, 13 thus:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the present petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
judgments AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
On August 3, 2006, the CA denied Ganzon’s motion for reconsideration.14
Issues
Hence, Ganzon has appealed to the Court upon the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT ATTENDING A CHRISTMAS PARTY AS REQUIRED BY THE OFFICE IS AN
OFFICIAL FUNCTION AND THAT ANY UNTOWARD INCIDENT COMMITTED DURING SUCH
CHRISTMAS PARTY IS AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED SERVICE RELATED AND THAT THE
OFFENDER COULD BE LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT?
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER WAS INTIMATELY
RELATED TO HIS OFFICE IN ORDER TO CONSIDER IT AS GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IS UNJUST AND EXCESSIVE.15
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To
constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of
the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must be manifest.16
In accordance with Section 46 of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), misconduct is among the grounds for disciplinary action, but no officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.
It is cogent to mention that the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service ,
which governs the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases,
classifies grave misconduct as a grave administrative offense.17
Did Ganzon’s act of aiming his loaded firearm at Arlos and menacing him with it constitute grave
misconduct in the context of the foregoing provisions?
Undoubtedly it did. Drawing and pointing the loaded firearm at Arlos evinced the intent on the part of
Ganzon to cause some harm upon Arlos on whom he vented his resentment of the poor performance
rating he received. Considering that Ganzon pointed his loaded firearm at Arlos not only once, but four
times, Ganzon’s menacing acts engendered in the mind of Arlos the well-founded belief that Arlos’ life
could be in imminent danger. That the firearm exploded when Arlos parried Ganzon’s firearm-wielding
hand did not help dissipate the belief.
Nonetheless, Ganzon projects that his acts did not constitute grave misconduct in the contemplation of
the law because they were not committed in relation to his performance of duty; and that the Christmas
party was not an official function as to render any untoward incident committed on the occasion thereof a
misconduct. He posits that his offense could exist without the office; and that the holding of the office was
not a constituent element of his offense.
We disagree.
The Court stressed in Largo v. Court of Appeals18 the criteria that an act, to constitute a misconduct,
must not be committed in his private capacity and should bear a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of his official duties.
Ganzon’s acts met the criteria in Largo v. Court of Appeals . To begin with, he was not acting in a private
capacity when he acted menacingly towards Arlos, it being clear that his resentment of his poor
performance rating, surely a matter that concerned his performance of duty, motivated his confronting
the latter. Moreover, it did not matter that his acts were committed outside of office hours, because they
were intimately connected to the office of the offender. An act is intimately connected to the office of the
offender if it is committed as the consequence of the performance of the office by him, or if it cannot exist
without the office even if public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract. This was the thrust
in Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 with the Court citing ample jurisprudence.20
In Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan , one of the two main issues was whether the crime of grave threats charged
against the accused had been committed in relation to his office. The resolution of the issue would
determine whether or not it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction to try him. The accused
contended that it was not established that the crime charged had been committed by him while in the
discharge of or as the consequence of his official functions as municipal mayor. He pointed out that
public office was not an essential ingredient of grave threats, the crime charged, which could be
committed with the same facility by a public officer and a private individual alike. The Court resolved that
the crime charged was properly within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the amended
information contained allegations showing that Alarilla had taken advantage of his official functions as
municipal mayor when he committed the crime of grave threats against the complainant, a municipal
councilor, by aiming a gun at and threatening to kill the latter on the occasion of a public hearing during
which the latter delivered a privilege speech critical of Alarilla’s administration. The Court explained that
the crime charged was "intimately connected with the discharge of Alarilla’s official functions" because the
crime charged was Alarilla’s response to the complainant’s attack against his performance as a mayor;
and that if Alarilla was not the mayor, "he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private
complainant might have said during said privilege speech."21
Considering that Ganzon resented the poor performance rating he had received, and his resentment
caused his aggressive confrontation of Arlos, it definitely appears that Ganzon’s offense could not be
separated from his performance of duty. Indeed, under Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan and its progenitor
rulings, an act that is the consequence of the discharge of the employee’s official functions or the
performance of his duties, or that is relevant to his office or to the discharge of his official functions is
justly considered as service-related.
The fact that the acts of Ganzon were committed within the premises of the DILG Regional Office No. 6
strengthens our view that such acts could not but be connected to Ganzon’s public employment. Verily,
the Court has regarded the commission of offensive overt acts by public officials and employees within the
premises of their public offices to be deserving of administrative reprobation.
For instance, in Quiroz v. Orfila,22 the court employees’ conduct of shouting at each other and quarreling
within the court premises and during working hours were considered as exhibiting discourtesy and
disrespect to their co-workers and to the court itself. Their behavior was held to be contrary to the ethical
standard demanded by Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees).
Another illustrative instance is Baloloy v. Flores,23 where the respondent Sherwin M. Baloloy was charged
with misconduct because:
x x x complainant alleged that as he was going back to his office after delivering court documents, he
noticed respondent sitting on a bench, staring menacingly at him. Without any warning, respondent stood
up and boxed him several times in the face. To avoid further harm, complainant ran towards room 315
and once he was inside, the secretary therein locked the door. Respondent pursued him and started
kicking and banging at the door, all the while shouting invectives at him. Respondent left after apparently
sensing the alarm he was causing.
A few minutes after respondents left, complainant left room 315 accompanied by a friend named Demet.
They went to respondent’s office to report the incident to respondent’s superior. When they got there,
however, they saw respondent holding a screwdriver, provoking them to fight. The branch clerk of court
intervened and requested Demet to take complainant to the hospital. x x x.
Finding both the complainant as legal researcher and the respondent as process server guilty of
misconduct, the Court ruled that:
We have time and again emphasized that the conduct and behavior or everyone connected with an office
charged with the administration of justice must at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum.
This Court will not tolerate misconduct committed by court personnel, particularly during office hours
and within court premises. Such misconduct shows a total lack of respect for the court, and erodes the
good image of the judiciary in the eyes of the public.
Both complainant and respondent have fallen short of the standard of conduct required of court
employees. Fighting with each other during working hours shows disrespect not only of coworkers but
also of the court.24 (Emphasis supplied)
Although court employees were involved in the foregoing situations, while the conduct of an employee of
the DILG is the focus herein, the same considerations taken into account in the former are applicable
herein.
Even if the affair occurred outside of the regular work hours, Ganzon’s menacing attitude towards Arlos
still had no excuse, particularly as Arlos was his superior in the office hierarchy. Section 4(c) of RA 6713
(Code of Conduct Standards for Public Officials and Employees) fittingly provides:
(c) Justness and sincerity. – Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times.
They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor
and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. (Emphasis supplied)
It is almost superfluous to remind all public employees like Ganzon that the law of good manners and
proper decorum was law during as well as outside office hours.
Another ground for Ganzon’s appeal was that the administrative case should not have been resolved
independently of the criminal case; and that his eventual acquittal in the criminal case precluded his
administrative liability.
Again, the Court disagrees.
We uphold the CA’s following rumination on the matter, viz:
x x x. The mere fact that he was acquitted in the criminal case (said criminal case was based on the same
facts or incidents which gave rise to the instant administrative case) does not
ipso facto absolve him from administrative liability. Time and again, the Supreme Court has laid down the
doctrine that an administrative case is not dependent on the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case
because the evidence required in the proceedings therein is only substantial and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt.25
An administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings.1âwphi1 The dismissal of a
criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the acquittal of an accused who is also a
respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily preclude the administrative proceeding nor
carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is because the quantum of proof required in
administrative proceedings is substantial evidence, unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence, according to Section 5 of Rule 133, Rules of Court, is "that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
In contrast, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.26
Finally, Ganzon’s insistence that the penalty of dismissal from the service imposed on him was unjustified
and excessive is unwarranted.
After being duly found guilty of grave misconduct, Ganzon was rightly meted the penalty of dismissal from
the service for his first offense conformably with the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service,27 to wit:
RULE IV
Penalties
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. – Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are
classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the
government service.
A The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
1. Dishonesty;
xxxx
3. Grave Misconduct;
1st offense – Dismissal (Emphasis supplied)
In this regard, Section 56 and Section 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service respectively state that the penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation of
the respondent from the service, with or without prejudice to criminal or civil liability, and shall carry
with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and the perpetual disqualification from
re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.
The Court deems it worthwhile to emphasize as a final word that the imposition of the correct disciplinary
measures upon erring public officials and employees has the primary objective of the improvement of the
public service and the preservation of the public s faith and confidence in the Government. The
punishment of the erring public officials and employees is secondary, but is nonetheless in accord with
the Constitution, which stresses in Section 1 of its Article XI that a public office is a public trust, and
commands that public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, whom they must serve with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. WHEREFORE the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals and ORDERS petitioner Rolando Ganzon to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194368 April 2, 2013

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs.
ARLIC ALMOJUELA, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Civil Service Commission's (CSC) appeal by certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals' (CA) amended decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 106258. The assailed decision partly granted the
respondent SJO2 Arlic Almojuela's (SJO2 Almojuela) Motion for Reconsideration from the CA’s original
decision,2 affirming its finding that SJO2 Almojuela is guilty of gross misconduct.
Factual Antecedents
The present administrative case, filed against Desk Officer/ Supervisor SJO2 Almojuela, sprang from the
escape of a detention prisoner in the Makati City Jail.
Tony Lao’s escape
At six’o clock in the morning of December 13, 2003, Ding Cang Hui a.k.a. Tony Lao / Tony Ling (Lao), a
Chinese inmate charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act) was
discovered to have escaped from his cell at the Makati City Jail. The following officers of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) – National Capital Region Office (NCRO) were on third shift
custodial duty when Lao escaped: J/C INSP Pepe Quinones (J/C INSP Quinones); SJO2 Arvie Aquino JMP
(SJO2 Aquino), officer of the day; SJO2 Arlic Almojuela JMP (SJO2 Almojuela), desk officer / supervisor;
SJO1 Jose Rodney Lagahit JMP (SJO1 Lagahit), desk reliever; JO1 Eric Manuel Palileo (JO1 Palileo), duty
nurse; JO1 Rommel Robles JMP (JO1 Robles), gater; JO1 Manuel Loyola, Jr. (JO1 Loyola), gater; JO1
Reynaldo Pascual JMP (JO1 Pascual), cell guard and JO1 Jaime Ibarra (JO1 Ibarra), roving guard.3
Based on testimonies cited in Civil Service Resolution No. 080701 4 and the Court of Appeals’ decision, the
facts outlined below led to Lao’s escape.
At about 11:00 p.m., SJO2 Aquino made a headcount of the inmates in the Makati City Jail, ensured
every cell was padlocked, and instructed SJO2 Almojuela (the desk officer on duty) to dispatch the
personnel to their respective areas of responsibilities.5
Thirty minutes later, inmate Florencio Jacinto (Jacinto) saw Cabidoy, an inmate charged with opening
and closing the cell gates, open Cell Number 8. Lao came out and Jacinto never saw him return to his
cell.6
Soon after Jacinto saw Lao walk out of Cell Number 8, JO1 Loyola (the gater at the Main Gate) saw Lao at
the front desk talking to SJO2 Almojuela and JO1 Pascual. According to JO1 Loyola, SJO2 Almojuela
ordered him and JO1 Pascual to buy food outside the jail premises.7 SJO1 Robles, another gater at the
main gate, saw the two leave the compound at around 11:45PM. SJO1 Robles then saw Lao, Cabidoy and
another inmate conversing at the Desk Area. SJO1 Robles were about to approach the three inmates to
caution them, but upon seeing SJO1 Lagahit at the desk area, he went back to his post. JO1 Pascual and
JO1 Loyola returned to the compound at around 12:30 a.m.; upon arrival, JO1 Loyola asked JO1 Robles
"nandyan na si Warden (Chief Inspector Quinones)?", to which the latter replied "tulog na si sir." JO1
Robles observed that JO1 Pascual was hiding something bulky in his uniform.8
In his defense, SJO2 Almojuela asserted that JO1 Loyola and JO1 Pascual went out of the jail compound
without his permission. He also testified seeing JO1 Pascual and Lao together at around 12 midnight,
while Lao was using JO1 Pascual’s celfone.9 Lao’s use of JO1 Pascual’s celfone was corroborated by SJO1
Robles’s testimony, who also said that JO1 Loyola’s phone kept on ringing or alerting for text messages. It
was not clear from SJO1 Robles’s testimony if JO1 Loyola was with JO1 Pascual and Lao at that time.
Roughly twenty minutes after Lao was seen using JO1 Pascual’s celfone, JO1 Loyola ordered inmate
Cabidoy to go to sleep, while JO1 Pascual took the keys to the jail cells from Cabidoy.10
At around 1:15 a.m., inmate Juan Mogado, Lao’s former cellmate, saw Lao for the last time, when the
latter bought ₱20.00 worth of Marlborro cigarettes from the store he was tending.11
Fifteen minutes later, at about 1:30 a.m., SJO1 Robles testified that JO1 Loyola took the gate keys for the
vehicular and visitor entrance and told him "Sige pahinga ka muna, mamaya ko na ibigay sa iyo mga
3:00."12
Between 1 to 1:30 a.m., Joan Panayaman, Almojuela’s househelp, saw JO1 Loyola and JO1 Pascual
together while she was heading for the comfort room. As she approached them, Panayaman overheard
JO1 Pascual talking over the cellphone saying "Bago namin ilabas ito, magdagdag muna kayo ng isang
milyon." JO1 Pascual then toned down his voice and entered his room, while JO1 Loyola walked towards
the jail area. She went up to SJO2 Almojuela’s room, but found it locked. While going downstairs, she
saw JO1 Loyola walking towards the gate with a man; a few minutes later, JO1 Loyola returned without
the man.13
According to SJO2 Almojuela, he went to his barracks at around 1:20 a.m. and returned at around 1:30
a.m.14 This is contradicted by SJO1 Lagahit’s testimony, which asserts that SJO2 Almojuela left the front
desk at around 1 a.m. and returned only at 3 a.m.15 At around the same time, inmate Jerwin Mingoy
(Mingoy) testified that SJO2 Almojuela ordered him to get food at cell number 8 and set the table for the
3rd shift personnel.16 It must be noted, however, that SJO1 Loyola saw the members of the 3rd shift
personnel take their meal some time between 12 a.m. to 1 a.m.,17 while inmate Cabidoy cooked their meal
at around 11:45 a.m.18
Between 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., JO1 Loyola said he saw that the desk area was unmanned and the control
gate of the detention cells open; he then gave the keys in his possession to JO1 Robles and went to the
infirmary.19 JO1 Loyola did not explain his whereabouts between 1:00 to 2:00 a.m.
SJO1 Lagahit testified that he conducted a roving inspection at around 2:30 a.m., and saw JO1 Loyola
going to the infirmary where JO1 Palileo was assigned. He also saw SJO1 Pascual sitting in front of the
gate of Cell Number 8, where Lao was billeted.20 By 2:45 a.m., JO1 Robles said he woke up to find that
the keys earlier taken by JO1 Loyola were already on his belly.21
At around 3 a.m., inmate Mingoy saw Lao talking to JO1 Palileo at the Desk Area.22 By 3:30 a.m., SJO2
Aquino left the female brigade area; while on her way to the Desk Officer’s lounge, she saw the following:
(1) SJO2 Almojuela sleeping on a folding chair; (2) JO1 Palileo sleeping in the infirmary; (3) SJO1 Lagahit
watching TV; 4) both control gates 1 and 2 were open; and (5) JO1 Pascual was standing inside control
gate number 2.23
By 5:30 a.m., several BJMP officers saw Chief Inspector Quinones leave the jail compound aboard his car.
News broke out in the jail facility that Lao was missing at around the same time. 24 Lao surreptitiously left
the Makati City Jail and brought along with him his possessions, including a trophy he won at a
pingpong match inside the prison.25
Two days after Lao’s escape, Supt. Edgar C. Bolcio, who replaced Chief Inspector Quinones, conducted a
search and inspection of the barracks of the jail personnel suspected to be involved in Lao’s escape. This
resulted in the recovery of 10 keys from SJO2 Almojuela’s barracks, one of which matched the padlock of
the main gate.26
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) subsequently conducted polygraph tests on JO1 Pascual and
SJO2 Almojuela. According to the NBI, JO1 Pascual and SJO2 Almojuela’s responses were "indicative of
deceptions occurred at relevant questions". When confronted and interrogated by the NBI, the two could
not satisfactorily explain the polygraph tests’ results.27
The BJMP’s Investigation Report
A BJMP Investigation Report conducted on the incident concluded that SJO2 Almojuela and the rest of
the jail officers on third shift custodial duty all colluded to facilitate Lao’s getaway. 28 Based on the report’s
recommendation, the Intelligence and Investigation Division of the BJMP filed an administrative
complaint against the abovementioned BJMP/NCRO members.29 In Administrative Case No. 04-11, CESO
IV Director Arturo Walit, the BJMP hearing officer, rendered his decision dated December 13,
2005,30 finding the following liable:
First, SJO2 Almojuela and JO1 Loyola were found guilty of Grave Misconduct and were meted the penalty
of dismissal from the service.
Second, SJO2 Aquino, SJO1 Lagahit and JO1 Robles were found guilty of Less Serious Neglect of Duty
and were meted the penalty of Suspension with forfeiture of salaries and allowances for six months.
Third, CINSP Quinones was found guilty of Neglect of Duty and was meted the penalty of Fine equivalent
to four months salary; he had since retired from the service.
Fourth, JO1 Pascual, while not absolved of administrative liability, could no longer be penalized as the
administrative proceedings began long after his separation from the service.
Fifth, JO1 Palileo and JO1 Ibarra were exonerated.
SJO2 Almojuela and JO1 Loyola moved for the reconsideration of Director Walit’s decision, which the
latter denied for lack of merit in a Joint Resolution dated June 21, 2006. SJO2 Almojuela then appealed
his conviction before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which affirmed Director Walit’s decision in its
Resolution No. 080701. The CSC subsequently denied SJO2 Almojuela’s motion for reconsideration. 31
The Appellate Court’s ruling
SJO2 Almojuela’s next recourse was a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. He assailed the
CSC’s decision for the following reasons: First, SJO2 Almojuela claimed to have been denied due process
because he was not accorded the benefit of a full-blown trial. Second, SJO2 Almojuela asserted that he
was denied equal protection of the laws because lesser penalties were imposed on his co-workers. Third,
SJO2 Almojuela argued that the evidence on record was insufficient to support his dismissal from the
service.32
The CA denied SJO2 Almojuela’s petition.33 According to the CA, SJO2 Almojuela was provided the due
process required in administrative proceedings when he was given the opportunity to answer the
accusations against him. He was fully informed of the charges against him, and did file a counter-
affidavit, motions for reconsideration, a notice of appeal, and a memorandum of appeal, where he
narrated his side of the story.
Further, SJO2 Almojuela’s claim that he was denied equal protection of the laws because his co-workers
were sentenced to lesser penalties has no legal basis. Citing Abakada Guro Partylist v. Purisima, 34 the CA
pointed out that the equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated; when persons are under different factual circumstance,
they may be treated differently.
In this case, the CA held that SJO2 Almojuela was handed the proper penalty, because next only to the
warden, he was the highest-ranking officer in the Makati City Jail at the time Lao escaped. It was
incumbent upon him to oversee the whole jail compound’s security, and ensure that all jail personnel
performed their respective tasks. His failure to do so deserved a greater penalty than those who were
under his command.
Lastly, the CA gave no credit to SJO2 Almojuela’s claim that the lack of a hearing and the BJMP’s bias
against him rendered his dismissal illegal. It held that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
Director Alit’s duty as disciplining authority should prevail over SJO2 Almojuela’s bare and unsupported
allegations. Further, Director Alit’s decision was based on substantial evidence – testimonies of SJO2
Almojuela’s colleagues on duty that night showed the following laxities in the implementation of jail rules:
(1) SJO2 Almojuela was seen sleeping in a folding chair;
(2) Control gates 1 and 2 were open;
(3) SJO2 Almojuela and JO1 Pascual were seen conversing with Lao at the desk area;
(4) SJO2 Almojuela ordered JO1 Loyola and JO1 Pascual to go out of the compound and to buy food;
(5) Lao and the other inmates were seen loitering around the jail premises when all of them should have
been inside their respective cells;
(6) The recovered keys from SJO2 Almojuela’s makeshift cubicle fit the padlock in the main gate for
vehicles;
(7) Persons other than gatekeepers JO1 Robles and JO1 Loyola had access to the keys of the respective
gates assigned to them.
The Appellate Court’s Amended Decision
The appellate court partially granted35 SJO2 Almojuela’s motion for reconsideration, and lowered his
liability from grave to simple misconduct. Applying Section 54(b), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service,36 SJO2 Almojuela was meted the penalty of three months
suspension as there was neither any attendant mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.
Citing Civil Service Commission v. Lucas,37 the CA held on reconsideration that misconduct, to be
considered grave, must involve the additional elements of corruption or willful intent to violate the law or
disregard of established rules; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.
The CA found no corrupt motive or willful intent on SJO2 Almojuela’s part to violate the BJMP Rules and
Regulations. No clear evidence was presented to show that SJO2 Almojuela was directly involved in the
prison break, nor was it proven that he benefited from it. SJO2 Almojuela likewise did not willfully trifle
with the BJMP Rules and Regulations. While Lao was allowed to leave his cell, he was accompanied by
the roving guard, JO1 Pascual, at all times. Considering the presumption that JO1 Pascual was regularly
performing his duty, SJO2 Almojuela had no reason to believe that Lao would escape because he was
under the jail guard’s watch. Further, SJO2 Almojuela was seen sleeping on duty only once; since SJO2
Aquino and SJO1 Lagahit (who were with him) were awake at that time, his lapse could not be considered
to be sufficiently grave or serious to warrant his dismissal from the service.
The Present Petition
The CSC asserts in its present petition that the CA should not have had disturbed the CSC’s findings, as
conclusions of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise are generally afforded
great weight by the courts.38 SJO2 Almojuela’s conviction is supported by evidence on record, and
sufficiently satisfied the substantial evidence standard. Taken together, the testimonies submitted during
the BJMP investigation establish that SJO2 Almojuela connived with JO1 Pascual, JO1 Loyola and Lao to
facilitate the latter’s escape. Even assuming that SJO2 Almojuela had no knowledge of the plan, he could
have easily discovered and prevented the escape had he been awake and alert.
According to the CSC, a jail guard’s act of sleeping while at his post on night-shift duty constitutes grave
misconduct because it is a flagrant disregard of BJMP’s policy that a jail officer should stay vigilant
during his shift. In SJO2 Almojuela’s case, this was aggravated by his rank – next only to the warden, he
was the highest-ranking jail officer on duty. As shift supervisor, it was incumbent upon him to be awake
at all times to fully oversee the jail compound’s security and to ensure that all the other jail officers were
performing their tasks.
Lastly, the CSC pointed out that Grave Misconduct could not be mitigated by the accused’s first time
offender status or by his length of service. Section 52, Rule IV the of Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 19-9939provides that the first offense constituting grave misconduct already
warrants the penalty of dismissal.
In his Comment,40 SJO2 Almojuela reiterated the line the Court of Appeals took in its amended decision,
and additionally raised the following arguments: first, the certificate of non-forum shopping, instead of
having been signed by the CSC, was signed by the assistant solicitor general, in violation of the rule on
certification against forum shopping; second, the CSC is not the proper party to appeal the CA’s decision;
and third, SJO2 Almojuela had been deprived of due process during the BJMP investigation, as he was
not given the opportunity to submit his evidence and to present his witnesses while the prosecution was
allowed to adduce its evidence under a trial-type arrangement.
Issues
The parties’ arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:
1) Whether the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed for failure to comply with
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
2) Whether the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed as the CSC is not the proper
party to appeal the CA’s amended decision;
3) Whether SJO2 Almojuela had been deprived of due process when he was not allowed to present his
evidence and witnesses during the BJMP investigation;
4) Whether SJO2 Almojuela connived with JO1 Loyola and JO1 Pascual to facilitate Lao’s escape from the
Makati City Jail; and
5) Whether SJO2 Almojuela’s actions constitute gross misconduct.
The Court’s Ruling
We first rule on the procedural issues SJO2 Almojuela posed.
The CSC’s petition failed to comply with
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
As SJO2 Almojuela correctly pointed out, the CSC’s petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court,41 when its certificate against forum shopping was signed by Associate Solicitor
General Sharon E. Millan-Decano; it was not signed by the CSC nor by the BJMP’s authorized
representatives.
The consequences of this mistep are prejudicial to the party filing the pleading. Section 5, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court provides that a petition for review that does not comply with the required certification
against forum shopping is a ground for its dismissal.42 This certification must be executed by the
petitioner, not by counsel. It is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services
have been retained only for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually
filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping by
counsel is a defective certification. It is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement under Section
4, Rule 45 and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.43
In Pascual v. Beltran,44 we affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari before the appellate
court because it was the Solicitor General, not the petitioner, who signed the certification against forum
shopping.
However, there have been instances when the demands of substantial justice convinced us to apply the
Rules liberally by way of compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement; 45 the rule
on certification against forum shopping, while obligatory, is not jurisdictional. Justifiable cirsumtances
may intervene and be recognized, leading the Court to relax the application of this rule.46
In People of the Philippines v. de Grano et. al.,47 for instance, we permitted the private prosecutor to sign
the certification in behalf of his client who went into hiding after being taken out of the witness protection
program. This is the case that the OSG invoked in the certification against forum shopping signed by
Associate Solicitor Millan-Decano who stated in her footnote that "Pursuant to People v. de Grano (G.R.
No. 167710, June 5, 2009), the handling lawyers of the OSG may sign verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping."48
A reading of People of the Philippines v. de Grano et. al., a decision from the Third Division of the
Supreme Court, shows that it cannot be used to support the OSG’s conclusion.
De Grano affirms a long line of Supreme Court decisions where the Court allowed the liberal application
of the rules on certification against forum shopping in the interest of substantial justice. But to merit the
Court’s consideration, the petitioner(s) must show reasonable basis for its/their failure to personally sign
the certification. They must convince the Court that the petition’s outright dismissal would defeat the
administration of justice. One of the cases cited in Grano was City Warden of the Manila City Jail v.
Estrella, a case decided by the Second Division of this Court, which allowed the Solicitor General to sign
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court. The
decision held that certification by the OSG constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules, considering
that the OSG is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its
agencies and instrumentalities.
In Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v. Pangandaman-Gania,49 an En Banc decision, we clarified the
application of City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella, 50 and held that this case does not give the
OSG the license to sign the certification against forum shopping in behalf of government agencies at all
times. We explained that the reason we authorized the Solicitor General to sign the certification against
forum shopping is because it was then acting as a ‘People’s Tribune,’ an instance when the Solicitor takes
a position adverse and contrary to the Government’s because it is incumbent upon him to present to the
Court what he considers would legally uphold government’s best interest, although the position may run
counter to a client's position; in this case, the Solicitor General appealed the trial court’s order despite the
City Warden’s apparent acquiesance to it and in the process took a position contrary to the City
Warden’s.
The rule is different when the OSG acts as a government agency’s counsel of record. It is necessary for the
petitioning government agency or its authorized representatives to certify against forum shopping,
because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know if another case is pending before another
court. The reason for this requirement was succinctly explained in Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v.
Pangandaman-Gania:
The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code is the only lawyer for a government agency
wanting to file a petition or complaint does not automatically vest the OSG with the authority to execute
in its name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office. In some instances, these government
agencies have legal departments which inadvertently take legal matters requiring court representation
into their own hands without the OSG’s intervention. Consequently, the OSG would have no personal
knowledge of the history of a particular case so as to adequately execute the certificate of non-forum
shopping; and even if the OSG does have the relevant information, the courts on the other hand would
have no way of ascertaining the accuracy of the OSG’s assertion without precise references in the record
of the case. Thus, unless equitable circumstances which are manifest from the record of a case prevail, it
becomes necessary for the concerned government agency or its authorized representatives to certify for
non-forum shopping if only to be sure that no other similar case or incident is pending before any other
court.51
To be sure, there may be situations when the OSG would have difficulty in securing the signatures of
government officials for the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. But these situations
cannot serve as excuse for the OSG to wantonly undertake by itself the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in behalf
of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its reasons for doing so,
beyond simply citing cases where the Court allowed the OSG to sign the certification. In Hon.
Constantino-David et. al. v. Pangandaman-Gania, the Court dealt with this situation and enumerated the
following requirements before the OSG can undertake a non-forum shopping certifications as counsel of
record for a client agency:
(a) allege under oath the circumstances that make signatures of the concerned officials impossible to
obtain within the period for filing the initiatory pleading; (b) append to the petition or complaint such
authentic document to prove that the party-petitioner or complainant authorized the filing of the petition
or complaint and understood and adopted the allegations set forth therein, and an affirmation that no
action or claim involving the same issues has been filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency; and, (c) undertake to inform the court promptly and reasonably of any change in the
stance of the client agency.52
Under these principles, the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari before this Court is defective for failure
to attach a proper certification against forum shopping. In the certificate, the associate solicitor merely
stated that she has prepared and filed the petition in her capacity as the petition’s handling lawyer, and
citing People v. Grano, claimed that the OSG’s handling lawyers are allowed to verify and sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping. No explanation was given why the signatures of the CSC’s authorized
representatives could not be secured.
Despite this conclusion, we cannot turn a blind eye to the meritorious grounds that the CSC raised in its
petition, and to the reality that the administration of justice could be derailed by an overly stringent
application of the rules. Under the present situation and in the exercise of our discretion, we resolve to
overlook the procedural defect in order to consider the case on the merits. We carefully note in doing this
that our action does not substantially affect the due process rights of the respondent, nor does it involve a
jurisdictional infirmity that leaves the Court with no discretion except to dismiss the case before us. 53 In
other words, no mandatory duty on the part of the Court is involved; we are faced with a situation that
calls for the exercise of our authority to act with discretion. In the exercise of this discretion, we have
deemed it more prudent, as a matter of judicial policy in the present situation, to encourage the hearing
of the appeal on the merits rather than to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid, technical sense that
impedes the cause of justice.54
Our approach is a reminder that the rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application tending to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided.55 The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford
every party litigant with a facially meritorious case the amplest opportunity for the proper determination
of his or her cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.56 It is a far better and more prudent course
of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties the review of a meritorious case
on appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicalities and cause a grave injustice; the latter course
of action may give the impression of speedy disposal of cases, but can only result in more delay and even
miscarriage of justice.57
Our liberal application of the Rules of Court in this case does not however mean that the OSG can cite
this Decision as authority to verify and sign the certification for non-forum shopping in behalf of its client
agencies. The OSG should take note of our decision in the cited Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v.
Pangandaman-Gania for the requisites to be satisfied before it can verify and sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping for its client agencies. Rather than an authority in its favor, this Decision should serve as
a case showing that the OSG had been warned about its observed laxity in following the rules on the
certification for non-forum shopping. Only the substantive merits of the CSC’s case saved the day in this
case for the OSG.
The CSC is the proper party to raise an
appeal against the CA’s amended petition
SJO2 Almojuela asserts that the CSC has no legal personality to challenge the CA’s amended decision
because it must maintain its impartiality as a judge and disciplining authority in controversies involving
public officers. He implores the Court to reconsider its ruling in Civil Service Commission v.
Dacoycoy,58 citing the arguments from Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion.
More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in Dacoycoy the CSC’s standing to
appeal the CA’s decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service
system. Since then, the ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications, 59 but
the doctrine has remained the same:60 the CSC has standing as a real party in interest and can appeal
the CA’s decisions modifying or reversing the CSC’s rulings, when the CA action would have an adverse
impact on the integrity of the civil service. As the government’s central personnel agency, the CSC is
tasked to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service;61 it has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary
action is imposed on an erring public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling
absolving or lightening the CSC-imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not
guilty of the charge against him would have no other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be
appealed by the public employee who has been absolved of the charge against him; neither would the
complainant appeal the decision, as he acted merely as a witness for the government. 62 We thus find no
reason to disurb the settled Dacoycoy doctrine.
In the present case, the CSC appeals the CA’s amended decision, which modified the liability the former
meted against SJO2 Almojuela from grave misconduct to simple misconduct, and lowered the
corresponding penalty from dismissal to three months suspension. Applying the Dacoycoy principles, the
CSC has legal personality to appeal the CA’s amended decision as the CA significantly lowered SJO2
Almojuela’s disciplinary sanction and thereby prevented the CSC from imposing the penalty it deemed
appropriate to impose on SJO2 Almojuela. The findings and conclusions below fully justify our liberal
stance.
SJO2 Almojuela was afforded due process
in the BJMP investigations
In his Comment, SJO2 Almojuela argued that he had been deprived of due process during the BJMP
investigation because he was not allowed to present his evidence and his witnesses, and was not accorded
the trial-type proceedings that the prosecution panel enjoyed. Since he elected a formal investigation,
SJO2 Almojuela asserts that he should have been permitted to require the attendance of witnesses
through compulsory processes.
We support the CA’s conclusion that SJO2 Almojuela was accorded the right to due process during the
BJMP investigation. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings (such as the BJMP
investigation) is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.63 Where a party has been given the opportunity to appeal or seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural due process may be cured.64
In SJO2 Almojuela’s case, he was informed of the charges against him, and was given the opportunity to
refute them in the counter-affidavit and motion for reconsideration he filed before the BJMP hearing
officer, in the appeal and motion for reconsideration he filed before the CSC, in his petition for review on
certiorari, in his memorandum on appeal, and, finally, in the motion for reconsideration he filed before
the CA.
In particular, SJO2 Almojuela admitted in his comment that he narrated in his counteraffidavit the
circumstances that, to his knowledge, transpired immediately before Lao’s breakout. 65 The Motion for
Reconsideration to the CA’s original decision contained the additional piece of evidence that SJO2
Almojuela claimed would have exculpated him from liability: Captain Fermin Enriquez’s testimony during
his cross-examination in Criminal Case No. 3320236, filed against SJO2 Almojuela for conniving with or
consenting to evasion under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code.66 This piece of evidence was reiterated
in the comment SJO2 Almojuela filed before this Court.67 Notably, SJO2 Almojuela repeteadly mentioned
‘other witnesses and other documentary exhibits’ that he would have presented to absolve him from
liability,68 but the only piece of evidence he submitted in his Motion for Reconsideration and Comment
was Captain Enriquez’s testimony.
These circumstances sufficiently convince us that SJO2 Almojuela had been given ample opportunity to
present his side, and whatever defects might have intervened during the BJMP investigation have been
cured by his subsequent filing of pleadings69 before the CSC, the CA, and before this Court.
SJO2 Almojuela’s consent to Lao’s
escape from the Makati City Jail has been
satisfactorily proven by substantial evidence
We now proceed to the substantive issues.
We differ from the CA’s conclusion in its amended decision finding no clear evidence that SJO2 Almojuela
had been directly involved in Lao’s escape. SJO2 Almojuela adopted this stance, and added that Criminal
Case No. 3320236, which was filed against him for facilitating Lao’s escape, has been dismissed. He also
pointed out Captain Enriquez’s (one of the investigating officers) testimony in Criminal Case No. 3320236,
where Captain Enriquez admitted that JO1 Pascual was the last person seen in possession of the
maingate’s keys, and that the gatekeepers JO1 Loyola and JO1 Robles should have been safekeeping the
keys. Lastly, SJO2 Almojuela sought to discredit the testimonies of SJO2 Aquino, JO1 Loyola, SJO1
Lagahit and JO1 Robles for being hearsay, and questioned the admissability of their affidavits as they
were never offered as part of the BJMP prosecutors’ documentary evidence.
According to the BJMP report, Lao most likely exited the jail compound through the main gate,
considering that he was discovered to have disappeared at about the same time the warden left the jail on
board his car (the BJMP report pegged the discovery of Lao’s escape 30 minutes after the warden left,
while the jail officers’ affidavits estimated it to have transpired 30 minutes before). A search and
inspection of the barracks of suspected jail personnel resulted in the recovery of ten keys from SJO2
Almojuela’s barracks, one of which matched the main gate’s padlock. This piece of evidence, when
considered along with other pieces of evidence presented before the BJMP investigation and the CSC, is
sufficient to conclude that SJO2 Almojuela knew and consented to Lao’s getaway.
True, the CSC failed to present direct evidence proving that SJO2 Almojuela had been involved in
facilitating Lao’s escape. But direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt since circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evideence. 70 Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While this provision appears to refer only to criminal cases, we have applied its principles to
administrative cases.71To fulfill the third requisite, this Court in RE: AC NO. 04-AM-2002 (JOSEJINA
FRIA V. GEMILIANA DE LOS ANGELES),72 an En Banc decision, required that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain that leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the person accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person. 73 The circumstantial
evidence the CSC presented leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that, at the very least, SJO2
Almojuela consented to Lao’s getaway. The keys found in SJO2 Almojuela’s room fit the padlock in the
maingate, Lao’s most possible point of egress. The fact that these keys should be in the safekeeping of
JO1 Pascual and JO1 Robles does not clear SJO2 Almojuela from liability; on the contrary, it should
convince us of his involvement in Lao’s escape. It leads us to ask why the keys were found in SJO2
Almojuela’s room, when the last person seen to possess the keys, and the personnel who were supposed
to safekeep them, was not SJO2 Almojuela. SJO2 Almojuela’s bare allegations that he was set up cannot
stand up against the presumption of regularity in the performance of the investigating officers’ duty. This
presumption, when considered with the following pieces of evidence, leads us to no other conclusion than
SJO2 Almojuela’s implied consent to Lao’s escape. First, SJO2 Almojuela’s lax attitude regarding Lao,
whom he admitted seeing loittering around the jail’s premises at night and even using JO1 Pascual’s
celfone, both in contravention of BJMP rules and regulations. Second, SJO2 Almojuela lied when he
stated in his affidavit that he only left the desk area at around 1:20 to 1:40 AM, when the testimonies of
two other jail officers, SJO1 Lagahit and JO1 Loyola, show otherwise. Third, when Panayaman overheard
the negotiations for Lao’s release between JO1 Pascual and the person he was talking to in his celfone,
Panayaman went to SJO2 Almojuela’s room but found that the door was locked.
Finally, we do not agree with SJO2 Almojuela’s assertion that the statements of SJO2 Aquino, JO1
Loyola, SJO1 Lagahit and JO1 Robles in their affidavits should be disregarded for being hearsay as he
failed to cross-examine them. It is well-settled that a formal or trial-type of hearing is not indespensible in
administrative proceedings, and a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet
the requirements of due process.74 Technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not always
apply.75 In Erece v. Macalingay et. al.,76 we affirmed the CA’s ruling finding the petitioner guilty of
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service despite his contention that he had
been denied his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. We held that the right to cross-examine
the other party’s witnesses is not an indispensable aspect of due process in administrative proceedings.
Due process in these proceedings is not identical with "judicial process;" a trial in court is not always
essential in administrative due process.77 Moreover, we have consistently held that in reviewing
administrative decisions, the findings of fact made must be respected as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.78 We find no reason in this case to depart from these principles.
In consenting to Lao’s escape, SJO2
Almojuela is guilty of gross misconduct in
the performance of his duties as Senior Jail
Officer II
We find SJO2 Almojuela guilty of gross misconduct in the performance of his duties as Senior Jail Officer
II. Misconduct has been defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."79 Misconduct becomes grave if it
"involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence."80 In SJO2 Almojuela’s case, we
hold it established by substantial evidence that he consented to Lao’s escape from the Makati City Jail.
Thus, there was willful violation of his duty as Senior Jail Officer II to oversee the jail compound’s
security, rendering him liable for gross misconduct.
SJO2 Almojuela is guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of his duties
as Senior Jail Officer II
Even assuming that SJO2 Almojuela had not consented to Lao’s getaway, adequate evidence shows that
SJO2 Almojuela had been grossly negligent in the performance of his duties. Gross neglect of duty or
gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In cases involving public
officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.81
First, SJO2 Almojuela left the desk area from 1:30 a.m. to 3:00 a.m., with no explanation as to where he
went or why he had to leave his post. His contention that he stepped out from the desk area at 1:20 a.m.
and returned at 1:30 a.m. to take a snack is belied by the testimony of SJO1 Lagahit (the desk reliever)
who testified that SJO2 Almojuela returned at 3 a.m.; and by the testimony of JO1 Loyola that the desk
area was unmanned between 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. At 3 a.m., when he was established to be at the desk area,
SJO2 Almojuela was even seen sleeping on a folding chair. The situation was thus one of compounded
neglect.
As shift supervisor and one of the highest ranking jail officers on duty at the time of the prison break,
SJO2 Almojuela had the responsibility to oversee the security of the jail compound and to ensure that all
members of the shift were performing their tasks. SJO2 Almojuela’s acts of leaving his post for two hours,
without any adequate reason, and sleeping afterwards show a wanton disregard for his responsibilities as
shift supervisor. SJO2 Almojuela’s neglect of his duties considerably contributed to the lax prison
environment that allowed Lao not only to escape, but to even bring his belongings with him. During SJO2
Almojuela’s absence, JO1 Loyola saw that the control gates for the detention cells were open, and the
desk area was unmanned.
Second, SJO2 Almojuela tolerated the blatant disregard of BJMP rules and regulations by the jail officers
under his supervision. He admitted that he saw Lao loittering in the jail compound in the wee hours of
the night, and did nothing about it. Worse, SJO2 Almojuela was even seen talking to Lao and JO1
Pascual at the desk area, and other inmates have been seen conversing at the desk area. The fact that
JO1 Pascual accompanied Lao could not absolve SJO2 Almojuela from liability. According to BJMP rules
and regulations, all inmates must be kept inside their cells after visiting hours. During night time,
compelling reasons and I or emergency situations must exist before the inmates can be allowed to leave
their cells. Thus, contrary to the conclusion in the CA's amended decision, it was highly irregular for Lao
to be outside his cell, regardless of whether he is accompanied by a jail officer.
These circumstances show that SJ02 Almojuela, as the desk officer and shift supervisor, was grossly
negligent in discharging his duties, which contributed in Lao's surreptitious escape from the Makati City
Jail.
Under Section 52 (A)(2) and (3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,82 both gross misconduct and gross neglect of duty are grave offenses punishable by dismissal
from the service for the first offense. Our conclusions fully justify the imposition of this penalty and the
reinstatement of the CA's original penalty of dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The amended decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arlie Almojuela is found guilty of gross
misconduct and gross neglect of duty, and is hereby D DISMISSED from the service.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A.
ROBLES, Petitioner,
vs.
AURORA A. SALVAÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's repeal or modification of
its original decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept of a "party adversely affected" by a
decision of the Civil Service Commission granted the statutory right to appeal:
We are asked in this petition for review1 filed by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government-
owned and -controlled corporation, to modify the Civil Service Commission’s finding that respondent was
guilty only of simple dishonesty.
This case developed as follows:
On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued Office
Order No. 119, series of 2006.2 The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña’s designation as Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It "direct[ed] her instead to handle special projects
and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned to her"3 by the Administrator.
Atty. Salvaña was directed to comply with this office order through a memorandum issued on May 22,
2006 by Atty. Elmo Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the administrative department. Instead
of complying, Salvaña questioned the order with the Office of the President.4
In the interim, Salvaña applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to May 31,
2006.5 In support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate6 issued by Dr. Grace Marie
Blanco of the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).
LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied having seen
or treated Salvaña on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate. 7 On June 23, 2006,
Administrator Robles issued a notice of preliminary investigation. The notice directed Salvaña to explain
in writing within 72 hours from her receipt of the notice "why no disciplinary action should be taken
against [her]"8 for not complying with Office Order No. 119 and for submitting a falsified medical
certificate.9
Salvaña filed her explanation on June 30, 2006.10 She alleged that as a member of the Bids and Awards
Committee, she "refused to sign a resolution"11 favoring a particular bidder. She alleged that Office Order
No. 119 was issued by Administrator Robles to express his "ire and vindictiveness"12 over her refusal to
sign.
The LRTA’s Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory. On July 26, 2006, it issued a
formal charge against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Insubordination, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.13
On August 5, 2006, "Salvaña tendered her irrevocable resignation."14 None of the pleadings alleged that
this irrevocable resignation was accepted, although the resolution of the Fact-finding Committee alluded
to Administrator Robles’ acceptance of the resignation letter.
In the meantime, the investigation against Salvaña continued, and the prosecution presented its
witnesses.15Salvaña "submitted a manifestation dated September 6, 2006, stating that the Committee was
biased and that [Administrator] Robles was both the accuser and the hearing officer."16
On October 31, 2006, the Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvaña guilty of all the
charges against her and imposed [on] her the penalty of dismissal from . . . service with all the accessory
penalties."17 The LRTA Board of Directors approved the findings of the Fact-finding Committee18
Salvaña appealed with the Civil Service Commission. "In her appeal, [she] claimed that she was denied
due process and that there [was] no substantial evidence to support the charges against her."19
On July 18, 2007, the Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution No.
071364.The Civil Service Commission found that Salvaña was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was
meted a penalty of suspension for three months.20
LRTA moved for reconsideration21 of the resolution. This was denied in a resolution dated May 26,
2008.22 LRTA then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.23
On November 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals24 dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil Service
Commission’s finding that Salvaña was only guilty of simple dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled
that Administrator Robles had no standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service
Commission because that right only belonged to respondent in an administrative case. 25 LRTA moved for
reconsideration26 of this decision but was denied.27
Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.
Petitioner argues that it has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission
before the Court of Appeals.28 It cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia29 as basis for its argument that it
can be considered a "person adversely affected" under the pertinent rules and regulations on the appeal of
administrative cases.30 It also argues that respondent’s falsification of the medical certificate
accompanying her application for sick leave was not merely simple but serious dishonesty.31
Respondent agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner had no legal personality to file
the appeal since it was not the "person adversely affected" by the decision. She counters that
Administrator Robles had no authority to file the appeal since he was unable to present a resolution from
the Board of Directors authorizing him to do so.32 She also agrees with the Civil Service Commission’s
finding that she was merely guilty of simple dishonesty.33
In its reply,34 petitioner points out that it presented a secretary’s certificate35 dated July 17, 2008 and
which it attached to the petitions before the Civil Service Commission, Court of Appeals, and this court. It
argues that the certificate authorizes the LRTA and its Administrator to file the necessary motion for
reconsideration or appeal regarding this case, and this authorization has yet to be revoked. 36
Both parties filed their respective memoranda before this court on May 23, 201237 and December 6,
2012.38
The legal issues that will determine the results of this case are:
1. Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the
modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision
2. Whether Salvaña was correctly found guilty of simple dishonesty only
We grant the petition.
The parties may appeal in administrative cases involving members of the civil service
It is settled that "[t]he right to appeal is not a natural right [or] a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law."39 If it is not granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides for
it.40 When made available by law or regulation, however, a person cannot be deprived of that right to
appeal. Otherwise, there will be a violation of the constitutional requirement of due process of law.
Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be "the
central personnel agency of the Government."41 In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that a
public office is a public trust, the Commission was tasked with the duty "to set standards and to enforce
the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants."42
Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and "[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process."43 Under Section 12,
Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code, it is the Civil Service Commission that has the power to
"[h]ear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal."
The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil
Service Law of 1959, appeals "by the respondent"44 were allowed on "[t]he decision of the Commissioner of
Civil Service rendered in an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate officers and
employees."45
Presidential Decree No. 807, while retaining the right to appeal in administrative cases, amended the
phrasing of the party allowed to appeal. Section 37, paragraph (a), and Section 39, paragraph (a),of
Presidential Decree No. 807 provide:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
Sec. 39. Appeals. - (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition shall be decided within fifteen
days. (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Section 47, paragraph (1), and Section 49, paragraph (1), of the Administrative Code provide:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in
an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office.
SECTION 49. Appeals.—(1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably
filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days….(Emphasis supplied)
The phrase, "person adversely affected," was not defined in either Presidential Decree No. 807 or the
Administrative Code. This prompted a series of cases46 providing the interpretation of this phrase.
The first of these cases, Paredes v. Civil Service Commission,47 declared:
Based on [Sections 37 (a) and 39 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807], appeal to the Civil Service
Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is,
the person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable
to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary.48(Emphasis supplied)
This ruling was repeated in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission49 where this court stated that:
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law
does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
....
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is
found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as
in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.50 (Emphasis supplied)
The same ratio would be reiterated and become the prevailing doctrine on the matter in Magpale, Jr. v.
Civil Service Commission,51 Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone,52 University
of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,53 and Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.54
In these cases, this court explained that the right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can only be
availed of by the party specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will only be made in
decisions prescribing a penalty, this court concluded that the only parties that will be adversely affected
are the respondents that are charged with administrative offenses. Since the right to appeal is a remedial
right that may only be granted by statute, a government party cannot by implication assert that right as
incidental to its power, since the right to appeal does not form part of due process.55
In effect, this court equated exonerations in administrative cases to acquittals in criminal cases wherein
the State or the complainant would have no right to appeal. 56 When the Civil Service Commission enacted
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, or the URACCS, on September 27, 1999,
it applied this court’s definition. Thus, Section 2, paragraph (l),Rule I, and Section 38,Rule III of the
URACCS defined "party adversely affected" as follows:
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.
....
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case
has been rendered.
For some time, government parties were, thus, barred from appealing exonerations of civil servants they
had previously sanctioned. It was not until the promulgation by this court of Civil Service Commission v.
Dacoycoy57 on April 29, 1999 that the issue would be revisited.
Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoyand Philippine National Bank v. Garcia
In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,58 an administrative complaint for habitual drunkenness,
misconduct, and nepotism was filed against the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of
Arts and Trade in Allen, Northern Samar. The Civil Service Commission found Dacoycoy guilty, but the
Court of Appeals overturned this finding and exonerated Dacoycoy of all charges. The Civil Service
Commission then appealed the ruling of the appellate court. This court, in addressing the issue of the
Commission’s standing, stated that:
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held
respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the
complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil
Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices
the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that
"the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where
the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal."
In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a
review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes
v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission;
Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo
v. Civil Service Commission.59 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In his concurring opinion, then Chief Justice Puno summed up the rationale for allowing government
parties to appeal, thus:
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the
law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty
(30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary.
But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor
offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and
employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of
our administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative
agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-
emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous
decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is thus
non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses cannot
be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism
cannot also be appealed.60 (Emphasis supplied)
The decision in Dacoycoy would be reiterated in 2002 when this court promulgated Philippine National
Bank v. Garcia.61 Philippine National Bank categorically allowed the disciplining authority to appeal the
decision exonerating the disciplined employee.
In that case, the bank charged Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr., one of its check processors and cash
representatives, with gross neglect of duty when he lost ₱7 million in connection with his duties. Both the
Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals reversed the bank and exonerated Garcia from all
liability.
This court, however, upheld Philippine National Bank’s right to appeal the case. Citing Dacoycoy, this
court ruled:
Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we
bar appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions,
in which acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double
jeopardy.
Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to
prevent appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and
pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.
Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its rights in appealing the CA’s
exoneration of the respondent public official therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to
preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB
has the standing to appeal to the CA the exoneration of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved
party which has complained of his acts of dishonesty. Besides, this Court has not lost sight of the fact
that PNB was already privatized on May 27, 1996. Should respondent be finally exonerated indeed, it
might then be incumbent upon petitioner to take him back into its fold. It should therefore be allowed to
appeal a decision that in its view hampers its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it
can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in our country. 62(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 021600 published on December 29, 2002,
which amended the URACCS, to allow the disciplining authority to appeal the decision exonerating the
employee:
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. –
....
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case
has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said
employee.
Subsequent decisions continued to reiterate the rulings in Dacoycoy and Philippine National Bank.
In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,63 this court explained the rationale of allowing the Civil
Service Commission to appeal decisions of exonerations as follows:
That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals reversing or modifying its
resolutions which may seriously prejudice the civil service system is beyond doubt. In Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy[,] this Court held that the CSC may become the party adversely affected by such
ruling and the aggrieved party who may appeal the decision to this Court.
The situation where the CSC’s participation is beneficial and indispensable often involves complaints for
administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, and the like, where the complainant is more often than
not acting merely as a witness for the government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In
cases of this nature, a ruling of the Court of Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is
understandably adverse to the government, and unavoidably the CSC as representative of the government
may appeal the decision to this Court to protect the integrity of the civil service system.
The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its
constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to establish a career
service, adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and
courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the adverse decision does not preclude
the private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly elevating the decision for review.64
Then in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan,65 this court declared:
At the outset, it should be noted that the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the central
personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of
merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. Thus, the CSC, as an institution whose primary
concern is the effectiveness of the civil service system, has the standing to appeal a decision which
adversely affects the civil service. We hold, at this juncture, that CSC has the standing to appeal and/or
to file its motion for reconsideration.66
The right to appeal by government parties was not limited to the Civil Service Commission.
In Pastor v. City of Pasig,67 this court ruled that the City of Pasig had standing to appeal the decision of
the Civil Service Commission reinstating a city employee to her former position, despite the city
government having reassigned her to another unit.
In Geronga v. Varela,68 this court ruled that the Mayor of Cadiz City had the right to file a motion for
reconsideration of a decision by the Civil Service Commission exonerating a city employee on the ground
that "as the appointing and disciplining authority, [he] is a real party in interest."69
In Department of Education v. Cuanan,70 this court ruled that the Department of Education "qualifie[d]
as a party adversely affected by the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an
administrative case."71
There are, however, cases, which sought to qualify this right to appeal.
In National Appellate Board v. Mamauag,72 an administrative complaint for grave misconduct was filed by
Quezon City Judge Adoracion G. Angeles against several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Central Police District Command (CPDC) of Quezon City, upon investigation, dismissed the
complaint. Dissatisfied, Judge Angeles moved for a reinvestigation by then PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento
II.
PNP Chief Sarmiento issued a decision finding the accused police officers guilty of the offenses charged.
Some were meted the penalty of suspension while others were dismissed from service. Upon motion for
reconsideration by Judge Angeles, Chief Sarmiento modified his ruling and ordered the dismissal of the
suspended police officers.
One of the officers, Police Inspector John Mamauag, appealed the decision with the National Appellate
Board of the National Police Commission. The National Appellate Board, however, denied the appeal.
Mamauag appealed the denial with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the National Appellate Board and ruled that it was the Philippine National Police, not Judge Angeles,
which had the right to appeal the decision of PNP Chief Sarmiento, as it was the party adversely affected.
The National Appellate Board then appealed this decision with this court.
This court, while citing Dacoycoy, declared that Judge Angeles, as complainant, had no right to appeal
the dismissal by CPDC of the complaint against Mamauag. It qualified the right of government agencies to
appeal by specifying the circumstances by which the right may be given, thus:
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which
previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The
government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the
respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal
hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting
the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of
Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the
Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his
decision is appealed to a higher court for review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as
adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review
decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.73 (Emphasis supplied)
The ruling in National Appellate Boardwas applied in Montoya v. Varilla, 74 Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG,75 and
Ombudsman v. Liggayu.76
The present rule is that a government party is a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal provided
that the government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case.
Despite the limitation on the government party’s right to appeal, this court has consistently upheld that
right in Dacoycoy. In Civil Service Commission v. Almojuela,77 we stated that:
More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in Dacoycoy the CSC’s standing to
appeal the CA’s decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service
system. Since then, the ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications but the
doctrine has remained the same: the CSC has standing as a real party in interest and can appeal the CA’s
decisions modifying or reversing the CSC’s rulings, when the CA action would have an adverse impact on
the integrity of the civil service. As the government’s central personnel agency, the CSC is tasked to
establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary action is imposed on
an erring public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling absolving or lightening
the CSC-imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of the charge
against him would have no other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be appealed by the
public employee who has been absolved of the charge against him; neither would the complainant appeal
the decision, as he acted merely as a witness for the government. We thus find no reason to disturb the
settled Dacoycoy doctrine.78 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, recent decisions showed that this court has allowed appeals by government parties. Notably, the
government parties’ right to appeal in these cases was not brought up as an issue by either of the parties.
In Civil Service Commission v. Yu,79 this court allowed the Civil Service Commission to appeal the Court
of Appeals’ decision granting the reinstatement of a government employee whose appointment had been
revoked by the Commission.
In National Power Corporation v. Civil Service Commission and Tanfelix, 80 the National Power Corporation
had previously filed an administrative complaint against one of its employees, Rodrigo Tanfelix, resulting
in his dismissal from service. When the Civil Service Commission exonerated Tanfelix and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the exoneration, the National Power Corporation was allowed to appeal.
These cases, however, allowed the disciplining authority to appeal only from a decision exonerating the
said employee. In this case, respondent was not exonerated; she was found guilty, but the finding was
modified. This court previously stated that:
If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense
charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the
lesser penalty remains the same.81
Dacoycoy, Philippine National Bank, and the URACCS failed to contemplate a situation where the Civil
Service Commission modified the penalty from dismissal to suspension. The erring civil servant was not
exonerated, and the finding of guilt still stood. In these situations, the disciplinary authority should be
allowed to appeal the modification of the decision.
The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision
The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees."82 When the government office
disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. This
discretion is inherent in the constitutional principle that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all
times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."83 This is a principle that can be invoked
by the public as well as the government office employing the public officer.
Here, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense that
challenges the integrity of the public servant charged. To bar a government office from appealing a
decision that lowers the penalty of the disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that
the civil service employs only those with the utmost sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency.
Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in public service. If all decisions by quasi-
judicial bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and unappealable, it
would, in effect, show tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public servant. The quality of civil service
would erode, and the citizens would end up suffering for it.
During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service Commission modified the
definition of a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. –
....
k. PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative
case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or
modifying the original decision. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural laws have retroactive application. In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery:84
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as
when they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following
language:
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
....
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective
law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express
provision to that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their
enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions
undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.85 (Emphasis supplied)
Remedial rights are those rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights that only
operate to further the rules of procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such, the retroactive application
of remedial rights will not adversely affect the vested rights of any person. Considering that the right to
appeal is a right remedial in nature, we find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS applies in
this case. Petitioner, therefore, had the right to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission that
modified its original decision of dismissal.
Recent decisions implied the retroactive application of this rule. While the right of government parties to
appeal was not an issue, this court gave due course to the appeals filed by government agencies before
the promulgation of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In Civil Service Commission v. Clave,86 the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) found one
of its employees, Aurora M. Clave, guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Civil Service Commission affirmed
the GSIS’s findings. The Court of Appeals, however, while affirming the Civil Service Commission, reduced
the penalty. Both the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission were given standing to appeal the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
In GSIS v. Chua,87 the GSIS dismissed Heidi R. Chua for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSIS, but the Court
of Appeals, while affirming the findings of the Commission, modified the penalty to simple misconduct.
The GSIS was then allowed to bring an appeal of the modification of the penalty with this court.
Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case who may
appeal shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either
overturned or modified by the Civil Service Commission.
The offense committed was less serious dishonesty, not simple dishonesty
Dishonesty has been defined "as the ‘disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack
of integrity’ . . . ."88 Since the utmost integrity is expected of public servants, its absence is not only
frowned upon but punished severely.
Section 52, Rule IV of the URACCS provides:
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. – Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are
classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the
government service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
1. Dishonesty - 1st Offense – Dismissal
....
In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,89 this court explained the rationale for the severity of the
penalty:
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first
offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And
the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the
performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are
not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in
its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his
government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his
fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed;
and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the
victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to
counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his
public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and
the discipline and morale of the service.90 (Emphasis supplied)
However, on April 4, 2006, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 06-0538 or the Rules on
the Administrative Offense of Dishonesty.
Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from
service.91 It, however, also recognizes that "some acts of Dishonesty are not constitutive of an offense so
grave as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service."92
Recognizing the attendant circumstances in the offense of dishonesty, the Civil Service Commission
issued parameters "in order to guide the disciplining authority in charging the proper offense" 93 and to
impose the proper penalty.
The resolution classifies dishonesty in three gradations: (1) serious; (2) less serious; and (3) simple.
Serious dishonesty is punishable by dismissal.94 Less serious dishonesty is punishable by suspension for
six months and one day to one year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. 95 Simple
dishonesty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense, six
months and one day to one year for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.96
The medical certificate respondent submitted to support her application for sick leave was falsified. The
question remains as to whether this act could be considered serious dishonesty, less serious dishonesty,
or simple dishonesty.
According to the Civil Service Commission’s finding in its resolution:
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the medical certificate submitted by
Salvaña was spurious or not genuine as the physician-signatory therein, Dr. Blanco[,] testified that she
did not examine/treat the appellant nor did she issue a medical certificate on May 15, 2006 since she was
on sick leave of absence on that particular day. Worthy [of] mention is that the appellant never bothered
to submit any evidence, documentary or otherwise, to rebut the testimony of Blanco.
Thus, the Commission rules and so holds that the appellant is liable for Dishonesty but applying the
aforementioned CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, her dishonest act would be classified only as Simple
Dishonesty as the same did not cause damage or prejudice to the government and had no direct relation
to or did not involve the duties and responsibilities of the appellant. The same is true with the falsification
she committed, where the information falsified was not related to her employment.97 (Emphasis supplied)
In Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit,98 this court previously ruled that "it is the general policy of this Court
to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities ‘not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce.’"99 The same case also stated that:
. . . . we reaffirmed the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded
not only respect but also finality when the decision and order . . . are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The findings off acts must
be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or
preponderant.100
Petitioner insists that respondent committed serious dishonesty when she submitted the falsified medical
certificate. Under Section 3 of Resolution No. 06-0538, serious dishonesty comprises the following acts:
Section 3. Serious Dishonesty. – The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the
commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act causes serious damage and grave prejudice to the government.
b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act.
c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property,
accountable forms or money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an
intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption.
d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent.
e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of
the dishonest act related to his/her employment.
f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions.
g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service
eligibility such as, but not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets.
h. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
Simple dishonesty, on the other hand, comprises the following offenses:
Section 5. The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the
dishonest act would constitute the offense of Simple Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.
b. The dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of
the respondent.
c. In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her
employment.
d. That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.
e. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
This court previously ruled that "[f]alsification of an official document, as an administrative offense, is
knowingly making false statements in official or public documents."101 Respondent, in her defense, states
that she merely relied on her Health Maintenance Organization’s (HMO) advice that it was going to issue
her a medical certificate after she had gone to the hospital complaining of hypertension. 102 She maintains
that she did not know that her medical certificate was falsified. We do not find this defense credible.
Respondent knew that she was not examined by Dr. Blanco, the medical certificate’s signatory. She knew
that she would not be able to fully attest to the truthfulness of the information in the certificate. Despite
this, she still submitted the certificate in support of her application for leave.
The Civil Service Commission, however, found that the medical certificate was falsified. Dr. Blanco
repudiated the certificate. Respondent did not present any evidence to defend its validity. Her application
for sick leave, therefore, should not have been granted since it was unaccompanied by the proper
documents. The Commission correctly found respondent guilty of dishonesty.
However, it would be wrong to classify this offense as simple dishonesty.
By law, all employees in the civil service are entitled to leave of absence for a certain number of days, with
or without pay.103 Under Section 1, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code, government employees are entitled to 15 days of sick leave annually with full pay.
The grant of sick leave with pay is an exception to the principle of "no work, no pay," i.e., entitlement to
compensation only upon actual service rendered. As such, applications for leave must be properly filled
out and filed accordingly. Section 16, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code provides the rules for an application for sick leave:
SECTION 16. All applications for sick leaves of absence for one full day or more shall be on the prescribed
form and shall be filed immediately upon the employee's return from such leave. Notice of absence,
however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor and/or to the office head. Application for sick leave
in excess of five days shall be accompanied by a proper medical certificate.
Respondent’s application for sick leave, if approved, would allow her to be absent from work without any
deductions from her salary. Being a government employee, respondent would have received her salaries
coming from government funds.
Since her application for sick leave was supported by a false medical certificate, it would have been
improperly filed, which made all of her absences during this period unauthorized. The receipt, therefore,
of her salaries during this period would be tantamount to causing damage or prejudice to the government
since she would have received compensation she was not entitled to receive.
This act of causing damage or prejudice, however, cannot be classified as serious since the information
falsified had no direct relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering from hypertension is
a matter that has no relation to the functions of her office.
Given these circumstances, the offense committed can be properly identified as less serious dishonesty.
Under Section 4 of Resolution No. 06-0538, less serious dishonesty is classified by the following acts:
Section 4. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the
dishonest act would constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as
to qualify under the immediately preceding classification.
b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.
c. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
We hold, therefore, that respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña is guilty of less serious dishonesty.
A final note
The records showed that respondent tendered her irrevocable resignation on August 5, 2006. Petitioner’s
acceptance of respondent’s resignation was not mentioned in any of the pleadings. However, the
resolution by the Fact-finding Committee stated that "[o]n 16 August 2006, the Office of the Administrator
received the resignation."104On the issue of whether respondent’s resignation mooted its proceedings, it
concluded that:
[I]n the response of the Administrator to the letter of resignation filed by Respondent there was no
unconditional acceptance of the same. In fact it was specified therein that her resignation is "without
prejudice to any appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her
tenure[."]There can [sic] be no other conclusion from the above that her resignation does not prevent the
administration from proceeding with any charge/s appropriate under the circumstances. 105 (Emphasis in
the original)
Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper government authority.
In Republic v. Singun,106 this court stated:
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to
surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To
constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to
relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
....
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective.
Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective
must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance,
such as the appointment of the successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his
resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the
Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance.
The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he
had been duly notified therefor.107 (Emphasis supplied)
If there was evidence to show that petitioner did not, in fact, accept respondent’s resignation, her
resignation would have been ineffective. Respondent’s continued absence from her post would have been
deemed abandonment from her office, of which she could be criminally charged.
Although the response of Administrator Robles was not attached to the record, it can be concluded from
the resolution of the Fact-finding Committee that he accepted the resignation, albeit with the qualification
that it be "without prejudice to any appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed
during her tenure."108
The qualified acceptance of Administrator Robles, however, did not affect the validity of respondent’s
resignation.1âwphi1Section 1, Rule XII of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40,
series of 1998, as amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999,
requires:
Sec. 1. Resignation. The following documents shall be submitted to the Commission for record purposes:
a. The voluntary written notice of the employee informing the appointing authority that he is
relinquishing his position and the efffectivity date of said resignation; and,
b. The acceptance of resignation in writing by the agency head or appointing authority which
shall indicate the date of effectivity of the resignation.
An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings until finally terminated.
The qualification placed by Administrator Robles on his acceptance does not make respondent’s
resignation any less valid. The rules and regulations allow the acceptance of resignations while the
administrative case is pending provided that the proceedings will still continue.
We also note that the unauthorized absences were incurred after the issuance of Office Order No. 119.
Atrespondent’s refusal to comply, she was administratively charged, which prompted her resignation from
office. If there were irregularities in the issuance of Office Order No. 119, what respondent should have
done would be to occupy the new position and then file the proper remedies. She should not have defied
the orders of her superiors.
Because of her resignation on August 5, 2006, any modification as to the service of her suspension
became moot. Her permanent employment record, however, must reflect the modified penalty.
Considering that she is also a member of the Bar, this court furnishes the Office of the Bar Confidant
with a copy of this decision to initiate the proper disciplinary action against respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated November 11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 104225 and Resolution No. 071364 dated July 18, 2007 of the Civil Service
Commission is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent, Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña, is found
guilty of Less Serious Dishonesty. The Civil Service Commission is DIRECTED to attach a copy of this
decision to respondent's permanent employment record.
Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate the proper disciplinary
action against respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178454 March 28, 2011

FILIPINA SAMSON, Petitioner,
vs.
JULIA A. RESTRIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision1 dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 83422 and its Resolution2 dated June 8, 2007, denying her motion for reconsideration.
The CA affirmed the Ombudsman in finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b)3 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population Commission with office
at the Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.
Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the
latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the
expenses would reach ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for
the titling of respondent’s land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found
out that the land is government property. When petitioner failed to return the ₱50,000, respondent sued
her for estafa. Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her
from office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to abide by the
standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of committed
service when she embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a certificate of title over the
latter’s land.4
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in an Order5 dated March 15, 2004, reduced the
penalty to three months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner’s acceptance
of respondent’s payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short of the standard of
personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public officials shall endeavor to
discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. The
Ombudsman held:
x x x [petitioner] admitted x x x that she indeed received the amount of ₱50,000.00 from the [respondent]
and even contracted Engr. Liberato Patromo, alleged Licensed Geodetic Engineer to do the surveys.
While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other government agencies for the
processing of the titles of the subject property, we believe, however, that her mere act in accepting the
money from the [respondent] with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of the title is
already enough to create a perception that she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of [R.A.] No. 6713 mandates that
public officials and employees shall endeavor to discourage wrong perception of their roles as
dispenser or peddler of undue patronage.
xxxx
x x x [petitioner’s] act to x x x restore the amount of [₱50,000] was to avoid possible sanctions.
x x x [d]uring the conciliation proceedings held on 19 October 2002 at the barangay level, it was agreed
upon by both parties that [petitioner] be given until 28 February 2003 within which to pay the amount of
₱50,000.00 including interest. If it was true that [petitioner] had available money to pay and had been
persistent in returning the amount of [₱50,000.00] to the [respondent], she would have easily given the
same right at that moment (on 19 October 2002) in the presence of the Barangay Officials. 6 x x x. (Stress
in the original.)
The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman’s Order dated March 19, 2004. The CA ruled that contrary to
petitioner’s contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act complained of is a private
matter. The CA also ruled that petitioner violated the norms of conduct required of her as a public officer
when she demanded and received the amount of ₱50,000 on the representation that she can secure a title
to respondent’s property and for failing to return the amount. The CA stressed that Section 4(b) of R.A.
No. 6713 requires petitioner to perform and discharge her duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of her role as a
dispenser and peddler of undue patronage.7
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private dealing by a government
employee or where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty?
2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable despite
the dismissal of the estafa case?
3. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower penalty in view of
mitigating circumstances?8
Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty, the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
for holding her administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case was dismissed upon a finding
that she was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence misconduct cannot be attributed to her. And even
assuming that she is guilty of misconduct, she is entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstances such
as the fact that this is the first charge against her in her long years of public service.9
Respondent counters that the issues raised in the instant petition are the same issues that the CA
correctly resolved.10 She also alleges that petitioner failed to observe the mandate that public office is a
public trust when she meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for
undelivered work.11
We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. We hasten to add, however,
that petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.
On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between
them.12 Section 13(1),13 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on
its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section 16 14 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her
tenure. Section 1915 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint
concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the
public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.16
On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed,
she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges. 17
For proper consideration instead is petitioner’s liability under Sec. 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713.
We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:
SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee shall
observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the
public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of
their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and
economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They
shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall
endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of
undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people
at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against
anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the
rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
 customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not
dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by
consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to
positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose
terms are coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone
without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend prompt,
courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when
required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide information
on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness
of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage
suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and
develop an understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in
the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to
the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-produced goods,
resources and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people.
They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign
intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to
the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and
manifest by deed the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all
times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or
party.
(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives
appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or
ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these
standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing merit
increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their
office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing
research and experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials
and employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.
Both the Ombudsman and CA found the petitioner administratively liable for violating Section 4(A)(b) on
professionalism. "Professionalism" is defined as the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark
a profession. A professional refers to a person who engages in an activity with great competence. Indeed,
to call a person a professional is to describe him as competent, efficient, experienced, proficient or
polished.18 In the context of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, the observance of professionalism also
means upholding the integrity of public office by endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their
roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage." Thus, a public official or employee should avoid any
appearance of impropriety affecting the integrity of government services. However, it should be noted that
Section 4(A) enumerates the standards of personal conduct for public officers with reference to "execution
of official duties."
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of
professionalism by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn public duty.
The Ombudsman said that petitioner’s act deprived the government of her committed service because the
generation of a certificate of title was not within her line of public service. In denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration, the Ombudsman said that it would have been sufficient if petitioner just referred the
respondent to the persons/officials incharge of the processing of the documents for the issuance of a
certificate of title. While it may be true that she did not actually deal with the other government agencies
for the processing of the titles of the subject property, petitioner’s act of accepting the money from
respondent with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to
create a perception that she is a fixer.
On its part, the CA rejected petitioner’s argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create those
"wrong perceptions" or the "impression of influence peddling." It held that the law enjoins public officers,
at all times to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good customs,
public order, public policy, public safety and public interest. Thus, it is not the plurality of the acts that is
being punished but the commission of the act itself.
Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad enough to
apply even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of one’s office. We hold, however,
that petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. The reason though
does not lie in the fact that the act complained of is not at all related to petitioner’s discharge of her
duties as department head of the Population Commission.
In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized 19 the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No. 6713. Accordingly, the CSC
issued the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (hereafter, Implementing Rules). Rule V of the Implementing Rules provides for an Incentive
and Rewards System for public officials and employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and
conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713,
to wit:
RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM
SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who have demonstrated
exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in
Section 4 of the Code, namely:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - x x x
(b) Professionalism. - x x x
(c) Justness and sincerity. - x x x
(d) Political neutrality. - x x x
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - x x x
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - x x x
(g) Commitment to democracy. - x x x
(h) Simple living. - x x x
On the other hand, Rule X of the Implementing Rules enumerates grounds for administrative disciplinary
action, as follows:
RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION
SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action prescribed under existing
laws, the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he holds office or employment in
a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared unlawful or prohibited by the
Code, shall constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary action, and without prejudice to criminal
and civil liabilities provided herein, such as:
(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office. x x x.
(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee, consultant,
counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or
licensed by his office, unless expressly allowed by law;
(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law or
regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions;
(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or referral is mandated
by (1) law, or (2) international agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of the functions
of his office;
xxxx
(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him by reason
of his office and not made available to the public, to further his private interests or give undue
advantage to anyone, or to prejudice the public interest;
(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or
anything of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection with any
operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of, his
office. x x x.
xxxx
(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary to morals or
public policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for
dissemination to the general public;
(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or preference;
(i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;
(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules;
(k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within a
reasonable time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these Rules;
 (l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or to act
promptly and expeditiously on public personal transactions;
(m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of business
interests and financial connections; and
(n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty (30) days
from assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to divest himself
of his shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within sixty (60) days from such
assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises: Provided, however, that for those who
are already in the service and a conflict of interest arises, the official or employee must either
resign or divest himself of said interests within the periods herein-above provided, reckoned from
the date when the conflict of interest had arisen.
In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,20 this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to abide by the
norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a
ground for disciplinary action, to wit:
The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The provision
commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest
degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said provision merely enunciates
"professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public servants, in addition to
commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the public,
nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule
V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the
grant of incentives and rewards to officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and
conduct based on their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under
the mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the high standard
set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same favorable
treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be sanctioned
for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as
grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts "declared unlawful or prohibited by the
Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for
administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of
R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 in that case.
We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we reverse the CA
and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In so
ruling, we do no less and no more than apply the law and its implementing rules issued by the CSC
under the authority given to it by Congress. Needless to stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute
and are binding as if written in the law itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case
by a competent court.21
But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for disciplinary action under
R.A. No. 6713?
We also rule in the negative.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.22 Conversely, one cannot be
found guilty of misconduct in the absence of substantial evidence. In one case, we affirmed a finding of
grave misconduct because there was substantial evidence of voluntary disregard of established rules in
the procurement of supplies as well as of manifest intent to disregard said rules. 23 We have also ruled
that complicity in the transgression of a regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes simple
misconduct only as there was failure to establish flagrancy in respondent’s act for her to be held liable of
gross misconduct.24 On the other hand, we have likewise dismissed a complaint for knowingly rendering
an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law, and grave misconduct, since the complainant did not even
indicate the particular acts of the judge which were allegedly violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct.25
In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner’s violation of an established and definite rule of
action or unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of petitioner. In fact, respondent
could merely point to petitioner’s alleged failure to observe the mandate that public office is a public trust
when petitioner allegedly meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for
undelivered work.
True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the Constitution that
public office is a public trust. However, respondent’s allegation that petitioner meddled in an affair that
belongs to another agency is a serious but unproven accusation. Respondent did not even say what acts
of interference were done by petitioner. Neither did respondent say in which government agency petitioner
committed interference. And causing the survey of respondent’s land can hardly be considered as
meddling in the affairs of another government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population
Commission. It does not show that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any government
agency. Even the Ombudsman has recognized this fact. The survey shows only that petitioner contracted
a surveyor.1ihpwa1 Respondent said nothing on the propriety or legality of what petitioner did. The
survey shows that petitioner also started to work on her task under their agreement. Thus, respondent’s
allegation that petitioner received an amount for undelivered work is not entirely correct. Rather,
petitioner failed to fully accomplish her task in view of the legal obstacle that the land is government
property.
However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any administrative liability.
But first, we need to modify the CA finding that petitioner demanded the amount of ₱50,000 from
respondent because respondent did not even say that petitioner demanded money from her. 26 We find in
the allegations and counter-allegations that respondent came to petitioner’s house in Biñan, Laguna, and
asked petitioner if she can help respondent secure a title to her land which she intends to sell. Petitioner
agreed to help. When respondent asked about the cost, petitioner said ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000
from respondent to cover the initial expenses.27
We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the aborted
transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by the Ombudsman,
if petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of ₱50,000 until the preliminary investigation of
the estafa case on September 18, 2003,28 there would have been no need for the parties’ agreement that
petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said amount including interest. Indeed, petitioner’s
belated attempt to return the amount was intended to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the
filing of the estafa case against her.
For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a
public officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents therein were guilty of
conduct unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on their promise to have pertinent
documents notarized and submitted to the Government Service Insurance System after the complainant’s
rights over the subject property were transferred to the sister of one of the respondents. 29 Recently,
in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said
that unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions
of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed
method.301avvphi1
This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for public office
shall not be countenanced.31 The Constitution categorically declares as follows:
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.32
Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after failing to
accomplish the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her for estafa,
thus reinforcing the latter’s suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money. Although the element of
deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed against the petitioner, it is clear that by her
actuations, petitioner violated basic social and ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if unrelated to
her duties as a public officer, petitioner’s transgression could erode the public’s trust in government
employees, moreso because she holds a high position in the service.
As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine in Jamsani-Rodriguez.
Under the circumstances of this case, a fine of ₱15,000 in lieu of the three months suspension is proper.
In imposing said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance petitioner’s 37 years of public
service and the fact that this is the first charge against her. 33 Section 5334 of the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that mitigating circumstances such as length of
service shall be considered. And since petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of ₱50,000
including interest, we find it proper to order her to comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties
may even find time to rekindle their friendship.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as well as the Decision dated January 6, 2004
and Order dated March 15, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F, and ENTER a new
judgment as follows:
We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose upon her a FINE of
₱15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within five (5) days from finality of this Decision.
We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of ₱50,000.00 with interest thereon at
12% per annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall have been fully paid.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED

LEGAL NOTE 0023: WHAT IS MISCONDUCT AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT? HOW DO YOU PROVE
MISCONDUCT AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT?

SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. CLAUDIO M. LOPEZ (A.M. NO. P-10-2788,
18 JANUARY 2011, CORONA, C.J.) SUBJECT: QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN ADMIN
CASES; DEFINITION OF MISCONDUCT AND WHEN IT IS GRAVE. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. LOPEZ).

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

LOPEZ, A COURT PROCESS SERVER WAS FOUND TO BE IN POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA. ADMIN

CHARGE WAS FILED AGAINST HIM. SC RULED HE COMMITTED GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

WHAT IS MISCONDUCT?

The Court defines misconduct as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.”8

WHAT IS GRAVE MISCONDUCT?

The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent
to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence.9

As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.

WHAT IS CORRUPTION?

Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary

person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.

MUST GRAVE MISCONDUCT BE A CRIME?

No.

An act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact,
crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the
Administrative Code.10

We agree with the findings and recommendation of both the Investigating Judge and the OCA that
respondent committed grave misconduct which, under Section 52 (A)(3), Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases, is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.

WHAT IS REQUIRED TO PROVE GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

Only substantial evidence is required.

As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Judge, to sustain a finding of administrative

culpability, only substantial evidence is required. The present case is an administrative case, not a
criminal case, against respondent. Therefore, the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.

WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case
is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. We emphasize the well-settled rule
that a criminal case is different from an administrative case and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.7
=============================================
=============================================
=============================================
ADDITIONAL NOTES (OCTOBER 2011 CASE):

SOURCE: MONICO K. IMPERIAL, JR. VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (G.R. NO.
191224, 04 OCTOBER 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECTS: GRAVE MISCONDUCT; SIMPLE MISCONDUCT,
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; PENALTIES FOR MISCONDUCT; EXAMPLES OF CLEAR DEFIANCE
OF THE LAW AND PROCEDURES (BRIEF TITLE: IMPERIAL VS. GSIS)

PETITIONER WAS ADJUDGED BY GSIS, SSC AND CA AS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT? WAS
THIS RULING CORRECT?

NO. NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENTS OF

“CORRUPTION,” “CLEAR INTENT TO VIOLATE THE LAW” OR “FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF
ESTABLISHED RULE” THAT MUST BE PRESENT TO CHARACTERIZE THE MISCONDUCT AS GRAVE.

PETITIONER ONLY COMMITTED SERIOUS LAPSE OF JUDGMENT SUFFICIENT TO HOLD HIM

LIABLE FOR SIMPLE MISCONDUCT.

Thus, the petitioner’s liability under the given facts only involves simple misconduct. As Branch
Manager of the GSIS Naga Field Office, he is presumed to know all existing policies, guidelines and
procedures in carrying out the agency’s mandate in the area. By approving the loan applications
of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who did not fully meet the required qualifications, he
committed a serious lapse of judgment sufficient to hold him liable for simple misconduct.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

BUT PETITIONER COMMITTED SUCH OFFENSE TWICE ALREADY. CAN HE BE NOT CONSIDERED
TO HAVE COMMITTED “FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF ESTABLISHED RULE”?

NO. THERE MUST BE DELIBERATE DEFIANCE OF THE RULES. THE CSC’S FINDINGS ON THE
PETITIONER’S ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE APPROVAL OF THE LOANS NEGATE THE PRESENCE OF
ANY INTENT ON THE PETITIONER’S PART TO DELIBERATELY DEFY THE POLICY OF THE GSIS.
FIRST, GSIS BRANCH MANAGERS HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE PAST THE AUTHORITY TO
APPROVE LOAN APPLICATIONS BEYOND THE PRESCRIBED REQUIREMENTS OF GSIS; SECOND,
THERE WAS A CUSTOMARY LENIENT PRACTICE IN THE APPROVAL OF LOANS EXERCISED BY
SOME BRANCH MANAGERS NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTING GSIS POLICY; AND THIRD, THE
PETITIONER FIRST SOUGHT THE APPROVAL OF HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR BEFORE ACTING
ON THE LOAN APPLICATIONS. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES RUN COUNTER TO THE CHARACTERISTIC
FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF THE RULES THAT GRAVE MISCONDUCT REQUIRES.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS MISCONDUCT?

AN INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING OR A DELIBERATE VIOLATION OF A RULE OF LAW OR

STANDARD OF BEHAVIOR.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHEN IS MISCONDUCT GRAVE?

A MISCONDUCT IS GRAVE WHERE THE ELEMENTS OF CORRUPTION, CLEAR INTENT TO VIOLATE
THE LAW OR FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF ESTABLISHED RULE ARE PRESENT.[1][21] OTHERWISE, A
MISCONDUCT IS ONLY SIMPLE.

Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. Misconduct has been defined as an intentional
wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a
government official.[2][20] A misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. [3][21] Otherwise, a misconduct is
only simple.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

GIVE EXAMPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE WHEN THERE HAS BEEN OPEN DEFIANCE OF A

CUSTOMARY RULE.

AS FOLLOWS:

Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon. It has been
demonstrated, among others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of a customary
rule;[4][23] in the repeated voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of
supplies;[5][24] in the practice of illegally collecting fees more than what is prescribed for delayed
registration of marriages;[6][25] when several violations or disregard of regulations governing the
collection of government funds were committed;[7][26] and when the employee arrogated unto
herself responsibilities that were clearly beyond her given duties.[8][27] The common denominator in
these cases was the employee’s propensity to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her
actions.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE PENALTY FOR SIMPLE MISCONDUCT?

SUSPENSION FOR ONE MONTH AND ONE DAY TO SIX MONTHS FOR THE FIRST OFFENSE AND
DISMISSAL FOR THE SECOND OFFENSE.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

BUT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENSE TWICE. WHY SHOULD HIS PENALTY BE NOT
DISMISSAL?

BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROPORTIONATE TO THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF HIS TRANSGRESSION.

The Revised Uniform Rules of the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) classifies simple misconduct as
a less grave offense. Under Section 52(B) (2), Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, the commission of
simple misconduct is penalized by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. While records show that
this is not the petitioner’s first offense as he was previously suspended for one (1) year for neglect
of duty, we believe that his dismissal would be disproportionate to the nature and effect of the
transgression he committed as the GSIS did not suffer any prejudice through the loans he
extended; these loans were for GSIS employees and were duly paid for. Thus, for his second simple
misconduct, we impose on the petitioner the penalty of suspension from the lapse of his
preventive suspension by GSIS up to the finality of this Decision.[9][2