Case 5:16-cv-01518-JGB-DTB Document 56 Filed 01/18/17 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:685

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. EDCV 16-01518-JGB (DTBx) Date January 18, 2017

Title Socorro Diaz & Francisco Diaz v. GB Inland Property, LLC, et al.

Present: The Honorable JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MAYNOR GALVEZ Not Reported

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):

None Present None Present

Proceedings: Order (1) GRANTING the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint by Bank of New York Mellon (Dkt. No. 50); (2) GRANTING
the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint by Quality
Loan Service Corp (Dkt. No. 52); and (3) VACATING the hearing on
January 23, 2017 (IN CHAMBERS)

Before the Court are two motions: (1) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint by Bank of New York Mellon as Trustee for Structured Asset Mortgage Investments
II Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2005-AR8 and Nationstar Mortgage LLC,
(Dkt. No. 50); and (2) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint by Quality Loan
Service Corp. (Dkt. No. 52.) The Court finds these matters suitable for resolution without a
hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After consideration of the papers filed in support of
and in opposition to the motions, the Court GRANTS both Motions to Dismiss and DISMISSES
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The January 23, 2017
hearing is VACATED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2016, Plaintiffs Socorro Diaz and Francisco Diaz (“Plaintiffs”), proceeding
pro se, filed a complaint against GB Inland Properties, LLC (“Inland”) and the Bank of New
York Mellon as Trustee for Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Inc. Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificate Series 2005-AR8 and Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“BNYM”). (Dkt. No. 1.)
Inland filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on August 24, 2016. (Dkt. No. 27.) The Court

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subsequently dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against Inland, without prejudice, on September 12,
2016. (Dkt. No. 30.)

Plaintiffs, through counsel, filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on December
1, 2016. (Dkt. No. 49.) Inland and BNYM (collectively, “Defendants”) filed the instant motions
on December 15, 2016. (“Motions,” Dkt. Nos. 50, 52.) Plaintiffs opposed on December 30,
2016. (“Opposition,” Dkt. No. 53.) Defendants filed their respective reply memorandums on
January 9, 2017. (Dkt. Nos. 54, 55.)

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’s FAC purports to assert six causes of action against Defendants. (FAC at 1.)
Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to plead sufficient facts to
state claims for which relief can be granted. (BNYM Mot. at 1; QLSC Mot. at 1-2.) The Court
agrees with Defendants.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), a party may bring a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As a general
matter, the Federal Rules require only that a plaintiff provide “‘a short and plain statement of the
claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a
court must accept all material allegations in the complaint — as well as any reasonable inferences
to be drawn from them — as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005); ARC Ecology v.
U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005); Moyo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382,
1384 (9th Cir. 1994).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Rather, the allegations in the
complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that (1) a complaint
must “contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the
opposing party to defend itself effectively,” and (2) “the factual allegations that are taken as true
must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing

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party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652
F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

In this case, Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to meet these standards. Plaintiffs’ claims are entirely
deficient because Plaintiffs fail to identify the elements of their causes of action, and do not allege
facts, which if true, would satisfy the elements. As pleaded, Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to give
Defendants fair notice of Plaintiffs’ claims against them, or the grounds upon which those claims
rest. Instead, for each claim, Plaintiffs rely wholly on their general allegations, expecting
Defendants and this Court to infer the basis for the requested relief. Although detailed factual
allegations are not required, and a formulaic recitation of the elements is insufficient, Plaintiffs
allegations must at least “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have failed to do so here. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ FAC WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND.1

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants Motions to Dismiss and
DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ FAC with LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs’ shall file their amended
complaint, if any, no later than January 27, 2017. The hearing on January 23, 2017 is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1
In their Opposition, Plaintiffs requested leave to amend if the Court granted the
Motions. (Opp’n at 13.) Although the Court is hesitant to grant leave to amend in cases where a
plaintiff has previously been allowed to amend a deficient complaint, it exercises its discretion
here on the basis that the woeful inadequacies of the FAC prevent the Court from properly
evaluating each claim. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating
that if a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, a “district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless
it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”) The
Court notes however, that on November 23, 2016, the Court extended the last day to amend
pleadings in these proceedings from November 14, 2016 to November 30, 2016. Despite this
extension, Plaintiffs’ filed their FAC on December 1, 2016. The Court warns Plaintiffs’ Counsel
that future failure to comply with the deadlines set by the Court may result in sanctions,
including dismissal of this action.
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