Case Digests/Reviewer in Criminal Law

Q: In 2003, Padua was charged for violating R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. He was seventeen years old at that time. He was convicted in 2004. He
subsequently appealed to the CA and thereafter to the SC. Can he validly claim that his rights under
RA 9344, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2006” were violated?

A: No. Suspension of sentence under RA 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s
benefit. Sec. 40 of RA 9344 provides that once the child reaches the age of 18 years, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspension of
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Padua
has already reached 21 years of age and thus could no longer be considered a child for purposes of
applying RA 9344. (Padua vs. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008)

Q: De Guzman was charged and convicted of rape. Decision became final and executory.
Subsequently, De Guzman and the offended party contracted marriage. Is his criminal liability
extinguished?

A: Yes. Art. 89 of the RPC states that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the marriage of the
offended woman. Art. 344 also states that in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and
rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit
the penalty already imposed upon him. (People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010)

Q: Jarillo married Alocillo in 1974. In 1979, Jarillo married Uy while the first marriage was subsisting.
Uy filed a case for bigamy in 1999. Jarillo claimed that the action has already prescribed inasmuch as
Uy already knew about her previous marriage as far back as 1978. Decide.

A: Jarillo’s contention is untenable. The crime of bigamy prescribes in 15 years. The prescriptive period
for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their agents, as opposed to being counted from the date of
registration of the bigamous marriage. In this case, Jarillo failed to prove that Uy had known of her
previous marriage as far back as 1978. Her defense is therefore ineffectual. (Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No.
164435, September 29, 2009; see also Sermonia vs. CA, 233 SCRA 151)

Q: Ronald was convicted and subsequently granted probation. One of the terms and conditions of his
probation is the indemnification of the heirs of the victim. The court subsequently directed him to
submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him. Ronald failed to do so. Can his
probation be revoked?

A: Yes. Probation is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial court. Its grant is
subject to terms and conditions that may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant
probation, it follows that it also has the power to order its revocation. Having violated the terms and
condition of his probation, he must now serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Soriano vs.
CA, G.R. No. 123936, March 4, 1999)
Q: Guinhawa sold a Mitsubishi van to Spouses Silo. He told the spouses that the vehicle was brand
new when in fact he knew that it isn’t. It already figured in an accident and he just had it repaired. The
Spouses discovered the concealment and filed a complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the
RPC, or the crime of OTHER DECEITS. Is Guinhawa liable?

A: Yes. The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new is one
of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the RPC. This provision includes any kind of
conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Arts. 315 to 317 of the RPC. It is intended as the
catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment. It is evident that such false
statement or fraudulent representation constituted the very cause or the only motive for the spouses to
part with their property. (Guinhawa vs. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005)

Q: R issued a check to P but the same bounced. R was charged for ESTAFA under the RPC.
Subsequently, he was charged with violation of B.P. 22 for the same set of facts. Can P recover civil
liability in both cases?

A: No. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct
criminal offenses: Estafa and violation of BP 22. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising
from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil
liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the
offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. (Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July
29, 2005)

Q: Dr. Ampil performed hysterectomy on Natividad Agana in Medical City. A few days after, Natividad
complained of severe pain. Another doctor discovered that a gauze had been left inside her body that
caused infection. Natividad died. Is the doctor and the hospital solidarily liable?

A: Yes. For purposes of apportionment of the responsibility in medical services cases an Employer-
Employee relationship exists between doctors and hospitals including medical consultants. Reasons: 1.
Hospitals exercise control in the hiring and firing of the doctors 2. Performance of doctors consultants
are generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality statistics and feedbacks
from patients, nurses and interns 3. The private hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control on the staff
of the medical hospital. If the private hospital is owned by a private corporation, such corporation can
be held liable on the basis of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility. As the owner of the
hospital it is its responsibility to supervise its doctors including its consultants, and the treatment
prescribed to its patients. Consequently, both are jointly and severally liable to the Aganas. (PSI vs.
Agana, G.R. No. 126297, February 2, 2010)

Q: If the accused committed a heinous crime under R.A. 7659 punishable by death, the offended party
is entitled to 75,000 by way of indemnity and 50,000 by way of moral damages but now under R.A.
9346, the death penalty is proscribed and it is prohibited to impose the death penalty. How much is
the indemnity in favour of the offended party and the moral damages to the heirs?
A: The amount of indemnity remains the same. R.A. 9346 did not eliminate the death penalty. It remains
but what is prohibited is its imposition. There is still a heinous crime but death penalty cannot be
imposed. Moreover, the amount of damages is controlled by the NCC and not the RPC. Therefore, the
amount still remains. (Quiachon v. People 500 SCRA 704; see also People vs. Catubig G.R. No. 137842,
August 23, 2001)

Q: Dela Cuesta, a district supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools, was in the district office when a
certain Justo asked him to accommodate Miss Racela as a teacher in his district. Dela Cuesta told Justo
that there was no vacancy. Justo got angry and challenged Dela Cuesta to fight outside, which the
latter allegedly accepted. When they were in front of the table of a clerk in the office, Justo grabbed
the collar and polo shirt of Dela Cuesta and boxed him several times. Is Justo liable for direct assault?

A: Yes. Dela Cuesta was not disrobed of the mantle of authority and the privilege of protection of a
person in authority by the mere fact that he accepted Justo’s challenge. The character of persons in
authority is not assumed or laid off at will but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office.
Assuming that the complainant was not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this
fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority; as long as the
impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty, past or present, and even if at the very
time of the assault no official duty was being discharged. (Justo vs. CA, G.R. No. L-8611, June 28, 1956)

Q: PAGCOR gave Monteverde, a barangay official, money for the lighting and beautification of the
barangay. Monteverde submitted a financial statement with copies of sales invoices toPAGCOR. He
was charged with falsification of a public document. Can she be held liable?

A: Yes. A person can be held liable for falsification of a public document even though it was a private
document at the time of its falsification as long as it is intended by law to be part of the public or official
record. In this case, the sales invoice formed part of the official records of PAGCOR when it was
submitted by Monteverde as one of the supporting papers for the liquidation of her accountability to
PAGCOR. However, the prosecution must prove the accused’s guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
committing the crime of falsification of a public document. (See Monteverde vs. People, G.R. No. 139610,
August 12, 2002)

Q: Iluminado, a techer clerk, died. Thereafter, the Bureau of Public schools sent the deceased’s salary
warrants, three in all. Her wife, Pilar, endorsed the treasury warrants to encash the same. She signed
the name of her husband as payee for purposes of endorsement. She was charged with the crime of
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. Is Pilar liable?

A: No. There is no criminal intent on the part of Pilar because she believed in good faith that she is
entitled to the proceeds of the salary warrant. Moreover, the government did not sustain financial loss
due to encashment of checks by the wife, as her husband had left accumulated vacation and sick leaves
which exceeded the value of the checks. This does not mean that if there is no damage, there is no
falsification. The point here is that absence of damage is an element to be considered to determine
whether or not there is criminal intent. (Luague vs. CA, G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04, February 22,
1982)
Q: Bernabe, an alleged arsonist, was summoned by Mendoza, a lieutenant of the barrio, to his office
after the owner of the burnt house reported the incident. However, the latter took no action
whatsoever, nor did he report the facts to the proper higher authority. He even allowed Bernabe to
return home. Mendoza was charged as accessory after the fact in the crime of arson. Bernabe was
acquitted. Is Mendoza liable?

A: No. The responsibility of the accessory after the fact is subordinate to that of the principal in a crime,
because the accessory’s participation therein is subsequent to its commission, and his guilt is very
directly related to the principal delinquent in the punishable act. In the case at bar, it is neither possible
nor proper to convict Mendoza as accessory after the fact of Bernabe who was acquitted of the said
crime of arson. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 7540, September 23, 1912)

Q: Merencillo, an examiner of the BIR, demanded money from a taxpayer in exchange for the
approval of a certificate authorizing registration. An entrapment operation was conducted where
Merencillo was caught in the act receiving the money. He was charged for violating R.A. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and direct bribery under the RPC. Is there double jeopardy in this
case?

A: No. Sec. 3 of RA 3019 provides that “in addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law”. One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a
felony under the RPC for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously
or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code. (Merencillo vs. People,
G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007)

Q: Tad-y, a structural analyst of the Office of the City Engineer of Bacolod City, allegedly demanded
money from Encabo for the issuance of certificate of final inspection and certificate of occupancy. An
entrapment operation was conducted where Tad-y supposedly received the money. Can Tad-y be held
liable for direct bribery?

A: To be liable for bribery, it is sufficient if the actions of the government officer, affected by the bribe,
are part of any established procedure consistent with the authority of the government agency.
However, where the act is entirely outside of the official functions of the officer to whom the money is
offered, the offense is not bribery. In this case, it is incredible why Tad-y would demand the said amount
as precondition to his signing a certificate of occupancy considering that it is only the Building Official
who is specifically vested with authority to sign said certificate. Moreover, the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Tad-y demanded the money. The circumstances surrounding the
entrapment also disprove any intention on the part of Tad-y to accept the money and consider it his
own. (Tad-y vs. People, G.R. No. 148862, August 11, 2005)

Q: Sazon, a Senior Management Specialist of the DENR, demanded from R&R Shipyard supporting
documents for the banned species of logs found in the latter’s premises. R&R failed to provide the
documents. Sazon then demanded P100,000.00 from R&R accompanied by threats of prosecution and
confiscation of the logs. He received the money in an entrapment operation. Is Sazon liable for the
crime of robbery extortion?

A: Yes. In robbery there must be intent to gain and unlawful taking or apoderamiento, which is defined
as the taking of items without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Sazon received the
money for her personal benefit, thus the elements of unlawful taking and intent to gain are present.
Sazon also employed intimidation to get the P100,000.00. By using her position as Senior Management
Specialist of the DENR, he succeeded in coercing R&R to choose between two alternatives: to part with
their money or suffer the burden and humiliation of prosecution and confiscation of the logs. (Sazon vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009)