Assignment (INTRODUCTION TO LAW)

(for block 1&2)

1. The nature of Law

2. Sources of law
3. The law and the state
4. The law and the individual
5. The law and the society
6. The application of law

Answer:
1. Legal Theory Lexicon 065: The Nature of Law
Introduction
What is the nature of law? This question has occupied center stage jurisprudence and
philosophy of law in the modern era, and has been the central occupation of contemporary
analytic jurispurdence. This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon aims to give an overview of the
"What is Law?" debate.
Historically, the answer to the question, "What is law?," is thought to have two competing
answers. The classical answer is provided by natural law theory, which is frequently
characterized as asserting that there is an essential relationship between law and morality or
justice. The modern answer is provided by legal positivism, which, as developed by John Austin,
asserted that law is the command of the sovereign backed by the threat of punishment.
Contemporary debates over the nature of law focus on a revised set of positions. Legal
positivism is represented by analytic legal positivists, like H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and Jules
Coleman. The natural law tradition is defended by John Finnis. And a new
position, interpretivism is represented by the work of the late Ronald Dworkin.
In some ways, the title of this Lexicon entry is misleading, because of our focus on the "What is
law?" question as it has been approached by contemporary legal philosophers. There are other
important perspectives on the nature of law that focus on law's functions rather than the the
meaning of the concept or the criteria of legal validity. For example, the sociological tradition
includes important work on the nature of law by Max Weber and Niklas Luhmann. These issues
are discussed by Brian Tamanaha in the article cited in the Links section at the end of this entry.
This Lexicon entry maps the territory of the "What is Law?" controversy, and provides
introductory sketches of the major positions. As always, theLexicon is written for law students,
especially first-year law students, with an interest in legal theory.
Natural Law Theory
Natural law theory is strongly associated with classical and medieval thought, especially
Aristotle, Roman jurisprudence, and St. Thomas Aquinas. There are several challenges
associated with the task of explicating natural law theory, and one of the most important tasks
of this introductory entry is simply to identify these challenges.
First, there are two interrelated but distinct views that are called "natural law theory." One is a
view about the nature of morality: this view asserts that there are natural moral laws, and it is
not essential to this view that it take any particular stand on the "What is law?" debate. A
second view that is called "natural law theory" is a theory about "law" as an institution or
practice--that is the view that is implicated in the "What is law"" controversy.
Second, contemporary understandings of "natural law theory" have been strongly influenced by
the legal positivists critique. When the positivists articulated the theory they were criticizing,
their articulations of natural law theory were neither charitable nor true to the natural law
tradition. When Holmes referred to a "brooding omnipresence in the sky" he was not offering a
sympathetic or charitable reading of the natural law tradition.
For the purposes of this broad overview, we might use the latin phrase lex injusta est non lex as
a starting point. Natural law theory could be understood as affirming something like the
following:
An unjust "law" is not a true law.
This formulation differs from a literal translation--an unjust law is not a law. Formulated in that
way, natural law theory seems to be committed to a contradiction: something which is a law
(but also is unjust) is not a law. The quotation marks around "law" and the phrase true
law make it clear that natural law theory is asserting something else, that something which
might be called a "law" is not in fact a law if it is unjust. Usually, this notion is accompanied by
some explication of the characteristics that are required for status as a "true law," a "focal case
of law," or perhaps "valid law."
Legal Positivism
It is difficult to know where the positivist tradition begins. Hobbes's theory of law shares some
characteristics with the theories offered by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin--both of them
clearly in the positivist tradition. Jeremy Bentham developed a very sophisticated version of
legal positivism, but for a variety of reasons, the more influential and widely known view was
that of Bentham's student, John Austin, the author of The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined (1861).
Austin's theory was that a given rule was a law if and only if the rule was the command of the
sovereign to subjects of that sovereign backed by the threat of punishment. A sovereign is
some person or institution who is habitually obeyed in a well-defined territory, but who or
which does not habitually obey any other person or institution.
Austin's positivist theory does an excellent job of explaining the rules of criminal law, which
forbid certain actions and impose punishments on those who engage in the forbidden actions.
But this theory has a difficult time accounting for other aspects of law, and especially for those
rules that create legal powers, such as the power to create contracts, trusts, wills, and so forth.
This difficulty is most acute with respect to rules that define the basic institutional
arrangements that define the sovereign itself, e.g., the rules of constitutional law in the United
States.
These deficiencies in Austin's theory prompted H.L.A. Hart to develop a more sophisticated
version of legal positivism. One feature of that theory is the distinction between primary rules
(which would include criminal prohibitions) and secondary rules (which allow for the creation,
alteration, and termination of primary rules). Hart replaced the notion of a sovereign with that
of a rule of recognition--a social rule that specifies what counts as a law and what does not.

2. Sources of law

There are many different sources of law in any society. Some laws will be written in the
country's Constitution; others will be passed by the legislature (usually a parliament or
congress); others will come from long social tradition.

Let us consider each main source of law in turn.

Constitution

In any country with a written Constitution, the Constitution will take precedence over any other
source of law. For example, if the Constitution says there is freedom of speech for all citizens,
but the social tradition is for women not to speak in public, a court will protect the right of any
woman to speak in public if she chooses to do so; the Constitution takes priority over tradition.

Customary law

In developing countries which have been decolonised since the 1940s or 1950s, the law is
generally a mixture of law introduced by the former colonial power and customary law which
was there before colonisation. That customary law often still takes priority in certain areas of
life.

Typically, customary law applies in those areas of life least affected by colonisation. These may
include land ownership, customary titles and family relationships.

There may be special courts to deal with these matters, conducted according to tradition and
presided over by a customary chief or group of elders. Alternatively, these matters may be dealt
with by an ordinary court, but customary law may take precedence over other kinds of law in
these cases.
Common law

English common law is the customary law of England, yet it has become influential in the laws
of many other countries. The United States and most countries in the Commonwealth have legal
systems based on English common law.

If there is nothing in the Constitution to cover a situation, and if no specific law has been passed
by parliament to cover a situation, a court in a Commonwealth country may decide the case
depending upon English common law. Indeed, some Commonwealth countries have the British
House of Lords as their final court of appeal.

This is not true in all countries, of course. There are many different legal systems, and they do
things in different ways. It would be impossible, within the limits of a book like this, to deal with
them all. We are therefore limiting ourselves in this volume to talking about those legal systems
which are based on English common law.

If you want to know more about common law and the differences between it and other legal
systems, click here.

Legislation

Any law passed by a lawful government which is different from English common law will take
precedence over common law.

For example, under the English common law principle of habeas corpus, the police are not able
to hold a person for longer than a certain period (typically 24 hours) without bringing them
before a public court. Habeas corpus can be loosely translated from Latin to mean "show us the
person" and it is meant to prevent authorities holding people in secret without due legal
process.

However, in times of emergency such as war many countries pass legislation suspending these
provisions. In the so-called "war on terror", many countries have introduced anti-terrorism laws
which override habeas corpus to allow authorities to hold people, often in secret, for much
longer periods. Some prisoners held by US authorities in Guantanamo Bay prison off the
American coast have been held for many years without trial or even appearing before an
American judge.

[For more on this subject go to Chapter 72: Security and anti-terrorism laws.]

Case law

Legislatures pass laws, but courts work out what they mean in practice. Laws are interpreted
and tested by a succession of trials, over a period of time, under a variety of circumstances.
For example, the law says in some countries that cars should drive on the left-hand side of the
road; but it also says that boats should pass port-to-port (that is, as if they were on the right-
hand side of an imaginary road). What should happen in the event of a flood, where a truck
driving along a flooded road meets a boat coming the other way?

Is the road still a road? If so, they must keep left and pass right-side to right-side. Or is it now a
waterway? If so, they must keep right and pass left-side to left-side. The legislation will state
clearly what the rules are in each case; but it is unlikely to say clearly how deep the water has to
be before a road turns into a waterway.

Courts often have to decide such things. An important part of legal training is to learn what
judgments have been made in the past, in order to know exactly what each law means. This is
called case law, and lawyers will quote previous cases in court, in order to show how the law
should be applied in this case.

Any case law that is from a court of equal or higher rank to the one where a case is now being
heard, will normally take precedence over common law, should they differ.

Also, a decision by a higher court (for example a court of appeal or supreme court) is binding
upon a lower court. The lower court must follow what the higher court has said, in another case
where the circumstances are similar.

3. The law and the state

Law and the Structure of the State Fundamental to the existence and sustenance of the state
are factors such as legitimacy, stability, equity and justice. The efficient co-ordination of these
factors within a state ensures the attainment of harmony and tranquility necessary for the
progress and development of the state. Explaining how the state came into existence Plato says
that: A state arises out of the needs of mankind. No one is self-sufficing, But all of us have many
wants and many persons have needs to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and
another for another; and when the helpers and partners are gathered together in one
habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a state (1935, 95). On how the state came into
existence Plato writes The true creator of a state is necessity, which is the mother of our
invention. The first and the greatest necessity is food, the second is dwelling, and the third is
clothing (p.96). Human needs in the state are numerous and most of the time, the way human
beings aspire to achieve their various needs creates serious conflicts in the society. It is in the
solemn resolution of such conflicts that we know a just system of law. The truth is that a just
system of law should afford the citizens of the state equal opportunity to excel in whatever
trade they aspire to or engage in. Consequently, it is expedient that the implementation of the
stipulations of law, the custodians of law should take into reckoning the fact that a just system
of law is one which takes into consideration the limitations of man. Having noted this they
(custodians of law within a polity) should endeavour to device ways of adequately ameliorating
human excesses in the society without causing undue injury to the violator of law. The issue of a
just system of law further raises the question of the purpose and goal of law in the state. In
whose interest is the law made? The state, the citizenry, or the leadership? Is law made to
protect the week or to serve the interest of the strong? Is it that right is might or that might is
right? On what ground have the citizens the right to disagree with certain laws of the land?
These and many other questions are necessary in the evaluation of the functions of law in the
state in the sense that legitimacy can be Nebula7.1/7.2, June 2010 Okoro: Law and the State: a
Philosophical Evaluation 145 usurped and imposed upon the people. To ensure that everyone is
equal before the law, certain mystique (system of norms) have been created around law with a
view to enhancing the efficacy of law. They include the following: (i) Law is regarded as a social
institution in which we sometimes speak of law in the abstract sense. Expressions as “the
majesty of law”, “the justice of law”‟ “equality of all before the law”, “the rule of law”, “Law, the
common man‟s hope” and so on are used to characterize law in the social context. (ii) There are
“laws” or the “rules” in which process law comes into existence as expressed by its contents and
the range of application. (iii) There is law as a peculiar source of certain rights, duties, powers
and other relations among people. In this sense, law confers, regulates and restrains. It is in this
latter sense that we say someone should be held responsible for damage on grounds of
negligence, or that the law provides that a certain person has the right to leave his property to
whoever the person so pleases. It is also in this third sense of law that we say that the ignorance
of law is no excuse to flout the law, in which case, no man may profit from his own wrong doing.
Doubt, however, remains as to whether law cannot be perverted to profit the wrong doer or if
law cannot sometimes be prejudiced as to legislate unfavourable conditions that will affect the
citizens of the state adversely? There is no question as to the fact that may err, but whatever
the law states or stipulates at a time, “that is the law” and ignorance of the law is no excuse to
flout it. For law in whichever circumstance is more de facto than de jure. The above submission
notwithstanding, the point still remains that it will be injurious, if not damaging, for the citizens
of the state (particularly, one which is a democracy) to perceive the law of the land as being
coercive. To avoid such ugly situation, Leo Strauss enunciates the view that in order for man to
attain his highest statute, he must live in the best kind of society most conducive to him. This
best kind of society which inspires man to pursue after excellence, according to Leo Strauss, is
called the politeia (1964: 135). Let‟s hear from Strauss on this matter. As a civil society, the
politeia depicts the government of men as opposed to the mere administration of state affairs,
it is the factual distribution of power within a community than what the constitutional law
stipulates in regards to political power. However, the politeia as a legal phenomenon exists in a
constitutional form (pp. 135-36). Nebula7.1/7.2, June 2010 Okoro: Law and the State: a
Philosophical Evaluation 146 The theory of politeia enunciated by Leo Strauss calls to mind
Plato‟s “Ideal Polity”, Marx‟s “Communist State”, Augustine‟s “City of God”, African
“Communalism” and the Islamic “Uma” all of which sound utopian. Utopian as the issue of an
ideal state of affairs may sound, the fact remains that the engineering and re-engineering of the
state through law to attain balance and cohesion is not be possible without the notion of the
ideal state. Crucial to the existence of the state therefore, is the issue of legitimacy. By what
process and in what manner was the leadership installed? Is it through a democratic process?
Or is the leadership a group of usurpers who imposed their will upon the people? How would a
regime react to individual discretion concerning state duties and citizen morality? These
questions are central to the issue of legitimacy and for that matter the nature of law in the
state. They are questions that are also of interest to schools of thought in philosophy of law and
in jurisprudence. Defending the Natural Law theory, Socrates identified “law and nature, and
the just with the legal” (p. 106). His central concern is about how man can live a good or just life
in the society. For Plato, the question of legitimacy follows from the issue of justice and justice is
when reason governs the lower emotions in the same way as the philosopher King is supposed
to be the ideal leader over the soldiers and artisans. Only then could justice be said to be
obtainable in the society. Aristotle distinguished between “Natural Justice and Legal Justice”.
The first is a derivation from Natural Law and is universal in status, while the second is derived
from the constitution of the state and is determined by the laws of the state. It is perhaps from
this justice point of view that Aristotle justifies the institution of slavery. For the Sophists, The
Natural Law is universal and all men are equal before the law. Any human law that contradicts
Natural Law is illegitimate and unjust. The Stoics on their own part, see legitimacy and justice as
derivations from Logos otherwise known the universal principle of reason. According to
d‟Entreves, Natural justice for the Romans was based on the knowledge of the “know-how” (i.e.
technical). They saw law as a matter of social engineering in which Nebula7.1/7.2, June 2010
Okoro: Law and the State: a Philosophical Evaluation 147 legitimacy and justice were seen as
obtainable from within the confines of the state following the laws of nature. Thus, they
developed legal principles which the Roman jurists and magistrates saw as empirical principles
of reason and justice rather than as deductions from universal reason. They developed three
levels of idea of Natural Law as follows: (i) “ius gentium” as the embodiment of laws and usages
found among peoples and representing good sense. (ii) “ius naturale” as the exercised creative
function through the ius gentium. (iii) “ius civil” as the practical law of the state. In the medieval
era, legitimacy, justice and law were seen from the theological perspective or what d‟Entreves
calls the “ontological” approach to law. Thus, Thomas Aquinas, in his theory of Natural Law,
espoused the view that should a person hold a secret that will set a polity into crises, such a
person should withhold his findings no matter how important or factual such findings are. It
does not matter if the regime is despotic. What Aquinas seems to be emphasizing is that the
King is an embodiment of God and only God can so oust him. Similar kind of legal philosophy
obtained in medieval Islam where propagation of the “divine rights of Kings” loomed large. The
spiritual took control of the temporal. For Kings and Sultans to gain legitimacy, they had to seek
the anointing of the Church or the Mosque. Justice, of course, was at the mercy of the despots.
Two philosophers, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and Nicholo Machiavelli (1469- 1537), however
held opposing views to the common belief of this period. Ibn Khaldun relayed the sociological
flux (rise and fall) of the regimes of the Maghreb. He exposed the avarice of the regimes, their
greed for naked power and their imposition of their will on the citizenry under the guise of
divine justice. De-emphasizing the issue of divine justice, Ibn Khaldun goes ahead to describe
the means by which leaders of medieval Islam imposed their will upon the people. According to
him, two principles, Asabiya and Mulk are central to the organization of any polity. In his book
Kitab al Ibar (Universal History), Ibn Khaldun explains that asabiya is the principle of collective
discipline that a group or groups use for the obtainment of dominion or power (mulk). Whereas
the Malik (King) relies on asabiya for support, mulk allows him the expression of his authority
and power. In other words, “power is the basis of the state and the necessary instrument of
Nebula7.1/7.2, June 2010 Okoro: Law and the State: a Philosophical Evaluation 148 that
restraining authority without which man cannot exist” (Rosenthal, 1958: 85). Machiavelli on his
part, enunciated the psychological and moral behaviour of the ruler and the ruled. His aim was
“to set objective laws from historical facts, and these laws are meant to direct and guide the
ruler who wishes to perform efficiently in his political objectives” (Bah, 1989: 10). He shows
how the principalities of Italy rallied for state power and exerted naked authority on their
citizens. Since the Prince enthroned himself by means of conspiracy, he was pessimistic about
the nature of men. Since men are evil by nature, the Prince is to combine the craftiness of the
fox and the aggression of the lion in order to manipulate the selected men and the mass-men.
His watchword was to legitimize his authority over the people, and in doing this, “he judges by
results, looks to the end in order to justify his means” (p. 13). Epicurus Lucretius, in his poem
entitled On The Nature Of Things, had developed the State of Nature Theory. For him, “man had
to evolve society in order to overcome the intimidating forces of nature and the fear and
menace of wild beasts” (Leo Strauss, 111- 112). Following the State of Nature Theory, the Social
Contract Theorists shifted the emphasis of law and justice from obligations to natural rights.
Their major task was to deemphasize the divine rights of Kings that stressed obligation over
rights. In place of this Social Contract Theorists propagated legislation by parliament that
stressed natural rights over obligations. In opposition to this view of Social Contract Theorists
however, stood the Hegelian conception of law which strips the citizens of their rights. Hegel in
his Philosophy of Right portrays the state as the manifestation of the Absolute Spirit. He goes
ahead to say that the will of the Absolute Spirit is the will of the state which is embodied in the
personality of the leader. The result is that the Kings of the Reformation, wielded absolute
powers, to the extent that the: “Religion of the King was the religion of the state (cuis regio,
enes religio) or the boast of Louis XIV, the King of France. The state? I am the state. The King
becomes the embodiment of the sovereignty of the state” (Ajayi, 1992: 14).

4. LAW, THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

Thu, 07/29/2010 - 17:29 — webmaster
Law makes for order. Absence of law for disorder. Man in his individual life as well as in his
social life, needs order. Therefore man needs law.

I. Man individually needs order. To begin with, he needs some external order. He may claim
to prefer disorder, saying that order stifles spontaneity. His clothes and his room are in chaos.
He in unable to be punctual at work. He cannot stand the idea of a personal timetable. Yet he
too will get annoyed if the train is late or his car breaks down or the phone is out of order. He
wants these things to be in order. Besides, you can be sure that he is not so disorderly that he
never eats or sleeps. No; each man needs some regular pattern of exterior order: regular food,
regular rest, regular income. Everyone needs some external order.
Man also needs internal order. No one likes the disorder of a stomach ulcer or of a bone
cancer ...
Man specially needs another sort of interior order: order in his spirit and its operations.
In each man there is one person, one 'I' who acts. Nevertheless, one can and should
distinguish different aspects of the spiritual activity of man. To think is not the same as to feel,
to know is not the same as to love. In the relationship between these interior faculties and in
the operation of each, man also needs law and order.
The heart as an organ of thought?
'To have one's heart in the right place' is a most interesting expression. A person would
clearly have his heart in the wrong place if it were located where his liver or his brain is. Such a
disorder would pose nice physiological problems. Of course, the phrase 'heart in the right place'
does not refer to physical location at all. It has an affective meaning. It expresses the idea of a
person whose affections are sound, whose sympathies are easily aroused, who can feel with
others. However, even in this more spiritual sense, a man's heart would not be in the right place
if it habitually occupied the place where his mind should be, i.e. if feelings habitually took the
place of thought. This is a more frequent disorder than might be imagined.
The heart, in the sense of feelings, has its function in man's life. More importantly, so
does the mind; and so does the will. One has to think and will and feel properly, i.e. in a
properly ordered way, according to the laws of thinking, willing and feeling. If a man's actions
are ruled by his feelings to the exclusion of his reason, or if he loves just with his heart and not
also with the will, he is not in good order as a man.
Some people don't care how or what they think, or how or what they will or feel. They
should care. If there is no law or order, if there is 'lawlessness' in the operations of mind and
will-and emotions too - they can end in a sorry mess.
Perhaps there is no better illustration of what we are trying to express than that phrase
of the Psalmist. 'The fool says in his heart, "there is no God!" ' (Ps 14:1).
Is the Scripture being fair to atheists? After all there are quite a number of atheists
around who seem to be rather clever people. Yet the Bible says the atheist is a fool. Why?
Because it is not his mind that leads him to say there is no God. It is his heart, i.e. his feelings,
his preferences, his prejudices.
The human mind that is in good working order and is used properly, will never say there
is no God. On the contrary, the mind that is in proper order leads naturally and directly to the
conclusion: there is a God. That is why those who say 'there is no God' are not using their mind
properly. In this matter of God's existence, they would seem not to be using it at all. They are
'thinking' with their heart which is not a proper organ of thought. That is why atheists, however
clever they may be in other areas, are fools in this capital point. They say there is no God, but it
is not through thinking that they have come to this 'conclusion', but through lack of thinking.

Ruling oneself
Man needs interior order. There must be government within man. The big question for
each one is, 'who or what is going to rule in my life?'. We may quickly answer: 'I. I am going to
govern myself.' We answer well; but we have not yet given a full answer. It is true that, while
man is not an autonomous being, he is meant to be self-governing. But he must govern himself
according to some law. Which law will it be?
Either a man 'declares' himself 'independent' and writes his own personal and subjective
moral law; and then he rules himself by a law of selfishness; or is ruled by it ... Or else he
accepts the natural law and the law of God and rules himself according to divine wisdom. 'I rule
myself by all your precepts' (Ps 1 19: 128).
It must be said of course that such a declaration does not make a man independent. He is
a creature, and therefore dependent by nature. If he 'rejects' his dependence on God--who lifts
him up he becomes more and more dependent on things that drag him down.
We must rule ourselves. But self-rule offers various possibilities. Let us consider them.
The lower part of man's self may be let take over the government, and then man is ruled
by his passions. lust, greed, avarice, anger ... If this happens, he is under a rule of slavery. His
higher self, his spirit, is enslaved to his bodily passions: the 'law of his members' (cf. Rom 7: 23).
This is selfishness run wild, and selfishness at its lowest. It is anything but self-government.
Of course a man may acknowledge that his is indeed a rule of slavery, that under such
government he is quickly losing his real freedom; and he may react. He may, with an effort,
subject his passions to the government of his mind and will. This can be done in different ways.
He may do this in a defective way: i.e. when he thinks and wants his self (even his
'spiritual' self) to be the centre and end of his life. Then he is under a worse government still
that puts him in slavery to his pride.
In such a case he may be keenly aware of that lower area (the law of his members) where
he has proved himself master. But he resolutely turns his mind away from that higher area (the
law of God), where he is not prepared to serve. Since he wanted to be a law to himself, since he
wants his own self to be supreme, he refuses to look above self. And so he remains: puffed-up in
his own self-esteem; but actually endwarfed and fossilised through pride .
A man's mind and will can govern in a proper way only when he centres them on God.
This can only begin to happen when he realizes that the truth is independent of his mind and
greater than his mind, and that his mind is meant not to create the truth but to seek it. Then he
can begin to overcome the pride of making his own mind the measure of all things. He will
begin to look up to the Truth; and he will discover God as the law of his mind, as the infinite
Truth that his mind has been created to seek and know.
His will in consequence will want a good greater not only than material or sensual things,
but greater too than self or self-satisfaction. And so he will discover God as the law of his will. If
he continues firmly in the struggle to overcome pride, he will discover more and more of the
infinite Truth and infinite Goodness of God, and will want to put God's law as the law of his life.
That is the one law that can bring him to fulfilment. When he makes up his mind to serve God's
law, he is made free (cf. Jn 8: 32, James 1: 25), and becomes not only master of himself but a
lord too of creation ('cui servire regnare est': to serve him is to reign...).

Laws of self-fulfilment
Truth is the law of the mind. Goodness is the law of the will. If a person starts saying, 'I
am free to think what I like,' he is breaking the law of his mind. It is not his nature to think what
he likes, but to think what his mind tells him is true.
 He may have the power to think what he likes: but if what he likes to 'think' is not what
his mind really tells him is true, he does not have the right to think so. He is thinking falsely
-against the truth and against his mind. He is breaking the law of the mind.
He may have the power to do what he likes. But if what he likes to do is evil, he has no
right to do it. He is rejecting goodness and breaking the law of the will.
The law leads man to 'self-fulfilment'. It points out the true way and warns against the
dead-ends. Self-centredness is the dead-end, and converts all other ways into dead-ends. The
law, with its first command -- 'You shall love the Lord your God'-calls us out of self-centredness.
And with its second command too: 'you shall love your neighbour as yourself'.
The way that the law indicates is the way of love. Love for God, love for neighbour: and
--also --love for self. Love for self, true love for self, is not opposed to love for God; it is part of
love for God.
Self-love is not a dead-end, nor is it forbidden by the law, but rather commanded. What is
a dead-end and forbidden is self-centred self-love. We should love ourselves, as our neighbour,
for God's- sake. If, in all things, we strive to be God-centred, we are following the law and
finding the fulfilment of our lives.
Love for God, therefore, is not in opposition to self-fulfilment, nor even to self-love. It is
in opposition only to self-centredness. We have to be God-centred, not self-centred. Only by
being God-centred do we truly love ourselves and can we truly fulfil ourselves. The law of love
for God is not opposed to the law of self-fulfilment; it is the law of self-fulfilment.
II We have seen that individual life needs order; and that therefore it needs law. Social life
too needs order. Society therefore needs law. A group of persons living without order or law is
not a society; it is a mob.
It is natural for man to live in society. The purpose of society is to create and maintain
unity among men in relation to their end. It is to help each one live in unison with his fellow-
men, so that he help them and they help him to fulfil the potentialities of human nature.
Man's nature is social; and yet he has to learn to live socially! If a man looks into himself,
he sees the need for society. He finds social tendencies within himself: a tendency to
companionship, friendship, marriage, family, loyalty, cooperation, trade ... If man had never
fallen, his social tendencies would have prospered without effort or difficulty. But man in fact
has fallen. And now, as he looks into himself, he also discovers anti-social tendencies:
selfishness, suspicion, jealousy, revenge....
Men tend to live together. But, living together, they now also tend to take advantage of
one another, and there emerges, at least in some, the tendency to cheat and exploit; and even
to hate and want to eliminate others.
Social man; and anti-social man
The social aspect of man's nature, his out-goingness to others, is up against the anti-
social aspect of his fallen nature. Healthy other-centredness is up against unhealthy self-
centredness.
 There is a constant tension in this situation. If social life is to be orderly, if it is to be
human and liveable, then law is clearly needed; partly as a guide to encourage and channel
men's good social tendencies, and largely as a check on their anti-social tendencies. If society is
to be just, an effective legal system, with the several elements that go to make it up, is
necessary.
Laws that embody true principles of justice are needed as guidelines to men in their
relations with one another. Laws that teach or remind men that the life, the property, the good
name of others are to be respected; that personal freedoms, e.g. freedom of expression, are not
to be used to corrupt others; that just taxes, for necessary public services, are to be paid, etc.,
etc.
Laws may be just and a society may be very law abiding. Yet, even in such a situation,
there are bound to be conflicts between people. Two persons, each in perfect good faith, can
claim the same right, e.g. the ownership of the same plot of land. If one of the parties is not in
good faith, the conflict can be all the more serious. No matter how clearly the law defines rights,
wrongs are going to occur. The law would be theoretical and ineffective if it did not provide a
system to apply law to concrete cases, i.e. to judge conflictive situations according to justice,
and to decide who is in the right and who is in the wrong. Law, therefore, must have its judicial
system. law courts, judges, lawyers, etc.
Furthermore, law would still remain ineffectual and rights would not be adequately
protected, if there were no way to ensure that the decisions of the law courts are carried out.
So, a legal system must be backed by law-enforcement agencies.
Clearly, a law-abiding society will be largely, though not totally, at peace. The less law-
abiding a society is, the busier courts and law-enforcing agencies are going to be.

Just and unjust laws

A just society is not the automatic result of just laws, since there will always be some
persons who have no respect for any type of law. Nevertheless, just laws always have an
immense positive social effect. Along with actually ordering men's relations, they also have an
educative function. They present an image of justice that people can look up to and take as a
model for their everyday relations with others.
People have the right to laws that are just and to a just administration of law. They have
the right to see that justice is equal for all. They have the right to see that judges and police are
above corruption; in other words, that you do not have to bribe agents of the law to gain your
rights, and that you cannot bribe them to obtain what is not your right. They have the right to
see that justice is not sold and that injustice cannot be bought.
A society where laws are just and are justly administered will be a society where people--
the majority of people--look up to the law, sense the sacredness of the law, and so are more
encouraged to follow justice in their personal lives.
A just society is not the automatic result of just laws. But an unjust society is the
inevitable result of unjust laws. Unjust laws bring justice into disrepute. They lead to contempt
for authority. They undermine the sense of the rights of others, cause mutual distrust and give
an excuse for mutual exploitation.
Unjust tax laws obviously foster tax evasion. Discriminatory laws against minority groups
produce frustration and hatred. Unjust allocation of public money (which, after all, is the
people's money) spreads the 'let-me-too-see-what-I-can-get' mentality ....
A major example of the disastrous social effect of an unjust law is the legalisation of
abortion. Legalised abortion encourages sexual irresponsibility. Even more than that, it
encourages violence --precisely because it gives legal sanction to the maximum physical
violence against a completely innocent human being. In consequence people lose respect for
the sacredness of human life and human relationships. Where abortion is legalised, social
violence escalates. This is only to be expected. If one may kill an innocent child, in order to save
one's reputation, satisfy one's whims, avoid emotional strain or financial difficulties, why should
one not rob one's neighbour or poison one's mother-in-law, for similar reasons?
A society therefore will not be healthy if it lacks good laws. But even a society with good
laws can be unhealthy if its citizens lack respect for law.
The harmful effect of bad laws is evident. Good citizens will not respect bad laws, and are
right not to do so. Their lack of respect is a defence reaction of healthy members of society
against a disease that threatens the whole social body.
While they are right not to do so, there is a danger that their lack of respect may turn
into a sort of contagion that spreads and reaches out even to good laws; and even to the whole
concept of law.
Good citizens will not respect bad laws; bad citizens will not respect good laws. That is
natural. What is not so natural is when good citizens are tempted not to respect good laws. But
this is something that can occur. A generalized loss of respect for law can be a social disease that
proves fatal to a society.
The unhealthy reaction of lack of respect for good laws -among otherwise good citizens --
can come about in different ways. It can obviously come in the aftermath of a period of bad
laws or bad administration. Even if new and good laws take the place of the bad, and honest
administration that of corrupt, it will probably take some time before people's confidence in the
law and sense of respect for the law are restored.

Authority, an instrument of oppression?

One of the difficulties affecting people's attitude towards law today is the tendency to be
suspicious of all government. Government means authority; and authority, it is suggested, is in
some way (or so easily becomes) an instrument of oppression. Besides, government implies
rulers and subjects, and therefore seems to suggest superiority and inferiority. Is there not
something degrading in being 'under' authority?
These difficulties need an answer, since the fact is that we cannot have laws, effective
law, (and therefore we cannot have justice) without government.
 Authority implies a relationship between those wielding authority and those subject to it.
But this is not essentially a relationship of power, nor is it based on force, nor on the ability to
bring others into subjection. It is a relationship of free wills, properly ordered towards the
common good. So, of its nature, it implies reason and freedom in both those exercising and
those accepting authority.
Where authority is properly exercised, in the carrying out of just laws, it is not opposed to
personal freedom but fosters it and serves it.
To the thinking man, just authority is seen as a positive good. The principle of authority
has a certain sacredness to it, because it brings justice to society. Acceptance of authority is a
reasonable act. Obedience to authority becomes an act of freedom and a sign of maturity.
Behind authority lies the will of God (cf. Rom 13: 1; Jn 19: 11); that is the ultimate reason for its
sacredness. Acceptance of authority is therefore a rational and religious act.
Opposition between personal freedom and authority or government arises only when
there is a disorder in one or the other. If an individual uses his freedom wrongly, he will meet
the opposition of authority as it defends the common good. Moreover, the authority, in
opposing his wrong use of his freedom, is also defending his own personal good.
If authority becomes unjust and tyrannical, then personal freedom: a) is not bound to
obey it; b) may choose to resist it; c) may in extreme cases even be obliged to resist.
Even in cases a) and b), however, as long as the authority or law in question is not
essentially opposed to the common good, it may be better to obey it, or have recourse to
peaceful civil disobediences, rather than to rise against it violently.
The reason is that the principle of authority lies at the very foundation of the social
order; and is therefore itself a great good. To oppose it with violence in order to remedy a
particular situation may have the effect of undermining people's respect for any authority.
A person may rise against a particular government or authority because of this or that
specific law which is unjust. But this example of violent disobedience and rebellion, apart from
the immediate disorder and bloodshed it is likely to cause, may encourage all sorts of
dissatisfied groups into thinking that violence and rebellion are legitimate ways of advancing
their claims.
Taking the law into one's own hands risks destroying all sense of law. Lawlessness is a
contagious disease that spreads rapidly. History offers many examples of how rebellions against
defective or corrupt governments have plunged countries into civil war or anarchy; and in the
end often left them under an even more tyrannical government.
5. The law and the society
Law is a common and yet distinct aspect of everyday life in modern societies. This course
examines the central features of law as a social institution and as a feature of popular
culture. We will explore the nature of law as a set of social systems, central actors in the
systems, legal reasoning, and the relationship of the legal form and reasoning to social change.
The course emphasizes the relationship between the internal logic of legal devices and
economic, political and social processes. Emphasis is placed upon developing a perspective
which views law as a practical resource, a mechanism for handling the widest range of
unspecified social issues, problems, and conflicts, and at the same time, as a set of shared
representations and aspirations.
We will explore the range of experiences of law for its ministers (lawyers, judges, law
enforcement agents and administrators) as well as for its supplicants (citizens, plaintiffs,
defendants). We will examine how law is mobilized and deployed by professionals and ordinary
citizens. We cannot cover all aspects of the legal system, nor focus on all the different actors. A
set of topics has been selected to develop understanding of the situational and systemic
demands within which actors in the legal system operate and perform their roles; at the same
time, we will try to discover systematic patterns in the uses and consequences of
law. Throughout the course there is concern for understanding what we mean by legality and
the rule of law.
6. Application of Law
activity of state bodies or officials by which, in legal acts promulgated on the basis of and in exe
cution of statutes, edicts, and
other normative acts, these bodies or officials establish, amend, and abolish rights and duties of
state bodies, public
organizations, officials, and individual citizens or resolve questions of applying sanctions for viol
ation of legal norms. Theprocess of applying the law includes establishing the factual circumstan
ces of the case with objective reliability, selecting the
legal norm to be applied in the given instance, interpreting the meaning of the legal norm select
ed, and issuing an instrument
on the application of the legal norm addressed to the person or organization in question. In the
USSR, application of the lawis a legal form by which state bodies carry out their functions of ma
naging political and administrative affairs (for example,acts on the appointment or removal of o
fficials), managing the economy (for example, acts establishing plan assignments),and administe
ring justice (for example, the decisions and verdicts of courts).