Motion to Quash
Hence, on October 23, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for
[G.R. No. 141336. June 29, 2004]
RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, PEDRITO REYES, REMEDIOS MARASIGAN, BAYANI ANASTACIO,
RUMULADO BAWASANTA, JOSE ENRIQUEZ, NELSON GABUTERO, JOSE GENILO, JR., JOSE
LEYNES and ALFONSO UMALI, JR., petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4TH DIVISION and
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN/SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On April 8, 1997, petitioners Rodolfo G. Valencia, Pedrito Reyes, Remedios Marasigan,
Bayani Anastacio, Rumulado Bawasanta, Jose Enriquez, Nelson Gabutero, Jose Genilo,
Jr., Jose Leynes and Alfonso Umali were charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) in
relation to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, in an Information which reads:
That on or about January 12, 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Rodolfo G. Valencia, then Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro, Pedrito A.
Reyes, then Vice-Governor and Presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Oriental Mindoro, Bayani Anastacio, Romualdo J. Bawasanta, Emmanuel B.
Buenaventura, Cesareo M. Cueto, Violeta D. Dakis, Jose A. Enriquez, Nelson B.
Cabutero, Jose G. Genilo, Jr., Jose C. Leynes, Dante A. Manao, Remedios E. Marasigan,
all members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro, and Alfonso V.
Umali, Jr., then Provincial Administrator, all of whom are public officials of the provincial
government of Oriental Mindoro, while in the performance of their official and/or
administrative functions, and acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
conspiring and confederating with private accused Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza, and
mutually helping one another , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
said accused Alfredo M. Atienza unwarranted benefit, privilege and advantage by
entering into a grossly disadvantageous contract of loan, whereby the provincial funds
of Oriental Mindoro in the sum of P2,500,000.00 was given to Alfredo M. Atienza to
finance the cost of repair, operation and maintenance of his vessel, thereby causing
the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro damage and undue injury.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No.
23624.
On April 11, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion Seeking an Order to Allow Accused to File
with the Ombudsman Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and to Defer Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest.[2] This was followed by a Motion to Quash filed by petitioner
Valencia on April 14, 1997.[3]
The prosecution manifested that it had no objection to a reinvestigation of the case.
reinvestigation and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation.[4]
On March 23, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman issued a Joint
Resolution wherein Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto and Prosecution Bureau Director
Victorio U. Tabanguil approved the recommendation of Special Prosecution Officer II
Manuel A. Corpuz that the motion for reinvestigation be denied but that the complaint
as against Emmanuel B. Buenaventura, Violeta A. Daquis and Damte A. Manzo be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E.
Kallos and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against all accused on the ground that their liability is civil in nature.[5]
Accordingly, the prosecution filed an Amended Information.[6]
Petitioners filed with the Sandibangayan a Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor/Ombudsman,[7] which was denied in the first assailed Resolution dated June
23, 1999.[8]
In the meantime, petitioners learned that in the administrative case against them
docketed as OMB-ADM-1-96-0316, which involved the same subject matter as the
criminal case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against them after finding that
the contract of loan was entered into in pursuance of the police power of the local
chief executive.[9] Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 23, 1999 and/or Motion to Resolve
Motion to Quash Information.[10] In the second assailed Resolution dated September
27, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.[11]
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, based on the
following grounds:
Respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in not dismissing the information or in not granting the Motion to Quash
information despite the fact that:
a) Respondent ombudsman had already dismissed the administrative case
against the petitioners regarding the same subject matter of the criminal case against
the petitioners;
b) The facts alleged in the information have already become moot and
academic and no longer constitute an offense;
c) No satisfactory reason was given by the respondent Ombudsman in delaying
inordinately (close to three [3] years) the filing of the information against the petitioners.
Similarly, respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in the Resolution dated September 27, 1999 in holding that the
dismissal of the administrative case against all the petitioners is not determinative of the
outcome of the criminal case despite the facts following:
a) The subject matter in both criminal and administrative cases against the same
petitioners are one and the same;
b) The degree of proof in criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Whereas, in administrative case the proof required is only substantial evidence; and
c) Two of the reviewing prosecutors, namely: Deputy Prosecutor Roberto Kallos
and Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo held in the Joint Resolution dated March 23,
1999 that the criminal case against the petitioners should be dismissed, and they both
concurred with the findings of GIO I Medwin Dizon, Dir. Angel Mayoralgo, Jr., and Hon.
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera, Jr., in their Resolution dated October 8,
1996, which recommended the dismissal of the case as they found that the contract of
loan entered into by the petitioners with a certain Alfredo Atienza was in pursuance of
the General Welfare Clause of Section 16 of the Local Government Code.[12]
In a Minute Resolution dated January 31, 2000, the petition was dismissed for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan.[13]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] as well as a Supplemental thereto.[15]
The respondents were required to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplement.[16] The prosecution filed a Comment on the petition for certiorari.[17]
Thereafter, petitioners filed their Reply.[18]
In the meantime, on May 29, 2000, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued enjoining
respondents from further proceeding with the pre-trial and trial in Criminal Case No.
23624 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo G. Valencia, et al., scheduled [on]
May 22, 23, 24 and 25, 2000 and from acting on the motion to suspend petitioners
pendente lite.[19]
On November 27, 2000, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was granted and the
petition was reinstated.[20]
The petition lacks merit.
The grounds on which a complaint or information may be quashed are:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.[21]
Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to
quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such motion only such facts as are
alleged in the information, and those admitted by the prosecutor, should be taken into
account in the resolution thereof. Matters of defense can not be produced during the
hearing of such motions, except where the rules expressly permit, such as extinction of
criminal liability, prescription and former jeopardy.[22] Otherwise put, facts which
constitute the defense of the accused against the charge under the information must
be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper
grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material
averments do not constitute the offense.[23]
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the
information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter,
should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. The informations need only state the ultimate facts; the
reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.[24]
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash under this
particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this
examination, matters aliunde are not considered.[25] However, inquiry into facts outside
the information may be allowed where the prosecution does not object to the
presentation thereof.[26] In the early case of People v. Navarro,[27] we held:
Prima facie, the facts charged are those described in the complaint, but they may be
amplified or qualified by others appearing to be additional circumstances, upon
admissions made by the peoples representative, which admissions could anyway be
submitted by him as amendments to the same information. It would seem to be pure
technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the parties and the judge
were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply
because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that
upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the
averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky
revelation of his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all
candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently
reiterated that such officials role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are
convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit 2. He enters into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
the court from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of
a speedy administration of justice. 3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.[30]
It should be stressed, however, that for a case to fall under the exception, it is essential
that there be no objection from the prosecution. Thus, the above rule does not apply A careful scrutiny of the Information shows that all the above elements are averred
where the prosecution objected to the presentation of extraneous facts and even therein. It sufficiently alleges that petitioners are public officials discharging official or
opposed the motion to quash.[28] administrative functions who, in evident bad faith and with manifest partiality, entered
into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government with a private
In the case at bar, petitioners are charged with violation of Section 3 (e), in relation to 3 person which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and advantage.
(g), of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The pertinent
provisions read: Petitioners invoke the earlier Resolution of the Ombudsman which recommended the
dismissal of the case against them. There, the Graft Investigation Officer opined that the
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public contract of loan extended by petitioners to Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza for the repair,
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices maintenance and operation of the latters motor vessel was necessary for the
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: transportation needs of the inhabitants of the Province of Oriental Mindoro, which had
just suffered three successive typhoons. The loan of provincial funds was supposedly
xxx xxx xxx. extended by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro under Section 468[31]
of R.A. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991), pursuant to the General Welfare
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving provision embodied in Section 16 thereof, which states:
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which
permits or other concessions. are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
xxx xxx xxx. preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
profited or will profit thereby. among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
xxx xxx xxx.
As enunciated above, however, the Resolution must be established as their defense
The elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) are the following:
during the trial. It was not even offered and admitted as evidence by the
Sandiganbayan. It was merely attached to petitioners Supplemental Pleading in
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
Support of Motion to Quash Information.[32] Furthermore, the Resolution does not bear
functions;
the approval of the Ombudsman.[33]
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
In any event, the Ombudsman subsequently denied petitioners motion for
negligence; and
reinvestigation. The fact that Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo and Deputy
3. His action has caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos recommended the dismissal of the case against
has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the petitioners is of no moment, especially since the same Special Prosecutor and Deputy
discharge of his functions.[29] Special Prosecutor signed the Comment filed before this Court wherein they extensively
argued against the instant petition. The continuing objection and opposition of the
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (g) are: prosecution to petitioners motion to quash the Information removes this case from the
exception to the above-cited rule that in the determination of whether the facts
1. The offender is a public officer;
alleged constitute an offense, only the allegations in the Information, whose truth and
veracity are hypothetically admitted, should be considered.
Indeed, the findings of the Graft Investigation Officer are contradicted by the following
disquisition by the Ombudsman in the Resolution finding probable cause to charge
petitioners, to wit:
The subject loan does not fall within the context of the general welfare clause under
Section 16 of the Local Government Code. The loan in question was more inclined to
promote the personal or business interest of Engr. Atienza rather than to boost the
common welfare of the people in Mindoro. In the credit agreement itself, while the
problem of transport system was addressed in passing under its whereas clause
(introductory part) of the said contract, however, the same was not mentioned in the
body of the said agreement. There is no provision in the contract to obligate Engr.
Atienza towards the improvement of transport service for the people of Oriental
Mindoro. In short, it is not clear in the said agreement that Engr. Atienza is mandated to
render transport service for the general welfare of the people in Mindoro. xxx xxx xxx.
xxx xxx xxx.
As embodied in the credit agreement, the purpose of the loan being stated therein was
to finance the cost of the repair, operation and maintenance of Atienzas vessel. This in
essence is indeed a private affair. It suits Atienzas personal aggrandizement. In synthesis,
the subject loan has the attributes of a private interest as opposed to public purpose.
Consequently the subject loan does not rhyme with the requirement that government
funds shall be used/spent strictly for public purpose. xxx xxx xxx.[34]
In the final analysis, the conflicting findings of the Ombudsman boil down to issues of
fact which, however, are not within our province to resolve. As has been oft-repeated,
this Court is not a trier of facts.[35] This is a matter best left to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case
against them based on the same subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal
case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, while that in administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While that may be
true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from
criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the
public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of
crime.[36]
Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against
petitioners is the fact that they were reelected to office. Indeed, a reelected local
official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during
his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him
back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then
such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.[37]
However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not
the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office, thus:
The ruling, therefore, that when the people have elected a man to his office it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any refers only
to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because a
crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or
malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious
not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the
reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for
extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at
least insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the
President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.[38]
There is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the Information against
petitioners on the basis solely of the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
them.
Finally, petitioners invoke the ruling in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[39] where this Court
dismissed the criminal cases against petitioner for the inordinate delay of three years in
the conduct of preliminary investigations which violated his right to due process and the
constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases. In the case at bar, petitioners
allege that while the letter-complaint against them was dated March 10, 1994, the
Ombudsman resolved to file the Information against them three years later, on February
14, 1997, and in fact the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on April 8, 1997.
By way of explanation for the perceived delay, the Special Prosecutor, in his Comment
to the petition, enumerated the chronology of events beginning from the receipt of the
letter-complaint to the filing of the Information. It appears therefrom that in most cases
the extended periods of time were devoted to verifications and investigations, first by
the National Bureau of Investigation and then by the Ombudsman. Within the Office of
the Ombudsman, the complaint had to undergo separate investigations by the Fact-
Finding Investigation Bureau and the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau.
During the preliminary investigation itself, petitioners sought extensions of time before
they filed their counter-affidavits.
Thus, the ruling in Tatad does not apply here. In that case, the delay was exacerbated
by the fact that the charges against petitioner were found to be politically motivated. In
the case at bar, there is no indication that the complaint against petitioners was filed to
serve political ends. Neither is the delay vexatious, capricious or oppressive. On the
contrary, what appears is that the prosecutors exercised extreme care in verifying,
evaluating and assessing the charges against petitioners before making a finding of
probable cause.
For certiorari to lie, it must be shown that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion,[40] or more specifically, that it exercised its power arbitrarily or despotically
by reason of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise was so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in
contemplation of law.[41] Petitioners failed in this respect.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on May 16, 2000 is LIFTED. The
Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to conduct proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23624 with
deliberate dispatch.
Motion to Quash On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information[5] before the
MYRNA P. ANTONE, G.R. No. 183824 Regional Trial Court, Pasay City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-
Petitioner, CFM and raffled to Branch 115.

Present: Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.[6] He
corona,C.J., informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the
-versus- Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007;[7] that the decision
DEL CASTILLO, and became final and executory on 15 May 200[7];[8] and that such decree has already
ABAD,** been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007.[9] He argued that
PEREZ, JJ. since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was
actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in
the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.[10]
LEO R. BERONILLA, Promulgated:
Respondent. In its comment/opposition to the motion,[11] the prosecution, through herein petitioner,
December 8, 2010 maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all the essential requisites
of bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent
on 18 November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x marriage on 16 February 1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been committed
before the court declared the first marriage null and void on 27 April 2007.[12] The
prosecution also invoked the rulings of the Supreme Court holding that a motion to
DECISION quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and that facts
contrary thereto are matters of defense which may be raised only during the
PEREZ, J.: presentation of evidence.[13]

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to nullify and set aside the issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834,
to wit: (a) the Resolution[1] dated 29 April 2008 dismissing the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, which assailed the trial courts Orders[2] dated 20 September 2007 and 6
December 2007 in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution[3]
dated 18 July 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration of the first resolution.
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were
rendered incomplete after herein respondent presented documents to prove a fact,
which the court believed would negate the allegation in the Information that there was
a first valid marriage. The evidence presented showed that respondent later obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first union following the celebration of a subsequent
marriage.
The Antecedents
On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-
Complaint[4] for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been
legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile
Maguillo in 1991.
After a hearing on the motion,[14] the court quashed the Information.[15] Applying
Morigo v. People,[16] it ruled:
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla was actually
never legally married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone, the first element appears to
be missing. Furthermore, the statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved clearly contemplates that the first marriage
must at least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx [I]n a
similar case, [the Supreme Court] had the occasion to state:
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of
a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the
beginning. xxx The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. xxx[17]
The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said
Order[18] on the ground, among others, that the facts and the attending circumstances
in Morigo are not on all fours with the case at bar. It likewise pointed out that, in
Mercado v. Tan,[19] this Court has already settled that (a) declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense.[20]
In its Order of 6 December 2007,[21] the court denied the motion for reconsideration
stating that Mercado has already been superseded by Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment[22] before the Regional Trial Court of
Naval, Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24
March 2008, the court set aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of
petitioner with respondent null and void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in
Civil Case No. B-1290) to file her answer to the complaint.[23] On 21 July 2008, the court
DISMISSED the petition for nullity of marriage for failure of herein respondent (plaintiff in
Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial brief.[24] Respondent, however, challenged
the orders issued by the court before the Court of Appeals.[25] The matter is still pending
resolution thereat.[26]
Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26
March 2008 before the Court of Appeals,[27] herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay
City trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and
denied her motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:
The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the following reasons:
1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the
allegations in the petition are based on authentic records.
2. Since the petition assails the trial courts dismissal of the criminal information
for bigamy filed against private respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all
warranted, should be filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the Office of the
Solicitor General, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the
subject criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial courts finding that
the first essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid marriage contracted by
private respondent is wanting. There is no clear showing in the petition that the dismissal
was tainted with arbitrariness which violated petitioners right to due process. Notably,
petitioner filed her comment/opposition to private respondents motion to quash before
the trial court issued its Order dated September 20, 2007 dismissing the information.
Hence, if there is no denial of due process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion
that would merit the application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. [28]
On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforequoted Resolution for lack of merit. [29]
Hence, this petition.[30]
Our Ruling
I
We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the
defect in the pleading and the question of legal standing to bring the action.
The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks
a proper verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading.[31]
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order
that the ends of justice may be served.[32] The defect being merely formal and not
jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may nevertheless order the correction of the
pleading, or even act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that xxx
strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice
xxx may be served.[33] At any rate, a pleading is required to be verified only to ensure
that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were true and correct and
not based on mere speculations.[34]
There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has
the authority to represent the government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of
Appeals. The Administrative Code specifically defined its powers and functions to read,
among others:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. xxx It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party.[35]
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices
to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases
involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and
control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.[36]
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,[37] we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in
order.[38] Not even the appearance of the conformity of the public prosecutor in a
petition for certiorari would suffice because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his
assistant to represent the People of the Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the
trial court.[39]
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when
the respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General.
In Labaro v. Panay,[40] this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order or
ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the
one to question the order or ruling before us.[41] xxx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff
People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground.
Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in
some cases.[42] In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted
as its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, Inc.,[43] without requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a
comment on the petition, this Court determined the merits of the case involving a novel
issue on the nature and scope of jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority
to settle cooperative disputes as well as the battle between two (2) factions concerning
the management of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.
(DARBCI) that inevitably threatens the very existence of one of the countrys major
cooperatives.[44]
And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant
petition even absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, for justice to
prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone.[45] To borrow the words of then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case
where the dismissal of a criminal case pending with the trial court was sought:
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic
society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court]
are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx The State, like any other
litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its
case.[46]
II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in
violation of the respondents right against double jeopardy on the theory that he has
already been practically acquitted when the trial court quashed the Information.
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused
is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his
express consent.[47]
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent
has not yet entered his plea to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the
Information, and (2) the case was dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at
his instance.[48]
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on
account of an order sustaining a motion to quash.[49] More specifically, the granting of
a motion to quash anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.[50] Thus:
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against
petitioner was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
that the facts charged in the complaint do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the
dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, for it is provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an order sustaining the motion to quash is not
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the
grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now substantially
reproduced in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure]
xxx.[51]
III
We now determine the merit of the petition ˗ did the trial court act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondents motion
to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information?
Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information and any evidence contrary thereto
can only be presented as a matter of defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
We define a motion to quash an Information as ˗
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the Information.[52]
This motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,[53] for
which reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the
face of the information.[54]
As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:[55]
 It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on
the ground that it charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test
in considering a motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in
the law.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, a reading of the information will
disclose that the essential elements of the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is
not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the very outset, in a preliminary hearing
only and without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination.
Given the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the
prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the informations on the basis
only of the petitioners evidence, such as [this].[56]
As in the recent case of Los Baos v. Pedro,[57] where we found no merit in respondents
allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the Information
duly charged a specific offense and provide[d] the details on how the offense was
committed,[58] we see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the
case at bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a lawful marriage with one MYRNA
A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the accused
has all the essential requisites for validity.[59]
sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.[60]
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment
has already become final and executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to
that alleged in the Information ˗ that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the
respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered
at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after
taking into consideration the established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this
Court, among others: (1) when the new allegations are admitted by the
prosecution;[61] (2) when the Rules so permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of
criminal liability and double jeopardy;[62] and (3) when facts have been established by
evidence presented by both parties which destroyed the prima facie truth of the
allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and it would be pure
technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the
prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction
xxx.[63]
For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first
marriage offer? Would it serve to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the
trial in accordance with People v. dela Rosa thereby warranting the non-observance of
the settled rule that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in
the information? We quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the
allegations of the information do not charge an offense, facts have been brought out
by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima facie truth accorded to
the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in
the nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the
court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the
case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction, and hold the
accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on
her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of
the prosecution.[64] (Emphasis supplied.)
We find that there is none.
With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first
marriage void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the rulings[65] in People v.
Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio
marriage will not prosper because there is no need for a judicial decree to establish that
a void ab initio marriage is invalid;[66] and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has
retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after
all, which renders the elements of bigamy incomplete.[67]
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which
was promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before
respondents subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,[68] where this Court settled the conflicting
jurisprudence on the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.
After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial
declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of cases,[69] this
Court, concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by
then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared
that a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration
of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy.[70]
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is,
therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the
information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale,
neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by
way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the
information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of
evidence.

Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we
cannot uphold the Order dated 6 December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained
that Morigo has already superseded Mercado. In fact, in Morigo, this Court clearly
distinguished the two (2) cases from one another, and explained:
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained
after the second marriage was already celebrated. xxx
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized xxx.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
declared void ab initio.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in
so quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an
evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules
that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information;
and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional
circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April
2008 and 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No.
07-0907-CFM is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage
for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.[71]

The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position
of this Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court
ruled in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:[72]
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. xxx.[73] (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Serafico,[74] this Court pronounced:
In a catena of cases,[75] the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. xxx
Motion to Quash
[G.R. No. 109376. January 20, 2000]
PANFILO O. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo
(hereafter DOMINGO) seeks to nullify the resolution[1] of 15 March 1993 of the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to quash the information against him
for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The records show that on 26 May 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo
M. Cuenca, then president of the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former Deputy Presidential Assistant. The
complaint was docketed as TBP Case No. 87-02391.[2]
In an Order dated 1 September 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped
from the complaint Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and therefore
outside the criminal jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary
investigation against the other respondents. In the same order, it was also directed that
a subpoena be issued to DOMINGO, the President of PNB at the time of the questioned
transactions, it appearing from the evidence on record that he was involved in the
case.[3] However, the subpoena addressed to DOMINGO at PNB, Escolta, Manila, his
last known address, was returned "unserved," since he was no longer connected with
the said bank at the time it was served.[4]
On 8 June 1988, in line with the ruling in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,[5] then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez issued Administrative Order No. 1 addressed to the
Office of the Special Prosecutor and Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutors authorizing
them to continue the preliminary investigation of cases pending as of 27 April 1988 until
the same are terminated.[6]
On 6 February 1992, after a finding of probable cause to implead DOMINGO in the
case, Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued an order
directing him to submit a counter-affidavit.[7] DOMINGO submitted on 9 March 1992 his
counter-affidavit with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.[8] Misoedp
On 9 July 1992, SPO III Diaz-Baldos issued a resolution recommending that DOMINGO
and Rodolfo M. Cuenca be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section
4(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, but that the complaint be dismissed as
against Ferdinand E. Marcos for being moot and academic by reason of his death, and
as against Joaquin T. Venus for lack of merit.[9] This was approved by Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez, and the corresponding information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on 30 July 1992. The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
17847.[10] The information reads as follows:
That on or about the month of July 1980, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, being then the President of the
Philippine National Bank, a government financial institution, and hence a public officer,
while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his
office and conspiring and confederating with then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
with RODOLFO M. CUENCA, a private individual, being then the Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Construction and Development Company of the Philippines (CDCP),
a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality cause undue injury to the Philippine National Bank and grant
unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the following manner: accused RODOLFO M.
CUENCA, capitalizing and exploiting his close personal association with the then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos to obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP,
requested the latters assistance and intervention in securing the approval by the
Philippine National Bank Board of Directors of the application of the CDCP for a U.S. $40
Million Letter of Credit and in foregoing the collateral requirements of CDCP, as a result
of which accused Panfilo O. Domingo, acceding to the pressure exerted by President
Marcos in relation to accused Cuencas requests, facilitated and made possible the
passage by the PNB Board of Directors of Board Resolution No. 144 whereby the U.S.$40
Million Standby Letter of Credit applied for by CDCP to secure the principal and interest
on its loan with the Republic National Bank of Dallas was approved, notwithstanding a
collateral deficiency by CDCP on its previous accounts with PNB, and again
subsequently recommended to the PNB Board of Directors the approval of Board
Resolution No. 180 amending Board Resolution No. 144 in order to allow CDCP to use its
loan proceeds secured by the aforementioned letter of credit for its other international
projects and thereafter allowed CDCP to forego its collateral requirements, which act of
the accused inflicted undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to
assume CDCPs obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas after the latter had
defaulted in the payment thereof, amounting to U.S. $29 Million, and which likewise
granted unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the same amount.
On 11 August 1992, DOMINGO filed a petition for reinvestigation[11] with the
Sandiganbayan. The latter directed the prosecution to treat the petition as a motion for
reconsideration of the 9 July 1992 resolution.[12] The motion was, however, denied by
the Office of the Special Prosecutor on 14 January 1993.[13] Edp sc
On 19 February 1993, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
information against him on the grounds that (1) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished by prescription, and (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense.[14]
In its Resolution of 15 March 1993 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.[15]
Not satisfied, DOMINGO filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it denied his motion to quash the information.
Meanwhile, on 17 August 1993, during his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 17847,
DOMINGO refused to enter a plea; hence, the Sandiganbayan ordered that a plea of
"not guilty" be entered for him.[16]
We shall first take up the issue of prescription.
DOMINGO contends that his alleged criminal liability has already been extinguished by
prescription. In support thereof he claims that the prescriptive period commenced to
run in July 1980 when the crime was allegedly committed, and was only tolled on 6
February 1992, when he was impleaded as party-respondent by Prosecutor Diaz-Baldos.
The filing of the complaint with the Tanodbayan on 26 May 1987 produced no legal
effect and could never be deemed to have validly interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period, considering that effective 2 February 1987, the Tanodbayan was
divested of its authority to conduct preliminary investigation unless duly authorized by
the Ombudsman.
We are not persuaded.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the
period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted. Sce dp
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its own prescriptive
period. Section 11 thereof reads: "All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in
ten years." This was later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March
1982, which increased the prescriptive period of the crime from ten years to fifteen
years.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special
law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act
No. 3326,[17] as amended, which provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period
shall commence to run on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation
of the special law is not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to
run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.[18]
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were
made because both parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to
perpetrate fraud against the government.[19] The alleged anomalous transactions
could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the
original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to
said date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those
transactions.[20] Hence, the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from
the date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February 1986
after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.
Calrsp ped
As to when the period of prescription is interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2
of Act. No. 3326, as amended, provides that it is "when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person." Whether the running of the prescriptive period was tolled on 1
September 1987, when DOMINGO was impleaded as an accused, or on 30 July 1992,
when the information against him was filed with the Sandiganbayan, is immaterial; for
only about one or six years, respectively, has elapsed from the date of the discovery of
the alleged offense. Thus, the prescriptive period, whether ten years as provided in R.A.
No. 3019 or fifteen years as provided in the amendatory Act, has not yet lapsed. The
motion to quash on the ground of prescription was, therefore, correctly denied.
We now come to the question of whether the facts charged in the information
constitute an offense.
The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
averred in the information do not amount to an offense is whether the facts
asseverated would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law.[21]
In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.[22]
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the
information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter,
should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted.[23] The informations need only state the ultimate facts; the
reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.[24]
DOMINGO, together with Rodolfo Cuenca, was charged with violation of Section 3(e),
in relation to Section 4(a), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. These provisions read:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e). Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
Sccal r
SEC. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. -- (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having
family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take
advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the
government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include
the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word
"close personal relation" shall include close personal relationship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free
access to such public officer.
The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: (1) that the accused is
a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the
said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue
injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; (4) that such undue
injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and (5) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[25]
The information specifically stated as follows:
(1) That DOMINGO was a public officer, being then the president of PNB, a government
financial institution, and Rodolfo Cuenca was a private individual, then Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the CDCP, who conspired and confederated with DOMINGO,
capitalizing and exploiting his close personal association with then President Marcos to
obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP;
(2) That DOMINGO committed the offense in relation to his office and while in the
performance of his official functions;
(3) That he facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of
Resolution No. 144, thereby causing undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was
unjustly forced to assume CDCPs obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas after
the CDCP defaulted in the payment of the loan amounting to US$29 Million;
(4) That such undue injury was caused by his facilitation of the approval of the Letter of
Credit and the waiver of the collateral deficiency, thereby granting unwarranted
benefits to CDCP in the same amount; and
(5) That he acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.
Clearly, the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended. Hence, the motion to quash must fail. C alrsc
Finally, DOMINGO avers that the long and inordinate delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation and the filing of the information violated his right to speedy trial,
invoking the ruling enunciated in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.[26]
The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that
right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the
length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.[27] The right of an accused to a
speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the same shall not be utilized
to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures
rights to an accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.[28]
A review of the records show that his right has not been violated. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor, in its Comment/ Opposition to the Motion to Quash,[29] has
adequately explained the reason for the said delay, to wit:
The records show that accused Domingo filed his counter affidavit on March 3, 1992,
and the case was resolved on July 9, 1992. There was no undue delay in the resolution
of this case despite the gargantuan volume of cases filed with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
There [might have been] a delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation but
which is not undue and intended as they were brought about by unforseen peculiar
circumstances.
Sometime in 1987, when this case was in its initial stage of preliminary investigation, the
authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation
and file cases with the Sandiganbayan was questioned and was subsequently nullified
by the Supreme Court in the cases of Zaldivar vs. Gonzales and Zaldivar vs.
Sandiganbayan (supra.). This necessitated the issuance of Administrative Order No. 1
(supra.) in order that the Office of the Special Prosecutor will continue to function as
part of the Ombudsman. Following this event was the retirement of the assigned
Prosecutor, Juan T. Templonuevo, in the early part of 1989. When RA 6770 was enacted
in November 1989, the OSP was reorganized by the Ombudsman. After its
reorganization in 1990, the present case was assigned to SPO III Teresita Diaz-Baldos. The
said SPO instead of resolving the case, considering that the respondents have already
been subpoenaed, gave another opportunity for the accused herein to file their
counter affidavits. She forthwith issued subpoena for the accused to file their counter-
affidavits. Accused-movant, Domingo filed his counter-affidavit in March 199[2]. Hence,
the Resolution.[30] Mis act
Perforce, DOMINGO cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law
considering that one of the principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him
the opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit since the first subpoena was returned
unserved. After DOMINGO filed his counter-affidavit on 9 March 1992, the
corresponding information was in due time filed on 30 July 1992. The delay, if any, was
actually more beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to petitioner in that it was intended to
afford him the opportunity to refute the charges made against him.

It is also worthy to note at this point the long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or
prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest
requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society. The writ may issue only in specified cases, among which are to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner,
and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.[31] Such exceptions do not
obtain in this case.

Thus, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolution denying DOMINGOs
Motion to Quash must be, and is hereby, AFFIRMED.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan is

DIRECTED to try and decide Criminal Case No. 17847 with purposeful dispatch.
Motion to Quash
G.R. No. L-36528 September 24, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH VI and AGAPITO GONZALES Y VENERACION,
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent City Court of
Manila, Branch VI, dated 20 January 1973, dismissing the information (for violation of
Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) against the accused, herein respondent
Agapito Gonzales, in Criminal Case No. F-147348 and its amended order, dated 16
March 1973, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the first order.
Respondent Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of
violating Section 7, in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of
the Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of
Manila on 4 April 1972.
On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the two (2) cases, the City Fiscal amended the
information in Criminal Case No. F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section
11, Rep. Act No. 3060), by alleging that the accused.
conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to be publicly
exhibited ... completed composite prints of motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in color
forming visual moving images on the projection screen through the mechanical
application of the projection equipment, which motion pictures have never been
previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview,
examination and partnership, nor duly passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at
Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila].
On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348 (for violation of Article
201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that, on the same date, 16
July 1971, the same accused,
conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the mechanical
application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent
and immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color,
depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed
private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and obvious positions, among other
similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public
view, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila].
On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, accused Agapito Gonzales pleaded not guilty to
both charges. The other accused, Roberto Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he was
(and he still is) at large.
On 26 June 1972, accused Agapito Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in
the two (2) cases, on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. The
motion was denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases were set for trial on 7 August 1972.
No hearing was held on 7 August 1972, however, as the accused moved for
postponement of the trial set on said date and the trial set on two (2) other dates. On 15
November 1972, the accused Gonzales moved for permission to withdraw his plea of
"not guilty" in Criminal Case No. F-147348, without however, substituting or entering
another plea. The Court granted the motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27
December 1972.
On 27 December 1972, accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal
Case No. F-147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was according to him,
also pending against him Criminal Case No. F-147347, for violation of Rep. Act No. 3060,
where the information allegedly contains the same allegations as the information in
Criminal Case No. F-147348.
Petitioner opposed the motion to quash but the respondent City Court, in an order,
dated 20 January 1973, dismissed the case (Criminal Case No. F-147348) stating thus:
In one case (F-147347), the basis of the charge is a special law, Rep. Act No. 3060. In the
other case (F-147348), the basis of the same is the pertinent provision of the Revised
Penal Code. Considering that the allegations in the information of said cases are
Identical the plea entered in one case by the accused herein can be reasonably seen
as exposing him to double jeopardy in the other case, as said allegations therein are not
only similar but [sic] Identical facts.
After the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147348, or on 7 February 1973, in Criminal Case
No. F-147347, the accused changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of
"guilty" for violation of Rep. Act No. 3060. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of
P600.00.
On 10 February 1973, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 20
January 1973, dismissing Criminal Case No. F-147348. This was however denied by
respondent court in its order dated 15 March 1973, and in its amended order dated 16
March 1973; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the accused could not invoke the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy, when there had been no conviction, acquittal, dismissal or
termination of criminal proceedings in another case for the same offense. 1 The
respondent, on the other hand, argues that conviction or acquittal in, or dismissal or
termination of a first case is not necessary, so long as he had been put in jeopardy of
being convicted or acquitted in the first case of the same offense.2
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a
frustration thereof
All these requisites do not exist in this case.
The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only
one offense, contrary to private respondent's allegations. In other words, the offense
defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not
duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not
included in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing
the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures.
The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the two (2)
laws involved would show that the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from each
other. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 3060 state:
Sec. 7. It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in
any motion picture theater or public place, or by television within the Philippines any
motion picture, including trailers, stills, and other pictorial advertisements in connection
with motion pictures, not duly passed by the Board; or to print or cause to be printed on
any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater, or public place or by television, a
label or notice showing the same to have been previously passed by the said Board
when the same has not been previously authorized, except motion pictures imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and
newsreels.
Sec. 11. Any violation of Section seven of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than six months but not more than two years, or by a fine of not less than six
hundred nor more than two thousand pesos, or both at the discretion of the court. If the
offender is an alien he shall be deported immediately. The license to operate the movie
theater or television shall also be revoked. Any other kind of violation shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of not
less than one hundred pesos nor more than three hundred pesos, or both at the
discretion of the court. In case the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership
or association, the liability shall devolve upon the president, manager, administrator, or
any office thereof responsible for the violation.
On the other hand, Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions.- The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon:
... 3. Those who in theaters, fairs, cinematographs, or any other place open to public
view, shall exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows; ...
It is evident that the elements of the two (2) offenses are different. The gravamen of the
offense defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion picture which
has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion
picture may not be indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously approved by
the Board, its public showing constitutes a criminal offense. 3 On the other hand, the
offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is the public showing of
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures. 4
The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. The crime punished in
Rep. Act No. 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved
because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient.
Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no Identity of the offenses
here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. 5 Evidence
required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other. The
defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper. As aptly put in People v. Doriquez.6
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for
the same offense or Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more)
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a
dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
(People v. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621; People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 24). Phrased elsewhere,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. (People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472).7 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner also questions the propriety of allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. F-
147348 to withdraw his plea of not guilty in order to file a motion to quash on the ground
of double jeopardy. Petitioner argues:
It is true that on February 3, 1973, the trial court finally convicted respondent Gonzales in
Criminal Case No. F-147347 by imposing on him a fine of P600.00. But it is obvious that
respondent Gonzales's conviction in that case cannot retroactively supply the ground
for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147348.
But even if conviction in Criminal Case No. F-147347 preceded the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. F-147348, still that conviction cannot bar the prosecution for violation of Article
201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, because, by pleading to the charge in Criminal
Case No. F-147348 without moving to quash the information, the accused (now the
respondent) Gonzales must be taken to have waived the defense of double jeopardy,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 117, section 10. (Barot v. Villamor, 105 Phil. 263 [1959]) It
is only in cases where, after pleading or moving to quash on some other grounds, the
accused learns for the first time that the offense of which he is charged is an offense for
which he has been in jeopardy that the court may in its discretion entertain at any time
before judgment a motion to quash on that ground. ... In the case at bar, however, the
fact is that the accused (now the respondent Gonzales) was arraigned in the same
court. He, therefore, cannot claim ignorance of the existence of another charge
against him for supposedly the same offense. 8
have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. 11
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The appealed orders are hereby reversal and set
aside. Criminal Case No. F-147348 is ordered reinstated and remanded to the
respondent Court for trial according to law.

Petitioner's argument is well-taken. Sec. 10, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, before its
amendment stated —

SEC. 10. Failure to move to quash-Effect of- Exception. — If the defendant does not
move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto he shall be taken
to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except when
the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without
jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the defendant learns after he has pleaded or has
moved to quash on some other ground that the offense for which he is now charged is
an offense for which he has been pardoned, or of which he has been convicted or
acquitted or been in jeopardy, the court may in its discretion entertain at any time
before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such pardon, conviction,
acquittal or jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied)

However, it must be noted that, under the 1985 Rules, the provision now reads as follows:

Failure to move or quash or to allege any ground therefore. The failure of the accused
to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the
same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash,
except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of the offense
or penalty, and jeopardy. ... 9

The above, being an amendment favorable to the accused, the benefit thereof can be
extended to the accused-respondent. However, whatever benefit he may derive from
this amendment, is also illusory. For, as previously noted, there is no double jeopardy
which gave rise to a valid motion to quash.

The People (petitioner) rightly appealed the dismissal of Criminal Case No F-147348. For,
as ruled in People v. Desalisa: 10

As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a case after arraignment and plea of
the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or
information (Sec. 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if
(1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant,
and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or
of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate
court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would
Motion to Quash
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 167526 CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Petitioner,
Present: The Information[9] in Criminal Case No. 119832 reads:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, That on June 18, 1999, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
PERALTA, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the
-versus- BERSAMIN,* beneficial owner of 75,000,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered
ABAD, and security which has been sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act,
MENDOZA, JJ. which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company,
way above the 10% required by law to be reported, did then and there willfully,
Promulgated: unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and
DANTE TAN, with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares
Respondent. July 26, 2010 of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and
regulations prescribed pursuant thereto.

DECISION CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]

PERALTA, J.: After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty[11] to both charges and the
trial ensued.

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the On November 24, 2003, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence,[12]
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the June 14, 2004 Resolution[2] and February 24, consisting of Exhibits A to E with sub-exhibits, Exhibits K-1, K-10 and K-11, Q, R, S, T and W
2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433. with sub-exhibits, and Exhibit X.

The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1,[4] in
relation to Sections 32 (a)-1[5] and 56[6] of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by
petitioner People of the Philippines against respondent Dante Tan in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 153. They were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
119831 and 119832.
The Information[7] in Criminal Case No. 119831 reads:
That on December 10, 1998, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the beneficial owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation
shares, a registered security sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities
Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the
company, way above the 10% required by law to be reported, and covered by
Certificate Nos. DT-UK 55485704 and DT-UR 55485776, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and
with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares
of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such
beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and
regulations prescribed and pursuant thereto.
On December 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order[13] admitting Exhibits A, B, W
and X, but denied admission of all the other exhibits on the grounds stated therein.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in
an Order[14] dated January 27, 2004.
In the meantime, on December 18, 2003, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave
to File Demurrer to Evidence[15] and to admit the attached Demurrer to Evidence.
On January 29, 2004, the RTC issued another Order[16] granting respondents
Motion for Leave to File the Demurrer and forthwith admitted respondents attached
Demurrer. The RTC also ordered petitioner to file an opposition.
On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition[17] to the Demurrer to
Evidence. Respondent then filed a Reply.[18]
On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order[19] granting respondents
Demurrer to Evidence, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused Dante Tan to
be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.[20]

On April 12, 2004,[21] petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[22] before the CA
assailing the December 11, 2003, January 27, 2004, and March 16, 2004 Orders of the
RTC.

On June 14, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the context of all the foregoing considerations, it would be futile to take
further action on the herein petition, which is therefore DISMISSED outright for evident
want of merit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action by
the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal,
for which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy.[24]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated February 24, 2005.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the lone assignment of error, to
wit:
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE PEOPLE FROM PROSECUTING ITS
CASES AGAINST DANTE TAN.[25]
The petition has no merit.
Notwithstanding the RTCs grant of respondents Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner
contends that the CA erred in applying the rules on double jeopardy. Specifically,
petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not apply in cases decided by the trial
court without jurisdiction and in violations of petitioners right to due process.[26]
In People v. Sandiganbayan,[27] this Court explained the general rule that the
grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the
merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by
the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to
place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there.[28]
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3)
the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[29]
These elements are present here: (1) the Informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 119831
and 119832 against respondent were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the RTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832; (3)
respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be
had.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio,
Jr.,[30] this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial
was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its
very power to dispense justice.[31]
After an extensive review of previous Court decisions relevant to herein petition, this
Court finds that the abovementioned exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu
herein. This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it
conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondents demurrer to
evidence.
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[32]
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[33] this Court ruled that the prosecution was denied due
process of law when the trial was but a mock trial, to wit:
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar
where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian
president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of
acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused.[34]
In addition, in People v. Bocar,[35] this Court ruled that there is no double jeopardy
when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the
trial court, to wit:
It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that the
parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the
respondent Judge (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered
into the records of the case before respondent Court. Respondent Court's issuance of
the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable
abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.
Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance
to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court (pp.
11-17, rec.). Verily, the prosecution was denied due process.
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case,
its right to due process is thereby violated. x x x[36]
Likewise, in People v. Judge Albano,[37] this Court held that there is no double jeopardy
when the trial court preemptively dismissed the case, thus:
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution
failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even
require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction, when it preemptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence
thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby
violating its fundamental right to due process." With this violation, its Orders, dated 28
October 1976 and 20 December 1976, are therefore null and void. Likewise, for being
null and void, said orders cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy.[38]
In Saldana v. Court of Appeals,[39] this Court ruled that the prosecutions right to due
process is violated when the trial court aborted its right to complete its presentation of
evidence, thus:
The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the
trial court does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. One of the elements of double
jeopardy is a competent court. The trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction
when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to
complete the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been
terminated. The remand of the case for further hearing or trial is merely a continuation
of the first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. x x x[40]
Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is did the
RTC violate petitioners right to due process? On this note, this Court rules that petitioner
was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual
antecedents which led to the grant of respondents demurrer.
On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and, on the
day after, filed its formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002, respondent filed an
opposition to petitioners formal offer. Instead of filing a reply as directed by the RTC,
petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-
open Presentation of Evidence.[41] Said motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner
thus continued its presentation of evidence.
On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses and was
then ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On February 26, 2003, petitioner
filed a request for marking of certain documents and motion to admit attached formal
offer of evidence.[42] The motion was initially denied by the RTC, but on motion for
reconsideration the same was granted by the RTC. The RTC, thus, ordered petitioner to
file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally, on November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence.[43]
After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated January 29,
2004, directed petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February 18, 2004, petitioner
filed its Opposition[44] to the demurrer.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC never prevented petitioner from
presenting its case. Unlike in Bocar and Saldana where the prosecution was prevented
from completing its presentation of evidence, petitioner was given the opportunity to
present its case, formally offer its evidence and oppose respondents demurrer. It even
bears to point out that the RTC even allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal offer of
evidence after having initially rested its case and then continue its presentation by
introducing additional witnesses. Thus, no grave abuse can be attributed to the RTC as
petitioners right to due process was not violated. Even Galman finds no application to
the case at bar as clearly such trial cannot be considered a sham based on the
abovementioned considerations.
Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose to grant
respondents demurrer to evidence notwithstanding that it had filed a Motion to Hold in
Abeyance the Resolution of Accused Dante Tans Demurrer to Evidence and The
Prosecutions Opposition Thereto.[45] Petitioner contends that instead of acting on the
motion, the RTC peremptorily granted respondents demurrer to evidence which
prevented petitioner from its intention to file a petition for certiorari to question the
December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC.
While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution
of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so.
Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the
RTC, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an
error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois acquit.[46] We
are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the
dismissal of the case cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double
jeopardy.[47] To reiterate, the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction which cannot be attributed to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in
abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence. Consequently, petitioners
attempt to put in issue the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC
which denied admission of certain documentary exhibits in evidence must fail. As
correctly manifested by the CA, the said Orders have already been overtaken by the
March 16, 2004 Order, which already granted respondents demurrer to evidence.
Hence, this Court would be violating the rules on double jeopardy if the twin orders were
to be reviewed after a finding that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting
the demurrer to evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the
29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of the
merits thereto. As correctly observed by the CA, the RTC extensively discussed its
position on the various issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main
reasons for the RTCs decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to
prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks were
divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as common shares, or even
which type of shares respondent had acquired, thus:
To secure conviction for the violations of RSA Secs. 32 (a-1) and 36
(a), it is necessary to prove the following: (1) the BW Resources Corporation (BW) has
equity securities registered under the Revised Securities Act; [2] that the equity securities
of BW Resources Corporation are divided into classes, and that these classes are
registered pursuant to the Revised Securities Act; (3) the number of shares of BW
Resources Corporation (authorized the number of shares of BW Resources (authorized
capital stock) and the total number of shares per class of stock; (4) the number of shares
of a particular class of BW stock acquired by the accused; (5) the fact of the exact
date, the accused [becomes] the beneficial owner of ten (10%) percent of a particular
class of BW shares; and (6) the fact, the accused failed to disclose his ten (10%) percent
ownership within ten days from becoming such owner.

It is very clear from the evidence formally offered, that the foregoing
facts were not proven or established. These cases were for Violations of RSA Rule 32 (a)-
1 and Section 56 of Revised Securities Act, however, it is very surprising that the
prosecution never presented in evidence the Article of Incorporation of BW Resources
Corporation. This document is very vital and is the key to everything, including the
conviction of the accused. Without the Article of Incorporation, the Court has no way of
knowing the capitalization authorized capital stock of the BW Resources Corporation,
the classes of shares into which its stock is divided and the exact holdings of Dante Tan
in the said corporation. Its not being a prosecutions evidence renders impossible the
determination of the ten (10%) percent beneficial ownership of accused Dante Tan, as
there is no focal point to base the computation of his holdings, and the exact date of his
becoming an owner of ten (10%) percent.[48]

There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of the
evidence of the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is manifestly
mistaken. Assuming, however, that there is an error of judgment on the denial of
admission of certain exhibits of the prosecution and the appreciation of the
prosecutions case, there is to this Courts mind, no capricious exercise of judgment that
would overcome the defense of double jeopardy.

Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been
acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the
abuse of criminal processes.[49] While petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion, this Court finds that none can be attributed to the RTC.
Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC.

On a final note, this Court is aware of this Courts Third Division Decision dated
April 21, 2009 entitled Dante Tan v. People of the Philippines[50] wherein respondent
argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the prosecution. This Court denied
the petition and ruled for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. It
must be pointed out that said decision involves Criminal Case No. 119830,[51] which is
distinct and separate from Criminal Case No. 119831 and Criminal Case No. 119832
which are the subject matter of herein petition. Thus, the resolution of the case at bar is
without prejudice to the proceedings that are being conducted in Criminal Case No.
119830 at whatever stage it may be.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 14, 2004
Resolution and February 24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
83433 are AFFIRMED.
Motion to Quash
[G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO
NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan
was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a
ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal
Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered
him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00
representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of
P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner
Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago,
province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing
Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along
the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless
and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances
and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and
damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said
automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate
No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn
down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the
appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch
shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that
they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from
Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera butsaid that the accused also
wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the
accused at the Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before they
proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they
consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 oclock noon they went home. Then
at about 2:00 or 3:00 oclock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and
(Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck.
They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They ate and
drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go bowling.
They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove
the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but
unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank
one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the
accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took
some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a
nearby store where they ate arroz caldoand then they decided to go home. Again the
accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the
deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately
behind the accused. The accused was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per
hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of
the highway (although according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed
of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway because the car
was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The
accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from
the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two
vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of
the highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while
the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of
the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point
of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit A) prepared by Cudamon the following
morning at the Police Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost
consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his
belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and
then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still
unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were
brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night (Exhibit B) while Ambrocio
suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.[2]
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as
that of the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that
Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed that:
The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of
the road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago,
Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming from
the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the cars lane and
bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the
road while the jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken
after the incident (Exhibit 1) and a sketch (Exhibit 3) drawn by the accused during his
rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the drivers side. As a result of the collision, the
accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas
died at the Flores Clinic where they were all brought for treatment.[3]
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court
decided Criminal Case No. 066 in petitioners favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused
NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of
the trial courts judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the
Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that
appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the
Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is
hereby held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was
the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-
appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident
occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed all in all,
a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9 a.m. and 11 p.m.[6] It found that
petitioners act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)[7] and pursuant to Article 2185 of
the Civil Code,[8] a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioners
act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself because the mishap, which
occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation.[9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August
24, 1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for
our consideration:
FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON
THE ACCUSEDS (PETITIONERS) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN
HE WILL BE PLACED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES
AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-
DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONERS
ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE
CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR
RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL
COURT.
THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA
NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED
WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL
CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE
MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of
Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his
civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the
Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed
the findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under
the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial courts finding that he
was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable
doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate
court not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy.
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioners guilt had
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal
terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial
court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in
criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had
to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding
indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding
indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.[10] When a person is charged with an offense and the
case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense.[11] This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements
must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as the first.[12] In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy
by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge.
The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was
elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a
second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no
second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the
lower courts judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal.
Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners
claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the
act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission.[13] There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must
be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.[14] The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.[15] This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,[16] where the civil action for damages is
for the same act or omission. Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case.
However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve
the same act or omission.[17] The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same
and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding
herein petitioners acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29
applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioners negligence or
reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was
neither criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is
predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial courts judgment shows that
the judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence
of petitioners negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be
deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into
play.
Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the
conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt;
hence, petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
courts declaration that did not discount the possibility that the accused was really
negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the
accused presented itself before the Court and since said hypothesis is consistent with
the recordthe Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction.[18] The foregoing
clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt
had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing
fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of
the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated
March 24, 1988.[19] He avers that since Manchester held that The Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees, the
appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less
award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant
case. They ask us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly
instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as to docket and
filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on
March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela
did not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or
legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in the information, the trial
court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding payment thereof.
Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules
of Court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment.
Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions
with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.[20]
As correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that
the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or information.
With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule
111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated
July 7, 1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award
for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint
or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the
time private respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the
court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies
retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the
actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in
the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of
damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the
complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.[21] Recall that the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no
specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure
effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of
the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal
complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioners allegations that the
filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well
as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.