LABOR CASE DIGEST I

SERRANO vs. GALLANT MARITIME

FACTS:
• Antonio Serrano complained of Sec 10 of RA 8042. He said it does not
magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to
national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them
by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to
their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their
employment contract "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner
claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in
that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal
protection and denies them due process
• Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA approved contract
• Sadly, he got downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998
• Gallant didn’t make good on their promise so Serrano didn’t want to
work for them anymore. He got repatriated
• He had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his
contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and
twenty-three (23) days
 • Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73
• LA awarded a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, which he based on
computation on the salary period of three months only — rather than
the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
petitioner's employment contract — applying Sec 10
• Both appealed to NLRC - corrected the LA's computation of the
lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable
salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042
"does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be
proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay
• Serrano partially appealed, questioning the constitutionality of Sec
10, but was dismissed
• Filed an appeal with CA – initially denied but later affirmed NLRC

ISSUE: WON Sec. 10 is unconstitutional

HELD:
Serrano says: subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly
impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their
overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period
and a fixed salary package.  It treats OFWs differently from local
Filipino workers. The insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No.
8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement
agencies. Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of
placement agencies, the subject clause sacrifices the well-being of
OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes foreign employers better
off than local employers because in cases involving the illegal
dismissal of employees, foreign employers are liable for salaries
covering a maximum of only three months of the unexpired
employment contract while local employers are liable for the full
lump-sum salaries of their employees

Gallant says: Issue too late for appeal

SG says: R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's contract, the
provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioner's employment. OFWs and local workers differ in terms of
the nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary
benefits must necessarily be treated differently. First, while local
workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs
perform their jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult
for our courts to acquire jurisdiction; and second, as held in Coyoca
v. National Labor Relations Commission and Millares v. National
Labor Relations Commission, OFWs are contractual employees who
can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers
who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG posits
that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but
not available to OFWs. Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind
the subject clause as a police power measure adopted to mitigate
the solidary liability of placement agencies for this "redounds to the
benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks
to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps
[assure] the government that migrant workers are properly
deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions."

• It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a
constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity
entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before
a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the
pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be
considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it
cannot be considered on appeal.
• Does not violate Sec 10, Art 3. The prohibition is aligned with
the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation,  and cannot affect acts or contracts
already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence,
their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part
thereof. Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people are generally
applicable not only to future contracts but even to those
already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the
superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to
promote public welfare. 
• Violates Sec 1 of Art 3, Sec 18 Art 2 and Sec 3 Art 12. Our
present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital
social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law
bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the
 working class on the humane justification that those with less
privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to
afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to
translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of
a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection,
judicial scrutiny ought to be stricter. In the case at bar, the
challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients
of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades.
• Subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first
category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment
contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal,
they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portion of their contract. The second category consists of
OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or
more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to
monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired
portion of their contracts
• In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with
fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
 treated alike in terms of the computation of their money
claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the
subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their employment contract have
since been differently treated in that their money claims are
subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
• The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a
suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim
of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject
clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it
with a peculiar disadvantage.
• In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of
proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would
justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs
under the subject clause
• The Court further holds that the subject clause violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives
him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any
existing valid governmental purpose.
 • The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that
the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal
protection

• Overtime and leave pay should NOT form part of the salary
basis in the computation of his monetary award, because their
existence have to be established first


SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC INC vs. DOZA

FACTS:
• Skippers United Pacific, Inc. deployed, in behalf of Skippers, De
Gracia, Lata, and Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom
Star for 10 months, 12 months and 12 months respectively.
Paragraph 2 of all the employment contracts stated that: "The terms
and conditions of the Revised Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of All Seafarers shall be strictly and faithfully
observed." No employment contract was submitted for Nathaniel
Doza.
• De Gracia, et al. claimed that Skippers failed to remit their
respective allotments for almost five months,compelling them to air
their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers Free Union. The ITF
Inspector Adrian Mihalcioiu of the Romanian Seafarers Union sent
Captain Savvas of Cosmos Shipping a fax letter, relaying the
complaints of his crew, namely: home allotment delay, unpaid
 salaries (only advances), late provisions, l ack of laundry services
(only one washing machine), and lack of maintenance of the vessel
(perforated and unrepaired deck).
• To date, however, Skippers only failed to remit the home allotment
for the month of December 1998. On 28 January 1999, De Gracia, et
al. were unceremoniously discharged from MV WisdomStars and
immediately repatriated. Upon arrival in the Philippines, De Gracia,
et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter
and prayed for payment of their home allotment for the month
of December 1998, salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contracts, moral damages, exemplary damages,and attorney’s fees.
• Skippers, on the other hand, claims that at around 2:00 a.m. on 3
December 1998, De Gracia, smellingstrongly of alcohol, went to the
cabin of Gabriel Oleszek, Master of MV Wisdom Stars, and was rude,
shouting noisily to the master. De Gracia left the master’s cabin
after a few minutes and was heard shouting very loudly somewhere
down the corridors.
• Skippers also claims that at 12:00 noon on 22 January 1999, four
Filipino seafarers, namely Aprosta, DeGracia, Lata and Doza, arrived
in the master’s cabin and demanded immediate repatriation because
they were not satisfied with the ship. De Gracia, et al. threatened
that they may become crazy any moment and demanded for all
outstanding payments due to them
• Skippers also claims that, due to the disembarkation of De Gracia, et
al., 17 other seafarers disembarked under abnormal circumstances.
For this reason, it was suggested that Polish seafarers be utilized
instead of Filipino seamen. Since De Gracia, et al. pre-terminated
 their contracts, Skippers claims they are liable for their repatriation
expenses in accordance with Section 19(G) of Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA)Memorandum Circular No.
• Skippers also prayed for payment of moral damages and attorney’s
fees.
• LA: Dismissed action for lack of merit because the seafarers
voluntarily pre-terminated their employment contracts by
demanding for immediate repatriation due to dissatisfaction with
the ship.
• NLRC: Dismissed De Gracia, et al.’s appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed the LA’s decision. They also considered De Gracia, et al.’s
claim for home allotment for December 1998 unsubstantiated.
• CA: Granted De Gracia, et al.’s petition and reversed the decisions
of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. The telex message was "a self-serving
document that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion that
petitioners indeed voluntarily demanded their immediate
repatriation."

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding petitioners
liable to pay back wages and the alleged unremitted home allotment pay
despite the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the claims are
baseless

HELD:
• PETITION DENIED.
• For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with
both procedural and substantive due process. The legality of the
manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the
legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process
• The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices
before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first
notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the
issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be
complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is
not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted
• In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et
al., regarding the cause of their dismissal. Cosmoship furnished a
written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency,
claiming that De Gracia, et al., were repatriated because the latter
voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given
credibility and weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that
there was pre-termination of the employment contract "akin to
resignation" and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by
the CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document
that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence." If,
indeed, De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts,
then De Gracia, et al., should have submitted their written
resignations
• Since memorandum 55 states that home allotment of seafarers
actually constitutes at least eighty percent (80%) of their salary,
 home allotment pay is not in the nature of an extraordinary money
or benefit, but should actually be considered as salary which should
be paid for services rendered. For this reason, such non-remittance
of home allotment pay should be considered as unpaid salaries, and
Skippers shall be liable to pay the home allotment pay of De Gracia,
et al., for the month of December 1998
• Awarded home allotment payment and salary for unexpired term and
attorney’s fees.

SAMEER OVERSEAS vs. BAJARO et al

FACTS:
• Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. deployed respondents
Maricel N. Bajaro et al to work as operators for its foreign principal,
Mabuchi Motors Company, Ltd. under individual two-year
employment contracts, 7 with a monthly salary of Taiwan Dollars (NT
$) 15,840.00 each. Prior to their deployment, each respondent paid
petitioner company the amount of P47,900.00 as placement fee
• However, after working for only a period of eleven (11) months and
before the expiration of the two-year period, respondents'
employment contracts were terminated and they were repatriated
to the Philippines. This prompted the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner company and its President and General
Manager, individual petitioner Rizalina Lamson, 8 with prayer for the
payment of salaries and wages covering the unexpired portion of
their employment contracts in lieu of reinstatement, and with
allegations of illegal deductions and illegal collection of placement
 fees. Respondents Bajaro, Morilla and Sumigcay likewise sought
reimbursement of the amount they personally expended for their
plane tickets for their return flight, alleging that their employment
contracts provided for free transportation expenses in going to and
from Taiwan. Collectively, respondents prayed for the award of
damages as well as attorney's fees
• In defense, petitioners claimed that respondents were validly
retrenched due to severe business losses suffered by their foreign
principal. They denied the alleged deductions amounting to NT
$7,500.00 from petitioners' monthly salaries and that, consequently,
petitioners are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees
• LA: pay full reimbursement of placement fees and 3 months’ salary
• NLRC: all the requirements for a valid retrenchment have been
established, thus, the respondents were not illegally dismissed.
Therefore, it found that the awards of salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the contracts and the refund of placement fees
to be bereft of any basis in fact and in law. The award for the
payment of the salary deductions was also not considered for
respondents' failure to substantiate it, and the claim for
reimbursement of expenses for the return flight of respondents
Bajaro, Sumigcay and Morilla was similarly disallowed
• CA: LA affirmed

ISSUE: WON CA erred

HELD:
 • As petitioners failed to establish a valid retrenchment, respondents
were clearly dismissed without just, valid or authorized cause
• Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court finds that a
modification of the monetary award in the amount of NT$47,520.00
per respondent — corresponding to three (3) months' worth of
salaries — granted by the Labor Arbiter is in order, conformably with
the pronouncement in the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services
• Since the unexpired portion of respondents' individual two-year
contracts is still for 13 months, as they worked in Taiwan for a
period of only 11 months, each respondent is therefore entitled to a
total amount of NT$205,920.00 23 or its current equivalent in
Philippine Peso, by way of unpaid salaries, in addition to the other
monetary awards granted by the Labor Arbiter

CREWLINK vs. TERINGTERING

FACTS:
• Editha Teringtering, spouse of the deceased Jacinto Teringtering,
and in behalf of her minor child filed a complaint against Crewlink
for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial
assistance, damages and attorney’s fees.
• Editha alleged that her husband entered into an overseas
employment contract with Crewlink – he took a medical exam
and was declared fit to work. On April 9, 2001 Jacinto died due to
drowning. Editha claimed for compensation but was denied by
Crewlink. She claimed that in order for her to get compensation it is
 enough that Jacinto died during the term of his contract and while
still on board.
• She asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or
mood disorder bipolar type.S he further alleged that the death was
not deliberate and of his own will but as a result of a mental
disorder.
• Crewlink alleged that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice. He was
saved the first time and someone was assigned to watch over him.
He jumped off a second time and was no longer saved. Crewlink
asserted that Editha was not entitled to the benefits because
Jacinto committed suicide.

ISSUE: WON Editha was entitled to death benefits
HELD:
• In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that
Jacinto's death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing
himself by jumping into the sea.
• Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that her
husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness,
or any medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's
insanity. The record does not even show when the alleged insanity
of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family problems may
result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to
mental disorder. 
• The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition
of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man
would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or
 condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with thep erson claimed to be insane, or who
has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the
witness’ own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to
support respondent's claim.

PEOPLE vs COMILA

FACTS:
• Charlie and Aida Comila, along with Indira Lastra were charged with
Illegal Recruitment in large scale by a syndicate and 7 counts of
estafa. Indira is still at large while the Comilas were found guilty.
• Annie Felix was introduced by her sister-in-law, Ella Bakisan, to
appellant Aida Comila in August 1998 (pp. 3, 24, tsn, September 14,
1999). Ella Bakisan told her that appellant Aida Comila could help
her find work abroad as she was recruiting workers for a factory in
Palermo, Italy
• Appellant introduced them to a certain Erlinda Ramos, one of the
agents of Mrs. Indira Lastra, a representative of the Far East Trading
Corporation
• Annie submitted all her requirements to appellant, along with the
amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) as processing fee. She
also paid a total of twenty three thousand (P23,000.00) as partial
 payment of her placement fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
on or about September 6 or 7, 1998
• Another 50, 000 for the processing fee was charged.
• Various flights to Italy were cancelled. Rescheduling and delays took
place
• They found out Indira was an inmate of Manila City Jail. .When they
demanded the return of their money from Indira Lastra, the latter
told them to withdraw their money from appellant Aida Comila
• Aida Comila never professed that she had the authority to recruit
and made it clear to the applicants for overseas employment that it
was Erlinda Ramos who had such authority and who issued the job
orders from Italy. Upon this premise, this appellant contends that
the subsequent transactions she had with the applicants negate the
presence of deceit, an essential element of estafa under paragraph
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. On the charge of
illegal recruitment, this appellant argues that "she was merely trying
to help the applicants to process their papers, believing that Indira
Ram Sighn Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really send the applicants
to Italy." With respect to co-appellant CharlieComila, the defense
submits that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove his
participation in the illegal recruitment and estafa.

ISSUE: WON they were guilty

HELD:
• Relying completely on Aida's representations, the applicants-
complainants entrusted their money to her only to discover later
that their hopes for an overseas employment were but vain
• (1) she had to show and explain the job order and the work and
travel requirements to the complainants; (2) she had to meet the
complainants at Jollibee, Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City and in her
residence; (3) she had to be present at the briefings for the
applicants; (4) she received the placement fees even if she claims
that she received them from Ella Bakisan; (5) she had to go down to
Manila and accompanied the complainants for their medical
examination; and (6) she had to go out of her way to do all these
things even when she was pregnant and was about to give birth.
Certainly, she was not a social worker or a humanitarian who had all
the time in this world to go out of her way to render free services to
other people whom she did not know or just met. To be sure,
Aida Comila had children to attend to and a husband who was
unemployed to be able to conduct such time-consuming charitable
activities
• The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when, among other
things, a person who, without being duly authorized according to law
represents or gives the distinct impression that he or she has the
power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to
whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given
to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that
employment. EaSCAH
• In fact, even if there is no consideration involved, appellant will still
be deemed as having engaged in recruitment activities, since it was
 sufficiently demonstrated that she promised overseas employment
to private complainants. To be engaged in the practice and
placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer
of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether
locally or abroad.
• Charlie admitted that when Aida gave birth, he had to accompany
the complainants to Manila for their medical examination and again,
on another trip, to bring them to the office of Erlinda Ramos to
follow-up their visas
• It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged
and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason
therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second,
such an intent is imperative
• Here, it has been sufficiently proven that both appellants
represented themselves to the complaining witnesses to have the
capacity to send them to Italy for employment, even as they do not
have the authority or license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this
misrepresentation that induced the complainants to part with their
hard-earned money for placement and medical fees.

PEOPLE vs. JAMILOSA

FACTS:
• Sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, representing
to have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and
 deploy or transport workers for overseas employment, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and
promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely,
Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work
or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home
and Care Center.
• Prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Imelda Bamba,
Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh.
• According to Bamba, she met the appellant on a bus. She was on her
way to SM North Edsa where she was a company nurse. Appellant
introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad.
Appellant told her he could help her get employed as nurse.
Appellant gave his pager number and instructed her to contact him
is she’s interested. Sometime in January 1996, appellant fetched her
at her office, went to her house and gave him the necessary
documents and handed to appellant the amount of US$300.00 and
the latter showed her a photocopy of her supposed US visa.
However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money.
Thereafter, appellant told her to resign from her work because she
was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for USA on Feb,
1996. On the scheduled departure, appellant failed to show up.
Instead, called and informed her that he failed to give the passport
and US visa because she had to go to province because his wife died.
Trying to contact him to the supposed residence and hotel where he
temporarily resided, but to no avail.
• Witness Lagman testified that she is a registered nurse. In January
1996, she went to SM North Edsa to visit her cousin Bamba. At that
 time Bamba informed her that she was going to meet to appellant.
Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. The appellant convinced them
of his ability to send them abroad. On their next meeting, Lagman
handed to the latter the necessary documents and an amount of US
$300.00 and 2 bottles of black label without any receipt issued by
the appellant. Four days after their meeting, a telephone company
called her because her number was appearing in appellants cell
phone documents. The caller is trying to locate him as he was a
swindler. She became suspicious and told Bamba about the matter.
One week before her scheduled flight, appellant told her he could
not meet them because his mother passed away.
• Lastly, Alma Singh, who is also a registered nurse, declared that she
first met the appellant at SM North Edsa when Imelda Bamba
introduced the latter to her. Appellant told her that he is an
undercover agent of FBI and he could fix her US visa. On their next
meeting, she gave all the pertinent documents. Thereafter, she gave
P10,000 to the appellant covering half price of her plane ticket.
They paged the appellant through his beeper to set up another
appointment but the appellant avoided them as he had many things
to do.
• The accused Jamilosa testified on direct examination that he never
told Bamba that he could get her a job in USA, the truth being that
she wanted to leave SM as company nurse because she was having a
problem thereat. Bamba called him several times, seeking advices
from him. He started courting Bamba and went out dating until
latter became his girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh thru Bamba.
As complainants seeking advice on how to apply for jobs abroad, lest
 he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman and Singh sign
separate certifications, all to effect that he never recruited them
and no money was involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment case
against him because they quarreled and separated.
• RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the
crime of
Illegal recruitment in large scale

HELD:

• “Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,

enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

• Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Provided, That any such
non- licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises
 for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged.

• To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is

burdened to prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the
person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b)
or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused
committed the same against three or more persons individually or as
a group. As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the
complaining witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court
found to be credible and deserving of full probative weight, the
prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove
the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA,
are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals
ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other
circumstance.

• The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or

document signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have
received money and liquor does not free him from criminal liability.
Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as
consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is considered
as being engaged in recruitment activities. It can be gleaned from
the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused
 promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for
illegal recruitment.

PEOPLE vs. NENITA HU

FACTS:
• Nenita Hu is the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc.a
land-based recruitment agency dulylicensed by the POEA to engage
inthe business of recruitment and placement
of workers abroad. EthelGenoves, on the other hand, workedas a
consultant and marketing officer of Brighturn. Aside from her stint
atBrighturn, she was also connectedwith Riverland Consultancy
Service,another recruitment agency.Brighturn was authorized to
recruit, process, and deploy land-
basedworkers for the period of 18December 1999 to 17 December
2001
• Genoves and Hu were charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale following the complaint from 6 people that they promised the
latter employment/
job placement abroadand collected fees from them.However, when
the job placements never materialized, the complainants demanded
that the money they gave as placement fees be returned to them.
Hu was not able to refund the same.
Four of these complainants were promised employment during the
validity of Brighturn’s license. Garcia applied on April 2002, when
Brighturn’s license had already expired. She was referred
 to BestOne, another recruitment agency, but her placement fee was
paid with Brighturn.
• For her defense, Hu cited that the
receipts that the complainantsshowed her were issued byRiverland. 
She denied knowing Genoves. 

ISSUE: WON she was guilty of Illegal recruitment

HELD:
• A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on
a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons
whether individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does
not require that at least three victims testify at the trial,
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving
that the offense was committed against three or
more persons. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adducesuf
ficient evidence to prove thatillegal recruitment was committedagai
nst three or more persons.
Theillegal recruitment was committedagainst only one person: Garci
a because Hu referred Garcia to another agency without the license
or authority to do so. Illegal recruitment
cannot successfully attach to the allegations of the others since they
testified that they accomplished their  pre-
employment requirements through Brighturn from June 2001 up to
October of the same year, a period wherein Brighturn’s license to
engage in recruitment and placement was still in full force and
effect.
• However, failure of the prosecutionto proves the guilt of Hu beyond
reasonable doubt does not absolve her of her civil obligation to
return the money she collected
from thecomplainants. Neither does her acquittal herein exempt her
 from subsequent criminal prosecution for estafa provided that
deceit, which isan essential element of estafa, be proven by the
prosecution.
• Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur: (1) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
enablehim to lawfully engage in therecruitment and placement of w
orkers; and (2) he undertakes any
activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. The crime becomes Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale when the foregoing two elements concur,
with the addition of a third element—the recruiter committed the
same against three or more persons, individually or as a group
• The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or
forwarding an applicant after an initial interview to
a selected employer, placement or  bureau, is included in
recruitment. The absence of receipts in the case of illegal
recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is
not fatal to the prosecution’s case. As long as the prosecution
is able toestablish through credible andtestimonial evidence that the
appellant had engaged in illegalrecruitment, a conviction for theoffe
nse can be very well justified.
Obiter: Ei incumbit probation qui dicit nonqui negat – he who asserts,
not hewho denies, must prove.

VILLAR V. PEOPLE

FACTS:
• In January 1993, Rosario Villar and Dolores Placa represented to Nila
Panilag that they would be able to find her a job abroad and
obtained from the latter P6,500 as placement fee, but they did not
have any license or authority to do so. An Information was filed
against Villar
and Placawith the title designating their offense under RA 8042. In 2
002,after the trial, the RTC held Villar liable for
the offense of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code.
Villar appealed to the CA, which found that Villar should
have only been

charged 

under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and not under RA8042. It then
held that Villar was liable under Article 38 of the Labor Code, in relation
to Article 13(b) and Article 39 of the same Code. It then affirmed the trial
court’s decision.

Villar appealed, claiming that the CAfailed

to consider that RA 8042cannot be given retroactive effect andthe
decision of the RTC constitutes aviolation of the constitutional prohibition
against

ex post facto law.


ISSUE: W/N RA 8042 was retroactively used as basis for filing a criminal
action against Villar for illegal recruitment.

W/N Villar is guilty of illegal recruitment.

Under which law should Villar be held accountable? 

W/N RA 8042 was appliedretroactively in Villar’s case.

HELD:

• NO. Petitioner was charged in 1998under an Information that

erroneously designated the offense as covered by RA 8042, but
alleged in its body acts which are punishable under the Labor Code.
As it was proven that she had committed the acts she was charged
with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not
under RA 8042.

• YES. The prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had performed
the acts constituting the offense defined inArt. 38, in relation to Art.
13(b) and punished by Art. 39 of the Labor Code, as alleged in the
body of the Information.

• THE LABOR CODE. A criminal act is punishable under the laws in

force at the time of its commission. Thus, Villar can only be charged
and foundguilty under the Labor Code which was in force in 1993
when the acts attributed to her were committed. 
 • NO. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court give RA 8042
retroactive application because both courts passed upon Villar’s case
only under the aegis of the Labor Code. The proceedings before the
trial court and the appellate court did not violate the prohibition
against ex post facto law nor involved a retroactive application of RA
8042 in any way.

• The real nature of the crime charged is determined, not from the
caption or  preamble of the information nor from the specification
of the law alleged to have been violated, but by the actual recital
of facts in the complaint or information. What controls is not the
designation but the description of the
offense charged. If the accused performed the acts alleged
in the body of the information, in the manner stated, the then he
ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the
name of the crime which those acts constitute.