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This document is current for urgency legislation through Chapter 1 of the 2016 Session.
Deering’s California Code Annotated > PENAL CODE > Part 1. Of Crimes and Punishments
> Title 7. Of Crimes Against Public Justice > Chapter 4. Forging, Stealing, Mutilating, and Falsifying
Judicial and Public Records and Documents
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Cal Pen Code § 115
(7) The court shall set a hearing for the motion brought by the prosecuting agency under
subdivision (e) no earlier than 90 calendar days from the date the motion is made. The
prosecuting agency shall provide a copy by certified mail of the written motion and a notice
of hearing to all interested parties described in paragraphs (1), (5), or (6), and all other
persons who obtain an interest in the property prior to recordation of notice of pendency of
action no later than 90 days before the hearing date set by the court. The notice shall state
the street address, if available, and the legal description of the affected real property.
(8) At a hearing on a motion brought by the prosecuting agency under subdivision (e), the
defendant, prosecuting agency, and interested parties described in paragraphs (1), (5), or (6),
shall have a right to be heard and present information to the court. No party shall be denied
a right to present information due to a lack of notice by the prosecuting agency or failure
to contact the prosecuting agency or the court prior to the hearing.
(9)
(A) At a hearing on a motion brought by a prosecuting agency under subdivision (e), if the
court determines that the interests of justice or the need to protect the property rights of
any person or party so requires, including, but not limited to, a finding that the matter
may be more appropriately determined in a civil proceeding, the court may decline to
make a determination under subdivision (e).
(B) If, prior to the hearing on the motion, any person or party files a quiet title action that
seeks a judicial determination of the validity of the same false or forged instrument that
is the subject of the motion, or the status of an interested party as a bona fide purchaser
of, or bona fide holder of an encumbrance on, the property affected by the false or
forged instrument, the court may consider that as an additional but not dispositive factor
in making its determination under subdivision (e); provided, however, that a final
judgment previously entered in that quiet title action shall be followed to the extent
otherwise required by law.
(g) As used in this section, ″prosecuting agency″ means a city attorney, a district attorney, the
Attorney General, or other state or local agency actively prosecuting a case under this section.
(h) An order made pursuant to subdivision (e) shall be considered a judgment, and subject to appeal
in accordance with, paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 904.1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
History
Enacted 1872. Amended Stats 1984 ch 593 § 1, ch 1397 § 8; Stats 1985 ch 106 § 106; Stats 2014
ch 455 § 1 (AB 1698), effective January 1, 2015.
Historical Derivation:
(a) Field’s Draft NY Pen C § 149.
(b) NY Pen C § 95.
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Cal Pen Code § 115
Annotations
Notes
Amendments:
1984 Amendment:
In addition to making technical changes, added subds (b) and (c) and the last paragraph. (As amended
by Stats 1984, ch 1397, compared to the section as it read prior to 1984. This section was also amended
by an earlier chapter, ch 593. See Gov C § 9605.)
1985 Amendment:
2014 Amendment:
Case Notes
1. Generally
2. Construction
2.5. Construction with Other Law
3. Application
1. Generally
This section simply seeks to bring within its terms various classes of instruments entitled under our law
to be recorded, without any regard to whether the particular instrument is defective in form or
certification. People v. Webber (1919, Cal App) 44 Cal App 120, 186 P 406, 1919 Cal App LEXIS 473;
People v. Baender (1924, Cal App) 68 Cal App 49, 228 P 536, 1924 Cal App LEXIS 217.
The statute was designed to prevent the recordation or registration of spurious documents, knowingly
offered for record with intent to defraud. People v. Baender (1924, Cal App) 68 Cal App 49, 228 P 536,
1924 Cal App LEXIS 217.
The constitutionality of this section is upheld as against an attack based on former Cal Const Art IV
§ 24 (see now Cal Const Art IV § 9), requiring that the subject of an act be expressed in its title. People
v. Standley (1932, Cal App) 126 Cal App 739, 15 P2d 180, 1932 Cal App LEXIS 587.
The trial court erred in failing to dismiss an amended information in which defendant was charged with
10 counts of forgery, Pen C § 470, and 10 counts of presenting a false or forged document for
recording, Pen C § 115. The counts contained in the amended information and the counts contained in
the original information for which a guilty verdict had been reversed for insufficient evidence were
based on the identical conduct. Since defendant’s conviction was reversed for insufficiency of
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Cal Pen Code § 115
evidence, Pen C §§ 1262 and 1009 had no application to the case. While it is true that a defendant may
be retried when a conviction is reversed for trial error, retrial on the same charge is impermissible if
the reversal is based on insufficiency of the evidence. The prosecution here made a deliberate choice
of prosecuting defendant originally on grand theft charges, while all along knowing that the identical
evidence could support forgery and filing false document charges. Defendant’s prosecution on the new
information was barred by Pen C § 654(a). Sanders v. Superior Court (1999, Cal App 2d Dist) 76 Cal
App 4th 609, 90 Cal Rptr 2d 481, 1999 Cal App LEXIS 1018.
2. Construction
The word ″instrument,″ in this section, is limited in its application to that class of instruments
invariably referred to throughout our statutes. People v. Fraser (1913, Cal App 1st Dist) 23 Cal App
82, 137 P 276, 1913 Cal App LEXIS 182.
Generally the term ″instrument″ as applied to documents necessarily imports a paper writing; but every
paper writing is not necessarily an instrument within the statutory meaning of the term. With reference
to writings the term ″instrument″ as applied in our statutes has been defined to mean an agreement
expressed in writing, signed and delivered by one person to another, transferring the title to or creating
a lien on real property, or giving a right to a debt or duty. People v. Fraser (1913, Cal App 1st Dist)
23 Cal App 82, 137 P 276, 1913 Cal App LEXIS 182.
It is only the recording of an instrument entitled to be recorded which constitutes a crime under this
section. People v. Webber (1919, Cal App) 44 Cal App 120, 186 P 406, 1919 Cal App LEXIS 473.
The gist of the offense is the offering for record of a false or forged deed. People v. Standley (1932,
Cal App) 126 Cal App 739, 15 P2d 180, 1932 Cal App LEXIS 587.
Intent to defraud another or the defrauding of anyone is not required. People v. Standley (1932, Cal
App) 126 Cal App 739, 15 P2d 180, 1932 Cal App LEXIS 587.
This section does not require a specific intent, as the word ″knowingly″ does not impart the idea of
intent, but merely refers to a knowledge of the essential facts which bring the act within the statute.
People v. Horowitz (1945, Cal App) 70 Cal App 2d 675, 161 P2d 833, 1945 Cal App LEXIS 1120.
This section does not require that the act be done with intent to defraud, nor does it require that anyone
be defrauded thereby. The crime is sufficiently proved when it is shown that the accused intentionally
committed the forbidden act. People v. Geibel (1949, Cal App) 93 Cal App 2d 147, 208 P2d 743, 1949
Cal App LEXIS 1360.
Word ″instrument″ as used in section is limited in its meaning and application to that class of
instruments defined as agreements expressed in writing, signed, and delivered by one person to
another, transferring title to or creating lien on realty, or giving right to debt or duty. People v. Olf
(1961, Cal App 2d Dist) 195 Cal App 2d 97, 15 Cal Rptr 390, 1961 Cal App LEXIS 1429.
Pen C § 115, stating that every person who offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered
or recorded in any public office is guilty of a felony, was designed to prevent the recordation of
spurious documents knowingly offered for record. In the case of a deed, the crime is complete when
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Cal Pen Code § 115
the deed has been prepared so that upon its face it will have the effect of defrauding one who acts upon
it as genuine. It is not necessary to constitute a completed offense that anyone actually be defrauded.
A violation of the statute does not require a writing which falsely purports to be the writing of another,
that is, a forgery. The statute differentiates between the two categories, clearly proscribing either a false
or a forged instrument. Obviously, an instrument may have the effect of defrauding one who acts on
it as genuine even though it does not bear a forged signature or otherwise meet the technical
requirements of a forged instrument. Generes v. Justice Court (1980, Cal App 3d Dist) 106 Cal App
3d 678, 165 Cal Rptr 222, 1980 Cal App LEXIS 1908.
In a prosecution in which the information charged defendant with attempting to file a forged death
certificate, and in which defendant pleaded nolo contendere to offering a forged instrument for filing
(Pen C § 115), defendant was entitled to appeal the conviction, since he was able to establish
jurisdictional grounds going to the legality of the proceedings, as required under Pen C § 1237.5
(prerequisites to appeal from conviction on plea of guilty or nolo contendere). Both defendant and the
prosecution agreed that a death certificate was not an ″instrument″ within the meaning of Pen C § 115,
thereby rendering the plea defective. Since the issue raised by defendant was jurisdictional, it was
cognizable on appeal after defendant’s plea. People v. Soriano (1992, Cal App 1st Dist) 4 Cal App 4th
781, 6 Cal Rptr 2d 138, 1992 Cal App LEXIS 323, reh’g denied, (1992, Cal App 1st Dist) 1992 Cal
App LEXIS 518.
An altered temporary restraining order was an ″instrument″ for purposes of Pen C § 115 (filing false
instrument). Thus, defendant’s conviction of violating § 115 was not improper, where he had obtained
an ex parte order enjoining his former girlfriend from contacting or harassing him, and had added false
requirements to the order before filing it with the marshal. Although prior case law had required that
a document represent an agreement in order to qualify as an ″instrument,″ a more recent appellate court
opinion rejected this requirement. Subsequently, the Legislature extensively revised § 115, leading to
the presumption that the more recent case was approved. Moreover, the amendments to § 115
demonstrate a legislative intent to protect judicial and public records such as the temporary restraining
order. People v. Parks (1992, Cal App 4th Dist) 7 Cal App 4th 883, 9 Cal Rptr 2d 450, 1992 Cal App
LEXIS 811.
Materiality is not an element of the offense of offering a false or forged instrument for record (Pen C
§ 115). The terms of § 115 do not suggest materiality is an element of the offense. The core purpose
of § 115 is to protect the integrity and reliability of public records. This purpose is served by an
interpretation that prohibits any knowing falsification of public records. Accordingly, a court may not
insert into § 115 a requirement of materiality that the Legislature did not see fit to include. People v.
Feinberg (1997, Cal App 1st Dist) 51 Cal App 4th 1566, 60 Cal Rptr 2d 323, 1997 Cal App LEXIS
17.
Fishing activity record is an instrument within the meaning of Pen C § 115, and the definition of
″instrument″ in the statute is not unconstitutionally vague; moreover, prosecution of an offending
fishing boat operator was not precluded by a regulation governing fishing records, 14 Cal Code Reg
§ 190, because the two provisions were not identical. People v. Powers (2004, Cal App 1st Dist) 117
Cal App 4th 291, 11 Cal Rptr 3d 619, 2004 Cal App LEXIS 418.
Violation of Pen C § 115, is governed by Pen C §§ 801.5 and 803(c), notwithstanding its absence from
the list of specific offenses. Regardless of subsequent actions by the legislature, the terms of Pen C §
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Cal Pen Code § 115
803.5(c), applied to the violation of Pen C § 115, as charged against defendant. People v. Soni (2005,
Cal App 4th Dist) 134 Cal App 4th 1510, 36 Cal Rptr 3d 864, 2005 Cal App LEXIS 1944, review
denied, (2006, Cal) 2006 Cal LEXIS 5004.
Because filing a false vehicle theft report in violation of Veh C § 10501 would commonly result in a
violation of the general false report statute, Pen C § 115(a), prosecution under the general statute is
precluded. People v. Murphy (2011, Cal) 52 Cal 4th 81, 127 Cal Rptr 3d 78, 253 P 3d 1216, 2011 Cal
LEXIS 6795.
For purposes of unemployment benefits, there was no basis for a finding that a reasonable person
would have thought it was not dishonest when a school district employee exceeded break times and
falsified time sheets, given that making false entries in a public document could be a crime. Irving v.
California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2014, 2d Dist) 2014 Cal App LEXIS 833.
3. Application
Where an instrument, if genuine, would not be entitled to be recorded under the law of the state, as
in the case of a forged instrument purporting to be an assignment of an interest in certain letters patent
for an invention, it is not a felony to offer it for record, or to cause or procure it to be recorded. People
v. Harrold (1890) 84 Cal 567, 24 P 106, 1890 Cal LEXIS 843.
A birth certificate is not an ″instrument″ within the meaning of this section. People v. Fraser (1913, Cal
App 1st Dist) 23 Cal App 82, 137 P 276, 1913 Cal App LEXIS 182.
There can be no forgery of an instrument which is void upon its face. People v. Baender (1924, Cal
App) 68 Cal App 49, 228 P 536, 1924 Cal App LEXIS 217.
A deed was constituted a false and forged instrument within the meaning of this section by the signing
of the grantor’s name to the deed, valid upon its face, by another, and the impersonation of the grantor
in the acknowledgment, with intent on the part of the person procuring such signature and
impersonation to defraud his wife of a life estate in the property, and the actual deception of a title
company in insuring title in the belief that such deed was genuine. People v. Baender (1924, Cal App)
68 Cal App 49, 228 P 536, 1924 Cal App LEXIS 217.
Although a deed conveys no title, being valid on its face it may be the subject of forgery. People v.
Baender (1924, Cal App) 68 Cal App 49, 228 P 536, 1924 Cal App LEXIS 217.
No proof is required that anyone has been defrauded by the filing of a false or forged instrument.
People v. Horowitz (1945, Cal App) 70 Cal App 2d 675, 161 P2d 833, 1945 Cal App LEXIS 1120.
In a prosecution for forgery of a will and a contract, for offering a false document to be filed of record,
and for offering false evidence, it is error to instruct as to the meaning of criminal intent and to define
the word ″wilfully″ in connection therewith, without limiting the application of such instruction to the
charge of forgery, which is the only one involving actual intent, and the prejudicial effect of such error
is not cured by an instruction to the effect that forgery is one of the crimes in which a specific element
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Cal Pen Code § 115
of intent is required. People v. Geibel (1949, Cal App) 93 Cal App 2d 147, 208 P2d 743, 1949 Cal App
LEXIS 1360.
Prosecution of automobile dealer for offering to be filed with the department of motor vehicles certain
false documents described as ″Dealer’s Reports of Sale,″ and ″Certificates of Non-Operation,″
assuming that such documents were ″instruments″ within meaning of this section, under which
prosecution was brought, such prosecution should nevertheless have been brought under former Veh
C § 131(d), providing that one who knowingly makes false statements in any document required to be
filed with departments of motor vehicles is guilty of misdemeanor. People v. Wood (1958, Cal App 2d
Dist) 161 Cal App 2d 24, 325 P2d 1014, 1958 Cal App LEXIS 1697.
Motion to set aside count of indictment charging president of company with wilful violation of this
section was properly granted where allegedly false or forged document offered to be filed of record
was application for permit filed with Corporations Commissioner which was not ″instrument″ within
meaning of section. People v. Olf (1961, Cal App 2d Dist) 195 Cal App 2d 97, 15 Cal Rptr 390, 1961
Cal App LEXIS 1429.
The trial court properly dismissed an information charging defendant with violating Pen C § 115,
prohibiting the filing, registration, or recording of any false or forged instrument, by procuring and
filing a false affidavit of voter registration, on the ground that the affidavit of voter registration was
not an ″instrument″ within the meaning of that term as used in Pen C § 115, in view of the long
standing judicial definition of the term as including only an agreement expressed in writing, signed,
and delivered by one person to another, transferring the title to or creating a lien on real property, or
giving a right to a debt or duty. People v. Fox (1977, Cal App 1st Dist) 73 Cal App 3d 178, 140 Cal
Rptr 615, 1977 Cal App LEXIS 1810.
Wills are not agreements, and they also are considered instruments within the contemplation of Pen C
§ 115, providing that every person who offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered or
recorded in any public office is guilty of a felony. Generes v. Justice Court (1980, Cal App 3d Dist)
106 Cal App 3d 678, 165 Cal Rptr 222, 1980 Cal App LEXIS 1908.
Prosecution of defendant for offering a false or forged instrument to be filed in a public office (Pen C
§ 115), based on allegations that defendant, an attorney, had offered a forged will for probate, was
barred by the general three-year statute of limitations for felony prosecutions (former Pen C § 800(a)),
where the criminal complaint was not filed for more than three years after the alleged offense.
Violation of § 115 does not constitute the ″falsification of public records″ within the meaning of former
Pen C § 799, which provided that there was ″no limitation within which a prosecution for … the
falsification of public records must be commenced.″ A will is not a public document before it is filed
for probate; thus, any falsification of a will before it is filed would not constitute the falsification of
a public record. The procuring or offering of a false instrument for filing in a public office (§ 115) is
an entirely separate offense from the falsification of a document already part of the public record (Gov
C §§ 6200, 6201), and there was nothing to show that the Legislature intended the exception created
by former Pen C § 799 to be interpreted broadly so as to include Pen C § 115 offenses. People v.
Garfield (1985) 40 Cal 3d 192, 219 Cal Rptr 196, 707 P2d 258, 1985 Cal LEXIS 402.
Fines were properly imposed against a defendant convicted of filing false deeds of trust in connection
with an elaborate scheme to unlawfully shield a friend’s personal assets from collection by judgment
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Cal Pen Code § 115
creditors (Pen C §§ 115, 115.5). The statutory fines were not meant only to benefit owners of property
fraudulently encumbered, but also to protect the interests of judgment creditors of the property owners.
The statute (Pen C § 115.5) applies to ″every person″ filing a false deed of trust on a single family
residence with the county recorder, and is clear and unambiguous, neither stating nor implying an
exception for deceitful homeowners who unlawfully attempt to encumber their own property. Pen C
§ 115.5, is but a more specific application of the general statute (Pen C § 115) and the purpose behind
both statutes is the same, to preserve the integrity and reliability of public documents. It is no defense
that the accused also owned the property for which the fraudulent documents were filed. People v.
Gangemi (1993, Cal App 1st Dist) 13 Cal App 4th 1790, 17 Cal Rptr 2d 462, 1993 Cal App LEXIS
236.
Each of two defendants was properly convicted of violating Pen C § 115 (offering false or forged
instrument for filing), where each defendant was a probationer with a community service requirement
as a condition of probation, and each had reported, on a work referral form, community service work
that she had not completed. Each defendant’s work referral form was an ″instrument″ under § 115. The
object of § 115 is to protect the integrity of judicial and public records. The work referral forms in this
case were to be filled out by an administering agency to reflect the number of hours defendants had
worked on a service project, and they were intended to be filed with the court to demonstrate
fulfillment of the work service condition of probation. Defendants had not performed the service
reflected on their respective documents, and they knew it. They deliberately filed these false
documents with the court in order to induce the court to credit them with satisfaction of a probation
term they had not satisfied. Under these circumstances, the documents were ″instruments″ within the
meaning of § 115. People v. Tate (1997, Cal App 2d Dist) 55 Cal App 4th 663, 64 Cal Rptr 2d 206,
1997 Cal App LEXIS 442.
Failure to order a competence hearing or assign counsel required reversal of a judgment under Pen C
§§ 115 and 523 because the trial court twice expressed doubt about defendant’s mental competence and
warned of a hearing under Pen C § 1367, giving rise to a duty under Pen C § 1368(a) to appoint counsel
to represent defendant on the competence issue. The trial court’s dereliction of that statutory duty
denied defendant the right to counsel. People v. Jenan (2007, Cal App 5th Dist) 148 Cal App 4th 1144,
56 Cal Rptr 3d 360, 2007 Cal App LEXIS 420.
Although defendant argued that she was improperly convicted of the felony offense of procuring or
offering false information in violation of Pen C § 115(a) because that offense was preempted by more
specific recently enacted misdemeanor offenses, this argument was rejected. Because both Veh C §§
20 and 10501 could operate concurrently with Pen C § 115, defendant’s conviction was upheld. People
v. Murphy (2009, 4th Dist) 180 Cal App 4th 905, 103 Cal Rptr 3d 417, 2009 Cal App LEXIS 2082,
review granted, depublished, People v. Murphy (Melissa Kay) (2010, Cal.) 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 229
P.3d 984, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 3854, rev’d on other grounds, (2011, Cal) 52 Cal 4th 81, 127 Cal Rptr 3d
78, 253 P 3d 1216, 2011 Cal LEXIS 6795.
Defendant’s conviction under Pen C § 115(a) based on filing a false vehicle theft report had to be
reversed because defendant should have been prosecuted under the more specific statute, Veh C §
10501. People v. Murphy (2011, Cal) 52 Cal 4th 81, 127 Cal Rptr 3d 78, 253 P 3d 1216, 2011 Cal
LEXIS 6795.
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Cal Pen Code § 115
Quitclaim deeds could reasonably be considered false documents because defendant transferred an
interest that he did not have to himself and then he recorded the document, clouding the title of the true
property owners. People v. Denman (2013, 4th Dist) 2013 Cal App LEXIS 619.
Cross References:
″Knowingly″: Pen C § 7.
Commencement of time limitation for persons filing forged instruments: Pen C § 803.5.
Collateral References:
Witkin & Epstein, Criminal Law (4th ed), Introduction to Crimes § 76.
Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (LexisNexis Matthew Bender), CALCRIM
No. 1945, Procuring Filing of False Document or Offering False Document for Filing.
Practice Tips: Realignment of California’s Criminal Justice Policies. 35 LA Law 15 (April, 2012).
Practice Tips: Addressing the Problem of Bogus Liens. 36 LA Law 12 (December 2013).
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