Legal Ethics Cases - Midterm

Legal Ethics Case Digests
Michael Angelo L. Memoracion
Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000
FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys
pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with unauthorized practice of law,
grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to
an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate before he took his
oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance and
advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a
lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the
minutes of the meeting of the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the
pleading as counsel for the candidate.
I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.
R: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities he
participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The
right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and
skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the
Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the
fact that he already took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of
the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1,
Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before
judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and
the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED.
Cruz v Atty. Cabrera AC No. 5737 October 25, 2004
Facts: The complainant files an administrative charge against the respondent for misconduct in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth-year law student, appears in court in his own behalf as he
instituted a case against his neighbor who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing, the
respondent uttered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performance of his duties as a
lawyer. The complaint was referred to the IBP commissioner who recommended suspension of respondent in the
practice of law for 3 months which was annulled by a resolution of the IBP Board recommending dismissal of the
case for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct.
RULING: The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it is not to such a magnitude as
to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. The court thereby dismissed the case due to lack of merit.
Cruz v Mina G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the
bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.
IN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee
and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and
of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from
bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the
State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the
regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee
as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as
arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the
court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
FACTS: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of
P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US
until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law
profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual
membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of
non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.
ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual membership.
RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by the State,
which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the
fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus,
his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is denied.
Santos Jr. v Llamas A.C. No. 4749 1.20.00
FACTS: This is a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation and non-payment of IBP membership dues. For
years, the respondent does not indicate proper PTR no. in his practice of the law profession. Now of old age, he
contends that he is engaged in the limited practice of his profession and as a senior citizen, he is exempt from paying
taxes and membership dues with the IBP.
ISSUE: WON the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for
being a senior citizen.
RULING: No. He is not exempt since Rule 139-A requires all IBP members to pay the annual fee and failure thereof
for 6 months merits suspension of the membership and for 1 year becomes a ground for removal of the member’s
name from the Rolls of Attorney regardless one is a practicing lawyer or not. His non-renewal of his PTR is a
misrepresentation to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540 SCRA 424
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must
also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
 the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;

 the payment of professional tax;
 the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant
to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
 the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
Alawi v Alauya
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sale representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. of Davao City. Ashari Alauya is
the incumber executive of clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. It appears that through
Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the above-mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing
loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards,
or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of
the termination of his contract with the company.
Ruling:
1. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
2. WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and
he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic A.C. No. L-533
“A lawyer, making known his legal services shall only use true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.”—Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility
“A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications for legal services.”—Rule 3.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility
Facts of the Case:
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales, was to move toward
specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms.
Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements which states undignified phrases
like-- “Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Information on DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE, VISA.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to 6:00pm 7th Floor Victoria Bldg. UN
Avenue, Manila.”
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in The Philippine Star
because it is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s situation no matter how complicated it is,
especially on marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation.
Citing John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be allowed based on this American
Jurisprudence. According to him, there is nothing wrong with making known the legal services his Legal Clinic has to
offer.
Issue:
Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.
Court Ruling:
The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the paralegals. As
stated in a previous jurisprudence, practice of law is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to
paralegals. As with the Legal Clinic’s advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer
in making known his legal services must use only honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts.
A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes
divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages which are undoubtedly contrary to law.
The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in a reputable law list, (2.) An
ordinary professional card (3.) Phone directory listing without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.
In the Matter of Joseph Hamm
FACTS:
Hamm, the Petitioner, was sentenced to life in prison for one count of first degree murder to which he pled guilty.
Prior to serving his sentence, Hamm had been separated from his wife with whom he had a son and had supported
himself by selling and using marijuana, other drugs and drinking alcohol.
The crime for which Hamm was sentenced to life imprisonment is for the murder of Morley and Well, who were killed
by Hamm along with two accomplices, Garland Wells and Bill Reeser. The three robbed and killed Morley and Well
by shooting them with a gun and leaving their bodies lying in the dessert.While in prison, Hamm exhibited good
conduct and became a model prisoner which earned him a conditioned parole. Hamm was released after serving
nearly seventeen years in prison. From conditioned parole, Hamm absolutely discharged on December 2001. While
on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State University College of Law. In July 1999, Hamm passed the
Arizona bar examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and Fitness Report with the Committee. In its report, the
Committee stated that, in reaching its conclusions, it considered the following:Hamm’s unlawful conduct, which
included the commission of two violent “execution style” murders and his testimony as to the facts surrounding the
murders
Hamm’s omissions on his Application and his testimony in explaining his failure to disclose all required information.
Hamm’s neglect of his financial responsibilities and/or violation of a longstanding child support court order and his
testimony as to hisfailure to comply with the court order.
Hamm’s mental or emotional instability impairing his ability to perform the functions of an attorney including his
testimony as to any diagnosis and treatment.
ISSUE
Whether or not Hamm can be admitted to the Bar.
HELD
No, the Supreme Court decided that Hamm failed to prove his burden that he is of good moral character on the
following grounds:Hamm failed to show rehabilitation from past criminal conduct by not accepting full responsibility
forserious criminal misconduct Staples’ murder although he accepted responsibility for the death of Morley.Hamm
was not completely upfront in his testimony to the murder of which he claims that he only
intended to rob and not to kill. This is contrary to the facts he accepted the gun and brings it with him in the car, shot
Morley without attempting robbery and shot hit again to ensure he is dead and shot Staples when he attempted to
escape.Hamm’s failure to fulfill his long overdue obligation to support his child who he was aware existed.Hamm’s
failure to disclose the incident involving him and his wife, Donna, when he submitted his application to the Committee.
This incident gave rise to Hamm being questioned by the law enforcers which should have been reflected by Hamm
in the application Question 25. Hamm’s act of quoting lines from Supreme Courts’decision and use the same in the
introduction for his petition.
Soriano v. Dizon A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006
FACTS:
While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car driven by herein respondent.
Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn. An altercation resulted therefrom
that got to the point that the respondent fired and shot complainant hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the
respondent so the latter pushed him out and sped off.
ISSUE:
WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

RULING:
Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society
in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed
firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.
Linsangan v Tolentino
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that Atty.
Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, “pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an
affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card which appears as follows:
FRONT
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
BACK
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such calling cards.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal
another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees
for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep
into another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although Atty.
Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear
that Labiano was connected to his law office. Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty. Tolentino could
produce a more favorable result.
Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance legal actions for the clients.
The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may
not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire
devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case,
the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either
of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states “w/ financial assistance“, was clearly used to entice clients (who already
had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and direct hand in the
printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino
committed, he was suspended by the Supreme Court for one year.
Teves v COMELEC G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009
Facts:
In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run for a congressional seat in the May 2007 election because of a
Sandiganbayan decision rendered against him in 2005 involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude.
The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the latter lost in the said election.
Issue:
Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
when Comelec disqualified petitioner in view of the petitioner’s conviction.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the crime for which petitioner was convicted in Sandiganbayan in 2005 did not involve moral
turpitude.
As found in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner, then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to
gain pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a
cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does
not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently
immoral. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. It was held that it was not
for the judiciary to settle questions which is for other branches of the government to deal with.
Being so, the Court reversed the Comelec’s decision of disqualifying petitioner. The case was not moot since the
resolution of which would determine petitioner’s qualification in future elections.
Victoria Barrientos v. Transfiguracion Daarol
FACTS:
Complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the
time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, while respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married,
General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time of the said relationship.
Respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was
solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a Catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo,
and that said respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his relationship with
complainant.
Respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime, having been a former student of
complainant's father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in
Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually with her other
sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also befriended
complainant and who became a close friend when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the
usherettes during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch
her at her residence in the morning and took her home from the convention site after each day's activities.
Respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7,
1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents' permission was respondent's partner
during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that
evening, they left the place but before going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the
jeep at the beach, where there were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the
sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to have joy ride with
complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to make love twice or three times a week; that as a
result of her intimate relations, complainant became pregnant.
That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant
would deliver her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on
the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her there
on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in February and March 1974; that later on complainant
decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and
her sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a
baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week
of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the
respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; which complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she instituted the present
disbarment proceedings against respondent.
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after hearing, respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daarol is grossly immoral.
HELD:
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to complainant, then
still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in
having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise
to marry her, and then deserted her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply
demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the
grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct is in order. Good moral conduct is a condition which precedes
admission to the Bar and is not dispensed with upon admission there. It is a continuing qualification to which all
lawyers must possess. Otherwise, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred.
Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451 25 Jul
FACTS:
Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who was once his student in
tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Respondent filed
motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well as the love letters while under
extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The case took an unexpected turn when another complaint was
filed, the wife as again the complainant but now together with their seven children as co-signatories. After several
hearings, the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed abandoned his family as against morals, based on
testimonial evidences. In addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated and the Code of Ethics for Lawyers
culpable for disbarment.
HELD:
YES. Respondent disbarred.
RATIO:
The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for the members of the law profession.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.
Royong v Oblena AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with rape. The
Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge
between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex. In view of his own findings as a result of his
investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other
misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately
alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously
with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus
rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the
respondent as lawyer and judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of
respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.
HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.
RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock
common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble
profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral
character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He
lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to
his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
Ui v Bonifacio
Facts:
Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant against
respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s
contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June
1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred
that Carlos Ui never lived with her.
Issue:
Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law.
Held:
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was dismissed.
All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
Vitrolio v Dasig
NATURE
Administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED).
FACTS:
1. Almost all complainants are high-ranking officers of the CHED. They allege Vitriolo committed acts that are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
2. During her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B.
Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action
on their pending applications or requests before her office
3. Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11)
baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which
were subsequently dismissed.
4. Complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 of Presidential Decree
No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to “Borela Tire Supply” and “Nova’s Lining Brake &
Clutch” as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued
to respondent.
5. Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant
Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son,
Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the
Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats
against the respondent and her son, was lodged
6. Complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and
unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors
calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an
appointment for herself.
7. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline concluded that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order
to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. It was recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years
with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
8. The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner and Respondent was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent attorney-at-law, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance violative of
CPR 6.02
HELD: YES.
Ratio
1. Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar.
2. The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a
ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
3. Respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a
member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her
to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by
her office.
4. A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but
of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
5. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office
are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar
from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a
breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.
Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing.
6. Respondent was found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well
as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was ordered DISBARRED.
Mendoza v Deciembre A.C. No. 5338, February 23, 2009
Philippine Supreme Court found the respondent lawyer guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which reason he was DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
The complaint was filed by Eugenia Mendoza in 2000. It sought the disbarment of respondent Atty. Victor V.
Deciembre for fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks without her authority and using the same for filing
unfounded criminal suits against her.
The Court made the following doctrinal pronouncements in the said case, thus:
1. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry
in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.
2. The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. A high
sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar. They must conduct
themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.
3. The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent
were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.
4. A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach
on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether
the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his
personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
5. In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the
legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the integrated bar.
Office of the Court Administrator v Indar
"In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the
records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato
City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid;
(3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases
were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars
of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff
Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words,
Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage
cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential
requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
The Court condemns Judge Indar’s reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without
conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing
consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge
Indar’s gross misconduct greatly undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and
confidence in the courts. Judge Indar’s utter lack of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves
nothing less than dismissal from the service."
Barandon v Ferrer
FACTS: On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from
the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for
filing a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive and improper language which
insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court. The said document purported to be a
notarized document executed at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer.
Moreover, on December 19, 2000, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, “Laban kung
laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines
Norte, angabogadonarito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwina kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito” at the
Municipal Trial Court in Daet before the start of a hearing.
The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a
disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against him.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a
Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough
evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit
despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to
it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the
presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing. On June 29, 2002 the IBP
Board of Governors passed Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation
but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
ISSUE:
DID THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE IBP INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER ERR IN FINDING
RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND IF THE PENALTY IMPOSED WAS JUSTIFIED?
HELD: The Supreme Court examined the records of this case and finds no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the
falsification of an affidavit without evidence that the document had indeed been falsified. Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could
have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a
fellow lawyer. The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s
drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing and Atty. Ferrer failed to show
convincing evidence denying the said charge against him.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of
the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper
attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the
court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
Consequently, the penalty of suspension of one from the practice of law is deemed just and proper.
Foodsphere, Inc. v Atty. Mauricio A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009
FACTS:
Foodsphere, a corportation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture of canned goods of
―CDO‖ filed an administrative complaint against Atty.Melanio Mauricio, Jr. for violation of the code of professional
responsibility. The case at hand involved a certain Alberto Cordero who purportedly found a colony of worms inside
the can of liver spread by CDO and Foodsphere that he bought from the grocery. The Cordero family sued the
company for P150,000 for damages, but the companies did not agree to the demands. The Cordero’s thereafter
threatened to resort to the media, if their demands are not met. Consequently, Atty. Mauricio the counsel of the
Cordero’s, was involved in various media productions such as being a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang
Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS
telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB. Atty. Mauricio, in many
cases utilized these media outlets to place the said company in a bad light by declaring to the masses the liver
spread of worms; even after his receipt of the Order addressed to him to desist from ―further publishing, televising
and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products‖. Even after the parties have performed an agreement, signed by the
Cordero’s and Atty.Mauricio himself – resulting in the dismissal of the Cordero case, Atty.Mauricio still inexplicably
launched a media offensive to the companies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Atty. Mauricio has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Mauricio has violated the code of professional responsibility. His recourse to the Media, even after being
told to desist from such was a clear violation of Rule 13.03 of Canon 13, ―A lawyer shall not make public statements
in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party‖. His action has put not
only the company Foodsphere and CDO in a bad light, but has also degraded the dignity and authority of the legal
system. Besides the above, he has also violated Canon 1.01 by engaging in deceitful conduct taking advantage of
the complaint against CDO to advance his own interests, and Canon 8, when he used abusive and offensive
language in his dealings.
Tumbokon v. Pefianco A.C. No. 6116, 1 August 2012
Facts:
According to the complainant, respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of
the attorney’s fees, the latter would received in representing Spouses Yap whom he referred, in an action for partition
of the estate of the spouses’ relative. Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated 11 August 1995.
However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney’s fees amounting
to 17% of the total estate or about PhP 40 million. Instead, the complainant was informed through a letter dated 16
July 1997 that Spouses Yap assumed to pay the same after the respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees
from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission which the respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that the respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his
profession for having abandoned his legal wife with whom he has two children, and cohabited with another with
whom he has four children. He also accused the respondent of engaging in money-lending business without the
required authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
In his defense, the respondent disputed the 11 August 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that the Spouses
Yap assumed to pay.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pefianco is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Lawyer’s Oath.
Held:
Respondent’s defense that forgery of the 11 August 1995 letter was belied by his 16 July 1997 admitting to have
undertaken the payment of the complaint’s commission but passing on the responsibility to the Spouses Yap. Clearly,
the respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in
the case at bar.
Furthermore, the respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his
mistress with whom he begot four children. The Supreme Court found credence to IBP’s findings that the respondent
violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR.
The respondent was found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath; Rule 1.01, Canon 1; and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
the CPR. The respondent was suspended from active practice of law for one year.
Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana , A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014
The Supreme Court held that Atty. Gupana’s revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in
order for failure to require the personal presence of the affiant in an Affidavit of Loss purportedly executed in 1994.
Baculi v Battung
Facts:
Judge Baculi, Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City, filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Battung. He claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised
him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would
be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, “Then cite me!”Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and
imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, “Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” Judge Baculi ocited him for direct contempt of court for the second
time.
After his hearings, respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I
am not afraid of you!” He kept on shouting, “I am not afraid of you!” and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and
lawyers escorted him out of the building.
Judge Baculi later found out that after the respondent left the courtroom, Atty. Battung continued shouting and
punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Issue:
Did Atty. Battung violate Cannons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Ruling:
IBP Commissioner found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also
violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the courts. The respondent’s argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should
not be given due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he
created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. De la Rama recommended that the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The Supreme Court held that litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and
avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that
he represents.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s role, stature and position
in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file
a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode
the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that,
even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or
complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into
disrepute.
Atty. Battung was ordered suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Santeco v Avance
Facts: In an En Banc Decision dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for,
among others, abandoning her client’s cause in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed
at her without any explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
years.
Subsequently, while respondent’s five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, Judge Consuelo
Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a letter-report dated November 12, 2007
to the Court Administrator informing the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases
wherein she misrepresented herself as “Atty. Liezl Tanglao”. When opposing counsels confronted her and showed to
the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B.
Avance, but qualified that she was only suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted.
Acting on Judge Amog-Bocar’s letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution dated April 9, 2008, required respondent to
comment within ten days from notice. Respondent, however, failed to file the required comment. On June 10, 2009,
the Court reiterated the directive to comment. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court
issued a Resolution on September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect contempt. Respondent was ordered
to pay a fine in the amount of Php 30,000.00 which respondent failed to pay.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Avance should be disbarred.
Held: Respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance is disbarred for gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of
a superior court. Her name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Rationale: As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest
form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court orders and processes.
We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect
which merits a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment. Sebastian v. Bajar teachers
Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree or irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondent’s
obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders not “only betrays recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.”
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as
an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or of any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)
In repeatedly disobeying this Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine
Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an
officer of the court an deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
Rules of Court 138
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. — Citizens of the United States of America
who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in
good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue
such practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do

solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled
attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in
the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have
practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been
suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two
preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four
years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the
Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be
filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school
or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he
has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course,
the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field
of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the
evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within
section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if
embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence
that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time
their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in
newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to
examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law
(Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil
Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers,
books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or
Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers
without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only
noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of
other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of
Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be
distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day:
Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day:
Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the
Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be
designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of
one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during
examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who
violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure
against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the
average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social
Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent;
Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon
thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers and
notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has
approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be
disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed
regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the
candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings
obtained by them in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been
otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of
office.
Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the
Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to
him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall
be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth
and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause,
from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which
he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge
may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to
appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the
name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in
court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who
has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An attorney who appears de parte in a
case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition
withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after
it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions;
but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written
consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case
of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has
been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client
the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to
protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. — Upon
such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy
and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending
the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of
his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation,
the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party
in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of
counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so
assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the law the court may, in
its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance
with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor
more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3)
Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized
member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in
the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Bar Matter No. 1153
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 9, 2010
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through
Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those referred to in
the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have
successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a
law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign
jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination
unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the
government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law,
labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon
submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority;
and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly
recognized by the Philippine Government.
SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by the proper government
agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of
study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a foreign law school must
present proof of having completed a separate bachelor's degree course.
The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law
schools in the country."
Article 12, Section 14 Philippine Constitution
The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs,
professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be
promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the national
benefit. The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed
by law.
Lawyer’s Oath
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
MCLE
MCLE, or Mandatory Continuing Legal Education, is a program mandated by the Supreme Court under Bar Matter No.
850 (2 October 2001) requiring members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to undergo continuing legal education
to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law. (Sec. 1, BM 850)
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
P1,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the
MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 139-B of the Court shall apply.
RA 6713
The purpose of R.A. 6713 is “to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. Public officials and employees
shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal
interest.” The law expects public officials to be accountable to the people in the matter of their integrity and
competence. Thus, the Court cannot interpret the Review and Compliance Procedure as transferring such
accountability to the Committee.
RA 7160, Section 90 Local Government Code of the Philippines
Practice of Profession.
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he
is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

Legal Ethics Cases - Midterm

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Legal Ethics Case Digests

Michael Angelo L. Memoracion

Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000

I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cruz v Atty. Cabrera AC No. 5737 October 25, 2004

ISSUE: WON the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct.

Cruz v Mina G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

IN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)

Santos Jr. v Llamas A.C. No. 4749 1.20.00

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?

 the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic A.C. No. L-533

Facts of the Case:

Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.

Whether or not Hamm can be admitted to the Bar.

Soriano v. Dizon A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006

WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

Teves v COMELEC G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009

Victoria Barrientos v. Transfiguracion Daarol

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daarol is grossly immoral.

Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451 25 Jul

YES. Respondent disbarred.

Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.

Royong v Oblena AC No. 376 April 30, 1963

Mendoza v Deciembre A.C. No. 5338, February 23, 2009

Office of the Court Administrator v Indar

Tumbokon v. Pefianco A.C. No. 6116, 1 August 2012

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Avance should be disbarred.

Rules of Court 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

Bar Matter No. 1153

Article 12, Section 14 Philippine Constitution

RA 7160, Section 90 Local Government Code of the Philippines

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