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TEXT OF PETER LOMBARD
Chapter One
1. OMNIS DOCTRINA EST DE REBUS VEL DE SIGNIS. 1. ALL DOCTRINE IS OF THINGS OR OF SIGNS. With
Veteris ac novae Legis continentiam diligenti indagine diligent investigation, we have considered again and
etiam atque etiam considerantibus nobis, praevia Dei again the contents of the Old and New Law; by God’s
gratia innotuit sacrae paginae tractatores [tractatum]
prevenient grace, it has become clear to us that the
circa res vel signa praecipue versari. Ut enim egregius commentators [the study] of the Sacred Page deal
doctor Augustinus ait in libro De Doctrina Christiana: principally with things or with signs. For as the
Omnis doctrina vel rerum est, vel signorum. Sed res
egregious doctor Augustine says in his book On
etiam per signa discuntur. Proprie autem hic res Christian Doctrine (I, 2, n. 2): All doctrine is of things
appellantur, quae non ad significandum aliquid or of signs. But even things are learned through signs.
adhibentur; signa vero, quorum usus est in For here thing properly designates whatever is not used
significando. to signify another; signs, however, designates whatever
is used in signifying.
Eorum autem aliqua sunt, quorum omnis usus est Now of these, there are some signs whose use
in significando, non in iustificando, id est, quibus non consists entirely in signifying, and not in justifying,
utimur nisi aliquid significandi gratia, ut aliqua that is, they are such that we do not use them except
sacramenta legalia; alia quae non solum significant,
for the sake of signifying something, as some
sed conferunt quod intus adiuvet, sicut evangelica sacraments of the Law. There are others that not only
sacramenta. Ex quo aperte intelligitur, quae hic signify, but also confer that which helps interiorly, as
appellentur signa, res illae videlicet quae ad do the sacraments of the Gospel. From which it is
significandum aliquid adhibentur. Omne igitur signum clearly understood, what are here named signs, namely,
etiam res aliqua est: quod enim nulla res est, ut in
those things that are used to signify something.
eodem Augustinus ait, omnino nihil est; non autem e
Therefore every sign is also a thing. For what is not a
converso omnis res signum est, quia non adhibetur ad thing, as Augustine said in the same book, is entirely
significandum aliquid. nothing; and conversely, however, not every thing is a
sign, because it is not used to signify something else.
2. Cumque his intenderit theologorum speculatio 2. And since the studious and modest speculation
studiosa atque modesta, divinam Scripturam, formam of theologians is intent upon these matters, it will
praescriptam in doctrina tenere advertet. note that divine Scripture holds the prescribed form
in its doctrine.
3. De his ergo nobis, aditum ad res divinas 3. Concerning these, therefore, there is to be a
aliquatenus intelligendas Deo duce aperire volentibus, discussion by us who want, with God as guide, to
disserendum est; et primum de rebus, postea de signis open access towards understanding divine things to
disseremus. some extent. And first we will first discuss things,
afterwards signs.
Chapter Two
1. DE REBUS COMMUNITER AGIT. Id ergo in rebus 1. DEALING WITH THINGS GENERALLY. As Augustine
considerandum est, ut in eodem Augustinus ait, quod says in the same book, among things, therefore, it
res aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus must be considered that there are some things that are
utendum est, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur. Illae
to be enjoyed, other things that are to be used, and still
quibus fruendum est, nos beatos faciunt; istis quibus
other things that enjoy and use. Those things that are
utendum est, tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuvamur et to be enjoyed make us blessed; we are helped and, as it
quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas res quae nos beatos
were, supported by those other things which are to be
faciunt, pervenire eisque inhaerere possimus. used, as things tending towards beatitude, so that we
can arrive at and adhere to those things that make us
blessed.
2. DE REBUS QUAE FRUUNTUR ET UTUNTUR. Res vero, 2. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ENJOY AND USE. We and
quae fruuntur et utuntur, nos sumus, quasi inter the holy angels are the things that enjoy and use,
utrasque constituti, et Angeli sancti. constituted, as it were, between both.
3. QUID SIT FRUI ET UTI. Frui autem est amore 3. THE MEANING OF ENJOYING AND USING. Moreover
inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam; uti vero, id quod to enjoy is to adhere to a thing by love on account of its
in usum venerit referre ad obtinendum illud quo very self; but to use is to refer that which has come to
fruendum est: alias abuti est, non uti, nam usus illicitus be used to obtain that which is to be enjoyed; otherwise
abusus vel abusio nominari debet. it is to abuse, not to use. For an illicit use should be
named an abuse or a perverse use.
4. DE REBUS QUIBUS FRUENDUM EST. Res igitur 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE TO BE ENJOYED. The
quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus things, therefore, that are to be enjoyed, are the Father
Sanctus. Eadem tamen Trinitas quaedam summa res and the Son and the Holy Spirit. However, the same
est communisque omnibus fruenitibus ea, si tamen res Trinity is a most high thing and is common to all who
dici debet et non rerum omnium causa, si tamen et enjoy it, if it should even be called a thing, and not the
causa. Non enim facile potest invenire nomen quod cause of all things, even if it is also a cause. For it is not
tantae excellentiae conveniat, nisi quod melius dicitur easy to find a name that agrees with such excellence,
Trinitas hic [haec] unus Deus. except that it is better to say that this Trinity is the one
God.
5. DE REBUS QUIBUS UTENDUM EST. Res autem, 5. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE TO BE USED. As for
quibus utendum est, mundus est et in eo creata. Unde the things that are to be used, they are the world and
Augustinus in eodem: Utendum est hoc mundo, non created things in it. Hence Augustine in the same
fruendum, ut invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt book: This world is to be used, not enjoyed, so that the
intellecta conspiciantur, id est ut de temporalibus invisible things of God may be clearly seen, having been
aeterna capiantur. Item in eodem: In omnibus rebus understood through those things that have been made,
illae tantum sunt quibus fruendum est, quae aeternae that is, as from temporal things there are only eternal
et incommutabiles sunt; ceteris autem utendum est, ut things that are to be enjoyed, which are eternal and
ad illarum perfruitionem perveniatur. Unde unchangeable; but the all others are to be used, so that
Augustinus in libro decimo De Trinitate: Fruimur one may come to the full enjoyment of these. Hence
cognitis in quibus ipsis propter se voluntas delectata Augustine in On the Trinity, Book Ten: We enjoy the
conquiescit; utimur vero eis quae ad aliud referimus things that we know, in which the will finds delight for
quo fruendum est. their own sake and comes to rest; but we use those
things which we refer to another thing that is to be
enjoyed.
Chapter Three
1. ITEM QUID INTERSIT INTER FRUI ET UTI, ALITER 1. ALSO, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TO ENJOY AND TO
QUAM SUPRA. Notandum vero, quod idem Augustinus USE EXPLAINED IN ANOTHER WAY. But it is to be noted,
in libro decimo De Trinitate, aliter quam supra that the same Augustine in On the Trinity, Book Ten,
accipiens uti et frui, sic dicit: Uti est assumere aliquid accepting to use and to enjoy in another way than
in facultatem voluntatis; frui autem est uti cum gaudio, above, speaks thus: To use is to assume something into
non adhuc spei, sed iam rei. Ideoque omnis qui fruitur, the faculty of the will; but to enjoy is to use with a joy
utitur: assumit enim aliquid in facultatem voluntatis no longer of hope, but already of a thing. And for that
cum fine delectationis; non autem omnis qui utitur, et reason, everything that is enjoyed is used; for one
fruitur, si id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, assumes something into the faculty of the will for the
non propter ipsum, sed propter aliud appetivit. purpose of delight. Moreover not everything that is
used is also enjoyed; if that which is assumed into the
faculty of the will, is desired not for its own sake, but
Et attende quia videtur Augustinus dicere illos frui for the sake of another.
tantum qui in re gaudent, non iam in spe; et ita in hac And note that Augustine seems to say that only
vita non videmur frui, sed tantum uti, ubi gaudemus those who enjoy rejoice in the thing, and no longer in
in spe, cum supra dictum sit frui esse amore inhaerere hope. And so it seems that in this life we do not enjoy,
alicui rei propter se, qualiter etiam hic multi but only use, since we rejoice in hope, although it was
adhaerent Deo. said above that to enjoy is to cleave to any thing by
love for its own sake, in which manner many even
here adhere to God.
2. DETERMINATIO EORUM QUAE VIDENTUR 2. DETERMINATION OF THE APPARENT
CONTRARIA. Haec ergo, quae sibi contradicere CONTRADICTION. Therefore, these things that seem to
videntur, sic determinamus, dicentes nos et hic et in be contradictory, we thus determine saying, that we
futuro frui, sed ibi proprie et perfecte et plene, ubi per both here and in the future enjoy, but there properly
speciem videbimus quo fruemur; hic autem, dum in and perfectly and fully, where we shall see by species
spe ambulamus, fruimur quidem, sed non adeo plene. what we enjoy; but here, while we walk in hope, we
Unde in libro decimo De Trinitate: Fruimur cognitis in indeed enjoy, but not so fully. Hence Augustine in the
quibus voluntas est [propter se delectata conquiescit]. tenth book On the Trinity: We enjoy things known, in
Idem in libro De Doctrina christiana ait: Angeli illo which the delighted will rests for its own sake. Likewise
fruentes iam beati sunt, quo et nos frui desideramus; et in the book On Christian Doctrine he says: The Angels,
quantum in hac vita iam fruimur, vel per speculum vel enjoying him, are already blessed, whom we also desire
in aenigmate, tanto nostram peregrinationem et to enjoy; and as much as in this life we enjoy through a
tolerabilius sustinemus et ardentius finire cupimus. mirror or in enigma, so much more shall we both more
tolerably sustain our pilgrimage and more ardently
desire to finish.
ALIA DETERMINATIO. Postest etiam dici quod qui ANOTHER DETERMINATION. It can also be said that
fruitur etiam in hac vita, non tantum habet gaudium he who enjoys even in this life, not only has the joy of
spei, sed etiam rei, quia iam delectatur in eo quod hope, but also the joy of the thing itself, because he
diligit, et ita iam rem aliquatenus tenet. already delights in that which he loves, and thus he
already has the thing to a certain degree.
3. Constat ergo, quia debemus Deo frui et non uti. 3. It is therefore established that we ought to
Illo enim, ut ait Augustinus, frueris, quo efficeris enjoy God and not use him. For, as Augustine says,
beatus et in quo spem ponis, ut ad id pervenias. De hoc you will enjoy him, by whom you will be made blessed
idem ait in libro De Doctrina christiana: Dicimus ea re and in whom you place your hope, so that you may
nos frui, quam diligimus propter se, et ea re nobis arrive at blessedness. Concerning this he says in his
fruendum esse tantum, qua efficimur beati, ceteris vero book On Christian Doctrine: We say that we enjoy that
utendum. thing, which we love for its own sake, and that thing
alone is to be enjoyed by us, by which we are made
blessed; but all other things are to be used.
Frequenter tamen dicitur frui, cum delectatione Frequently, however, one is said to enjoy when one
uti. Cum enim adest quod diligitur, etiam uses with delight. For when the thing which we love is
delectationem secum gerit. Si tamen per eam transieris, present, it also brings delight with it. If, however, you
et ad illud ubi permanendum est eam retuleris, uteris would pass over through this delight and refer it to
ea, et abusive, non proprie diceris frui. Si vero that, where one is to thoroughly remain, you are using
inhaeseris atque permanseris, finem in ea ponens it and you will be said to enjoy not properly, but in an
laetitiae tuae, tunc vere et proprie frui dicendus es: abusive sense. But if you cleave to it and thoroughly
quod non est faciendum nisi in illa Trinitate, id est in remain in it, placing the end of your gladness in it, then
summo et incommutabili bono. truly and properly you are said to enjoy; which is not to
be done except in that Trinity, that is, in the most high
and unchangeable Good.
4. UTRUM HOMINIBUS SIT UTENDUM VEL FRUENDUM. 4. WHETHER MEN ARE TO BE USED OR ENJOYED.
Cum autem homines qui fruuntur et utuntur aliis Moreover since men, who enjoy and use other things,
rebus, res aliquae sint, quaeritur utrum frui se are themselves other things, it is asked, ‘whether they
debeant, an uti, an utrumque. Ad quod sic respondet ought to enjoy or use themselves, or both?’ To which
Augustinus in libro De Doctrina christiana: Si propter Augustine responds thus, in his book On Christian
se homo diligendus est, fruimur eo; si propter aliud, Doctrine: If a man is to be loved for his own sake, we
utimur eo. Videtur autem mihi propter aliud enjoy him; if for the sake of another, we use him: but it
diligendus. Quod enim propter se diligendum est, in eo seems to me that he is to be loved for the sake of
constituitur beata vita, cuius etiam spes hoc tempore another. For what is to be loved for its own sake, in this
nos consolatur. In homine autem spes ponenda non is constituted the blessed life, hope for which consoles
est, quia ‘maledictus’ est qui hoc facit. Ergo si liquide us even at this time. But in man hope is not to be
advertas, nec se ipso quisquam frui debet, quia non se placed, because ‘accursed’ is he who does this.
debet diligere propter se, sed propter illud quo Therefore if you clearly examine this, no one ought to
fruendum est. enjoy his very self, because he ought not love himself
for his own sake, but for the sake of that, which one is
to enjoy.
5. Huic autem contrarium videtur quod 5. But what the Apostles says, speaking to
Apostolus, ad Philemonem loquens, ait: Ita, frater, ego Philemon, seems contrary to this: Thus, brother, do I
te fruar in Domino. enjoy you in the Lord.
Quod ita determinat Augustinus: Si dixisset Which Augustine determines thus: If he has said
tantum ‘te fruar’, et non addidisset ‘in Domino’, only ‘I enjoy you’, and had not added ‘in the Lord’, it
videretur finem dilectionis ac spem constituisse in eo; would seem that end or hope of delight was constituted
sed quia illud addidit, in Domino se finem posuisse in him; but because he added that, he placed his end in
eodemque frui significavit. Cum enim, ut idem the Lord and signified that he enjoys him. For when, as
Augustinus ait, homine in Deo frueris, Deo potius the same Augustine says, you enjoy a man in God, you
quam homine frueris. will enjoy God rather than man.
6. HIC QUAERITUR UTRUM DEUS FRUATUR AN 6. IT IS ASKED WHETHER GOD IS ENJOYED OR USED
UTATUR NOBIS. Sed cum Deus diligat nos, ut BY US. But when God loves us, as Scripture frequently
frequenter Scriptura dicit, quae eius dilectionem erga says, which much commends his love toward us,
nos multum commendat, quaerit Augustinus, Augustine asks, in what manner does he love,
quomodo diligit, an ut utens, an ut fruens. whether as one using, or as one enjoying.
Et procedit ita: Si fruitur nobis, eget bono nostro: And he proceeds thus: If He enjoys us, he is in
quod nemo sanus dixerit. Ait enim Propheta: ‘Bonorum want of our good, which no sane person would say. For
meorum non indiges’; omne enim bonum nostrum vel the Prophet says: ‘You are not in want of my goods’.
ipse est, vel ab ipso est. Non ergo fruitur nobis, sed For our good is either he himself or from him. Therefore
utitur. Si enim nec fruitur nobis nec utitur, non invenio, he does not enjoy us, but rather uses us. For if he
quomodo diligat nos. Neque tamen sic utitur nobis ut neither enjoys nor uses us, I do not find how he loves
nos aliis rebus. Nos enim res quibus utimur, ad id us. And he does not so use us, as we use other things.
referimus ut Dei bonitate perfruamur; Deus vero ad For we refer the things, which we use, for this, that we
suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert. Ille enim thoroughly enjoy the goodness of God; but God refers
miseretur nostri propter suam bonitatem, nos autem our use to his own goodness: for he has mercy on us for
nobis invicem propter illius bonitatem; ille nostri the sake of his own goodness, but we have mercy on
miseretur ut se perfruamur, nos vero invicem nostri one another for the sake of his goodness; he has mercy
miseremur ut illo fruamur. Cum enim nos alicuius on us, so that we may thoroughly enjoy him, but we
miseremur et alicui consulimus, ad eius quidem have mercy on one another, to enjoy him. For when we
facimus utilitatem eamque intuemur; sed et nostra fit have mercy on anyone and look to the interests of
consequens, cum misericordiam quam aliis anyone, we indeed work for his utility and look at it
impendimus, non reliquit Deus sine mercede. Haec attentively, but the consequence is also ours, since the
autem merces summa est, ut ipso perfruamur. mercy, which we spend upon others, God has not left
without it recompense. Moreover this is the highest
recompense, that we may thoroughly enjoy him.
Item quia bonus est sumus, et in quantum sumus, Likewise: because he is good, we are, and inasmuch
boni sumus. Porro quia etiam iustus est, non impune as we are, we are good. Furthermore, because he is also
mali sumus; et in quantum mali sumus, in tantum just, we are not without impunity evil, and inasmuch as
etiam minus sumus. Ille igitur usus, quo nobis utitur we are evil, to that extent we also are less. Therefore
Deus, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, that use, by which God uses us, is referred not to his,
ad eius vero tantummodo bonitatem. but to our utility, however only to his goodness.
7. UTRUM FRUENDUM AN UTENDUM SIT VIRTUTIBUS. 7. WHETHER VIRTUES ARE TO BE USED OR ENJOYED.
Hic considerandum est utrum virtutibus sit utendum Here one must consider whether one is to use virtues
an fruendum. or enjoy them.
Quibusdam videtur quod eis sit utendum, et non It seems to some that one is to use them and not
fruendum. Et hoc confirmant auctoritate Augustini, to enjoy them, and this they confirm with the
qui, ut praetaxatum est, dicit non esse fruendum nisi authority of Augustine, who, as has been discussed,
Trinitate, id est summo et incommutabili bono. says, that one is not to enjoy anything except the
Trinity, that is, the most high and unchangeable good.
Item dicunt ideo non esse fruendum eis, quia They also say, for that reason, that the virtues are
propter se amandae non sunt, sed propter aeternam not to be enjoyed because they are not to be loved for
beatitudinem; illud autem quo fruendum est, propter their own sake, but for the sake of eternal beatitude.
se amandum est. Moreover, that, which one is to enjoy, is to be loved
for its own sake.
Sed quod virtutes propter se amandae non sunt, But that the virtues are not to be loved for their
immo propter solam beatitudinem, probant own sake, not even for the sake of beatitude alone,
auctoritate Augustini, qui in libro decimo tertio De they prove with the authority of Augustine, who in
Trinitate contra quosdam ait: Forte virtutes, quas Book Thirteen of On the Trinity says against certain
propter solam beatitudinem amamus, sic persuadere men: Perhaps the virtues, which we love only for the
nobis audent ut ipsam beatitudinem non amemus; sake of beatitude, are bold enough to convince us not to
quod si faciunt, etiam ipsas utique amare desistimus, love beatitude itself. If they do so, we cease to love
quando illam, propter quam solam istas amavimus, them, since we do not love that for whose sole sake we
non amamus. Ecce his verbis videtur Augustinus loved them. Behold with these words Augustine seems
ostendere, quod virtutes non propter se, sed propter to show that the virtues not for their own sake, but for
solam beatitudinem amandae sint. Quod si ita est, the sake of beatitude alone are to be loved. If this is
ergo eis fruendum non est. indeed the case, then they are not to be enjoyed.
8. Aliis vero contra videtur, scilicet quod eis 8. But to others the opposite seems true; namely,
fruendum sit, quia propter se petendae et amandae that one is to enjoy them, because they are to be
sunt. Et hoc confirmant auctoritate Ambrosii, qui ait sought and loved for their own sake. And this they
super illum locum Epistolae ad Galatas: ‘Fructus confirm with the authority of Ambrose, who says on
autem spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, patientia the passage from the Epistle to the Galatians: ‘But the
etc.’: Haec non nominat opera, sed fructus, quia fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, patience etc.’:
propter se petenda sunt. Si vero propter se petenda He does not name these works, but fruits, because they
sunt, ergo propter se amanda. are to be sought for their own sake. But if they are to
be sought for their own sake, therefore they are to be
loved for their own sake.
9. Nos autem harum quae videtur auctoritatum 9. But desiring to remove from the middle of these
repugnantiam de medio eximere cupientes, dicimus the things that which seems repugnant to these
quod virtutes propter se petendae et amandae sunt, et authorities, we say, that the virtues are to be sought
tamen propter solam beatitudinem. Propter se and loved for their own sake, and, however, for the
quidem amandae sunt, quia delectant sui possessores sake of beatitude alone. Indeed they are to be loved
sincera et sancta delectatione, et in eis pariunt for their own sake, because they delight their
gaudium spirituale. Verumtamen non est hic possessors with sincere and holy delight and give
consistendum, sed ultra gradiendum. Non hic haereat birth in them to a spiritual joy. Still however one must
dilectionis gressus, neque hic sit dilectionis terminus, not stop here, but step beyond. Not here does the step
sed referatur hoc ad illud summum bonum cui soli of delight stand still, nor is here the limit of delight,
omnino inhaerendum est, quia illud propter se but this is referred to that highest good, to whom
tantum amandum est, et ultra illud nihil quaerendum alone one must entirely cleave, because it is to be
est: illud est enim supremus finis. loved only for its own sake, and beyond it nothing is
to be sought; for It is the supreme end.
Ideo Augustinus dicit quod eas diligimus propter For that reason Augustine says, that because we
solam beatitudinem, non quin eas propter se love them for the sake of beatitude alone, we are not
diligamus, sed quia id ipsum, quod eas diligimus, to love them for their own sake, but because we refer
referimus ad illud summum bonum cui soli that very thing, that we love them, to that highest
inhaerendum est; et in eo permanendum finisque good, to whom alone one is to cleave, and in whom
laetitiae ponendus. Quare virtutibus non est one is to thoroughly remain, that he is to be placed as
fruendum. the end of all our gladness; wherefore one is not to
enjoy the virtues.
10. Sed dicet aliquis: Frui est amore inhaerere alicui 10. But someone will say: To enjoy is to adhere in
rei propter se ipsam, ut praedictum est; si ergo virtutes love to some thing on account of its very self, as has
propter se amandae sunt, et eis fruendum est. been said; if therefore the virtues are to be loved for
their own sake, then they are also to be enjoyed.
Ad quod dicimus: In illa descriptione, ubi dicitur To which we say: in that description, when it is
‘propter se ipsam’, intelligendum est ‘tantummodo’, said ‘on account of its very self’, ‘alone’ is to be
ut scilicet ametur propter se ipsam tantum, ut non understood, so that it would be loved on account of
referatur ad aliud, sed ibi ponatur finis, ut supra itself alone, and would not be referred to another
ostendit Augustinus dicens: Si inhaeseris atque thing, but one’s end would be placed there, as
permanseris, finem ponens laetitiae, tunc vere et Augustine shows in what was said above: If you were
proprie frui dicendus est: quod non est faciendum nisi to adhere to it and remain in it, finding in it the summit
in illa Trinitate, id est summo et incommutabili bono. of your joy, then truly and properly you could be said to
enjoy it. But this is not to be done, except in the case of
that Trinity, that is, the most high and unchangeable
Utendum est ergo virtutibus, et per eas fruendum good.
summo bono. Ita et de voluntate bona dicimus. Unde One is to use, therefore, the virtues and through
Augustinus in libro decimo De Trinitate ait: Voluntas them to enjoy the most high good. We speak in the
est per quam fruimur. Ita et per virtutes fruimur, non same way of a good will. Hence Augustine says in
eis, nisi forte aliqua virtus sit Deus, ut caritas, de qua Book Ten of On the Trinity: The will is that through
post tractabitur. which we enjoy. Thus and through the virtues we
enjoy; not in them, unless perhaps in the case of some
virtue which is God, such as charity, of which we will
treat afterwards.
11. EPILOGUS. Omnium igitur, quae dicta sunt ex 11. EPILOGUE. Of all the things, therefore, which
quo de rebus specialiter tractavimus, haec summa est: have been said, of which we have especially treated of
quod aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus things, this is the summation: that there are some
utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur; et inter eas things that are to be enjoyed, others that are to be
quibus utendum est, quaedam sunt per quas fruimur, used, and others that enjoy and use; and among those
ut virtutes et potentiae animi, quae sunt naturalia that are to be used, there are also those by means of
bona. De quibus omnibus, antequam de signis which we enjoy, such as the virtues and powers of the
tractemus, agendum est; ac primum de rebus quibus soul, which are natural goods. Before we deal with
fruendum est, scilicet de sancta atque individua signs, we must discuss all of these, and first the things
Trinitate. that are to be enjoyed, namely the holy and undivided
Trinity.
COMMENTARY OF THOMAS AQUINAS
Division of the Text
Finito prooemio, hoc est initium praesentis operis Having concluded the proemium, this is the
in quo Magister divinorum nobis doctrinam tradere beginning of the present work in which the Master
intendit quantum ad inquisitionem veritatis et intends to transmit the doctrine of divine things to us,
destructionem erroris: unde et argumentativo modo with regard to the inquiry of truth and the
procedit in toto opere: et praecipue argumentis ex destruction of error. Hence, in the entire work he
auctoritatibus sumptis. Dividitur autem in duas proceeds in an argumentative way and principally
partes: in quarum prima inquirit ea de quibus takes arguments from authority. Now, the text is
agendum est, et ordinem agendi; in secunda divided into two parts: in the first, he inquires about
prosequitur suam intentionem: et in duas partes those things to be dealt with and the order in which
dividitur. Secunda ibi: hic considerandum est utrum they should be treated; in the second he carries out
virtutibus sit utendum, an fruendum. his intention. And this is divided into two parts, the
second part beginning with: Here one must consider
whether one is to use virtues or enjoy them.
Ea autem de quibus in hac doctrina However, those things that are considered in this
considerandum est, cadunt in considerationem hujus doctrine fall within the consideration of this doctrine
doctrinae, secundum quod ad aliquid unum insofar as they are referred to one thing, namely, to
referuntur, scilicet Deum, a quo et ad quem sunt. Et God, from whom and to whom they are. And
ideo ea de quibus agendum est dividit per absolutum therefore, he divides the things to be dealt with into
et relatum: unde dividitur in partes duas. In prima absolute and relative: hence, it is divided into two
ponit divisionem eorum de quibus agendum est per parts. In the first he presents the division of those
absolutum et relatum secundum cognitionem, in things to be dealt with into absolute and relative
secunda secundum desiderium, ibi: id ergo in rebus according to knowledge, in the second according to
considerandum. desire, where it says: Among things, therefore, it must
be considered.
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit divisionem About the first point he does two things. First, he
eorum de quibus agendum est, in res et signa, quae ad presents the division of things to be dealt with into
cognitionem rerum ducunt; secundo concludit things and signs, which lead to knowledge of things;
ordinem agendi, ibi: cumque his intenderit second, he concludes with their order, where it says:
theologorum speculatio studiosa atque modesta, And since the studious and modest speculation of
divinam Scripturam formam praescriptam in doctrina theologians is intent upon these matters, it will note
tenere advertet. In primo tria facit. Primo ponit that divine Scripture holds the prescribed form in its
divisionem; secundo probat per auctoritatem, ibi: ut doctrine. In the first point he does three things. First,
enim egregius doctor Augustinus ait; tertio ponit he presents the division; second he proves by
membrorum divisionis expositionem, ibi: proprie authority, where it says: For as the egregious doctor
autem hic res appellantur quae non ad significandum Augustine says; third, he presents the exposition of
aliquid adhibentur: ubi primo exponit quid sit res; the division of the members, where it says: For here
secundo quid sit signum, ibi: signa vero quorum usus things properly designates whatever is not used to
est in significando; tertio utriusque comparationem, signify another; where first he expounds what the
ibi:omne igitur signum etiam res aliqua est. thing is; then what the sign is, where it says: signs,
however, designates whatever is used in signifying;
third, he presents the comparison of the two, where it
says: Therefore every sign is also a thing.
Id ergo in rebus considerandum est. Hic, dimissis Among things, therefore, it should be considered.
signis, subdividit res per absolutum et relatum ex Here, leaving aside the signs, things are subdivided
parte desiderii, scilicet per fruibile, quod propter se into absolute and relative on the part of desire,
desideratur, et utibile, cujus desiderium ad aliud namely, into enjoyable things, that are desired for
refertur: et dividitur in partes duas. Primo ponit themselves, and useful things, whose desire is referred
divisionem; secundo epilogat et concludit to another. And this is divided into two parts. First, he
intentionem et ordinem, ibi: omnium igitur quae dicta presents the division; second, he summarizes and
sunt, ex quo de rebus specialiter tractavimus, haec concludes the intention and the order, where it says:
summa est. Prima in tres. Primo ponit divisionem; Of all the things, therefore, which have been said, of
secundo partium manifestationem, ibi: illa quibus which we have especially treated of things, this is the
fruendum est, nos beatos faciunt; tertio movet summation. The first part is divided into three. First,
dubitationes, ibi: cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et he presents the division; second, the manifestation of
utuntur aliis rebus, res aliquae sint, quaeritur utrum se the parts, where it says: Those that are to be enjoyed
frui debeant, an uti, an utrumque. In secunda duo makes us blessed; third, he presents doubts, where it
facit. Primo manifestat divisionem; secundo ponit says: Moreover since men, who enjoy and use other
quamdam contrarietatem, et solvit, ibi: notandum things, are themselves other things, it is asked,
vero, quod idem Augustinus (...) sic dicit. ‘whether they ought to enjoy, or use themselves, or
both?’. In the second he does two things. First, he
manifests the division; second, he presents a problem
and resolves it, where it says: But it is to be noted, that
the same Augustine … speaks thus.
Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat partes Regarding the first point he does two things. First,
divisionis per definitiones; secundo quantum ad he manifests the parts of the subdivision by means of
supposita, ibi: res igitur quibus fruendum est, sunt definitions; second, regarding the supposits, where it
pater, et filius, et spiritus sanctus. Circa primum says: The things, therefore, that are to be enjoyed, are
quatuor facit. Primo definit fruibilia per effectum; the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. About the
secundo utibilia, ibi: istis quibus utendum est, first point he does four things. First, he defines the
tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuvamur; tertio definit enjoyable things by means of the effect; second, the
utentia, et fruentia ibi: res vero quae fruuntur et usable things, where it says: we are helped by those
utuntur, nos sumus; quarto definit uti et frui ad other things which are to be used, as things tending
probationem totius: frui autem est amore alicui rei towards beatitude; third, he defines the things to be
inhaerere propter seipsam. Et eodem ordine procedit used and the things to be enjoyed, where it says: We
manifestando secundum supposita. are the things that enjoy and use; fourth, he defines
useful and enjoyable to prove everything: Moreover to
enjoy is to adhere to a thing by love on account of its
very self. And with the same order, he proceeds to
manifest them according to the supposits.
Notandum vero, quod idem Augustinus (...) aliter But it is to be noted, that the same Augustine …
quam supra accipiens frui et uti, sic dicit. Hic ponit accepting to use and to enjoy in another way than
contrarietatem ad haec tria. Primo ponit diversam above, speaks thus. Here he presents a doubt to these
assignationem uti et frui; secundo concludit three. First he presents a diverse assignation to use
contrarietatem ad praedicta, ibi: et attende, quod and enjoyment; second, he concludes the contrariety
videtur Augustinus dicere illos frui tantum qui in re of the things said, where he says: And note that
gaudent; tertio ponit solutionem, ibi: haec ergo quae Augustine seems to say that only those who enjoy
sibi contradicere videntur, sic determinamus. Et primo rejoice in a thing; third, he presents a solution, where
solvit per divisionem; secundo per interemptionem, it says Therefore, these things that seem to be
ibi: potest etiam dici, quod qui fruitur etiam in hac vita contradictory, we thus determine. And first he resolves
non tantum habet gaudium spei, sed etiam rei. it by division, second, by elimination, where it says: It
can also be said that he who enjoys even in this life, not
only has the joy of hope, but also the joy of the thing
itself.
Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur aliis Moreover since men, who enjoy and use other
rebus, res aliquae sint, quaeritur, utrum se frui things, are themselves other things, it is asked,
debeant, an uti, an utrumque. Hic movet dubitationes ‘whether they ought to enjoy or to use themselves, or
de habitudine eorum quae pertinent ad invicem: et both?’ Here he presents doubts about the relation of
primo quaerit de utentibus et fruentibus, an sint those things that pertain to one another: and first he
utibilia vel fruibilia; secundo de fruibilibus, scilicet de inquires about those who use and those who enjoy, if
Deo, utrum sit utens nobis vel fruens, ibi: sed cum they are useful or enjoyable; second, about the
Deus diligat nos (...) quaerit Augustinus quomodo enjoyable, namely about God, whether he is useful to
diligat, an ut utens, an ut fruens; tertio de quibusdam us or able to be enjoyed by us, where it says: But when
utibilibus, utrum sint fruibilia, ibi: hic considerandum God loves us, … Augustine asks, in what manner does
est, utrum virtutibus sit utendum, an fruendum. he love, whether as one using, or as one enjoying; third,
with regard to useful things, whether they are
enjoyable, where it says: Here one must consider
whether one is to use virtues or enjoy them.
Question One
Quaelibet harum partium dividitur in quaestionem Each of these parts is divided into question and
et solutionem. Hic quaeruntur tria: primo, de uti et solution. Here, three questions are posed: first, about
frui. Secundo, de utibilibus et fruibilibus. Tertio, de to use and to enjoy second, about the things that are
utentibus et fruentibus. useable and enjoyable. Third, about those who use
and enjoy.
Circa primum quaeruntur duo: Concerning the first, two things are asked:
quid sit frui secundum rem; (1) What is enjoyment secundum rem?
quid sit uti secundum rem. (2) What is useful secundum rem?
Article One
Utrum frui sit actus intellectus
Whether to enjoy is an act of intellect
CIRCA PRIMUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod frui OBJECTION 1: It seems that to enjoy is an act of the
sit actus intellectus. Nobilissimus enim actus est intellect. For, the noblest act is the noblest power.
nobilissimae potentiae. Altissima autem potentia in But, the highest power in man is the intellect.
homine est intellectus. Ergo, cum frui sit Therefore, since to enjoy is the most perfect act of
perfectissimus actus hominis, quia ponit hominem in man, because it places man in his ultimate end, it
suo fine ultimo, videtur quod sit actus intellectus. seems that it is an act of intellect.
PRAETEREA, sicut dicit Augustinus, visio est tota OBJ. 2: Further, as Augustine says, vision is the
merces. Sed merces totius meriti consistit in fruitione whole reward. Now, the reward of all merit consists in
divinitatis. Ergo fruitio est essentialiter visio. Sed visio the enjoyment of the divinity. Therefore, enjoyment is
est actus intellectus: ergo et fruitio. essentially vision. But vision is an act of intellect:
therefore so is enjoyment.
SED VIDETUR quod sit actus voluntatis. Actus enim OBJ. 3: But it seems that it is an act of will. For an
determinatur ex objecto. Sed objectum fruitionis est act is determined by its object. But the object of
fruibile, quod est finis ultimus. Finis autem, cum enjoyment is the enjoyable, which is the ultimate end.
rationem boni habeat, est objectum voluntatis. Ergo For the end, since it has the ratio of good, is the
et frui est actus voluntatis. object of will. Therefore, to enjoy is also an act of will.
PRAETEREA, Augustinus, definit fruitionem per OBJ. 4: Further, Augustine defines enjoyment by
voluntatem dicens: fruimur cognitis, in quibus ipsis the will, saying: we enjoy what we know, when the
propter se voluntas delectata conquiescit. Ergo magis delighted will is at rest in it for its own sake. Therefore
videtur esse actus voluntatis quam intellectus. it seems to be rather an act of will than an act of
intellect.
ITEM, videtur quod sit actus omnium potentiarum. OBJ. 5: Also, it seems that it is an act of all powers.
Praemium enim respondet merito. Sed homo meretur For recompense corresponds to merit. But man merits
per omnes potentias. Ergo et secundum omnes through all his powers. Therefore he shall be
praemiabitur. Sed praemium est ipsa fruitio: ergo recompensed in all his powers. But the recompense is
fruitio est omnium potentiarum. enjoyment itself; therefore enjoyment belongs to all
powers.
PRAETEREA, Augustinus dicit, quod homo inveniet OBJ. 6: Further, Augustine says that a man will
pascua interius in divinitate salvatoris, et exterius in find inner pastures in the divinity of the Savior, and
humanitate. Ergo videtur quod tam vires exteriores exterior pastures in the humanity of the Savior.
quam interiores fruentur. Therefore, it seems that men will enjoy as much with
their exterior forces as with their interior forces.
SED VIDETUR quod nullius potentiae sit. Omnis OBJ. 7: But it seems that it belongs to no power.
enim actus denominatur a potentia cujus est, sicut For every act is named from the power to which it
intelligere ab intellectu. Sed frui non denominatur ab belongs, as to understand from the intellect. But to
aliqua potentia. Ergo et cetera. enjoy is not named from any power. Therefore, etc.
UNDE ULTERIUS QUAERITUR, cujus habitus actus sit: OBJ. 8: Hence it is further asked, to which habit
et videtur quod tantum caritatis. Sicut enim dicitur 1 this act belongs; and it seems that it is charity alone.
Corinth. 13, caritas virtus perfecta est. Sed, secundum For, as it is said in 1 Corinthians 13, charity is a perfect
philosophum, felicitas est operatio virtutis perfectae. virtue. But, according to the Philosopher, happiness is
Ergo fruitio, in qua est tota nostra felicitas, est actus the operation of perfect virtue. Therefore enjoyment,
caritatis. in which is our whole happiness, is an act of charity.
HOC IDEM VIDETUR ex definitione Augustini OBJ. 9: It seems that this same thing is brought
inducta in littera: frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei forward from the definition of Augustine in the text:
propter seipsam. to enjoy is to inhere in something by love on account of
itself.
SED VIDETUR quod non tantum caritatis. Ad OBJ. 10: But it seems that it is not only of charity.
fruitionem enim tria concurrunt, perfecta visio, plena For there are three things that concur in enjoyment:
comprehensio, et inhaesio amoris consummati. Ergo perfect vision, full comprehension, and the inherence
videtur quod sit actus etiam succedentium fidei, et of consummated love. Therefore, it seems that it is
spei. also an act of the things that succeed faith and hope.
PRAETEREA, secundum fruitionem conjungimur OBJ. 11: Further, it is by enjoyment that we are
Deo. Sed omnis virtus conjungit nos Deo, cum virtus conjoined to God. But every virtue conjoins us to God,
sit dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in 7 since virtue is a disposition of the perfect to the best,
Physic. Ergo fruitio est actus secundum omnem as it is said in Physics, VII. Therefore enjoyment is the
virtutem. act according to every virtue.
RESPONDEO dicendum, quod fruitio consistit in I RESPOND saying that enjoyment consists in the
optima operatione hominis, cum fruitio sit ultima best operation of man, since enjoyment is the
felicitas hominis. Felicitas autem non est in habitu, ultimate happiness of man. For happiness is not in
sed in operatione, secundum philosophum. Optima habit, but in operation, according to the Philosopher.
autem operatio hominis est operatio altissimae The best operation of man is the operation of the
potentiae, scilicet intellectus, ad nobilissimum highest power, namely the intellect, to the noblest
objectum, quod est Deus: unde ipsa visio divinitatis object, which is God: hence, the entire substance of
ponitur tota substantia nostrae beatitudinis, Joan. 17, our beatitude is placed in this vision of the divinity:
3: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum This is eternal life, that they may know the only true
verum. God (John 17:3).
Ex visione autem ipsum visum, cum non videatur Now from the vision, what is seen, since it is not
per similitudinem, sed per essentiam, efficitur seen by likeness, but by essence, is effected in some
quodammodo intra videntem, et ista est way within the seer, and this is the comprehension of
comprehensio quae succedit spei, consequens what succeeds hope, following the vision of what
visionem quae succedit fidei, sicut spes quodammodo succeeds faith, as hope is generated by faith in some
generatur ex fide. Ex hoc autem quod ipsum visum way. But owing to the fact that the very one seen is
receptum est intra videntem, unit sibi ipsum received into the seer, he unites the very seer to
videntem, ut fiat quasi quaedam mutua penetratio per himself, that there may take place a sort of mutual
amorem. Sic dicitur 1 Joan. 4, 16: qui manet in caritate, penetration through love. For thus it says in 1 John
in Deo manet et Deus in eo. Ad unionem autem 4:16: He who abides in charity, abides in God and God
maxime convenientis sequitur delectatio summa; et in in him. Upon this union of what is maximally fitting
hoc perficitur nostra felicitas, quam fruitio nominat follows the highest delight; and in this our happiness
ex parte sui complementi, magis quam ex parte is brought to completion. Now enjoyment names
principii, cum in se includat quamdam delectationem. happiness more from its completion than from its
Et ideo dicimus quod est actus voluntatis, et beginning, since enjoyment implies in itself a certain
secundum habitum caritatis, quamvis secundum delight. And therefore we say that it is an act of will,
ordinem ad potentias et habitus praecedentes. and according to the habit of charity, albeit having
some order to preceding powers and habits.
AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod appetitus REPLY OBJ. 1: To the first, therefore, it should be
semper sequitur cognitionem. Unde, sicut inferior said that appetite always follows upon knowledge.
pars habet sensum et appetitum, qui dividitur in Hence, even as the inferior part [of the soul] has sense
irascibilem et concupiscibilem, ita suprema pars habet and appetite, which is divided into the irascible and
intellectum et voluntatem, quorum intellectus est concupiscible [powers], so does the superior part have
altior secundum originem, et voluntas secundum intellect and will, of which intellect is higher
perfectionem. Et similis ordo est in habitibus, et etiam according to origin, and will according to perfection.
in actibus, scilicet visionis et amoris. Fruitio autem And a like order is found in habits, and also in acts –
nominat altissimam operationem quantum ad sui namely, acts of vision and of love. Enjoyment,
perfectionem. however, names the operation that is highest with
respect to perfection.
ET SIMILITER etiam patet solutio ad secundum: REPLY OBJ. 2: And likewise, too, the solution to the
quia visio non habet perfectam rationem felicitatis, second is clear: for vision does not have the perfect
nisi secundum quod est operatio perfecta per ea quae ratio of happiness except insofar as it is an operation
sequuntur. Perficit enim delectatio operationem, sicut perfected by the things that follow upon it. For
pulchritudo juventutem, ut dicitur 10 Ethic. delight perfects operation as beauty does youth, as is
said in Ethics, 10.
Alia duo concedimus. These two we concede.
AD ALIUD dicendum, quod inferiorum potentiarum REPLY OBJ. 5: To the other it should be said that
non potest esse fruitio proprie dicta: non enim habent enjoyment cannot be said properly of the inferior
operationem circa finem ultimum, quem non powers, for they do not have the operation
apprehendunt, cum sint virtutes materiales; sed sicut concerning the ultimate end, which they do not
nunc intellectus perficitur accipiendo ab inferioribus apprehend, since they are material powers; but as
potentiis, ita erit in patria e converso, quod perfectio now the intellect is perfected by taking from the
et gaudium superioris partis redundabit in inferiores inferior powers, so in patria will the opposite be the
potentias. Unde Augustinus: sensus vertetur in case, that the perfection and joy of the superior part
rationem, inquantum scilicet sua remuneratio et will redound in the inferior powers. Hence Augustine:
gaudium a ratione emanabit. “Sensation will be turned into” insofar as namely its
reward and joy will emanate from reason.
AD ALIUD dicendum, quod humanitas Christi non REPLY OBJ. 6: To the other it should be said that
est ultimus finis: unde in visione ejus non erit proprie the humanity of Christ is not the ultimate end: hence
fruitio, sed erit quoddam accidentale gaudium, et non in the vision of it there will not properly be
substantialis beatitudo. enjoyment, but there will be a sort of accidental joy,
and not substantial beatitude.
AD ALIUD dicendum, quod quando aliquis actus est REPLY OBJ. 7: To the other it should be said that
absolute alicujus potentiae, denominatur ab illa, sicut when some act is absolutely of some power, it is
intelligere ab intellectu; sed quando est actus unius named from it, as the “to understand” is named from
potentiae secundum ordinem ad alteram, a nulla the intellect; but when there is an act of one power
denominatur; sicut scire est actus rationis secundum with an order to another, it is named from no one of
ordinem ad intellectum inquantum principia deducit them, as knowing is an act of reason with an order to
in conclusiones; similiter frui est actus voluntatis the intellect insofar as it deduces conclusions from
consequens actum intellectus, scilicet apertam Dei principles; and likewise enjoying is an act of the will
visionem. consequent to the act of intellect, namely to the open
vision of God.
Alia duo concedimus. These two we concede.
AD ALIA patet solutio per ea quae dicta sunt: quia, REPLY OBJ. 10: To the others the solution is clear
quamvis tria concurrant ad fruitionem, tamen in from what has been said: since, although three things
amore perficitur, ut prius, in corp. art., dictum est. concur to enjoyment, still it is perfected in love; as it
was said before in the body of the article.
AD ULTIMUM dicendum, quod aliae virtutes REPLY OBJ. 11: To the last, it should be said that the
conjungunt Deo per modum meriti et dispositionis, other virtues conjoin one to God by way of merit and
sed sola caritas per modum perfectae unionis. disposition, but only charity by way of perfect union.
Article Two
Utrum uti sit actus rationis
Whether to use is an act of reason
CIRCA SECUNDUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod OBJECTION 1: It seems that ‘to use’ is an act of
uti sit actus rationis. Ordinare enim unum ad alterum reason. In fact, to order one thing to another is of a
est potentiae conferentis, cujusmodi est ratio. Sed uti power that is confronted, which is reason. Now, ‘to
dicit ordinem ad finem. Ergo est actus rationis. use’ means order to an end. Therefore, it is an act of
reason.
PRAETEREA, ut dicit Philosophus, ordinatio eorum OBJ. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says, the
quae sunt ad finem et inventio finis pertinent ad ordination of those things which are means to the
prudentiam. Prudentia autem est habitus rationis. end and the discovery of the end belong to prudence.
Ergo et uti, quod dicit talem ordinationem, est actus For prudence is the habit of reason. Therefore also ‘to
rationis. use’, which means such ordination, is an act of
reason.
SED VIDETUR quod sit actus voluntatis, quia BUT IT SEEMS that it is an act of will, because will is
voluntas ponitur in definitione ejus: uti enim est placed in its definition: for to use is to assume
assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis. something in the faculty of will.
Praeterea, illud ordinatur ad finem quod finem Further, that which obtains the end is ordered to
consequitur. Sed frui, quod dicit consecutionem finis, the end. But to enjoy which is called the attainment
est actus voluntatis, ut dictum est, in articulo of the end, is an act of the will, as was said in the
antecedente. Ergo et uti. previous article. Therefore so is to use.
RESPONDEO dicendum, quod uti dicitur I RESPOND saying that “to use” is said in many
multipliciter. Aliquando enim nominat quamlibet ways. At times, in fact, it indicates some operation,
operationem, secundum quod dicimus usum alicujus according to which we say that the use of a certain
rei esse bonum vel malum; et secundum hoc videtur thing is good or bad; this seems to be defined by
definiri ab Augustino: uti est assumere aliquid in Augustine: to use is to assume something to the
facultatem voluntatis; idest, ut operemur de eo quo faculty of will; that is, that we operate with that which
utimur ad nutum voluntatis. Aliquando dicit we use to the command of will. At times, it means the
frequentiam operationis, secundum quod usus est frequency in operation, according to which use is
idem quod consuetudo: et sic definit Victorinus: usus identified with custom; and this is how Victorinus
est actus frequenter de potentia elicitus. defines it: Use is an act frequently elicited from a
power. But, in both of these modes it is the act of
some power.
Sed utroque modorum istorum est actus Still, at times, to use is said of those things that
cujuslibet potentiae. Dicitur etiam aliquando uti are ordered to some end; and thus to use is taken
eorum quae ad finem ordinantur aliquem; et sic uti here according to the first definition given. Now, that
sumitur hic quantum ad primam definitionem quae which is for the end, is led to its end by three
ponitur. Illud autem quod est ad finem, inducitur ad operations. The first is the operation of reason that
finem suum tribus operationibus. Prima est operatio pre‐establishes the end and orders and directs to this
rationis praestituentis finem et ordinantis et end. The second is the operation of the will that
dirigentis in ipsum. Secunda est operatio voluntatis commands. The third is the operation of the moving
imperantis. Tertia est operatio virtutis motivae faculty that executes the command. Now, to use
exequentis. Uti autem nominat executionem ejus indicates the execution of that which has been
quod ad finem ordinatum est, non secundum actum ordered to the end not according to the proper act of
proprium alicujus motivarum virium, sed some moving power, but commonly presupposing the
communiter praesupposita ordinatione in finem. ordination to the end. Hence, it is an act of will,
Unde est actus voluntatis, quae est universalis motor which is the universal motor of the power according
virium secundum ordinem ad rationem. to order to reason.
AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod uti REPLY OBJ. 1: To the first, therefore, it should be
praesupponit ordinem; sed ejus substantia magis est said that to use presupposes order; but its substance
in executione voluntatis. is more in the execution of the will.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod prudentia est REPLY OBJ. 2: To the second, it should be said that
perfectio rationis practicae, secundum quod est recta. prudence is the perfection of the practical reason,
Rectitudo autem ejus et veritas est, ut dicitur 6 Ethic., according to which it is right. For, its rectitude and
secundum convenientiam cum appetitu recto. Unde truth is, as it is said in the Ethics, VI, 3, according to
prudentia non tantum perficit ad actum qui est ipsius the convenience with right appetite. Hence, prudence
rationis, sed etiam ad actum voluntatis, qui regulatus is not perfected only to the act which is of reason
est ratione; sicut eligere, etsi sit actus voluntatis vel itself, but also to the act of the will which is regulated
liberi arbitrii, est tamen prudentiae. by reason, as election, even though it is an act of will
or free‐will, it is still of prudence.
Question Two
Circa objecta dictorum actuum, primo quaeritur With regard to the object of the aforesaid acts,
de fruibilibus; secundo de utibilibus. Quantum ad first enjoyable things are inquired about, second,
primum duo quaeruntur: useful things. Concerning the first two questions are
utrum solo Deo sit fruendum; asked:
utrum una tantum fruitione vel pluribus. (1) Whether only God is to be enjoyed?
(2) Whether enjoyment is only one or many?
Article One
Utrum fruendum sit solo Deo
Whether God alone is to be enjoyed
AD PRIMUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod non OBJECTION 1: It seems that God alone is not to be
solo Deo fruendum sit. His enim rebus fruendum est, enjoyed. In fact, as it says in the text, we should enjoy
ut dicitur in littera, quae nos beatos faciunt. those things that make us blessed. For, created
Beatitudo autem creata beatos nos facit. Ergo ea beatitude makes us blessed. Therefore, one should
fruendum est: non ergo tantum Deo. enjoy this, and not God alone.
PRAETEREA, ultimus finis hominis est sua felicitas. OBJ. 2: Further, the ultimate end of man is his
Felicitas autem ejus est perfectissima operatio. Cum happiness. For his happiness is the most perfect
igitur ultimo fine fruendum sit, operatione operation. Since, therefore, the ultimate end is to be
perfectissima fruendum est: quod etiam videtur per enjoyed, the most perfect operation is to be enjoyed:
philosophum qui dicit, quod felicitas non quaeritur as it seems also for the Philosopher, who says that
propter aliquid aliud: et per Boetium, qui dicit, happiness is not sought for someone else: and for
quod beatitudo est status omnium bonorum Boethius, who says that, beatitude is the perfect state
aggregatione perfectus. of the aggregation of all goods.
PRAETEREA, Tullius dicit: honestum est quod sua vi OBJ. 3: Further, Cicero says: It is honest that which
nos trahit, et sua dignitate nos allicit. Sed quod per se attracts us by its force, and attracts us by its dignity.
allicit, propter se amatur. Ergo omni honesto But what attracts by itself, is loved on account of
fruendum est, et ita omnibus virtutibus. Ergo non itself. Therefore, every honestum is enjoyed, and so
tantum Deo. also every virtue. Therefore God alone is not enjoyed.
PRAETEREA, apostolus ad Philemonem 20, OBJ. 4: Further, the Apostle in the Letter to
dicit: itaque, frater, ego te fruar in domino. Ergo etiam Philemon, says: Therefore, brother, I enjoy you in the
homine justo frui possumus, et per consequens Lord. Therefore, we too may enjoy a just man, and
quolibet homine, qui est ad imaginem Dei, et consequently, any man, who is in the image of God,
qualibet creatura, in qua est vestigium Dei. and any creature, in which is the vestige of God.
CONTRA, ratio dilectionis est bonitas. Sed omnis ON THE CONTRARY, the ratio of love is goodness.
bonitas refertur ad bonitatem Dei a qua fluit et cujus But every goodness is referred to the goodness of God
similitudinem gerit. Ergo nihil est diligendum nisi in from whom it flows and whose likeness it bears.
ordine ad Deum. Ergo solo Deo fruendum est. Therefore, nothing is loved unless it is ordered to
God. Therefore God alone is to be enjoyed.
Praeterea, Proverb. 16, 4, dicitur: universa propter Further, Proverbs 16:4, says: God has made the
semetipsum operatus est Deus. Ergo ipse est finis universe for himself. Therefore, he is the end of all
omnium. Omnia ergo propter ipsum diligenda sunt: things. Therefore, all things are love because of him:
et sic idem quod prius. and thus the same as before.
Respondeo dicendum, quod frui aliquo dicitur I respond saying that to enjoy something is said in
tripliciter. Aut sicut objecto; et hoc modo solo Deo three ways. Either as an object; and in this way only
fruendum est: quia ad bonitatem ipsius Dei ordinatur God is to be enjoyed: because the entire goodness of
tota bonitas universi; sicut bonum totius exercitus ad the universe is ordered to the goodness of God
bonum ducis, ut dicitur 12 Metaph. Alio modo sicut himself; as the good of an entire army to the good of
habitu eliciente actum fruitionis; et hoc modo the leader, as is said in Metaphysics XII. In another
beatitudine creata et caritate fruendum est. Tertio way, as the habit that the act of the enjoyment elicits;
modo fruimur aliquo sicut instrumento fruitionis; et and in this way are created beatitude and charity
hoc modo fruimur potentia, cujus fruitio est actus. enjoyed. In a third way we enjoy something as an
instrument of enjoyment; and in this way, we enjoy a
power, whose enjoyment is the act.
AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod aliquid facit REPLY OBJ. 1: To the first, therefore, it should be
beatum dupliciter: vel effective, sicut Deus; et hoc said that something makes something blessed in two
solo fruendum est velut objecto: vel formaliter, sicut ways: either effectively, as God does; and this alone is
albedo facit album; et hoc fruendum est formaliter to be enjoy as object; or formally, as whiteness makes
loquendo, et sic beatitudo beatum facit. something white: and this is to be enjoyed formally
speaking, and thus beatitude makes something
blessed.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod objectum REPLY OBJ. 2: To the second it should be said that
operationis terminat et perficit ipsam, et est finis the object of the operation finishes and perfects it,
ejus. Unde impossibile est operationem habere and it is its end. Hence, it is impossible for operation
rationem finis ultimi. Sed, quia objectum non to have the notion of ultimate end. However, since
consequimur nisi per operationem, ideo est idem the object is not obtained unless through operation,
appetitus operationis et objecti. Unde, si aliquo modo then the appetite of the operation and the object are
ipsa fruitione fruimur, hoc erit inquantum fruitio nos the same. Hence, if in a certain way we enjoy this
Deo conjungit: et eadem fruitione fruemur fine et enjoyment, this will be insofar as the enjoyment
operatione, cujus objectum est finis ultimus; sicut unites us to God: and with this same enjoyment we
eadem operatione intelligo intelligibile et intelligo me will enjoy the end and the operation, whose object is
intelligere. the ultimate end; as with the same operation I
understand the intelligible and I understand that I
understand.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod propter se dicitur REPLY OBJ. 3: To the third it should be said that
dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod opponitur ad ‘on account of itself’ is said in two ways. In one way
propter aliud; et hoc modo virtutes et honestum non according to what is opposed ‘on account of another’;
propter se diliguntur, cum etiam ad aliud referantur. and in this way virtues and the bonum honestum are
Alio modo dicitur propter se, secundum quod not loved on account of themselves, since they refer
opponitur ad per accidens; et sic dicitur propter se to another. In another way ‘on account of itself’ is
diligi quod habet in natura sua aliquid movens ad said according to what is opposed to ‘per accidens’;
diligendum: et hoc modo virtutes propter se and thus loved on account of itself is said of what has
diliguntur, quia habent in se aliquid unde quaerantur, in its nature something that moves it to be loved: and
etsi nihil aliud ab eis contingeret: non tamen est in this way the virtues are loved on account of
inconveniens ut aliquid propter se ametur et tamen themselves, because they have in themselves
ad alterum ordinetur, sicut dicitur in 1 Ethic. Est something for which they are sought, even if nothing
autem aliquid quod desideratur, non propter aliquid else is obtained from them: still it is not inconvenient
quod in se habet, sed tantum secundum quod that something is loved on account of itself and also
ordinatur ad alterum, ut effectivum illius; sicut potio ordered to something else, as it is said in I Ethic. For
amara amatur, non propter aliquid quod in ipsa est, there is something that is desired, not for what it has
sed quia sanitatem efficit: et hujusmodi nullo modo in itself, but only insofar as it is ordered to another,
propter se diliguntur; sive propter se dicat causam as productive of this; as a bitter drink is loved, not for
formalem, sicut virtus dicitur propter se diligi; sive something that is in it, but because it produces
finalem, sicut Deus. health: and such things are in no way loved ‘on
account of themselves’; or ‘on account of itself’ is said
of the formal cause, as virtue is said to be loved on
account of itself, or of the final cause, as is God.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod homine justo non REPLY OBJ. 4: To the fourth it should be said that
est simpliciter fruendum, sed in Deo; ita quod the just man is not enjoyed absolutely, but rather in
objectum fruitionis sit Deus; et repraesentans ipsum God; namely, that the object of enjoyment is God;
gratiae objectum per similitudinem, in qua inhabitat and the holy man is by likeness a representative of
Deus, sit homo sanctus. Nec tamen sequitur quod the very object of grace he is a man] in which God
homine peccatore sit fruendum in Deo, quia non est inhabits. And still it does not follow that a sinful man
in eo gratia, quae facit Deum inhabitare, et quae est should enjoy in God, since in him there is not grace,
exemplar expressum illius summae bonitatis, qua which makes God inhabit, and which is the exemplar
fruendum est: et multo minus hoc sequitur de that expresses that supreme goodness, which is to be
creatura irrationali: non enim sufficit ad hoc enjoyed: and much less does it follow in the case of
similitudo imaginis et vestigii, sed similitudo gratiae. the irrational creatures: for the likeness of image and
vestige is not enough, while the likeness of grace is.
Article Two
Utrum fruamus Deo una fruitione
Whether we enjoy God with one enjoyment
CIRCA SECUNDUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod OBJECTION 1: It seems that we do not enjoy God
non una fruitione Deo fruamur. Actus enim with one enjoyment. For an act is distinguished
distinguuntur secundum objecta. Sed objecta according to its object. But the object of enjoyment
fruitionis sunt tres res distinctae proprietatibus are three realities distinct by personal properties,
personalibus, scilicet pater, filius, et spiritus sanctus. namely, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore, the
Ergo fruitiones sunt tres. enjoyments are three.
PRAETEREA, operatio animae sistens in communi OBJ. 2: Further, an operation of the soul that stops
non est perfecta, nisi etiam descendat ad propria, in what is common is not perfect, unless to descends
sicut cognitio generis perficitur per cognitionem to what is proper, as the knowledge of the genus is
differentiae; et multo plus desiderium et amor perfected by the knowledge of the differences; and
perficitur in particulari. Sed fruitio est operatio desire and love are perfected even more in the
perfecta. Ergo non tantum fruemur essentia particular. Now, enjoyment is a perfect operation.
communi tribus personis, sed singulis personis et Therefore, we do not only enjoy the common essence
proprietatibus ipsarum; et ita videtur quod non sit of the three persons, but rather the singular persons
una tantum fruitio. and their properties; and thus it seems that there is
not only one enjoyment.
PRAETEREA, quidquid habet filius solet referre ad OBJ. 3: Further, whatever the Son has is usually
patrem a quo habet, sicut Joan. 7, 16, dicitur: mea referred to the Father from whom it is had, as John
doctrina non est mea, sed ejus qui misit me. Sed 7:16 says: My doctrine is not mine, but of him who sent
bonitatem accepit filius a patre nascendo, sicut me. But, by being born, the Son receives goodness
essentiam. Ergo et fruitionem bonitatis filii debemus from the Father, as he does his essence. Therefore, we
referre in fruitionem patris. Ergo non est aequaliter should refer the enjoyment of the Son’s goodness to
fruendum tribus personis: multo minus ergo nec the enjoyment of the Father. Therefore, the three
eadem fruitione. persons are not to be enjoyed equally: much less,
then, by the same enjoyment.
CONTRA, sicut Deus Trinitas est unum principium ON THE CONTRARY, as the Triune God is one
omnium, ita est unus finis omnium. Sed eadem principle of all, so is he the one end of all. Now, the
operatio communis est totius Trinitatis, inquantum same common operation is of the whole Trinity,
est unum principium. Ergo eadem est fruitio trium, insofar as he is one principle. Therefore, the
inquantum est unus finis. enjoyment of the three is the same, insofar as he is
one end.
Praeterea, operatio felicitatis est ad nobilissimum Further, the operation of happiness is to the
objectum, ut dicit philosophus. Nobilissimum autem noblest object, as the Philosopher says. For the
est unum tantum, quia quod per superabundantiam noblest is only one, because what is said by
dicitur, uni soli convenit. Ergo, cum fruitio sit superabundance belongs to only one thing.
operatio ultimae felicitatis, refertur ad unum tantum Therefore, as enjoyment is the operation of ultimate
objectum; ergo fruimur tribus personis, inquantum happiness, it is referred to only one object; therefore,
sunt unum: ergo inquantum est unum objectum. we enjoy the three persons insofar as they are one:
therefore, insofar as they are one object.
RESPONDEO dicendum, quod una fruitione I RESPOND saying that we enjoy the three persons
fruimur tribus personis: et hujus ratio est duplex. Una by one enjoyment: and the reason for this is twofold.
ex parte essentiae. Objectum enim fruitionis est One reason concerns the essence. For the object of
summa bonitas; unde fruitio respicit unamquamque enjoyment is the supreme goodness; hence,
personam, inquantum est summum bonum; unde enjoyment concerns each person insofar as he is the
cum eadem numero sit bonitas trium, eadem erit et highest good; hence, since the goodness of the three
fruitio. is the same number, so also will be the same
enjoyment.
Alia ratio sumitur ex parte proprietatum. Sicut The other reason is taken from what concerns the
enim dicit philosophus qui novit unum relativorum, properties. For as the Philosopher says, the one who
cognoscit et reliquum; et sic cum tota fruitio knows one of the terms of the relation, knows the
originetur ex visione, ut prius dictum est, qui fruitur remaining term; and thus since the entire enjoyment
uno relativorum inquantum hujusmodi, fruitur et originates from the vision, as what said before (q. 1, a.
reliquo. Personae autem tres distinguuntur tantum 2 ad 2), he who enjoys one of the terms of the relation
secundum relationes; et ideo in fruitione unius as such, enjoys the remaining terms. In fact, the three
includitur fruitio alterius; et ita est fruitio eadem persons are distinguished only according to the
trium. Sed prima ratio melior est, quae tangit relations; and thus in the enjoyment of the one is
rationem objecti, a qua actus habet unitatem. included the enjoyment of the others; and thus there
is the same enjoyment of the three. However, the first
reason is better, since it touches on the ratio of the
object, by whose act there is unity.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum: quia tres REPLY OBJ. 1: And based on this, the solution to
personae non distinguuntur secundum id quod sunt the first is clear: because the three persons are not
objectum fruitionis, immo uniuntur in eo, scilicet in distinguished according to what is the object of
summa bonitate. enjoyment, but rather they are united in it, namely in
the supreme goodness.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod proprietate REPLY OBJ. 2: To the second it should be said that
uniuscujusque personae fruimur, ut paternitate; we enjoy the properties of each of the persons, such
tamen paternitas non dicit rationem fruitionis: unde as paternity; still paternity does not mean the ratio of
fruemur paternitate, inquantum paternitas est idem the enjoyment: hence, we enjoy paternity insofar as
re quod summa bonitas, differens tamen ratione. paternity is the same thing as supreme goodness, yet
differs by reason.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod illa reductio non REPLY OBJ. 3: To the third it should be said that
ponit gradum bonitatis in patre et filio, sed tantum this reduction does not place a degree of goodness in
ordinem naturae; et ideo non tollitur aequalitas et the Father and the Son, but only an order of nature;
unitas fruitionis. and thus it does not take away the equality and the
unity of the enjoyment.
Question Three
Deinde quaeritur de utibilibus, utrum omnibus Then there is a question about useful things,
aliis praeter Deum sit utendum. whether all things outside of God are useful.
Article One
Utrum utendum sit omnibus aliis a Dio
Whether all things other than God are useful
ET VIDETUR QUOD NON. Uti enim est assumere OBJECTION 1: And it seems that they are not. For
aliquid in facultatem voluntatis. Illud autem tantum to use is to assume something in the faculty of will.
est hoc modo assumptum quod nostrae operationi Now, only that which is subjected to our operation is
subjacet. Non autem omnia creata sunt talia, sicut assumed in this way. Now, not all created things are
caelum et Angeli, quae non sunt operabilia a nobis. such, such as heaven and Angels, which are not able
Ergo non possumus omnibus uti. to be worked upon by us. Therefore, we cannot use
all things.
PRAETEREA, illo utimur quo tendentes ad OBJ. 2: Further, we use that by which we are aided
beatitudinem juvamur. Sed creaturis impedimur in our tendency to beatitude. But, creatures
frequenter, sicut dicitur Sap. 14, 2: creaturae factae frequently impede this, as Wisdom 14:11 says:
sunt in odium et in tentationem animabus hominum, Creatures were made in hatred and for temptation to
et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium. Ergo non the souls of men and as a trap for the feet of the
omnibus possumus uti. foolish. Therefore, we cannot use all of them.
PRAETEREA, si omnibus praeter Deum tenemur OBJ. 3: Further, if we are held to use everything
uti, ergo quandocumque non referimus aliquid in outside of God, then we every time we do not refer
Deum, peccamus; sed quandocumque referimus something to God, we sin; while every time we refer
aliquid in Deum, meremur. Ergo omnis actus est something to God, we merit. Therefore, every act is
meritorius, et sic nullus actus erit indifferens. meritorious, and no act will be indifferent.
PRAETEREA, sequitur quod nullum peccatum sit OBJ. 4: Further, it follows that no sin is venial; for,
veniale; quia, si refertur in ultimum finem, non est if it is referred to the ultimate end, it is not a sin; for
aliquod peccatum; si autem constituatur aliquis finis if it constitutes some other end not related to the
alius ultimus, non relatus ad finem ultimum, est ultimate end, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, since every
peccatum mortale. Cum igitur omnis actus rationis act of reason is for some end, it is necessary that that
sit ad aliquem finem, oportet quod ille finis vel sit end is either the ultimate end, and thus is not a sin;
finis ultimus, et sic non est peccatum; vel sit alius or is another end not related to the ultimate end, and
finis non relatus ad finem ultimum, et sic erit thus it will be a mortal sin. Therefore, no sin is venial.
peccatum mortale. Ergo nihil est peccatum veniale.
CONTRA, 1 Corinth. 10, 31: sive manducatis, sive ON THE CONTRARY, Whether you eat or drink… do
bibitis (...) omnia in gloriam Dei facite. Ergo videtur everything for the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31).
quod omnibus sit utendum. Therefore, it seems that all things are to be used.
Item, sicut Deus est perfectae potentiae, ita est Also, as God is perfect power, so is he perfect
perfectae bonitatis. Sed ad perfectionem potentiae goodness. But it belongs to the perfection of his
ejus pertinet quod nihil habeat esse nisi productum power that nothing have being unless it be produced
ab ipso. Ergo et ad perfectionem divinae bonitatis by him. Therefore, it belongs to the perfection of
pertinet quod ametur nihil, nisi quod est in ordine ad divine goodness that nothing be loved, unless it is
ipsum. ordered to him.
RESPONDEO dicendum, quod quaecumque sunt I RESPOND by saying that what is good does not
bona, non habent bonitatem nisi inquantum have goodness unless insofar as it approaches the
accedunt ad similitudinem bonitatis divinae. Unde likeness of divine goodness. Hence, it is necessary
oportet, cum bonitas sit ratio dilectionis et desiderii, that, since goodness is the reason for delight and
ut omnia amentur in ordine ad bonitatem primam. desire, everything be loved in relation to the first
Omne autem quod bonum est, a Deo est: unde quae goodness. For everything that is good is from God:
ab ipso non sunt, nec quaerenda sunt, nec eis hence, what is not from him are neither to be sought
utendum est: et ideo nullo peccato utendum est, quia nor to be used: and therefore, no sin is to be used,
peccatum non est a Deo. Poena autem a Deo est; et because sin is not from God. Punishment, however, is
ideo poena utendum est, et ordinanda ad finem, from God; and therefore punishment is to be used,
secundum quod promovet meritum hominis, ducens and is to be ordered to the end, according to which
eum in considerationem suae infirmitatis, et the merit of man promotes, leading him to the
secundum quod purgat peccata. Similiter etiam res consideration of his weakness, and according to
mundi ab ipso sunt, et eis utendum est, vel which he purges sin. Similarly the things of the world
inquantum conferunt ad Dei cognitionem, are from God, and these are to be used, either insofar
ostendentes ipsius magnitudinem, vel secundum as they lead to the knowledge of God, showing his
quod praebent subsidium vitae nostrae ordinatae in greatness, or insofar as they provide a help to our life
Deum. Similiter opera nostra quae mala non sunt, ab that is ordered to God. Similarly, our works which are
ipso sunt, et propter ipsum facienda: non quod not evil, are from him, and are to be done for him; it
quamlibet operationem oporteat semper actualiter is not necessary that every operation be always
referre in Deum; sed sufficit ut habitualiter in Deo referred actually to God; but rather it suffices that
constituant finem suae voluntatis. [men] are constitute the end of their will habitually in
God.
AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod illis creaturis REPLY OBJ. 1: To the first, therefore, it should be
non utimur tamquam a nobis operatis, sed sicut in said that those creatures are not used insofar as they
Dei cognitionem ducentibus. are worked upon by us, but rather they are used as
leading us to the knowledge of God.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod creaturae, REPLY OBJ. 2: To the second it should be said that
quantum est in se, non impediunt nos a consequenda creatures, with regard to what is in them, do not
beatitudine; sed ex parte nostra, inquantum eis impede us in obtaining beatitude; but rather, on our
abutimur, in eis sistendo, sicut in fine. part, insofar as we abuse them, stopping in them as in
the end.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod, secundum REPLY OBJ. 3: To the third it should be said that,
theologum, nullus actus procedens a voluntate according to the theologian, no act proceeding from a
deliberante est indifferens; quia, si refertur in Deum, deliberating will is indifferent; because, if it is
supposita gratia, meritorius est; si autem non est referred to God, supposing grace, it is meritorious; if,
referibilis, peccatum est; si vero est referibilis et non however, it is not referable it is sinful; if however it is
referatur, vanus est: otiosum autem inter peccata referable and is not referred, it is in vain; now, sloth is
apud theologum computatur. counted among sins by the theologian.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod, quamvis ille qui REPLY OBJ. 4: To the fourth it should be said that,
peccat venialiter non referat actu in Deum suam although the one who sins venially does not refer in
operationem, nihilominus tamen Deum habitualiter act to God by his operation, nevertheless he has God
pro fine habet: unde non ponit creaturam finem habitually for the end: hence, he does not place a
ultimum, cum diligat eam citra Deum; sed ex hoc creature as ultimate end, since he loves it under God;
peccat, quia excedit in dilectione; sicut ille qui nimis but he stills sins for he has exceeded in love; like the
immoratur viae, non tamen exit a via. one who lingers too long on the way, and yet does
not leave the road.
Question Four
Deinde quaeritur de fruentibus et utentibus. Et Then those who enjoy and those who use are
de fruentibus; questioned:
de utentibus. (1) those who enjoy;
(2) those who use.
Article One
Utrum frui conveniat omnibus rebus
Whether to enjoy belongs to all things
AD PRIMUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Fruitio dicit OBJECTION 1: Enjoyment means desire resting in
desiderium quietatum in fine. Sed omnis creatura, the end. Now, every creature, even the insensible
etiam insensibilis, desiderat naturaliter suum finem. creatures, naturally desire the end. Therefore, when it
Ergo, cum contingat ipsam consequi suum finem et happens that they achieve their end and rest in it, it
quiescere in eo, videtur quod fruitio sit creaturae seems that enjoyment is of insensible creatures.
insensibilis.
PRAETEREA, fruitio est ejus quod per se quaeritur, OBJ. 2: Further, enjoyment is of that which is
non relatum ad alterum. Sed bruta quaerunt aliqua in sought for itself, and not related to another.
quibus delectantur et non referunt ad aliud, quia However, brute animals seek certain things in which
carent ratione ordinante. Ergo brutorum est fruitio. they delight and they do not refer them to another,
since they lack ordering reason. Therefore, enjoyment
belongs to brute animals.
PRAETEREA, naturali dilectione contingit aliquem OBJ. 3: Further, it happens that one loves God
diligere Deum super omnia, cum naturaliter above all things with a natural love, since he is
cognoscatur esse summum bonum, et ita propter se naturally known to be the highest good, and is loved
amandum. Sed fruimur eo quod propter se amamus. for himself. But, we enjoy that which we love for
Ergo contingit hominem existentem in naturalibus itself. Therefore, it happens that man existing in the
tantum, frui Deo. natural state alone, enjoys God.
PRAETEREA, contingit quod aliquis existens in OBJ. 4: Further, it happens that someone in mortal
peccato mortali, alicujus suae actionis Deum finem sin, constitutes God as ultimate end of one of their
ultimum constituat, non referens ad aliud. Hoc actions, and do not refer it to another. Now, this is to
autem est frui. Ergo peccator etiam potest frui Deo. enjoy. Therefore, even the sinner can enjoy God.
SED E CONTRARIO videtur quod nec etiam justus OBJ. 5: But to the contrary, it seems that not even
fruatur in via. Frui enim est quiescere voluntatem the just man can enjoy in via. For to enjoy is to rest
delectatam in cognitis propter se. Sed quamdiu the will, delighting in knowledge for itself. But, as
aliquis est in via, non quiescit. Ergo quamdiu est in long as someone is in via, he does not rest. Therefore,
via, aliquis Deo non fruitur. while one is in via, they do not enjoy God.
PRAETEREA, videtur quod nec etiam beati fruantur. OBJ. 6: Further, it seems that not even the blessed
Sicut enim habetur in littera, omne quod fruitur enjoy. For as was said in the text, everything that is
aliquo eget illo. Sed quidquid eget aliquo caret illo. enjoyed by someone, is needed by them. But whoever
Cum igitur beati non careant Deo, videtur quod non needs something lacks it. Therefore, since the blessed
fruantur illo. do not lack God, it seems that they do not enjoy him.
EX QUO etiam concluditur quod nec seipso Deus OBJ. 7: From this, though, it can be concluded
fruatur, cum non seipso indigeat. that not even God enjoys himself, not having need of
himself.
RESPONDEO dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum I RESPOND saying that, as was said above,
est, qu. 1, art. 1, fruitio ponit quamdam delectationem enjoyment places some delight in the end. For delight
in fine. Delectatio autem non potest esse nisi in cannot be unless in the knower: for which Plato said
cognoscente: propter quod Plato dixit, quod that delight is the generation of the sensible in
delectatio est generatio sensibilis in naturam; id est, nature; that is, that a convenience in nature is sensed;
quae sentitur naturae conveniens; et ideo cum and therefore, since insensible creatures do not
creaturae insensibiles non cognoscant, non know, they do not delight or enjoy.
delectantur nec fruuntur.
Item, fruitio proprie loquendo, est tantum ultimi Likewise, enjoyment properly speaking is only of
finis. Bruta autem ultimum finem non apprehendunt, the ultimate end. However, brute animals do not
nec finem proximum possunt ordinare ad finem apprehend the ultimate end, nor can they order the
ultimum, cum careant ratione, cujus est ordinare. proximate end to the ultimate end, since they lack
Unde non proprie fruuntur. reason, to which it belongs to order. Hence, they do
not properly enjoy.
Similiter peccator ponit finem ultimum in quo Similarly the sinner places the ultimate end in
non est; unde, cum verum finem non habeat, non something that is not the ultimate end; hence, since
vere fruitur. he does not have the true end, he does not truly
enjoy.
Ulterius autem fruitio dicit delectationem in fine; Furthermore, enjoyment is called delight in the
unde perfecta fruitio non est, nisi sit perfecta end; hence, there is not perfect enjoyment if there is
delectatio, quae esse non potest ante consecutionem not perfect delight, which cannot be had before
finis: et ideo justus homo non perfecte fruitur; sed obtaining the end: and therefore, the just man does
beati, qui consecuti sunt finem, vere et perfecte et not enjoy perfectly; the blessed however, who have
proprie fruuntur. obtained the end, truly and perfectly and properly
enjoy.
AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod, quamvis omne REPLY OBJ. 1: To the first, therefore, it should be
desiderium consequatur cognitionem, desiderium said, that, although every desire follows upon
tamen creaturae insensibilis non sequitur knowledge, the desire of insensible creature, though,
cognitionem in ipsa existentem, sed cognitionem does not follow upon knowledge existing in them, but
motoris primi (quicumque sit ille) ordinantis the knowledge of the first mover (whoever this is)
unumquodque in suum finem: et ideo sine cognitione ordering each thing to its end: and therefore, without
nec delectationem nec fruitionem habent. knowledge one has neither delight nor enjoyment.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod pecora, quamvis REPLY OBJ. 2: To the second it should be said that
delectentur in fine, ille tamen finis non est ultimus; animals delight in the end, however that end is not
immo est relatus ad aliud, non ab ipsis, sed a primo the ultimate end; what it more, it is related to
ordinante omnia in seipsum: et ideo, cum non another, not by themselves, but by the first who
delectentur in ultimo fine simpliciter, sed in ultimo orders all things to himself: therefore, not delighting
apprehenso ab eis, aliquo modo dicuntur frui, sed in the simply ultimate end, but in the last that is
improprie. apprehended by them, they can be said to enjoy in
some way, however improperly.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod delectatio sequitur REPLY OBJ. 3: To the third, it should be said that
operationem perfectam. Perfecta autem est operatio delight follows the perfect operation. Now, perfect is
quae procedit ab habitu. Habitus autem acquisiti vel the operation that proceeds from habit. Acquired or
naturales non perficiunt ad ultimam beatitudinem natural habit, however, do not perfect to the ultimate
patriae, ut supra habitum est, sufficienter, et proxime: beatitude of the patria sufficiently and proximately,
quia, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de as established above; for, as Augustine says in the
poenitentia, quodam familiari contactu ad book De poenitentia, the beloved creature is next to
experiendam ejus suavitatem adjacet amanti amata the lover with some familiar contact in order to
creatura. Sed voluptas creatoris longe alterius generis experience his sweetness. But the pleasure of the
est; et ideo sine habitu gratuito non est delectatio Creature is of a very different kind; and, therefore,
talis quae ad fruitionem sufficiat. Vel dicendum, quod without the gratuitous habit, there is not such delight
delectatio naturalis non ponit aliquam operationem that is sufficient for enjoyment. Or it is said that
in actu, sed tantum quamdam naturalem natural delight does not place any operation in act,
inclinationem, quae in actum reducitur per habitum but only some natural inclination which is reduced to
caritatis. act by the habit of charity.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod existens in mortali REPLY OBJ. 4: To the fourth it should be said that
peccato, diligit aliquid habitualiter supra Deum, etsi the one who is in mortal sin habitually loves
non in actu semper; et ideo non fruitur ipso, sed illo something above God, even though he does not
ad quod omnia ordinat. always do so in act; and, therefore, he cannot enjoy
God, but rather that to which he has ordered all
things.
AD QUINTUM dicendum, quod est duplex quies, REPLY OBJ. 5: To the fifth it should be said that
scilicet quies desiderii, et quies motus. Quies there is a twofold rest, namely the rest of desire and
desiderii est quando desiderium sistit in aliquo the rest of motion. The rest of desire is when the
propter quod omnia facit et quaerit, et non desiderat desire is in something on account of which it does
aliquid ulterius; et hoc modo voluntas justi quiescit in and seeks all things, and does not desire something
via in Deo. Quies autem motus est quando pervenitur else; and in this way the will of the just man in via
ad terminum quaesitum; et ista quies voluntatis erit rests in God. However, the rest of motion is when the
in patria. Haec autem quies facit perfectam sought end is reached; and there will be this rest of
fruitionem, sed prima imperfectam. the will in heaven. For the latter rest gives perfect
enjoyment, while the former gives imperfect
enjoyment.
AD SEXTUM dicendum, quod aliquid eget altero REPLY OBJ. 6: To the sixth it should be said that
dupliciter. Aut sicut eo a quo dependet secundum something needs another thing in two ways. Either as
esse; et hoc modo omnia egent Deo; quia, secundum that which depends on another according to being;
Gregorium, omnia in nihilum tenderent, nisi ea and in this way everything needs God; because as
manus conditoris teneret: non enim est tantum causa Gregory says, everything would tend to nothingness,
fieri, sed esse rerum; et hoc modo beati egent Deo. unless it were held by the hand of the Creator: for he
Alio modo dicitur quis egere illo quod nondum is not only the cause of becoming, but of the being of
habet; et sic non egent. things; and in this way the blessed need God. Or in
another way one says that one has need of that which
they do not yet have; and thus they are not in need.
AD ULTIMUM dicendum, quod hoc intelligendum REPLY OBJ. 7: To the last it should be said that this
est, quando fruens et id quo fruitur sunt diversa in should be understood when the one enjoying and
essentia: quod non est in divina fruitione: et ideo what is enjoyed differ in essence: this is not the case
perfecte ipse fruitur seipso: unde Gregorius:esto in divine enjoyment: and therefore he perfectly
gloriosus, et speciosis induere vestibus; dicit: ipse enjoys himself, hence Gregory comments on Job
gloriosus est qui, dum seipso fruitur, accedentis laudis 40:10: Be glorious and put on beautiful vestments; and
indigens non est. says: He is glorious the one that while he enjoys
himself, does not need added praise.
Article Two
Utrum usus conveniat existentibus in patria
Whether use belongs to existing things in heaven
AD SECUNDUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod in OBJECTION 1: It seems that in heaven no one will
patria nullus erit utens. Via enim non est necessaria use. The way is not necessary once one has the end;
habito fine; unde Bernardus: quid necesse est scala hence Bernard says: Of what use are the stairs if one
tenenti jam solium? Sed usus est eorum quae sunt ad already has the throne? But use is of the things that
finem, quae se habent per modum viae. Igitur in are to the end, and had by mode of way. Therefore, in
beatis consecutis finem non erit usus. the blessed who have reached the end, there will not
be use.
PRAETEREA, uti est referre aliquid in alterum. Sed OBJ. 2: Further, to use is to refer something to
hoc non potest fieri nisi unum cogitetur post aliud; something else. But this cannot happen unless one is
quod non videtur esse in patria, secundum thought of after the other; and this does not seem to
Augustinum, quia non sunt ibi cogitationes volubiles. happen in heaven, according to Augustine, because
Ergo videtur quod non sit ibi usus. there are not voluble thoughts. Therefore, it seems
that there is not use there.
CONTRA, constat quod in patria manet dilectio Dei ON THE CONTRARY, it is known that in heaven the
et proximi, quia caritas nunquam excidit, 1 Corinth. love of God and one’s neighbor remains, because
13, 8. Sed proximus nunquam diligetur propter se, sed nothing surpasses charity (1 Cor. 13:8). But a neighbor
propter Deum. Semper ergo erit ibi dilectio usus. is not loved for themselves, but for God. Therefore,
there will always be love of use in heaven.
RESPONDEO dicendum, quod usus est eorum quae I RESPOND saying that use regards means to the
sunt ad finem. Sed eorum quae sunt ad finem, end. But of the means that are to the end, some
quaedam sunt includentia finem et contingentia include the end and touch it and these are those
ipsum, et haec sunt quae non repugnant perfectioni things that are not repugnant to the perfection of the
finis, sicut dispositiones materiae manent cum forma end, such as the dispositions of matter that remain
substantiali; et talium erit usus in patria; sicut with the substantial form; and these will be used in
perfectiones naturales, et septem dona spiritus sancti, heaven; such as the natural perfections and the seven
et alia quae ex sua ratione imperfectionem non gifts of the Holy Spirit, and other things that do not
dicunt. Quaedam autem sunt ad finem sicut distantia imply imperfection in their ratio. Other means,
a fine, ut motus et hujusmodi; et ista propter suam though, are related to the end as being far from the
imperfectionem non compatitur finis: unde talium end, such as motion and other such things; and these,
non erit usus in patria; sicut poenae, et actus fidei et due to their imperfection are not compatible with the
spei et cibi et hujusmodi. end: hence, such things will not be used in heaven;
such as punishment, the act of faith, the act of hope,
food and so forth.
AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod sicut invenimus REPLY OBJ. 1: To the first, therefore, it should be
in processu cognitionis, quod in cognitionem said that as we find in the process of knowledge, that
principiorum venit quis per principiata, quibus tamen one comes to the knowledge of the principles
habitis, magis ipsa cognoscit quam principiata; nec through the conclusions, still once the principles are
indiget principiatis ad cognitionem principiorum possessed, they are more known than the
quae jam per se cognoscit; neque tamen conclusions; one does not need knowledge of the
principiatorum cognitionem amittit; immo illa conclusions for the knowledge of principles once they
cognitio per principia perficitur: ita est in processu are known per se; nor does one lose knowledge of the
hominis in Deum, qui per creaturas in Deum venit: conclusions; rather, that knowledge is perfected by
quo habito, creaturis non eget ad ipsum habendum, the principles: such is the process of man to God,
sed per ipsum venit in perfectum usum omnium when man reaches God by creatures: once God is had,
aliorum. Sic etiam est in processu naturae, quod per he does not have need of creatures to have him, but
dispositiones acquiritur forma, quae habita, est through God comes to the perfect use of all other
principium omnium accidentium; et ita est in things. This is also the process in nature, which
omnibus aliis invenire. through the dispositions form is acquired, once it is
possessed it is the principle of all the accidents; and
this can be seen in all other things.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod cogitatio volubilis REPLY OBJ. 2: To the second it should be said that
proprie dicitur quae est per discursum rationis, cui voluble knowledge is properly said of that which is by
non offertur statim quod quaerit: unde oportet quod discourse of reason, to which is not offered
inveniat procedendo ab uno in aliud. Ibi autem immediately what is sought: hence, it is necessary
statim sine difficultate occurret in illo divino lumine that one discovers proceeding from one thing to
quidquid quaeretur: unde etiam homines intelligent another. In heaven, however, whatever is sought will
intellectu deiformi, sicut et Angeli. Non autem immediately and without difficulty be presented in
excluditur successio cogitationum in patria, et multo that divine light: hence, men will understand by a
minus ordo unius ad alterum, qui etiam sine deiform intellect, like the angels. Still succession of
successione esse potest. knowledge is not excluded in heaven, and much less
the order of one thing to another, which can be
without succession.
Aliud concedimus. We concede the contrary.
Exposition of the Text
Circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod With regard to the text, there is a question about
dicitur: innotuit, sacrae paginae tractatores circa res what is said: it has become clear to us that the
vel signa praecipue versari. Videtur enim divisio esse commentators on the Sacred Page deal principally with
incompetens: eo quod contingit idem signum esse et things or with signs. It seems, however, that the
rem; sicut corpus Christi verum et character in division is inadequate: for it happens that sign and
Baptismo. thing are identical; as the true body of Christ and the
character in Baptism.
Praeterea, ipsemet dicit quod omne signum res Further, he himself says that every sign is a thing;
est; et ita videtur quod divisio non sit per opposita. and thus it seems that the division is not made by
opposition.
Item, creaturae omnes sunt signum divinae As well, all creatures are signs of divine goodness;
bonitatis; et ita videtur quod fere omnia quae in hac and thus it seems almost all of the things that are
doctrina traduntur sunt signa. transmitted in this doctrine are signs.
Ad quod dicendum, quod ista divisio non est data To the first it should be said that this division is
per oppositas res, sed per oppositas rationes not made by opposing things, but by opposing
secundum absolutum et relatum. Signum enim est notions according to absolute and relative. For a sign
quod est institutum ad aliquid significandum: res is that which is instituted to signify something; and a
autem est quae habet absolutam significationem non thing is that which has an absolute meaning, not a
ad aliud relatam. Unde non est inconveniens quod meaning relative to another. Hence it is not
idem sit signum et res respectu diversorum; sicut inconvenient that the sign and the thing are identical
etiam idem homo est pater et filius. Unde patet with respect to diverse things; just like the same man
solutio ad primum. is father and son. Hence the solution to the first is
clear.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod res dupliciter To the second it should be said that a thing is
sumitur in processu hujus locutionis; sumitur enim taken in two ways in the development of this
communiter pro omni ente; et sic omne signum est discourse; for it is taken commonly for every being;
res: sumitur etiam magis stricte pro eo quod est res and thus every sign is a thing: but it is taken more
tantum et non signum, et sic contra signum dividitur. restrictedly for that which is only a thing and not a
sign, and thus it is divided from the sign.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis creaturae To the third it should be said that although
sint signum alicujus, nihilominus tamen ad hoc creatures are signs of something, still they were not
principaliter non sunt institutae: et ideo non instituted principally for this: and thus they are not
continentur sub signis, nisi secundum quid. contained under signs except in a relative sense.
Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: et primo de Then, there is a question about what is said: And
rebus, postea de signis disseremus. Videtur enim quod first we will discuss things, afterwards signs. For it
prius agendum est de signis. Res enim per signa seems that first it is necessary to deal with signs. In
discuntur, ut in littera dicitur. Ergo per cognitionem fact things are discussed by signs, as is said in the
signorum devenimus in cognitionem rerum. text. Therefore from the knowledge of signs we come
to the knowledge of things.
Ad quod dicendum, quod hoc sequitur, quando To this it should be said that this follows when
signa et res sunt ejusdem ordinis, scilicet quod prius signs and things are of the same order, and therefore
determinandum est de signis quam de rebus quae per it is necessary to determine what concerns signs
illa signa significantur. Sic autem non se habent signa before what concerns things that are signified by
sacramentalia ad ea de quibus in primis tribus libris signs. Now, this is not the relationship between
agitur. Vel dicendum, quod alius est ordo servandus sacramental sign and the things which are dealt with
in accipiendo cognitionem, et tradendo. Accipiens in the first three books. Or it should be said that the
enim cognitionem procedit de signis ad signata, quasi order to be followed in the receiving of knowledge
modo resolutorio, quia signa magis sunt nota quo ad differs from the order to be followed in transmitting
ipsum; sed tradens cognitionem signorum, oportet it. In fact, in receiving knowledge one from proceeds
quod res ante signa manifestet, eo quod signa from the signs to the signified, almost in a resolutory
sumuntur per similitudinem ad res: unde oportet way, because the signs are more known to him; but in
praecognoscere res ad cognitionem signorum, ad transmitting knowledge of signs, it is necessary that
quarum similitudinem sumuntur. the thing is manifested before the sign, for the sign is
taken from the likeness to the thing: hence, it is
necessary to first know the thing before the
knowledge of the signs, which are taken from the
likeness of things.
Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: nos sumus Then there is a question about what is said: We
quasi inter utrasque constituti. Videtur enim ex hoc are constituted, as it were, between both. In fact, it
quod homo sit medium inter utibilia et fruibilia: that from this that man is an intermediate between
cujus contrarium videtur ex hoc quod virtus useable things and enjoyable things: the contrary
continetur inter utibilia. Virtus autem est de maxime seems to be the case from the fact that virtue is
bonis, secundum Augustinum, quibus nullus male placed among useable things. For virtue is of the
utitur. Naturales autem potentiae sunt media bona, maximally good, according to Augustine, which no
quibus aliquis male potest uti, et bene: et ita videtur one uses in an evil way. For, natural powers are
quod virtutes sunt supra hominem. intermediate goods, which one can use for evil and
for good: and thus, it seems that the virtues are above
man.
Ad quod dicendum, quod ordo bonorum To this it should be said that the order of the good
dupliciter potest considerari. Aut per comparationem can be considered in two ways. Either in comparison
ad rectitudinem vitae; et hoc modo virtus, quae est to rectitude of life; and in this way virtue, which is
sicut causa per se talis rectitudinis, est maximum like a per se cause of such rectitude, is the maximum
bonum; potentia autem naturalis, quae est sicut good; for a natural power, which is like a material
materiale ad talem rectitudinem, est medium; et res cause with regard to such rectitude, is an
aliae quae sunt exterius adminiculantes, sunt minima intermediate; and the other things, which are
bona. Potest etiam considerari ordo bonorum external aids, are the minimal goods. One can also
secundum progressum in beatitudinem, et hoc modo consider the order of good according to progress in
ipsum beatificans erit maximum bonum, et beatitude, and in this way the one who beatifies will
participans beatitudinem erit medium, et disponens be the maximum good, and the participant in
ad ipsam erit minimum. beatitude will be the intermediate, and the
dispositional cause to this will be the minimum.
Item quaeritur de hoc: res aliae sunt quibus There is also a question about this sentence: there
fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum est, aliae quae are some things that are to be enjoyed, other things
fruuntur et utuntur. Omne enim quod est, vel est that are to be used, and still other things that enjoy
finis, vel est ad finem. Sed fruibile habet rationem and use. In fact, all that is, is either an end or a means
finis, utibile autem rationem eorum quae sunt ad to an end. But what is enjoyable has the ratio of end,
finem. Ergo utibile et fruibile sufficienter dividunt the useful, however, has the ratio of the means that
res, et ita tertium membrum superfluit, praecipue are to the end. Therefore, the useable and the
cum ipse post dicat, quod hominibus, qui utentes et enjoyable sufficiently divide things, and thus a third
fruentes sunt, utendum est. member is superfluous, principally as it will be said
afterwards that men, which use and enjoy, are to be
used.
Ad quod dicendum, quod aliquid est ad finem To this it should be said that something is ordered
ordinatum dupliciter: vel sicut progrediens in finem; to the end in two ways: either as that which
et hoc modo fruens et utens est ad finem: vel sicut via progresses to the end; and in this way the one who
in finem; et hoc modo utibile est ad finem: unde enjoys and the one who uses are means to the end: or
utibile non comprehendit omnia quae sunt ad finem, as the way to the end; and in this way the usable is a
nisi valde large acceptum. Nec est inconveniens, si means to the end. Hence, the usable does not
idem contineatur sub duobus membris, cum divisio comprehend the means to the end, except in a broad
sit data per oppositas rationes, et non per oppositas sense. Nor is it inconvenient is the same thing is
res. contained under the two members, as the division is
given for opposite notions and not for opposite
things.
Item quaeritur de hoc: uti vero est id quod in usum As well, there is a question about this: to use is to
venerit referre ad obtinendum illud quo utendum est. refer that which has come to be used to obtain that
Videtur quod male notificet: quia usum non est magis which is to be enjoyed. It seems that this is a poor
notum quam uti; et ita videtur quod definitio non sit clarification: because use is not known better than to
per magis nota. use; and thus it seems that the definition is not
known better.
Ad quod dicendum, quod totum hoc quod To this it should be said that the entire expression
dicitur: id quod in usum venerit, ponitur loco unius that which has come to be used is presented as one
dictionis, et est circumlocutio hujus quod dico phrase, and it is a circumlocution for what I call
utibile, quod est objectum hujus actus uti. Actus ‘useful’, which is the object of the act of using. For,
autem convenienter per suum objectum definitur. the act is conveniently defined by its object.
Item quaeritur de hoc: non enim facile potest As well, there is a question concerning the cause
inveniri nomen quod tantae excellentiae conveniat, of the following statement: For it is not easy to find a
quae sit causa hujus dicti. name that agrees with such excellence.
Ad quod dicendum, quod nos imponimus nomina To this it should be said that we impose names on
rebus secundum quod veniunt in cognitionem things according to how they come to our knowledge;
nostram; et quia nos cognitionem accipimus a rebus and because we receive our knowledge from created
creatis, imponimus nomina secundum modum rerum things, we impose names according to the mode of
creatarum. Ea autem quae sunt in creaturis, non sunt created things. Now, that which is in creatures, is not
per eumdem modum in Deo, sed excellentiori modo; in God in the same way, but in a more excellent
ideo nomina quae nos imponimus, non sunt mode; therefore the names which we impose are not
sufficientia ad significandum Deum, sicut patet quod sufficient to signify God, as is clear that names that
nomina significantia in abstracto, significant quid signify in abstract, signify something imperfect that is
imperfectum non per se subsistens, ut humanitas, vel not subsistent through itself, such as humanity, or
albedo; concreta autem significant quid compositum, whiteness; and concrete names signify something
quorum neutrum divinae convenit nobilitati. composite: and neither of these belong to divine
perfection.
Item quaeritur de hoc: tanto nostram As well, there is a question about this statement:
peregrinationem et tolerabilius sustinemus, et so much more shall we both more tolerably sustain our
ardentius finire cupimus. Videtur enim contrarium, pilgrimage and more ardently desire to finish it. For, it
per id quod dicitur Proverb. 13, 12: spes quae differtur, seems that the contrary is so as it says in Prov. 13:12:
affligit animam. Et ita per hoc quod in speculo Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul. And thus for
cognoscimus, et praesentiam desideramus, this reason what we know as in a mirror, we desire to
intolerabilius absentiam sustinemus. be present, and its absence we support intolerably.
Ad quod dicendum, quod inquantum spes est To this it should be said that insofar as hope is of
desiderati absentis, sic est causa afflictionis; desired things that are absent, it is the cause of
inquantum autem res desiderata per spem et affliction. But insofar as the desired realty is in some
imperfectam cognitionem aliquo modo efficitur way made present by means of hope and imperfect
praesens, sic affert quamdam delectationem. knowledge, it brings a certain delight.
Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: notandum Then, there is a question about what is said: But it
quod idem Augustinus (...) aliter quam supra, is to be noted, that the same Augustine … accepting to
accipiens uti et frui, sic dicit. Unius enim unica est use and to enjoy in another way than above, speaks
definitio, sicut et esse. Ergo de uti et frui non debent thus. In fact, one definition belongs to one thing, as
dari multae definitiones. does being. Therefore, there many definitions should
not be given for to use and to enjoy.
Ad quod dicendum, quod si inveniretur aliqua To this it should be said that if a definition were
definitio quae diceret esse rei secundum found that says the being of a thing in relation to all
comparationem ad omnes causas ipsius proprias, of its causes, it would be most perfect, and would
esset perfectissima, et una tantum; sed inveniuntur only be one. However, more definitions are found
definitiones notificantes esse rei plures secundum when the being of a thing is expressed according to
diversas causas. Unde aliqua datur per causam diverse causes. Hence, something is given for the
finalem, quaedam per formalem, et sic de aliis. final cause, one for the formal cause, and so on for
Inveniuntur etiam aliae notificationes sumptae ex the other causes. One also finds other expressions
proprietatibus consequentibus esse rei, et tales etiam taken from the properties that follow upon the being
possunt esse plures. of a thing, and these can also be many.
Dicendum ergo, quantum ad praesens pertinet, It should be said, therefore, with regard to the
quod prima definitio de frui, scilicet, frui est amore present case, that the first definition of to enjoy,
alicui rei inhaerere propter seipsam, datur per namely: to enjoy is to adhere to a thing by love on
comparationem ad objectum, et habitum elicientem account of its very self is given in relation to the
actum; secunda autem, scilicet, fruimur cognitis in object and to the habit that elicits the act; the second,
quibus ipsis propter se voluntas delectata conquiescit, however, namely, We enjoy things known, in which
datur per comparationem ad potentiam cujus est the delighted will rests for its own sake, is given in
actus secundum ordinem ad potentiam relation to the power to which the act belongs
praecedentem, scilicet cognitivam; tertia, scilicet, frui according to the order of the preceding power,
est uti cum gaudio, non adhuc spei, sed jam rei, datur namely, the cognitive; third, namely, to enjoy is to use
per proprietatem consequentem actum, inquantum with a joy no longer of hope, but already of a thing, is
perfectus est, scilicet gaudium de re habita. Similiter given by the property that follows the act, insofar as it
dicendum quod prima definitio de uti, scilicet, uti est is perfect, namely, the joy of the thing possessed.
referre quod in usus venerit, ad obtinendum id quo Similarly it should be said that the first definition of
fruendum est, datur per comparationem ad objectum to use, namely, to use is to refer that which has come
et ad finem de uti proprie dicto: alia autem, to be used to obtain that which one is to enjoy, is given
scilicet, uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem in relation to the object and the end of use properly
voluntatis, datur de uti communiter sumpto per speaking: the other, however, namely, to use is to
comparationem ad potentiam operantem et assume something into the faculty of the will, is given
universaliter moventem. regarding to use taken commonly in relation to the
operating and universally moving power.
Deinde circa hoc quod dicit:neque tamen sic utitur Then about what was said: And he does not so use
nobis ut nos aliis rebus, notandum quod ostendit us, as we use other things, it should be noted that he
differentiam usus nostri ad usum divinum in duobus: shows the difference between our use and divine use
scilicet in hoc quod nos referimus usum nostrum, in two ways: namely in that we refer our use, by
quo operamur circa res, ad utilitatem nostram; ille which we operate concerning things, to our utility;
vero non ad utilitatem suam, sed nostram. Item ipse God, though, does not refer to his utility, but to ours.
refert usum suum, quo rebus utitur, ad bonitatem Likewise he refers his use, by which he uses things, to
suam; nos vero non ad bonitatem nostram, sed ipsius. his goodness; we, however, not to our goodness, but
Et hoc ostendit in operibus misericordiae primo, et to his. And this he shows in the works of mercy, and
planum est: et secundo in operibus creationis: ipse it is clear. Secondly, this is shown in the works of
enim propter bonitatem suam fecit nos; et ideo creation: in fact he made us on account of his
dicit: quia bonus est, sumus; et ex eo quod sumus, goodness; and for this reason he says: because he is
habemus bonitatem: et hoc prodest nobis. Et sic patet good, we are; and it is from this that because we are,
quod hoc opus est ad nostram utilitatem. Tertio we have goodness: and this favors us. And thus it is
ostendit in opere justitiae; ipse enim punit nos clear that this work is for our utility. Thirdly, it is
propter bonitatem suam; et ideo dicit: quia justus est, shown in works of justice; for he punishes us on
non impune mali sumus: quia justitia ejus bonitas ejus account of his goodness; and therefore he says:
est. Hoc etiam ad utilitatem nostram cedit; quia ad because he is just, not with impunity are we evil;
hoc punimur pro malo, ut a malo recedamus, et ita a because his justice is his goodness. And this also falls
non esse: propter quod dicit: inquantum mali sumus, to our utility: because we are punished for the evil so
minus sumus; quia quanto magis mali sumus, minus that we flee from evil, and from non‐being; for this
sumus: malum enim est privatio; unde quanto reason he says: insofar as we are evil, we are less;
multiplicatur in nobis, tanto elongat nos ab esse because the more greatly we are evil, we are less: for
perfecto. evil is a privation; hence to the degree that it is
multiplied in us, we distance ourselves from being
perfect.
Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: item quia Then there is a question about the following:
bonus est, sumus. Videtur enim esse falsum: sicut Thus, because he is good, we are. It seems that this is
enim dicit Boetius, si removeatur per intellectum false: for, as Boethius says, if goodness is removed
bonitas a Deo, adhuc remanebunt alia entia et alia, intellectually from God, other beings and others still
sed non bona. Ergo non quia bonus est, sumus. remain, but not good beings. Therefore it is not
because he is good that we are.
Respondeo dicendum, quod opera divina possunt I respond saying that the divine work can be
comparari ad divina attributa sicut ad causam compared to the divine attribute as to an efficient‐
efficientem exemplarem; et hoc modo sapientia exemplar cause; and in this way creature’s wisdom is
creaturae est a sapientia Dei, et esse creaturae ab esse to God’s wisdom, and the creature’s being to divine
divino, et bonitas a bonitate; et sic loquitur Boetius. being and goodness to goodness; and in this way
Sed tamen quia bonitas habet rationem finis, et finis Boethius speaks. However, because goodness has the
est causa omnium causarum, ideo omnes istae ratio of end, and end is the cause of the other causes,
processiones perfectionum in creaturas attribuuntur therefore all these processions of perfection in the
bonitati divinae etiam a Dionysio, quamvis a diversis creatures are also attributed to divine goodness by
attributis exemplentur. Dionysius, even though they derive exemplarily from
different attributes.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: inquantum Likewise, there is a question about what is said:
sumus, boni sumus. Alia enim est ratio boni et entis; insofar as we are, we are good. For one thing is the
et ita videtur falsum dicere. ratio or good and another is the ratio of being; and so
it seems that something false is said.
Respondeo dicendum, quod quamvis bonum et I respond by saying that although good and being
ens differant secundum intentiones, quia alia est ratio differ according to the concept, for one thing is the
boni et entis; tamen convertuntur secundum notion of good another is that of being; still they
supposita, eo quod omne esse est a bono et ad convert according to the supposit, insofar as all being
bonum; unde inquantum non dicit identitatem is from good and to the good; hence, ‘insofar as’ does
intentionis, sed aequalitatem suppositorum boni et not mean conceptual identity, but rather equality of
entis. the supposits of good and being.