Sciences Po – New Nuclear Order

Nuclear policy Paper No. 1 Abril 2016

Emerson R. Figueroa Peña

How to deal with North Korea in the second nuclear age

This policy paper is aimed to provide advice to the DoD of the Unite States of America. It
addresses the role of North Korea in the second nuclear age, and the challenges that hinder
the US efforts to deter this rogue state from using the nuclear bomb. This paper also states
that it is impossible to rely in conventional deterrence when addressing the Pyongyang’s
nuclear issue. Consequently, the final recommendation is to dismantle the North Korean
nuclear arsenal by the combination of economic sanctions, defensive systems, conventional
forces, and nuclear capabilities.

The Second Nuclear Age and North Korea

The second nuclear age is substantially different from that which took place in
the second half of the XX century; This era is characterized by the presence of new unstable
actors, and the diversification of purposes of their nuclear programs. The New nuclear era
brought new geopolitical dynamics and makes the implementation of the "zero nuclear
weapons" more difficult because of the diversification and decentralization of the nuclear
environment. There is a new range of interactions among nuclear and no-nuclear states; first of
all, it is important to mention that nuclear and non-nuclear states have different grades of
sophistication and reasons for pursuing or not the atomization of their arsenals. First, there are
established nuclear powers, which have the strongest and more developed nuclear capabilities
and understand the role and rules that define the purpose and “use” of nuclear weapons. Second,
the rogue nuclear powers go into the scene. This powers are characterized by their late and
limited development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and the fact that their reasons
for carrying out these developments are linked to regional conflicts and disparities in
conventional forces. For instance, North Korea saw the overwhelming US and South Korean
conventional capabilities as a barrier to its interests, and, moreover, as a threat to its own
existence. So the nuclear weapons were seen as a necessary measure to both inhibit the US
intervention which hinders the strategical plans of North Korea towards the south, and to deter
any tempt of external intervention that seeks to overturn the antidemocratic regime. Finally,
there are states, that although have not developed nuclear weapons yet, they have the nuclear
experience and the financial strength to get them in a relatively short time; this states are named
as potentially nuclear. Therefore, the diversity in cultures, perceptions, geopolitical interests,
and nuclear and diplomatic expertise, makes the US administration of the deterrence
capabilities and nuclear calculus in general more difficult.

Asia is the centre of attention within the framework of the second nuclear age
because of the concentration of nuclear capabilities through the region and the high risk of
escalation into conflict. The possible conflict igniters are the following four: First, the several
territorial disputes through the region, although the most important are those between great
powers as that between Japan and China in the South-China’s Sea. Second, the cultural
divergence, and the unhealed wounds caused by both Japan’s colonialism and WW2, are factors
that impact negatively any attempt of constructing interstate confidence within the region.
Third, the lack of a definitive peace accord that brings about an end the Korean war, creates a
continuous environment of tension and confrontation in the peninsula. And finally, the region's
strategic importance for both, China and US. This relation is characterized by the strong
Chinese opposition against the US leadership policy within the region, which has the potential
to lead the two powers into war. Since the sole escalation point of view, Asia is not the most
unstable region around the world, but the importance is evident when the concentration of
nuclear capabilities is taken into account; At least, six of the nine nuke-powered states have
assets or targets in Asia (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).

There are also allies and partners of US within the region that are potential
nuclear states. This term is used for states that have the economic solvency and technological
capabilities to develop nuclear weapons in a relatively short time, but who decided not to do it,
but to accept the protection of the US nuclear umbrella. Japan and South Korea are examples
of potential nuclear powers. Consequently, this big concentration of nuclear capabilities
summed to territorial conflicts, as the South-china sea claims; the complicated political relation
between Taiwan and China; the never-end war between both Koreas; the cultural and border's
issues between Japan and China; and finally, the strong opposition of China to the US policy
of strategic leadership within the region, are the powder that could ignite a nuclear confrontation
in Asia.

The multipolar order that is being moulded in this second nuclear age was
addressed above, especially, the complex situation in Asia. Next, the context of the North
Korean case is going to be considered. North Korea has been taken as a rogue state regarding
its nuclear development, and although US has conducted many attempts to force North Korea
to abandon its missile and nuclear programs, it has shown a certain level of success. Since 1992,

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the US Department of State has issued 59 sanctions against the DPRK though it has shown not
to be effective. In the contrary, the Pyongyang’s A-bomb and BM programs have evolved
steadily in last 15 years; North Korea announced per first time that it had nuclear weapons in
2005, just three years after abandoning the NPT. In 2006, long and short-range missiles were
launched causing great criticism, but the global attention was attracted by its first underground
nuclear test on Oct. 9, 2006. It seems that US unilateral and UN multilateral sanctions do not
push any change in the Pyongyang Regime. The sanctions-proof North Korean atomic program
stood “alone” and stubbornly against the global condemn; Economic sanctions (promoted by
US and UN) and diplomatic efforts (led by China and US) have been the main measures taken
in order to hinder Pyongyang nuclear aspirations. Nevertheless, every path that US has followed
has resulted fruitless. On Jan 06, 2016, another underground nuclear test was detected; it was
followed by the Pyongyang announcement of a successful test of an H-bomb. Disregarding the
veracity of these claims, the regime intention of miniaturizing the A-bomb, and the feasibility
of developing capable tactical nuclear weapons was clear. The tension within the region has
increased steadily at the same speed as the nuclear and ballistic programs in North Korea. The
improvements in ballistic technologies, the evolution of sub-marine launched capabilities, the
continuous enhancement of its nuclear program, and its strong conventional forces, are enough
reasons for elucidating a real nuclear risk, so a threat for the stability within the region.

Why US failed in stopping the North Korean Nuclear and Ballistic programs?

Considering the relevance of the region for US, and the importance that is given
to the NPT by nuclear powers, a question arises: how did North Korea, an isolated regime,
achieve success in the technological, economic, and political costly race of developing nuclear
capabilities? The answer is short, but not easy: North Korea was not completely isolated, but
under cooperation with China's authorities. This should be a surprise, but it is not. Clearly,
China was confident about its influence over North Korea, disregarding the stubbornness of the
Pyongyang regime. China lost control of its spoiled son, even was China the one that facilitated
him the development of the tools of mass destruction that he is showing off nowadays. China
was not completely committed when enforcing the measures aimed to coerce North Korea from
developing the A-bomb, and the delivery systems. Consequently, it was not an US mistake, but
an international community one, where China should claim the biggest responsibility.

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Can be North Korea deterred from using the bomb? US Challenges

There are several challenges that US should deal with before assuring an
effective deterrent against the use of nukes by North Korea. In the following part, some of this
challenges are going to be enumerated.

The first challenge that US affronts within the region, is to cover its allies and
partners under its nuclear umbrella. This because a proliferation process could degenerate in
the use of the bomb as a response to the lack of confidence, the asymmetries of the armed
forces, and the irrational behaviour of North Korea. Australia, South Korea, and Japan are the
US allies in Asia, and they have well developed nuclear technology, the economic capability,
and in case of a lack of protection from the US, a reason to acquire their own atomic deterrent.
Consequently, the best way to prevent US allies from developing nuclear weapons is by
effectively protect them under US atomic shield. This is imperative because proliferation, in
contrast with the common belief about nuclear weapons as a way to prevent conventional war,
would increase the risk of nuclear confrontation in the region; The traditional deterrence
requires responsible behaviour, certain degree of confidence, and comparable conventional and
nuclear means in all bands. In the contrary, Asia is defined by contrary characteristics; the
relations between Japan and its neighbours are defined by a lack of confidence and extreme
nationalism, both having as origin the Japanese colonialism and the cicatrices of the second
world war. besides, the North Korean regime has shown lacks of responsibility, and awareness
of its weak economy and armed forces. Consequently, Pyongyang’s regime watch to its
deterrence capability as an assurance of impunity for itself, while this attitude could lead to a
miscalculation, so to a conflict. In other words, the lack of confidence among the states within
the region, and the irrational behaviour of North Korea impedes that the conventional deterrence
process functions as during the Cold War, in the contrary, augments the instability and the
chances of a “preventive” attack from North Korea. As a result, Japan and South Korea will
require major US commitment with dismantling the risk that North Korea represents.

Another factor that represents a challenge for US is the necessity of avoid either
launching or receiving a counter attack by mistake. This risk is dramatically high due to the
relatively short distances between the launching assets and the possible objectives, so the short
time of response, and the misinterpretations that could arise related to it. Moreover, the special
nature of Kim Jong-un's regime increments this risk; This regime has shown a certain level of
“irrationality” and alarmism, which make more difficult the employment of conventional

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deterrence. This nature, and its self-assertion as a limited nuclear power that does not have a
second strike capability, and which is aware of the feasibility of receiving a US preventive
attack that could disable its nuclear capabilities, could lead North Korea to launch an unjustified
nuclear attack.

Finally, the main issues for many of the possible measures that US could conduct
against North Korea are related to the diversity of nuclear actors in Asia. Consequently, with
the diversity of actors and its interests, the measures that result efficacious for deterring North
Korea, conversely, could add fuel to the US-China's relationship. For instance, and increment
in the US ABM systems throughout the region could initiate a nuclear race between US and
China, while it would prevent South Korea from atomizing its arsenal by diminishing the North
Korean reliability on its nuclear capabilities. In similar way, an increment in US regular forces
within the region, which is a valid measure to control a possible expansionist policy of China,
would increase the reasons for North Korea to develop and use its nuclear arsenal in order to
reduce the gap between its conventional forces and the American ones.

How to deal with North Korean deterrence?

To solve the question regarding the possibility of effectively deter North Korea
from using the bomb is, maybe, one of the most important issues for the US foreign policy
nowadays. The answer to this question could define the destiny of a third of the global
population; If it results impossible to deter North Korea, the only feasible option would be the
complete dismantlement of its nuclear capability, which could require the use of nuclear
weapons. This adds complexity to the scenario and increases the risks of both a new atomic
race and a war between super powers. On the other hand, the possibilities of deterring
Pyongyang’s regime from using the bomb are not convincing at all. When talking about North
Korea, relying in conventional means of deterrence is a risk that I do not recommend taking.
Consequently, I argue that the only way to prevent North Korea from using its nuclear weapons
is by neutralising them. In order to do it, it is essential to use a combination of anti-ballistic
missile systems, conventional forces, and economic pressure; besides, the commitment of
China in this process is essential. Nevertheless, the possibility of using military means should
be maintained, planned and triggered under very specific circumstances.

The employment of ABM systems is the first and the most effective deterrence
that the US has in this moment because it is highly effective against actual North Korean assets,
and it could show the rogue state that there is no way of winning a nuclear race with US. North

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Korean missile systems are not sufficiently advanced for passing through the PATRIOT II
systems, and its warheads are not many enough for overwhelming the system. Nevertheless,
the communist regime is investing daily for overcoming its limitations. Consequently, The
ABM systems effectiveness relies upon the US capacity to hinder and bring about an end the
North Korean nuclear program. On the other hand, it is important to take into account that China
could feel that its deterrence capability is hindered by any deployed US ABM systems.
Disregarding this, a limited and strategically located ABM capability will bring more good than
harm; Basically, China would tolerate the ABM presence because it would prevent Japan and
Korea from pursuing their own nuclear programs. At the end, China has more to win than to
lose.

It was already explained the role that China played in the failure of the economic
sanctions in North Korea, subsequently it is important to commit it in this process. China is
realizing the inconvenience of having an uncontrollable nuclear-armed neighbour, and US
could exploit that for obtaining the Chinese compromise with the UN sanctions against North
Korea, then preventing any support that could alleviate the pressure on Pyongyang’s economy.
Tough sanctions and the warranty of China enforcing them would hinder both the nuclear and
the ballistic programs in the dictatorial country. This is imperative in order to prevent North
Korea from developing re-entry vehicles, increasing the effectiveness of its submarine launched
missile system, miniaturizing the A-bomb, and especially, reaching the H-bomb.

In addition to the latter, the regime's resilience to the economic sanctions should
be addressed also. The Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il´s regimes did not fall although they were
not able to provide human security to its citizens. This is likely to happen again with the Kim
Jong-un's regime if the population loyalty is not undermined. This is crucial for maximizing the
possibility of leading the population to rebel against the dictatorial government, which is one
of the purposes of the blockade. In this sense, I recommend letting the civil population to enjoy
from the benefits of the open markets and then strangulate the country with tough economic
measures. This was determinant for the success of the nuclear agreement with Iran, so it is likely
to improve the possibility of success in the Korean peninsula. It is also important to take care
about the smuggling of technology that could result helpful for the North Korean atomic
aspirations.

The US conventional and nuclear capabilities possess great relevance under

different scenarios within the region. First, there is a small possibility of a surprise attack from

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the North. This attack could be based on the impunity that nuclear weapons assure to their
owners. Moreover, a coordinated attack that pushes back enemy forces would trigger a nuclear
attack; North Korea could react to its weakness in the More…Repeated Word battlefield by
attempting to balance forces through the use of mass destruction weapons. In this scenario, US
should launch a co-ordinate attack that combines nuclear and regular strikes. This attack would
have to assure the destruction of all the nuclear capabilities of North Korea. This is feasible
only if there is a complete and detailed list of targets. This is not the favourite option, but it is
important to consider it seriously. Nevertheless, a strong military presence in the Korean
peninsula could increase the hysteric concerns of the North regime. Therefore, low numbers of
US personnel in Korea are recommended. Furthermore, it is important to assure precise
intelligence, an accountable targeting process, availability of necessary means, and complete
secrecy; these capabilities cannot be used as threat or deterrent. They should have only an
offensive purpose.

Conclusions

The nuclear situation in Asia is not a crisis, but an issue that will last some
decades. Consequently, the US strategy should be defined for a long term.

In the long term, it is feasible that North Korea develops nuclear weapons and
delivery systems that could surpass the US defences. then, due to the special characteristics of
this rogue nation, it is unlikely that conventional deterrence shows effectiveness against them.
Consequently, the only way to prevent that DPRK uses the bomb is by dismantling its nuclear
capabilities.

The combination of economic sanctions, ABM systems, conventional forces,

and nuclear capabilities, would be required for dismantling the North Korean Nuclear Force in
the long term.

Economic sanctions are the first step towards the denuclearization of

Pyongyang’s arsenal. In addition, China’s commitment with these coercive measures is
fundamental to accomplish their objectives; first, to hinder the development of the North
Korean nuclear program, and second, to generate a degradation of the relation between the
regime and the population, which could evolve in a rebellion against the dictatorial government.

It is recommended that UN allows North Korean civil population to enjoy the

benefits of living without economic sanctions. This could increase the effectiveness of future

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sanctions by an increment in the pressure from the population over the regime in order to
increase social expenditure.

To effectively deterring North Korea form using the nuclear bomb is essential
for preventing Japan and South Korea from developing its own atomic arsenals. The
deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems is enough to deter North Korea in the short term,
then, to avoid proliferation. Nevertheless, for the long term, additional measures should be
implemented.

The use of nuclear and conventional forces must be considered, although, it

should not be either announced or used as a deterrent. A use of these capabilities with another
purpose than offensive, could increment the panic in North Korean leadership. Therefore, it
could bring unexpected consequences.

Detailed and complete intelligence is fundamental for conducting an effective

use of force that could dismantle North Korean nuclear arsenal. An attack should not be
conducted without these requirements.

The circumstances under which I recommend the use of force are three:

1. When North Korean nuclear or missile developments reach a technological level that
represents a medium risk for US or its allies. Especially, when its delivery systems gain
capability to avoid the US anti-aerial and anti-ballistic missile systems.
2. As a response to a North Korean attack that undermines the strategical interest of US or
its allies within Asia.
3. As a response to a first strike aimed at US or any of its allies within the region.

It is important to avoid the deployment of nuclear weapons near the objectives.

It could deteriorate the stability at the regional level, or even, trigger a nuclear attack against
US interests.

The deployment of ABM systems must be consequent to the North Korean

threat. An excess in this aspect could be seen as a threat by China.

The definitive resolution of the conflict between both Koreas would enhance the
nuclear situation within Asia. For this reason, it should be a priority of the US foreign policy.

There are several factors that could lead North Korea to use the bomb, ranging
from awareness of its conventional weakness, and as response to an indecisive US first strike

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to the simple irrationality that characterises its regime. Therefore, the huge risk of permitting
that North Korea has NW relies in that.

Reading List

Bracken, Paul. (2012) The Second Nuclear age: Strategy, Danger, and the New
Power Politics. 1st ed. Times Books, New York.

The National Bureau of Asian research. (2013). Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in
the Second Nuclear Age. NBR publications. Seattle, WA.

US. Department of State. (Mar, 2016). Non-proliferation Sanctions. Available

on-line in: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/226423.htm.

Security Council Report. (2016). Internet Page: UN Documents for DPRK

(North Korea): Security Council Resolutions. Available on-line in:
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-
documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag=%22Security%20Council%20Resol
utions%22+AND+%22DPRK%20(North%20Korea)%22&ctype=DPRK%20(North%20Kore
a)&rtype=Security%20Council%20Resolutions&cbtype=dprk-north-korea

Suk Him Ki & Chang, Semoon. (2007). Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear
North Korea. McFarland & Company, Inc. North Carolina, US.

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