Roger Clark Report On Reginald Thomas Jr.'s Death

Case 2:16-cv-08602-SJO-RAO Document 208-3 Filed 02/02/18 Page 1 of 46 Page ID
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Roger A. Clark
Police Procedures Consultant, Inc.
10207 Molino Road. Santee, CA 92071
Phone: (208) 351-2458, Fax: (619) 258-0045
rclark9314@aol.com
January 5, 2018
Ms. Caree Harper, Esq.

Law Offices of Caree Harper
4640 Admiralty Way, Suite 500
Marina Del Rey, CA 90292
Regarding: Shainie Lindsey, et al., vs. City of Pasadena, et al., Case No.: CV 16-8602
SJO (RAOx).
Dear Ms. Harper:
Thank you for retaining me to analyze and render opinions regarding the September 30,
2016 Law Enforcement Activity Related Death (LEARD) of Mr. Reginald Thomas (Mr.
Thomas) by Pasadena Police Department (PPD) Officers Villicana (Officer Villicana),
Orosco (Officer Orosco), Butler (Officer Butler), Poirier (Officer Poirier), Santiago
(Officer Santiago), and Griffith (Officer Griffith). Pursuant to the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, I have studied the PPD reports, photographs,
video surveillance recordings, audio recordings, deposition transcripts, TASER
International documents, taser reports, and other materials provided to me thus far (as
listed below) regarding this case. I am advised that additional data may be pending
(including depositions, training documents and policy and procedures documents). Please
be advised that if/when any additional information is submitted, it is likely that a
supplemental report will be necessary.
It is also necessary to state at the beginning of this report that I do not make credibility
determinations in expressing my opinions. That is, where there are differences in the
events proffered by the Defendant Officers versus testimony proffered by witnesses,
video recordings, and/or others, I do not opine for the trier of fact regarding who are the
more believable witnesses. The resolution of any such conflicts are obviously within the
purview of a jury to decide.
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Materials Reviewed Thus Far:
1. Complaint for Damages.
2. Pasadena Police Department Crime Scene Report, PAS000001-

PAS000062.
3. County of Los Angeles Homicide Report, URN 016-00112-3199-

055.
4. 9-1-1 Calls:
a. Mr. Thomas 1.
b. Mr. Thomas 2.
c. Mr. Thomas 3.
d. Mr. Thomas 4.
e. Mr. Thomas 5.
f. Mr. Thomas 6.
5. Dispatch Audio Recordings:

a. 16-1319 Frequency 1.
b. 16-1319 Frequency 2.
6. Declaration of Deputy District Attorney Martha Carrillo, August 8,

2017.
7. Declaration of Detective Robert Gray, May 9, 2017.
8. Video surveillance recordings:

a. Apartment video Surveillance Video.
b. Body worn audio recorders of Officer Santiago,
Officer Butler, Officer Newlin, Officer Griffin.
c. Audio Interleave (AVI) system: Vehicle assigned to
Officers Newlin and Griffin.
9. Taser Downloads:
a. X12002E64 (Belonging to Officer Butler and used 6
times for a total of 26 seconds over a 64 second
period.)
b. X122003TWV (Belonging to Officer Orosco and used
6 times for a total of 31 seconds over a 44 second
period.)
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c. X12200556V (Belonging to Officer Poirier)

d. X12005572 (Belonging to Officer Santiago)
e. X1200556N (Belonging to Officer Griffin)
f. X120055R9 (Belonging to Officer Griffith)
g. X120055R0 (Belonging to Officer Villicana)
h. X00-607645 (Belonging to Officer Newlin)
10. Audio Interviews:

a. Mr. DeMarcus Holder, October 16, 2016.
11. Involved Officer Personnel and Training Data:

a. PPD Officer Aaron Villicana
b. PPD Officer Matthew Griffin
c. PPD Officer Jeffery Newlen
d. PPD Officer Michael Orosco
e. PPD Officer Philip Poirier
f. PPD Officer Raphael Santiago
g. PPD Officer Robert Griffith
h. PPD Officer Thomas Butler
12. I/A Interviews

a. PPD Officer Aaron Villicana, October 4, 2016
b. PPD Officer Matthew Griffin, October 4, 2016
c. PPD Officer Jeffery Newlen, October 4, 2016
d. PPD Officer Michael Orosco, October 3, 2016
e. PPD Officer Philip Poirier, October 3, 2016
f. PPD Officer Raphael Santiago, October 3, 2016
g. PPD Officer Robert Griffith, October 4, 2016
h. PPD Officer Thomas Butler, October 3, 2016
I. PFD Paramedic Bradley Sims, October 26, 2016.
j. PFD Paramedic Casey Hoffman, October 26, 2016.
k. PFD Paramedic Ariana Alvardo, October 31, 2016.
l. PFD Paramedic Kevin Adair, October 31, 2016.
m. PFD Captain David Marquez, October 26, 2016.
13. Deposition Transcripts:

a. Ajay Panchal, M.D., Volume I, March 1, 2017 and
Volume II, November 27, 2017.
b. Mr. DeMarcus Holder (civilian witness), October 16,
2017.
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c. PPD Chief of Police Phillip Sanchez, November 6,

2013 (re: Kenneth McDade v. Pasadena, et al.)
d. PPD Officer Aaron Villicana, November 27, 2017.
(Refused to answer questions pursuant to 5th
Amendment protections.)
e. PPD Officer Matthew Griffin, November 27, 2017.
f. PPD Officer Raphael Santiago, November 28, 2017.
g. PPD Officer Philip Poirier, November 28, 2017.
h. PPD Officer Michael Orosco, November 29, 2017.
14. Nationally recognized law enforcement training regarding

Restraint/Positional Asphyxia:
a. National Law Enforcement Technology Center Report
on Positional Asphyxia-Sudden Death.
b. The Los Angeles Police Department Training Bulletin:
"In-Custody. Deaths." July 1999.
c. The Los Angeles Police Department Training Bulletin:
"Use of Force - Restraining Procedures and Devices,”
September 1997.
d. Training Video produced by the New York Police
Department: "Best Practices, Positional Asphyxia."
e. Training Video produced by the Georgia Bureau of
Investigation: "Preventing Restraint Asphyxia."
15. 2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines. U.S. Department of

Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and Police
Executive Research Forum. Washington, D.C., 2011.
16. Additional TASER International Training Materials.
17. California POST Basic Learning Domains:

a. #1: “Leadership, Professionalism, and Ethics.”
b. #2: “Criminal Justice System.”
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c. #3: “Policing in the Community.”

d. #5: “Introduction to Criminal Law.”
e. #15: “Laws of Arrest.”
f. #16: “Search and Seizure.”
g. #20: “Use of Force.”
h. #21: “Patrol Techniques.”
I. #23: “Crimes in Progress.”
j. #31: “Custody.”
k. #33: “Arrest Methods/Defensive Tactics.”
l. #34: “First Aid and CPR.”
m. #35: “Firearms/Chemical Agents.”
18. Report of John C. Hiserodt, M.D., January 3, 2017.
19. Images of the incident scene via the internet.
Brief Overview of Events and Commentary:
In September of 2016, Mr. Thomas resided in the Pasadena area. Mr. Thomas was not on
probation or parole, and was not wanted for questioning in connection with any crime.
Mr. Thomas was a father, and was well-like by residents of the Orange Grove Gardens
complex, where Mr. Thomas’ girlfriend, Shainie Lindsey (Shainie), resided with their
children.
On September 30, 2016, Mr. Thomas apparently experienced a mental or medical

emergency and called 9-1-1 (six times) apparently for assistance. Mr. Thomas was not
conscious of his actions - so much so, that Mr. Thomas walked around Shainie’s
apartment holding onto a fire extinguisher. Officers arrived, grossly tased Mr. Thomas,
beat him with batons, fists, kicks (including in the head), placed him in a hobble restraint,
pressed their body weight onto his torso and apparently suffocated Mr. Thomas. Mr.
Thomas died, as a result of the force and restraints, inflicted by no less than six Pasadena
Police Department Officers. The following paragraphs briefly recount the incident and
comment on the force used against Mr. Thomas.
Incident
On October 29, 2016, Mr. Thomas visited Shainie at her apartment (Orange Grove
Gardens apartments, 252 E. Orange Boulevard, unit 210). Shainie resided there with her
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minor son from a previous relationship, Shane Love (Shane), and four younger children
that they shared together. Shainie was also six months pregnant with their fifth child.
As the evening progressed into night, Shainie and the children retired to their rooms, and
went to bed. Mr. Thomas stayed up and apparently experienced a mental or medical
emergency. As the date switched from the 29th to the 30th, Mr. Thomas acquired a hand-
held fire extinguisher from the apartment complex. He also apparently acquired a knife
and tucked it under his armpit.
Mr. Thomas began deploying the fire extinguisher, into Shainie’s apartment, and also into
Shane’s, face. After deploying the fire extinguisher, Mr. Thomas called 9-1-1, apparently
for medical assistance. The record indicates that Mr. Thomas called 9-1-1 six different
times. During the calls, Mr. Thomas never explained why he called, and what he needed
help with.
During the sixth 9-1-1 call, Shainie took the phone from Mr. Thomas and handed it to
Shane. Shane spoke with the 9-1-1 operator. During the call, the operator asked Shane if
Mr. Thomas had a knife. Shane explained that Mr. Thomas was holding a knife by the pit
of his arm, and not in his hand. Next the operator asked Shane if Mr. Thomas had
threatened them with the knife, and Shane responded, “No.” It should be noted that
during the six different 9-1-1 calls, Mr. Thomas was never heard or recorded making any
threats or being aggressive toward anyone in Shainie’s house.
After the 9-1-1 call terminated (2:44 a.m.), Mr. Thomas stood in the doorway of Shainie’s
apartment. He was not assaultive, belligerent, or threatening to Shane or his mother,
Shainie, as he (Mr. Thomas) stood in the doorway.
At approximately 2:46 a.m. through 2:47 a.m., Officers Santiago, Butler, Villicana,
Poirier, Orosco, and Griffith arrived. Officers Santiago and Butler were partners.
Officers Villicana and Griffith were partners, and Offices Poirier and Orosco were solo
units. Officers Santiago and Butler were the first Officers to make contact with Mr.
Thomas. At this point in the sequence of events, surveillance video from the Orange
Grove Gardens apartment (although pixilated) captured the initial contact between
Officer Butler and Mr. Thomas.
Officer Butler walked west, turned his flashlight on, pointed it at Mr. Thomas (who stood
in the doorway of apartment 210), and stopped in front of Shainie’s apartment (210).
Officer Santiago followed closely behind Officer Butler, and also turned his flashlight on
and shone in at Mr. Thomas.
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Based on the video recording, Mr. Thomas remained standing at the front door of
apartment 210. Officer Butler moved forward, and approached Mr. Thomas. When
Officer Butler neared Mr. Thomas, Mr. Thomas appeared to back-step into Shainie’s
apartment. Officers Butler and Santiago alleged that they ordered Mr. Thomas to drop
the knife. However, Mr. Thomas, based on Shainie and Shane’s statements, was not
holding the knife in his had, but had it tucked underneath his armpit, while he held the
fire extinguisher with both hands.
After ordering Mr. Thomas to drop the knife (which was tucked under Mr. Thomas’ arm
pit), Officer Butler deployed his taser into Mr. Thomas’ body, less than one minute after
his initial contact with Mr. Thomas.
At this point in the sequence of events, and based on video surveillance recordings, Mr.
Thomas had not moved toward Officer Butler, had not made any attempt to assault
Officer Butler, and according to civilian witnesses and officer statements, had not uttered
any threats or assaulted Officer Butler or Officer Santiago - or any other officer who
arrived.
After Officer Butler deployed his taser weapon, Mr. Thomas (who had been standing in
the doorway of unit 210) appeared to fall/retreat from the front door into the apartment
living room. Shortly after Officer Butler deployed his taser into Mr. Thomas, Officers
Orosco, Villicana, Griffith, and Poirier arrived. Over the next few minutes, the
responding PPD officers inflicted an incredible furry of force on Mr. Thomas - including
multiple taser cycles from two tasers, baton blows, punches, kicks, hobbling and body
compression.
In this regard, it is necessary to quote a portion of Officer Villicana’s compelled

statement that he provided on October 4, 2016 - 4 days after the incident and after
consultation with his attorney. Officer Villicana appears in the record as a significant
ranking participant who also shouted orders to other involved officers. Although lengthy,
his statement documents the incident and includes the sequence of events and the some
admitted uses of force:
Officer Villicana’s Compelled Statement:
A: “Prior to that, I remember telling my trainee because he left - I believe

the car on and the lights on. I told him to turn the car off, or turn the lights
off. One of those two. At that point, I didn’t feel like being - there was
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such urgency in (Butler)’s voice. I’m very - I’m very keen to the members
of - of our team and knowing their voices when they’re under stress. And
his - the way he said it, he was under stress. And so I kept running, uh, at a
full sprint after I opened the door. And I could hear screaming and I could
hear yelling on my right side, which was the west side of the building. And,
um, as I’m running, I could see Officer (Poyer) and another officer. I didn’t
know who that officer was at the time. I’m running up the steps and I’m
now trailing them up the steps. And I r- I run towards the - the first floor.
So you - you climb - or you - you step up two sets of stairs and then there’s
the first floor. It’s kind of odd
“But when I reached the top of the, uh, the stairs, I could see Officer
(Butler) and (Santiago) at the front of the door. And I heard a radio
transmission, as well as me seeing, that he had deployed his taser. As I run
towards the front door, I could see the wires coming from the outside of the
door where Officer (Butler) is standing, going into, uh, into the door. The
door was wide open at that point. And I could hear somebody screamin’
and yelling at the top of their lungs. And I could hear (Butler) giving him
commands. I can’t recall what those commands were. But he’s - he was
yelling commands at whoever he had tased at that - at that - that time. So I
- I ran past Officer (Butler) and there was a little retaining wall that just
held, like, a - a bed of flowers. And I see - now I see three to four officers
at the front door. And I didn’t want to crowd the officers because I knew
that, hey, this guy was armed with a knife at one point. And I need to get a
tactical advantage. That was in my mind. I need to get a clear view of the
suspect and what they’re engaging. So I walked right on top of this
retaining wall which was about two and a half, three feet. Looking directly
in a southeast direction into the door. So now I - (Butler)’s actually a tall
guy, so it’s hard to look over him. I’m a lot shorter than him. So with this
ad- advantage, I’m able to look inside the apartment and see exactly what’s
going on with the suspect. What they have, what the threat is, um, I know
a knife’s involved. I know he’s tasing. So when I get on top, I could see
the sus- this male black’s screaming at the top of lungs. And as he’s
screaming, he’s armed with a fire extinguisher. And the way he’s holding
the fire extinguisher, it wasn’t, like, a bear hug or just holding it with his
hands. He had it at both of its ends. So as he had it at both of its ends, I’m
thinkin’, okay, this guy could possibly throw this at me. As he’s taking the
second right - I believe they - they gave him, uh, uh, another taser
deployment at that time because they’re tellin’ him - (Butler) was givin’
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him commands to stop. I - I don’t know exactly what those commands

were because now I’m focused on the weapon that he had in his hands.
He’s tellin’ ‘em to stop. And he’s not. And he’s grunting, and he’s actually
fighting through this deployment. And when I say he’s fighting through
the deployment, this is what I mean. He’s actually actively trying to stand
up as he has this fire extinguisher in his hands. At that point, I become
afraid that if this guy stands up and he has the ability to stand up and -
while fighting through this taser deployment - then he has the ability to
obviously when it’s - when the - when the taser deployment is done, to do
whatever he wants with us. He could either engage us, he could throw that
fire extinguisher at us, uh, cause great bodily harm. I don’t know what the
extent of it is. But I don’t know what he’s capable of at that - that time. I
do know this, though. I do know that I said, “Hey where’s the knife?”
That’s my concern. “Where’s the knife?” Because I don’t see it at that
point.
Q: Mm.
A: “And somebody yelled out, “He doesn’t have it anymore.” Well to me

that doesn’t give me a lot of information. Okay, that means that, okay, he -
okay, did he drop it? Is he sitting on it? Is it in his back pocket? Is it next
to the fire extinguisher he’s holding? As they say this, I could hear the
suspect screamin’ and yelling. And then I could hear, to my right, there’s a
set of stairs that go to the second floor of the second story apartment which
he’s inside of. And I see a family gathered in the stairway and they’re also
screamin’ and yelling. And I can’t tell you what they’re saying. It’s just a
lot of chaos. Again, I don’t know the extent of the call - I wasn’t following
the history of the call on TAC-2 because I was busy on TAC-1. All I got
was, “Hey go assist these guys. This is basically what they have, a man
armed with a knife and there’s a lot of screaming.” So I don’t know if he
even belongs there at that point. I don’t know if he’s family. I don’t know
if he’s just somebody that made entry into the house and is not supposed to
be there. I don’t know that. Um, at that point, I un-holster my gun because
I said, okay if he gets up with this fire extinguisher and he’s able to fight
through an actual taser deployment, first thing that popped in my head was,
okay he’s - he has excited delirium which causes super human strength. It’s
a dissociative anesthetic. Those things quickly ran through my head. And
so I’m thinkin’, okay if this guy can fight through it, this is gonna be a
potentially deadly encounter because he’s not stopping. At that point, I
think I yelled at somebody, “Hey deploy your baton to break his grip from -
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from this, uh, fire extinguisher.” That’s when I saw Officer (Arosco)
deploy his baton. But, again, I could see Officer (Arosco). I can’t tell you
his state of mind. But I could tell you what I saw. He was hesitant to make
entry into the house - into the, uh, the plane of the doorway hesitant to make
entry into the house - into the, uh, the plane of the doorway which was
open. He was hesitant to go in. And I understand why, it’s because this
guy was armed and the way he was acting. Um, he reaches in and he starts
delivering baton strikes to, I believe his left side - his left arm area. And
I’m not satisfied with the way, uh, Officer (Arosco) is hitting him with the
baton because I wanted it to be harder. That way we could go in and take
care of the problem and overwhelm this man with - that’s armed with this
fire extinguisher and/or this potential knife that I can’t see but I knew he
had at some point. So I - I begin telling Officer (Arosco), “Hit him. Hit
him. Hit him.” At some point, while I’m yelling this at (Arosco), I see the
suspect grab his baton. I don’t know what hand, but I see him temporarily
grab it. And this almost sends, like, shivers down my spine. Because I’m
like, okay if this man is able to fight through a taser deployment, now he’s
grabbing my partner’s baton, this is - this is a deadly encounter if he
disarms my - my fellow officer here. At that point, I - I had un-holstered
my gun. And I can’t tell ya if I took it out or not, but I un-holstered it
because I drew this line. In training, and in the academy, you always draw
an imaginary line and you say, “Okay if this armed suspect crosses this line
after I gave him X amount of command and he’s not following, and he still
has the potential to hurt me, and he’s still carrying this weapon, that
imaginary line - and - and if he crosses that imaginary line, you have to
engage this man with whatever force you’re gonna use.” Whatever force
option you - you use in you - you’re thinkin’ in your head, you have to use it
at that point. Because what the mind wants to do is keep ren- renegotiating
with a deadly suspect. Anyways, that’s the way I - I was trained. So I
drew this line and I said, “Hey if he crosses this with baton in his hand or
the fire extinguisher, I have to shoot him.” Um, I don’t know if there was
another taser deployment. But Officer (Arosco) is able to retrieve his baton
somehow. And then very rapidly, and this happens within split seconds,
this man stands up. You know, he’s armed with the fire extinguisher still.
The baton strikes and the taser deployments did not work. And that’s - at
that point, um, I said, “You know what? I’m not gonna shoot this man. I’m
not gonna do it.” Even though he - he was almost at the threshold of the
door. I said I’m - my name’s not gonna be in the news tomorrow. And -
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sorry. Um, you know, I have - I have three little girls at home. So I can’t
put - I can’t put my family through that. You know? So at some point, I,
um, at some point, he gets up and there’s this violent - excuse me. He
manages to close the door. And, um, then I’m really scared. I’m scared for
the family inside. Again, I don’t know where this knife is. I knew he had a
- a fire extinguisher the last I saw him. And it’s hard for me to describe this
engagement we had with the suspect because it was so violent, it was so
fast. The fight at the door was so hellacious that I don’t know how that
apartment complex - everybody in that apartment complex didn’t hear it.
It’s slamming, it’s opening, there’s screaming inside. This man’s screaming
as well. Which - which is another symptom - or, to me, anyway, based on
my training and experience engaging suspects that are under the influence
of a controlled substance - that there’s paranoia involved on his behalf.
And there’s screaming and yelling which is another symptom of this, the
excited delirium. Um, at some point, the door - the officers are kickin’ the
door. And when I say, “The officers,” I know (Arosco)’s engaged with the
door. I know Officer (Poyer)’s engaged with the door. And when I say -
say, “Engaged,” they’re kicking it, actively kickin’ it and pushin’ their body
against the door. I’m frustrated at that point because I have a previous
injury on my knee. I have a bone bruise and I can’t engage this door with
them. I can’t help them. I’m useless. So I’m tellin’ (Arosco), “Hey.” I’m
like, “Hey, hit that door. Get it open. Get it open.” Again, I don’t know
what the threat is inside anymore. I don’t know if this guy is rearming
himself or what the deal - I don’t know. I just hear screamin’ and yelling
inside. Somehow the door opens after one of the officer hits the door. The
door opens. And, um, (Butler) and (Arosco), I believe, make entry first.
The suspect’s there, s- standing in the living room. And I can’t tell you how
or wh- what happened because my view is obstructed. I get off the
retaining wall and I go in to make entry. At that point, I think I had
deployed my baton. I can’t tell you when I did that. But somehow I - I
holstered and I deploy my baton. I’m the third one in so when the door
opens, two officers are directly in front of me. So I tell myself, I need to hit
this guy hard and I need to make it precise and on spot because I don’t want
to hurt these other officers. And I need to take his right hand out of
commission from engaging our officers. Um, that way he can’t pick up a
weapon or, um, punch us, or assault us in any way. I want this to end now
and I want it to end abruptly. So I round one of the officers and I could
hear another taser deployment and I could hear screamin’ and yelling still
from this suspect. He’s screaming and yelling and I see him reaching up
with his right hand. I don’t know what he’s reaching for, but when I round
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that corner, I come over the top and strike in a downward motion twice.
And, uh, I hit his right arm. I think it’s - I don’t know if it was his forearm
or his - right below his shoulder area. But I strike him hard two or three
times. I can’t tell you how many times I - I officially hit him. But I hit him
two to three times with my baton. At that point, I remember him turning his
attention to me and I could see this - this look and - and we kind of say it in
law enforcement when we - when we talk about excited delirium, suspects
and people that are under the influence of controlled substances, that they
have this thousand yard stare. And I could see that he’s kind of, like,
looking right through me. It was - it was just this gaze, like, nothing was
phasing him. And he was just lookin’ at me. At that point, he reaches over
with his right hand. The h- the hand that I was hitting, and he grabs my
baton. And I remember that hands were a little sweaty because - because of
the sprint that I had made. I was a little out of breath. And because I was so
nervous, um, because I almost shot him at the door, that, um, I could rem- I
remember that my hands were a little slippery. So I - I engage him. He grabs
my baton. Now I have to include this details, that when I struck him, I
struck him with one hand gripped on my baton. That was the only way for
me - that was the only space I had. I didn’t have time to wind up in a - in a,
uh, striking stance or anything.
Q: “Mm-hmm.
A: “So that was the only way I could engage him with my baton at that
moment. So I hit him with the baton twice and he grabs onto my baton.
And when he grabs my baton, we’re at a tug of war with my baton. And
piggy backing on the excited delirium, I felt - I’d - I work out almost every
other day. Okay? I’m not a slouch. And this guy was able to almost break
my grip off of my baton. And so I grab - I remember grabbin’ it as quickly
as I could with my other - my left hand. And we’re at a tug of war. And the
only thing that I could to defend - I could do to defend myself at that point,
and my fellow officers that were there - I don’t know how many were in the
room. There was more than two though. Um, the only way I could defend
myself and them, and also protect him from being harmed further, was to
deliver two strikes, uh, kicks to his head to retrieve my baton. Um, at that
point, I knew I was in - again, for the second time, I knew I was in a deadly
encounter. And in my mind, I thought, if he - so if he has the strength to
disarm me and takes my baton, I have no choice but to engage him with
deadly force. And I said - I said, “That’s not gonna happen.” Like, I’m
gonna do everything I can so that doesn’t happen. I don’t want to shoot this
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guy. I don’t want to. Um, so I grabbed onto my baton. I delivered two to
three strikes. I don’t remember. I can’t tell you the official amount of
strikes. I kept with those strikes until I was able to retrieve my baton. As
soon as I did that - in defensive tactics school and instructor school, what
we teach is, you d- deliver the strikes necessary. The reasonable force
necessary while you’re in a fight. And you create space between the
suspect and yourself. Meaning, after I delivered those strikes, I took a step
back to reassess my use of force. Whether I needed to escalate it or
deescalate it. And at that point, I was fighting tunnel vision because I can’t
tell you who was in the room. All I could see was - were his hands and his
upper body. That’s all I could see. And everything was black outside.
And, um, I - I remember takin’ a step back. I don’t know how I collapsed
my baton, but somehow it ends up in my holster. And I go for my taser. I
said, “Okay, the next force option is a taser.” Okay? And I’m - again, I’m
not really hearing a lot that’s going on other than his screaming. And I’m
solely focused on him. So I take my taser out of, um, my drop down holster
and I’m about to tase this man. But at the same time, now I hear another
taser deployment. And I said to myself, “Okay, if he’s bein’ tased and he’s
still fighting, what use is it for me to add another ta- taser to the equation
and tase him when this ride is over?” It doesn’t make sense. If we already
have tasers out, we have tasers out. And we could still engage this guy with
the tasers that are already being deployed. So I - I quickly asses that within,
like, a split second and I holstered my taser back up. And at the same time,
now my training’s kicking in to where - whenever you’re engaged in
something like this, you want to - you want to scan. We’re always taught,
hey you shoot, you scan, you look around, look for other threats. And that’s
what I started doing. I started fighting that - that, um, tunnel vision and I
started looking around. Okay, where’s this knife? Who’s in here? What’s
happening? What are the off- other officers doing? And that’s when I saw
the other tasers being deployed and I saw the other tasers out of their
holsters from other officers. Um, so I could hear screaming from maybe ten
feet away. And when I heard screaming, I looked at the family and they
were still there. And they were watching us. And she was yelling at me,
“Why are you kicking him? Why are you hitting him with the baton? Why
are you kicking him?” And so at that point, I knew it wasn’t good for the
family or whoever that was - I’m assuming it was the family. Um, I told
them to get out because it was not - this encounter was not good for them to
see or anybody else to see. So I told - I yelled at them, I said, “Get out of
here. Get in the courtyard and wait for us outside.” Somethin’ like that. I
don’t know. I just yelled at ‘em and I told ‘em to get out. Um, at which
Page 13 of 40
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point, they did and I saw four or five people come down from the second
floor and they rushed out of the - the apartment. By the time I look back
down, the fight’s still on. And I feel the urgency to reengage this suspect.
And when I reengage him, I’m kneeling down on the left side of his upper
torso. So in this direction, just above him over here. I’m not standing over
him. And I - I had my knee kind securing his chest in a way. My left knee.
And I had - I was in a - maybe, like, a catcher’s stance, is probably the best
way I can describe it.
Q: Okay.
A: “And I’m leaning over his body, not applying too much pressure, but I -
I see him coming up and I kind of have my right hand a little over his face.
And he’s screaming and he’s yelling at the top of his lungs. And he’s got
his mouth open where my right hand was. And when I noticed that, I - I saw
his face coming up as if he may be trying to bite me at that point. And so I
delivered two strikes and that’s the injury you see here. This is where I
sustained this injury. I delivered two strikes to his face to keep him down.
And so I delivered a strike. It was, like, more of a hammer fist. Best way I
could describe it, like a hammer fist. And then I didn’t - what I remember,
like, a straight punch down. And when I punched down, I just felt
discomfort. I didn’t know what it was. But I just felt discomfort in my - in
my, uh, in my hand. I didn’t know that it was broke at that time. I didn’t
know ‘til hours later. Um, as soon as that happens, I don’t know - I can’t
tell you how he’s flipped on his stomach, but that was our goal. Thinking
back on it, um, a lot of the reasons why I didn’t verbalize stuff is because it
was such a chaotic scene. There were officers already tellin’ him to get on
his stomach or stop fighting. Something of that nature. But the goal was to
get him on his stomach. And I think - can’t speak for everybody else. But I
think that was the plan from the start, to get this guy on his stomach so that
we could cuff him. Um, so he finally ends up on his stomach and I see
officers at each point of his, um, extremities. So I see an officer on his left
arm. I see, I believe (Arosco) on his right arm. And I see (Butler) holding
his legs. And I remember (Butler) saying something like, “Stop kicking.
Stop kicking. Stop fighting.” And so I said, “Hey you gotta get that arm
out.” I said somethin’ like that. But at that time, we could kind of slow
things down a little bit because he didn’t have the ability to lean up now and
reengage us. He was now at a position of disadvantage. And so when they
pulled the arms out, I - there was, like, a sigh of relief. I’m like, “Okay cool.
We’re getting somewhere. We’re - we’re getting control.” At that point, up
Page 14 of 40
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until - from the start of the incident to that point, we were completely in
defensive mode. Now we’re in offense and now we’re able to cuff him. And
there’s a sigh of rel- a sigh of relief for me. I’m - I’m watching this now,
and then (Butler) says, “I - I need help with his legs.” I said, “Hobble him.”
Eventually the hobble gets on. I can’t tell you how many seconds it took.
But it - it was a struggle ‘cause he was still fighting with his legs. And the
hobble gets on. Mind you, he’s - the - the male is still screaming and
yelling. As soon as that latch went on the handcuffs from the hobble, um, I
didn’t hear screaming and yelling anymore. And I thought, ‘Okay, good.
Good. It’s over.’ He knows he cuffed. Fight’s over. And that’s it. And so I
remember sayin’ something like, “Hey check his waistband.” Meaning, hey,
let - let’s put him on his side, let’s check his waistband - waistband. So they
start checkin’ his waistband. And I notice something odd. And there - two
things ran into my head at that time. He’s not screamin’ anymore, so I’m
thinkin’, ‘Okay, he’s - he knows the fight’s over.’ And - and it’s done and
he’s not gonna fight anymore. But I also see his - his head dangling
towards the ground a little bit. And I’m like, okay. That’s a little not
normal. But okay. Maybe he’s just - he’s out of breath or something. He
just gave up. So I’m standing behind, um, the suspect. So I’m lookin’ at
his back. I can’t see what - what his face - what his facial expressions are. I
can’t see anything. Throughout this entire time, he never made one
coherent statement, word, said anything, nothing. It was just complete
screaming, and yelling, and grunting throughout the whole time - the whole
thing. So I said, “Okay.” And I said, “I need to see his face now. I need to -
to talk to him.” And I so I l- I look at him and I could see that his eyes were
kind of - they weren’t completely shut but - best way I could describe it is
maybe, like, um, like, a quarter way - his eyelids were, like, a quarter way
down from, uh, from having his eyes completely open, for lack of a better
term. His eyes - his eyelids were a little droopy. So I’m - I’m lookin’ at his
eyes. I’m lookin’ at his mouth. Now his mouth is, like, kind of - I could
see where gravity’s kind of just takin’ over a little bit where his - his lips -
his - the side of his face kind of relaxed to the point where, you know, it’s
kind of - it - it’s - gravity’s taking over. And so, um, I’m like, “Hey he
doesn’t look good. Check his pulse.” That was the first sign. I said, “This
guy might be in distr- in distress.” I said, “Check his pulse.” And
somebody checked it and said, “Hey there’s a faint pulse.” I said, “Okay
that’s fine.” I said - but it still wasn’t settling well with me and I said,
“Take the hobble off.” And somebody else said, “Take the hobble off and
take the cuffs off.” And I said, “Okay.” At that point, I was like, “Okay I -
Page 15 of 40
#:5592
I agree with that.” And I yelled at the suspect and I said, “Hey if we take
these restraints off, if we take the cuffs off, and you fight, you’re gonna get
hurt.” And he, um, there was no response. And so I said, “Recheck his
pulse.” And somebody checked it and they said, “No pulse.” So now we’re
rushing to get the restraints off that we took so much time on - getting on.
We take ‘em off and by the time we take ‘em off, we lay him flat on his
back. Now, like, ten to 12 years ago, I was certified EMT. So I know
basics. You know? So I said, “Okay.” Checked his pulse, there was no
pulse. He’s on his back. What can I do now? Okay, I’m a - now I’m
looking for ABCs. I’m looking for his chest to rise. I’m listening for air. I
want to make sure that his airway’s open. So I remember tilting his head
back a little bit to open his airway. Um, I tilted it back a little bit and I held
his head and, um, still no response from him, no nothing. Um, and I said,
“Somebody needs to start compressions and somebody needs to say it over
the air.” Um, and so somebody said it over the air, “We’re starting
compressions.” That’s when I remember (Jeff Newman) walking over and
he said, “I’ll do it.” And he kind of pushed an officer aside and he started
compressions. And I just wanted to make sure that his, uh, the suspect’s
head wasn’t leaning to the left or to the right so I had held his head. Um,
my hand on his forehead and my left hand under his neck. And I just kept it
open and st- basically, stabilized it while they were conducting, uh, CPR.
Uh, I can’t tell you how fast it was for PFD to respond. But from what I
remember, they were staging for this incident. Meaning, they were close
by.” (Compelled interview of Officer Aaron Villicana, October 4, 2016,
lines 250 - 585.)
Professional Standards And Training Regarding the Use of Force:
Early on in the POST Basic Academy, the seriousness of the unique powers imbued on
Law Enforcement Officers is stressed with the required responsibility they have to use
them with “great care”. It is clear that there is no room for unprofessional, immature
and/or hot-headed individuals in the law enforcement profession. This is best expressed
in Learning Domain # 2: “Criminal Justice System:”
“The criminal justice system gives law enforcement two extraordinary powers:
1. The power of arrest and

2. The power to use deadly force.
Page 16 of 40
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The authority to do so does not come from the rule of an

authoritarian dictator. Rather it comes from the will and consent of
the people who put their trust in law enforcement to use that power
with the utmost of care and restraint. This is why it is important to
emphasize that peace officers do not confer “police powers” on
themselves. These powers come to the criminal justice system from
the people they serve.” (Learning Domain #2: “Criminal Justice
System,” page 1-4. Emphasis added.)
Additionally, POST specifies that there are a number of key factors that can affect which
force option is approved and appropriate under the concept of the “totality of
circumstances.” POST defines four categories of behavior and a range of appropriate
officer responses to gain control compliance, and defines four categories of behavior and
a range of appropriate officer responses to gain control compliance. They are:
Cooperative - Subject offers no resistance:

• Mere professional appearance
• Nonverbal actions
• Verbal requests and commands
Passive non-compliance - Does not respond to verbal commands but also

offers no physical form of resistance:
• Verbal requests and commands
• Officer’s strength to take physical control, including
lifting/carrying
• Control holds and techniques to direct movement or
immobilize a subject
Active resistance - Physically evasive movements to defeat an officer’s

attempt at control, including bracing, tensing, running away, or verbally
signaling an intention to avoid or prevent being taken into or retained in
custody:
• Control holds and techniques to control the subject and
situation
• Use of personal weapons in self-defense and to gain
advantage over the subject
• Use of devices to secure compliance and ultimately
gain control of the situation
Page 17 of 40
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Assaultive - Aggressive or combative; attempting or threatening to assault

the officer or another person:
• Use of devices and/or techniques to secure compliance
and ultimately gain control of the situation
• Use of personal body weapons in self-defense and to
gain advantage over the subject
Life-threatening - Any action likely to result in serious injury or possibly the

death of the officer or another person
• Utilizing firearms or any other available weapon or
action in defense of self and others
NOTE: Officers must take into account the totality of

the circumstances when selecting a reasonable
force option. It is not the intent of this chart to
imply that an officer’s force options are limited
based on any single factor.
NOTE: Officers must be aware of and comply with their

specific agency policies regarding appropriate
force options. (reference: POST LD # 20: “Use
of Force.” Page 2-5.):
Competent police officers are also trained at the POST Basic Academy that the “totality
of the circumstances” are an important aspect in the decision to use force and that
California law requires that the use of force must meet an “Objectively Reasonable”
standard. The following quotes typify the training:
“A reasonable officer is defined as an officer with similar training,

experience, and background in a similar set of circumstances, who will
react in a similar manner.” “Unreasonable force occurs when the type,
degree and duration of force employed was not necessary or
appropriate.”(Learning Domain #20: “Introduction to the Use of Force,”
page 1-4.)
Additionally, an entire chapter in POST Learning Domain #20 is devoted to the

“Consequences of Unreasonable Force.” Cruelty and malicious assaults are absolutely
forbidden:
Page 18 of 40
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“Unreasonable force occurs when the type, degree and duration of force
employed was not necessary or appropriate.”
“Malicious assaults and batteries committed by peace officers constitute

unlawful conduct. When the force used is unreasonable, the officer can
face criminal and civil liability, and agency disciplinary action.” (Learning
Domain #20, page 6-4.)
Most police departments include in their training that all force applied by police must be
objectively reasonable. In order to be “reasonable,” the use of force in any situation must
match the circumstances facing the officer(s). Factors to be considered include:
• The nature of the crime (felony versus misdemeanor – violent versus

non-violent).
• The actions of the suspect (passively non-compliant, actively non-
compliant, or assaultive/combative).
• The presence and type of any weapons.
• The physical size and number of the suspects versus the size and
numbers of the deputies.
• Other resources at hand (such as more personnel available for call-
out, the availability of specialized equipment, etc.).
In this set of facts, Mr. Thomas exhibited signs of intoxication, but never uttered a threat
or aggressed on any officer. Additionally, there was no urgent need to rescue persons at
risk. In this set of facts, at initial encounter at the door nothing further than “Officer
Presence - Verbal Skills” appears as reasonable. However I would not be critical of a
coordinated tactical application of a taser or O/C spray to temporally disarm Mr. Thomas’
possession of the fire extinguisher he held in both arms and the knife allegedly tucked
under his armpit. The gross intensity and methods of force documented in the record in
this case appear as excessive - i.e. not necessary or appropriate.
POST Training Regarding the Use of Impact Weapons:
It cannot be overstated that Mr. Thomas sustained injuries to legs, body and head, which
appear consistent with blunt force caused baton blows. POST training in this regard
states:
“Every peace officer must understand that an impact weapon (i.e. baton)
should be used only when an officer is acting in a reasonable manner or to
Page 19 of 40
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repel and protect in certain tactical considerations.” (Post Learning Domain

#33, page 7-3. Emphasis added.)
“A peace officer's impact weapon is a deadly weapon as defined in Penal

Code Section 12020. In law enforcement, however, to be used In an
authorized manner, it must be used reasonably to repel or protect.” (Post
Learning Domain #33, page 7-3. Emphasis added.)
“Illegal use by an officer:
“Any officer who uses an impact weapon against a subject beyond

objectively reasonable (i.e., Graham vs. Connor) force can be criminally
liable under the following statutes.”
“Penal Code 149: Any officer unnecessarily assaulting or beating any

person under color of authority.”
“Penal Code 245: Assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to

produce great bodily injury.” (Post Learning Domain
#33, page 7-4.)
Further, officers are taught (and as recently stated by the 9th Circuit) that among other
obvious injuries, the use of the baton can cause deep bruising and clotting that can
eventually reach the heart and/or lungs and cause stroke and/or death. In the matrix of
subject behaviors, the use of the baton is justified only as a response to aggressive or
combative acts. Officers have testified that they considered Mr. Thomas’ behaviors a
lethal threat, yet they admit Mr. Thomas never aggressed or threatened them. Under these
set of facts, the admitted blows to the head and body by a baton are not justified.
Consequences of Blows/Kicks to the Head:
It is important to note that autopsy reports uncovered trauma to Mr. Thomas’ head, which
appears consistent with blows or kicks to Mr. Thomas’ head. Officers are trained that
blows to the head can result in serious injury and death, and are not to use blows to the
head absent the protection of life. With six Officers present, and Mr. Thomas on the
ground, no Officer’s life was in danger; therefore, any kicks or blows to the head of Mr.
Thomas were out of policy, reckless, and excessive.
Page 20 of 40
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“Punches to the head or face can cause severe injuries to the individual, and
additionally carry a high risk of injury to the deputy using such force.
Deputies should only use this extremely dangerous level of force where
lower force levels are not available or are ineffective, especially when the
individual is already handcuffed and less severe use of force alternatives are
available. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. LASD’s Deputy Field Operations
Manual and Defensive Tactics Manual state that “personnel are discouraged
from striking an attacker's head with a fist,” and encourages deputies “to
use an open hand palm heel strike to lessen the potential of cutting injuries.”
LASD policy prescribing situational uses of force essentially ranks head
strikes as akin to deadly force, stating they are appropriate only when a
subject’s behavior is “likely to result in serious injury or
possibly in the death of a person.” Punches to the face, as opposed to the
head, are not considered deadly force, but this poor tactic can result in more
injury to a subject and a deputy. The pattern of head and face strikes against
handcuffed individuals we observed in LASD appears unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.” (DOJ Correspondence: “Investigation of Los
Angeles County Sheriffs Department Stations in Antelope Valley,” June 28,
2013, Page 32.)
Training Regarding The Right To Lawful Resistance:
Officers are trained that although Penal Code Section 834a states that the person being
arrested must submit to an arrest, if unlawful or unreasonable force is used to effect the
arrest, the person being arrested may lawfully resist to overcome that force. The
following lists the applicable penal code sections:
Section 692: Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may

be made by the party about to be injured or by other parties.
Section 693: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by

the party about to be injured to prevent an offense against his
person, or his family or some member thereof. To prevent an
illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful
possession.
Section 694: Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be
injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the
Page 21 of 40
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offense.” (POST Learning Domain #20: Consequences of

Unreasonable Force, page 6-9.)
Established Federal Standards Regarding the Use of the Taser Weapon:
The Taser has three modes of use: “probe,” “touch-stun,” and “elongated stun” modes. In
the probe mode, the cartridges project, through a set of wires, a pair of barbs (or darts with
hooks) that attaches to clothing or penetrates the skin after the Taser is fired, delivering an
electrical charge. When the barbs strike, the electrical current is sent down the wires and
through the body between the two barb points. In the “elongated stun” the activated
weapon is moved to a distant part of the body while the probes are imbedded into the body
creating a longer path of electrical energy extending from the darts to the weapon. In the
“touch stun” mode, electrical contacts on the Taser are pressed directly onto a person and
there is a similar, but greatly reduced neuromuscular effect. Consequently “touch-stun”
applications are not generally accepted as a justified use of force.
It is uncontested in the record that Officer Butler and Officer Orosco inflicted repeated
multiple cycles of tasering from their tasers into Mr. Thomas. The duration and number of
the taser cycles by Officer Butler and Officer Orosco, have been disclosed as 12 separate
cycles totaling 57 seconds. Officer Butler fired his taser 6 times for a total of 26 seconds
over a 64 second period. Officer Orosco fired his taser 6 times for a total of 31 seconds
over a 44 second period. When Pasadena Fire Department (PFD) personnel arrived and
treated Mr. Thomas - who was unresponsive. It must be noted that the PFD report stated
that their were no less than three different taser lines emanating from Mr. Thomas’ body.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), with support from the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJI),
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and other policing organizations and associations
developed and published in 2006 and 2011 defining documents regarding the use of the
Taser weapon (listed as item 16 on page 3 of this report.) Among other issues, the medical
risks of excessive applications, and listed 52 specific and necessary guidelines governing
the use of the Taser weapon. As such, the document expresses the accepted professional
standard of care and are endorsed by the U.S. Department of Justice. I have noted a
number of significant specific apparent departures from the guidelines by Sergeant Phan
which, in my opinion, contributed significantly to this incident and inflicted very serious
injury on Mr. Davis in violation of published and trained Federal guidelines, as follows:
“Medical Considerations: Repeated or multiple applications may

increase risk of death
Page 22 of 40
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“It is important to recognize that ECWs have been cited by medical

authorities as a cause of, or contributing factor in, some deaths. A number
of factors appear to be associated with fatal and other serious outcomes.
These factors include how the ECW was used and the physical or medical
condition of the subject who received an ECW application. Indeed, in July
2010 the American Academy of Emergency Medicine issued a Clinical
Practice Statement advising physicians that they should consider additional
evaluation and treatment for individuals who experienced an ECW
application longer than 15 seconds.
“Although causation factors are not clear, the most common factors that
appear to be associated with fatal and other serious outcomes include 1)
repeated and multiple applications, 2) cycling time that exceeds 15 seconds
in duration, whether the time is consecutive or cumulative, and 3)
simultaneous applications by more than one ECW. Officers must be trained
to understand that repeated applications and continuous cycling of ECWs
may increase the risk of death or serious injury and should be avoided.”
(Page 13.)
“Medical Considerations: High-risk populations
“Some populations currently believed to be at a heightened risk for serious

injury or death following an ECW application include pregnant women,
elderly persons, young children, visibly frail persons or persons with a
slight build, persons with known heart conditions, persons in
medical/mental crisis, and persons under the influence of drugs
(prescription and illegal) or alcohol. Personnel should be trained about the
medical complications that may occur after ECW use and should be made
aware that certain individuals, such as those in a state of excited delirium,
may be at a heightened risk for serious injury or death when subjected to
ECW application or other uses of force to subdue them.” (Page 14.)
“Medical Considerations: Positional asphyxia
“Agencies also need to be cognizant of how positional asphyxia may

exacerbate the condition of any individual who has received an ECW
application. Positional asphyxia is a death that occurs when a subject’s
body position interferes with breathing, either when the chest is restricted
from expanding properly or when the position of the subject’s head
Page 23 of 40
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obstructs the airway. Positional asphyxia has been mentioned as a possible

contributing factor in a number of cases in which subjects died after one or
more ECW applications. Police personnel should be trained to use a
restraint technique that does not impair a subject’s respiration following an
ECW application.” (Page 14.)
“Drive Stun: Avoid use as a pain-compliance tactic

“The most commonly used ECWs can be used in two modes: probe and
drive stun. Many police managers and officers erroneously believe that
applications of drive stun are as effective as applications with probes, but
that is not correct. The drive stun mode can be used to complete the circuit
in the event that one of the probes is ineffective or becomes dislodged. The
drive stun mode can also be used in close quarters for the purpose of
protecting the officer or creating a safe distance between the officer and
subject. Absent these circumstances, using the ECW in drive stun mode is
of questionable value. The primary function of the drive stun mode, when
not used to complete the circuit, is to gain subject compliance through the
administration of pain. Using the ECW to achieve pain compliance may
have limited effectiveness and, when used repeatedly, may even
exacerbate the situation by inducing rage in the subject. For these
reasons, agencies should carefully consider policy and training regarding
when and how personnel use the drive stun mode, and should discourage its
use as a pain compliance tactic. Drive stun has an applicable but limited
purpose that should be taught, explained, and monitored during ECW
training and field use.” (Page 14.)
Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines (of the 52 listed):
13. Personnel should be trained to use an ECW for one standard cycle
(five seconds) and then evaluate the situation to determine if
subsequent cycles are necessary. Training protocols should
emphasize that multiple applications or continuous cycling of an
ECW resulting in an exposure longer than 15 seconds (whether
continuous or cumulative) may increase the risk of serious injury or
death and should be avoided.
14. Training protocols should emphasize the risk of positional asphyxia,

and thus officers should be trained to use a restraint technique that
does not impair the subject’s respiration following an ECW
application.
Page 24 of 40
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16. Agencies’ policy and training should discourage the use of the drive
stun mode as a pain compliance technique. The drive stun mode
should be used only to supplement the probe mode to complete the
incapacitation circuit, or as a countermeasure to gain separation
between officers and the subject so that officers can consider another
force option.
17. Personnel should be trained to attempt hands-on control tactics

during ECW application, including handcuffing the subject during
ECW application (i.e., handcuffing under power). Training should
emphasize that personnel who touch a subject during ECW
application will not receive exposure to the electrical charge, so long
as caution is taken not to touch the subject along the circuit (i.e.,
between the locations of the two probes).
18. Command staff, supervisors, and investigators should receive ECW

awareness training appropriate to the investigations they conduct and
review.
20. In addition to providing an overview of ECWs, agencies should

provide ECW awareness training to personnel who are not certified
to carry the devices and emphasize their responsibilities. The
training should also cover situations such as attempting to handcuff
subjects during ECW application and transitioning to other force
options.
21. Personnel should use an ECW for one standard cycle (five seconds)
and then evaluate the situation to determine if subsequent cycles are
necessary. Personnel should consider that exposure to the ECW for
longer than 15 seconds (whether due to multiple applications or
continuous cycling) may increase the risk of death or serious injury.
Any subsequent applications should be independently justifiable, and
the risks should be weighed against other force options.
22. A warning should be given to a subject prior to activating the ECW

unless doing so would place any person at risk. Warnings may be in
the form of verbalization, display, laser painting, arcing, or a
combination of these tactics.
Page 25 of 40
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23. When feasible, an announcement should be made to other personnel

on the scene that an ECW is going to be activated.
25. ECWs should be used only against subjects who are exhibiting active
aggression or who are actively resisting in a manner that, in the
officer’s judgment, is likely to result in injuries to themselves or
others. ECWs should not be used against a passive subject.
46. ECW activations should be tracked in the agency’s early intervention

system (EIS). (“2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines.” U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services and Police Executive Research Forum (PERF),
Washington, D.C., March, 2011.)
In my opinion, Officer Orosco’s and Officer Butler’s gross departure from the standards
is reflective of the custom and practice of the PPD to endorse the gross over-dependence
on the Taser weapon when other far more reasonable and appropriate methods of force (if
actually necessary) should be deployed. Mr. Thomas called 9-1-1 for medical help, was
abruptly confronted by PPD Officers, was not combative, assaultive, and uttered no
threats to any Officer. As such, Mr. Thomas did not fall under the “active combatant”
rubric. Although Mr. Thomas had a knife wedged in his armpit, and was holding a fire
extinguisher, he did not make any sudden moves toward the Officers, or make any
attempt to handle the knife. In my opinion, the use of a taser in this instance grossly
deviated from the POST and federal training that Officers Orosco and Butler had
allegedly participated in and completed.
Cautions Regarding the Use of Hobble Restraints:
Officers are trained that because of the dangers of positional asphyxia, the Hobble
Restraint Device must not be used to bind an individual’s hands to his/her feet in any
manner. Additionally, the Hobble Restraint Device must never be applied to the head or.
neck of an arrestee. Once the handcuffs are secure and the Hobble Restraint Device has
been applied to a suspect’s ankles, the suspect should be searched (if appropriate) and
then immediately rolled into an upright, seated position. Secured arrestees must never be
placed in a recumbent; position causing them to lie on their stomach or side.
Because this procedure allows suspects some limited movement, they must be
contiguously monitored. If possible, an officer should maintain grip on the remainder of
Page 26 of 40
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the hobble strap to assist in controlling the suspect's legs. (Ref: Los Angeles Police
Department Training Bulletin: "Use of Force - Restraining Procedures and Devices,”
September 1997, page 7.)
The Positional or Restraint Asphyxia Occurrence:
Every day, police officers encounter situations that require them to restrain persons. As a
national standard, police officers are taught that it is imperative that only the force
necessary to make an arrest or subdue a combative or resistive person may be used. This
is because officers are responsible at all times for the safety and well being of persons
they take into their custody, as well as for their own safety and that of bystanders and
persons who are improperly restrained can suffer severe injury or death.
Properly trained officers learn how improper restraining techniques can block the flow of
air into the individual’s lungs contributing to a life-threatening condition known as
Positional, or Restraint, Asphyxia. Proper training also covers the multiple effective
options available such as avoiding compression of the chest, rolling the subject over on
his side, sitting or standing the subject up, proper hobbling methods (which excludes
hogtying), sitting the subject in the police unit, etc.
Just restraining someone in a face-down position with their hands handcuffed behind their
back is not generally sufficient in and of itself to cause sudden and unexpected death.
Chest compression, the presence of illegal drugs such as cocaine or methamphetamine
and the fact that many victims of positional/restraint asphyxia have been involved in
physical exertion prior to their restraint all work together to result in a scenario that can
cause a sudden and unexpected death. Key risk factors include all or some of the
following conditions:
• Obesity.
• Pre-existing medical conditions such as heart problems or head and
neck injuries.
• The length of any struggle.
• The physical environment in which the struggle takes place.
• Whether the suspect suffers from a mental condition.
• Whether the suspect has been drinking alcohol.
• The presence of depressant or stimulant drugs (substances such as
cocaine and methamphetamine.
Page 27 of 40
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Experts have stated that excessive restraint, combined with one or more of these factors,
can wreak havoc on the cardiovascular and respiratory systems.
Properly trained officers know that breathing requires two actions: Increasing the size of
the chest by expanding the ribs, and contracting the diaphragm, allowing air to fill the
lungs. When a person is lying face down, performing both of these functions can be more
difficult. The contents of the abdomen are pressing against the diaphragm. In order to
raise the ribs or use the diaphragm when forced into a prone position, the weight of the
body must be lifted. An officer kneeling or lying on the individual’s back, aggravates the
situation, because the additional weight of the officer(s) must be lifted along with the
weight of the persons’ body. The greater the weight or more intense the compression, the
harder it becomes to breathe. As a result, the suspect struggles more violently, and the
untrained or incompetent officers respond by using more force. With no reserve oxygen
left and unable to take deep breaths, the individual slips into unconsciousness and in
minutes could be dead.
As stated above, the majority of positional or restraint asphyxia incidents have occurred
after physical exertion and struggle. Both of these activities stress the heart and lungs,
depleting reserve oxygen stored in the muscles.
Competently trained officers know this scenario can be easily avoided by using proper
restraint techniques and following simple guidelines that are key to the possibility that a
struggling subject could be in danger of death due to positional or restraint asphyxia. One
of the most important of these factors is the longer the physical contact, the more fatigued
the body will become.
Further, officers are trained that they must act quickly to return the subject to an upright
position, especially when risk factors are present because the restraint techniques used
could mean the difference between life and death. Basic guidelines include avoiding
placing weight on the neck or back, avoiding “straddle” positions and“pile-ons,” and
immediately positioning the subject so he can breathe.
Lastly, officers are taught that it is not possible for a law enforcement officer to actively
determine who is at risk for sudden and unexpected death while suspects are being
restrained. As a consequence, the law enforcement officer must assume that any person
being restrained presents a risk of sudden and unexpected death. The risk that restraint
asphyxia and accidental death will occur is only controlled by using proper restraining
techniques.
Page 28 of 40
#:5605
Properly trained officers are trained that excessive restraint, combined with one or more
of these factors, several of which were present in this instance, can impair the
cardiovascular and respiratory systems.
Properly trained officers know that breathing requires two actions:
• Increasing the size of the chest by expanding the ribs and.

• Contracting the diaphragm, allowing air to fill the lungs.
Training includes to know that:
• When a person is lying face down, performing both of these

functions can be more difficult.
• The contents of the abdomen are pressing against the diaphragm.
• In order to raise the ribs or use the diaphragm when forced into a
prone position, the weight of the body must be lifted.
• An officer kneeling or lying on the individual’s back aggravates the
situation because the additional weight of the officer(s) must be
lifted along with the weight of the persons’ body.
• The greater the weight or more intense the compression, the harder it
becomes to breathe. As a result, the suspect struggles more
violently, and untrained officers respond by using more force.
• With no reserve oxygen left and unable to take deep breaths, the
individual slips into unconsciousness and in minutes, and could be
dead.
Properly trained officers know this scenario can be easily avoided by using proper
restraint techniques and following simple guidelines that are key to the possibility that a
struggling subject could be in danger of death due positional or restraint asphyxia. One of
the most important of these factors is the longer the physical contact, the more fatigued
the body will become.
Additionally, officers are also trained that they must act quickly to return the subject to an
upright position, preferably in a sitting position, cease applying restraint, especially when
risk factors are present, because the restraint techniques used could mean the difference
between life and death.
Basic guidelines include avoiding placing weight on the neck or back, avoiding “straddle”
positions and “pile-ons,” and immediately positioning the subject so he can breathe.
Page 29 of 40
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Police reports and depositions in this case suggest that Mr. Thomas went unconscious
while he was handcuffed in a prone position, and that he was in that position with weight
being applied. Properly trained officers know that they must monitor the vital signs of
any person who is restrained. Officers are also trained that it is not possible for them
actively determine who is at risk for sudden and unexpected death while suspects are
being restrained. As a consequence, the law enforcement officer must assume that any
person being restrained presents a risk of sudden and unexpected death. The risk that
restraint asphyxia and accidental death will occur is only controlled by using proper
restraining techniques.
It does not appear that the Defendant Officers referred to their training, or completely
disregarded their training, which appears to have contributed (if not caused) Mr. Thomas’
untimely, unnecessary, and tragic demise.
At 2:50 a.m., the PPD CAD report reflected a radio transmission that Mr. Thomas was in
custody. Therefore, Mr. Thomas was handcuffed and hobbled from 2:50 a.m. until 2:55
a.m., when it was broadcast that the hobble was being removed. It appears that from the
initial tasering (2:48 a.m.) until the removal of Mr. Thomas’ hobble and handcuffs, that
Mr. Thomas had no less than six Officers kneeling on him, placing body weight on him,
tasing him, striking him, and forcing him into a prone position.
According to DeMarcus Holder (Mr. Holder), who lived across from Mr. Thomas, he
observed Officers kicking Mr. Thomas, while Mr. Thomas lay on the floor.
THE INVESTIGATOR: What time did you wake up?

MR. HOLDER: I don't remember the exact time that I woke up at. I just
know when I woke up, I just heard a -- I heard a loud
commotion outside. So I looked out my window from
the second floor of our apartment here, and I basically
saw six, seven cops approaching a -- running towards
the gentleman's apartment across from ours. And I -- I
saw -- I saw about two, three Taser -- I don't know how
they are -- exactly what – they are prong thingies
coming out of his body. And I heard him yelling, and I
heard them yelling. At one point, the door shut, and the
officers attempted to kick the door back in, and -- but
during this whole time, I think he was on the ground.
He didn't -- he -- he -- he seriously didn't appear to
have anything in his arms -- his hands at that moment.
But they kicked the door back in, and I heard a little --
Page 30 of 40
#:5607
I heard, like, a little pop sound. I don't know if that was

from another Taser sound, but it – it -- it was definitely
-- you could definitely hear this little pop sound. It
wasn't a gunshot. And then -- if I remember correctly -
- which I am trying to remember from that night. Well,
they got the door back open, and he was still laying on
the ground halfway in and halfway out the door. And
then sudden - -- all of a sudden, I just looked down,
and he wasn't moving at all and they stopped. They just
stopped there, and I went -- went to go get my -- my
girlfriend and her sister, who also lives here at this
apartment, to just show them and tell them what was
going on. And we came back to the window, and he
was still laying there. But this time, he was about -- he
was more -- he was more in the door, so he wasn't -- he
wasn't there -- he definitely wasn't in the same position
he was at the moment that I had seen him earlier. And
after that, then cops just got -- just got really quiet, and
the guy was just laying there motionless. He wasn't
moving at all.
THE INVESTIGATOR: Did you know this gentleman?
MR. HOLDER: I didn't know him personally, but we did -- we did see
him every day basically. (Holder Deposition, Pages
35-37)
Opinions Thus Far:
1. This incident is a case of excessive force and incompetent arrest

tactics by police officers who, by virtue of POST standards and
training and their individual and collective experience, knew better.
The record indicates that Mr. Thomas suffered substantial physical
abuse at the hands of Pasadena Police Officers involved with his
restraint and death. The defendant officers appear in the record as
all having a direct involvement in this incident and deliberately
acted contrary to the proper arrest and control methods required in
this case. The injuries that were inflicted by the officers upon Mr.
Thomas were documented during autopsy and speak to this fact. In
my opinion, the actions of the PPD motioned a series of events that
resulted in Mr. Thomas’ injuries and death. In this regard, Mr.
Page 31 of 40
#:5608
Thomas’ injuries and death would not have occurred had the
officers used the proper basic arrest and control procedures that are
taught to all POST certified officers. In fact, throughout the
country, law enforcement officers are trained regarding the methods
and means of response when dealing with citizens. Above all, they
are required to avoid excessive and unnecessary force. In this
instance, the defendant Officers appear to have failed in their duty
to utilize these methods and follow these standards. Rather, their
response and use of force appears grossly unjustified, excessive, and
unnecessary in the totality of the circumstances confronting them,
and includes their collective failure to abide by POST standards,
and law (as taught by POST)
2. It is a national standard taught throughout the nation (as noted

above) to never place a hobbled or use hobble methods on a subject
with their face, chest, and/or stomach down. Mr. Thomas should
never have been left in that position for an extended period of time,
particularly while sat upon and handcuffed. Anything short of
sitting Mr. Thomas upright was improper.
3. Police officers and police supervisors are trained as a POST

standard that they must intercede (regardless of their rank) when
excessive force occurs in their presence. None of the PPD officers
who were present at the scene complied with this POST
requirement. It is likely that an early intervention by a competent
officer would have prevented Mr. Thomas’ serious injuries and
death. This did not occur. It would have been apparent to any
reasonably trained officer that multiple baton blows, taser use, the
kicks, punches, hobbling extreme weight on his body, and blows to
his head were excessive and unreasonable. Taking the record as
true (and as supported by witnesses), then each officer present failed
in their duty to intervene to prevent and/or stop the unnecessary and
excessive force inflicted on Mr. Thomas:
“The community expects that its peace officers will use only
reasonable amounts of force. Likewise, it expects that
someone, including peace officers, will intervene if
reasonable force is exceeded. For the community and the
officer’s protection, the officer must know the laws pertaining
to intervention.
Page 32 of 40
#:5609
“Peace officers are required by their position to intervene in

any force situation they perceive as excessive.” (POST
Learning Domain: #20 “Use of Force,” Chapter 6 -
Consequences of Unreasonable Force, page 6-7.)
“The United States Constitution protects individuals from

unlawful actions of peace officers. NOTE: The officer who
fails to intervene, for whatever reason, is also held
accountable by the United States Code.” (POST Learning
Domain: #20 “Use of Force,” Chapter 6 - Consequences of
Unreasonable Force, page 6-8.)
4. I see nothing whatsoever that justifies the use of force and restraint
inflicted on Mr. Thomas by Officers Butler, Santiago, Orosco,
Villicana, Poirier, and Griffith, including (but not limited to) the
gross over-use of the two tasers inflicting multiple cycles, punching
and kicking him (including blows to the head), placing Mr. Thomas
in handcuffs and a hobble configuration and forcing him in a prone
position with body weight on his restrained body. I have noted that
the Pasadena Police Department only recently released Mr. Thomas’
autopsy - which documents the significant indications of excessive
force. The Pasadena Police Department can not be excused for
apparently dissembling ostensibly criminal uses of force against Mr.
Thomas by the Officers in this case.
5. The PPD and LASD investigation into Mr. Thomas’ LEARD (in-
custody death) is per se incomplete and incompetent. For example,
the obvious omissions include allowing the involved officers days to
consult with their attorney(s) and/or others (including among
themselves) before appearing and providing compelled statements,
and not taking an immediate blood draw.
6. The actions of the involved officers appears to have been an over-

reaction driven by “subjective fear” rather than an “objectively
reasonable” fear justified by actual facts and circumstances.
7. There is no evidence in the record thus far that there has been any
retraining or adequate discipline of the police officers or custody
personnel involved. The response of the PPD to this incident is
Page 33 of 40
#:5610
indicative of their collective ratification of what occurred and it is

wrong. As such, it demonstrates systemic, organizational, and
cultural patterns and practices which tacitly allow excessive and
unnecessary force by the rank and file. The responsibility for this
condition rests with the PPD chain of command and the Chief of
Police.
My Qualifications To Review This Case:
My opinions are based in part on my training, professional experience and education. I

am a twenty seven year veteran of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD).
I was hired on December 1, 1965, and I retired from active service on March 31, 1993.
My career included six years at the rank of Deputy Sheriff, six years as a Sergeant, and
fifteen years as a Lieutenant. I retired holding a California Peace Officer Standards and
Training (POST) Advanced Certificate, and I am a graduate of the POST Command
College (class #5, 1988). The POST Command College was a Masters level two-year
course of study requiring a thesis, in Police Administration, with the diploma awarded by
the California Department of Justice (and not the California University system).
During the course of my service with the department, I had a wide range of duties. Those
duties included an 18 month assignment as a staff jail deputy and two years as an
Administrator/Lieutenant in the same jail facility (Men’s Central Jail). I also served on
the department as a patrol officer, field supervisor, jail watch commander and
administrator, station watch commander, and commanding officer of investigative units.
I was a field training officer while assigned as a patrol deputy, and I trained new officers
in POST and department approved patrol procedures, field investigations, apprehension
techniques, and emergency procedures.
I was a Station Detective and, as such, reviewed and assessed cases passed on to me by
the patrol officers. Those cases included possible complaints relating to both
misdemeanor and felony crimes. They frequently required follow up investigations and
interviews before the exact nature of the case could be determined. As a field officer and
detective, I was trained in interview and interrogation methods and subsequently trained
other officers.
Among other assignments as a Sergeant, I supervised field officers and station detectives
as they took complaints and conducted preliminary investigations regarding criminal and
administrative matters.
Page 34 of 40
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As a Sergeant and as a Lieutenant, I served on the training staff of the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department’s Patrol School which taught the POST accepted patrol
tactics, and investigation and apprehension methods.
As a Watch Commander and as a Lieutenant, I responded to, investigated, and reported

on the use of force and officer-involved shootings. I was also assigned by my Department
to sit as a member of Departmental review committees regarding the reasonable or
unreasonable use of force and tactics.
As stated above, during my career I was assigned to the Los Angeles County Men’s
Central Jail (MCJ) for a period of 18 months as a line officer. Upon my subsequent
promotion to Lieutenant, I returned to the same facility approximately 10 years later.
During that time, I was assigned as a Jail Watch Commander, and as the Facility Training
and Logistics Administrator. At the time of my assignment, the MCJ held a daily
population in excess of 7,000 inmates, including a hospital, which was serviced by a staff
of more than 900 sworn and civilian personnel.
During my assignment as the Administrative Lieutenant of the Department’s Reserve

Forces Bureau, I worked closely with the State of California Peace Officer Standards and
Training in revamping our Reserve Academy to bring it into state compliance. This
process gave me an expertise in the POST Basic curriculum. I also supervised the
training of cadets at our Reserve Training Academy. They were taught proper
investigation, interview, and apprehension procedures. Among other topics, I lectured the
Reserve Academy on the POST syllabus: “The Legal and Moral Use of Force and
Firearms.”
During the 1984 Olympics held in Los Angeles, I was assigned and served as the
Department’s Intelligence Officer at the Los Angeles Olympics Emergency Operations
Center.
During the last five and one half years of my career, I commanded a specialized unit
known as the North Regional Surveillance and Apprehension Team (N.O.R.S.A.T.),
which was created to investigate, locate, observe and arrest major (career) criminals. I
held this position until my retirement from the Department on March 31, 1993.
Criminals investigated and arrested by N.O.R.S.A.T. included suspects involved with

homicide, robbery, kidnaping, extortion, burglary, major narcotics violations and police
corruption. The majority of our cases were homicide cases, including the murder of
police officers. Arrests frequently occurred in dynamic circumstances including crimes in
progress.
Page 35 of 40
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My unit also conducted major narcotics investigations including undercover narcotics

buys, buy busts, and reverse stings. We frequently deployed at the request of
investigative units, such as Narcotics, which provided the initial investigative leads for
our operations. These narcotics cases usually involved multiple kilogram quantities of
drugs and amounts of money ranging from one hundred thousand to more than one
million dollars.
Approximately 80% of cases assigned to N.O.R.S.A.T. were active Homicide

investigations. In that regard, the unit processed, under my command and supervision,
various aspects (depending on the complexity of the cases involved) of approximately
1,000 Homicides ranging from deaths of police officers to serial homicide suspects.
Additionally, the majority of the over 1550 cases for which I have been retained as a
consultant (since 1993) have involved injuries or deaths connected with some aspect of
force during either apprehension or while in police custody.
During the first three months of my command of N.O.R.S.A.T., the unit had three
justifiable shooting incidents. From that time, and over the next five years of my
command, N.O.R.S.A.T. established a remarkable record of more than two thousand
arrests of career criminals without a single shot fired – either by my officers or by the
suspects whom we arrested.
Many of these suspects were armed and considered to be very dangerous. Some were
apprehended during the course of their crimes and were very prone to use firearms to
escape apprehension. This record of excellence was accomplished through the use of
proper tactics, management and supervision of personnel, training in correct apprehension
methods, and adherence to the moral and ethical standards endorsed by California POST
and my Department. These methods and principles are also embraced by every state
training commission of which I am aware, as well as the national standards established by
the U.S. Department of Justice.
As a result of my position and record as the commanding officer of N.O.R.S.A.T., I was

assigned to author Field Operations Directive 89-3, “Tactical Operations Involving
Detective Personnel.” This order remained in force 20 years (until September 30, 2009),
and included the basic standards and considerations with which investigative officers
must comply in the event of a tactical deployment such as the dynamic entry into a
building for the purpose of an arrest and/or seizure of evidence.
Since my retirement, I have testified as an expert on use of force, jail procedures and jail
administration, investigations, police procedures, police tactics, investigative procedures,
Page 36 of 40
#:5613
shooting scene reconstruction, and police administration in Arizona State Courts,

California State Courts, Washington State Courts and Federal Courts in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, New Mexico, New York and
Wisconsin. I have testified before the Los Angeles Police Department Board of Rights
and the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission. I have testified before the Harris
County (Texas) Grand Jury and the Cleveland Grand Jury. I have also submitted written
opinions in matters before Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Montana, North Carolina, New
York, Oregon, Kentucky, and Wyoming Federal and State Courts. I was selected
(January 20, 2007) to present on the topic of: “Police Experts” at the National Police
Accountability Project held at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. I was
selected (September 23, 2010) to present on the topic of: “Using POST Modules to
Establish Police Officer’ Standard of Care” at the National Police Accountability Project,
National Lawyers Guild Convention, in New Orleans, Louisiana. I was selected (March
30, 2012) to present to the Kern County Public Defenders in Bakersfield, California, on
the topics of “Ethics, Police Investigations, the California POST Curriculum, and the
M26 and X26 Taser weapons.” On August 7, 2013 I was invited and presented to the
Texas Civil Rights Project (TCRP) 2013 Annual Legal Summit in Austin, Texas on the
topic: “Ethically Working with Experts from the Prospective of a Police Expert.” On
October 15, 2015 I was the invited presenter at a Community Forum in Victorville,
California on the topics of Police Procedures, Community Policing, Use of Force, and
features of the M26, X26 and X2 Taser weapons.
I have worked on several projects with the Paso Del Norte (El Paso, Texas) Civil Rights
Project and the Texas Civil Rights Project (Austin, Texas). As a result of my expert
testimony in Border Network, et al. v. Otero County, et al., Case No. 07-cv-01045
(D.N.M. 2008), a federal court issued a temporary injunction to stop the illegal and
widespread immigration raids in Chaparral, New Mexico, implemented pursuant to
Operation Stonegarden. The case resulted in the adoption of a model policy for inquiring
into a person’s immigration status, which has been adopted nationwide and has also been
presented to the United States Senate, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other
government officials seeking to reform immigration enforcement.
I have been recognized, and my expert report was quoted by the USDC in Burns v. City of
Redwood City, 737 F.Supp2nd.1047. I have been recognized, and my expert report was
quoted by, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as an expert in Police
Administration and Use of Force in Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, et al., 485 F.3d 463,
485 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit also drew from my expert report in a second
published case involving Police Detective Investigations. Torres, et al. v. City of Los
Angeles, et al., 540 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2008). The Torres case was appealed to
Page 37 of 40
#:5614
the U.S. Supreme Court and returned for trial. I provided the expert opinion in Chavies
Hoskin v. City of Milwaukee, et al. (USDC Case No. 13-cv-0920), regarding field strip
and cavity searches, hiring, training, discipline and supervision, and which resulted in
significant policy changes within the MPD. My opinions supported argument in the
Ninth Circuit case: Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014).
The Ninth Circuit also drew from my expert reports regarding credible threats justifying
the use of force, Hayes v. County of San Diego, 658 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2011), and Young
v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit also drew
from my expert reports regarding Jail Administration and Administrative Responsibilities,
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit also drew from my
expert reports regarding an officer’s violation of the 14th Amendment if an officer kills a
suspect when acting with the purpose to harm, unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement
objective, in AD v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F. 3d 446 (9th Cir. 2013). The Fifth
Circuit drew from my expert report regarding search and seizure, investigations and no-
knock requirements in Bishop et al. v. Arcuri et al., 674 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2012). The
Ninth Circuit also drew from my expert report regarding the use of impact weapons
(PepperBall) on civilians in Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012). I was
the expert in the Ninth Circuit opinion regarding the allegations proffered by police
officers and their use/display of firearms against civilians in Green v. City and County of
San Francisco, 751 F. 3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2014). Most recently, I was the expert in an
important Ninth Circuit opinion regarding the allegations proffered by police officers and
their use of lethal force against unarmed persons in Jennifer Cruz, et al., v. City of
Anaheim, et al., 765 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). I was the expert at trial in the Ninth
Circuit opinion regarding the order of evidence at trial in Estate of Manuel Diaz, v. City
of Anaheim, et al., No. 14-55644. My opinion is quoted in the Ninth Circuit opinion
regarding the use of lethal force in A.K.H. a minor, et al, v. City of Tustin, et al., No. 14-
55184. My opinions supported argument in the Ninth Circuit case: Estate of Angel Lopez,
et al., v. Kristopher Michael Walb, No. 14-57007 (not for publication) wherein the Ninth
Circuit Affirmed the Denial of Summary Judgement by the District Court. My opinions
supported argument in the Ninth Circuit case: Estate of Shakina Ortega, et al., v. City of
San Diego, et al. No. 14-56824 (not for publication) wherein the Ninth Circuit Affirmed
the Denial of Summary Judgement by the District Court. My opinions supported
argument in the Ninth Circuit case: Jerry Newmaker, et al., v. City of Fortuna, et al. No.
14-15098 (for publication). My opinions supported argument in the Ninth Circuit Case:
Tonya E. Shirar, v. Miguel Guerrero, et al. regarding use of lethal force and “suicide by
cop,” No. 15-55029 (not for publication). My opinions supported argument in the Ninth
Circuit Case Angel Mendez; Jennifer Lynn Garcia, v County of Los Angeles, et al., Nos.
13-56686, and 13-57072 (for publication) and which was settled before the Supreme
Court, No. 16-369, regarding the use of lethal force and searches. My opinions supported
argument in the Ninth Circuit case: Chien Van Bui, et al, v City and County of San
Page 38 of 40
#:5615
Francisco, et al, No. 14-16585 (not for publication), regarding the use of lethal force. My
opinions supported argument in the Sixth Circuit opinion, Case No. 16-5322, Carey
Woodcock v. City of Bowling Green, et al, Originating Case No. 1:13-cv-00124 regarding
the use of lethal force. My opinions supported argument in the Ninth Circuit opinion,
Case No. No. 14-17388 (for publication), Johnathan Jones, et al v. Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department, et al, Originating Case No. 2:12-cv-01636- regarding
the use of lethal force and Taser weapons. My opinions supported argument in the Ninth
Circuit opinion, Case No. No. 16-15606 (for publication), Christian Longoria, et al v.
Pinal County, et al, Originating Case No. 2:15-cv-00043, PHX SRB, regarding the use of
lethal force after a vehicle pursuit.
The California Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District) drew in part from my expert
report regarding search warrant service, Macias v. County of Los Angeles, 144 Cal.
App.4th 313, 50 Cal. Rptr.3d 364 (2006). The California Supreme Court drew in part
from my expert opinion regarding police tactics and the use of deadly force, Hayes et al.
v. County of San Diego et al., 57 Cal.4th 622 (2013).
On February 10, 1989, I was personally commended at the Los Angeles County Hall of
Administration by United States Attorney General, the Honorable Edwin Meese III, for
my work to establish California Penal Code Section 311.11 (forbidding the Possession of
Child Pornography). On February 22, 1993 (at the time of my retirement), Mr. Meese
presented a second personal commendation for the success of this critical five-year effort
to bring this law into effect.
On December 7, 2015 I was requested by the Cleveland District Attorney to present my

opinions to the Cleveland Grand Jury regarding the November 22, 2014 shooting death of
Tamir Rice by City of Cleveland police officers. In March, 2016 I was requested by the
Delaware Attorney General to review and provide my opinions regarding the shooting
death of Jeremy McDole. The AG report was published May 12, 2016.
I have been found competent by both Federal and State Courts to render opinions as to
responsibilities as occurred in this case. A number of my cases have involved law
enforcement officers as civil plaintiffs and as criminal defendants.
Since my retirement, I have become an expert in the features and the use of TASER
International’s products, including the Model M26, Model X26 and Model X2 ECDs. I
own each, along with the download software. I have reviewed all the TASER training
materials and am familiar with the risks and tactics associated with these potentially lethal
devices. I have qualified as an expert on TASER products and testified both in deposition
Page 39 of 40
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and before juries on their usage. Two published examples are Lee v. Nashville, 596 F.
Supp. 2d 1101, 1121-22 (M.D. Tenn. 2009), and Heston v. City of Salinas, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98433, *25-*26 (E.D. Cal. 2007). My most recent Federal
acceptance/certification as an expert in the general use and deployment of the TASER
weapon (including Taser International product warnings/bulletins sent to every agency
using the Taser weapon) occurred in Los Angles, California on November 7, 2017 in
William Mears, et al., v. City of Los Angeles, USDC Case No.: CV 15-08441 JAK
(AJWx). There are many others.
Attached as Exhibit A is a statement listing my law enforcement qualifications and

experience; Exhibit B is my fee schedule; Exhibit C is a listing of matters in which I have
testified in the last four years as an expert.
I reserve the right to modify my opinions to the extent additional information is provided.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed January
5, 2018, at Santee, CA.
Page 40 of 40
#:5617
ROGER A. CLARK
10207 Molino Road • Santee CA 92071 • Telephone: (208) 351-2458. Fax: (619) 258-0045.
EXPERIENCE
Police Procedures Consultant (self employed)

April 1, 1993 to Present.................................................................. 25 years
I have been certified by Federal and State courts as expert in jail and police
procedures in Federal and State Courts. I select my cases carefully and have
consulted in approximately 1700 cases thus far since my retirement from the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.
Substitute Teacher, Madison School District

August 1994 to 2003......................................................................... 9 years
I substitute teach at all levels in the school district (elementary to high school).
As a volunteer, I wrote and managed a $85,000.00 federal grant for our Central
High School. This grant is in its sixth year and has generated $510,000.00 for
the school.
District Liaison, State of Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections

August 1, 1995 to March 1, 1997..........................................1 year, 7 months
I represented the new Department of Juvenile Corrections to the ten counties in

the Seventh Judicial District. As such, I worked closely with Probation
Officers, County Commissioners, Judges, other state agencies, private care
providers, etc. in the implementation of the new Idaho Juvenile Corrections Act
of 1995. I wrote or participated in the writing of several federal grants for the
District. I conducted training - both formal and informal - and developed a
series of new therapy programs for juveniles with private care providers. I also
served as the Director of the Detention Center and the State Placement
Coordinator during this time.
-1-
#:5618
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

December 1, 1965 to March 31, 1993.................................27 years 4 months
Note: In 1993 the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department had 7,000 sworn
and 3,000 civilian personnel and a daily County Jail inmate population of
23,000.
Service as a Lieutenant (15 Years, 0 Months):
1. Field Operations Region I

NORSAT 11/15/87 to 3/31/93 64 months
I commanded a specialized unit created to investigate, locate, observe and

arrest major (career) criminal offenders. This unit was designed as a
multijurisdictional effort for the cities in the northern region of Los Angeles
County. The command consisted of four (4) Sergeants, seventeen (17)
Deputies, four (4) Police Officers, twenty five (25) Reserves, and three (3)
civilian employees. The 1992 budget set at $1.5 million. The arrest rate
averaged 500 career criminal arrests per year with a 97% conviction rate and no
shots fired (on either side) for 61 consecutive months.
Significant contributions while assigned at this Bureau were:
• Increase in participating police agencies.

• Direct participation with corporate (private) agencies.
• Formation of a reserve and volunteer unit.
• Establishment of NORSAT Foundation private funding.
• Computerization of the unit.
• Promotion of fourteen personnel.
• Fleet expansion from 13 to 28 vehicles (donated).
• Formation of the DEA Valley Task Force.
• Field Operations Directive 89-3.
2. Executive Offices
Reserve Forces Bureau 05/01/84 to 11/15/87 42 months
I was the administrative officer to a specialized bureau responsible for

coordinating the activities of 1,000 sworn reserve personnel, 900 civilian
-2-
#:5619
volunteers, and 450 law enforcement explorer scouts. The Bureau identifies
programs for their effective utilization throughout the Department; develops
and tracks training programs; sponsors activities designed to promote growth
and keep morale at high levels.
Significant contributions while assigned at this bureau are:
• Total restructure of the Academy training process for reserve Deputies.

• Implementation of upgrade programs to move lower level reserves to
level I status.
• Departmental Reserve Certification procedures.
• Annual leadership seminar.
• The Reserve News, a nationally recognized police magazine.
• Computerization of the Bureau.
3. Field Operations Region I

Crescenta Valley Station 04/01/80 to 05/01/84 49 months
Crescenta Valley Station is a full service police facility of 100 personnel

serving a population of 50,000 (including the Contract City of La
Canada-Flintridge) and a total area of 250 square miles. During my four years
service at this facility I served in every management role:
• Nine months as the Station Commander during an extended absence by

the Captain (08/01/83 TO 05/01/84).
• Sixteen months as the Operations Lieutenant (03/01/82 TO 08/01/83).
• Twelve months as the station Detective Bureau Commander (03/01/81
to 01/01/82).
• Twelve months as a Watch Commander (04/01/80 to 03/01/81).
Significant contributions while assigned at this command are:
• Negotiation of an enhanced city contract (at a savings to the City).

• Formation of a volunteer community support group.
• Development and implementation of an integrated community
emergency response plan.
• High School undercover narcotics operation.
• Restructure of the Station Detective Bureau.
• The annual station picnic, which was effective in boosting station
morale.
-3-
#:5620
4. Custody Division
Central Jail 04/01/78 to 04/01/80 24 months
The Los Angeles County Central Jail is the largest jail facility in the State of
California, with a daily inmate population of seven thousand (7,000), an
assigned staff of six hundred (600), and two hundred (200) civilian personnel.
My service at this command was equally divided into two major assignments:
C Training and Logistics Lieutenant (04/01/79 to 04/01/80).

C Watch Commander (04/01/78 to 04/01/79).
• "Hot Fire" Training program, which is now a State (POST) mandated

training module for all custody personnel throughout California.
• The "Defend in Place" fire safety operational plan for jail facilities.
• New fire safety specifications for jail bedding and mattresses.
• The development of fire safe jail mattress material.
• The development of a facility emergency response plan.
• The computerization of training, timekeeping, and scheduling for the
facility (800 sworn and 200 civilian personnel).
• "Spouse day at CJ"--A program for spouses of employees.
Service as a Sergeant (6 Years, 4 Months):
5. Administrative Division
Federal Surplus Property 01/12/76 to 04/01/78 27 months
This program was entirely my idea and developed while I was assigned at my
previous assignment (Emergency Operations Bureau). The unit provides
millions of dollars in free federal excess and surplus food and property from
clothing to heavy equipment and aircraft to the department each year. I am
very proud of this contribution to the Department.
6. Patrol Division
Emergency Operations 02/01/74 to 01/12/76 23 months
I was among the original personnel that formed this unit which blended the
activities of the Department's planning unit with emergency operations
planning and preparation. I was assigned as the Personnel and Logistics
Sergeant.
-4-
#:5621
• Formation of a new County Emergency Operations Center.

• Participation in the 1974 Federal earthquake studies of Los Angeles
County.
• Development of the Department's specialized Field Command Post
equipment.
• Development of the Department's Field Booking Team.
7. Patrol Division
Civil Defense Bureau 12/01/73 to 02/01/74 02 months
I was assigned to this unit to facilitate the orderly transition into the new
Emergency Operations Bureau.
8. Patrol Division
San Dimas Station 12/12/72 to 12/01/73 12 months
I performed all the duties of a Watch and Patrol Sergeant. I also frequently served
as the Watch Commander.
9. Technical Serviced Division

Communications Bureau 12/01/71 to 12/12/72 12 months
I served as the Watch Commander in The Sheriff's Department's old radio room
located at the Hall of Justice, and assisted in the transition to the existing
communications facility.
Service as a Deputy (6 Years, 0 Months):
10. Patrol Division

San Dimas Station
Detective Bureau 01/01/70 to 12/01/71 23 months
I served as a Station Detective assigned to the evening watch. I handled the first
response to all crimes requiring investigations. I processed all evening juvenile
matters, prepared criminal complaints and juvenile petitions.
-5-
#:5622
11. Patrol Division

San Dimas Station Patrol 01/29/68 to 01/01/70 24 months
I performed all duties assigned to Station Patrol: Jailer, Desk, Watch Deputy,
Patrol, and Traffic.
12. Technical Services Division

Transportation Bureau 11/01/67 to 01/29/68 02 months
I was temporarily assigned to the Beverly Hills Municipal Court pending my

assignment to a Patrol Station.
13. Custody Division

Central Jail 05/06/66 to 11/01/67 18 months
I returned to my previous assignment at the Central Jail after graduation from the
Academy. I performed all aspects of a Custody Deputy i.e. Module Officer,
Prowler, Control Booth, High Power, etc.
14. Administrative Division

Academy 01/17/66 to 05/06/66 04 months
I was a Sheriff's trainee assigned to Class #110.
15. Custody Division

Central Jail 12/01/65 to 01/17/66 01 month
I was a pre-academy Custody Deputy assigned to the Central Jail as an "off the
street" Deputy Sheriff.
DEGREES AND CERTIFICATION
P.O.S.T. Command College (Class #5) POST 1988

Management Certification POST 1980
Advanced Certification POST 1975
Associate of Science Degree Chaffey College 1971
-6-

Roger Clark Report On Reginald Thomas Jr.'s Death

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Case 2:16-cv-08602-SJO-RAO Document 208-3 Filed 02/02/18 Page 1 of 46 Page ID

Ms. Caree Harper, Esq.

Dear Ms. Harper:

Materials Reviewed Thus Far:

1. Complaint for Damages.

2. Pasadena Police Department Crime Scene Report, PAS000001-

3. County of Los Angeles Homicide Report, URN 016-00112-3199-

5. Dispatch Audio Recordings:

6. Declaration of Deputy District Attorney Martha Carrillo, August 8,

7. Declaration of Detective Robert Gray, May 9, 2017.

8. Video surveillance recordings:

c. X12200556V (Belonging to Officer Poirier)

10. Audio Interviews:

11. Involved Officer Personnel and Training Data:

12. I/A Interviews

13. Deposition Transcripts:

c. PPD Chief of Police Phillip Sanchez, November 6,

14. Nationally recognized law enforcement training regarding

15. 2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines. U.S. Department of

16. Additional TASER International Training Materials.

17. California POST Basic Learning Domains:

c. #3: “Policing in the Community.”

18. Report of John C. Hiserodt, M.D., January 3, 2017.

19. Images of the incident scene via the internet.

Brief Overview of Events and Commentary:

On September 30, 2016, Mr. Thomas apparently experienced a mental or medical

In this regard, it is necessary to quote a portion of Officer Villicana’s compelled

Officer Villicana’s Compelled Statement:

A: “Prior to that, I remember telling my trainee because he left - I believe

him commands to stop. I - I don’t know exactly what those commands

A: “And somebody yelled out, “He doesn’t have it anymore.” Well to me

Professional Standards And Training Regarding the Use of Force:

1. The power of arrest and

The authority to do so does not come from the rule of an

Cooperative - Subject offers no resistance:

Passive non-compliance - Does not respond to verbal commands but also

Active resistance - Physically evasive movements to defeat an officer’s

Assaultive - Aggressive or combative; attempting or threatening to assault

Life-threatening - Any action likely to result in serious injury or possibly the

NOTE: Officers must take into account the totality of

NOTE: Officers must be aware of and comply with their

“A reasonable officer is defined as an officer with similar training,

Additionally, an entire chapter in POST Learning Domain #20 is devoted to the

“Malicious assaults and batteries committed by peace officers constitute

• The nature of the crime (felony versus misdemeanor – violent versus

POST Training Regarding the Use of Impact Weapons:

repel and protect in certain tactical considerations.” (Post Learning Domain

“A peace officer's impact weapon is a deadly weapon as defined in Penal

“Illegal use by an officer:

“Any officer who uses an impact weapon against a subject beyond

“Penal Code 149: Any officer unnecessarily assaulting or beating any

“Penal Code 245: Assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to

Consequences of Blows/Kicks to the Head:

Training Regarding The Right To Lawful Resistance:

Section 692: Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may

Section 693: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by

offense.” (POST Learning Domain #20: Consequences of

Established Federal Standards Regarding the Use of the Taser Weapon:

“Medical Considerations: Repeated or multiple applications may

“It is important to recognize that ECWs have been cited by medical

“Medical Considerations: High-risk populations

“Some populations currently believed to be at a heightened risk for serious

“Medical Considerations: Positional asphyxia