Southeast Asian gas outlook to 2045: Prospects of gas network expansion

to increase security of supply

Yuliana *
Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management - Delft, University of Technology, the Netherlands
2015

Abstract

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are countries in Southeast Asia that have been known as LNG exporters since the early periods of LNG
trade. After being major LNG exporters for the last four decades, the countries are confronted with depleting gas resources. The whole region
is facing a similar trend of increasing domestic gas consumption and a decline in domestic gas production that leads to a problem of security
of gas supply. Currently, there are two master plans of gas infrastructure in Southeast Asia: Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline (TAGP) and ASEAN
LNG facilities. This research is aimed to evaluate the ability of the current proposed plans to meet natural gas demand in the region until
2045. A gas network model of existing gas pipelines and LNG infrastructures in the region has been developed to evaluate the plans. The
results show that the current plans are hardly sufficient to meet natural gas demand especially in Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore, and
therefore, need to be revised. Based on the BAU scenario, the three countries will need to add more regasification capacities and new TAGP
connection will only come from East Natuna to Java. In the Reference scenario, Singapore could defer the regasification expansion until
2040, and there could be additional TAGP connections, i.e. from East Natuna to West Natuna – Singapore or East Natuna to Erawan.

Keywords: Southeast Asia, natural gas, security of supply, gas pipeline, LNG, network expansion

1. Introduction islands. In this case, LNG shipping is used to deliver natural

Countries in Southeast Asia through a regional
cooperation called ASEAN (Association of South East Asia
Nations) have established cooperation in various sectors
including energy. In 1975, the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) convinced ASEAN to create a
petroleum council (also known as ASEAN Council on
Petroleum - ASCOPE) that manages dedicated programs
towards promoting and coordinating energy research, and
addressing energy-related problems [1]. One of the plans
put forward by the ASCOPE is Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline
(TAGP) to connect gas infrastructures within Southeast
Asia. The first cross-border gas pipeline in the ASEAN
region was commissioned in 1991 to export gas from
Malaysia to Singapore [2]. Since then, several cross-border
gas pipelines have been constructed to support the regional
gas trades by connecting countries with more gas reserves
to countries that are short of gas reserves. New TAGP
connections are proposed to be built to increase the
interconnection capacity within ASEAN. The main source
of the TAGP supply will come from East Natuna, Indonesia.
Figure 1 shows the master plan of the TAGP project.
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are major LNG
exporters featuring several gas liquefaction facilities. LNG
regasification facilities can be found throughout the region,
even in the gas producing countries, such as Indonesia and
Malaysia. This is mainly due to their geography of scattered
gas from domestic gas fields that are far from domestic
demand centers. The LNG regasification facilities, then, are
solely used to regasify LNG from domestic production
supplies to meet domestic demands. However, in gas
producing countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, LNG
import activities also exist, probably to anticipate declining
gas supplies from domestic production or to meet their
growing gas demands. Both countries have secured a long-
term LNG import agreement, where Indonesia decided to
buy LNG from the U.S-based company, Cheniere, which
will be started in 2018 [3], and Malaysia from the
Norwegian company, Statoil [4].
Figure 2 shows the map of existing, under construction,
and planned LNG liquefaction and regasification facilities
in Southeast Asia. Singapore and Thailand, the net gas
exporters in the region have built regasification facilities to
anticipate declining imported pipelined gas supplies from
Indonesia and Malaysia in the case of Singapore, and from
Myanmar in the case of Thailand. In this research, the focus
will be on the seven ASEAN member states, excluding the
Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia, due to no (or little) gas
trading activities in those three countries. A more detailed
picture and technical specifications of the existing and
proposed gas pipelines and LNG infrastructures in the
region can be found in Appendix A.

*
Corresponding author
E-mail: yuliana.liu@gmail.com; yuliana@student.tudelft.nl
 2

Fig. 1. Map of Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline [5]

Fig. 2. LNG infrastructures in Southeast Asia [6]


Currently, the gas producing countries are facing
depleting gas resources. This leads to the research question
whether the current proposed plans of gas pipelines and
LNG infrastructures will be able to meet natural gas demand
and increase security of gas supply in the region until 2045.
A model-based approach will be used to answer this
research question. A gas network model consists of the
existing gas pipelines and LNG infrastructures in the region
will be built. The utilization and additional capacity
requirement of each gas infrastructure in each country are
then being measured. The results will be compared with the
proposed infrastructure options to see whether the proposed
options are sufficient to meet the additional capacity
requirements.
To the extent of the author’s knowledge, gas
infrastructure models have never been built for Southeast
Asia. Therefore, a review of gas network models built for
Europe and global world will be presented in section 2 in
order to understand the basic foundation or principle used in
the existing models, important assumptions, inputs, and
outputs of the models. The structure of the gas network
model built for Southeast Asia can be found in section 3.
The results of the model are presented in section 4,
distinguished based on two scenarios, Business-as Usual
(BAU) and reference scenario. The main difference
between these two scenarios is on the assumptions of
growth in the Indonesian gas production and consumption.
This is because the East Natuna gas field, which is the
determinant of the continuity of the TAGP is located in
Indonesia. Therefore, any decisions made by the Indonesian
government will significantly affect the development of the
Southeast Asian gas network. In section 5, an evaluation of
the TAGP and LNG infrastructure master plans will be
presented, together with a discussion regarding
independency of each Southeast Asian country to meet its
domestic gas demand based on its domestic gas supply, and
tradeoffs between security of gas supply and profit
maximization. Conclusions and further recommendations
can be found in section 6.
2. A review of gas network models
Several gas infrastructure or gas network models have
been built either at the European level, e.g. EUGAS [7],
GASTALE [8, 9], TIGER [10], or at a larger scale (global),
e.g. World Gas Trade Model (WGTM) from the Baker
Institute [11].
EUGAS model is based on a long-term, dynamic, and
inter-regional optimization model with an aim to optimize
the natural gas supplies at minimum costs. The model is
used to analyze the future European natural gas supply. The
model provides forecasts until 2030 (from 2005). The main
parameters in the model are European gas demand, supply
costs, and gas reserves. The model includes natural gas
infrastructures such as gas pipelines, liquefaction plants,
and regasification terminals. In EUGAS model, natural gas
demand and availability of resources are given exogenously.
The model does not only include European gas producers,
e.g. the Netherlands, Norway, UK, but also non-European
3
exporting countries, e.g. Algeria, Egypt, and Libya.
Production costs include investment costs and operating
costs which differ for each producing area. The results of
the model are forecasted investments in production and
transport capacities.
GASTALE model is calibrated at higher aggregation
level than EUGAS by grouping the European countries into
two groups, called EU15 and CEEC10 [9]. The model is
based on a recursive-dynamic game theoretic principle and
includes market participants such as producers, network
operators, storage operators, and consumers from various
sectors. The model produces a single wholesale price of gas
as a result of its market clearing. As inputs, the model
considers production capacity and marginal production
costs at each region and also capacity, investment costs, and
transportation costs for both pipeline and LNG
infrastructures. The model also includes capacities,
investment costs and operational costs of storage facilities
in both consumer regions. The results of the model are
wholesale gas prices from the market clearing until 2030,
security of supply level based on share of EU15 production
from the EU E15 consumption, and new investments needed
for storage (in EU15 and CEEC10), pipelines (connecting
exporting regions to importing regions), liquefaction
(exporting regions), and regasification facilities (in EU15
and CEEC10) from 2005 to 2030.
TIGER (Transport Infrastructure for Gas with Enhanced
Resolution) is a linear dispatch model to optimize natural
gas supply to all European countries. It provides enhanced
resolution because the model consists of elements from the
European Database of Gas Infrastructure (EDGIS) such as
more than 500 nodes and more than 650 pipeline sections
with their individual characteristics, e.g. diameter, pressure,
capacity, length, and owner. The model also includes gas
production in Europe and its neighboring countries (which
are aggregated to 17 production regions), non-European
production from four regions which enter the system
through LNG import terminals, more than 147 gas storage
facilities, at least 24 LNG terminals, 53 demand regions and
58 demand profiles distinguished by country and sector. The
results of the model are utilization of the capacities of each
infrastructure, i.e. pipelines, storage, and LNG facilities.
The WGTM model uses a principle of spatial and inter-
temporal equilibrium of the world market for natural gas
(also called a dynamic spatial general equilibrium model).
The use of the model is to calculate patterns of production,
transportation routes, and prices to equate both demands and
supplies with a main objective to maximize the present
value of producer rents, assumed that the markets are
competitive. The model uses similar inputs as the previous
models, however, including a larger scope, i.e. globally.
Based on the level of aggregation, the GASTALE model
is the highest because it groups the European countries into
two main groups. The WGTM model, although includes
most countries in the world, uses a lower aggregation by
identifying each gas infrastructure in each country. The
TIGER model has the lowest aggregation level with its 500
nodes, 650 pipeline sections, and more than 147 gas
storages in Europe.
 4

The earlier discussed models mostly share same kinds of
data needed, for example, gas reserves, gas production
volume, gas demand or consumption volume, capacity of
each gas infrastructure, including the investment
(construction) and the operating costs. Some models also
explicitly state which data are exogenously defined and
what assumptions are used in the model. This information is
very useful to build the gas infrastructure model in the
Southeast Asian region. Some models have gas prices as the
output of the model. However, this is less applicable in this
research because most trades are based on long-term
contracts and there is no gas hub or trading points that could
generate new gas prices. Therefore, instead of as an output,
the gas price will be included as a key parameter in the
model, and be referred to Japan-cif index because Japan and
other countries in Northeast Asian are the main destinations
for LNG exports from Southeast Asia.
3. GANESA model
countries. Inputs of the model consist of proven gas reserves
in each country that are based on the EIA database and IEA
report [6], production and consumption volumes based on
projections by the IEA [6], excluding Indonesia. Indonesian
production and consumption are based on the national
outlook document from the BPPT [12]. Long-term LNG
sales agreements are based on GIIGNL report [4]. The
minimum capacities of LNG exported from the liquefaction
plants are based on the historical gas trades data from BP
[13], while the maximum capacities for both liquefaction
plants and LNG terminals are based on a report published
by the IEA and ERIA [6]. The minimum capacities of the
cross border gas pipelines are based on the historical gas
trades data from BP [13] while the maximum capacities and
the long term pipelined gas contracts are gathered from the
project specific websites (e.g. [14], [15]).
Figure 3 shows the conceptualization of the model,
indicating the relations among the input variables.
Mathematical formulation of the model can be seen in
Appendix B.

GANESA model represents the existing GAs NEtwork LNG import

sources
Regasification
Cost
Proved
Reserves

in Southeast Asia, mainly its cross-border gas pipelines and Dummy Marginal
Production
LNG infrastructures, i.e. liquefaction plants and LNG shipping
Cost
Regasified
Capacity
Cost Dummy
Capacity
volume Production
regasification terminals. The function of the model is to find Volume Gas Pipeline
Operational

the optimal allocation of natural gas that goes through Imported

LNG Price
Cross-Border
pipelined gas
Cost

liquefaction facilities (for export), regasification facilities Domestic

Demand
(E/I)
(for import), and cross border gas pipelines (export/import) Pipelined
Domestic Liquefaction Gas Price
in each country. The model has also be able to capture Gas Price Cost
Liquefied
additional capacity requirement of each gas infrastructure. volume

This can be seen as a network flow problem and can be
solved with linear programming.
The GANESA model adopts higher level of aggregation
by adding up all capacities from the liquefaction plants and
regasification terminals located in each country. For the
cross-border gas pipelines, the capacities of gas pipelines
connecting the same countries are combined. This is done
to reduce the number of decision variables in the model
which otherwise will be unnecessary since the higher level
perspective (country-based) is already sufficient to provide
the results expected from the model.
3.1 Conceptualization
The time frame of the model is 2014 to 2045 (32 years).
The model will be developed as a linear dispatch
programing as in the TIGER model because the objective
function and constraints of the model are linear, and the
model also has no discrete decision variables. The objective
function of the model is to maximize cash-flow balance
(maximize profit or minimize loss) in all included countries
in the model as follows:
32 7 agreement (GSA) has its own pricing formula, although oil-
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: ∑ ∑ 𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑖 (1)
𝑡=1 𝑖=1
NCB is the abbreviation of net cash-flow balance, t
indicates number of years and i indicates number of
REVENUES Dummy Exported
Capacity LNG Price
COSTS
Exported
LNG
Fig. 3. Conceptual Model
3.2 Development of the model
3.2.1 Unit cost and gas price assumptions
Several cost assumptions including wellhead cost,
liquefaction cost, regasification cost, pipeline transmission
cost, and LNG shipping cost need to be made. In practice,
each gas infrastructure will have its own operating cost.
However, the data is confidential since it is about the
company performance and might disturb its
competitiveness. Therefore, it will be assumed that each
type of gas facilities in each country share the same unit cost
assumptions. The unit cost assumptions used in this model
can be found in [16].
In this model, the gas price will be assumed to be
exogenously known in advance, as a result of oil-linked
projection price. However, in practice, each gas sales
linked pricing mechanism is the most common in the Asian
GSA [17, 18]. In this model, it is assumed that there is a
single gas price based on Japan cif price, which will be used
as the import and export price for LNG and pipelined gas.
Japan cif price includes insurance and freight costs.
 5

Therefore, in the model, it is assumed that the exporters bear  The parameters of the GANESA model, e.g.
the cost of LNG shipping. BP provides a historical record of production level, domestic consumption growth,
Japan cif price [13]. However, extrapolation of Japan cif and extension of gas pipeline long-term contracts
price until 2045 is not available. To predict the future Japan are changed and the model could still run as
cif price, correlation of the historical data of the Japan cif expected.
price with Brent-oil index [19] will be observed. See [16]
for more detail of the regression analysis. Data validity refers to the accuracy of the data (real and
computer generated) and the data’s adequacy to build the
3.2.2 Scenarios model and conduct experiments to solve the problem [20].
Two scenarios will be run in the model, the BAU This requirement has been fulfilled because information
scenario and the Reference scenario. In the BAU scenario, about the model inputs and assumptions are based on the
gas production in Indonesia is assumed to decline after 2017 previous network models (see section 2) and the required
with a rate of 4.14% from 2018 to 2023 and 3.80% from data have been collected from various national (e.g. BPPT,
2023 to 2045 while the domestic gas consumption is SKK Migas, Pertamina, PGN) and international agencies,
assumed to grow at 2.20% per annum [12]. In this scenario, such as EIA, IEA, and BP Statistics.
Indonesia will not extend any long term gas export
contracts.
In the Reference scenario, the Indonesian gas production 4. Results
will grow constantly at 0.50% per annum. This is supported
by the historical trend of Indonesian gas production [13]. The results of the model could be looked from the two
The domestic consumption in this Reference scenario is scenarios. In each scenario, domestic gas production and
assumed to grow at 2.70% per annum according to the consumption, together with the utilization of the gas
BPPT estimates [12]. In the Reference scenario, it is pipelines and LNG infrastructures will be presented.
possible for Indonesia to export its gas and this could affect
the future plans of gas network expansion in its neighboring
countries, especially Singapore and Thailand because 4.1 Business-as-Usual Scenario
Indonesia could be their potential supplier.
4.1.1 Domestic gas production and consumption
Figure 4 shows the gas production and domestic
3.3 Verification and Validation consumption in six Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is
not included because it does not have any gas reserves and
First the model was built as a spreadsheet model using thus, there is no gas production activities in the country.
Ms. Excel in a single year and three years period.
Afterwards, with the same inputs and assumptions, the
model was built in MATLAB 2014b. The results then were
compared to see if the conceptual model has been correctly
translated into the computerized model. When the results of
the objective function and decision variables are same for
both the excel spreadsheet and Matlab script, the number of
years in MATLAB and other data inputs were increased
from 1 year, 3 years, to 32 years which is the time frame of
the model.
Operational validity is fulfilled when the output behavior
of the model has a satisfactory range of accuracy to serve
the intended purpose and applicability of the model [20]. As
the model is able to produce the results that were expected
by the author, it could be said that the model serves its
purpose. Comparing simulated and real data, sensitivity
analysis based on design of experiment and regression
analysis are techniques that could be used to validate the Fig. 4. Domestic gas production and consumption in BAU Scenario
model [21]. These techniques could be used to assess the
operational validity. Following steps are done to check the Based on this scenario, gas production from Malaysia
operational validity of the model. will surpass Indonesia’s production after 2020, given that
 The gas price is validated by comparing the result Malaysia could exploit all its potential gas reserves while
of the regression analysis with the actual data. The Indonesia does nothing to increase its production level.
differences then being measured as error Thailand who has been a net gas importer will continue to
measurement. It resulted in 1.20 of standard error. import gas either via pipelines from Myanmar or LNG from
With 95% confidence interval the gas price will various suppliers.
fall in -/+ 2.40 of the reference gas price.
 6

The production from Thailand’s gas fields is expected to production gets disrupted. Within the time frame of the
keep declining and finally be totally depleted after 2022 if model, Brunei does not need to build any regasification
the country fails to find new gas fields. Most producing terminal because its domestic gas production is still
countries show both a positive (at earlier periods) and sufficient to meet its domestic gas demand. Brunei also does
negative growth trend (at later periods). The declining not have any regasification terminal because its geography
growth trend is expected to happen within the time frame of is less scattered, unlike in the case of Indonesia and
the model, except for Vietnam. Vietnam shows a positive Malaysia.
growth trend within the time frame due to later development
of its gas fields. However, Vietnam will have to manage its Table 1
LNG infrastructures utilization based on BAU Scenario
production growth faster than the domestic consumption
Country & Capacity utilization at EOY (bcm)–BAU Scenario
growth otherwise the country will have to rely on import to LNG 2015 2025 2035 2045
supply the unmet demand from domestic supply. infrastructures
Indonesia
4.1.2 Cross-border gas pipelines Liquefaction 25.41 9.66 1 0
Regasification 0 5.33 20.70 20.70
As indicated in figure 5, pipelined gas contract from (+5.45) (+31.30)
Indonesia to Malaysia will expire in 2021 and to Singapore Malaysia
in 2023. Pipelined gas from Malaysia to Singapore will last Liquefaction 34.36 31.89 31.09 11.67
a bit longer, up to 2025. Afterwards, the scenario assumes Regasification 0.14 0.14 0.14 0
Brunei
that Singapore decides not to extend the pipeline contracts Liquefaction 8.45 8.68 8.90 2.97
and will rely on LNG import. Thailand
Regasification 6.35 6.90 6.90 6.90
(+42.29) (+55.78) (+65.65)
Myanmar
Liquefaction - - (+1.67) -
Regasification (+ 1.17) - - -
Vietnam
Liquefaction - (+0.14) (+0.53) (+1.01)
Regasification (+0.17) - - -
Singapore
Regasification 4.2 10.78 11.80 11.80
(+0.3) (+1.44) (+2.82)

Both Thailand and Singapore do not have any

liquefaction plants because both countries are net gas
Fig. 5. Cross-border gas pipelines in BAU Scenario
importers. If domestic gas consumption in Thailand keeps
Pipelined gas from Myanmar to Thailand will decline growing by 1.0%, Thailand will have to significantly
increase its regasification capacity. This is also due to
gradually because in practice, there are three pipeline
declining supply from Myanmar’s pipelined gas. Therefore,
connections from Myanmar to Thailand which have
Thailand really needs to strive to find new gas fields,
different dates of expiration. The last pipelined gas is from
otherwise the country will have to rely heavily on imported
Myanmar to China which has just started in operation at the
end of 2014 and the contract will last for 30 years. The LNG.
figure shows the pipeline could operate at its maximum The latest contract agreement between Indonesia and
Singapore requires Singapore to pay USD 17 per mmbtu for
capacity from 2030 to 2035, and will decline afterwards.
the pipelined gas. Singaporean analysts find that they could
get LNG import from the USA with a cheaper price than the
4.1.3 LNG infrastructures
current pipelined gas price. This has led Singapore to build
Based on the existing pattern of domestic gas production
in Indonesia, Indonesia will have to increase its a regasification terminal in Jurong in order to have more gas
supply alternatives and more bargaining power.
regasification terminal capacities, especially to manage the
Based on the results of the BAU Scenario, after the
imported LNG. This is caused by the declining gas
pipelined gas contracts from Indonesia expire, Singapore
production and growing domestic gas demand. Indonesia
will have to start increasing its regasification capacity after
will need to increase its regasification capacity after 2030.
2025, given the domestic gas consumption keeps growing
However, this should be done earlier considering the
utilization of the regasification terminals that also handle the by 1.0%. The country will face a harder challenge to become
Asian gas hub if it only relies on imported LNG. Adding
domestic LNG supply has not been included.
more capacity to its regasification terminal is not a simple
Table 1 shows the volume of natural gas processed at the
matter for Singapore because it has a very limited land
liquefaction and regasification facilities in the Southeast
availability. Therefore, getting pipelined gas supplies from
Asian countries. The number in bracket indicates additional
capacity requirement of each LNG facility. In the Malaysian its neighboring countries could be an alternative. Another
case, Malaysia does not need to increase its regasification option to increase its regasification capacity is building
floating storage and regasification facilities. However, it
capacity. The amount of imported LNG in Malaysia is quite
might be more costly compared to existing pipelined gas
small, mainly comes from its long-term contract with Statoil
supplies from Indonesia or Malaysia.
to be used as a back-up supply when its domestic gas

In the case of Myanmar, the need for LNG facilities are
relatively small and only for a short duration (+/- 5 years).
Therefore, it could be neglected. The government of
Myanmar could eliminate the needs by adjusting their
domestic gas production and consumption. While in the
case of Vietnam, it needs to import gas especially for the
first seven years or until the domestic gas production could
meet the required amount of gas for domestic consumption.
Afterwards, there is an opportunity for Vietnam to export its
excess of gas production if it could meet the expected
growth of consumption.
4.2 Reference Scenario
4.2.1 Domestic gas production and consumption
In this scenario, there is no change in the profile of
domestic gas production and consumption except for
Indonesia. Figure 6 shows the change of gas production and
consumption in Indonesia.
Fig. 6. Comparison of gas production and consumption in Indonesia
With a constant growth of 0.05% after 2017 as in the
Reference scenario, Indonesia will be able to meet its
domestic gas demand, at least until 2044. This will make the
country needs to reduce its gas export sales agreement or
even not export gas anymore after the existing long-term
contracts expired. This could be avoided if the country could
successfully manage its potential gas fields, e.g. in East
Natuna or Arafura Sea.
4.2.2 Cross-border gas pipelines
The Reference scenario assumes that both Indonesia and
Singapore agree to extend their pipelined gas contract as
long as the reserves are available. Figure 7 shows the gas
traded through the cross-border gas pipelines in the region.
Fig. 7. Cross-border gas pipelines in Reference Scenario
7
4.2.3 LNG infrastructures
Since the change is only at the Indonesian gas production
and domestic consumption, the results of other countries
LNG infrastructures’ capacity utilization remain the same.
In the Reference scenario, the capacity of the Indonesian
liquefaction facilities is more utilized compared to the BAU
scenario. While, for the regasification capacity, in the
Reference scenario, the imported LNG is only based on the
long-term contract with Cheniere that will be started from
2018 to 2037. From 2044 onwards, Indonesia will need to
import LNG because the domestic gas production will not
be able to meet the domestic gas demand anymore. The
utilization of LNG regasification terminal under the
Reference scenario, especially for import, is much lower
compared to the BAU scenario, and no additional capacities
are needed.
Table 2
LNG infrastructures utilization based on REF Scenario
Country & LNG Capacity utilization at EOY (bcm)–REF Scenario
infrastructures 2015 2025 2035 2045
Indonesia
Liquefaction 25.24 25.02 13 0
Regasification 0 1.12 0 2.84
Singapore
Regasification 4.2 8.78 11.24 11.80
(+2.82)
Table 2 summarizes the utilization of LNG facilities in
Indonesia and Singapore. Since Indonesian gas production
will constantly grow, Indonesia will be able to keep
supplying pipelined gas to Singapore. This scenario
assumes that the pipelined gas contract between these two
countries will be extended. As the result, the capacity
needed for regasification terminal in Singapore will
decrease. Figure 8 shows the comparison of the
regasification capacities used in Singapore according to the
BAU and Reference Scenario.
Fig. 8. Comparison of LNG regasification capacity in Singapore
The figure indicates that in the Reference Scenario,
Singapore will need a later time to expand its regasification
capacity, at least until 2040 (compared with 2025 in the
BAU scenario). In this scenario, there are also some
allowances for the Singaporean regasification capacity
which will bring more flexibility for Singapore to handle
more LNG import and re-distribute the LNG to other
countries who need it. This will support the goal of
Singapore to become an Asian gas hub, unlike in the BAU
scenario where the regasification capacity is not even
sufficient to fulfil its domestic consumption.

5. Discussion
In this section discussion related to the ability of the
TAGP and LNG infrastructure master plans to meet the
additional capacity requirements, the independency of each
ASEAN member state to meet its domestic gas demand, and
trade-offs between security of gas supply and profit
maximization will be presented.
5.1 TAGP and LNG infrastructures master plans
5.1.1 TAGP master plan
There are four proposed gas pipelines in the TAGP: to
Java (Indonesia), Erawan (Thailand), Kerteh (Malaysia),
and Vietnam [5]. However, considering the high content of
CO2 in the gas from East Natuna that reaches 71% [14], it is
less likely that the reserves will be able to supply the four
gas pipelines. In the BAU scenario, Indonesia will face
declining gas production. In this case, gas supply from East
Natuna will be crucial to meet Indonesian domestic demand
and reduce dependency on import. However, this also
indicates that the other three possible connections of gas
pipelines will be less likely to be built.
In the Reference scenario, on the other hand, gas supply
from East Natuna to demand centers in Indonesia (e.g. Java)
is not very crucial because gas production from other gas
fields will grow constantly and be able to meet domestic gas
demand until 2044. In this case, the Indonesian government
could still build a gas pipeline to Java with smaller capacity
than in the BAU scenario, and also build other gas pipeline
connections. The most likely to be executed is the gas
pipeline from East Natuna to Erawan because currently
PTTEP, the Thai state-owned gas company is in the East
Natuna consortium, together with Pertamina, ExxonMobil,
and Total. PTTEP replaced Petronas (Malaysian state-
owned gas company) that stepped out of the consortium in
2012 [22]. Therefore, the gas pipeline connection to
Malaysia is less likely to happen. Since Vietnam has also
found several gas fields and signed long-term agreements of
cooperation (similar with Production Sharing Contract)
with several multi-national gas companies, e.g. Gazprom
[23], the Vietnamese government seems to prioritize
developing its own gas fields than importing pipelined gas
from East Natuna.
5.1.2 LNG infrastructures master plan
According to the master plan of LNG infrastructures
development in the coming years [6], Indonesia has two
liquefaction projects and no regasification project because
the proposed regasification projects have all been
constructed in 2014. In both BAU and Reference scenario,
the liquefaction projects will be executed.
Currently, BP Berau, the operator of Tangguh field has
received environmental and social impact assessment
approval (AMDAL) from the Indonesian government and
announced its FEED contract to two ‘domestic’ consortiums
(as required in the contract). As published in BP press
release [24], BP and the Tangguh Partners signed a sales and
purchase agreement with Indonesian state owned electricity
8
company, PT. PLN, to supply 1.5 million ton per annum
(mtpa) LNG from 2015 to 2033.
In the case of Abadi gas field in the Arafura Sea, the
proposed plan is to develop the field with a floating
liquefaction facility (FLNG). However, both Inpex and
Shell (the contractor and shareholder of Abadi gas field) are
also looking for alternative options besides building FLNG
with 2.5 mtpa capacity. At first, the reserves in the block
was estimated to be 283.3 billion cubic meter (bcm), and
now, the proven and probable (2P) reserves is expected to
be 524.1 bcm [25]. This then leads Inpex and Shell to
consider alternative options, e.g. onshore LNG plant with a
larger capacity of 5 mtpa that could be expanded to 10 mtpa.
The final investment decision has not been made, but it is
more likely that the contractor will choose the alternative
option that offers larger capacity with smaller capital
expenditures. Besides these two liquefaction projects, there
is also a possibility to develop East Natuna gas field using
an onshore LNG plant. However, further feasibility study
needs to be conducted, especially to assess the economic
viability of the option.
In terms of regasification capacity, in the BAU scenario,
Indonesia will need to add several regasification terminals,
mainly to accommodate the needs for import. The required
amount indicated by the model has not included the capacity
used to regasify LNG from domestic supply.
The plans of both Malaysia and Vietnam to build
regasification terminals will be sufficient to secure gas
supply in the coming years. If Vietnam could successfully
develop its gas fields, it could consider to build a
liquefaction facility. Thailand and Singapore will need to
add more capacities to their regasification terminals due to
expiration of their pipelined gas contracts. The current plans
will not be sufficient to replace the pipelined gas supplies.
In the case of Singapore, due to the limitation of land
availability, it could consider to build floating regasification
facilities. In Both BAU and Reference scenario, Singapore
will have to increase its regasification capacity. The
difference is only at the time when the additional capacity
should be put in place, i.e. 2025 in the BAU scenario and
2040 in the Reference scenario. While for Thailand, the
additional capacity could be slightly lower if it could secure
long term pipelined gas contract from East Natuna. Another
option is to replace the use of natural gas with alternative
fuels. For example, Thailand could use renewable energy or
nuclear energy to replace natural gas as the fuel for its
electricity generation.
5.2 Independency
The independency level of each country could be
measured as a ratio of its domestic gas production to its
domestic gas consumption [26]. This could be an indicator
of security of gas supply in one particular country based on
the ability of its domestic gas production to meet its
domestic gas demand. According to the previous result of
the gas production and domestic consumption, excluding
the gas trades either via pipelines or LNG shipping, the

independency level of each country along the time frame of
the model is shown in figure 9.
Based on the figure, Thailand has the second lowest
independency level after Singapore that has no gas reserves
and will totally rely on import in 2023. With no new gas
field development as in the BAU scenario, Indonesia will
start to lose its independency in 2027. On the other hand,
according to the Reference scenario, Indonesia could still
maintain its independency until 2043. Vietnam has the
closest match between domestic gas supply and demand.
However, following a concern of security of gas supply, it
will be better if Vietnam could develop its gas fields faster
so that the independency level could increase above 1.0.
Fig. 9. Independency level in Southeast Asian countries
Both Malaysia and Brunei show a declining trend of
independency level due to a higher growth of their domestic
consumption compared to their gas production. However,
during the time frame of the model, their independency
levels are still above the standard line of 1.0. Myanmar
shows a positive trend of growth until 2035 and decline
afterwards. In practice, the independency level of Myanmar
is much lower because it has several pipelined gas export
contracts to Thailand and China.
The independency level provides an insight with respect
to country’s security of supply. Countries that have
independency level above 1.0 are able to meet their
domestic natural gas demands without imports. Any import
activities will make the buyer countries rely on supplier
countries and any disputes or tensions, not only between the
two countries, but also in the region where the countries
located (e.g. conflicts between the EU and Russia), could
hamper the natural gas supplies and might have a domino
effect to other sectors that rely on natural gas, e.g. chemical
industry, electricity generations.
Countries that have independency level below 1.0 need
to find a way to increase their security of supply, e.g.
through a long-term contract or investing in upstream
development in other countries. Considering pipelined gas
supplies from Indonesia will expire in 2023, Singapore
through Singapore’s Pavilion has put investments in
upstream gas fields development in Tanzania and Papua
New Guinea [18]. According to a report from the IEA
regarding the investment of Asian companies, Thai state-
owned companies, PTTEP invests in upstream gas field
development in Mozambique. Malaysia, with an
independency level above 1.0 also actively invests in
9
upstream development in several projects around the world,
e.g. Canada, Australia, and across the Africa continent,
notably in South Africa, Sudan and Egypt [18]. This
indicates the strategic moves of Petronas-Malaysia in order
to remain competitive in the international LNG market.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian gas company, Pertamina, has
only secured a long term contract to buy LNG from the US
and not actively involved in international upstream gas
projects. This might be due to several potential gas fields in
Indonesia that have not been developed or Pertamina will
probably be assigned to manage the existing gas fields (after
the expiration of the existing PSCs). There could be a shift
to a more aggressive strategy in the future because in 2013-
2014, Pertamina has acquired several oil field assets in
Algeria, Iraq, and Malaysia [27]. Other Asian countries,
especially the long-term buyers of Southeast Asian LNG,
i.e. Japan, Korea, and China, have put investments in the
US, Canada, Russia, Australia, and East Africa [18] to
anticipate declining gas supply from Southeast Asia.
5.3 Security of supply or profit maximization (from the
Indonesian perspective)
The main goal of the contractors or the gas companies is
to gain profit as much as possible. For the Indonesian
government as the host or owner of the gas fields, social
welfare through utilization of natural gas for domestic needs
is also important, and thus the government will have to
secure a long-term supply of natural gas. On the other hand,
especially for the Indonesian government, natural gas
together with oil contribute approximately one-fifth of the
nation’s income in 2014. This has happened for a long time
since oil and gas were first commercialized for export. As
the time goes, the domestic needs for oil and gas are
increasing and for the last decades the government has been
burdened by the oil subsidies heavily.
Several studies indicate that substituting oil with gas and
allocating more gas for domestic needs (e.g. for chemical
and fertilizer industries, to build new gas-fired power
plants) will offset the loss from gas export revenues and
even bring more benefits for the economic growth of the
country [28, 29]. The growth of domestic gas consumption
as in the BAU or Reference scenario depends on the
availability of distribution networks that could stimulate the
demand. For the last 10 years, the domestic gas
consumption growth of Indonesia is the lowest among the
other six ASEAN member states. Therefore, the
government should focus on developing its downstream gas
infrastructure.
PGN, the Indonesian state-owned gas network
(transmission and distribution) company actively refutes the
government’s intention to liberalize the national gas market.
PGN’s main argument is that it needs an assurance of both
gas supplies and gas demands to invest on gas
infrastructures [30], e.g. constructing both transmission and
distribution pipelines to ‘create and nurture’ the markets.
Allowing more players at the downstream and requirement
for third party access and unbundling will undermine PGN’s

business strategy which according to one senior official has
been proven to create a new demand center in West Java.
However, as have extensively been argued by the
supporters of market liberalization, liberalization is the only
way to bring more competition to the market, and
consequently, competition could bring the gas to the society
with a minimum cost and also secure or bring gas supplies
from other parts of the world. It is important to keep in mind
that the benefits from a more competitive market can only
be gained in a mature market, i.e. infrastructures have been
well developed, the investments to build the infrastructures
have depreciated and returns start to increase as the existing
infrastructures can be utilized at low marginal cost [31].
Therefore, in the case of the Indonesian government, when
the gas infrastructures are still lacking, it will be more
important to create a conducive business climate (bring
confidence) for the national companies such as Pertamina
and PGN to build the gas infrastructures. In other words, the
government should not liberalize the gas market until the
starting condition (i.e. mature market) for gas market
liberalization is achieved.
A caveat of this plan is the financial capability of the
Indonesian gas companies to build the gas infrastructures.
The government might want to accelerate the plans to
enhance the gas distribution network in Indonesia and the
state-owned gas companies might have limited financial
resources to fund and finish all of the projects within the
time constraint. This contains a political issue because one
period of the government regime in Indonesia lasts for five
years and the current government might want to attract
public sympathy in order to be elected again. Liberalization
of the gas market might attract more multi-national
companies or foreign investors to invest in Indonesia. They
are also more capable in terms of financial and human
resources to make the plans into action within the time
constraint. Another caveat is the political and economic
pressure either from the regional organizations (e.g.
ASEAN, ADB) or international organizations such as G-20,
IMF, or World Bank that might be more favorable if
Indonesia liberalizes its gas market. This then will depend
on the negotiation capabilities of the Indonesian
representatives to get the best or better deals for the country.
The problem of Indonesian gas market is not only at the
downstream side, but also upstream. Ideally, if both
Pertamina and PGN have confidence to develop the gas
fields by themselves, the government could choose not to
extend the existing PSC and award rights to develop the new
gas fields to one of the state-owned companies. This will
make the government achieving the goals of security of gas
supplies and also profit maximization as the government
could freely determine the gas allocation for domestic and
export. However, Pertamina and PGN seem to lack of
expertise to develop the offshore and stranded fields, e.g.
East Natuna and Abadi. This makes the government
becomes dependent on the multi-national gas companies to
develop those fields. Hence, the structure of the PSC,
especially profit sharing and contract duration will become
the main subjects of negotiations between the government
as the owner or host and the multi-national gas companies
as the contractors.
10
6. Conclusions
This article has presented a model of gas network
infrastructures in Southeast Asia. The use of the model is to
evaluate the ability of the TAGP and LNG infrastructures
master plans to meet natural gas demand in Southeast Asia
until 2045. Two scenarios have been analyzed to
accommodate the uncertainty in the Indonesian domestic
gas production and consumption. Overall, the two scenarios
indicate insufficiency of the current plans to achieve
security of gas supply, especially in Indonesia, Singapore,
and Thailand.
 According to the BAU scenario, Indonesian gas
production will decline after 2017. Consequently,
new regasification capacity (excluded capacity used
to handle domestic LNG supply) is needed to handle
imported LNG and needs to be put in place before
2033. This has not been accommodated in the current
LNG infrastructure expansion plan. In terms of the
TAGP, the East Natuna gas field should be used
mainly for domestic needs. Therefore, gas pipelines
connections from East Natuna to other countries will
not be favorable for Indonesia to build.
 Both Singapore and Thailand will also have to
increase their regasification capacities, especially
after the pipelined gas supplies from Indonesia and
Myanmar stop due to the expiration of the contracts.
These needs have not been captured in the current
LNG infrastructure expansion plan.
 In the Reference scenario, as the domestic gas
production of Indonesia will have a positive growth,
Indonesia does not need additional regasification
capacities to handle imported LNG.
 In the Reference scenario, it will be possible for
Indonesia to export gas to Singapore via existing gas
pipelines, e.g. South Sumatra-Singapore and West
Natuna-Singapore, or extend the connection from
East Natuna to West Natuna-Singapore gas pipeline.
 Indonesia could also export gas to Thailand by
constructing gas pipeline from East Natuna to
Erawan as in the TAGP plan. Other proposed gas
pipeline connections, i.e. to Malaysia and Vietnam
are less likely to be executed due to the limited
amount of gas reserves available after the CO2
removal. Another option is to export the East Natuna
gas in a form of LNG. This could be executed by
building an onshore LNG plant in Natuna Island.
Further research needs to be conducted especially to
know the feasibility of the plan.
 In the Reference scenario, the additional
regasification capacity requirement especially for
Singapore will be less, and the time when the
additional capacity need to be put in place also could
be deferred to 2040 (compared to 2025 in the BAU
scenario). However, this expansion plan has not been
included in the current Southeast Asian LNG master
plan. Another option, i.e. floating regasification and
storage might also be possible for Singapore,
considering its limited land availability.

Following policy recommendations are addressed to the Reference
Indonesian government:
[1]
 The Indonesian government should put off the plan
to liberalize the national gas market because the gas
market in Indonesia has not been mature yet. The
downstream gas infrastructures are still lacking and [2]
thus, requirements for unbundling will only [3]
slowdown the downstream infrastructure
development. This will potentially hinder the
government’s plan to enlarge the domestic gas
[4]
market. As the result, the domestic consumption
growth might be far less than the predictions. [5]
However, if the Indonesian government is forced to
liberalize (i.e. external political or economic
pressure), the main priority should be developing the [6]
downstream gas infrastructures first, followed by [7]
institutions reform or de-regulation.
 The government should carefully manage its PSC
[8]
structure (trade-offs between security of supply and
profit maximization) especially at difficult project
locations where the state-owned company, i.e. [9]
Pertamina, does not have the ability to develop the
fields (e.g. East Natuna gas field). A consortium [10]
could support Pertamina to gain technology learning
from other multi-national gas companies in the
consortium. In this case, Pertamina should not be
[11]
passive, and could take a role as a co-operator to
develop the difficult fields in order to gain
experiences and learning.
There are several limitations of the model, especially [12]
regarding the unit costs and gas price assumptions. When [13]
the information is available, the unit costs could be assigned [14]
differently based on each gas infrastructure location. The
gas prices could also be based on the actual price setting
[15]
formula in each gas sales agreement.
Further improvement could be made by disaggregating
the model, i.e. infrastructure-based instead of country-based [16]
as the current model. By disaggregating the model, the
results could indicate additional capacity requirement of [17]
each facility at each location to see whether: expansion is
possible, a new facility needs to be built, functional
switching (e.g. Arun liquefaction plant was converted or [18]
switched to a regasification facility due to depletion of gas [19]
reserves near the plant) or even abandoning the facility.
Geological data of the gas fields could be included in the
model to better estimate the production trend and the rest [20]
amount of reserves available. Gas storages could also be [21]
included in the model when more data is available. There is
also an opportunity to include potential LNG buyers or
suppliers into the model. This could be applied together with [22]
the infrastructure-based model, taking into account the
distance from the supply sites to the buyers’ locations.
Furthermore, the research could be extended by [23]
evaluating each infrastructure option of the TAGP and LNG
master plans to see the feasibility of the project, taking into [24]
account the PSC structure (including cost recovery scheme,
profit sharing, and tax obligation), volatility of oil-linked
gas prices and capital expenditures to build the
infrastructures.
11
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Appendix A

Table A1. Existing LNG Liquefaction Facilities in Southeast Asia [6]

Capacity
Country Project (Location) Status Start
mmtpa Bcm/y
Brunei Brunei LNG 7.2 9.8Operating 1972
Bontang (East Kalimantan) 21.6 29.4
Operating 1978
Arun* (Aceh) 4.8 6.4Operating 1978
Tangguh LNG (Papua) 7.6 10.3
Operating 2009
Indonesia
Donggi-Senoro 2.0 2.7Construction 2014
(Central Sulawesi)
Sengkang (South Sulawesi) 2.0 2.7 Construction 2014
MLNG I, II, III (Bintulu) 24.2 32.9 Operating 1983
Malaysia ~ expansion 3.6 4.9 Construction 2015
Kanowit FLNG (Sarawak) 1.2 1.6 Construction 2015
*The Arun LNG terminal is being converted from a liquefaction unit to a regasification unit

Table A2. Existing LNG Regasification Facilities in Southeast Asia [6]

Capacity
Country Project (Location) Status Start
mmtpa Bcm/y
West Java FSRU 3.7 5.2 Operating 2012
Lampung FSRU 2.0 2.8 Construction 2014
Indonesia Arun (Aceh) 1.5 2.1 Construction 2014
Banten FSRU 3.0 4.1 Construction 2014
Central Java FSRU 3.0 4.1 Construction 2014
Malaysia Lekas (Malacca) 3.8 5.2 Operating 2013
Jurong Island 3.5 4.7 Operating 2013
Singapore
~ expansion 5.3 7.1 Construction 2014
Thailand Ma Ta Phut 5.0 6.9 Operating 2011
Table A3. Existing Cross-Border Pipelines in Southeast Asia
(Data from various sources)

In
No. operation From To Length (km) Other Information
since
1. 1991 Malaysia Singapore 5 24 inch; 155MMCFD (max. 250MMCFD), a part of Peninsular gas
(Segamat - Peninsular) pipelines project; 20 years (until 2011)
2. 1999 Myanmar Thailand 410 36inch; 200MMCFD (max. 500MMCFD) (since 2010, additional pipeline
(Yadana) to Yangon, Myanmar with a capacity of 150MMCFD); reserves 5.3 tcf; 30
years (until 2025)
3. 2000 Myanmar Thailand 277 24 inch; 260 MMCFD (max. 300MMCFD); reserves 3.2 tcf; 30 years
(Yetagun) (until 2027)
4. 2001 Indonesia Singapore 654 28 inch; 325MMCFD; 22 years (until 2023)
(West Natuna) (Jurong)
5. 2001 Indonesia Malaysia 96 22 inch; 250 MMCFD (max.300 MMCFD); 20 years; (until 2021)
(West Natuna) (Duyong)
6. 2002 CAA* Malaysia 170 24inch; 270 MMCFD
7. 2003 Indonesia Singapore 468 28 inch; 350 mmscfd; 20 years (until 2023)
(South Sumatra)
8. 2007 CAA* Vietnam 330 18inch, 120 MMcfd
9. 2005 JDA** Thailand 390MMCFD, 35 years ( 5 years exploration, 5 years retention, 5 years
development, 20 years production)
55km-28inch + 277km-34inch, max 1,020mmscfd
10. 2006/2007 Malaysia Singapore 4 115 MMCFD, 18 years (until 2025)
11. 2009 JDA** Malaysia 96.5 36 inch onshore, max. 750MMSCFD
12. 2013 M9 Thailand 300 230km offshore and 70km onshore; 28 inch; max.300MMSCFD; reserves
1.8-2.5tcf
Table A4. Planned LNG Liquefaction and Regasification Facilities [6]
Capacity
Country Project (Location) Status Start
mmtpa Bcm/y
Liquefaction Facilities
Indonesia ~ expansion LNG Tangguh 3.8 5.2 Planned 2018
Abadi FLNG (Arafura Sea) 2.5 3.4 Planned 2016
Malaysia Rotan FLNG (Sabah) 1.5 2.0 Planned 2016
Regasification Facilities
Malaysia Lahad Datu (Sabah) 0.8 1.1 Planned 2016
Pengerang (Johor) 3.8 5.2 Planned 2017
Thailand ~ expansion Ma Ta Phut 5.0 6.9 Planned 2017
Vietnam Thi Vai 1.0 1.4 Planned 2016
Bin Thuan 3.0 4.1 Planned 2018

Table A5. Planned Cross-Border Pipelines [5]

No. From To Length (km)
1. East Natuna (Indonesia) JDA-Erawan (Thailand) 1500
2. East Natuna (Indonesia) Kerteh (Malaysia) 600
3. East Natuna (Indonesia) Jawa (Indonesia) 1400
4. East Natuna (Indonesia) Vietnam 900
Appendix B

The objective function in this model is to maximize cash-flow balance or revenue in all included
countries in the model.
32 7

𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: ∑ ∑ 𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑖
𝑡=1 𝑖=1

𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚,𝑡 ;

Where:
NCB means net cash-flow balance; CB means cash-flow balance; i = index of countries;
m = index of cross-border pipelines; t = years
CBi = domestic revenue – production cost + lng_export_revenue – (lng_liquefaction_cost +
LNG_shipping_cost + LNG_import_cost + LNG_regasification_cost)

 domestic_revenue i = domestic_gas_price * domestic_consumption i

 production_cost i = wellhead_price * production_volume i
 lng_export_revenue i = single_gas_price * (lng_export i + lng_export_dummy i )
 total_liquefaction_cost i = liquefaction_cost * lng_export i + (liquefaction_cost + k) *
lng_export dummy i
 lng_import_cost i = single_gas_price * (lng_import i + lng_import_dummy i )
 total_regasification_cost i = regasification_cost * lng_import i + (regasification_cost + k) *
lng_import_dummy i
 total_shipping_cost i = shipping_cost * (lng_import i + lng_import_dummy i )
Assumed to be paid by producer or exporting countries because the gas price refers to Japan-
CIF index

Pipeline transaction
Exporting country will gain revenues as follows:
single_gas_price * ( pipeline_volume m + pipeline_volume_dummy m ) - transmission_cost *
pipeline_volume m – (transmission_cost + k) * pipeline_volume_dummy m

Importing country will pay costs as follows:

single_gas_price * ( pipeline_volume m + pipeline_volume_dummy m )

Decision variables:
 Volume gas transmitted via pipeline (5 variables)
P12, P17, P27, P54, P58 (next will be called pipeline m, where m is from 1 to 5)
Index: P12  pipeline from 1 to 2
Country index: 1 = Indonesia; 2 = Malaysia; 3 = Brunei; 4 = Thailand; 5 = Myanmar;
6 = Vietnam; 7 = Singapore; 8 = China
 Volume LNG exported (7 variables)
 Volume LNG imported (7 variables)
 Dummy variable (or capacity needed) for existing transmission pipeline (5 variables)
 Dummy variable (or capacity needed) for export through liquefaction facilities (7 variables)
 Dummy variable (or capacity needed) for import through regasification facilities (7 variables)
The constraints are (for all i, m, t) :
 balancing_volume = 0,
where balancing_volume = production_volume + lng_import + lng_import_dummy – (
domestic_consumption + lng_export + lng_export_dummy ) +/- pipeline_volume and
pipeline_volume_dummy
 lng_export > = min_export_capacity (based on historical & existing long-term contract)
 lng_export < = max_export_capacity (based on existing liquefaction capacity)
 lng_import < = max_import_capacity (based on existing regasification capacity)
 pipeline_volume > = min_pipeline_capacity (based on historical & existing long-term contract)
 pipeline_volume < = max_pipeline_capacity (based on existing pipeline capacity)
 proved_reserves > = 0

Set:

 i = ncountries (i = 1,…,7)
 t = nperiods (t = 1,…,32)
 m = pipeline route (m = 1,…,5)

Table B1. Data Library of GANESA Model

Exogenous variables Size [row, column] Unit in the model
single_gas_price [nperiods, 1] USD/bcm
liquefaction_cost [nperiods, 1] USD/bcm
regasification_cost [nperiods, 1] USD/bcm
shipping_cost [nperiods, 1] USD/bcm
transmission_cost [nperiods, 1] USD/bcm
domestic_gas_price [ncountries, nperiods] USD/bcm
wellhead_price [ncountries, nperiods] USD/bcm
production_volume [ncountries, nperiods] bcm
domestic_consumption [ncountries, nperiods] bcm
Constraints (lower and upper bounds)
min_export_capacity [ncountries, nperiods] bcm
max_export_capacity [ncountries, nperiods] bcm
max_import_capacity [ncountries, nperiods] bcm
min_pipeline_capacity [npipelines, nperiods] bcm
max_pipeline_capacity [npipelines, nperiods] bcm
Decision variables (for each i, t, and m)
lng_export [1, nperiods] bcm
lng_export_dummy [1, nperiods] bcm
lng_import [1, nperiods] bcm
lng_import_dummy [1, nperiods] bcm
pipeline_volume [1, nperiods] bcm
pipeline_volume_dummy [1, nperiods] bcm