CRISOLOGO-JOSE VS.

LBP

GR. 167399

June 22, 2006

Ponente: CANCIO C. GARCIA, Associate Justice

FACTS:

Petitioner is the owner of hectares of land which used to form part of

a larger expanse situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by a
TCT. She is also the owner of several parcels of land situated in the
same municipality and covered by 12 separate titles. According to the
petitioner, respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) gave these
landholdings – which she inherited from her uncle Lim – a measly
valuation of P9,000.00 per hectare (regarding implementation of the
agrarian reform program which partakes of the exercise of the power
of eminent domain)

Excepting from the valuation purportedly thus given, petitioner filed,

a PETITION for determination of just compensation respecting her
landholdings aforementioned. It appears that in the midst of
petitioner’s presentation of her evidence, the trial court admitted
LBP’s ANSWER.The trial court, after due proceedings, rendered
judgment fixing the fair market value of the land in question.

Following the denial of its MR, respondent LBP went on appeal to

the CA. Eventually, the CA reversed that of the trial court. In time,
petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion.
Hence this petition for review under Rule 45, on both procedural and
substantive grounds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in admitting respondent’s answer.

HELD:

The petition is without merit

NO

On the procedural angle, petitioner faults the appellate court for

relying on and lending credence to the allegations and defenses that
respondent averred in its answer which it filed beyond the 15-day
period prescribed under Section 1, Rule 11 of the ROC. Petitioner also
blames the trial court for admitting, instead of expunging from the
records, said answer and for not declaring the respondent in default.
To admit or to reject an answer filed after the prescribed period is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In fact, Section 11,
Rule 11 of the Rules authorizes the court to accept answer though filed
late, thus:

SECTION. 11. Extension of time to plead. – Upon motion and on such

terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided
in these Rules.

The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other
pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules.

And as Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher

Education teaches, an answer should be admitted where it had been
filed before the defendant was declared in default and no
prejudice is caused to the plaintiff, as here. Indeed, petitioner
has not demonstrated how the admission by the trial court of
respondent’s answer was prejudicial to her case which, at bottom,
involves only the determination of the fair market value of her
property.

Given Indiana Aerospace and other related cases cited therein

virtually all of which is one in saying that default orders should be
avoided, petitioner’s lament about the trial court not declaring the
respondent in default for alleged belated filing of answer should be
denied cogency.

What is more, a declaration of default, if proper, shall not

issue unless the claiming party asked for it. As we said in
Trajano vs. Cruz, applying what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court “the court cannot motu proprio declare a party in default.” In
the words of Justice Regalado “there must be a motion [for a
declaration of default] by the plaintiff with proof of failure by the
defendant to file his responsive pleading despite due notice.”

Not lost on the Court, of course, is the fact that petitioner, after
securing the desired ruling from the trial court, never brought up the
matter of respondent’s belated filing of an answer before the CA.
Needless to belabor, issues not raised below cannot, as a rule, be
raised for the first time before the Court.