V.
Competence and Diligence It is the duty of counsel to check with the court
GALVEZ VS. CA
Facts:
The petitioner Jose Galvez was indicted for the crime of
estafa. The trial of the case was a protracted one,
spanning a period of more than two years, interspersed
by several postponements.
On February 6, 1962, when the prosecution’s case came
to a close, the defense forthwith requested the trial
court for two weeks’ time within which to ready its own
case. The request was denied on the ground that the
court had previously ‘Ordered a day-to-day hearing until
termination of the trial.
As a result of the failure of the defense to present its
case, the court ordered Galvez to appear on the
following day for pronouncement of judgment.
The defense filed a written motion for reconsideration ;
this was denied in open court.
The judgment of the trial court was then read,
convicting the petitioner Galvez of the crime charged
and sentencing him accordingly.
The petitioner argues, he was not able to anticipate the
arrival of his turn to present his defense and could not
have readied himself for it. Second, it is pointed out
that, in any event, the accused had no notion that the
prosecution would close its case on February 6, 1962,
and he would need no less than two weeks from that
time to organize his evidence and secure, by court
process or otherwise, the attendance of his witnesses
or the production of essential documents.
Issue:
Whether the lower court’s rejection of the petitioner’s
motion for a two-week postponement following the
arrival of his turn to present his evidence is here
assailed as unreasonable and as amounting to a denial
of his right to be heard.
Held:
respecting the outcome of the hearing at which he
failed to appear. In the absence of any claim to the
contrary, it is to be presumed that this he did in the
exercise of the diligence required of him as an officer of
the court.
As to the claim that the petitioner was deprived of the
opportunity to prepare his defense thru the denial of
his motion for postponement, we agree with the
respondent Court of Appeals that two years were more
than enough time for this purpose. The case is one of
estafa, and the transaction involved therein is not a
complicated one. The accused could be properly
expected to anticipate, before his turn came, what
course his defense would ultimately take and what
evidence would be required.
EDQUIBAL VS FERRER
JAVELLANA VS LUTERO
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo (CC 6425) dismissing a petition for
relief directed against the judgment rendered by the
municipal court of Iloilo City in its civil case 7220.
On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against Elpidio
Javellana with the municipal court of Iloilo City,
presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing, originally
set for April 30, 1963, was postponed to May 24 for
failure of the defendant to receive summons, and then
postponed again to June 27 for the same reason. It was
thereafter postponed to July 16, then to July 24, and
finally to August 27, all at the behest of the defendant's
Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he has not
finished his business transactions in Manila" and that
"he hurt his right foot toe." The last postponement was
granted by the municipal court with the warning that no
further postponement would be entertained.
When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963,
neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty. Hautea
appeared although one Atty. Romy Peña who was
present in court verbally moved for the postponement
of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in
Manila attending to a business transaction. The verbal
motion for postponement was denied and the plaintiff
was directed to adduce his evidence. The trial
proceeded nevertheless, and, on the basis of the
plaintiff's evidence, the court on the same date
rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the
defendant. The latter's counsel received a copy of the
decision on September 9, 1963. On the following
September 11, he filed a motion to set aside judgment
and for new trial. This motion was denied on September
26; a copy of the order of denial was received by him on
the same date.
On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days later, the
defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for
relief praying that the decision in question be set aside,
that the detainer case be set for trial on the merits, and,
pending determination of the petition, that an
injunction issue restraining the enforcement of the
decision.
the municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the
trial in his absence and that of his client, allowed the
private respondent to present his evidence ex parte,
and rendered a decision against the petitioner, thus
depriving the latter of his day in court.
This petition was given due course, the respondents
were required to file their answers, and a cease-and-
desist order was issued as prayed for. On February 22,
1964, after due hearing, the Court of First Instance
rendered judgment dismissing the petition.1äwphï1.ñët
ISSUE: WON the rendered decision will be set aside.
HELD: From the perspective of the environmental
circumstances obtaining in this case, the present appeal
is palpably devoid of merit.
A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by
mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and with due
regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty
bound to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate
speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a
detainer case, such as the one at bar, even if the issues
are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious
that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been
remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was
postponed at the behest of the said counsel. The last
postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the
unequivocal admonition by the judgment that no
further postponement would be countenanced. The
case was reset for hearing on August 27, 1963, which
means that the appellant's counsel had more than a
month's time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to
obviate a conflict between his business transactions and
his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither
he nor the appellant appeared at the trial. His absence
on the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some
other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and
justifiably prevented him from appearing in court.
In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said
counsel, under the circumstances, to give preferential
attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the
municipal court as a mere marionette that must ever
await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is
censurable as it reveals more than just a modicum of
disrespect for the judiciary and the established
machinery of justice.
Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by the
appearance in court on August 27 of another attorney
who verbally moved for postponement nor by his
telegram received by the municipal judge on the same
date asking for continuance. These circumstances, upon
the contrary, emphasize his presumptuousness vis-a-vis
the municipal judge.
It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing disquisition
that the petitioner-appellant was not deprived of his
day in court, and that the respondent municipal judge
did not err in proceeding with the trial, allowing the
private respondent to present his evidence ex parte,
and thereafter rendering decision for the plaintiff-
appellee. It follows that the petitioner was not entitled
to the remedy of a petition for relief.
ACHACOSO VS CA
Facts:
Upon the filing on December 15, 1972 of the petition at
bar for review of the Court of Appeals' decision
dismissing petitioner's petition for, the Court per its
resolution of December 22, 1972 required respondents
to comment thereon.
Respondents filed on February 8, 1973 an extensive
eighteen page comment and petitioner's counsel,
Rodrigo M. Nera, filed on February 12, 1973 a motion
for leave to file reply within 15 days from notice.
On the last day for filing of the reply, viz, March 14,
1973 counsel asked for an additional 15 days. The Court
granted the requested extension per its resolution of
March 20, 1973.
On the last day of the extended period for filing of the
reply, viz, March 29, 1973 counsel again asked for still
another 15-day extension stating that "due to the
pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial
engagements of the undersigned counsel, he has not
had sufficient material time to complete the
preparation of petitioners reply. The undersigned
counsel humbly apologizes that in view of his crowded
schedule, he has been constrained to ask for this
extension, but respectfully assures the Honorable Court
that this will be the last one requested.' The Court
granted such extension for the third and last time.
The period for the filing of petitioner's reply lapsed on
April 13, 1973 without counsel having filed any reply
manifestation explaining his failure to do so.
Court in its resolution of May 24, 1973 denying the
petition for review for lack of merit, further required
petitioner's counsel to show cause why discipline
action should not be taken against him for failure to
file the reply after having obtained such leave and
three extensions time within which to do so.
Issue: Whether or not Counsel is liable for repeatedly
asking extension to file their pleadings and letting the
period lapse without submitting pleading or even an
explanation or manifestation of their failure to do so.
Held: Yes. According to Petitioner’s counsel, his inability
to submit the reply within the extension granted by this
Honorable Court was due to supervening
circumstances, furthermore Atty. Rodrigo Nera
apologized for such incident, which after all were due to
causes and circumstances beyond his control.
However, according to the Supreme Court he could
have filed timely the necessary manifestation that he
was foregoing the filing of such reply on petitioner's
behalf. His inaction unduly delayed the Court's prompt
disposition of the case after the filing by respondents of
their comments.
Counsel readily perceived in his explanation that his
conduct comes close to delaying the administration of
justice and trifling with the Court's processes. It does
not reflect well on counsel's conduct as an officer of the
Court that after assuring the Court that the third
extension requested by him "in view of his crowded
schedule" and "of urgent professional work and daily
trial engagements" would be the last within which
period he would at last file the awaited reply, for him
thereafter to let the period simply lapse without any
explanation whatsoever, and worse, to wait to be found
out, and have the Court require him to explain. Atty.
Nera is hereby reprimanded.
ROXAS VS CA
Facts: Maguesun filed an Application for Registration of
2 parcels of unregistered land. They presented a Deed
of Absolute Sale, executed by vendor, Zenaida Melliza.
Zenaida in turn, bought the property from the
petitioner months earlier, as evidenced by said deed
and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land
Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon
Luna on the basis of Maguesun’s application for
registration. Since Roxas was not named as an adjoining
owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent
a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in
the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly.
After an Order of default was issued, RTC proceeded to
hear registration case. Later, the LRA reported, that the
subject parcels of land had previously been applied for
registration by petitioner but no decision has been
rendered thereon. Eventually, RTC granted Maguesun’s
application. Consequently,RTC dismissed the
petitioner’s application for registration. It was only
when the caretaker of the property was being asked to
vacate that petitioner learned of its sale and
registration of the lots in Maguesun’s name.
Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review before the
RTC, to set aside the decree of registration on the
ground that Maguesun committed actual fraud.
Contentions: lots were among the properties she
inherited; her family had been in open, continuous,
adverse and uninterrupted possession in the concept of
owner for more than 30 years before they applied for
its registration. Further denied that she sold the lots to
Zenaida whom she had never met before; her signature
was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication. Additionally, she claimed that
Maguesun intentionally omitted her name as an
adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the
application for registration submitted to the LRA such
that the lattercould not send her a Notice of Initial
Hearing. As result, an order of general default was
issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for
registration was granted.
RTC: dismissed petition for review of decree of
registration; concluded that the documents were not
forged. Also, Maguesun did not commit actual fraud.
CA: denied the petition and affirmed RTC. Held that
petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was actual
or extrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of
annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of
registration. Additionally, stated that the discrepancies
or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or
obvious, involve matters that are too trivial. Finally,
ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
Issue: w/n CA erred in ruling that Maguesun did not
commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the
registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the
basis of Maguesun’s good faith.
Held: yes, SC ruled there is actual fraud.
Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System
pursuant to PD 1529 “Adjudication of land in a
registration Case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after
the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the
decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which
court after hearing, may set aside the decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another party. Xxxx
However, the right of a person deprived of land or of
any estate or interest therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is
recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for
reopening and revising a decree of registration. Xxxx”
Fraud is of 2 kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or
positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception
practiced by means ofthe misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is
construed as a fraud because of its detrimental
effectupon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done or
committed with an actual design to commit positive
fraud or injury upon other persons.
Petitioner contended that Maguesun intentionally
omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as
having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject
property. In the corporation's application for
registration filed with the trial court, the following
declaration appears:
“6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as
known to the undersigned, of the owners of all
adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in
paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and
occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as
claimants are as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil. Leon Luna. Provincial Road all at
Tagaytay City (no house No.)"
The highlighted words are typed in with a different
typewriter, with the first five letters of the word
"provincial" typed over correction fluid. In the copy
submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same
number is as follows: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna,
Roxas. The discrepancy which is unexplained appears
intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed erased and
replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no
house No.)" in the original application submitted but
the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted to the
trial court it is reasonable to assume that the reason is
to mislead the court into thinking that "Roxas" was
placed in the original application as an adjoining owner,
encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same
application which formed the basis for the LRA in
sending out notices of initial hearing. Sec 15 of PD 1529
requires the applicant for registration to state the full
names and addresses of all occupants of the land and
those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known,
the extent of the search made to find them.
Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with
this requirement of law.
(Relevant part to “duty to apprise counsel”)
The CA held that pursuant to PD 1529, publication inthe
Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said
provision of law expressly states that "the
Commissioner of Land Registrationshall cause a notice
of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in thePhilippines. Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x"
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court,
publication in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation
remains an indispensable procedural requirement.
Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of
procedural dueprocess and aimed at giving "as wide
publicity as possible" so that all persons having an
adverse-interest in the land subject of the registration
proceedings may be notified thereof. Although
jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that
publication was not made in a newspaper of general
circulation is material and relevant in assessing the
applicant's right or title to the land.
In the case, Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing
was made in the Official Gazette and in the Record
Newsweekly, not a newspaper of general circulation.
Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation
and possession should be made at the appropriate time,
i.e., at the time of the application for registration,
otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent
notices of the initial hearing and Through such
misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the
registration proceedings involving their property, thus
effectively depriving them of their day in court.
ALCALA VS DE VERA
FACTS: Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty.
Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case. On April
17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.
On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the
adverse decision. Atty. De Vera failed to inform Alcala
about the adverse decision. On July 17, 1963, the court
sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution. That
was the only time when Alcala learned that he lost. And
because of Atty. De Vera’s failure to inform him of the
adverse decision, the period within which Alcala can
appeal his case had already lapsed.
As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil case
against Atty. De Vera in order to collect damages as he
averred that he sustained damages due to Atty. De
Vera’s negligence. The court however ruled that Alcala
is not entitled to damages. Unfettered, Alcala filed a
disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be
disbarred because of his failure to update his client of
the status of the case.
HELD: No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is
true that Atty. De Vera had been remiss in his duties as
counsel for Alcala because he failed to update him of
the status of the case, however, it appears that Alcala
did not sustain any damage by reason of such
negligence. But this is not to say that Atty. De Vera can
go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will only
serve as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court
found Atty. De Vera guilty of simple negligence and he
was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De
Vera’s failure to notify his clients of the decision in
question manifests a lack of total dedication or
devotion to the client’s interest expected of Atty. De
Vera under the lawyer’s oath.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all
negligence by counsel entitles the client to collect
damages from the negligent lawyer.
VI. Representation with zeal within legal bounds
FORONDA VS GUERRERO
PENA VS APARICIO
FACTS:
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is the legal counsel for
Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case. Hufana
is praying for claim for separation pay, but Pena
rejected the claim as baseless. On August 2005,
Aparicio sent a letter reiterating his client’s claim
for separation pay, threatening him with charges of
tax evasion and falsification of documents, if the
separation pay demanded by the former’s client
was not paid. The letter contains the following BUT
if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be
constrained to file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages to the tune of millions
under established precedence of cases and laws. In
addition to other multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income
not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due
to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of
failure to pay the above amounts as settlements in
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Respondent states that there was nothing wrong
with what he did, implying that he was pointing out
massive violations of the law by the Fernando
Pena, and that he was obligated, as a lawyer to tell
the truth. However, it is quite clear from the letter
given to Pena, that there was threat intended.
ISSUE:
WON Aparicio violated Canon 19 (and 19.01) of the
CPR, enjoining every lawyer to represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law?
Rule 19.01. A lawyer shall employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.
HELD:
YES. Under Canon 19, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal
case or cases against the adversaries of his client
designed to secure leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases
against the lawyer's client
In the case at bar, the threats are not only
unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also
amount to blackmail. Blackmail is "the extortion of
money from a person by threats of accusation or
exposure or opposition in the public prints,
obtaining of value from a person as a condition of
refraining from making an accusation against him,
or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to
his prejudice." The letter in this case contains more
than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains
a threat to file retaliatory charges against
complainant which have nothing to do with his
client's claim for separation pay. Indeed, letters of
this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
It was not respondent's intention to point out
complainant's violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even
contains an implied promise to "keep silent" about
the said violations if payment of the claim is made
on the date indicated.
While the writing of the letter went beyond ethical
standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a
penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering
that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness
to protect his client's interests. Accordingly, the
more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
MILLARE VS MONTERO
In a separate case for inhibition of judge
Paas in a criminal case, it was found that Juge Paas’
husband, Atty. Paas, who is a private petitioner,
was using his wife’s address in his law practice,
particularly in a criminal case he was handling
which was docketed a an RTC also in Pasay. In
support of this charge, documents were submitted
such as 1.) a notice of appeal signed by Atty. Paas
and 2.) notices from Pasay RTC, and from Supreme
Court.
This was admitted by Judge Paas, but she
claims that this was done only to ensure and
facilitate the delivery of those notices.

PAAS VS ALMARVEZ ISSUE: WON Judge Paas and Atty. Paas should be
penelized for allowing the latter to use the office of
FACTS: Pasay MTC Judge Paas administratively
the former as his return address in his private
charged Almarvez, a court utility worker, with
practice.
dishonesty to his fellow employees, neglect in
performing duties, and solicitation of money. RULING: YES. Using the judge’s address is a subtle
was sending a message that Atty. Paas is the
The court found that the aforementioned
husband of a judge in the same building and jould
charges were not supported by evidence since
be given special treatment by other judges or court
those who filed affidavits as evidence against
personnel. In SC Admin N. 01-99, it was stated that
Almarvez were not presented at the hearings. The
the court officials and employees must “never use
only offense which Almarvez was found to commit
their offices. for any other purpose that for court
was inefficiency in the discharge of his duties. Thus,
or judicial function”
he was suspended for 3 months.
Code of judicial conduct provides that a
Almarvez filed a counterclaim alleging that
judge should avoid impropriety in all activities and
Judge Paas ordered him to undergo a drug testing
shall not allow the use of the judicial office to
after the latter had already filed an administrative
advance the private interests of others. SC circular
complaint against him. Regarding this, the court
no. 3-92 prohibits the use of halls of justice for
held that this elicits the suspicion the judge in
residential or commercial purposes. It is
fishing for more evidence to support the admin
unprofessional and dishonorable to misuse a public
case she had already filed against Almarvez. This
office to enhance a lawyer’s prestige. It violates
was held to constitute conduct unbecoming a
canon 3, 1, 13, and 15 of the Code of the
member of the judiciary, for which judge Paas was
Professional Responsibility.
reprimanded.
 they deducted from the benefits allotted to faculty
members.
GAMILLA VS MARINO
On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant
FACTS: In 1986, respondent Atty. Mariño Jr. as
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mariño
president of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU) and
accusing him of (a) compromising their
other union officers entered into a collective
entitlements under the 1986 collective bargaining
bargaining agreement with the management of
agreement without the knowledge, consent or
UST for the provision of economic benefits
ratification of the union members, and worse, for
amounting to P35 million. The 1986 collective
only P2,000,000.00 when they could have received
bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but efforts
more than P9,000,000.00; (b) failing to account for
to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989
the P7,000,000.00 received by him and other
the faculty members of UST went on strike and as a
officers and directors in the UST Faculty Union
counter-measure UST terminated the employment
under the 1990 compromise agreement; (c) lack of
of sixteen (16) officers and directors of the USTFU
transparency in the administration and distribution
including respondent.
of the remaining balance of the P42,000,000.00
In 1990, the Secretary of Labor prescribed the package under the 1992 memorandum of
terms and conditions of a five (5)-year collective agreement; (d) refusal to remit and account for the
bargaining agreement between UST and the USTFU P4,200,000.00 in favor of the faculty members
retroactive to 1988 when the 1986 collective although the amount was denominated as
bargaining agreement expired. In the same year, attorney's fees.
the administration of UST and the USTFU also
ISSUE: WoN Marino should be reprimanded?
entered into a compromise agreement for the
payment of P7,000,000.00 from which HELD: Yes. Atty. Mariño failed to avoid conflict of
P5,000,000.00 was intended to settle the back interests, first, when he negotiated for the
wages and other claims of the 16 officers and compromise agreement wherein he played the
directors of the USTFU including respondent. diverse roles of union president, union attorney
and interested party being one of the dismissed
In 1992 UST and the USTFU executed a
employees seeking his own restitution, and
memorandum of agreement to settle the salary
thereafter, when he obtained the attorney's fees of
increases and other benefits under the collective
P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the
bargaining agreement effective 1988 for the period
circumstances justifying such claim to the members
1 June 1991 to 31 May 1993 for a total of
of the UST Faculty Union.
P42,000,000.00.
As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and
Complainants as members of the USTFU initiated
directors seeking compensation from the
two (2) complaints praying for the expulsion of the
University of Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal,
officers and directors of the union led by
respondent was involved in obvious conflict of
respondent Atty. Mariño because of their alleged
interests when in addition he chose to act as
failure to account for the balance of the
concurrent lawyer and president of the USTFU in
P42,000,000.00 ceded to them by UST and the
forging the compromise agreement. The test of
attorney's fees amounting to P4,200,000.00 which
conflict of interest among lawyers is "whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance thereof." In the same manner, it is
undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney
to put himself in a position where self-interest
tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less
than his best for his client.
Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing
a client in an action or any proceeding against a
party even with the client's consent after the
lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the
same defendant if it is uncertain whether the
defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments.
No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have
financial stakes in the subject matter of the suit
brought in behalf of his client.
Atty. Mariño both as lawyer and president of the
union was duty bound to protect and advance the
interest of union members and the bargaining unit
above his own. This obligation was jeopardized
when his personal interest as one of the dismissed
employees of UST complicated the negotiation
process and eventually resulted in the lopsided
compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly
brought money to him and the other dismissed
union officers and directors, seemingly or
otherwise at the expense of the faculty members.
Furthermore, there was lack of notice and
transparency in respondent's dual role as lawyer
and president of the UST Faculty Union when he
obtained P4,200,000.00 as attorney's fees. The
record does not show any justification for such
huge amount of compensation nor any clear
differentiation between his legal services and his
tasks as union president comprising in all
probability the same duties for which he had
collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the
union.
Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requiring every lawyer
to "observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients." Lawyers
are vanguards in the bastion of justice so they are
without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of
service-oriented conscience and a little less of self-
interest. As indispensable part of the system of
administering justice, attorneys must comply
strictly with the oath of office and the canons of
professional ethics - a duty more than imperative
during these critical times when strong and
disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of
law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can
begin with the simple act of openness and candor
in dealing with clients, which would progress
thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyer's
vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary
business proposition but a serious matter of public
interest.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES VS SANCHEZ
Facts:
During the period of July 8-10, Union of Filipro
Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified
the intermittent pickets they have been conducting in
from of Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court
building..They set up pickets' quarters on the Court's
premises and offices of justices, officials and employees.
They constructed provisional shelters along the
sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with
food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper
hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers
and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing
the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been
received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan
as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are
pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union
of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the
pickets might be informed that the demonstration must
cease immediately for the same constitutes direct
contempt of court and that the Court would not
entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were
maintained. The union leaders of Union of Filipro
Employees in the Nestle case (G.R. No. 75029) and their
counsel of record Atty. Jose C. Espinas and the union
leaders of Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the
Kimberly case (No. 78791) were ordered to appear
before the Court to show cause why they should not be
held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose Espinas was
further required to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Espinas, and the respondents Union of
Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor
Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia
should be held in direct contempt of court.
Held:
No. the Court the individuals herein cited who are non-
lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of
substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that
even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are
protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure
or influence courts of justice through the exercise of
either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did
they realize that any such efforts to influence the
course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The
duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest
primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their
counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his
attention was called by this Court, did his best to
demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts
and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a
reminder to all members of the legal profession that it
is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise
their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude
toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the
importance of a continuing educational program for
their members. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf
of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court
for the above-described acts, together with an
assurance that they will not be repeated.
VII. Attorney’s fees
METROBANK VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on
certiorari as appellate court affirms the decision of
the trial court expressing its view that petitioner
should pay the charging lien on the civil case filed
against them which result into a dismissal. Based
upon subsequent dismissal of the said case, private
respondents filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees
based on quantum meruit, resulting to an
exchange between the parties. Petitioners aver
that they have paid services of its lawyers in full,
but the latter contends that partial amounts
forwarded to them did not consist of payment. To
avoid adverse confrontation, petitioners offered to
pay P600,000 in which case respondents refused.
Both trial court and appellate court commanded
petitioner to pay the amount of P936,000 based on
the charging liens of the dismissed civil case against
them.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is entitled
to the enforcement of its charging lien to satisfy
attorney’s fees;
(2) Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary
for the enforcement of such lien;
(3) Whether or not private respondent is entitled
to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and
current market values of the litigated properties on
a quantum meruit basis.
HELD:
The Court held that respondent cannot charge a
lien due to the dismissal of the civil case. Such
enforceability is only applicable to money claims
and only to dismissed judgments if there is an
applicable law or pre-existing agreement between
the parties. In addition, the fixing of attorney’s fees
are determined in a separate civil action.
Accordingly, in fixing compensation based on
quantum meruit, three conditions are to be
considered: (1) the importance of the subject
matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services
rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the
lawyer. Likewise, the Court reiterates the legal
profession’s manifest mandate for public service
instead of capital gain. Its aim is to uphold public
interest and not profiteering. Court grants petition
on a review for certiorari and reverses the decision
of inferior courts. Appropriate proceedings may be
commenced by respondent to establish attorney’s
fees.
MALECDAN VS PEKAS
CANLAS VS CA
Facts: The private respondent own several parcels
of land located in Quezon City for which he is the
registered owner. He secured loans from L and R
corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over
the parcels of land for the security of the same.
Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated
an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties in
question after private respondent failed to pay
until maturity. The private respondent filed a
complaint for injunction over the said foreclosure
and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two
years after the filing of the petition, private
respondent and L and R corporation entered into a
compromise agreement that renders the former to
be insured another year for the said properties.
Included in the stipulations were the attorney’s
fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private
respondent however, remained to be in turmoil
when it came to finances and was apparently
unable to pay and secure the attorney’s fees, more
so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by
petitioner and private respondent executed a
document to redeem the parcels of land and to
register the same to his name.
Allegations were made by the private respondent
claiming the parcels of land to his name but
without prior notice, the properties were already
registered under the petitioner’s name. The private
respondent calls for a review and for the court to
act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said
certificates for the properties consolidated by the
redemption price he paid for said properties. The
private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of
judgment in the Court of appeals which ruled over
the same.
Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on
the reacquisition over the said properties.
Ruling: By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack
of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no
financing entity was willing to extend him any loan
with which to pay the redemption price of his
mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00
attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise
Judgment," a development that should have
tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious
reasons, he placed his interests over and above
those of his client, in opposition to his oath to
"conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good
fidelity ... to [his] clients." The Court finds the
occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a
moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a
matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law
advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a
shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of
a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his
fealty to his oath to “delay no man for money”.
We are not, however, condoning the private
respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning
Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the
fact that the private respondent has not settled his
liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty.
Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said
respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The
parties must then set off their obligations against
the other.
RAMOS VS DAJOYAG
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M. Ramos
against Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag Jr. for
negligence in failing to appeal a ruling of the
NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal by the
Labor Arbiter of a complaint for legal dismissal.
Ramos was illegally terminated from work,
alleging that his lawyer, Atty. Dajoyag, Jr.,
failed to file on time the petition for certiorari,
which the Supreme Court dismissed with
finality.
On June 25, 1996, the last day of the 90-day
period allowed at that time for filing a special
civil action for certiorari, he filed with this Court
a motion seeking an extension of thirty (30)
days for filing the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Because of pressure of work, he was
prevented from filing the same earlier. On July
25, 1996, the last day of the 30-day period he
asked for in his first motion for extension,
respondent filed a motion praying for another
extension of twenty (20) days for filing the
petition for certiorari. On the last day of the
second period of extension [20-day period] that
he asked for, August 14, 1996, respondent
finally filed the petition for certiorari.
Meanwhile, on July 24, 1996, this Court issued
a resolution granting respondents first motion
for extension, with a warning that no further
extension would be granted. Respondent
received a copy of the resolution on August 28,
1996. On August 26, 1996, the Court denied
the petition for certiorari for being filed out of
time. Respondent received a copy of the
resolution, dated August 26, 1996, denying his
petition on October 5, 1996. On October 18,
1996, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the Court in its resolution of December 2, 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ramos is guilty of
negligence.
RULING:
YES. Motions for extension are not granted as
a matter of right but in the sound discretion of
the court, and lawyers should never presume
that their motions for extension or
postponement will be granted or that they will
be granted the length of time they pray for. Due
diligence requires that they should conduct a
timely inquiry with the division clerks of court of
the action on their motions and the lack of
notice thereof will not make them any less
accountable for their omission. Rule 12.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda of briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or
explaining his failure to do so.
Regardless of the agreement he had with
complainant with respect to the payment of his
fees, respondent owed it to complainant to do
his utmost to ensure that every remedy allowed
by law is availed of. Rule 14.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins every
lawyer to devote his full attention, diligence,
skills, and competence to every case that he
accepts. Pressure and large volume of legal
work do not excuse respondent for filing the
petition for certiorari out of time.
Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr. is
REPRIMANDED. He is admonished to
exercise greater care and diligence in the
performance of his duties towards his clients
and the courts and warned that repetition of the
same or similar offense will be more severely
dealt with.
OLAVE VS CANLAS
Doctrine: General Rule: The courts, in the exercise
of their supervisory authority over attorneys as
officers of the court, are bound to respect and
protect the attorney's lien as a necessary means to
preserve the decorum and respectability of the
profession.
Exception: But if it be entirely indispensable for the
court to gain possession of the documents that
have come to the attorney and are held by him in
the course of his employment as counsel, it can
require surrender thereof by requiring the client or
claimant to first file proper and adequate security
for the lawyers' compensation.
Facts: Respondents Jose S. Matute, Anunciacion
Candelario,, Elena Matute and Amadeo Matute Jr.,
filed this action praying that the former
administrator, Matias S. Matute, be ordered to
surrender 17 titles to various properties of the
Estate to the assistant clerk of court, from whom
said Matias had received them on 28 September
1966.
The motion was resisted by the co-administrators
Matias and Carlos Matute and several other heirs
(through counsel Paterno Canlas), who pleaded
that the 17 titles is no longer with Matias and is
already with Carlos. However the titles are
currently possessed by their counsel Paterno
Canlas in his capacity as counsel for the Estate is
also retaining said titles in the exercise of his
retention lien for services rendered to the estate
(not to the Administrators).
The probate court granted the motion to surrender
the documents to the clerk of court for
safekeeping, "in order to prevent any possible
controversy regarding any transaction involving the
remaining properties of the estate"
Reconsideration of the order was sought and
denied 29 May 1967, the Court ordering Attorney
Paterno S. Canlas to surrender said documents
immediately.
Petitioners appeal, insisting that the lower court
erred in granting the motion to surrender the titles
in question in view of Rule 138, Section 37, of the
Rules of Court, specifically prescribing that —
SEC. 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have
a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his
client which have lawfully come into his possession
and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof. ...
Issue/s: Is Atty. Canlas entitled to retain the 17
titles as provided in Rule 138, Sec 37?
Held: Yes.
Sec 37 is controlling since the explicit terms of this
section afford no alternative but to uphold the
claim of appellant Paterno Canlas with respect to
the seventeen documents in his possession. His
right, as counsel for the deceased and his estate,
"to retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid "is incontestable,
and under the rule and section aforesaid, the
attorney can not be compelled to surrender the
muniments of title mentioned without prior proof
that his fees have been duly satisfied. The courts, in
the exercise of their supervisory authority over
attorneys as officers of the court, are bound to
respect and protect the attorney's lien as a
necessary means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the profession.
However, if it be entirely indispensable for the
court to gain possession of the documents that
have come to the attorney and are held by him in
the course of his employment as counsel, it can
require surrender thereof by requiring the client or
claimant to first file proper and adequate security
for the lawyers' compensation. The courts may
require the attorney to deliver up the papers in his
possession which may serve to embarrass his
client, provided the client files proper security for
the attorney's compensation. This proceeds from
the power of the courts to control its own officers
and to compel attorneys to act equitably and fairly
towards their clients.
Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the orders of the probate court dated 22 April 1967
and 29 May 1967, in so far as denying appellant
Attorney Paterno Canlas' right to retain the
seventeen (17) documents in his hands, as counsel
for the estate, and requiring him to surrender the
same without his claim for fees being first satisfied,
are hereby reversed and set aside. Costs against
appellees.
III. Suspension, disbarment, and discipline of
lawyers (Rule 139-B)
GONZALES VS ALCARAZ
IV. Readmission to the Bar
ADEZ REALTY VS CA
ZAGUIRRE VS CASTILLO
FACTS:
Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct
and imposed upon him the penalty of Indefinite
Suspension. Respondent, who was already married with
three children, had an affair with complainant between
1996 to 1997, while he was reviewing for the bar until
before the release of the results thereof. Complainant
got pregnant and respondent, who was then already a
lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit acknowledging
the child as his with a promise to support said child.
Upon the birth of the child, however, respondent
started to refuse recognizing the child and from giving
her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration seeking compassion and forgiveness
from this Court. He submitted certificates from
government and civic organizations appreciating his
services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance from
religious groups, and certificates of good moral
character from judges and lawyers in Occidental
Mindoro.
On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro
Chapter issued a Resolution recommending the
exoneration of respondent from administrative liability.
It stated that the suspension of respondent would cause
a great loss to the community; that respondent has
shown integrity and moral uprightness in the
performance of his official functions; that the acts
imputed to him may be attributed to his "youthful
indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended
his ways after taking his oath as member of the bar.
The IBP gave its Comment, stating that the motion for
reconsideration should be denied until respondent
admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support
her.
On August 25, 2003, respondent's wife, Livelyn Castillo,
submitted a handwritten letter stating that respondent
is the sole breadwinner of the family and that their
family will be gravely affected by his suspension.
On March 3, 2005, respondent reiterated his willingness
to support the child if only to show his remorse. He
attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed
to complainant for the months of March to December
2005 in the amount of P2,000.00 each.
On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental
Mindoro, asking whether or not respondent is still
connected with said office despite having been
indefinitely suspended by this Court. It replied on May
10, 2005 that respondent is still connected with their
office; that he has been regularly receiving his salary
and benefits; and that this was the first time that they
received communication concerning respondent's
administrative case.
RULING:
“In view of respondent's show of repentance and active
service to the community, the Court deems it just and
reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite
suspension to a definite period of two years
suspension.”
DISSENTING OPINION:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The Court suspended Atty. Castillo until such time that
he is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court,
that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of
maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of
every member of the profession.
I agree with the IBP's finding that Atty. Castillo has not
mended his ways because he continues and still fails to
recognize and support his child with complainant. He
has not shown remorse for having maintained an affair
with Zaguirre and fathering her child. Admittedly, he
received commendations for his
exemplary performance and contributions to public
service. Unlike the majority though, I hesitate to
conclude that these commendations adequately proved
respondent's repentance. Aside from the self-serving
statement that "he has mended his ways and suffered
so much because of the embarrassment, ridicules and
dislikes brought about by this event, especially to his
family," there is absolutely no proof of respondent's
remorse. Besides, a lawyer must not only be exemplary
in his public life, but equally important, he must also be
morally upright in his personal life.
I am distressed to note that in the pleadings submitted
by respondent and his wife, they make it appear that
they are the aggrieved party. Thus, they claimed that if
we “prolong these agonies, it will not only add anguish
and anxiety but also physical economic hardship upon
the respondent and indirectly to his family which they
already suffered and still suffering.” It must be
emphasized that to this date, respondent has not yet
served his penalty. Aside from a short leave of absence,
he continued to practice his profession and regularly
received his salary and other benefits. So what
economic hardship is he talking about?
As early as August 28, 2003, respondent admitted that
acknowledging complainant's daughter and
givingsupport remain his undertakings. He even
volunteered to comply unconditionally if they are the
required proofs of his remorse. He professed that he did
not disown his responsibility to give support. If, indeed,
respondent was so remorseful and willing to comply
unconditionally with his own undertaking, why then did
he wait until after the lapse of one (1) year and seven
(7) months before attempting to give support to
complainant's daughter. It was only on March 31, 2005,
that respondent furnished us with photocopies of ten
(10) postdated checks payable to Zaguirre at P2,000.00
each. He failed to mention or offer a concrete or
permanent settlement.
IN RE: BEJAMIN M. DACANAY
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in March 1960. In 1998, he had to
migrate to Canada to seek medical attention. He
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program. His application was approved
in May 2004.
On July 2006, petitioner reacquired his Philippine
Citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003). He thereafter returned
to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
lost his membership in the Philippine Bar when he gave
up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
HELD:
The loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines except when
Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as
a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. A Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never
to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it
in accordance with RA 9225, but, although he is also
deemed never to have terminated his membership in
the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues.
Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his practice, he must
first secure from the Supreme Court the authority to do
so conditioned on:
a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
b) the payment of professional tax;
c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of
mandatory continuing legal education;
d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
The petition of Atty Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby
granted, subject to compliance with the conditions
stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may
retake his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
TORRES-GOMEZ VS CODILLA
NOBLE VS AILES
Facts:
Maximino Noble III (Maximino) alleged that on
August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a
complaint for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino
represented, together with other defendants,
therein. Maximino claimed that at the time of the
filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R.
number should have already reflected payment of
his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009,
and that he should have finished his third
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Compliance, not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned
from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate
case for grave threats and estafa against Orlando.
When Maximino was furnished a copy of the
complaint, he discovered that, through text
messages, Orlando had been maligning him and
dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and
that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among
others:
"x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will
impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court
records, never appeared even once, that's why you
lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x
get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to
squeeze a lot of money from [you],
x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."
Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice
to Terminate Services of Counsel in the complaint
for damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x has
never done anything to protect the interests of the
defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and,
aside from charging enormous amount of
professional fees and questionable expenses, said
counsel's contracted services reached as far only in
preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss
x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of
which he sent to Marcelo for his signature.
Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint
charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM)
Nos. 850 and 1922, and prayed for the disbarment
of respondent as well as the award of damages.
In his defense, Orlando denied the charges against
him and claimed that his late submission of the
third MCLE compliance is not a ground for
disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate
Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement
were all made upon the request of Marcelo when
the latter was declared in default in the
aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted
that the allegedly offensive language in his text
messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-
to-brother communication" and were uttered in
good faith.
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and
estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation and, on June 19,
2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty,
Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust
vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying
Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and
persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x."
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated April 30,
2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a
transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement
is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to
disclose the required information would merely
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction
of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the
IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so
gross or grave as to warrant any administrative
liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the
communication between Orlando and Marcelo,
who are brothers, was done privately and not
directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to be
published and known by third persons.
In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and
dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to
be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino
moved for reconsideration which was however
denied in a Resolution dated May 3, 2014 with
modification deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed
the complaint against Orlando.
RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on
lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. It is a special privilege
burdened with conditions before the legal
profession, the courts, their clients and the society
such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself
in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the
public's faith in the profession. Consequently, a
lawyer must at all times, whether in public or
private life, act in a manner beyond reproach
especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the
judicial forum. In Buatis Jr. v. People, the Court
treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy,"
"inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and
"satan" in a letter addressed to another colleague
as defamatory and injurious which effectively
maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of
insulting language to describe the opposing counsel
is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal
profession.
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that
Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were
conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however,
the tenor of the messages cannot be treated
lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to
malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the
use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise,
Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately
terminate the services of Maximino indicates
Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague,
in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover,
Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of
unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against
him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes,
an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and
disrespected Maximino - a departure from the
judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions
directly affect the public's opinion of the legal
profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such
conduct of nobility and uprightness which should
remain with them, whether in their public or
private lives, and may be disciplined in the event
their conduct falls short of the standards imposed
upon them. Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential
that the statements were merely relayed to
Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the
bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect
in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to
another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor
is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to
interfere and insult Maximino to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of
judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language. The Court has consistently
reminded the members of the bar to abstain from
all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear
how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client.
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM
No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his
failure to disclose the required information for
MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he
had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a
ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall
only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as
well as the expunction thereof from the records.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing
with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
JUDGE LAQUINDANUM VS QUINTANA
FACTS:
Judge Laquindanum (petitioner) of RTC Midsayap wrote
a letter to Atty. Quintana (respondent) directing him to
stop notarizing documents within the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC Midsayap because it was outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court
which issued petitioner’s notarial commission for
Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao.
Despite this, respondent still continuously performed
notarial functions in Midayap as evidenced by: (1) the
Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card executed by Kristine C.
Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License
executed by Elenita D. Ballentes. Under Sec. 11, Rule III
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana
could not extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City
and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap,
Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the Province of
Maguindanao. Petitioner also alleged that upon further
investigation, it was discovered that it was Atty.
Quintana’s wife who performed notarial acts whenever
he was out of the office.
In his response, Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a
petition for notarial commission before Branch 18,
Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the
same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for
three weeks. He alleged that the reason for Judge
Laquindanums inaction was that she questioned his
affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a
member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a
Certification of Payments from the latter chapter.
Because of this, he opted to withdraw his petition. After
he withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge
Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him to
return his petition, but he did not oblige because at that
time he already had a Commission for Notary Public
issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City.
According to respondent, he was singled out by Judge
Laquindanum, because the latter immediately issued
notarial commissions to other lawyers without asking
for so many requirements. Further, he claimed that as a
lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his
legal profession in the entire Philippines. He also denied
giving permission to his wife to notarize any documents.
According to him, he even slapped his wife and old her
to stop because it would ruin his profession.
It was also later found out that one of the signatories to
a deed that he notarized was already dead at the time
of the notarization.
ISSUE/S:
1.) Whether or not a lawyer in good standing can
perform notarial acts in the whole Philippines.
2.) Whether or not Atty. Quintana can pass the liability
to his wife.
3.) Whether or not an attorney can notarize a document
where one of the affiants is dead.
Whether or not respondent violated the Rules on
Notarial Practice (short version)
HELD:
There is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he committed the following acts:
(1) he notarized documents outside the area of his
commission as a notary public; (2) he performed
notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his
wife notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he
notarized a document where one of the signatories
therein was already dead at that time
While it is true that lawyers in good standing are
allowed to engage in the practice of law in the
Philippines. However, not every lawyer even in good
standing can perform notarial functions without having
been commissioned as notary public as specifically
provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
He must have submitted himself to the commissioning
court by filing his petition for issuance of his notarial
commission. The commissioning court may or may not
grant the said petition if in his sound discretion the
petitioner does not meet the required qualifications for
a Notary Public. Furthermore, respondent did not fully
pay his IBP dues when he filed his petition for notarial
commission, hence, it was not acted upon. Since
respondent herein did not submit himself to the
procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial
commission, he has no reason at all to claim that he can
perform notarial acts in the entire country for lack of
authority to do so.
A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes
full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial
register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it
was his wife’s act and that he did not authorize his wife
to notarize documents. He is personally accountable for
the activities in his office as well as the acts of his
personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
also provides that, “A person shall not perform a
notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s
presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.” Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation
without even determining the presence or qualifications
of affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross
negligence and ignorance of the provisions of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.
DR. VIZCAYNO VS JUDGE DACANAY
FACTS: Dr. Vizcayno filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Dacanay for gross Ignorance of the Law,
Abuse of Authority, Manifest Partiality and Delay
relative to a Civil Case. The complaint originated from
the alleged ex-parte ocular inspection conducted by
respondent Judge without notice given to the
complainant. In the Judge’s Comment he raised as
defense that he went to the subject property with his
utility personnel only to conduct his own investigation
and no one from the plaintiffs or the defendant ever
entertained him. He argues that he made the inspection
in good faith and with noble intentions. 4. The Office of
the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
be declared guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service in violation of Sec. 1, Canon 4 of
The New Code of Judicial Conduct.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Judge Dacanay should be held
administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for conducting an ocular
inspection without informing the parties
2. Whether Judge Dacanay should be held
administratively liable for the delay in the resolution of
the Motion for Inhibition
HELD:
1. Judge Dacanay is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Section 1, Canon 4 of The
New Judicial Conduct states that “judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
their activities.” The Court previously ruled in similar
cases that an ocular inspection without notice to nor
presence of the parties is highly improper. Good and
noble intentions notwithstanding, Judge Dacanay’s
actuations gave an appearance of impropriety. His
behavior diminished public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. All those involved in
the dispensation of justice, from the presiding justice to
the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach.
Their conduct must, at all times, be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility free from any
suspicion that may taint the judiciary.
2. The Respondent Judge expunged from the records
the said motion because the counsel of complainant
failed to indicate the date of issue and number of MCLE
Compliance as required by Bar Matter No. 1922. Said
Order may therefore be considered as a denial of the
Motion for Inhibition, which was issued within the 90-
day period to resolve a motion
IN RE: AGUAS
In the matter of the proceedings against MARCELINO
AGUAS for contempt of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF PAMPANGA.
Facts:
On the 29th of August, 1900, during the progress of a
trial then being held before the Court of First Instance
at Bacolor, in the Province of Pampanga, the court had
occasion to caution Angel Alberto, a witness in the case,
not to look at the attorney for the defendant but to fix
his attention on the judge who was at the time
examining him.
of making his protest, but beyond that there is nothing
in the record which even tends to show that he was
disrespectful to the court or unmindful of its dignity.
The statement that the attorney's attitude was
"menacing" tended no more to competently establish
the alleged offense of contempt than if the witnesses
had testified and the court had found that his conduct
was "contemptuous or lacking in respect." The specific
act from which it was inferred that his attitude was
menacing should have been testified to by the
witnesses and found by the court, and failing that, the
record does not show concrete facts sufficient to justify
the conclusion that he was disrespectful to the court or
offensive to its dignity.

The witness did not give heed to this warning, and the
judge thereupon arose from his seat and approaching
the witness, seized him by the shoulders, and using the
expression, "Lingon ang mucha" ("Look at me"), either
shook him, as insisted by the attorney for the
defendant, or only turned him about, as claimed by the
judge and others. Whether the witness was shaken or
only turned about, at all events "seizing him," brought
the defendant's attorney, Señor Aguas, to his feet, who,
protesting against the action of the judge as coercive of
the witness, demanded that a record be made of the
occurrence and that the further hearing of the case be
postponed.

The court on this record adjudged the attorney to be in

contempt of court and suspended him from the practice
of his profession for a period of twenty days. From this
judgment Señor Aguas appealed to this court.

Issue:

Was the appellant respectful and regardful of the

court's dignity in presenting his objection and asking
that it be recorded in the proceedings?

Ruling:

The witnesses say and the judge finds that "his attitude
was menacing" (bastante amenazadora) in the moment