Jessop (2002) focuses on the crises of (Welfare) States.

I focus, instead, on the intrinsic crises of

capitalism, the contradictions of production and what are the socio-economic and ecological outcomes
of crisis. He says that ‘the State is not fully determined by capitalism logic’ and Esping-Andersen argues
that (Welfare) State is 'preoccupied with the production and distribution of social well-being' (1990).
Following the 1857 Introduction of Marx, I argue that the (Welfare) State is ultimately determined by the
contradiction between productive forces and relations of production. The main point of Jessop, on one
side, and Esping-Andersen, on the other, is recognizing that there is not a stable capital accumulation
only based on the market forces and that ‘a certain level of de-commodification’ boosts society’s well-
being. Indirectly, they both assume the counter-tendency role of the (Welfare) State. However, they do
not argue that clearly. Furthermore, many contradictions – especially in Esping-Andersen – are not
mentioned or solved. In addition, Esping-Andersen, first, does not explain what is the real base upon
which a specific form of Welfare State is created and, second, at what level of development is a specific
form of the State necessary and contradictory to that development. Furthermore, he does not mention
that a specific level of development is a peculiar grade of productivity (that effects the national social
relation and the relation between nations), hence, a grade of forces and relations of production. Finally,
he does not show in his comparative analysis that a specific grade of forces and relations of production
shape both a nation individually taken and the relation between two or more nations. Rather than
understand the Welfare State as 'the result of the State's history of national building and/or the influence
conservatism and Catholicism' (Ib. 1990), I focus on the above mentioned contradictions. In this respect,
I see an ideological character of their works. An ideology of the counter-tendency role of the (Welfare)
State that has to be criticized and empirically demonstrate the double contradiction it keeps. On one side,
the one between society and nature and, on the other, the one between society itself. This is known as
metabolic rift. Marx early works, such as the Manuscripts of 1884, were already conscious of this facture.
Lately, this concept has had a revival thanks to the work of Foster (1999).

Following Clarke (1994), I think is crucial consider the relation between constant and variable capital in
order to explain crisis and to understand the attempt and the forms of the WS to alleviate them. However,
even if the (Welfare) State achieves a 'minimum' social reproduction of the labour-force (I think not in
general, but specifically to alleviate crisis it has at least three consequences: 1. Creates long-term
instability, 2. Keeps or deepens society’s fractures, 3. Drift apart society and nature. This are key elements
to understand that its counter-tendency role, if and when effective, is extremely dangerous.
My work, on one side, follows the formal analysis of Jessop, but shows that there are intrinsic
contradictions in capitalism that explodes into crisis and that despite the weak and short-term results of
the WS; it creates the condition for further and deeper crisis. Moreover, it keeps or expands the metabolic
rift between society and nature and between society in itself (O'Connor 1978).
Jessop suggests that the capital contradiction between use value and exchange value impact differently
on different capitals and different strata of labour at different time and places. It could be useful to
expand more this concept. I would like to introduce – following Harvey – the concept of 'time rate of
crisis' to distinguish different 'pace' of how crisis emerge. I reckon two, the pace of 'social crisis' and the
pace of 'economic or political crisis'. The former grows faster and deeper than the latter. This happens
because the process of capital accumulation tends to put proportionally more wageworkers outside the
valorization of capital than the value it incorporate in itself. Furthermore, there is also a 'space rate of
crisis' to differentiate different 'areas' of where crisis take place. Finally, another concept would better
clarify the complexity of crisis, 'recoil of capitalism'. By the latter, I mean that when the State tries to
overcome crisis, if it does, it is only for the sake of economy (surplus value, profit or accumulation of
capital) and at the expense of society and nature. Therefore, every step forward in overcoming crisis
equals to two steps backwards for society and nature.
The counter-tendency of (Welfare) State is contradictory in two ways. First, some State regimes
reduce labour flexibility putting frictions to the process of accumulation. Second, the crisis generated by
the accumulation process reduce many people to ask for help, the help that paradoxically the State can

1
only give if they work (and pay taxes), namely, if they do not need help. Therefore, there is a theoretical
contradiction ab origine between the crisis of capitalism and the State in alleviating them.
Jessop hypothesis is that 'the State intervenes to contribute to the reproduction of labour-power'
and - according to Reuten et al. (1989) - is to 'compensate for the commodification on social reproduction
and social cohesion'. I think, instead, that the anti-crisis mission of the State is not only reproduce labour-
power or to compensate for the commodification of society, but to reproduce on a larger scale (extended
reproduction) or at the same scale (simple reproduction) the entire relation of production at a given stage of
productivity, including the reproduction of itself as capitalist (Welfare) State. It does not make sense if the
state reproduces labour-power and does not reproduce someone who buys it and profits from it. It must
reproduce private property of the means of production and the division of labour, or, said differently; it
must reproduce the contradiction between the labour forces and the relations of productions. Moreover,
he reckons that ‘the expansion of the economic logic of capitalism […] serves to extend the scope for
these contradictions, dilemmas and conflicts to become more fully imprinted on social relations more
generally.’ He also focus on contradiction. However, he mention and analyse only the contradiction
between ‘use and exchange value’ and sporadically the one between ‘space and place’, which ultimately
brings to that between ‘cash and card payments’. Furthermore, according to Marx (2010), Mandel (1962,
1978), O’Connor (1999) and Harvey (2014) we have at least 32 more contradictions in capitalism.
Jessop (2002) writes that ‘what is conventionally termed the welfare state is far from universal. It
is not found in all industrial societies nor even in all advanced capitalist societies and it is by no means an
irreversible evolutionary achievement. On the contrary, for some years there have been remarkable
changes in economic and social policies, their discursive framing and legitimation, the speed and scale at
which policy formation and reform occur in these areas, the institutional mechanisms and networks
through which these policies are pursued, and their economic, political and social bases’. These changes
are related to many factors. However, they can be reduce to two elements, contradictions of capitalism and
crisis tendencies. The counter-tendencies of the (Welfare) State are both socio-economic and political-ideological.
On one side, it is just ruinous because it deals with issues only solvable on a non-capitalistic mode of
production. On the other, it is apologetic because it – along with international associations, NGOs, IGOs
and intellectuals – merely justifies ideal conditions, such as equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of
wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a
good life' or a State 'preoccupied with the production and distribution of social well-being' (Esping-
Andersen 1990).
Finally, he explains the WS within the Regulationist, Polanyan and neo-Marxist framework while
I focus on a Marxist (mainly Marx and Mandel) critique of the (Welfare) State in order to highlight the
contradictions of its mission, the contradiction of the relation between WSs and the tendencies of
capitalism and, lastly, the contradiction of its ‘outcomes’ on workers and nature. I would understand WS
as a form of dominance based on a specific level of uneven development. Therefore, we should, 1. Underline the
conditions and laws of capitalist contradictory and uneven development and link a specific form of WS
to its real base (rather than doing only a formal analysis or an empirical study); 2. Focus on the relation
between the crisis tendencies of capitalism and the counter-tendency of the WS (explaining the necessity
of crisis, but not only relating them on ‘moral values’ or on the WS institution itself); 3. Emphasize the
devastating ecological and social ‘outcomes’ of the WS in its mission to alleviate capitalist crisis (seeing
at a global level what were the major consequences of neoliberalism ‘on’ itself and on the less-developed
and non-neoliberalist mode of productions and showing at what price capitalism is surviving). The first
point focuses on the crisis in the history of capitalism and WS development since 1975 and the
contradictory logic behind them. The second point focuses on the formal analysis of the WS in alleviating
crisis in the post-industrialization era up to the ‘outcomes’ of the Great recession (including their
ideologies). The third point shows the empirical contradictions and crisis of capitalism are intrinsic and
that the WS rather than alleviating them, it amplifies them. An amplification seen on the shoulders of
nature and workers. Therefore, I will study the history of capitalism since 1975, from the end of the
golden age era up to the effects of the Great Recession to today’s life standards and I will try to abstract
its contradictory logic of development. I will then undertake a formal analysis of the WSs (including their
ideologies) and then link them to the real base they belong in order to highlight their counter-tendency
2
role in capitalist economies. After which, I will be able to better present the contradiction of this relation.
At the end, I will back up my claims by drawing on the social and ecological ‘outcomes’ of this
contradictory relation in particular and that of capitalism in general. I will attempt to demonstrate that
capitalism is narrowing its chances to survive and it is focusing on a short-term and fragile ‘stability’ laying
the foundations for bigger, deeper and long-term instability. Furthermore, I will try to prove that any
form of the WS is anti-Welfare for the many and that it is WS for the few, showing a vicious circle
between crisis tendencies of the economy and the attempt of the WS to alleviate them. Finally, through
an empirical and historical time series analysis of capitalist six key development variables (Mandel 1978)
and old social risk variables (Ferragina et al. 2014), I will show the devastating changes of capitalism and
WSs over time, the current stage of development and, lastly, I would try to foresee further consequences
based on the results achieved.

After the end of the Golden Age (1945-1975), capitalism enters in decadence. In this phase, the
intervention and consolidation of the Welfare State becomes more and more necessary to alleviate crisis.
However, this trend has been noted by various authors during history. In the late XIX century, Engels
wrote that '[classes in antagonism] need a power that is apparently above society, which mitigates conflict,
keeps it within the limits of '"order"; and this power which emanates from society, but which stands
above it and which is increasingly alienated from it, is the State' (2011, Stress added). Between 1917 and
1918 Lenin had reconstructed the role and the position of the State in capitalist societies (2001). In Italy,
during the first half if the XX century, has been written that in capitalist economy with perennial crisis is
needed a 'programme' (Gramsci 1934). Lately, after a painful development of productive forces, Esping-
Andersen (1985, 1990 and 1997) has shown the 'pure' forms of the 'Welfare capitalism' and the 'hybrid'
form of Japan. Today, Jessop (2002), on one side, and Farragina et al. (2011, 2015), on the other, have
had the merit to further develop the concept of the 'Welfare State'. Its principles are recognized by the
UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 22-27 (1948) and ILO's Social Security Minimum
Standard Convention No. 102 (1952). However, at least three contradictions have been left behind.
Contradictions I would like to investigate and demonstrate true.

1. The contradictions of the laws of capitalist development. It is not only a matter of theory, but
also practice. Many contradictions have been analyzed (Harvey), but many have been forgotten (Marx
2010, Mandel 1962, 1978). Furthermore, they have not been related either to the crisis or the counter-
tendency of the (Welfare) State.
2. The contradiction between the crisis tendencies of capitalism and the counter-tendency of the
(Welfare) State to solve them. The (Welfare) State must intervene on a tendency of capitalism that
generates crises: the expulsion of labour power from the production process. Therefore, it must try to
alleviate or slow down the crisis that arises from this expulsion: the tendential fall of the rate of profit.
As a result it must perform two operations. First, maintain a certain 'dynamic balance' between capital
and labor by decreasing the contradiction and the gap between them. Second, be able to reproduce the
relation of production between capital and labor. In particular, it must reproduce the sell to buy relation.
In other words, the (Welfare) State must be able to reproduce the social wage relation. However, it is
barely able (with exception of violence or ‘apparent freedom’ given to citizens) to cure two huge fractures.
The first is that between society itself and the second is that between society and nature.
3. The contradiction between the ideal goals and the real outcomes of (Welfare) State counter-
tendency on crisis. Ideologically, the (Welfare) State shows various antagonisms. It attempts to
introduce 'principles' of a democratic and welfare State elements that go beyond the logic of capitalism.
For example, the welfare concept of 'equality of opportunity' goes against the capitalistic concept of
'accumulation law', which is based precisely on the law of uneven development. Practically, it intervenes
not to directly satisfy social needs, but to satisfy the needs of capital. This antagonism emerges because
its intervention is focused on specific variables (e.g. unemployment, poverty, defense, etc.). Therefore, I
reject the 'de-commodification' as a variable and do not believe that 'social rights' diminishes citizens'
status as 'commodities'. Finally, when and if it gets results, they are always contradictory. For example, it
manages to 'ensure' only 'relative' and 'short-term' stability (e.g. improving productivity by means of
3
socio-economic reforms), but in the long-term, socio-economic and ecological instability increase and
becomes generalized. I would like to investigate and demonstrate that these contradictions are true from
a theoretical, historical and an empirical point of view.

Only few attempts have been showing that 'every step forward in alleviating economic crisis equals
socially and environmentally to two steps backwards'. However, they did not highlight this key
phenomena I would like to investigate. Nevertheless, O'Connor (1998) proves the fundamental
contradiction between nature (ecosystem and human health) and capitalism, Reich (2007) verifies how in
the relentless fight for profit, producers and consumers have made gains, but citizens and the democratic
process have fallen behind, and Standing (2011) highlights the emerging of a 'new dangerous class'. This
opinion is true for many historians. Ryan (2012) argues that the egalitarian elements of the Welfare State
'are more minimal than either its defenders or its critics think'. However, the is also a vulgar and greedy
analysis of the 'pragmatists' such as Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Julius Court (2001). They are not
concerned by the social and environmental degradation brought about by capitalism nor the further
contradiction of the Welfare State in its mission to improve today’s critical situation. In addition, they are
not concerned with any theoretical or practical contradiction of capitalism, but rather they are more
worried about the correct "interval of efficient inequality". to. Studying the contradictions of capitalism
starting from Harvey, but adding missing contradictions that are expressed in Marx, Mandel, O'Connor,
Kliman and Harmann. Thus making the number of the contradictions of capitalism rise to 32.

b. To study the history and crises of capitalism starting from the 1973 energy crisis to the great recession
of 2007-2009.

c. Show, from the period from 1973 to the aftermath of the great recession, on which contradictions try
to leverage the WS and why the WS forms change to equal contradictions. Furthermore, criticizing the
counter-tendential role of the WS both from a political-ideological point of view and from an economic-
social point of view, showing how, on the one hand, it succeeds only ideally in the resolution of the crisis
('moral economy') and other, it really fails in the long term in alleviating the crisis, sharpening the
economic-social hardships and leaving the eco-system to rot ('economic morality').

In conclusion, I would like to study theoretically the contradictions of capitalism, to trace the historical
emergence of crises from 1973 to the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crisis and, finally, to analyze empirically
the relationship, the objectives and the economic-social and ecological effects. between capitalism and
the WS.

The choice of the so-called energy crisis is not accidental. I choose it because it is there that the golden
age of capitalism ends, it is there that the forms of (Welfare) State become increasingly important for the
survival of capitalism, it is there this where ‘a new world' arose, and with it the problems that we still have
today. Nevertheless, from that period onwards neither the contradictions of the mode of production nor
the tendency towards crises nor the counter-tendency towards them by the (Welfare) State have ceased.

I try to have a global perspective on the problem of crises and the counter-tendency towards it by the
(Welfare) State. Consequently, I do not limit myself only to the abstract laws of unequal development of
capitalism, but I confront the history of events. Furthermore, I do not limit myself only to the formal
analysis of the various forms of the WS, but I concentrate both on the affinities and on their differences,
on the relationship with the different capitalisms on which they are based, on the socio-economic and
ecological effects, and, finally, on the critique of their ideology. As Commoner said ‘any attempt to solve
a crisis contrasts with the solution of the others: pollution control limits the energy sources that can be
used, while energy saving has a high price [...] We are not facing a series of separated crises, but only one
fundamental insufficiency, an insufficiency closely connected to the very structure of modern society.’

4
I argue that the passage from Fordism to post-Fordism is not a clear cut and that the latter does not
eliminate the former. That happens because of the uneven laws of capitalist development. Capitalism
always presupposes someone to exploit. The one exploited is always the less developed, viz. the one who
produces slower and in less quantity and/or lower quality. In the laws of exchange, we can already see,
for instance, that financialisation presupposes a use value economy. More clearly, in Marxian Economic
Analysis of Exchange, we have, on one side, M-C-M' (buy to sell)1 and, on the other, C-M-C2 (sell to
buy). However, looking closer we see two more formulas that explain the uneven development in one
country and the international uneven development among many countries. First, we have M-M'3 (money
for more money) a formula possible only in high developed countries where someone exploits labour
without 'working', but simply by putting money 'to work'. Marx defines this as automatic fetishism. In
addition, here is crystal clear the contradiction of capitalism as a mode of production. Second, we have
UV-UV4 (barter or communist production). The social relations of a country or international relations
are explained by the quantity that a specific production and exchange plays into the economy. It is
renowned that in high developed countries the 'third' or the 'fourth sector' plays a bigger part in the
production of the GDP. For instance, in the US the formula M-M' (expressed by services, banks,
insurances and stock exchanges) has a greater part in the GDP than the same formula in a country where
a 'second sector' is the expression of the a specific social relation. Therefore, on one side, we would see
a specific mode of production (a sum of productive forces and relations of production) and mode of
regulation when a specific mode of production and exchange takes place as a result of a capitalist
development and, on the other, we see that the highest mode of exchange (M-M') presupposes always
the less developed ones. Hence, the role, the function and the form that the State has in alleviating crisis
is neither universal nor static, but rather particular and dynamic and, moreover, is a necessity in each
stage of capitalism. But, again, each stage of capitalism during time is visible at the same time also in the
same nation (only the proportion of specific types of production, and then of exchange, changes). For
example, the M-M' does not exclude UV-UV or M-D-M' or C-M-C (or domestic production which is
not even a commodity) but, the relation between this four modes of production (and exchange) are
different in the US compared to Italy in 2007 or in the US itself during its development. In general, M-
M' is post-Fordism, M-C-M' is Fordism, C-M-C is mercantilism and UV-UV is barter (or non-capitalistic
economies). In particular, M-M' is financial capital, M-D-M' is industrial capital, C-M-C is commercial
capital and UV is purely the product of labour. Socially speaking, M-M'+M-D-M', on one side, and C-
M-C+UV, on the other, explains the general relation between capitalists and proletarians. Those
formulas, nevertheless, are incomplete because, if on one side we have an extended reproduction, then
on the other we must have a restricted production. For instance, if we have M-D-M' on one side, then,
we must have, on the other, C-M-C_. If we have a real gain in economy, a real growth of the GDP, then
we must have a real lose in the economy, a real waste of productive forces (humans and nature must pay
for the sake of accumulation of capital and profits of capitalists). Moreover, if we have just a simple
reproduction, such as M-C-M and C-M-C, then we only have a transfer or wealth, rather than growth.

Jessop writes that 'the State intervention is not just a secondary activity aimed at modifying the effects of
a self-sufficient market but absolutely essential to capitalist production and market relations' and, he
continues - along with Offe (1972) and Mueller and Neusuess (1975) - saying that 'given the institutional
separation between the economical and the political, the State must ensure that capital accumulation occurs
before it can begins its redistributive activities' (Stress added, p. 43). In Marxist words, the State is obliged
to reproduce the fundamental contradiction between capital and wage-labour or, more precisely, between

1
Money for commodity for more money.
2
Commodity for money for commodity.
3
Money for more money.
4
Use value for use Value (only with the general introduction of money into the economy the use value transforms in
exchange value).
5
capitalists (the one who own the means of production) and proletarians (the one who are expropriated
from the means of production, regardless if they earn a wage or not). The State must be able to reproduce
the various forms of production and distribution that coexist in capitalism. Given this current state of
capitalism, it must be able to reproduce the following interdependent mode of production: financial
capital, industrial capital, commercial capital and use-value production (e.g. domestic reproduction, non-
capitalistic production, etc.). At each interdependent mode of production correspond a specific relation
of production that emerges historically, and can be seen logically. First, financial capital as a formal
category corresponds historically to the post-Fordism economy where the profit does not come from the
surplus-value of this specific mode of production taken separately, but comes from knowledge (or General
intellect) that exploits the other three. Logically the relation, that also corresponds to specific social
relations, is M-M+ (money for more money). At this stage capitalism shows the most obnoxious
contradiction, the fact that it 'grows', 'exploits', 'earns money' without a single gram of value! Second,
industrial capital as formal category corresponds historically to Fordism where profit comes from the
valorization of the surplus-value. Logically the relation, that corresponds to specific social relations, is M-
C-M+ (buying a commodity in order to buy a bigger share of commodities). Third, commercial capital
as formal category corresponds historically to mercantilism where the is no profit, but only a transfer of
value! Logically the relation, that corresponds to specific social relations, is C-M-C≈ (selling a commodity
in order to sell it again). However, as the interest of capitalists is profiting, and this profiting implies a
losing for the workers, exactly here tackles the State. It tries to keep the relation C-M-C stable, rather
than descending. And, to do this, it has to reproduce non only the workers that sell themselves for a
salary, the shops that sell commodities or keeping a relative high rate of unemployed or precariat, but
also the domestic and non-capitalist realm (UV-UV) and, consequently, industrial and financial capitalists
(M-M+ and M-C-M+) that, at different rates and different forms, profit over UV-UV and C-M-C, or, if
you prefer, over this two classes. Here is the goal of the State in alleviating crisis. Furthermore, in doing
this, the State reproduces itself as a Capitalist State which means that it reproduces - simply or in an
extended way - its apparatuses, functions and relations. Fourth, use-value production as a formal category
corresponds historically to tribal communism where there is neither profit nor transfer of value, but
rather the direct production and satisfaction of needs. Logically the relation, that corresponds to specific
social relations, is UV-UV (use-value for use-value). Those four single categories coexist as a unity in
contemporary capitalism, and the contradictions within the first three spheres is reproduced in capitalism
as a whole.

Da inserire: Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life,

Reich, 2007. Alan Ryan, On Politics, Book Two: A History of Political Thought From Hobbes to the
Present (Liveright, 2012). Scarica il terzo volume Einaudi di 'Quadarni dal Carcere', e leggi il quaderno 22:
Amercanismo e Fordismo.

The Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS)

Atlantic Fordism (industrialized, standardized mass production and consumption based on division of
labour, assembly-line and semi-skilled labour characterized by high productivity and profits) is the spread
of the Fordist accumulation regime occurred through the American Industrial Paradigm in Northwestern
Europe (1) supported by transatlantic regimes (2) (Van Der Pijl 1986; Rupert 1994). The State form of
Atlantic Fordism is the KWNS. The post-war states in the economy of Atlantic Fordism are USA,
Canada, Northwestern Europe, Australia and New Zealand. The aim of the KWNS is to 'manage the
conflicts between capital and labour'. The KWNS has 2 main features: a. provision of infrastructures to
support mass production and consumption (I would add, to support the reduction of the cost of labour-
force and to increase productivity), b. collective bargaining. I would reduce this to one category: public
policy, which has two distinctive features. First, demand-side policy (interest rates, inflation and taxation).

6
Second, supply-side policy (laws and/or investments). Fordism is the attempt of communism of the means of
consumption with the private property of the means of production.

If I ask, what specifically the State has to manage? It has to be able to 1. Not let the labour-force shrink
(which means, keeping the only source of value at a bearable quantity and cost), 2. Reproduce the
conditions for the accumulation of capital (which means, keeping or develop the necessary infrastructures
to create the labour-power), 3. Reproduce the relations of production (which means, keeping the double
and antagonistic relation of buy to sell and sell to buy). Now, given that the selling to buy relation is not static,
but quantitatively and qualitatively descending, then we can reduce the anti-crisis role of the State to one
single element: to maintain the selling to buy relation. Let us suppose that this hypothesis is false, as to
say, let us affirm that the State mission in alleviating crisis is not recreating the selling to buy relation. If this
is the case, then, it will not be recreating the buy to sell relation either. Therefore, capitalism will not be
possible even if we imagine a full automatization of production because it needs not only those two
relations, but also the mediation of the relation, money. Money that will disappears as those two relations
do too. If the hypothesis were false, we could deduce that we have a capitalist mode of production without
a capitalistic mode of distribution! Which means, we would have capitalism without capitalism! By this
reductio ad absurdum we demonstrate that the hypothesis that the State ant-crisis role is to maintain the
selling to buy relation is true.

The State is both Achilles' and Iron heel of Capitalism.

The Liberal model is based on market dominance and private provision; ideally, in this model, the state
only interferes to ameliorate poverty and provide for basic needs, largely on a means-tested basis. Hence,
the decommodification potential of state benefits is assumed to be low and social stratification high.
I diritti sociali derivano dalla dimostrazione dello stato di bisogno. I servizi pubblici vengono forniti
solamente a chi è povero di risorse.

The Conservative model is based on the principle of subsidiarity (decentralization) and the dominance of
social insurance schemes, offering a medium level of decommodification and permitting a high degree of
social stratification. I diritti e le tutele dipendono dalla professione esercitata: le prestazioni del welfare
sono legate al possesso di determinati requisiti, in primo luogo l'esercitare un lavoro. In base al lavoro
svolto lo Stato, attraverso leggi speciali, prevede l'istituto delle assicurazioni sociali obbligatorie per i
lavoratori nello stato di bisogno. I diritti sociali sono quindi collegati alla condizione del lavoratore.

The Social-Democratic model is based on the principle of universalism, granting access to benefits and
services based on citizenship. Such a welfare state is said to provide a relatively high degree of citizen
autonomy, limiting reliance on family and market. I diritti derivano dalla cittadinanza: vi sono quindi dei
servizi che vengono offerti a tutti i cittadini dello Stato senza nessuna differenza.

Derivazione dei diritti sociali Social Benefits Class division

Liberale Stato di bisogno fisiologico Low (1) High
(povertà assoluta o relativa)
Conservatore Stato di bisogno dei lavoratori Medium (3) High
(bisogno assoluto o relativo)
Socialdemocratico Stato di cittadinanza High (5) High
(bisogni minimi nazionali
assoluti o relativi)
Mediterraneo Vedi Ferragina et al. Low (2) High
Ibrido Vedi Esping-Andersen Medium (4) High

7
Se noi guardiamo i dati statistici circa la riduzione della povertà potremmo essere tratti in inganno che il
capitalismo si divenuto col tempo sempre più 'sociale'. In effetti, dal 1970 al 2013 la povertà assoluta è
stata quasi dimezzata (ma questo solo nei paesi fortemente industrializzati a danno dei paesi meno
progrediti). Inoltre, se noi consideriamo the employment to population ratio scopriamo che nei paesi OECD
vi è stata una crescita in questo periodo inferiore all'1% benché in alcuni paesi presi isolatamente la
percentuale è superiore! Questa piccola crescita delle condizioni di vita nei paesi 'sviluppati' è stata
possibile solo a danno di quelli poco sviluppati. Solo la legge dello sviluppo diseguale è capace di mostrare
tale contraddizione.

The Schumpeterian Competition State (SCS)

The real base upon which SCS has shaped its form is post-Fordism. The State had to fight the 'crisis-
tendencies' during the development of post-Fordism. Post-Fordism has some key features: information
technologies based production and distribution, products are marketed to niche markets base on
consumer-type rather than in mass consumption patterns based on social class, service
industries predominate over manufacturing, the workforce is feminized and financial markets are
globalized.

I argue that the difference that can distinguish 'Fordism' from 'post-Fordism' is where the surplus-value
comes from. Apparently, in post-Fordism surplus-value comes from 'knowledge' (intellectual labour).
However, it is just an appearance because 'services' and 'intellectual labour' are not 'variable capital'. They
do not produce a surplus-value, that is, they do not produce more than the value they create. The 'profits'
of those industry are not a net gain in society but rather a transfer of wealth or an exploitation of the only
source of surplus-value, manual labour. Therefore, big transfers of money from a country to another,
exploitation of industrial sectors and agriculture in the same nation o in various nations, is the base of
'profits' for 'post-Fordism'. Another difference is the abstraction of labour. In post-Fordism is evident
the abstraction character of capitalism. The abstraction, however, presupposes a concrete labour. In other
terms, there cannot be imagined a capitalist world based only on post-Fordism. Capitalism needs to
exploits manual labour and resources in order to develop and get 'profits' from the 'intellectual' or
'abstract' relation of production. For example, someone lending money to get more money in return
(interest), presupposes someone else that produce values. Why? Because if I lend 1£ to have 1.2£ in
return, I am not producing any value in this exchange! Here a double contradiction can be seen. First,
that 1=1.2 and, second, that value comes from non-value! Therefore, this exchange must rely on a solid
base such as the time of labour of the workers. Hence, it is a necessity, a limit and a contradiction of the
development of capitalism that 'financial capital' or, in general, 'post-Fordism' must rely on 'constant and
variable capital' from the industrial and the agricultural sector. The value they exchange and distribute
come from where this value is quantifiable with an 'economy of time'. Post-Fordism is the reality of
communism inside capitalism because it produces straightforward use-values. Capitalism converts them
in a quantifiable measure in order to get 'profits'. However, as this mode of production does not have a
production of surplus-value, then, its 'extended reproduction' (further development) is constrained within
the limits of 'Fordism'. In other words, post-Fordism can only develop further only if the is a growth of
the 'previous' and 'less developed' mode of production, such as industrial sectors and agriculture generally
understood as 'Fordism'.

Ferragina et al. (2015) define ‘political movements’ as the ‘ideological basis’ of the Welfare States. Those
are three, liberalism, Christian-democracy and Social-democracy. However, they do not tell us what is the real base
upon which such ideology arise. Jessop (2002), following Gramsci, defines the power of such ideologies,
‘the exercise of political, intellectual and moral leadership within and over a given political space’
(hegemony). If the latter is successful ‘bringing social forces and institutions into conformity with the
requirements of capitalist reproduction in a particular period’, then we have an ‘historic bloc’.
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Nevertheless, the word ‘conformity’ must not lead us to believe that capitalism will reproduce itself
without contradictions. Therefore, ‘conformity’ must be understood as the contradiction of capitalist
development. As capitalist is an antagonistic mode of production, then we are never dealing with ‘pure’
or ‘spurious’ capitalism. It has in itself all the elements it has overcome and kept during history (slavery,
feudalism, mercantilism, wage-labour etc.) and potentially what it could be if further developed
(communism). Here tackles the WS, on one side, to avoid such a potentiality according to a specific level
of development and, on the other, to involuntarily sharpen the contradictions of production. That the
reason why 'while capitalism cannot coexist with, neither can it exist without, the Welfare State' (Jessop
2002).

Esping-Andersen (1990) says that ‘de-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of
right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market’. This statement is
convoluted. It has many contradictions. First, how could a WS ‘de-commodificate’ if it still run on a
commodity-production economy mediated by money? It cannot. Second, why a service should be
rendered as a matter of right, and not as a matter of need? Do I need a right to eat to have a need to eat?
I do not. Besides, if the market is the place where commodities meet and if the production of
commodities is done in function of a market, then it is not possible that a person can survive as ‘a person
that does not need to rely on the market’. There is nothing such as ‘de-commodification’. If we take this
critique further and try to see the implications of Esping-Andersen’s definition, not even a tramp would
be ‘de-commodificated’ whether someone gives him handouts or he has a shelter, food, etc. for ‘free’, as
a use-value forms, without any manifest mediation of wage-labour or money because he will be subsumed
in capitalist economy. This is a contradiction that has to be highlighted at the very beginning of an analysis
of the crisis of capitalism and the one brought about by the WS itself in attempting to alleviate them, try
to prevent them, or guarantee the right environment to let capitalism survive. However, as briefly seen
above, the contradictions are - in the first and most apparent form – conceptual. By doing a critique of
those elements, going from the abstract of the definition to the concrete of reality, we would discover a
contradiction since the ‘beginning’ or, said differently, since the definition of what the WS is. However,
the definition is not the ‘beginning’, but rather the ‘end’ seen as beginning merely because comes at first
sight and because comes at last in the real movement of history. Esping-Andersen continues saying that ‘de-
commodification strengthens the worker (?) and weakens the absolute authority of the employer (?)’. I
would ask, would the worker be strengthen by a WS that has absolute authority over laws, policies and
violence? This question shows us that, rather than being a Welfare, the State is being just capitalistic. This
fact unveils another issue. The citizen is powerless in front of the State as it is powerless in front of the
capitalist. Citizens and workers are subjugated by the commodity production that’s brings the private
property. On one side, the private property of law, policies and violence (jails, judges, weapons, etc.) and,
on the other, the private property of the means of production. How could we be ‘de-commodificated’ if
we cannot plan, choose, elect, dismiss or discharge a functionary? How could we be ‘de-commodificated’
if we cannot organize the production of the means of production and of means of distribution according
to what we need? The minimum wage – just to give an example of how ‘rights’ do not ‘de-commodificate’
– does not question or challenge the private property of the means of production or their contradictions
thereof, but rather exploits, both directly with the ‘minimum wage law being applied’ and indirectly by
means of penalties, both wage-workers and capitalist who cannot compete with such a measure. In other
words, such a ‘measure’ is Welfare only for the most developed capitalist, but throws the others into
struggle. Hence, the minimum wage is a capitalistic measure and, as such, follows the same contradictory
and uneven laws of development. Exactly the same happens with any notorious right.

Esping-Andersen believes that the WS is the great savior, the protector of citizens and workers against
'employers'. The State, instead, is the opposite of what he affirms. Not only it does not solve the
contradictions of capitalism but rather amplifies them. Furthermore, it also does not 'protect' neither
citizens nor workers from ecological devastation and the social damage of capitalism. Furthermore, he
says that in a WS ‘citizens can freely and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt
out of work when they themselves consider it necessary’. Here there is not even need to call into question
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the theory because everyday life confutes it. For the majority of workers to be absent from work beyond
a certain period means to reduce their needs in absolute terms. He continues he says that the WS ‘is not
just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own
right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations’. Nevertheless, if,
on one hand, the WS ‘intervenes’ to correct the ‘structure of inequality’ and, on the other, is a ‘system of
stratification’, we are dealing with a contradiction. A contradiction that will be highlighted as a result of
the study. Finally, I agree when he says that the WS is ‘a means to combat the labour movements’.

In conclusion, I would like to study theoretically the contradictions of capitalism, to trace the historical
emergence of crises from 1973 to the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crisis and, finally, to analyze empirically
the relationship, the objectives and the economic-social and ecological effects. between capitalism and
the WS.

The choice of the so-called energy crisis is not accidental. I choose it because it is there that the golden
age of capitalism ends, it is there that the forms of (Welfare) State become increasingly important for the
survival of capitalism, it is there this where ‘a new world' arose, and with it the problems that we still have
today. Nevertheless, from that period onwards neither the contradictions of the mode of production nor
the tendency towards crises nor the counter-tendency towards them by the (Welfare) State have ceased.

I try to have a global perspective on the problem of crises and the counter-tendency towards it by the
(Welfare) State. Consequently, I do not limit myself only to the abstract laws of unequal development of
capitalism, but I confront the history of events. Furthermore, I do not limit myself only to the formal
analysis of the various forms of the WS, but I concentrate both on the affinities and on their differences,
on the relationship with the different capitalisms on which they are based, on the socio-economic and
ecological effects, and, finally, on the critique of their ideology. As Commoner said ‘any attempt to solve
a crisis contrasts with the solution of the others: pollution control limits the energy sources that can be
used, while energy saving has a high price [...] We are not facing a series of separated crises, but only one
fundamental insufficiency, an insufficiency closely connected to the very structure of modern society.’

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