76) TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C.

NICOLAS and the HEIRS OF ANTONIO

NICOLAS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PABLO P. INVENTOR
and RAMON NICOLAS, respondents.
[G.R. NO. 128781. August 6, 2002]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
(Petrache)

DOCTRINE: The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of the deceased
has supervision and control over said properties. The court thus has inherent power to
determine the properties included/excluded from the inventory. Such probate court,
however, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of
title provisionally. Thus in the CAB, collation is still premature. The order of the probate
court is merely an order for inclusion in the inventory of the decedent's estate of the
properties in question and not the final order contemplated in R90.2.

FACTS: Petitioner De Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael Nicolas
(Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Rafael C. Nicolas”). Said
case was consolidated with Sp. Proc No. C-1810.

Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas (both deceased) are the parents of Teresita,
Estrelita, Antonio, Ramon and Roberto. Antonio (deceased) is represented by his wife
petitioner Zenaida and his other heirs.

Private respondent Ramon (oppositor-applicant in the intestate proceedings) filed a

Motion for Collation, claiming that Rafael, during his lifetime had gratuitously given real
properties to his children and Teresita had failed to include them in the estate’s inventory
(at least 7 lots in Polo, Bulacan and Caloocan City given to different children).

The RTC issued an Order directed Ramon to submit pertinent documents for proper
determination if the properties should be collated. A hearing was set with notice to the
present registered owners (the children) to show cause why their proeprties should not
be collated. Ramon submitted an Amended Motion for Collation with supporting
documents attached. It included two properties not indicated in the original motion.

On Nov. 11, 1994: The Court ordered Teresita to include only certain lots for Collation.
Teresita filed an MR alleging that the properties subject of the Order were already titled
in their names many years prior and that their titles may not be collaterally attacked in a
motion for collation. Said motion was denied on the ground that it was within the
jurisdiction of the court to determine whether the titled properties should be collated
(Sec. 2, Rule 90 – final order of the court concerning questions as to advancements
made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir).

Teresita filed an MR for the Order denying the original MR. The RTC issued an Order
requiring Ramon to prove whether the properties were given gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration.
The RTC removed Teresita from her position as administratrix on the ground of conflict
of interest considering her claim that she paid a valuable consideration for the properties
transferred to her and are this not subject to collation.Teresita filed another MR, which
was denied.
Petitioners filed with the CA e petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. The CA found the petition devoid of
merit, ruling that the Order directing the inclusion of the enumerated properties in the
estate had become final for failure to appeal the order of collation. The appeal from the
Order removing petitioner as administratrix, however, was timely appealed.

CONTENTIONS: Petitioners claim that the properties were sold to them rather than
donated, that the Order was interlocutory and non-appealable, and that they were
deprived of due process. Private respondent contends that due process was afforded to
petitioners when petitioner resolved the issue of collation after hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Nov. 11, 1994 Order directing the inclusion of the
enumerated properties in the estate was final.

RULING: (The petition is partly GRANTED) NO.

RATIO: The Nov. 11, 1994 Order and all other orders emanating from said Order are
merely provisional or interlocutory, without prejudice to the heirs, administrator or
approving parties to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title (NIC: in other words, since interlocutoryang Order, any conflicts regarding
title over the properties can be resolved in an ordinary action). The CA committed an
error in considering the Order as final or binding upon the heirs or third persons who
dispute the inclusion of certain properties.

Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it was ruled in Garcia v. Garcia: the court acquires
jurisdiction over the properties of the deceased has supervision and control over said
properties. The court thus has inherent power to determine the properties
included/excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the courts’ attention to the fact that certain
properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts’
duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be
attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the
intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of
said properties.

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally. Probate courts have limited jurisdiction and questions of
title can only be settled in a separate action. All the court can do is determine whether
they should be included in the property.

Sec. 2, Rule 90 of the ROC, which provides that the final order shall be binding, is
invoked by the petitioner. The Order of exclusion or inclusion is NOT a final order and is
interlocutory in the sense that it does not settle once and for all the title to the lots. Sec.
2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context of Sec. 1. The RTC and CA erroneously
referred to it as an order of collation when it is nothing more than order of inclusion. The
motion for collation was filled in the early stage of the intestate proceedings and nothing
indicates that the debts have been paid nor the net remainder determined. In other
words, the issue on collation is still premature and the Order was merely for inclusion.

Even assuming that the assailed Order is a collation and a final order, it would have no
force and effect upon the parties. Only a final order is appealable and a final Order must
contain the facts and law on which it is based (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The
Order in this case does not state the reasons for ordering collation. Thus, it never could
have become final and would be inoperative.