RA 7610, Sec.

5-6
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act

[GROUP 4]
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Pp v Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
Perez v CA, G.R. No. L-80838 November 29, 1988

ABDUCTION
Pp v Sun Tong Co, 163 SCRA 222
Pp v Jose, G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
Pp v Alburo, G.R. No. 85822, April 26, 1990
Pp v Godines, G.R. No. 93410, May 7, 1991

PROSECUTION OF PRIVATE OFFENSES

Pilapil v Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

[GROUP 3]
SIMULATION OF BIRTH
Pp v Sangalang, 74 OG 5977

BIGAMY
Pp v Aragon, G.R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957

LIBEL
Malit v Pp, G.R. No. L-58681 May 31, 1982
Mercado v CFI, G.R. No. L-38753 August 25, 1982
Agbayani v Sayo, G.R. No. L-47880 April 30, 1979
Newsweek v IAC, G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986
Lacsa v IAC, G.R. No. 74907 May 23, 1988

[GROUP 2]
Soriano v IAC, G.R. No. 72383 November 9, 1988
G.R. No. 72383 November 9, 1988
MARCELO SORIANO, ​petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, HON. AUXENCIO DACUYCUY, and HON.
FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR. ​respondents.
FACTS:
Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. the then Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA), an information for libel
was filed against petitioner Marcelo Soriano and six (6) others in connection with press releases and
articles imputing to Tantuico the tampering by COA personnel of election returns in the May 14, 1984
Batasan elections at his residence in Tacloban City and in the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte. This
election offense was allegedly committed at Tantuico's behest to assure the victory of certain candidates
in the said Batasan elections. Publicly imputing the crime of falsification of public documents and/or
violation of election laws to said Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., publication in the said newspaper is
captioned "IMPEACH TANTUICO CASE LOOMS"
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of improper venue. The petitioner
contended that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, the libel case should have been filed at Quezon City where Tantuico holds office and
where the publication house of the "Guardian" is located.
Trial court denied the motion. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari prohibition with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction with the then Intermediate Appellate Court raising the same question of
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Leyte to hear and decide the libel case on the merits. The
appellate court dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Leyte may try the libel case or whether or not it should be tried
elsewhere.
HELD:
the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Court ruled that each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense. Stated more
succinctly for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, every time the same written matter is communicated such communication is considered a
distinct and separate publication of the libel.
The applicable law is Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
1289 and Republic Act No. 4363. It provides:
Persons responsible​.—Any person who shall publish exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for
in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission on of the offense: ​Provided,
however​, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city, or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shad be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published: ...
This Court in ​Agbayani v. Sayo ​(89 SCRA 699, [1979]) recapitulated the law as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission
of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense. (at P. 705)

Petitioner Marcelo B. Soriano was included as one of the accused in the libel case in his capacity as
editor-publisher of the "Guardian." Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine ... shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof." Soriano's criminal liability, thereof, was based
on a press release prepared in Tacloban City and mailed or delivered to various newspapers. The press
release was the basis of the alleged libelous article contained in the "GUARDIAN." Thus, as far as
Soriano is concerned, his criminal liability, if any, allegedly stemmed from the publication in the May
26-June 1, 1984 issue of the GUARDIAN of an article captioned "IMPEACH TANTUICO CASE
LOOMS" wherein the full text of the press release prepared by accused Cesar G. Villegas in Tacloban
was reproduced. Obviously, as far as petitioner Marcelo B. Soriano is concerned, the requirement as
regards the place where the ​libelous article was printed and first published ​must be construed as referring
to the publication of the press release of accused Cesar Villegas in Soriano's newpaper "THE
GUARDIAN."
For purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirements of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the
liability of a Manila or Quezon City editor must be deemed as commencing with the publication of the
allegedly libelous material in his newspaper and not with the typing or mimeographing of press releases
by interested persons in different municipalities or cities, copies of which are sent to metropolitan
newspapers for national publication. The amendments to Art. 360 ​were intended to free media persons
from the intimidating harassment of libel suits filed in any place where a newspaper happens to be
sold or circulated​. The purpose behind the law would be negated or violated if the interpretation made by
the trial court and appellate court is followed.

Bulletin v Noel, G.R. No. 76565 November 9, 1988

BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, represented by its President, MARTIN ISIDRO and
its Publisher, APOLONIO BATALLA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, FRED J. REYES, JAMIL MAIDAN
FLORES and JOHN DOES, ​petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE EDILBERTO NOEL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of the
Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region with station in Marawi City, ATTY. DIMATIMPOS
MINDALANO, ATTY. MANGORSI A. MINDALANO, SHIEK EDRES MINDALANO, SULTAN
GUINAR MINDALANO, FAROUK CALIPA MINDALANO, SULTAN MAHADI MINDALANO,
SULTAN KHALID MINDALANO, SULTAN MA-AMOR MINDALANO, DR. TAHER
MINDALANO, DATU MAGUIDALA MINDALANO, SOBAIDA MAGUMPARA VDA. DE
MINDALANO, RAISHA MINDALANO MANDANGAN, ATTY. KIMAL M. SALACOP, DATU
KAMAR M. MINDALANO, MAYOR RASLANI MINDALANO, VICE-MAYOR ALIDADI A.
MINDALANO, ENG. RASHDI A. MINDALANO, MRS. PAISHA MINDALANO AGUAM, DATU
AZIS MINDALANO AGUAM, MRS. MOOMINA MINDALANO OMAR, DATU AMINOLA
MINDALANO OMAR, in behalf of the Mindalano Clan, ​respondents.

G.R. No. 76565 November 9, 1988

FACTS:
On 3 July 1986, 21 persons (Atty. Dimatimpos Mindalano, Atty. Mangorsi A. Mindalano, Shiek Edres
Mindalano, Sultan Guinar Mindalano, Farouk Calipa Mindalano, Sultan Mahadi Mindalano, Sultan
Khalid Mindalano, Sultan Ma-Amor Mindalano, Dr. Taher Mindalano, Datu Maguidala Mindalano,
Sobaida Magumpara Vda. De Mindalano, Raisha Mindalano Mandangan, Atty. Kimal M. Salacop, Datu
Kamar M. Mindalano, Mayor Raslani Mindalano, Vice-Mayor Alidadi A. Mindalano, Eng. Rashdi A.
Mindalano, Mrs.Paisha Mindalano Aguam, Datu Azis Mindalano Aguam, Mrs. Moomina Mindalano
Omar, Datu Aminola Mindalano Omar), claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late Amir Mindalano,
suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the entire Mindalano clan of Mindanao, filed a Complaint for
damages (Civil Case 81-86) before Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City charging the
Bulletin Publishing Corp. represented by its President, Martin Isidro and its Publisher, Apolonio batalla,
Ben F. Rodriguez, Fred J. Reyes, Jamil Maidan Flores, et. al. with libel.

The Mindalanos' action was anchored on a feature article written by Flores entitled "A Changing of the
Guard," which appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue of Philippine Panorama, a publication of Bulletin
Publishing Corporation. In particular, exception was taken to the following excerpt: "The division of
Lanao into Sur and Norte in 1959 only emphasized the feudal nature of Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao
politics and you find yourself confined to a small circle of the Alonto, Dimaporo, Dimakuta, Dianalan,
Lucman families and a few more. These are big, royal families. If you are a Maranaw with aspirations for
political leadership, you better be a certified bona fide member of one or several of these clans. xxx About
the only time that one who was not of any royal house became a leader of consequence in the province
was during the American era when the late Amir Mindalano held some sway.

That was because Mindalano had the advantage of having lived with an American family and was
therefore fluent and literate in English. But as soon as the datus woke up to the blessings of the
transplanted American public school system, as soon as they could speak and read and write in English,
political leadership again became virtually their exclusive domain. There must be some irony in that."

They alleged that, contrary to the article, the Mindalanos "belong to no less than 4 of the 16 Royal Houses
of Lanao del Sur," that the statement that the late Amir Mindalano, grand patriarch of the Mindalano clan,
had lived with an American family, a statement which, they alleged, apart from being absolutely false,
"has a distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society." Contending finally that Bulletin, et. al. had
with malice inflicted "so much damage upon the social standing of the plaintiffs" as to "irreparably injure"
the Mindalano name and reputation, and thus interposed a claim for the award of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, all in the aggregate amount of P2,350,000.00. Reacting
to the complaint, Bulletin, et. al. filed on 6 August 1986 a Motion to Dismiss urging that (a) venue had
been improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and (c) the complainants lacked
the capacity to bring the suit. In an Order dated 30 October 1986, however, Judge Edilberto Noel
(Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region with station in Marawi
City) denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed Bulletin, et. al. to file their answer to the complaint.
Bulletin, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Bulletin’s article, which did not include the late Amir Mindalano as a member of a royal
clan, be considered defamatory.

RULING:
In its entirety, the subject article "A Changing of the Guard" is in essence a popular essay on the general
nature and character of Mindanao politics and the recent emergence of a new political leader in the
province of Lanao del Sur. The essay is not focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his family. Save in
the excerpts complained about, the name of the Mindalano family or clan is not mentioned or alluded to in
the essay. The identification of Amir Mindalano is thus merely illustrative or incidental in the course of
the development of the theme of the article. The language utilized by the article in general and the above
excerpts in particular appears simply declaratory or expository in character, matter-of-fact and
unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or derisive implications or nuances appear detectable at all,
however closely one may scrutinize the above excerpts. There is no evidence of malevolent intent either
on the part of the author or the publisher of the article in the quoted excerpts. Further, although the Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that titles of royalty or nobility have been maintained and appear to be
accorded some value among some members of certain cultural groups in our society, such titles of royalty
or nobility are not generally recognized or acknowledged socially in the national community. No legal
rights or privileges are contingent upon grant or possession of a title of nobility or royalty and the
Constitution expressly forbids the enactment of any law conferring such a title. Thus, the status of a
commoner carries with it no legal disability. Assuming for present purposes only the falsity (in the sense
of being inaccurate or non-factual) of the description in the Panorama article of Amir Mindalano as not
belonging to a royal house, the Court believes that such a description cannot in this day and age be
regarded as defamatory, as an imputation of "a vice or defect," or as tending to cause "dishonor, discredit
or contempt," or to "blacken the memory of one who is dead" in the eyes of an average person in our
community. The above excerpts complained of do not disparage ar deprecate Maranao titles of royalty or
nobility, neither do they hold up to scorn and disrespect those who, Maranao or not, are commoners.
There is no visible effort on the part of Bulletin, et. al. to cast contempt and ridicule upon an institution or
tradition of members of a cultural or ethnic minority group, an "indigenous cultural community" in the
language of the Constitution, whose traditions and institutions the State is required to respect and protect.
What the Mindalanos assert is defamatory is the simple failure to ascribe to the late Amir membership in
a Maranao royal house, the ascription, in other words, to him of a factual condition shared by the
overwhelming majority of the population of this country, both Maranao and non-Maranao, Muslim and
non-Muslim.
In a community like ours which is by constitutional principle both republican in character and egalitarian
in inspiration, such an ascription, whether correct or not, cannot be defamatory. Furthermore, personal
hurt or embarassment or offense, even if real, is not, however, automatically equivalent to defamation.
The law against defamation protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as
good as one's character and conduct warrant" in the community and it is to community standards — not
personal or family standards — that a court must refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be
defamatory. Hence, the article "A Changing of the Guard" is clearly one of legitimate public interest.
The newspaper in the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press have kept well within the generally
accepted moral and civil standards of the community as to what may be characterized as defamatory. The
complaint in the court below failed to state a cause of action and should have been dismissed by the
Judge.
Santos v CA, G.R. No. L-45031 October 21, 1991
SANTOS vs. CA
Nanerico Santos vs. Court of Appeals
October 21, 1991
Fernan, C.J.
Petition for review

FACTS

February 23, 1970 – Nanerico Santos was a columnist of the Manila Daily Bulletin. He wrote in his
column an article entitled “Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.” which was quoted verbatim
from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 13
by Rosario Sandejas and her daughters charging CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its board
chairman and controlling stockholder Carlos Moran Sison and its president-general manager Luis Sison,
of engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market.

That same day, Carlos Moran Sison met with Santos so that he could submit to the columnist his reply
which he wanted published the next day and in the same column. However, since they met at 6:15 pm that
day, the reply could be published, not on the next day, but on February 25 because it wsa already past the
deadline for next day’s issue.

The reply was not published on Feb 25 as promised so Carlos Sison called Santos not to publish the reply
anymore as it would only rekindle the talks. Sison also informed Santos that he would be sued for libel, to
which Santos replied, “Well, sue me for libel.”

March 4 – Complaint for libel was lodged against Santos and other persons of the Manila Daily Bulletin
by Carlos and Luis Sison. (It’s interesting to note that a few weeks after the complaint, Santos’ weekly
column was stopped, ostensibly to cut down on overhead expenses brought about by the adoption of the
floating rate in foreign exchange.)
TC: convicted of libel
CA: affirmed conviction – The article in question is not a privileged communication. At the time the
complaint filed with SEC was published in the column of the accused, there was as yet no proceeding at
which both parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard. Publishing an article based upon a
complaint filed in CFI before any judicial action is taken thereon is not privileged as a report of a judicial
proceeding. The article is libellous. It imputes a crime to the private offended parties, that of ‘willful
violation of the provisions of the Securities Act and the implementing Rules and Regulations issued by
the commission’

ISSUES

1. WON the publication of a complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission before
any judicial action is taken thereon is privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding (YES)

2. If it is privileged, WON prosecution was able to establish malice (NO)

RATIO DECIDENDI
The publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith
and without comments or remarks, even before any judicial action, is privileged.

REASONING
1. YES
The applicable provision of law is Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code which states as
follows:
Art. 354. ​Requirement for publicity​. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Generally, malice is presumed (malice in law) in every defamatory imputation. This presumption,
however, does not arise if the communication is privileged under Article 354.
The character of the privilege is a matter of defense which may be lost by positive proof of express
malice. In other words, the onus of proving actual malice is placed on the plaintiff who must then
convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is accomplished, the
defense of privilege is unavailing.

Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co. (Justice Moreland)

It is generally agreed that the privilege, the right to publish without liability for damages, does not extend
to mere pleadings filed in court, as, for example, bills in equity, upon which there has been no action. The
reason for this rule is thus stated in Park v Detroit Free Press Co.: There is no rule of law which
authorizes any but the parties interested to handle the files or publish the contents of their matters in
litigation. If pleadings and the documents can be published to the world by any one who gets access to
them, no more effectual way of doing malicious mischief with impunity could be devised than filling
papers containing false and scurrilous charges, and getting these printed news.

However, ​this ruling in Barreto has been superseded by the ruling in ​Cuenco vs Cuenco​ (Justice
Esguerra):

The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged is not
only because said pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize,
but also due to the undeniable fact that said pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and
assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before
the courts for the proper administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern.
Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they can be
supported by evidence presented in good faith, the contents of which would be under the
scrutiny of courts, and therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties and illegal statements
contained therein.
We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and true report
of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a
decision promulgated should be covered by the privilege.
Manuel vs. Pano (Justice Cruz): ​The publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial
proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks, is privileged and comes under Item 2
of Article 354. It is no longer correct to state that Article 354 is not applicable because the published
complaint as filed would not by itself constitute a judicial proceeding, as the issues have not as yet been
joined. That doctrine established in the Barretto and Choa Tek Hee cases is no longer controlling and has
been superseded by the Cuenco case

2. NO
It is plainly evident from a reading of the published article itself that it is but a faithful reproduction of a
pleading filed before a ​quasi-judicial​ body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations, distortions or
defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them to
public contempt. What petitioner has done was to simply furnish the readers with the information that a
complaint has been filed against a brokerage firm. Then he proceeded to reproduce that pleading ​verbatim
in his column. Now this is decidedly part and parcel of petitioner's job as a columnist whose "beat"
happens to be the stock market. He is obligated to keep the public abreast of the current news in that
particular field.

The controversial publication being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and made
without malice, we find the author entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on
privileged matters under Article 354 (2). It follows that he cannot be held criminally liable for
libel.
DISPOSITIVE
Conviction of Nanerico Santos is set aside and he is hereby ACQUITTEDof the crime of libel.

Sazon v CA, G.R. No. 120715. March 29, 1996

SAZON v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120715 | March 29, 1996

FACTS:
· ​Sazon (petitioner) and Abdon Reyes (private complainant) ran in the election on the association of
homeowners of PML Homes. Petitioner was elected as a director and president of the association.
· ​Abdon Reyes contested the said election. He also wrote to his co-homeowners explaining to them
his election protest and urging them not to recognize Sazon and the other members who won in the
election.
· ​There was a leaflet received by the homeowners stating “Supalpal si Sazon” and A phrase
“SAZON, nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan?” was seen boldly written on the walls near the entrance of the
subdivision.
o ​There was no proof, however, as to who was responsible for these writings.
· ​Thinking that only Abdon could be responsible, Sazon wrote in an issue of PML-Homemakers an
article against Abdon using words such as ​mandurugas, mag-ingat sa panlilinlang, matagal na tayong
niloloko, may kasamang pagyayabang, ang ating pobreng super kulit, patuloy na kabulastugan,
mastermind sa paninirang puri.
· ​Aggrieved by the said article, Abdon filed a complaint against Sazon.
o ​RTC found petitioner guilty of libel
o ​CA affirmed
ISSUE:​ Whether or not the questioned article written by petitioner is libelous.
RULING:​ YES.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:
a. It must be defamatory
b. It must be malicious
c. it must be given publicity; and
d. the victim must be identifiable

· ​Petitioner concedes the existence of the third and fourth requisites in the case at bench.
Accordingly, only the first and second elements need to be discussed herein.
· ​According to petitioner, the word mandurugas and other words and phrases used in the questioned
article do not impute to private complainant any crime, vice or defect which would be injurious or
damaging to his name and reputation. As far as petitioner is concerned, the descriptive words and phrases
used should be considered as mere epithets which are a form of non-actionable opinion, because while
they may express petitioners strong emotional feelings of dislike, they do not mean to reflect adversely on
private complainants reputation.
o ​In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used
by him mean. Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner are shown by the very
recitals thereof in the questioned article. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it.
o ​A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand
that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient
to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.
o ​Branding Reyes mandurugas, et al. most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. No
amount of sophistical explanation on the part of petitioner can hide, much less erase, the negative
impression already created in the minds of the readers of the libelous material towards private
complainant.
o ​These words and phrases (mandurugas, et al.) are indisputably defamatory for they impute upon the
private complainant a condition that is dishonorable and shameful, since they tend to describe him as a
swindler and/or a deceiver.
· ​Petitioner also maintains that there was no malice in this case.
o ​Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - ​Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious​,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
o ​Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is defamatory, as in this case, ​the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already
presumes that the defendants imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the
defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of
malice. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden in the case before us.
· ​Petitioner however submits that malice should not be presumed in the instant case, but must be
proved as a fact (malice in fact), since the questioned article is a privileged communication covered under
the two exceptions enumerated under Article 354. He avers that he wrote the article not to malign the
private complainant, but merely to correct the misinformation being circulated by Reyes and some
quarters within the community about the petitioner and the association he heads. He did it therefore, in
response to some moral, social or civic duty as he was at that time the President of their homeowners
association and editor of its newsletter. Hence, the article falls under the first exception of Article 354.
o ​it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the pant of public
officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication
is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an
additional requirement. ​Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having
jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to
perform or interest in connection therewith.
o ​none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was vested with the power of
supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the
latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated among the public, as what the petitioner did in this case.
· ​petitioner alleges that the subject article likewise constitutes a fair and true report on the actuations
of a public official falling under the second exception of Article 354, since private complainant was a
public relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry at the time the allegedly libelous
article was published on February 10, 1984.
o ​the rule is that ​defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers
which are ​related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves
the truth of the imputation. But ​any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters
which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute libel.
o ​A perusal of the petitioners article reveals that it has no reference whatsoever to the performance of
private complainants position as a public relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry.
The article attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved on matters completely
unrelated to his official functions. It cannot therefore fall under the protective coverage of privileged
communication.

SLANDER
Reyes v Pp, G.R. Nos. L-21528 & L-21529, March 28, 1969
Victorio v CA, G.R. Nos. L-32836-37 May 3, 1989
Victorio v CA (1989)
Facts:
- Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practicing lawyer since 1926, has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel
Victorio in certain cases when Victorio decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in
place of Ruiz and his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Exequiel Victorio and his wife afterwards filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang which was
assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, for
investigation and disbarment proceedings against Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office of the Solicitor
General. Petitioner Daniel Victorio is the son of Exequiel Victorio.
- During the hearing of the administrative case on that particular afternoon of January 9, 1964 in
the sala of Judge Avanceña, Atty. Castillo, counsel of the Victorios, presented an urgent motion to
disqualify Judge Avanceña to hear the administrative case, who apparently taken aback, called down Atty.
Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for respondent Judge Guiang in the
administrative case, moved that Atty. Castillo be cited for contempt of court.
- After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down the corridor leading to
the stairs from the sala of Judge Avanceña, the incident that gave rise to the criminal prosecution for oral
defamation took place. The Victorios were overheard by Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabantuan to
have uttered this:
Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at
estapador."

Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana ta abogado
Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz
na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.")
- They were charged with the crime of Serious Oral Defamation. Trial court found them guilty. CA
affirmed the decision.

Issue: WON the Victorios were guilty of the crime. OR WON the words uttered constitute grave oral
defamation instead of merely light oral defamation.

Ruling: YES. The words uttered constituted grave oral defamation.

- The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base
and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means
of livelihood. Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight
oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished by ​arresto mayor in its maximum period
to ​prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the
penalty shall be ​arresto menor​ or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos."
- To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court is
guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other,
depending upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
- In this case, the Victorios admitted having uttered the defamatory words against Ruiz. They
called him “estapador”, which attributes to Ruiz the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation.
Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libelous ​per
se. Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade,
occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are slanderous ​per se. As the scurrilous
imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the
defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation. In addition, the fact that the offended
party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador",
imputed against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the
performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se.
- It was grave oral defamation. There was no reason for the Victorios to be angry at Ruiz who was
merely performing his duties as a lawyer of his client. Their anger was not lawfully caused. The fact that
the defamatory words were uttered by them without provocation from Ruiz and taken seriously by him,
renders the words to be one of grave oral defamation. As a matter of fact, the words were uttered in the
presence of at least 10 persons.

Pp v Orcullo, G.R. No. L-57103 January 30, 1982

People v Orcullo (1982)
Facts:
 - The people alleged that in 1978, a special counsel in the Office of the City Fiscal of CDO filed an
info charging Venida Peralta alias Edat Peralta with oral defamation for uttering the words "Hostess ug
nangabit, bisan unsa lang oten and nakapaslak "; which approximately means in English.- "A hostess and
has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina", or words of similar import, directed to the
said Lydia Flores, in the presence and with the hearing of many people, well-knowing that what she
uttered were not only defamatory but downright false, causing the offended party by said utterance to
suffer undue shame, public ridicule, disrepute, discredit and contempt, to the great damage and prejudice
of the said Lydia Flores.
- Peralta, on her comment, contended that the wordings "Hostess and has a paramour, any kind of
penis had penetrated your vagina" are in unequivocal terms and can be readily understood as imputing to
the offended party the commission of the act of adultery, she being a married woman, hence the crime
charged consists in the imputation of an offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and can be brought
only upon complaint filed by the offended party as provided in paragraph 5, Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code.
- The people submits that the remarks impute prostitution rather than adultery. Peralta said that the
remarks imputed adultery.

Issue: WON derogatory remarks — "A hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your
vagina" — imputes adultery or prostitution.

Ruling: The words uttered imputes the crime of prostitution. Remanded to the trial court.
- The word "hostess" has acquired a notorious connotation. It has a peculiar reference to one who
works in nightclubs and "misters to the pleasures of men for fee". The expression "any kind of penis had
penetrated your vagina" definitely describes and only refers to the work of a prostitute, and not that of a
mere adulteress.
- It must be pointed out that since the information does not allege the civil status of complainant as
married, she should be presumed to be single, and therefore the remarks must be understood as imputing
prostitution, and not adultery. Assuming ​arguendo that Lydia is married and that the remarks, while
imputing acts of prostitution to her and in effect charged her with adultery, the information can still be
filed without her complaint.
- As thus alleged it is clear that, while the utterance in effect also imputed on her the commission of
adultery, the offended party being a married woman, the disreputable conduct she was particularly
charged with was the crime of prostitution, not adultery. And it may be pointed out that prostitution and
adultery are not one and the same thing. The essential element in prostitution is not simply a woman's
entering into marital relations with a man other than her husband, if she happens to be married, but the
existence of pecuniary or financial gain as inducement to, or consideration for, that woman's engaging in
sexual activities. ​Thus, to call a married woman a prostitute is not merely to proclaim her an adulteress a
violator of her marital vows: it is to charge her of having committed an offense against public morals, of
moral degeneracy far exceeding that involved in the maintenance of adulterous relations.
- Indeed, the words quoted in the information are indubitably an imputation of the crime of
prostitution which can be prosecuted ​de oficio​. It must be noted that it is only when derogatory remarks
clearly and categorically reflect the elements constituting adultery would the complaint for libel by the
offended party be necessary to commence prosecution. In this case, however, the derogatory remarks of
accused-respondent, not only do not clearly show the elements of adultery, but on the contrary, such
remarks indubitably impute the crime of prostitution. Therefore, the information for libel can be filed
without the complaint of the offended party.

[GROUP 1]
INCRIMINATION OF AN INNOCENT PERSON
Pp v Alagaan, 16 SCRA 879

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Pp v Cano, 17 SCRA 237
Ibabao v Pp, 132 SCRA 217
Buerano v CA, G.R. No. L-30269 July 19, 1982
Gan v CA, G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
Carillo v Pp, G.R. No. 86890 January 21, 1994

RA 10175 Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012

TERESITA G. NARVASA, ​petitioner,​ ​vs.​ BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ, JR., ​respondent

G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010

FACTS:
Three women employees of the Municipality of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya filed complaints for sexual
harassment against the municipal assessor Benjamin Sanchez Jr.
These were the acts of harassment committed by respondent:

a. against Mary Gay dela Cruz- giving notes saying, “I like you”, and sending a text message which says,
“Mary Gay..​ang tamis ng halik mo​.”
b. against Zenaida Gayaton- sending text messages such as: “​pauwi ka na ba sexy​?”, “I like you”, “have a
date with me”, “I slept and dreamt nice things about you”
c. against Teresa Narvasa- respondent pulled her towards him and attempted to kiss her

Mayor Marvic Padilla found respondent guilty for the three complaints for sexual harassment. He was
meted out the penalties of reprimand for his 1​st offense and 30 days suspension for his 2​nd offense.
However, as regards his third offense which is also against Narvasa, he was deemed to have committed
grave sexual harassment for which he was dismissed from government service.
Sanchez appealed to the CSC who only passed upon the decision on the case filed by Narvasa since the
penalty of reprimand and suspension for not more than 30 days cannot be appealed. The CSC affirmed the
penalty of dismissal. However, upon appeal to the CA, the same court downgraded the offense to simple
misconduct and meted the appeal to suspension for one month and a day.
ISSUE: WON the sexual harassment committed by Sanchez against Narvasa constitutes grave or simple
misconduct.

RULING:

It constitutes grave misconduct. ​Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a

rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to
or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.

Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional.
Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was
impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that
petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt
to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent
were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored
petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation.

Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is a

double-edged sword. In fact, respondent’s long years of government service should be seen as a factor
which aggravated the wrong that he committed. Having been in the government service for so long, he,
more than anyone else, should have known that public service is a public trust; that public service requires
utmost integrity and strictest discipline, and, as such, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity.