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1. Introduction
Pension policy PAYG is that payments by currently working generation finance transfer to
the currently retired.
Currently a large working population is supporting a relatively small, retired population, the
opposite will be true in another generation.
PAYG social security schemes was good if demographic equilibrium had been maintained.
Population aging has but intolerable strain on the early promises that were made
Figures from Chand and Jaeger 1996 shows the appeal of policies designed to have each
generation provide to a greater extent for its own retirement is understandable.
Many countries shift to reform self-provision and privatisation
Chand Jaeger estimates an aggregate 82% includes by 2050
Asia (65 and over): 1990 100 Million & 2050500 Million approximately (Need for
optimising retirement plans)
Things to consider of transitioning to retirement
1. Chronological age must be distinguished from functional age,
E.g. 55 years old is still working age in Japan but not Afghanistan.
2. Women live longer than men, and are more likely to end up living alone.
3. Approximately 1/4 old person 60+ is “very old- 75+” and 2/3 of these people are women.
Reasons for retirement social security programs: Redistribution, market failure, paternalism
(related to inadequate saving for retirement) and administrative efficiency in social insurance
delivery.
Redistribution: the intra0 and inter-generational aspects of redistribution and the importance of a
life cycle perspective.
Market Failure: adverse selection in the life annuity market, absence of adequate inflation insurance
E.g. social allocation of risk. Gordon and Varian (1988) emphasised the
intergenerational risk sharing function of social security, the idea that private markets
will not be able to allocate risk efficiently between generations that are alive and those
which are unborn.
Efficient allocation of retirement risks between live cohorts of different ages will be
difficult to achieve.
Projection: Single male weekly average earnings over 35 years, $A1 million in order to
retire with income which is equivalent to 65% preretirement income.
Life events are unplanned. We don’t know retirement age, illness or retrenchment.
Longevity is hard to predict.
Existence of government policies may themselves discourage adequate voluntary life
cycle saving. Tax twice, but consumption is once.
Private insurance against early retirement is expensive, if even offered at all.
Parametric reform: In PAYG plan, possible to reform by altering the values of one more key
parameters.
Critical parameters: Number of beneficiaries & works, contribution rate & value of the
benefit.
Increase in eligibility age = reduce beneficiaries & increase contributing workers
Alter survivorship provision= reduce beneficiaries
Cutting back disability benefits = increase number of contributing workers
Modification of indexation provisions= Reduce contribution rates
Structural reform: Any change that alters policy design rather than just its parameters.
E.g. Chile reformed its PAYG pension system in 1981, Australia has superannuation guarantee.
All structures with privately managed second pillars share many of the same challenges in
reform and implementation.
From a list of 22 countries (Added private mandatory second pillars)
- 6 High income countries, 10 Latin America, 5 socialist countries.
- All high income country reforms, involved adding a tier to an existing system to
converting a voluntary scheme into a mandatory one.
The US Debate (1990s reforming the PAYG, DB social security system) could use in discussions.
Comparisons
Coverage risk: statistical risk of a labour force participant falling outside the coverage
Replacement rate risk: Retire will not have enough income to maintain standard of living
after retiring
Investment Risk: Possibility amount saved for retirement is inadequate. Money invested will
perform
Longevity Risk: Retiree will exhaust retirement saved before he dies
Inflation risk: Risk of price increases which erode the purchasing power of lifetime savings
Criteria for the whole economy:
Price distortion: main sources of distortion Income tax & social welfare safety net
Market failure: markets for financial instruments designed to facilitate a stable retirement
income flow are likely to fail in the absence of government intervention.
Myopia: Short-sighted in lifetime economic planning, not to provide adequately for their
retirement.
Saving: Adequacy of saving rate. Savings undertaken by future working population declines
because of low numbers,
1.7 Challenges in Private Mandatory Retirement Policy Design
What challenges?
- Fully funded = Net rates of return are essential.
- Privately administered= governance needs to be specified, keep low overhead costs
- Stems from DC Structure= inter-cohort risk sharing needs attention
- Retirement streams sold privately = adverse selection must be addressed
Summary Week 2 It’s over BLAKE 2000!
PAYG: Benefits are paid out of current income (e.g. government general revenue)
Funded: Accumulation of assets to provide for future liabilities. (Youth to old age)
Disadvantage: Operating costs associated with running, may also take 1.5%-2.5% in
administration costs (BLAKE,2000).
- An estimated 10-20% lost in contributions due to fees alone
- Loss in initial marketing and set-up -> Charges are front-loaded at start of scheme
Typically DB Contributions are 5-6% where as DC Contributions are 9.5%-12% to
2.2.2 Decumulation Phase: Annuities
These options embodied in DB schemes are exchange options (variant of Black Scholes)
Asset-liability management involves constructing a portfolio of financial assets matches the pension
liability in two factors, size and volatility
1. If pensions are always funded, assets are always sufficient to meet liabilities in full
2. If assets in the pension fund are selected so that aggregate volatility matches the volatility of
the liability. Surplus risk reduced to 0, which implies options in the DB schemes can be issued
free of charge
DC pensions on retirement date depends entirely on the value of funds’ assets on that date.
With Db schemes, the investment performance of the fund’s assets are of no direct relevance to the
scheme member, since the pension depends on the final salary and years of service, not investment
performance. However, invesment performance is critical to the size of the pension of the DC
Scheme, scheme members bear all the investment risk.
4.1% point difference between the best and worst firms in the UK for 40 years could mean a
3.2 times larger accumulated fund. 5.9% = 5.3 times larger etc