Laser satellite ranMa as a hazard to

overflyingaircraft- -
G.J. PERT

The probability of a laser beam striking an aircraft and causing eye damage
to an occupant during a laser ranging experiment is considered. A general
formula for the probability is obtained. Application of the formula to a
typical case shows that one such incident might occur every year unless
precautions are taken to avoid them.

The use of laser ranging to measure satellite and lunar The probability of an aircraft entering the light circle in rt
orbits to a high accuracy is by now well established. How- is N(?rD2+ Dmt).However, of these only those within
ever, it is also well known that intense laser radiation can the circle whilst the laser is on will be hit. If an aircraft flight
cause eye damage. In this note we derive a simple formula path intersects the light circle over a distance x then the
to calculate the probability that an overflying aircraft may probability that it will be hit
be struck by a ranging beam, if no precautions are taken
p = Min [(x/X + q/rs), l] (3)
to avoid such occurrences.
where X = VT,. Hence, averaging across the light circle,
We first consider the simplest case where all aircraft fly at the probability that an aircraft entering the light circle
the same height h. The laser beam then intersects the air- will be hit.
craft plane in a circle of radius R. We assume the aircraft
may be represented by a moving circle of radius 1, where q/r, + D/X (0, + lYi
sin26,) X(1 - q/r,) < 20
21 is typical the fuselage length. The aircraft is therefore P=
struck by the laser if the centres of the laser beam and the
q/r,•tn/2 D/X X(1 - q/r,) > 20
(
fuselage come closer than a distance D while the laser is (4)
switched on. Clearly: where sin 8, = X(1 - 7t/rS)/2D. Hence the net probabi-
(~+R)>D>R (1) lity of striking an aeroplane during a laser run is given by:

Let us suppose the laser is switched on for a time r, then piV(nD'

the probability of an aircraft being hit is N(?rD't DVT)
where N is the density of aircraft over the flight plane and
v the relative speed between the plane and the beam,
assumed constant for the present, for all aircraft. In general
in a ranging experiment the signal consists of a series of
pulses each of length q, separated by a time 7,. In order to
calculate the probability of an aircraft being hit during a train
of pulses we cannot simply multiply the result thus obtained
by the number of laser pulses, unless the distribution of
aircraft at successive pulses is uncorrelated. This will occur
over some time T, due to wind or pilot manipulation. We
may distinguish two limiting cases:
1 The correlation time is short (7, < rS). The proba-
bility of an aircraft being hit is then:
nN(nD' + Duq)
where n is the total number of laser pulses.
2 The correlation time is long compared to the total
sending time (rt) (T, S TV).
The author is with the Department of Applied Physics, University
of Hull, Hull, HU6 7RX, UK. Received 26 July 1977
+ Dmt) (5)
In general correlation times are likely to be long, but the
total laser sending time relatively short, so that condition
2 will usually occur in practice.
We now include the probability that a passenger will look
at the laser and suffer eye damage. If there are M people in
the plane who can see the ground (in many aircraft M is
only about 10% of the total number of passengers) and
the probability of any person looking in the laser direction
is $, the probability of a passenger looking at the laser
is M$, assuming people look around at random. If the dia-
meter is small compared to the average passenger spacing,
the probability of the laser beam itself striking anybody
is small, thus the probability of a passenger strike is further
reduced by a factor of R2/D2, assuming the beam is large
(2) compared to an individual’s eye-spacing. Thus, if the solid
angle of acceptance of the eye is 52, the probability of at
least one person seeing the laser is:
9 = Min (MR2Jl/D2,
l), $I < !22/4n (6)
At high laser energy (6) may seriously underestimate \k as
diffuse reflection and scattering from the aircraft can also
lead to eye damage. The magnitude of this effect is diffi-

OPTICS AND LASER TECHNOLOGY. APRIL 1978 77

cult to assess, and for safety it may be preferable to put Table 1. Laser characteristics
\k= 1 if the intensity is sufficient to make this effect
likely. Hence, we obtain the probability that at least one
Pulse energy 1 mJ
person will look at the laser during an experiment:
Pulse duration 100 ps
P = p\kN(7rD2 + DVTt) (7) Pulse repetition rate 10 Hz
We may simply generalize this formula to consider aircraft
Beam divergence 100 prad
at various heights h and speeds v. Thus if the number of
aircraft per unit volume of air space with relative speed Beam width at laser 1 cm diameter
v --f (V + dv) isN(v, h)dv:

p= ho ‘PN(v, h) p (v,D) [no” + Dvq] dh dv
s 0
where h, is the maximum height at which the laser can
cause eye damage. D is a function of h. Assuming no scat-
tering, eye damage will only occur in the light cone of the
laser, so that:
R = [R,2 + (hG)21s
where R, is the initial beam radius and $ the angular diver-
gence of the beam. If strong scattering occurs, for example
in cloud, then the effective radius of the damage circle:
Rd = n,os@/2n&
where n, and u, are the density and cross-section of scatter,
@ the total laser flux and Id the intensity of the eye-damage
threshold. If this effect occurs:
D%R+Rd+l
However, since the return signal from the satellite would
be lost by the scattering it is unlikely that experiments
would be performed under these conditions, and this
case is probably therefore unimportant.
The maximum height at which damage occurs in the absence
of scatter is given by:
nR(h,) 2 = @lr,
Since the photo-electron return is proportional to E/$J~, the
maximum damage height is dependent only on the return
signal strength. A modification to this result may occur as
a result of atmospheric refractive index fluctuations. These
contribute two important effects:
Beam steering and dispersion. Refractive index fluc-
tuations whose scale size is of the same order as the
beam width wiIl tend to steer the beam, and small
ones to increase the angular divergence. The net
effects of both these phenomena is to increase the
effective beam radius R, by increasing the effective
angular divergence of the beam by an amount equal to
the atmospheric seeing angle - typically about 5 s.
Scintillation. As a result of small scale refractive
index variations across the beam, different rays will
have different optical paths which may lead to a
local enhancement of intensity by interference. We
may equivalently consider this enhancement as due
to a lensing effect of the fluctuations. It is at present
difficult to assess the magnitude of this effect, but
we consider that it is extremely unlikely in practice
to lead to an increase in intensity of greater than a
factor of four, and probably much less than this.
An estimate of the value of h, is given by taking the safety
limits for eye damage’ : 1O-s J cmm2 for normal conditions
with an upper limit of 1.5 x 10” J cmd2. Thus for a laser
energy of 1 J and beam divergence 1 mrad there is no pro-
(8)
bability of eye damage in aircraft above 60 km, and the
likelihood of serious damage at altitudes above 1 250 m is
probably small. However, in such matters it is better to err
on the safe side and we therefore consider 10 km as an
upper limit for damage under these laser conditions.
As an example of the use of these formula, consider the
(9) following case proposed as a system for use at Hull Univer-
sity, which can be considered typical for a repetitively pul-
sed satellite ranging system. The laser gives a return of about
0.01 photo-electron per shot from an output of 1 mJ at the
second harmonic of Nd-glass (0.053 nm). The natural beam
(10) divergence of the laser is reduced by telescoping to about
100 mad in a beam about 1 cm diameter. With this system
there is a possibility of eye damage at altitudes below - 15
km, above most aircraft flight altitudes. The laser character-
istics are summarized in Table 1. The aircraft characteristics
(11) at Hull, which is away from any airline flight lanes, are given
in Table 2.
Assuming that the laser beam is stationary, ie not used in a
tracking mode (so that v is the aircraft speed) and that the
beam is vertical so that R a h@ <I and D m 1. With these
parameters it is readily shown that (4) and (5) reduce to:
7.r D
pa--andPa ; D2Nr,/r, (13)
2 VT’,
(12)
Hence the probability of hitting an aircraft in unit time is
given by:
rr D’N/r, = IO4 s-’
2
Thus one aircraft will be hit during lo6 s or 10 days of laser
running time. It is difficult to assess the likelihood of pass-
enger injury unless more details are known as to the type
of aircraft involved SO that \k can be assessed, or the average
laser usage, taking into account cloud cover etc. Taking the
worst case that \k = 1 and a daily laser usage of 1 h, we
conclude that an exposure above a threshold of lo* J cma2
is likely to occur once every year, unless precautions are
taken to gate the laser.
The probability given by (14) is typical of this hazard with
lasers since for I - 10 m, equation (1) ensures that D is
independent of the beam divergence for values of @5 1
mrad, which is too large to allow a reasonable return signal.
Table 2. Aircraft characteristics at Hull
Density of aircraft lo4 rn-’
Aircraft speed 200 ms-’
Aircraft height 10km
Aircraft length 10 m

78 OPTICS AND LASER TECHNOLOGY. APRIL 1978

Thus iff= l/rs is the laser repetition frequency, we consider
that typically:
Probability per unit time - lo-’ f s-l (15)
At present most satellite and lunar ranging stations operate
non-repetitively with a frequency % 10m2 Hz, with an expo-
sure once every 1000 years, which is perhaps an acceptable
level of hazard. However, the next generation of systems,
which will be similar to that described above, will require
some protection against this danger.
More recent safety standards are more tolerant than those
used above. Thus a preliminary revision of BS. 48032
gives a maximum permissible exposure (MPE) for ruby or
second harmonic Nd-glass pulses of 1 ns duration of
5 x lob7 J cm-‘. Due to non-linear effects in the eye
this value must be scaled linearly with intensity for sub-
nanosecond pulses3 giving an MPE of 5 x lo* J cmw2
for 100 ps pulses, ie five times that used earlier, and
corresponds to a decrease in the maximum height for
damage, h, of a factor 5”. This revised value of h, - 5 km,
which assuming aircraft uniformly distribution in height
corresponds to a decrease in probability by a similar factor.
We must emphasis that the results given above should be
considered as an example, and that the probability for
individual laser systems must be evaluated with the appro-
priate parameters.
Conclusions
Based on these results we make the following recommend-
ations:
The probability of an aircraft strike is not negligible,
and should be estimated during system design.
Laser ranging stations should be sited away from
regular flightways. A site with as low an aircraft den-
sity as possible, consistent with other requirements,
should be chosen.
If the mean strike frequency is unacceptably high,
a gating system (probably lock-out radar) must be
employed.
Visible repetitively pulsed lasers are likely to attract
the attention of passengers and are therefore to be
OPTICS AND LASER TECHNOLOGY. APRIL 1978
avoided if possible. However, constraints introduced
by the return signal detector may override this.
The system should be operated at the minimum
return count rate per shot consistent with the coun-
ting statistics, in order to reduce the maximum
height, h,, at which eye-damage is caused.
Sub-nanosecond lasers should be operated at as long
a pulse length as possible, consistent with the accuracy
required.
As shown by equation (6) a significant improvement
in protection results if R < D, ie from equation (9)
if 4 is small. For a Gaussian beam of wavelength; h:
4 = h/2% (16)
so that the minimum spot radius 2% R, at height h
occurs if:
R, = Rapt = I&h/2n (17)
The actual laser may be matched to these values by a tele-
scope. For an average aircraft height, h, of 10 km at a wave-
length 0.53 nm, the initial optimal beam radius, Rapt = 3 cm.
This condition is, of course, subject to the comments on
diffusion and scattering following equation (7).
Finally before concluding we should like to draw attention
to the possible hazard incurred in visual displays by upward
directed cw lasers, as in the recent exhibition held in London,
where the air-traffic density is high. The probability of an
accident is given by equation (2). Thus, for example, at a
densityN - lOa rnb2 - equal to a low density site,
D- 10mandv - 100 m s-’ , we obtain a probability
- 10” s-r, equal to that of a 10 Hz ranging system.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank R.L. Hyde for numerous discussions
on the application of these criterion to the propesed Uni-
versity of Hull satellite ranging system.
References
1 Clark, A.M. ‘Ocular hazards’ in Handbook of Lasers. Ed. R.J.
Pressley (Chemical Rubber Company, Cleveland, 1971) 8-9
2 BS 4803 (revised). Protection of personnel against hazards
from laser radiation (British Standards Institution, London)
3 Tozer, B.A. Private communication
79