AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION

1. Mendez vs People

Facts:

Dr. Joel Mendez was the sole proprietor of 6 different business. He failed to file an income tax
return during the taxable years 2001-2013. A complaint was filed by the BIR, and subsequently
an Information was filed against him in the Court of Tax Appeals for violation of Art. 255 of the
Tax Code. After his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information.
Petitioner failed to file a comment and so the motion was granted. He now assails the validity of
the amended information in a Petition for Certiorary and Prohibition contending that the
prosecution’s amendment is a substantial amendment prohibited because its additional
allegations alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to him and affect the
form of his defense and that he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are
substantial in nature and must be denied.

Ruling:
No. The change in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase “for income
earned” is only consistent with the allegation in the information since the petitioner failed to file
his income tax for 2001, the filing of which could only be done in April of 2002, the deadline for
the filing of the return. The phrase “for income earned” added before the phrase “for the taxable
year of 2001” cannot be a formal amendment since the added phrase merely states with
additional precision something that is already contained in the original information, the income
return being filed precisely for the income earned for the preceding taxable year.
 2. People v Delfin
Facts:
On the night of 27 Sept 2000, one Emilio Enriquez was killed after being gunned down at a store
just across his home. Rael Delfin was charged with the murder of Emilio before the RTC
Malabon. Part of the information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a gun, with intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said weapon one EMILIO ENRIQUEZ, hitting
the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot wound, which caused his
immediate death. CONTRARY TO LAW.
The RTC found him guilty and the CA affirmed.
In his appeal to the SC, Delfin assails the validity of the information under which he was tried
and convicted. He specificially points out to the discrepancy between the date of the commission
of the murder and the one actually established during trial. He alleged that failure to accurately
allege the date of the commission violates his right and impairs his ability to prepare an
intelligent defense.

Issue:
Whether or not the date of the commission of the murder would render the information against
Delfin invalid.

Ruling:
No. We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried, and
convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in
the information and as established during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not
necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules
of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of
commission be approximated:1
 3. People v. Andrade (November 2014)

Important note: It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect in the information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order the amendment to be made.

Facts:
On June 30, 2003, a random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP)
wherein the urine samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to drug
testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical Technologist of the Alpha
Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine samples
tested positive.

All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on June 29,
2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006. On August 29,
2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged
in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165, further contending that
they were never apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug or for violating the
provisions of RA 9165, which would warrant drug testing and serve as basis for filing the proper
information in court. In fact, they were merely called to the Maximum Security Conference Hall
in the morning of June 30, 2003 and with seventeen (17) other inmates made to undergo drug
testing, pursuant to the directive. It was only after they were found positive for dangerous drugs
that the information for Violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed against each of them. They
were also not informed of the results of the screening test, thus depriving them of the right to
challenge the same through a confirmatory drug test within the required fifteen (15)-day period
after receipt of the positive result.

The RTC Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial and trial, GRANTED the
Motion to Dismiss finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information.
Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari in CA, but was DENIED. Hence this petition

ISSUE: WON CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of respondents' motion and eventually
dismissing the case based on lack of probable cause

HELD: YES. Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that
in a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the
motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. The RTC judge's determination of
probable cause should have been only limited prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not
after the arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether
there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of
probable cause exists.

The RTC should not have ruled on whether or not there is probable cause to hold respondents
liable for the crime committed since its duty is limited only to the determination of whether the
material averments in the complaint or information are sufficient to hold respondents for trial.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion to
quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to
be filed by respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the Information and
in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the Information without
dismissing the case. Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states
that if the ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment If it is
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be
given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be
granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. In the present case, the RTC judge
outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the
defect in the Informations. The CA, however, still upheld the ruling of the RTC, stating that
"whatever perceived error the trial court may have committed is inconsequential as any
intended amendment to the informations filed surely cannot cure the defects,"32 and to justify
such conclusion, the CA proceeded to decide the merits of the case based merely on the
allegations in the Information. Such pronouncement, therefore, is speculative and premature
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence or, to at least, amend the
Informations. Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present its
evidence in court or to amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right to due
process.
 4. Kummer v. People of the Philippines
September 11, 2013 Facts:

An information was filed against petitioner Leticia Kummer and her son, Johan, a minor, for
homicide. According to the prosecution's evidence, on June 19, 1988 Jesus Mallo, the victim,
accompanied by Amiel Malana went to the house of Kummer. When Kummer opened the door,
her son Johan shot Mallo twice. Kummer denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she
and her children were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988. The prosecution filed an
information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against the petitioner and Johan. Both accused
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the
trial on the merits accordingly followed. Meanwhile, the prosecutor made some amendment in
the date of the complaint that was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only
one month. Both RTC and Court of Appeals found both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Petitioner questioned the sufficiency of prosecution’s
evidence. She claimed that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she
was convicted.

Issue: Whether or not the change in the date of commission of crime requires formal
amendment of complaint

Held: Kummer’s interpretation is erroneous. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a
formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court
and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in
or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the offended party.

Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show
that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of
only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence
cited above, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal
amendment — it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the
offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not
prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the
amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also
true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment
was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
It bears to be remembered that a change in date of the complaint does not entail an new
arraignment so long as the date is not a material element to the crime charged.

Conviction affirmed.

5. Leviste vs. Alameda

G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010

FACTS:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with
homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The
private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the
deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on
record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter
issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the
Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner
questioned these two orders before the appellate court.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not
guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex
Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the
crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended
Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's
decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of
the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to
the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to
ask for a preliminary investigation.
RULING:
Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test
as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether
any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other.
An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance. here is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of
determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of
murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence
on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe
the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the
reinvestigation.

6. People vs. Sandiganbayan

September 9, 2015, G.R. NO. 160619
FACTS
Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite was charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,[3] in relation to the alleged illegal
operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. The information
alleged that while in the performance of his official functions, Castillo gave unwarranted benefits
to his co-accused by allowing them to operate the dumpsite without the requisite Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Dismiss or
Terminate Proceedings arguing that the case against him had been decriminalized by Section 37
of Republic Act No. 9003. Subsequently, Castillo also filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense invoking the ruling in
Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan asserting that the claim of undue injury must be "specified,
quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty." The Sandiganbayan allowed the quashal
of the Information due to the prosecution's failure to (1) allege, with precision, the exact amount
of benefits granted by Castillo to the Arciagas and (2) specify, quantify and prove "to the point of
moral certainty" the undue injury caused to the people.
ISSUE
What ultimate facts are required to be stated in an Information charging an accused with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Specifically, whether an Information alleging the
grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must state the precise amount of
the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify, specify, and prove the alleged injury to the
point of moral certainty.
RULING
The Court disagrees with Sandiganbayan. For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the
offense have been alleged, an Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
need not state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted nor
specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue injury caused. We have
consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an Information need only state the
ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer details of why and how the crime was
committed.
As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by Castillo to
operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the applicable laws, rules, and
regulations; the undue injury being residents and students were made to endure the ill-effects of
the illegal operation. The details required by the Sandiganbayan are matters of evidence best
raised during the trial; they need not be stated in the Information. For purposes of informing
the accused of the crime charged, the allegation on the existence of unwarranted benefits and
undue injury under the Information suffices.
Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one considers
the period when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's arraignment and the
parties' presentation of their evidence. It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require
specific peso amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury - to the
point of moral certainty, no less — at this stage of the criminal proceedings.
The Llorente ruling has no application in this case because the import of the ruling therein is
that proof of undue injury must be established by the prosecution during the trial and not when
the Information is filed.
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and
the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an
Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the
Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through
an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to
be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only
result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
Even assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan should have first ordered
its amendment and not its quashal.