VALERIO KALAW V. MA.

ELENA FERNANDEZ

FACTS
In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his marriage with Ma. Elena Fernandez
be annulled on the ground that Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC, after hearing the
expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition, but on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the said decision. Tyrone appealed to the Supreme Court. In September
2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Tyrone filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822) should be reversed

HELD
Yes. Trial court’s findings of facts should be given due weight
The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by the RTC when the SC reviewed the
case in September 2011. The SC ruled that the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial
court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in
the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect. Therefore, it was not proper
for the SC to brush aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr.
Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the Tyrone’s version of
the events. The conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely
drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC
itself had accepted the veracity of the Tyrone’s factual premises. Respondent could also
establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse
The plaintiff in an annulment case under Article 36 carries the burden to prove the nullity of the
marriage, however, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could also establish the
psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse if the respondent raised the matter in her/his
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof.
Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if
psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null
and void.
Elena’s excessive mahjong sessions is indicative of her psychological incapacity. In the
September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the children of Tyrone and Elena testified that
although their parents have differences, both took good care of them. However, upon closer
look at the testimonies of the children, it was shown that Elena was too addicted to mahjong
that she would even bring her children to her mahjong sessions which were so frequent and
would last from early in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that the Elena brought her
children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties,
but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully
exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was
a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her
own personal and escapist desires. This revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral
and mental development.

JOCELYN SUAZO V. ANGELITO SUAZO

FACTS
In 1985, Jocelyn and Angelito Suazo met each other. They were just 16 years old at that time. In
1986, they got married before the Mayor of Biñan, Laguna. But their marriage did not turn out
to be ideal. It was Jocelyn who had to work while Angelito was lazy. When confronted by
Jocelyn, Angelito would beat her. Angelito was also constantly drunk. And in 1987, Angelito left
Jocelyn for another woman.
In 1997, Jocelyn filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated.
In court, Jocelyn presented Dr. Nedy Tayag who testified that based on her interview with
Jocelyn and the description fed to her by Jocelyn, she concluded that Angelito is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
The RTC voided the marriage but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage should be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity

HELD
No. The psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party
(Jocelyn), could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively
formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.
Further, habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Anent Angelito’s violent tendencies, physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral
or personality patterns, however, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. In this case, the psychologist failed to link the violence
to psychological incapacity. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical
beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement
of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence, specifically the requisites provided for in the case
of Santos vs CA.

MINORU FUJIKI V. MARIA PAZ MARINAY

FACTS
In January 2004, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in
the Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting,
married another Japanese citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and
Maekara later went to Japan.
In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinay’s marriage with Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back
home to the Philippines together.
In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled “Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)“. He filed the petition under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry).
Basically, Fujiki wanted the following to be done:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage); that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages”, a petition for such may only be filed by
the husband or wife or in this case either Maekara or Marinay only.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC is correct

HELD
No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. What’s applicable is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. As aptly commented by the Solicitor General:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons” in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, “[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x.” The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore
be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Thus:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
But how will Fujiki’s petition in the RTC prosper?
Fujiki needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.

RODOLFO ASPILLAGA V. AURORA ASPILLAGA

FACTS
In 1977, Rodolfo Aspillaga and Aurora Apon met each other in college. They became
sweethearts after 5 months of courtship. In 1982, they got married. In 1983, they again married
each other as a sign of affirmation of their love to each other. But in 1991, when Aurora
returned from Japan, she discovered that Rodolfo was living with her cousin. From that point,
their marital relations soured. In 1992, Rodolfo left Aurora to live with her cousin. In 1995,
Aurora filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that Rodolfo is psychologically
incapacitated. Dr. Eduardo Maaba evaluated Rodolfo and Aurora. After evaluation, he concluded
that both are psychologically incapacitated. He explained that due to Aurora’s dark and
traumatic childhood past, she has the tendency for self dramatization and attention getting
behavior. Lapses in judgment and shallow heterosexual relationship was projected. Sign of
immaturity and desire to regress to a lower level of development were likewise projected. Self-
esteem was also low. Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness and emptiness hamper her
objectivity. On the part of Rodolfo, the doctor found that: he is an intelligent adult male, who is
egoistic and harbors an inner sense of inadequacy, helplessness and anxiety in losing agility. He,
however, projects himself as dominant person, to cover his deep-seated insecurity and
inadequacy. He tends to be suspicious and blames others for his mistakes. He claims for
adulation, reassurance and attention from other people. These can be traced from an unhealthy
familial relationship during the early maturational development specifically in the form of a
domineering and protective maternal image.

ISSUE
Whether or not both are psychologically incapacitated

HELD
No. Dr. Maaba only found that Rodolfo and Aurora are suffering from psychological disorders
but not the kind contemplated under the law on psychological incapacity which renders them
incapable to perform essential marital obligations. Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case,
the foregoing were not met. Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that these personality traits or
psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover,
there is no evidence to prove that each party’s condition is so grave or is of such nature as to
render said party incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. There is
likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is incurable and permanent. Note also that
they actually had a good marriage at first and their quarrel only began when Rodolfo cheated on
her with her cousin, hence, the allege psychological incapacity was not proven to have existed
at the time of their marriage.

AURELIO V. AURELIO
FACTS

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March
23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94,
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both
she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their
respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of
psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony.
Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. It alleged among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack
of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of
his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His
moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family.

On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely.
Her feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-
to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature;
she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets
upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their
hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the
essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally
argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards
set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void

HELD

Petition denied. Marriage is null and void. First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court
finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint.
We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner
and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological
incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the
root causes. Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such
grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their
marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with
were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that “the husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.”

ALCAZAR V. ALCAZAR
FACTS
In August 2000, Rey Alcazar and Veronica Cabacungan married each other. They lived together
for three weeks thereafter, Rey went to Saudi Arabia to work. In Saudi, Rey never communicated
with Veronica despite Veronica’s efforts to reach him. In March 2002, Rey returned to the
Philippines but instead of going home to Veronica, he went straight to his parents. He did not
even tell Veronica that he was coming home. Veronica had to learn of his husband’s return from
someone else. Veronica went to Rey’s parents but Rey cannot be found there (hiding).
In August 2002, Veronica filed an annulment case against Rey. Initially, the ground for
annulment was based on paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code or Rey’s failure to
consummate the marriage. But later, the ground was changed to psychological incapacity
(Article 36).
During trial, Veronica presented Dr. Nedy Tayag as expert witness who testified that Rey is
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). Rey was found by Tayag to be having a
grandiose sense of self. He thinks he is too important, too unique, and too special.
Also alleged in the complaint for annulment was Rey’s alleged sexual infidelity because when he
came home from abroad, it was said that he lived with a certain “Sally” in his parent’s
hometown.

ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage between Veronica and Rey should be annulled

HELD
No. First, the Supreme Court noted that it is correct that Veronica abandoned her cause under
paragraph 5, Article 45. The said provision states:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other,
and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate
denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of
sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of
the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the
parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part
from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental
block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the
marriage act. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that Rey was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica. In fact, Veronica admitted that
she and Rey had sex before and after the wedding. Thus, incapacity to consummate does not
exist int his case.
Second, psychological incapacity was not proven. Tayag’s testimony on Rey’s NPD was not
sufficient to establish psychological incapacity. The case between Veronica and Rey is merely a
simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with
the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his
wife. To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.
Lastly, the allegation of sexual infidelity on the part of Rey is a poor attempt to bolster the claim
against Rey. Sexual infidelity per se is not psychological incapacity. Veronica failed to establish
that Rey’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

CAMACHO-REYES V REYES
FACTS

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were
simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP
Los Baños campus. Their relation quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright,
although he did not follow conventions and traditions. Petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of
courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a
university student’s budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by
the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking
marijuana.

On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living
expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were
spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance
of ₱1,500.00 from his salary.

After a while the defendant resigned in the family business and then ventured to start his own
which resulted in him leaving his family for to manage his businesses. In the end, his business
venture resulted in failure.

The couple became estrange due to the defendant’s apparent lack of interest in the petitioner
and their children and the subsequent extra-marital affair.

ISSUE

Whether or not the defendant suffers Psychological Incapacity before the time of his marriage
with the petitioner which causes their marriage void ab initio.

RULING

Perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts
showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said
Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the
marriage x x x

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his
separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we
find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No.
89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and
VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.

AZCUETA V REPUBLIC

FACTS

Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. They got married on July 24,
1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City. At the time of their marriage, petitioner was
23 years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They
have no children.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch
72, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.
Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon
him. Because of this, the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation
whether there was collusion between the parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor
Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between the parties.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to
petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt
himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked
his mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found
them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.
Petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent
towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month
and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say
that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a
child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner requested that
they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did
not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her.
But he did not.

Petitioner presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining
petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent,
very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition in life. She also observed that
petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that
based on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas
concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose
response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-
confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other
people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was a cross-identification
with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondent’s
father was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began during
the early stages in his life but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According to
Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because he will not be able to make and to
carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable because it started in
early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.

ISSUE

Whether or not the defendant’s perceived psychological capacity is enough to declare their
marriage void ab initio.

RULING

Yes, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his
responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to
support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding
even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot
contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

The Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those
instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time
and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of
psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and
medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional
gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the
financial and material support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that
the family should be an "autonomous" social institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and
are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the
spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on
mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of
marriage. This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te: In dissolving marital bonds on
account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation
of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential
marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted
that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

CORPUZ V SOLGEN

FACTS

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.

January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. In its October 30,
2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerberts petition.

ISSUE

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
is valid according to his or her national law. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera] In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a
foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
 PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL

FACTS

On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the RegionalTrial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is
a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal
case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. Petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.

ISSUE

Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

RULING

No. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,
which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in
the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolutionof their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage

between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that

“the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a
criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the
Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court
declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.”

ANNULMENT: A BRIEF BACKGROUND + APPLICABLE LAWS

Is divorce allowed under Philippine laws?

No, divorce is not allowed in the Philippines. However, there are certain instances wherein the
divorce secured abroad by the foreigner-spouse, and even by former Filipinos, are recognized
under Philippine laws. More discussion here (Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce Decree).

Would it make any difference if I marry abroad where divorce is allowed?

No. Filipinos are covered by this prohibition based on the “nationality principle”, regardless of
wherever they get married (and regardless where they get a decree of divorce). Discussions
relating to Overseas Filipinos or OFWs are transferred in Part V.

Is “annulment” different from a “declaration of nullity” of marriage?

Yes. In essence, “annulment” applies to a marriage that is considered valid, but there are
grounds to nullify it. A “declaration of nullity” of marriage, on the other hand, applies to
marriages that are void or invalid from the very beginning. In other words, it was never valid in
the first place.

Also, an action for annulment of voidable marriages may prescribe, while an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage does not prescribe.

So, if a marriage is void from the very beginning (void ab initio), there’s no need to file
anything in court?

For purposes of remarriage, there must be a court order declaring the marriage as null and void.
Entering into a subsequent marriage without such court declaration means that: (a) the
subsequent marriage is void; and (b) the parties open themselves to a possible charge
of bigamy.

What if no marriage certificate could be found?

Justice Sempio-Dy, in the “Handbook of on the Family Code of the Philippines” (p. 26, 1997
reprint), says: “The marriage certificate is not an essential or formal requisite of marriage
without which the marriage will be void. An oral marriage is, therefore, valid, and failure of a
party to sign the marriage certificate or the omission of the solemnizing officer to send a copy of
the marriage certificate to the proper local civil registrar, does not invalidate the marriage. Also
the mere fact that no record of marriage can be found, does not invalidate the marriage
provided all the requisites for its validity are present.” (Citations omitted)

Can I file a petition (annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage) even if I am in a

foreign country?

Yes, the rules recognize and allow the filing of the petition by Filipinos who are overseas.

What are the grounds for annulment?

1. Lack of parental consent in certain cases. If a party is 18 years or over, but below 21, and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents/guardian. However, the marriage
is validated if, upon reaching 21, the spouses freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife.

2. Insanity. A marriage may be annulled if, at the time of marriage, either party was of unsound
mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife.

3. Fraud. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife. Fraud includes: (i) non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the
other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; (ii) concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; (iii) concealment
of sexually transmissible disease or STD, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or (iv) concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or
lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. However, no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds
for action for the annulment of marriage.

4. Force, intimidation or undue influence. If the consent of either party was obtained by any of
these means, except in cases wherein the force, intimidation or undue influence having
disappeared or ceased, the complaining party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife.

5. Impotence. At the time of marriage, either party was physically incapable of consummating
the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable.
Impotence is different from being infertile.

6. STD. If, at the time of marriage, either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. If the STD is not serious or is curable, it
may still constitute fraud (see No. 3 above).

What if a spouse discovers that his/her spouse is a homosexual or is violent, can he/she ask
for annulment?

Homosexuality or physical violence, by themselves, are not sufficient to nullify a marriage. At

the very least, however, these grounds may be used as basis for legal separation.

How is “legal separation” different from annulment?

The basic difference is this – in legal separation, the spouses are still considered married to each
other, and, thus, may not remarry.

Is legal separation faster than annulment?

Not necessarily. The petitioner in a legal separation, just like in an annulment, is still required to
prove the allegations contained in the petition. More important is the mandatory 6-month
“cooling off” period in legal separation cases. This is not required in annulment or declaration of
nullity cases. The court is required to schedule the pre-trial conference not earlier than six (6)
months from the filing of the petition. This period is meant to give the spouses an opportunity
for reconciliation.

What are the grounds for legal separation?

1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner.

2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation.

3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement.

4. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned.

5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent.

6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent.

7. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad.

8. Sexual infidelity or perversion.

9. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner.

10. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

The term “child” shall include a child by nature or by adoption.

Should I file a petition for legal separation, can I use my own sexual infidelity as a ground?

It is interesting to note that among the grounds for legal separation, as listed above, only
“sexual infidelity or perversion” is not qualified by the phrase “of the respondent” or “by
respondent”. This may give the impression that the sexual infidelity of the petitioner, or the one
who filed the petition, may be used as a ground in legal separation. We must consider, however,
that legal separation is filed by the innocent spouse or the “aggrieved party” against the guilty
spouse.

What happens if after learning that your husband (or wife) is unfaithful (No. 8 above), you still
co-habitate with him/her?

This may be construed as condonation, which is a defense in actions for legal separation. In
addition to condonation, the following are the defenses in legal separation:

1. Consent.
2. Connivance (in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal
separation).
3. Mutual guilt (both parties have given ground for legal separation).
4. Collusion (to obtain decree of legal separation).
5. Prescription (5 years from the occurence of the cause for legal separation).

If you’re separated from your spouse for 4 years, is that a sufficient ground for annulment?

No. De facto separation is not a ground for annulment. However, the absence of 2 or 4 years,
depending on the circumstances, may be enough to ask the court for a declaration
of presumptive death of the “absent spouse”, in which case the petitioner may again re-marry.
See Can someone remarry without going to court due to absence or separation?

What are the grounds for declaration of nullity of marriage?

1. Minority (those contracted by any party below 18 years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians).

2. Lack of authority of solemnizing officer (those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages, unless such marriages were contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so).

3. Absence of marriage license (except in certain cases).

4. Bigamous or polygamous marriages (except in cases where the other spouse is declared
as presumptively dead).

5. Mistake in identity (those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other).

6. After securing a judgement of annulment or of asolute nullity of mariage, the parties, before
entering into the subsequent marriage, failed to record with the appropriate registry the: (i)
partition and distribute the properties of the first marriage; and (ii) delivery of the children’s
presumptive legitime.

7. Incestous marriages (between ascendants and descendants of any degree, between brothers
and sisters, whether of the full or half blood).

8. Void by reason of public policy. Marriages between (i) collateral blood relatives whether
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (ii) step-parents and step-children; (iii)
parents-in-law and children-in-law; (iv) adopting parent and the adopted child; (v) surviving
spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (vi) surviving spouse of the adopted child
and the adopter; (vii) an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (viii) adopted
children of the same adopter; and (ix) parties where one, with the intention to marry the other,
killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her own spouse.
9. Psychological Incapacity. Psychological incapacity, which a ground for annulment of marriage,
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity. We
already discussed the guidelines and illustrations of psychological incapacity, including a case
involving habitual lying, as well as the steps and procedure in filing a petition.

Please note, however, that there are still other grounds to declare a marriage as null and void.

Tarlac State University

College of Law & Criminal Justice
Romulo Blvd., Tarlac City, Philippines

ANNULMENT:
AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE DECISIONS
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for Legal Research

Submitted by:
Botio, Marc Jeryl
Pagco, Reymond Jude

Submitted to:
Atty. Jorge Garcia
Judge Antonio M. Pangan