“Js it really possible to redesign and buttress the nonproliferation regime, as the Iranian case requires, while leaving Israel’ nuclear capacity an untouched taboo? Is it healthy for Israeli democracy or slobal ‘secutity to continue with the. ale of nuclear opacity?” The Last Taboo: Israel’s Bomb Revisited AVNER COHEN weapon state. It was the sixth nation in the world—and the first in the Middle East—to develop and acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, while exact figures are speculative, Israel's nuclear forces are believed to be (in qualitative terms at least) more like those of France and the United Kingdom than India’ and Pakistan’, Yet Israel's code of conduct and discourse in the nuclear field differs distinctly from the other estab- lished nuclear weapon states. Unlike the seven acknowledged nuclear nations—the five de jure nuclear weapon states under the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (the United States, Rus sia, United Kingdom, France, and China), and the two de facto nuclear weapon states outside the NPT (India and Pakistan)—Israel has never advertised or even admitted its nuclear status. Since Prime Minister Levi Eshkol stated in the mid-1960s that “Israel will not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East,” all eight of his successors have not moved from this ambiguous declaratory stance. The formula has become so anachronistic that Israeli leaders rarely invoke it anymore, Nobody—in or out of Israel—cares to ask Israeli leaders uncomfortable questions about the nation’s nuclear status. Israel's once big secret is regarded now as the world’s worst-kept secret, so there is no point in asking. Nearly 40 years after Israel crossed the nuclear threshold its leaders remain faithful to the same code of secrecy, nonacknowledgement, and censor- ship imposed at the time they initiated the program, This makes the Israeli bomb conspicuous by its I= everyone agrees, is an established nuclear AVNER COHEN, «senior fellow atthe Center for International and Security Studies at the Univesity of Maryland, is author of the forthcoming Israels Last Taboo 169 very absence. The bomb is Israel’ last taboo. Israelis call this taboo—this code of conduct and dis- course—amimut, Hebrew for opacity or ambiguity. The problem, from which the international com- munity can no longer afford to look away, is whether Israel’s nuclear opacity today presents a barrier to reform of the global nonproliferation regime. As the world confronts Iran’ nuclear ambi- tion, and along with it the need to strengthen non- proliferation norms and enforcement, there are many in the international community who are ask- ing, “And what about Israel?” Is it really possible to redesign and buttress the nonproliferation regime, as the Iranian case requires, while leaving Israel’ nuclear capacity an untouched taboo? Is it healthy for Israeli democracy or global security to continue with the path of nuclear opacity? THE ISRAELI EXCEPTION Amimut is Israel’s most distinguished legacy to the nuclear age. As a national policy it sets the ground rules for Israel's nuclear conduct and dis- course. At home, under this policy Israel treats its entire nuclear complex as one “black box.” That Israel’ big secret is no longer a secret makes no dif- ference to the government’ policy. Not only are Israeli officials prohibited from saying anything about the nation’s nuclear complex, but even pri- vate citizens (such as journalists or authors) are for- bidden. The office of the military censor enforces the taboo: it is a violation in Israel even to use the words “nuclear weapons” in print (in reference to Israeli weapons). Instead, the term is substituted with euphemisms such as “nuclear option,” “nuclear potential,” “nuclear capability,” or other softer words such as “strategic weapons.” The prac- tice is silly—everyone recognizes that—but under the current policy it continues. A host of military170 * CURRENTHISTORY * April 2005 censors continues to be paid to delete forbidden “n- words,” or to preface them with the legitimizing phrase, “according to foreign reports Nuclear opacity is more than an official policy or a strategic posture. It has also a strong—some would say critical—societal component. Opacity has become the Israeli way of seeing and doing things nuclear, The governments policy and the taboo as a societal response are two sides of the same coin, This intimate linkage between official policy and public taboo makes the nuclear issue a domestic Israeli oddity, a sort of paradox. On this particular issue, the Israeli citizenry defers its fun- damental democratic rights, and it does so in a most democratic fashion. Ultimately, the opacity is larger than just an Israeli affair; itis a sore problem for the nonprolif- eration regime. Nuclear weapons, and the ways they are acknowledged, proliferated, regulated, and con- trolled by nations, are an international issue, From this perspective, too, the Israeli bomb is an oddity, an international anomaly that has also turned out to be a taboo of sorts. In Washington, and subse- quently in other Western capitals, the Israeli bomb has become a most sensitive issue, almost untouch- able. What had started as a bilateral arrangement of “don't ask, dont tell,” has evolved over decadles into a policy under which the United States treats Israel asa special (and unique) nuclear case, Under this policy, the United States has exercised its diplomatic influence and power to ignore and shield the Israeli case, Israel is treated as an exception, somehow exempt from the nonproliferation regime that applies to everyone else. Friends and foes of Israel (and of the United States) have to reckon with this aura of exception- alism, For friends itis a matter of political embar- rassment; for foes it highlights the double standard, and inequality of America’s unevenhanded approach to nonproliferation. Ultimately, this attitude of exceptionalism has allowed Israel to enjoy the fruits of the nonproliferation regime without being in it, and surely without paying its dues to it. As a non- NPT signatory (one of three, the two others are India and Pakistan), Israel remains outside (most of) the nonproliferation regime’ international oversight and, accountability obligations. Initially, the attitude of looking the other way from the Israeli nuclear case stemmed from a sin- cere effort to ease the burden of having to deal with nuclear Israel on the Us nonproliferation policy, as well as on the international community at large Today, almost four decades after Israel became a nuclear weapon state and seven years after India and Pakistan openly declared their nuclear status, the conduct of opacity and the taboo underlying it are still with us. But the international context is, becoming more problematic. Rather than merely preserving the status quo, the nonproliferation regime today is viewed as a tool critically needed ut currently inadequate to prevent more states “rom acquiring nuclear weapons. This is especially * true when it comes to efforts to force Tran to com- ply with the npr. The insistence on a more aggres- sive and equitable enforcement of nonproliferation norms seems certain to cast greater light on what Israel’ leaders and their American allies have pre- ferred to keep in the dark. THE MAKING OF THE TABOO When President-elect John Kennedy met with President Dwight Eisenhower on January 19, 1961, on the eve of the new president’ inauguration, one of Kennedy's first questions was who would be the next nuclear proliferators. “Israel and India,” Secre- tary of State Christian Herter quickly replied. By Jan- uary 1961 Israel was the most pressing proliferation problem, Only a few weeks earlier the Eisenhower administration had established, with a sense of dis- may and complete surprise, that for nearly three years Israel had been secretly building a major nuclear facility near the town of Dimona in the Negev Desert. It was believed that Israel—if not stopped by the United States—could become a nuclear power within a decade or even less. In fact, the notion that Istael should explore the nuclear vision was as old as the state itself. David Ben Gurion, Israel’ first prime minister, had been obsessed by the nuclear option as the answer to Israel's security predicament since the days of the ‘War of Independence. He believed that only tech- nology could provide the qualitative strategic edge required to overcome Israel's inferiority in popula- tion, resources, and space. As former Prime Minis- ter Shimon Peres once put it, “Ben Gurion believed that science could compensate us for what Nature has denied us.” This phrase reflects, in essence, the whole philosophy of Israel’s nuclear project. From the outset American policy makers viewed Israel as a special case of nuclear proliferation. By 1961, just about 15 years after a third of the Jewish people had perished in the Holocaust, and at a time ‘when there were no international nonproliferation norms, probably no other nation had a stronger (that is, more justifiable) case for pursuing the nuclear option than Israel. From the Us perspective,it was a case of a small and friendly state outside the boundaries of American alliances and containment policy, a state that was surrounded by much larger enemies publicly vowing to destroy it. Unlike China or India, Israel did not aspire to the status ofa great power. Most significantly, Israel enjoyed unique domestic support in America. Kennedy knew very well that without the votes of about 80 percent of the Jewish voters in the United States, he would not have been elected, Yet, despite allthis, President Kennedy was deter- mined to thwart Israel's nuclear quest. Kennedy's “private nightmare” (in the words of Glenn Seaborg, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission under Kennedy) was global nuclear anarchy, a world of some 20 to 30 nuclear weapon states, Without decisive international action to curb nuclear prolif- eration, Kennedy feared this nightmare would become a reality within a decade or two. And for Kennedy, Israel was at Israel's Bomb Revisited * 171 old while promising the Johnson administration that it would “not be the first to introduce nuclear ‘weapons to the region.” When cia director Richard Helms finally told Johnson that Israel had crossed the nuclear divide, Johnson ordered Helms “to keep this a secret and not to share it even with Rusk and MacNamara” (the secretaries of state and defense). The sacred taboo came into being. THE OPACITY STRATEGY This taboo, as such, was rooted in history. It was the unique historical fabric under which Israel went nuclear in the 1960s—with full technological vigor but with a great deal of political ambivalence and caution—and the hesitant American response to it that gave rise to the taboo. The us effort to stop Israel's emergence as the worlds sixth nuclear nation was equally ambivalent at heart and self-deceptive in action. In retrospect, Israel's nuclear project was caught in the middle the center of the battle against nuclear prolif- eration. The case of Israel, he believed, was where the new nonpro- Almost 40 years after Israel became a nuclear weapon state, the nonproliferation regime remains unable to deal with the Israeli reality. as the global rules of the game were fast changing. In response Israel “invented” its unique liferation norm should begin. Israel was per- ceived as the dividing line between the old and irre- versible nuclear proliferation of the past and the new nonproliferation prohibition of the future. If the United States could not influence small Israel not to go nuclear, how could it persuade the Germans to give up their own nuclear ambitions? And if the United States could not stop the Germans, how could it expect the Soviet Union to prevent China from gaining the bomb? These considerations set the stage in the spring and summer of 1963 for probably the harshest American-Israeli confrontation, Kennedy threat- ened Prime Ministers Ben Gurion and Eshkol that the Us commitment to Israel’ security and well- being “would be seriously jeopardized” if his nuclear demands—in the form of American bi- annual inspection visits at Dimona—were not com- plied with. At the end of the confrontation, Prime Minister Eshkol seemed to accept Kennedy's demands, or so Kennedy was led to believe. In reality, this did not happen. It was up to Pres- ident Lyndon Johnson to implement the deal, but Johnson was initially less principled on the matter of nonproliferation in general and surely on the Israeli case in particular. It was during his time in office that Israel secretly crossed the nuclear thresh- mode of going (and then being) nuclear. Initially, going nuclear opaquely was designed to limit and ease the collision between Israel and America nonproliferation policy, as well as to keep the Arabs (especially Egypt) in the dark. By late 1966, as the NpT was near completion, Israel had already concluded the research and development phase for its first nuclear explosive device, but it dared not to test it. Technologically, Israel could cross the nuclear threshold, but politically it treated its nuclear project as an “option.” The Eshkol gov- ermment avoided making any explicit political deci- sion. In late May 1967, on the eve of the Six Day War, Israel secretly assembled two rudimentary nuclear devices to be readied for the worst-case sce- narios, but it was cautious not to make use of its capability even as a deterrent. More than a year later, Israel informed the United States that, given its security needs and without American security guarantees, it could not renounce its nuclear option and would not sign the NPT. By September 1969 Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had reached a new secret understanding with Pres- ident Richard Nixon over the nuclear issue. Meir told Nixon the truth—why Israel had found itself compelled to develop a nuclear weapons capability and why it could not sign the weT—but pledged that172 © CURRENT HISTORY * April 2005 Israel would not become a declared nuclear power. ‘That meant then that Israel would not test, would not declare itself a nuclear weapon state, and would ot use its nuclear capability for diplomatic gains, but rather would keep its bomb in the basement as a last resort. Israel would not join the NPr, but it,’ would not defy it either. By July 1970 The New York’ Times made public that the us intelligence commu nity considered Israel a nuclear weapon state.” Israels nuclear history in the period from 1973 to the present can be narrated along two distinct and schizophrenic themes: political caution and techno- logical resolve. During this period Israel’ policy of nuclear opacity was transformed from a short-lived improvisation to a semi-permanent strategic posture. Over this period, Israeli defense strategists came to view the policy as a great strategic success because it provided Israel all the benefits of existential nuclear deterrence but at a very low political cost. Nuclear opacity became an indispensable pillar in the nation’s national security doctrine. POLITICAL CAUTION On the side of political moderation, opacity was seen as the alternative to open nuclear strategy. In this respect, the 1973 Yom Kippur War had an important nuclear dimension, although its full drama has not yet been told. It has been widely rumored that during the early phase of the war Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan readied the nuclear weapons infrastructure, apparently propos- ing to Prime Minister Meir to arm the weapons in case Israel came to reach the point of “last resort.” But Meir refused to concede to Dayan’s worst-case thinking. American intelligence picked up signs that Israel put its nuclear-capable Jericho missiles on a high alert (apparently in a way that was designed to be noticed). But by Meir’s decision to resist Dayan’ advice, Israel’ policy of nuclear opac- ity survived. The prime minister's reluctance to slip into the nuclear brink made Israel a responsible and trusted nuclear custodian. This, too, has become an important legacy. In the period immediately after the 1973 war there were significant voices in Israel, including Dayan’, that argued it was time for Israel to move to an open nuclear posture. Some of those voices openly rec- ommended that Israel develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons. But in the mid-1970s Prime Min- ister Yitzhak Rabin (along with his foreign minister, Yigal Allon) vehemently opposed the introduction of “magic weapons” (as he publicly referred to them) and the move into an open nuclear strategy. Rabin feared the nucleatization of the Arab-Israeli conflict and was committed to preventing—or postponing — such a development. The policy of nuclear opacity ‘was for him a matter of political responsibility Nuclear opacity also allowed Israel to advocate internationally the idea of establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Nw) in the Middle East. In 1975, as the Israeli government resisted pressure to join the Npr, Rabin authorized Foreign Minister Allon to announce at the UN that Israel would sup- port consultation among all the region's states toward the establishment of a Nwrz. For the first time Israel supported the principle of a nwrz with- out conditioning it with demands for conventional arms control Everyone recognized, of course, that this vision was unrealistic in the absence of regional peace. It nevertheless clearly demonstrated the Rabin gov- ernment resistance to adopting proposals in favor of open nuclear deterrence. Ever since, in one diplomatic formula or another, Israel has remained loyal to its principal support for the creation of a Nwr7 in the region. In the past decade the idea of a Nwez has been extended to a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, at least in principle. EXPANDED CAPABILITY On the side of technological resolve, opacity was instrumental in setting up a friendly environment that allowed Israel to continue uninterrupted with its nuclear activities. The decade after the 1973 war marked an era of rapid technological development as Istael took full advantage of its freedom of action under opacity. It is widely believed that during this period Istael’s nuclear arsenal underwent a major transformation. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, Israel had expanded and modernized its weapons far beyond the early arsenal of a dozen or so low-yield first-generation bombs, But even as Israel significantly upgraded its nuclear capability in the period between the Yom Kippur War and the first Gulf War, it did not move to establish a secured, second-strike capability: While occasional discussions of the subject took place, operational and costly decisions were deferred. The underlying assumption guiding Israeli strategic planning in this period was that Israel regional nuclear monopoly was still holding: if and when the situation shifted, Israel would have ample time to adjust. The June 1981 bombing of Iraqs Osirak nuclear reactor was in line with this thinking. Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s decision to attack the Iraqi site was a warning to Arab regimes that Israelwould not allow a hostile power a nuclear weapons capability. It was also a sign that Israel was commit- ted to continuing its regional nuclear capability. This has changed since the 1991 Gulf War. Before the war Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir pushed the conduct of nuclear opacity to its limits when he threatened Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein with an “awesome and terrible” response if Iraq attacked Israel with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney enhanced and explicated that threat when he openly referred to the possibility that Israel would use its nuclear capabil- ity if Iraq dared to launch chemical ot biological weapons at Israel. By the war's end, some 40 Iraqi Scud missiles carrying conventional watheads had been fired at Israel, most of them aimed at Israel's population centers. That Iraq did not launch a chem- ical or biological attack on Israel led Israelis to believe that the veiled nuclear deterrent was effective in blocking Saddam’ use of nonconventional weapons. combined with new strate- gic developments, led to Israel’s decision to estab- lish a new sea-based strategic arm. By July 2000 Israel completed taking delivery of three Dolphin- class submarines it ordered from Germany after the Gulf War, Today it is believed that Israel is on its way toward restructuring its nuclear forces into a triad form—with potential delivery by aircraft, mis- sile, or submarine—assuring the capability to retal- iate if hit first with was There is tension between the commitments to political caution and technological resolve. Only the policy of opacity keeps this tension hidden. THE BOMB’S FREE RIDE In Israel itself, the Israeli nuclear complex remains a bubble of secrecy that stands as an anomaly against contemporary norms of proper democratic conduct—that is, measures of demo- cratic transparency, accountability, oversight, and the public right to know. However, Israelis have learned to live well with this undemocratic taboo. They have internalized and socialized the taboo; it has become embedded in the nation’s culture of national security. The public at large respects the nuclear taboo and has little desire to tamper with it, while insiders—the “guardians” of the bubble— are comfortable with a situation that leaves them uninterrupted and undisturbed by the citizenry or Nobody—in or out of Israel—cares to ask Israeli leaders uncomfortable questions about the nation’s nuclear status. Lessons from that war, Israel's Bomb Revisited © 173 its elected representatives. Those few who are aware of the undemocratic character of the policy of nuclear opacity consider it necessary and unavoidable. From a national security perspective, they see no alternative Two fundamental presumptions are involved in this reasoning. First, there is a consensus among Israelis that their country’s national security requires nuclear weapons—that Israel must main- tain existential deterrence. Under no conceivable circumstances could Israel afford to rid itself of this deterrent, not even after the establishment of regional peace. Recognizing the strength of this view among the citizenry, one must concede that, it is inconceivable for any Israeli government to take public steps that would imply, even only symbolically, a weakening of Israel’s nuclear capabilities and strategic assets Second, there is a deeply held conviction that the international community would never grant a seal of legitimacy to Israels nuclear status. From the perspec- tive of Israel national security culture, itis doubtful that even the United States could openly accept Israel as a legitimate nuclear weapon state, As for Israels neighbors, it is clear the Arab states would also never openly accept an Israeli nuclear monopoly. Hence, if Israel were to put its nuclear assets on the table, the argument goes, it would find itself on a dangerous slippery slope that would lead only to new demands to weaken its nuclear capability. Even limited acknowledgement and transparency would seem— in the eyes of the Israeli national security elite—an irresponsible act. On the other hand, the argument continues, the policy of nuclear opacity provides Israel with all of the benefits of existential deterrence (like those enjoyed by the declared nuclear weapon states) with- out any risks, Other regimes in the region can more successfully avoid domestic pressure to develop their own Wp if Israel’ status remains opaque. And as long as the United States continues to shield Israel's nuclear exceptionalism, Israel can take advantage of the utility of nuclear deterrence without paying the dues. Specifically, Israel enjoys all the benefits of the international nonproliferation regime without accept- ing any of its obligations for international inspections and other forms of transparency. Opacity looks to Israck strategists like the best ofall possible worlds So why should Israel change anything? The nuclearposture may be anachronistic and odd, but it is work- ing well for Israel’ national security. ‘WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE? From the perspective of the international non- proliferation regime, Israels exceptionalism is surely a problem. It leaves the Israeli case a constant sore point, a reminder of the regime’ lack of universality Israel benefits from the nonproliferation regime— for example, from the diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which are only possible because Iran is a signatory to the NPT—without incurring any responsibilities. And yet, almost 40 years after Israel became a nuclear weapon state, the nonproliferation regime remains unable to deal with the Israeli reality. This inadequacy is not without reason. It is the legal and political fabric of the NPT bargain itself that makes the Israeli nuclear case so difficult to cope with. Legally, the NPT established a baseline, January 1, 1967, for the divide between the nuclear weapon states and the nonnuclear weapon states under the treaty, From a technological perspective, by that date Istael could have tested and declared itself a nuclear ‘weapon state, but politically it chose not to. Conse- quently, as a matter of legal definition, the NPr can- not accommodate, let alone legitimize, Israel's nuclear status, Since Israel presumably did not test before January 1, 1967, it cannot be accepted into the NPT bargain as a nuclear weapon state. The legal-formal problem highlights the real problem, which is a political one, The very idea of the Npr was to limit the number of declared nuclear weapon states—at least to keep the number no higher than it was on January 1, 1967—and surely not to legitimize additional nuclear states. From the perspective of the nonproliferation regime there is, no political interest in adding new nuclear states, to put it mildly. The issue is not Israel per se, the argu- ‘ment goes: itis the integrity of the Ner norm. If this is the case, Israel has not much choice but to continue its policy of nuclear opacity: This is not only an Israeli interest—it is the only way the NPT regime can live with a nuclear-armed Istael. At the end of the day, a continuation of the status quo is the only way the international community seems to cope with the reality of a nuclear Israel. Israel's nuclear conduct may be undemocratic and anachronistic, but it is robust and functional, and not only for Israel, but also for the maintenance of international nonproliferation norms. Most impor- tant, despite its deficiencies, it is hard to propose alternatives to it BEYOND THE STATUS QUO Is there a way out of the status quo? Is there a better way—for Israel itself as well as for the inter- national community—to deal with the reality of a nuclear Israel? While all concede that Israel’s nuclear status is a problem, conventional wisdom within and outside of Israel supports the status quo because it sees no way out of the dilemma, no leeway for reform. As long as Israel remains committed to retaining its existential nuclear deterrence, and as long as the international community has no interest in openly acknowledging this reality, it is impossible to reform the status quo. Any change, from either perspective, s viewed as threatening a delicate balance, pote! tially causing more harm than good. Israel is not willing to be more transparent because it fears the danger of a slippery slope. The international com- munity is not willing to grandfather Israels nuclear status because it fears undermining the nonprolif- eration norm. This author, against the conventional wisdom, views the status quo not only as anachronistic but also burdensome. A mature nuclear program that functions within a bubble of secrecy exempted from the scrutiny of Israeli democracy is not a badge of honor for Israeli democracy, or for Israeli national security: A state that remains exempt with respect to the nonproliferation regime—even if it tacitly com- plies with much of the regime’ obligations—is not a mark of health for the universality of the regime On both sides of the problem, the status quo leaves too much opacity, and too litle transparency. If reform is possible at all on the Israeli nuclear case, it must be executed along a general formula of acknowledgement in return for transparency and constraints. This formula should apply to both aspects of the problem, domestic and inter- national. Domestic acknowledgment (say, by enacting a law) is probably a precondition for Israel to receive some measure of international acknowledgement. The international community in turn would accept Israel's nuclear status while demanding limits and accountability. Acknowledgment is not equivalent to granting lasting legitimacy to nuclear weapons. Nor is it an end to the long-term ideal of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the laraels Bomb Revisited © 175 Middle East, as part of the effort to promote lasting peace among the region's nations. Just as the NPT itself does not legitimize nuclear weapons—in fact, it calls for cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament—so this proposal does not aim to legitimize the existence of a permanent Israeli nuclear arsenal, “WHAT ABOUT ISRAEL?” It would be good for Israel to come clean on the nuclear issue, but this can be done, if at all, only if the international community and the nonprolifera- tion regime were willing to accept a nuclear Israel One way to conceive the international aspect of this—recognizing that amendment of the NPT is a political impossibility—would be through efforts to ban the production of fissile material and to apply this ban to all three de facto established nuclear weapons states—Israel, as well as India and Pak- istan (perhaps even along with Iran). This could be accomplished by a series of unilateral and regional arrangements, to be complemented perhaps with a freestanding separate agreement or protocol As Thomas Graham and I have noted, such a pro- tocol could permit Israel (along with India and Pak- istan) to retain their nuclear weapons programs, each under a different modality, but inhibit further devel- opment. The protocol could also contain provisions such as requiring cooperation with the international nuclear export control system and prohibiting the explosive testing of nuclear devices, as well as other provisions either in the Ner or associated with it. As a result of these commitments, Israel (as well as India and Pakistan) would have a settlement of the nuclear issue with the world community and an acknow!- edgement of its status through association with the nonproliferation regime. India, Israel, and Pakistan could sign the protocol, as well as the NPT Depositary States, which since the 1960s have been considered the general managers of the NPT regime. The time has come to address the nuclear case of Israel, along with the two other de facto nuclear states, in a realistic and honest fashion. While the nonproliferation regime should acknowledge Israels nuclear status, that country in return would have to accept new and explicit nonproliferation com- mitments—a fair bargain given Israel’ stake in pre- venting the further spread of nuclear weapons. i