1) ATTY RISOL VIDAL vs COMELEC
FACTS
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and
political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of President. None of the disqualification cases against him
prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and
filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective
post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to
run for public office because of his conviction for plunder
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section
40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding
that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened
and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the
contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which
carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold
public office?
HELD:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right
to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The
only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given
to and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually
specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that
former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same
cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by
legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and
Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that
the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon
remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not
yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there
was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the
pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored
to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon
that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted
to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a)
of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon
or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any
person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate
to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did
not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly

impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use
of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part
of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the
word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute
because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is
not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore,
does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional
or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the
pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is

merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot
be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be

conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same
2) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on
February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest.
The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the
death of the accused does not excuse him from his
civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in
People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the
accused claimed that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People
vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before the final judgement is rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability.
survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.
In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8,
1977 where it states that civil liability will only survive if death
came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan.
However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not
possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the
accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a
summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to
wit:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death
extinguished his criminal and civil liabilitybased solely on the act
complained of.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of

Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said that
civil liability is extinguished only when death of the
accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan
further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there
will be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no
civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court
stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the
3) JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATIONvs. HON.
JUDGE NELSON F.LIDUA, SR.,Presiding, BENEDICTO
BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, “JOHN DOES” and “PETER
DOES, respondents.
FACTS: Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was
authorized to render any motorvehicle immobilized by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.Balajadia and the
other respondents dismantled, took and carried away the
clampsattached to the wheel of the vehicles, which took place on
May 7, 2003. Jadewell filed acomplaint for robbery against the
respondents with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23,2003. However, the Informations were filed with the MTC on
October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed amotion to quash.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: The MTC granted the motion to quash and
dismissed the case and Jadewell‟s subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Jadewell‟s petition for certiorari with RTC was
likewise denied. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
CONTENTION OF JADEWELL: They argued that the filing of the
criminal complaint withthe Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City, not the filing of the criminal information beforeCourt, is the
reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action
had prescribed.
CONTENTION OF BALAJADIA: Respondents argued
that Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial
proceedings.Thus, the SC, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the
Complaint with the Office of the ProvincialProsecutor was not a
judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the
allegeddate of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and
ended two months after on July 7, 2003.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23,2003 tolled the prescription period of
the commission of the offense
HELD: No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
only the filing of anInformation tolls the prescriptive period where the
crime charged is involved in an ordinance.The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes,
211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of a municipal ordinance in
Rodriguez, Rizal alsofeatured similar facts and issues with the present
case. In that case, the offense was committed onMay 11, 1990. The
Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed
withthe Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before
the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was
running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had
two months to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is
unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private
respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to
ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity
of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also
has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes
that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor‟s office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not
justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a
distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
5) ANICETO RECEBIDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES the falsification.

FACTS: 3. Assuming that petitioner had a right to possess the subject

That on or about the 13th day of August, 1979, in the
Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, the
accused, being a private individual, falsify and/or imitate the
signature of one Caridad Dorol and/or cause it to appear that
said Caridad Dorol has signed her name on a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property in favor of the herein accused.
land, his possession became unlawful when the private
complainant offered to redeem the property and petitioner
unjustly refused. Petitioner cannot profit from the effects of his
crime.
Petition denied.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at

the time the information was filed?

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed gave abuse of

discretion in sustaining the conviction of the petitioner?

3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grievous error

in affirming the decision of the trial court for the petitioner to
vacate the land in question owned by the offended party?

HELD: NO

1. While the defense of prescription of the crime was raised only

during the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, there was no waiver of the defense.

2. The petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed

of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his
authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person
who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in
his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of
6) BENJAMIN PANGAN vs. HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE etal sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period of
G.R. No. 141718, January 21, 2005 prescription never began. However, by this time, petitioner has
fully served his sentence and should be released unless he is
detained for another offense or charge.
FACTS:

Petitioner Benjamin Pangan was found guilty of simple

seduction, when his counsel submitted the case for a decision
without offering any evidence due to his constant absence during
the hearing. Petitioner was then apprehended and detained at
the Mabalacat Detention Cell at the order of the trial court. Later,
petitioner filed for a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
contending that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the
ground that his penalty has prescribed after five years and that
having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for
almost nine years, his criminal liability has long been totally
extinguished. The trial court then denied the said petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code shall apply

in the case at bar

RULING: NO

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the

prescription period of penalties shall commence to run. It shall
commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of
his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion
of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have
been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of
his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of
liberty before his arrest, and as a consequence never evaded
7) DEL CASTILLO v TORRECAMPO

FACTS:

10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violating the
Election Code (whereby he was never apprehended and
remained at large), he filed before the trial court a motion to
quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of
prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. He based his
claims on Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty of the crime committed by

Torrecampo already prescribed.

HELD: NO

RATIO:

The petition must be denied since under Article 93,

prescription shall commence to run from the date the felon
evades the service of his sentence, which is inapplicable in the
case at bar since the petitioner was never brought to prison and
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
4) PANAGUITON JR. VS DOJ
Petitioner: LUIS PANAGUITON, JR.,
Respondents: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
RAMON C. TONGSON and
RODRIGO G. CAWILI,
Crime: violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)
Lower Court Decision: dismissed the charges against Tongson
Court of Appeals Decision: dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.’s
(petitioner’s) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion
for reconsideration.
Supreme Court Decision: GRANTED. The resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of
Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the
information against the petitioner.
FACTS:
 In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton
amounting to P1,979,459.
 In 1993, Cawili with his ‘business associate’ Tongson
issued 3 checks as payment
 Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of
both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment
on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either
for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
 During preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed that
he was not Cawili’s business associate.
 On Dec. 6 1995 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found
probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the
charges against Tongson.
 Petitioner then appeal before DOJ and in 1997 DOJ found
that it was indeed possible for Tongson to co-signed the
checks. It then directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
 Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson
without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor’s resolution. ACP Sampaga held that the
case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief
State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no
longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should
come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the rule on prescription as provided for
in Act No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. 22
RULING:
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg.
22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than
one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of
the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the
prescriptive period. delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed.
December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses Petitioner ’s filing of his complaint–affidavit before the Office of
was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
and punishment,”[39] and the prevailing rule at the time was accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with
halted.[40] the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
***************
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of
under his control.[55] A clear example would be this case, Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also
wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August
1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges
against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within
the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed
his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24
August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner’s control. After all, he
had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early
as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ’s
flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their