Designer Baskets, Inc v.
Air Sea Transport The general rule is that upon receipt of the goods, the
Facts:
 DBI is a domestic corporation engaged in the
production of housewares and handicraft items for
export.
 In October 1995, Ambiente, a foreign-based
company, ordered from DBI 223 cartons of
assorted wooden items.
 Ambiente designated ACCLI as the forwarding
agent that will ship out its order from the
Philippines to the United States. ACCLI is a
domestic corporation acting as agent of ASTI, a
US based corporation engaged in carrier transport
business, in the Philippines.
 On January 7, 1996, DBI delivered the shipment to
ACCLI for sea transport from Manila and delivery
to Ambiente. To acknowledge receipt and to serve
as the contract of sea carriage, ACCLI issued to
DBI triplicate copies of ASTI Bill of Lading. DBI
retained possession of the originals of the bills of
lading pending the payment of the goods by
Ambiente.
 On January 23, 1996, Ambiente and ASTI entered
into an Indemnity Agreement. Under the
Agreement, Ambiente obligated ASTI to deliver
the shipment to it or to its order “without the
surrender of the relevant bill(s) of lading due to the
non-arrival or loss thereof.” In exchange, Ambiente
undertook to indemnify and hold ASTI and its
agent free from any liability as a result of the
release of the shipment. Thereafter, ASTI released
the shipment to Ambiente without the knowledge
of DBI, and without it receiving payment for the
total cost of the shipment.
 DBI then made several demands to Ambiente for
the payment of the shipment, but to no avail. Thus,
on October 7, 1996, DBI filed the Original
Complaint against ASTI, ACCLI and ACCLI’s
incorporators-stockholders
 DBI claimed that under Bill of Lading is “to release
and deliver the cargo/shipment to the consignee, x
x x, only after the original copy or copies of [the]
Bill of Lading is or are surrendered to them;
otherwise, they become liable to the shipper for
the value of the shipment.” DBI also averred that
ACCLI should be jointly and severally liable with
its codefendants because ACCLI failed to register
ASTI as a foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines. In addition, ACCLI failed to secure
a license to act as agent of ASTI.
Issue: WON ASTI, ACCLI, and Ambiente are solidarily liable
to DBI for the value of the shipment.
Held:
Petition Denied.
1) A common carrier may release the goods to
the consignee even without the surrender of
the bill of lading.
consignee surrenders the bill of lading to the carrier and their
respective obligations are considered canceled. The law,
however, provides two exceptions where the goods may be
released without the surrender of the bill of lading because
the consignee can no longer return it. These exceptions are
when the bill of lading gets lost or for other cause. In either
case, the consignee must issue a receipt to the carrier upon
the release of the goods. Such receipt shall produce the
same effect as the surrender of the bill of lading.
We have already ruled that the non-surrender of the original
bill of lading does not violate the carrier’s duty of
extraordinary diligence over the goods (Republic v. Lorenzo
Shipping Corporation). Thus, we held that the surrender of
the original bill of lading is not a condition precedent for a
common carrier to be discharged of its contractual
obligation.
Clearly, law and jurisprudence is settled that the surrender of
the original bill of lading is not absolute; that in case of loss
or any other cause, a common carrier may release the
goods to the consignee even without it.
2) Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 of the Civil Code
are not applicable.
Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 speak of the common carrier's
responsibility over the goods. They refer to the general
liability of common carriers in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods and the presumption of negligence
against them.
The applicable provision instead is Article 353 of the Code of
Commerce, the Article allows the release of the goods to the
consignee even without his surrender of the original bill of
lading. In such case, the duty of the carrier to exercise
extraordinary diligence is not violated. Nothing, therefore,
prevented the consignee and the carrier to enter into an
indemnity agreement of the same nature as the one they
entered here. No law or public policy is contravened upon its
execution.
3) Article 1503 of the Civil Code does not apply to
contracts for carriage of goods.
Articles 1523 and 1503, refer to a contract of sale between a
seller and a buyer. In particular, they refer to who between
the seller and the buyer has the right of possession or
ownership over the goods subject of the sale. Articles 1523
and 1503 do not apply to a contract of carriage between the
shipper and the common carrier.
Transportation Case Digest: Sweet Lines, Inc. V. Teves (1978)
G.R. No. L-37750 May 19, 1978
Lessons Applicable: Contract of Adhesion (Transportation)
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
 Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro bought tickets
for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu
 Since many passengers were bound for Surigao, M/S
"Sweet Hope would not be proceeding to Bohol
 They went to the proper branch office and was
relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" where they were
forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid
inspection of the officers of the Philippine
Coastguard." and they were exposed to the scorching
heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's
cargo of corn grits and their tickets were not honored
so they had to purchase a new one
 They sued Sweet Lines for damages and for breach of
contract of carriage before the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental who dismissed the complaint for
improper venue
 A motion was premised on the condition printed at the
back of the tickets -dismissed
 instant petition for prohibition for preliminary
injunction
ISSUE: W/N a common carrier engaged in inter-island
shipping stipulate thru condition printed at the back of
passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions
arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed
only in a particular province or city
HELD: NO. petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Restraining order
LIFTED and SET ASIDE
 contract of adhesion
 not that kind of a contract where the parties sit down
to deliberate, discuss and agree specifically on all its
terms, but rather, one which respondents took no part
at all in preparing
 just imposed upon them when they paid for the fare
for the freight they wanted to ship
 We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the
back of the passage tickets should be held as void and
unenforceable for the following reasons
 circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship
 will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable
passengers in different s of the country who, under
Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against
petitioner only in the City of Cebu
 subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of
actions
 philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of
venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as
well as his witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of
justice
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. v MARITIME COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas
unto the custody of the consignee, Dole Philippines. The
corresponding claim for the damages sustained by the cargo was
filed by the plaintiff with the defendant, Maritime Company on
May 4, 1972.
On June 11, 1973 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the CFI Manila
embodying 3 causes of action involving 3 separate and different
shipments. The third cause of action therein involved the cargo
now subject of this present litigation.
On December 11, 1974, Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order
dismissing the first two causes of action. The third cause of action
which covered the cargo subject of this case now was likewise
dismissed but without prejudice as it was not covered by the
settlement. Because of the dismissal of the complaint with
respect to the third cause of action, DOLE instituted this present
complaint on January 6, 1975.
Maritime filed an answer pleading inter alia the affirmative
defense of prescription under the provisions of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act. The Trial Court granted the motion, scheduling
the preliminary hearing on April 27, 1977. The record before the
Court does not show whether or not that hearing was held, but
under date of May 6, 1977, Maritime filed a formal motion to
dismiss invoking once more the ground of prescription.
The Trial Court, after due consideration, resolved the matter in
favor of Maritime and dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 1155 of the Civil Code applies in lieu of the
COGSA.
Held:
No. Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of
actions is interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial written
demand by the creditor
Section 3, paragraph 6 of the COGSA provides that:
the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in
respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year
after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should
have been delivered; Provided, That, if a notice of loss or damage,
either apparent or conceded, is not given as provided for in this
section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the
shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the
goods or the date when.the goods should have been delivered.
1. Dole argues that since the provisions of the Civil Code are, by
express mandate of said Code, suppletory of deficiencies in the
Code of Commerce and special laws in matters governed by the
latter and there being a patent deficiency with respect to the
tolling of the prescriptive period provided for in the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, prescription under said Act is subject to the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling. Since Dole's
claim for loss or damage was filed on May 4, 1972 amounted to a
written extrajudicial demand which would toll or interrupt
prescription under Article 1155, it operated to toll prescription
also in actions under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
These arguments might merit weightier consideration were it not
for the fact that the question has already received a definitive
answer, adverse to the position taken by Dole, in The Yek Tong Lin
Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President Lines,
Inc.
2. Dole argues that it was error for the court not to have
considered the action of plaintiff-appellant suspended by the
extrajudicial demand which took place, according to defendant's
own motion to dismiss on August 22, 1952.
Court noticed that while plaintiff avoids stating any date when the
goods arrived in Manila, it relies upon the allegation made in the
motion to dismiss that a protest was filed on August 22, 1952 —
which goes to show that plaintiff-appellant's counsel has not been
laying the facts squarely before the court for the consideration of
the merits of the case. We have already decided that in a case
governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription should
not be made to apply. (Chua Kuy vs. Everett Steamship Corp., G.R.
No. L-5554, May 27, 1953.) We hold that in such a case the
general provisions of the new Civil Code (Art. 1155) cannot be
made to apply, as such application would have the effect of
extending the one-year period of prescription fixed in the law. It is
desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be
decided in as short a time as possible; the application of the
provisions of Article 1155 of the new Civil Code would
unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the
settlement of questions affecting transportation, contrary to the
clear intent and purpose of the law.
Under Dole's theory, when its claim was received by Maritime,
the one-year prescriptive period was interrupted and began to
run anew from May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one
year counted from that date within which to institute action on its
claim for damage. Unfortunately, Dole let the new period lapse
without filing action. It instituted Civil Case No. 91043 only on
June 11, 1973, more than one month after that period has expired
and its right of action had prescribed.