CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
- Remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
MISON V. GALLEGOS
- Writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
Facts:
 Dec 2013, Interpol of Seoul Korea sent a notice to Interpol Manila
requesting assistance in the location and deportation of Ku for
arbitrary spending allotted as a reserve fund for Phildip Korea Co.
Ltd.
 Embassy of Korea wrote a letter request to Mison chairperson of
Bureau of Immigration for immediate arrest and deportation of Ku
to Korea.
 Jan 2014, Ku’s visa expired.
 Prosecutor Mangrobang charged Ku for being risk to public
interest which was approvedby BI Board of Commissioners.
 Jan 2014, Ku was arrested and detained at BI detention center,
his passport was subsequently voided by Korea
 Ku filed a petition for issuance of Writ of Amparo with Interm
Remedies and a Supplemental petition for Issuance of Writ of
Amaparo.
 Judge Gallegos issued writ.
 Ku filed a Motion for issuance of TPO
 Judge Gallegos merely noted petitioners motion for being moot
considering that he already released Ku’s passport on March 2014
 Petitioner filed a Review for Certiorari assailing Gallego’s
resolution.
ISSUE: WON PRIVILEGE OF WRIT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED AT
CASE AT BAR
HELD: NO
 Sec 1 : Amparo Rule
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security is violated threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of public official or employee or private individual or entity.
threats thereof.
 Amparo Rule intended to address intractable problem of
extralegal killings and enforced diappearances in its coverage, in
its present form, is confined to these two instances or threats
thereof
Extra-legal Killings committed without due process of law
killings
Enforced Attended by the following characteristics
Disappearances 1. Attention, Detention or Abduction of
person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with direct
or indirect acquiescence of government
2. Refusal of state to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such person outside
protection of law.
(Navia v. Paridico) Elements of Enforced Disappearances Sec 3.
RA 9851
1. Arrest, Detention, Abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty
2. Carried out by or with authorization, support acquiescence of
State or Political organization
3. Followed by State or Political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on fate or whereabouts of
person subject of amparo petition
4. Intention of such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of law for a prolonged period of time.
 Ku’s circumstances does not come under statutory definition of
an enforced involuntary disappearance
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado
 Ku was arrested by agents of BI but there was no refusal on part
of BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to
give information on his whereabouts
 Neither an it be said that BI had any intention to remove Ku from
protection for a prolonged time.
 His arrest –well documented as evidenced by Return of Warrant
of Deportation and After Mission Report.
 No intent to remove Ku from protection of law for a prolonged
time –Ku’s counsel was immediately able to file Entry of
appearance thereby showing Ku’s legal rights were amply
guarded and that he was never removed from protection of law.
 Sec 5 Amparo rule enumerates what an amparo petition should
contain
1. Right to LLS aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission
2. How such threat or violation is committed with attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits
 Amparo rule requires parties to establish their claims by
substantial evidence. However KU was not able to present
evidence that he was exposed to “life-threatening situations while
confined in BI Detention Center. ---he was even afforded visitoral
rights ad access to counsel
 Fundamental function of writ of amparo is to cause disclosure of
details concerning EJK or ED. Ku’s whereabouts never hidden,
no need for issuance of Writ in the case at bar.
ZARATE V. AQUINO
 Petitioners : members of various progressive party lists and/or
religious organizations and that these organizations have been
wrongfully tagged by military and police as communists front
organizations
 March 2014: government commenced intensified military
offensives in Davao del norte under rubric of counterinsurgency.
1,300 Manobos allegedly evacuated to Davao City to escape
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 January 2015, Manobos started going back to davao.
 July 2015, Manobos were at United Chruch of Christ PH
(UCCP) Haran.Petitioners claimed that these Manobos sought
refuge due to persisting militarization of their communities and
forcible recruitment to paramilitary group, Alamara
 Certain Manobos claimed that they were deceived into going to
Davao City and that upon reaching UCCP Haran, they were
deprived of their freedom of locomotion and were held there
against there will for 22 days. They were forced to listen to
lectures and join rallies.
 May 2015 CIDG forwarded to Office of City Prosecutor of Davao
City complaint for violation of RPC (Kidnapping and Serious
illegal detention) and (Expanded Anti-trafficking in Persons Act
of 2012)
 To determine who would be charged in complaint. Complainants
were shown lists from which they purportedly identified
defendants.
 Photographs of De Jesus, Casino, Anover were in 1st list while
photographs of petitioners Zarate, Palabay, Balaba, and Ruiz
were in 2nd list.
 Petitioners now aver : inclusion of their names and
photographs : indicates that they have been subject to
State surveillance – inclusion in list threats to LLS
warranting protection under writ of Amparo
 No basis for inclusion of their names and photographs, then
respondents should be compelled via writ of habeas data to
disclose and to provide copies of all information and eveidence
pertaining to them whch respondents have in their files or
records.
 PETITION DISMISSED
 Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
rights to LLS is violated or threatened with violation of an
unlawful act or omission of public official or employee or of
private individual or entity.
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado

 Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which of membership is not an actual
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a test of substantial evidence.
conclusion. More than mere imputation of wrongdoing or 
violation that would warrant a finding of liability against a person ZARATE Complaints were duly
- avers that his inclusion in supported by affidavits, police
charged.
the list coupled with his blotters, medical records and
 Writ of Amparo is an ordinary remedy : available not only for previous inclusion in reports of social wrkers. We
violations of LLS but also against threated violations of such Order of Battle of Military, cannot say that criminal
==actual threat. filing of 2 charges of charges were fabricated or
 Petitioners failed to substantially proved that LLS are serious illegal detention that they are filed to threaten
threatened with violation. and violation of Anti-Child his LLS.
 Petitioner’s general statements are empty averments in the Abuse Law in connection
with the detention of
context of Amparo rule. Manobos and the fact
ZARATE Mere membership in these that being a former
-Bayanmuna Party list organizations and sectors representative of
DE JESUS cannot equate to an actual Bayanmuna Party-list
- Gabirela & executive threat that would warrant which has been labeled
director of CRC issuance of writ of amparo. by Governement as a
PALABAY military front org of the
- labeling administration of Writ of Amparo is sought Communist Party entitle
President GMA and individually and granted him to Wirt of Amparo.
Aquino of KARAPATAN individually – assess situation MARIANO AND CASINO Filing of cases cannot be
as front organizations of of petitioners individually. – charge of rebellion and earlier characterized as an unlawful
CPPA-NPA-NDP and lumping together previos and implication in kidnapping with act or omission in context of
death in 2013 of one of present experiences may give murder case Amparo rule.
their human rights worker of impression that indeed ANOVER Fails to allege any personal
who was allegedly taken together petitioners’ LLS - schools run my rural circumstance showing right to
included in target list of are threated and violated. = missionaries of PH for LLS are threatened or violated
military but this way of presenting the Manobos have been 
obtaining situation is occupied by soldiers and
misleading. Perusal of their that these schools were
individual circumstances tagged as communist
negates the conclusion that schools providing
they are each entitled to writ of education for rebels
amparo BALABA Of all the petiioners : only
(PALABAY).Death of - occasions and also Balaba
KARAPATAN’s workers noticed vehicle with red
without corroborative evidence placed have people that
that his death was on account seems to be stalking or

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
watching her.
ISSUE: WON THESE ALLEGATIONS CONSTITUTE
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS TO WARRANT ISSUANCE OF
WRIT OF AMPARO.
HELD
 No. Balaba failed to demonstrate an actual threat to her LLS.
 We cannot conclude that petitioner Balaba’s inclusion in the list
have direct relation to circumstances she experienced.
 Threat must be actual and not merely one of supposition or with
likehood of happening
 Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy of LLS is violated and threated by an unlawful act or
omission of public official, or employee, or private individual or
entity engaged in gathering collecting or storing data or information
regarding person, famly, home and correspondence of aggrieved
party.
 Writ of Habeas Data provides a judicial remedy to protect a
person’s rights to control information regarding oneself, particularly
in instances where such info is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve lawful ends.
 Habeas Data rule also requires substantial evidence.
 In present petition, petitioners fail to show how their right to privacy
is violated given the information contained in the list are only their
names, positions, respective organizations and photographs =
public knowledge and readily accessible even to civilians especially
known personalities.
 Although petition for writ of HD may be filed by fam member or
even relatives on behalf of aggrieved, HD presupposes that
aggrieved party is still alive to show how violation of aggrieved
party’s right to privacy, LLS violated. Heirs of Crispin Beltaran do
not have legal standing to file this petition.
OBERGEFELL V. GODGES DIRECTOR OF OHIO
DEPARTENT OF HEALTH ET AL
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 Petitioners in this case seek to find that liberty of marrying
someone of the same sex and having their marriage deemed lawful
on the same terms and conditions as marriages between persons
of opposite sex.
 These cases come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee
States that define marriage as union between man and a woman
 14 same sex couples and 22 men whose same sex are deceased
filed for the said petition.
 Respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing laws.
CLAIMS OF PETITIONERS
 It violates 14th amendment denying them right to marry or to
have their marriage lawfully performed in another stte, given
full recognition.
 ISSUE:
Whether 14th amendment requires a state to license and
recognize a same sex marriage
Brief History of Role of marriage:
 Marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, inding families
and societies together.
 Life long union of man and woman has promised nobility and
dignity to all persons without regard to their status in life.
 Its dynamic allows 2 people to find life that couldn’t be found alone
for marriage becomes greater than just 2 persons
 History: Marriage by nature is a gender differentiated union of man
and a woman.
 Petitioners acknowledge history but contend that these cases
cannot end there. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of
marriage that underlies the petitioner’s contentions.
 Lawful marriage is stripped off from them.
 Ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality but it has not stood
in isolation from developments in law and society.
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado
 History of marriage is one of both continuity and change. That
institution even as confined to opposite sex relation has evolved
over time.
 In fact in 2003 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the
State’s Constitution guaranteed same sex couples right to marry .
After that ruling, some additional states granted marriage rights to
same sex couples either through judicial or legislative process.
[DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 14TH AMENDMENT]
“No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law”.
 Identification and protection of fundamental rights require
courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of
person so fundamental that the State must accord them its
respect.
 Such process is guided by many of the same considerations
relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisions that set
forth broad principles rather than specific requirements.
 Court has long held that right to marry is protected by the
Constitution.
 Over time and in other contexts, Court has reiterated that right
to marry is fundamental under the Due Process clause.
 It cannot be denied that Court’s cases describing right to marry
presumed in a relationship involving opposite sex partners.
 In assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply
to same sex couples, court must respect the reasons why right
to marry has been long perfected.
 FOUR PRINCIPLES AND TRADITIONS: REASON FOR
MARRIAGE IS FUNDAMENTAL UNDER CONSTITUTION
AND APPLY WITH EQUAL FORCE TO SAME SEX
COUPLES.
First premise
 Right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the
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concept of individual autonomy. Right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals.
 Most intimate decision that an individual can make.
 Contradictory to recognize a right of privacy with respect to
other matters of family life and not with respect to decision to
enter the relationship is the foundation of family in our society
 It fulfills the yearnings for security, safe haven and connection
that expresses our common humanity, civil marriage is an
esteemed institution and decision whether and whom to marry
is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition
 There is dignity in the bond between 2 men/women who seek
to marry and their autonomy to make such profound choices
Second Premise
 Right to marry is fundamental because it supports two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals.
 Marriage is the coming together, for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring and intimate to the degree of being
sacred… association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony of living, not in political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects
 Right to marry dignifies couples who wish to define
themselves b their commitment to each other.
 Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely
person might call out only to find no one there.
 It offers the hope f companionship and understanding and
assurance that while both still live there will be someone to
care for them
 Same sex couples has sch a right
Third Premise
 Safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning
from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
education.
 Right to marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a
central part of liberty protected by Due Process clause.
 Allows children to understand the integrity and closeness
of their own family and its concord with other families in
thee community and in their daily lives.
 Affords permanency and stability important to children’s
best interest
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado
 As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide
loving and nurturing homes to their children whether
biological or adopted. Hundreds of children are presently
raised by such couples.
 Gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive families.
 Excluding same sex couples from marriage thus conflicts
with a central premise of right to marry .—without such
recognition, stability and predictability marriage offers,
their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are
somehow lesser. They also suffer significant material cost
of being raised by unmarriaged parents relegated through
no fault of their own to a more difficult uncertain family life.
Forth Premise
 Court’s case and Nations traditions make clear that
marriage is a keystone to our social order.
 Marriage is the foundation of family and society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.
 Marriage is a great public institution giving character to our
whole civil polity.
 Marriage remains a building block of our national
community.
 Just as couple vows to support each other, so does society
pledge to support the couple offering symbolic recognition
and material benefits to protect nourish the union.
 While state are in general free to vary benefits they confer
on marriage coupeles, they have throughout our history
made marriage the basis for an expanding lit of
governmental rights, benefits and responsibilities.
 ASPECTS OF MARITAL STATUS: Taxation, inheritance,
property rights, succession, spousal privilege, hospital
access, medical decision making authority, adoption rights,
rights and benefits of survivors, etc.
 There is no difference between same and opposite sex couples
with respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of this exclusion from
that institution, same sex couples are denied the constellation of
benefits that the states have linked to marriage.
 Same sex couples are consigned to an instability many opposite
sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives.
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 It demeans gays and lesbians for State to lock them out of a
central institution of Nation’s society.
 If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then
received practices could serve as their own continued
justification and new groups could not invoke rights once
denied.
 Right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and
tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources alone.
 They rise too from a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in
our own era.
 Right of same-sex couples to marry is a part of liberty promised
by the 14th amendment is derived too from Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection of laws.
[DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
ARE CONNECTED IN A PROFOUND WAY THROUGH THEY SET
FORTH INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLES]
 Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection
may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive
yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the
meaning and reach of the other.
 Equal protection clause can help to identify and correct
inequalities in the institution of marriage vindicating precepts of
liberty and equality under our constitution.
 Challenged law burden liberty of same sex couples and it must
be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of
equality.
 Imposition of disability on gays and lesbians serves to
disrespect and subordinate them. And the EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE, like due process clause, prohibits
unjustified infringement of fundamental right to marry.
 Constitution contemplates democracy is the appropriate process
for change, so long as that process does not abridge
fundamental right
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado

 Illogical to think that state recognition of love and commitment BEHAVIOR BY DIFFERENT SEX COUPLES VIOATE 14TH
between same sex couples will alter most intimate relationships AMENDMENT GUARANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF AWS
between opposite sex.
 Court in this decision, holds same sex coupes may exercise 2. WON PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS FOR ADULT
fundamental right to marry in all states. It follows that the Court CONSENSUAL SEXUAL INTIMACY IN HOME VIIOLATE THEIR
must hold and it now does hold that there is no lawful basis for VITAL INTERESTS IN LIBERTY AND PRIVACY PROTECTED NDER
state to refuse to recognize lawful samesex marriage performed DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 14TH AMENDMENT
in another state on ground of is same sex character
HELD
 No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the
highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice and family  If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of an
individual, married or single to be free from unwarranted
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS government intrusion into matters fundamentally affecting a
person.
(Question before the Court is the validity of Texas statute making it a  Facts in Bowers had some similarities to the instant case. A police
crime for 2 persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate officer, whose right to enter seems not to have been in question
sexual conduct. observed Hardwich in his own bedroom, engaging in intimate
secual conduct with another adult male. Conduct was in violation
 Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private
of Georgia statute making it criminal offense: engage in sodomy.
residence, Houston police entered petitioner Lawrence’s apartment
Bowers This case
and saw him and another adult man, petitioner Garner, engaging in
Prohibited conduct WON Applies only to participants of
a private, consensual sexual act. participants were of same sex same sex
 Complaint described their crime as deviate sexual intercourse “anal WON FEDERAL WON CRIMINAL
sex with member of same sex” CONSTITUTION CONFERS CONVICTIONS UNDER THE
 Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TEXAS HOMOSEXUAL
intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of UPON HOMOSEXUALS TO CONDUCT LAW—WHICH
the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. ENGAGE IN SODOMY AND CRIMINALIZES SEXUAL
HENCE INVALIDATES LAWS INTIMACY BY SAME SEX
 Petitioners challenged the Statute as a violaton of equal protection OF MANY STATES THAT COUPLES BUT NOT
clause in 14th amendment and of a like provision of the Texas STILL MAKE SUCH IDENTICAL BEHAVIOR BY
constitution CONDUCT ILLEGAL AND DIFFERENT SEX COUPLES
HAVE DONE SO FOR A VERY VIOATE 14TH AMENDMENT
ISSUES: LONG TIME,
 When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
1. WON CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS UNDER THE TEXAS another person, conduct can be one element in a personal bond
HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT LAW—WHICH CRIMINALIZES SEXUAL that is more enduring. Liberty protected by the Constitution allows
INTIMACY BY SAME SEX COUPLES BUT NOT IDENTICAL homosexual persons the right to make this choice.

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Aleezah Gertrude Regado

 Historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than

the majority opnion and the concurring opinion by CJ BURGER
indicate Their historical premise are not without doubts and at the
very least, overstated.
 Court in Bowers was making broader point that for centuries there
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as
immoral.
 The issue is WON majority may use the power of state to enforce
these views on the whole society through operation of criminal
law.
 Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code.
 When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law os the
state, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in private and public
spheres
 Stigma this criminal statute imposes moreover is not trivial.
 Still it remains a criminal offense with all the imports of dignity of
the person charged.
 Present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced r who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve
public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seeks to enter.
 The case involve two adults who with full and mutual consent,
engage in sexual practices common to homosexual lifestyle.
 State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.
 Right to liberty under Due Process clause gives them full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of government.
 It is a promise of the constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.
 The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interests, which can
justify its intrusion into personal and private life of individuals.

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VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
City Ordinance No. 6537
Facts:
 Section 1 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate
in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein whether
permanent, temporary or casual without first securing permit from mayor of
manila and paying permit of Php 50.00
 Exempt (1) Dimplomatic rel (2) Technical assistance program w/ PH Govt
(3) Working in their respective households (4) Members of religious orders
or congregations who are not paid
 Violation punishable with penalty or fine or both
 On 1968, private respondent who was employed in Manila filed a case to
declare said ordinance null and void.
 Claims by Private Petitioner
1. Discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2. No distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a
fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of
registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit
the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal
delegation of legislative powers:
3. Arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens
who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and
therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
 Claims by Petitioner Mayor Villegas
1. Rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue
measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure
but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a
regulatory measure in nature.
ISSUE:
WON ORDINANCE VIOLATED DUE PRROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION
HELD: YES
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 While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure
an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion
and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications
for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second
part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not
regulatory but a revenue measure.
 There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have
been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
 P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it
fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual
aliens who are required to pay it.
 Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real
and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of
the particular legislation.
 The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a
lowly employee or a highly paid executive
 Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide
the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.
 Ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be
attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or
refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building
permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
ORMOC SUGAR CO. INC V. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
Facts:
 1964: Municipality Bord of Ormoc passed Ordinance No 4 : imposing "on
any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign
countries
 Payments were made under protest
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado
 Ormoc Sugar Company filed with CFI Leyte: alleging that such ordinance
is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause and
uniformity of taxation
 Defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within the defendant city’s
power to enact under Local Autonomy Act and that same did not violate
constitutional limitations.
 CFI ruled in favor of City.
ISSUE: WON ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: NO
 Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered
cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public
purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
 Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation, and a classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
 Questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other.
 At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
 Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well.
 The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff,
for the coverage of the tax
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CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. BSP
Facts:
 1993 – RA 7653 (The New Centra Bank Act) : created new BSP
 2001- Central Bank Employees association, filed a petition against BSP to
restrain respondents from implementing Sec 15 (c) Art 2 of RA 7653.
[exercise of authority]
 Petitioner’s Claim:
 Unconstitutional cut between 2 classes of employees (1) BSP officers or
those exempted form Salary Standardization Law (2) Rank and File [salary
grade 19 and below]
 Not based on substantial distinctions which makes real difference but
solely on SG of BSP personnel’s position
 Not germane to purposes of Sec 15 (c) Art 2, RA 7653
 GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from coverage of
SSL and thus within class of rank and file personnel of government
financial institutions (GFIs) the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated
upon
 Subjecting compensation of BSP rank-and-file employees to rate
prescribed by SSL actually defeats purpose of law establishing
professionalism and excellence at all levels in BSP
 In sum : classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious and
violates equal protection clause of the constitution.
 Respondent BSP claim:
 It does not violate equal protection clause
 Fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP and mandate of Monetary
board to establish professionalism and excellence in all levels in
accordance with sound principles of management
 OSG
 : classification is based on actual and real differentiation , even as it
adheres to the enunciated policy of RA 7653
 ISSUE: WON LAST PARAGRAPH OF SEC 15 (C) ARTICLE 2 OF RA
7653 RUNS AFOUL OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE THAT NO
PERSON SHALL BE DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS
 HELD:
o It is settled in constitutional law that equal protection clause does not
prevent legislature form establishing classes of individuals or objects
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
upon which different rules shall operate, so long as classification is not
unreasonable. Guaranty of equal protection of laws is not a guaranty
of equality in application of laws upon all citizens of state. Equality, not
identity of rights .Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. Equal
protection of laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
o All that is required for a valid classification is that:
1. Reasonable (classification based on substantial distinctions)
2. Germane to the purpose of law
3. Not limited to existing conditions only
4.Apply equally to each member of class.
o In the case at bar it is clear that in the Legislative deliberations,
exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from SSL was intended to
address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
component officers ad executives.
o ENACTMENT, HOWEVER OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS—EXEMPTING
ALL OTHER RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE
SSL—RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF
CHALLENGED PROVISION IN VIOLATION OF EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAWS
o Statutes valid at one time, may become void because of altered
circumstances. Continued enforcement of otherwise void law would be
unreasonable and oppressive.
o A statute non-discriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory
in its operation.
o No difference between law which denies equal protection and law
which permits of such denial.
o Enactment of RAs which amended charters of other GFIs their rank
and file personnel from SSL.
o Thus within class of rank and file personnel of GFIs, BSP rank and file
are also discriminated upon.
o Subsequent charters of 7 other GFIs share the common provision:
blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of SSL,
expressly, or impliedly
o Thus 11 years after amendment of BSP charter, rank and file of 7
other GFIs were granted exemption that was specifically denied to
Rank and file of BSP thereby exposing provision of assailed RA to a
more serious scrutiny.
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o Scrutiny relates to constitutionality of classification. Classification must
not only be reasonable but must also apply equally to all members of
class.
o Proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it
cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation so as practically to
make unjust distinction between persons who are without difference
o In second level of scrutiny, inequality of treatment cannot be justified
on mere assertion that each exemption rests on a policy determination
by legislature. All legislative enactments necessarily rest on policy
determination.
o Policy determination argument may support inequality of treatment
between rank-and-file officers of BSP but it cannot justify inequality of
treatment between BSP r&f and other GFIs’ who are similarly situated.
There exists no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate the BSP
r&f from other r&f of 7 GFIs.
o It fails to appreciate that what is the issue in the second level scrutiny
is not the declared policy of law per se but the oppressive results of
Congress inconsistent and unequal policy.
o Compensation Position Classification System was to be
governed by the following principles
1. Just and equitable wages w/ ratio of compensation between payy
distinctions maintained at equitable levels.
2. Basic compensation generally comparable with private sector in
accordance with the prevailing laws on minimum wages.
o BSP and seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as the Congress
deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from SSL.
o GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government entities.
o In the case at bar, it is precisely the act as regards the exemption from
SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to those 7 GFIs or their
rank and file employees were denied exemption which BSP rank and
file employees were denied. Distinction made by law is not only
superficial but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions
that make real differences between BSP rank-and-file and seven other
GFIs
o It bears stressing that the exemption from SSL is a privilege fully
within the legislative to give or deny
o However its subsequent grant to other rank and file of 7 other GFIs
and continued denial to BSP’s rank and file employees breached the
latter’s equal protection..
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
o Equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality, but it
requires all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
YRASUEGUI V. PAL
FACTS:
 Petitioner Armado Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of
PAL. The proper weight of a man for his height and body structure is from
147-166 punds, ideal weigh is 166 pounds as mandated by Cabin and
Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
 In the course of his employment, he had weigh problems. In lieu thereof he
was extended a vacation leave and a leave without pay to address his
weight concerns.
 He was allowed to return after meeting required work but such work
problem occurred, prompting the company to give him another leave
without pay.
 He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report
weight checks on several dates, even made a referral to the company’s
physician. He tried to regain his ideal weight, failed to attend required
weight checks, his efforts were fruitless.
 Pal finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation
of company standards on weight requirements.
 1992: Petitioner did not deny being overweight. What he claimed instead is
that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PA since no action
has been taken by company since 1988. He also claimed that PAL
discriminated against him because the company has not been fair in
treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated.
 1993 : petitioner was formally informed by Pal : considering the utmost
leniency extended to him which spanned about almost 5 years, his
services were considered terminated and effective immediately
Lower court ruling (summary, y’know just in case) #GirlScoutsOfThePhilippines
Labor Arbiter Illegally dismissed – weight standards reasonable in view of nature
of job however weigh standards need not be complied with under
pain of dismissal
NLRC Affirmed LA—obesity or tendency to gain weight uncontrollably
regardless of amount of food intake is a disease in itself
CA Reversed—weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing
qualification for an employee’s position. Failure to adhere =
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dismissal. Weight standards : reasonable.
ISSUE:
WON OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER THE LABOR
CODE
WON PETITIONER WAS UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PETITONER
WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN
ATTENDANDS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED
HELD:
Obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Art 282(e) of Labor
Code
 Weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than they
constitute a continuing qualification of employees in order to keep the job
 By its nature, qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and after
employee is hired.
 Petitioner advances the argument that obesity is a physical abnormality or illness--
He was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is
possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination and self-
discipline.
 Petitioner claims that reducing weigh is costing him a lot of expenses---however he
has only himself to blame, he could have easily availed the assistance of the
company’s physician per advice of PAL but he chose to ignore the suggestion and
repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight checks .
 Obesity of petitioner when placed in context of his work as flight attendant
becomes an analogous cause under Art 282 (e) of Labor Code that
justifies dismissal from his service.
 His obesity may not be unintended but it is nonetheless voluntary (ouch)
 MEIORIN TEST : Used to determine whether an employment policy
is justified --show that
1. Adopted standard for purpose rationally connected to performance of
his job
2. Standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of work-
related purpose (factual basis)
3. Standard reasonably necessary in order to accomplish legitimate work
–related purpose.
 A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for the reasons of
public policy is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for safety of
passengers it transports
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado
 It is only logical to hold that weight standards of PAL show its efforts to
comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by the law by virtue
of being a common carrier.
 Business of PAL is air transportation.
 Passenger safety goes to the core of job as a cabin attendant.
 On board an aircraft body weight and size of cabin attendant are
important factors to be considered in case of emergency. Air crafts have
constricted cabin space and narrow aisles and exit doors.
 Obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one. It would be
absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure aircraft in order to
wider aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin
attendants. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility.
Petitioner failed to substantiate claim that he was discriminated against
PAL
 Nothing in the records which could support finding of discriminatory
treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the
supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him.
Substantial proof must be shown.
 Bill of rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
 Art 202(2) on its face violates constitutionally guaranteed rights to due
PEOPLE V. SITON
FACTS:
 Respondents Evangeline Sitn and Krystem Sagrano were cargged with
vagrancy pursuant to Art 202(2) of the RPC.
 2003: in Davao, accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and
loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi streets without any visible means
to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.
 Art 202 (2) RPC : Any person found loitering about public or semi-
public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support.
 Respondents claim: Art 202 is unconstitutional for being vague and
overboard.
MTC Denied—law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to State’s police power
and justified maxim of solus populi est suprema lex which calls for
subordination of individual benefit to interest of greater number. Proper
surveillance conducted on 2 accused in an area reported to be frequented
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by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.
RTC Respondents claim:
 Definition of vagrancy under Art 202(2) apart from being vague
results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators since the
definition of crime includes persons who are otherwise performing
ordinary peaceful acts.
 It violated equal protection clause under Constitution because it
discriminates against poor and unemployed permitting arbitrary and
unreasonable classification.
Ruling:
 Definition of Vagrancy under Art 22 of RPC offers no guidelines or
any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no
visible means of support by force of circumstances and those who
chose to loiter about and bum around, who are proper subjects of
legislation cannot pass judicial scrutiny of constitutionality.
ISSUE: WON ART 202 (2) OF RPC IS CONSTITUTIONAL
PETITIONER CLAIM:
 Presumption of validity
 Overbreadth and and vagueness doctrines have special application to
free-speeches cases only and are not appropriate in testing
 State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare
in the exercise of its police power
RESPONDENTS CLAIM:
process and the equal protection of laws.
HELD: Court finds for the petitioners.
 Power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is
legislative in nature and inherent in sovereign power of the state to
maintain social order as an aspect of police power
 Legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful provided no constitutional rights have been abridged.
 Legislature must inform citizens with reasonable precision of what acts it
intends to prohibit so that he may have certain understandable rule of
conduct and know what act is his duty to avoid.
 Void for vagueness doctrine: statute which either forbids or requires doing
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
US Case (Jacksonville) PH CASE
Unconstitutional Constitutional
“wandering or strolling without any “without visible means of support”
lawful purpose or object” : trap for
innocent acts
Gives police unfettered discretion Requirement of probable cause provides an
to make arrest acceptable limit to police or executive authority
which may be abused in relation to search/arrest
of persons found to be violating
 Art 202(2) fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct
finds no application here under our legal system, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith
 Grounds for suspicion are reasonable = Arresting Officer authority +
Probable cause + Good faith in making arrest. (just my own formula, read
the text if you doubt)
 As applied in the instant case, police authorities have been conducting
previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to arrest. This
satisfies the probable cause requirement under our constitution.
 Policy behind law:
“streets and parks : training ground for petty offenders who graduate
hardened and battle scared criminals.”
: Maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in the
human society.
 Acts are made illegal by their offensiveness to society’s basic sensibilities
and their adverse effect on quality of life of people for society.
 Art 202 (2) does not violate against equal protection clause, neither
does it discriminate against the poor or unemployed
 Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status but for
conduct themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public
peace or cause alarm and apprehensions in the community. Being poor
or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to
engage in immoral conduct
 Vagrancy is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting
themselves at a certain place and time which orderly society finds
unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for safety
and well-being of members of community.
 Dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
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LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC
Facts:
 Petitions for prohibition commenced by League of City of PH : assail
constitutionality of 16 laws each converting the municipality covered
thereby into a city and seek to enjoin COMELEC from conducting
plebiscite pursuant to subject laws.
 LGC 20 million to 100 millon locally generated income.
 Common to 16 municipalities : provision in cityhood bills exempting
municipality covered from Php 100 million income requirement
 Petitioners :
1. Seek to declare cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec 10,
Art 10
2. violation of equal protection of laws
3. Wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
ISSUE:
WON CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE SEC 10 OF ART X OF CONSTITUTION
WON CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
HELD
IT DOES NOT VIOLATE SEC 10 ART X OF THE CONSTITUTION
 Section provides that criterion of political subdivisions shall be in
accordance with the criteria established by local government code subject
to the approval of voters of units concerned. “code” = law congress
enacted
 Congress alone and no other can enforce criteria, Fr.Bernas: authority to
created municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature
 Congress can even, after making a codification enact an amendatory law
adding to existing layers of indications earlier codified, just as efficiously
as it may reduce the same
 Legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in
which the resulting law is couched. Applying strictly literal interpretation of
statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience an absurd
situation or injustice.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado

 Pimentel-Drillon exchange eloquently indicates : complementary QUINTO V. COMELEC

legislative intentions.(1) pending cityhoodbills would be outside the pale
of minimum income requirement of Php 100 million (2) RA 9009 would Facts:
not have any retroactive effect insofar as cityhood bills are concerned.
Assailed laws: They violate equal
IT DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE protection clause and
Section 13, RA 9369 suffer from over breadth
 Cityhood laws by grnating special treatment to respondent municipalities Sec 66 of Omnibus Election Code
by way of exemption does not violate equal protection of laws. Section 4(a) of COMELEC RESOLUTION 8678
 Artificial persons as respondent LGUs entitled to protection only insofar
as property is concerned. Assailed decision struck down the following laws due to the grounds provided
 No deprivation of property results by virtue of enactment of cityhood laws. for below.
LCPs claim that IRA will be substantially reduced would not suffice to 1. They violate equal protection clause of the constitution because of
bring it within the ambit of constitutional guarantee differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those hoding
 Fundamental right to equal protection of laws does not require absolute elective positions
equality. ONLY (S.G.N.E) substantial distinctions.germane.not limited to 2. Overbroad insofar as they prohibit candidacy of all civil servants holding
existing conditions. Equally: same class appointive posts:
 Favorable treatment accorded to 16 municipalities rests on substantial - without distinction as to whether or not they occupy a high/influential position
distinctions. - they limit these civil servants’ activity regardless of whether they be partisan
 Respondent LGUs which are subjected only to erstwhile 20 M income or nonpartisan in character or whether they be in national, municipal or
criteria instead of stringent income prescribed by RA 9009 are barangay level.
substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. 3.Congress has not show compelling state interests to restrict fundamental
 Due to extraneous circumstances = Changing rules in the middle of the right to these public appointive officials.
game. COMELEC ARGUMENT
 Basis for exemption : Justice and fairness. Reduce inequality  Not violative of equal protection cause when they accord differential
 They are qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. treatment to elective and appointive officials because such differential
Because of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, spoiler in form treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to
of RA 9009 supervened. purpose of law.
 To impose them higher income requirements after what they have gone  Do not suffer from over breadth.
through would indeed be unfair.
 Thus imperatives of fairess dictate that they should be given a legal SECTION 4(A) OF COMELEC RESOLUTION 8678 IS COMPLIANT WITH
remedy by which they would be allowed to prove that they have all the LAW
necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under
LGC of 1991. Incumbent Appointive Official Incumbent Elected
 Peculiar conditions of LGUs which are actual and real provide sufficient Official
grounds for legislative classification. Ipso Facto Upon filling of certificate of Upon start of campaign
Resigned candidacy period for which they
are running

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado

 These laws and regulations implement Sec 2(4) of Article 10-B of Consti
which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any
electioneering or partisan political campaigns.
 Intent of both Congress and Framers of our constitution to limit
participation of civil service officers and employees is too plain to be
mistaken.
 Constitutional ban does not cover elected officials
- By the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political
activities almost all year round even outside of campaign period.
SECTION 4(A) OF RESO 8678, SECTION 13 OF RA 9369 AND SECTION 66
OF OEC DO NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
(Farinas et al.. v. Executive Secretary is Controlling)
Substantial distinction clearly exists between elective officials and appointive
officials
Elective Officials Appointive Officials
Occupy office by virtue of mandate of Hold office by virtue of designation thereto
electorate by appointing authority
Elected for a definite term and may Tenure: Permanent/At pleasure of
remove therefrom only upon stringent appointing authority
conditions : respect to will of electorate
::serve office until end of term
Classification Germane to the purpose of law.
 Equal protection clause does not require universal application of laws to all
persons or things without distinction.
 It simply requires equality among equals
 Test : (S.G.N.E)
 Dictum I love: “sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores long
standing rule that to remedy injustice, Legislature need not to address
every manifestation of evil at once,; it may proceed one step at a time”
 The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve government interest
1. Efficient civil service faithful to government and people rather than
to party
2. Avoidance of appearance of political justice as to policy
3.Avoidance of danger of a powerful political machine
4.Ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and
that they be free from both coercion and prospect of favor from
political activity.
DOES NOT SUFFER FROM OVERBREADTH
LIMITATION ON CANDIDACY REGARDLESS OF INCUMBENT
APPOINTIVE POSITION, VALID
 The avoidance of such a politically active public work force:: could give an
emerging political machine an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power ---
a reason enough to impose restriction on candidacies of all appointive
public officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being
held by such employee or the degree of influence that may be attendant
thereto.
LIMITATTION ON TYPE OF CANDIACY REGARDLESS OF TYPE OF
OFFICE SOUGH, VALID
 Alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real.
 Erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that the concerns of a
truly partisan office and temptation it fosters are sufficiently different from
those involved in an office removed from regular party politics as to
warrant distinctive treatments.
 The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the
elections of barangay offices, since they are the only elections in this
country which involve nonpartisan public offices
 Since Barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation
rule, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy.
 In the case at bar, probable harm in society in permitting incumbent
appointive officials to remain in office even as they actively pursue elective
posts far outweighs less likely evil of having arguably protected
candidacies blocked by possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overbroad
statute.
VILLANUEVA V. JBC
Facts:
 Petitioner Judge Ferdinand Villanueva was appointed as presiding judge in
MTC, Bataan on 2012
 On 2013, he applied for vacant positions for various RTC (Tagum,
Davao,Agusan Del Sur)
 He was not included in the list of candidates because of JBC’s long
standing policy of opening chance for promotion to second level courts to
among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current
positions for at least 5 years.
 Petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, hence was excluded
in the list.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
 Claims of petitioner:
1. Constitution already prescribed qualifications of RTC judge and
JBC could not add more
2. 5 year requirement violates equal protection and due process
clause of the constitution.
3. Violates constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human
Rights for equal opportunity of employment
 Response of JBC:
1. Equal protection clause was not violated because a classification of
lower court judges who served for at least 5 years and those who
served for less than 5 years is valid.
2.No violation of due process clause as the policy is merely internal in
nature.
HELD :
 Under the Constitution, JBC is mandated to recommend to the judiciary
and only those nominated by JBC in a list officially transmitted to the
president may be deemed appointed as judge in judiciary.
 JBC is burdened with great responsibility that is imbued with public interest
as it determines men and women who will sit on judicial bench.
 While the 1987 Constitution has provided qulifications of members of
judiciary, this does not preclude JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively insure its mandate.
 JBC’s ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply fill up
judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient
administration of justice.
 The adoption of the 5 year requirement policy applied by JBC to
petitioner’s case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred to it
by the Constitution.
EQUAL PROTECTION
 JBC employs standards that have a rational basis to screen applicants
who cannot be accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary,
to determine who is best qualified, and not to discriminate any against any
particular individual or class.
 What equal protection clause requires is merely simple equality among
equals.
 JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional
requirement and its rules that a member of the judiciary must be of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence
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 The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine
proven competence which may be measured by experiences among other
factors.
 In determining competence, JBC considers among other qualifications,
experience and performance.
 5 year stint in judiciary can also provide evidence of integrity probity and
independence of judges seeking promotion.
 Clearly, classification created by challenged policy satisfies rational basis
test
 Policy does not infringe on equal protection as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of applicants
DUE PROCESS
 JBCs policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations
exempted from publication requirement
 Nonetheless, JBC’s failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced
petitioner’s private interest.
 Petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list, since possession of
constitutional and statutory qualification for appointment in judiciary may
not be used to legally demand that one’s own name be included in the list
PEOPLE V. JUMAWAN
FACTS:
 Accused-appellant and his wife KKK, were married on 1975, they had 4
children.
 1999: KKK exected a complait affidavit alleing that her husband raped her
at 3 amand that on 1998, boxed her for refusing to have sex with him
 1999: City Prosecutor issued Joint Resolution finding probable cause for
grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending
criminal information to be filed against accused appellant
 1999: two informatons for rape were filed before RTC
Version of Prosecution
 1997: husband started to be brutal in bed
 1998: Started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to
attend to him. She was pre-occupued with financial problems in their
businesses. He wanted KKK to stay home because “a woman must stay in
house and only good in bed”
 Subjected to rape, in Cebu City where they stayed for the graduation rites
of their daughter.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
 Oct 1998: she did not lie on bed but on a cot near the bed. Respondent
rose from the bed, lifted cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to
fall. Husband expressed desire to copulate by taping fingers on her lap,
said she was not feeling well. Panties were torn, and the husband
forcefully insisted and succeeded on penetrating her.
 Her pleas were audible on children’s room, causing them to go up, MMM
forced himself towards the room and saw her mom crying. They
succeeded in leaving the room.
 She told the children that she was forced to sex by their father.
 The following night, same act occurred. Presence of children did not pacify
accused appellant’s desire. He justified his authority by saying that he is
the head of the family.
 Again, he forced himself towards her
 Children afterwards saw their mother crying, with her hair disheveled.
VERSION OF DEFENSE
 Denied raping her.
 On October 16 and 17 1998, he was in Bukidnon peeling corn
 On October 7, his truck met an accident but left in on the roadside to
attend to graduation rites of their dauther, but went back to pick up truck.
 He asserted that KKK merely fabricated rape charges as her revenge
because he took over control and operation of pick up truck.
 Accused appellant provoked to do so, when she failed to account for her
ban deposits and business earnings.
 KKK wanted to cover up extra-marital affairs : she had more than 10
paramours
RTC Spontaneous and Straightforward testimonies of prosecution’s
witnesses. TC also upheld sincere and genuine : two
daughter’s testimonies.
CA Affirmed RTC’s ruling.
KKKs failure to submit herself to medical examination did not
negate commission of crime.
CA rejected accused appellant’s argument that since he and
KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligation of and right to
sexual intercourse there must be convincing physical evidence
or manifestations of alleged force and intimidation used upon
KKK such as bruises.
- No wife in her right mind would accuse her
husband of having raped her if it were not true.
- Delay in filing of rape complaint as sufficiently
explained by KKK when she stated that she only
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found out that wife may charge his husband with
rape when fiscal investigating her separate
complaint for grave threats and physical injuries
told her about it.
HELD:
o Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached the Court until
now.
o According to CJ Ramon C. Aquino, a husband may not be guilty of rape under Art
335 of Act No 3815.
o In 1981, Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying United Nations Convention on
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW) –first
international women’s bill of rights : ban on all forms of discrimination against
women.
o PH enshrined equality in 1987 Constitution.
Sec11: dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect to human rights
Sec 14 role of women in nation-building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before law of
women and men.
o CEDAW : part of GAPOIL
o Legislature pursued enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997 RA
8353 eradicated stereotype of rape in Art 266C of RPC. It reclassified rape as a
crime against persons and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity
o Read together, Sec 1 of law unqualifies use of term “by man” in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that RA 8353 penalizes crime without regard to rapist’s legal
relationship with victim.
o Martial rape is not defined. All that the law makers are trying to point out is that one
cannot justify rape sex without consent just because they are married to their wives.
For as long as attendant circumstances of traditional rape are present, it is rape.
REFUTATION OF ACCUSSED-APPEALLANTS ARGUMENTS
o Claim: (1) Consent to copulaion is presumed between cohabiting husband
and wife unless contrary is proved (2) this case shoud be viewed and
treated differently from ordinary rape case and that standards for
determining presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the
ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between
husband and wife.
o The Philippines as a State Party to CEDAW recognized that change in the
traditional role of men as well as role of women in society and in the family
is needed to achieve full equality between them.
o RA No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape
cannot exist because a husband has absolute propriety rights over his
wife’s body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is
always obligatory or at least presumed,
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado

o Clear : it is now acknowledged that rape as a form of violence exists within  Ordinance SP_2235, SP-2013 : proceeds collected from garbage fees on
marriage. residential properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an
o A man who penetrates his wife against her consent or against her will earmarked special account under general fund to be utilized for garbage
commits sexual violence upon her, and PH as a state party to CEDAW and collections . It also provided for a penalty in case the household owner
its accompanying declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under refuses to pay.
RA 8353. Claims of Petitioner:
o A woman is no longer the chattel-atiquated practices labeled her to be. A  Petitioner asserts that protection of real properties from informal settlers
husband, who as sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using his and collection of garbage are basic and essential duties and functions of
property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with QC government
dignity equal to that are accorded to himself.  By imposing SHT and garbage fees, latter has shown a penchant and
o He cannot be permitted to violate the dignity by coercing her to engage in pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that could be covered by
sexual act without her full and free consent. revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land, business, transfer,
o Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from nonmarital rape amusement, etc. as well as Internal Revenue Allotment from IRA.
cases in terms of elements that constitute crime and in the rules of their  Respondents did not raise the issue that QC government is in dire financial
proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitution right to state and desperately needs money to find housing for informal settlers
equal protection of laws ordains that similar subjects should not be treated and to pay for garbage collection
differently so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate  According to petitioner, the constitutional provision (Sec 5,Art 10) is not a
against others; no person or class of person shall be denied the same blanket provision for LGU to tax everything.
protection of laws, which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in  Annual property tax is an ad valorem tax : subject to revision every 3 years
like circumstances. to reflect increase in market value of property.
o A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an Respondent’s claim:
unmarried woman. She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual  Presumption of constitutionality
intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such
 Enactment finds basis in social justice principle enshrined in Sec 9, Art 2 of
consent.
Constitution.
o Human rights of woman include their control over and decide freely and
CLAIMS ON SOCIALIZED HOUSING TAX
responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and
Petitioner Respondent
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.
o According to petitioner, collection o Ordinance No. SP 2095 applies
o In fine, since law does not separately categorize marital rape from of SHT is a kind of class equally to all real property
nonmarital rape nor provide for different definition or elements of either. legislation that violates right of owners without discrimination.
property owners to equal There is no way that the
protection of laws since it favors ordinance could violate equal
informal settlers who occupy protection because real property
property not their own and pay owners and informal settlers do
FERRER JR. V. BAUTISTA no taxes over law-abiding real not belong to the same class.
FACTS: property owners who pay for
 2011: QC enacted Ordinance No SP-2095, S-2011 or the Socialized income and realty taxes. Social
Housing Tax of Quezon City justice and police power,
petitioner believes, does nt mean
 Effective for 5 years, Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) shall be utilized by QC
imposing tax on one or that one
government for the various of projects + it also provides for tax credit. has to give up something for the

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
benefit of another.
o Petitioner alleges that o
It is not oppressive, since tax
Bistekvilles will be constructed rate is consistent with UDHA.
out of SHT collected. While law authorizes LGUs to
collect SHT on properties with
assessed value of more than 50
K, questioned ordinance only
covers properties with an
assessed value of 100K + it
provides for tax credit
ON GARBAGE FEE
o Respondents claim that o Petitioner argues that ordinance
ordinance is an exercise of police cannot be justified by exercise of
power. police power
o No double taxation because o The subject ordinance is
ordinance involves a fee. Even discriminatory as it collects
assuming that garbage fee is a garbage fee only from domestic
tax, same cannot be a direct hoseholds not restaurants, food
duplicate tax as it is imposed on courts, etc with much more
a different subject matter. garbage than residential
property.
o The only reference to property is o Double taxation because
the determination of applicable garbage collection is basic and
rate and facility collection essential public service that
should e paid out from property
tax, business tax and alike.
o QC Government already collects
garbage fees.
o Garbage fee collected even if
required publication not yet
elapsed.
COURT RULING:
 For an ordinance to be valid it must not only be within corporate powers of LGU to
enact and must be passed according to procedure prescribed by law
 It should also conform to the following requirements
1. Not contrary to Constitution
2. Not Unfair or Opressive
3. Not partial or discriminatory
4.Not prohibit but may regulate trade
5.General and consistent with public Policy
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6. Not unreasonable.
 An ordinance must pass muster under test of constitutionality and test of
consistency with prevailing laws, if not : void.
 LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of whole; that policy of ensurng
the autonomy of local governments was never intended by drafters of 1987
Constitution to create an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political
subdivisions.
 Local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomoys, the
legislature must see to it that (a) Taxpayer will not be overburdened ir saddled with
multiple and unreasonable impositions (b) each LGU will have its fair share of
available resources (c) Resources of national government will not be unduly
disturbed (d) Local taxation will be fair, uniform and just.
ON SOCIALIZED HOUSING TAXES
 1987 Constitution : use of property bears a social function and that all
economic agents shall contribute to the common good
 Rights of property are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment
as shall prevent them from being injurious and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established.
 Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police
power.
 SHT is one of the sources of funds for urban developmet and housing
program.
 Rationale
Provide sufficient funds to initiate, Removal of urban blight
implement and undertake social will definitely increase the
housing projects and other related fair market value of the
preliminary activities properties in the city
Benefit Socialized Housing programs
and Projects of City Gov, specifically
the marginalized sector through
acquisition of properties for human
settlement
 Uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens.
 Under UDHA (Urban Dev Housing Act) , socialized housing shall be the
primary strategy in providing shelter for the underprivileged and homeless
 Clearly SHT charged by QC Govt is a tax which is within its power to
impose. Aside from specific authority vested by Sec 43 of the UDHA, cities
are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such functions
and responsibilities as are necessary or incidental to efficient and effective
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
provisions of the basic services and facilities which include among others
programs and projects of low cost housing and other mass dwellings
 It is greatly imbued with public interest.
 Removing slum areas in QC is not only beneficial to the underprivileged
and homeless, it is also advantageous to the real property owners as well.
 The situation will improve the value of property investments, fully enjoying
same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community and will enhance
the quality of life of the poor making them law abiding constituents and
better consumers of business products.
 Petitioner argues that SHT is a penalty imposed on real property owners
because it burdens them with expenses to provide funds for housing of
informal settlers and that it’s a class legislation since it favors latter who
occupy properties which is not their own and pay no taxes
 WE DISAGREE. Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. + Valid and reasonable classification (SGNE)
 Disparity between real property owner and an informal settler are two
distinct classes : too obvious and does not need to be discussed in length
 Differentiation conforms to practical dictataes of justice and equity and is
not discriminatory within the meaning of the constitution.
 It is inherent in power to tax that State is free to select the subjects of
taxation. Inequities which result from singling out one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
 It is not confiscatory or oppressive since tax imposed therein is below what
UDHA actually allows.
ON GARBAGE FEE
 Purpose and policy underpinnings of police power to regulate collection
and disposal of solid waste are
1. Preserve and protect public health and welfare as well as
environment
2. Defray costs and ensure financial stability of the system for the
benefit of entire community
 Ordinance regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of validity.
 In this jurisdiction pursuant to Sec 16 of LGC and in proper exercise of its
corporate powers under Sec 22 of same, Sangguniang Panlunsod of QC is
empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for general welfare of city and its inhabitants.
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 General welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of police power
of State to LGUs.
 RA 9003 or Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 affirms this
authority as it expresses that LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of its provisions within their respective
jurisdiction
 Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such
reasonable fees and charges for services rendered. Charge = pecuniary
liability.
 Hence not being tax, (no violation: double taxation)
 To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce revenues in
excess of cost of regulation because such fee will be construed as an
illegal tax when revenue by regulation exceeds cost of regulation.
 From the provisions of RA 9003 it s clear that the authority of municipality
or city to impose fees is limited to the collection, transportation of non-
recyclables and special wastes and for the disposal of these into sanitary
landfill
 Barangays have the authority to impose fees for the collection and
segregation of biodegradables, compostable and reusable wastes from
households commerce, other sources of domestic wastes for the use of
barangay MRFs (materials recovery facility)
 It violates equal protection clause of Constitution and the provisions
of LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as
practicable on tax payers ability to pay and not unjust and
oppressive, confiscatory.
 In the subject ordinance, rates of impossible fee depend on land or floor
area and whether payee is occupying a lot, condominium, social housing
project or apartment.
 For the purpose of garbage collection, there is in fact no substantial
distinction between an occupant of lot on one hand and an occupant of a
unit of a condominium on the other hand.
 A similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.
 Rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable.
 Classification under Ordinance No SP 2235 are not germane to its
declared purpose of promoting shared responsibility with the residents to
attack their common mindless attitude in overconsuming the present
resources and in generating waste.
**allegation with regard to publication not established by convincing
evidence.
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Aleezah Gertrude Regado

thereof could not be prohibited by the be subjected to the blare of political

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON V. COMELEC COMELEC from expressing their propaganda
Facts: political opinion lest their property simply aims to ensure equal
rights be unduly intruded upon campaign opportunity, time, and
 Feb 2001 RA 9006 “Fair elections Act was passed” space for all candidates - an important
 2013: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 9615 which provided for and substantial governmental interest,
rules implementing RA 9006 which is totally unrelated to the
 Sec 7 : Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. –(f.) Publicc areas or in suppression of free expression; that
private properties without consent of owner any restriction on free speech is
merely incidental and is no greater
 (g) 5. Public Utilities + 6. Premises of public transport terminals
than is essential to the furtherance of
 Petitioner claims that provisions impedes right to free speech of private the said governmental interest.
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. Petitioner requested COMELEC
to reconsider implementation and allow private owners of PUVs and ISSUES:
transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles WON RESOLUTION NO. 9615 VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
and transport terminals. OF THE OWNERS OF [PUVs] AND TRANSPORT TERMINALS.
 COMELEC en Banc denied.
 Justification for denial: WON THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVE TO GIVE AN EQUAL
 The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a PUV or in OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM THE ELECTORATE IS NOT IMPAIRED BY
transport terminals is exactly because it is public and can be seen by all; POSTING POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS ON PUVs AND TRANSPORT
and although it is true that private vehicles ply the same route as public TERMINALS.
vehicles, the exposure of a [PUV] servicing the general, riding public is
much more compared to private vehicles. Categorizing PUVs and transport HELD:
terminals as 'public places' under Section 7 (f) of Reso. No. 9615 is
therefore logical. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
Arguments 9615 are prior restraints on speech
Petitioner Respondents  Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
violate the right to free speech of the privately-owned PUVs and transport truthfully any matter of public concern without prior restraint or censorship
owners of PUVs and transport terminals are public spaces that are and subsequent punishment.9 Prior restraint refers to official governmental
terminals; that the prohibition curtails subject to its regulation. restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
their ideas of who should be voted by
publication or dissemination.
the public.
no substantial public interest COMELEC has the power to enforce  Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
threatened by the posting of political and administer all laws and 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
advertisements on PUVs and regulations relative to the conduct of speech.
transport terminals to warrant the an election, including the power to  Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of
prohibition imposed by the COMELEC regulate the enjoyment or utilization of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through
all franchises and permits for the the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince
operation of transportation utilities.
others to agree with them.
ownership of the PUVs per se, as well PUVs and private transport terminals
as the transport terminals, remains hold a captive audience - the  As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are
private and, hence, the owners commuters, who have no choice but forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado
the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an
invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
 A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well-defined standards,16 is constitutionally
permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the
following requisites concur:
1. Regulation is within constitutional power of government
2. Furthers important governmental interest
3. Such interest is unrelated to suppression of free expression
4. Incidental restriction on form of expression is no greater than is essential
in furtherance of interest
 However, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of
the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there
is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners
of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and
not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
 COMELEC has the power to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
utilities during an election period.
 In Adiong, the Court, while recognizing that the COMELEC has
supervisory power vis-a-vis the conduct and manner of elections under
Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, nevertheless held that such
supervisory power does not extend to the very freedom of an individual to
express his preference of candidates in an election by placing election
campaign stickers on his vehicle.
 In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of
supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election
period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants
COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or
utilization "of all franchises or permits for the operation," inter alia, of
transportation and other public utilities.
 COMELEC's constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and
regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.
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FRANCHISE OWNERSHIP
needed to operate these facilities to Ownership is a relation in private law
serve the public by virtue of which a thing pertaining to
one person is completely subjected to
his will in everything not prohibited by
public law or the concurrence with the
rights of another.
What constitutes a public utility is not right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
their ownership but their use to serve without other limitations than those
the public established by law.
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from
the ownership of the facilities thereof
 Restriction on the franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is
necessarily a limitation on ownership, but a limitation on the rights of
ownership over the PUV is not necessarily a regulation on the franchise or
permit to operate the same.
 Thus, a government issuance, which purports to regulate a franchise or
permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the considerations affecting its
operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not
on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of the
vehicle used for public transport.
 In the same manner, the COMELEC does not have the constitutional
power to regulate public transport terminals owned by private persons.
 the posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public
transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression,
but also an act of ownership - it has nothing to do with the franchise or
permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals
is not necessary to further the stated governmental interest.

 A strict implementation of the foregoing provisions of law directed to
political parties and candidates would suffice to achieve the governmental
interest of ensuring equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in
elections. There is thus no necessity of still curtailing the right to free
speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals by prohibiting them
from posting election campaign materials on their properties.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified
under the captive-audience doctrine.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS
Aleezah Gertrude Regado

 A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not  Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport
be justified if the supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the terminals in the prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience
doctrine;
 the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign
materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable
of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the
same unbearably intrusive.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting
election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
 It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies
equally to the members of the purported class.
 However, the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it
is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of
the law.
 A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private
vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as such,
needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to
operate.
 Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per
se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any
manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport
terminals.
 As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners
of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport
terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private.
 No cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and
transport terminals.
 In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely
superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
 The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by
the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from
private vehicles and other properties.

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