CONSTITUTION LAW PROJECT

RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Submitted to : Submitted by :
Dr. Asad Malik Anany Upadhyay
B.A.LLB(Hons)
2nd Year

Faculty of Law
Jamia Milia Islamia
New Delhi

1
 Acknowledgement
It gives me immense pleasure and gratitude to thank my Constitution law
teacher Dr. Asad Malik who has helped me in each possible way that one
could . My project without him help would had been a much difficult task.
I would like to thank staff of the faculty of law library of Jamia Millia
Islamia for helping me in searching valuable information .

Your’s Sincerely
Anany Upadhyay

2
 INTRODUCTION
Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution are grouped under the heading "Cultural and Educational
rights". These both Articles protect and guarantee certain collective rights for the minorities to
help them preserve their language, religion and culture. These rights also contribute to preserve the
rich diversity of the country and give minority a sense of security. Over the decades, the interplay
of these two Articles has been the cause of intense debate, Firstly, touching on issues such as
secularism and secondly, the degree of control over private educational institutions maintained
by the State or receiving aid out of State funds; on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
language or any of them. This chapter begins with the discussion of rights guaranteed under
Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India. Further it discusses judicial approach relating to
each Sub Clause of Articles 29 and 30. Subsequently, the researcher has discussed the judicial
interpretation relating to the relation between Articles i.e. 29 and 30.

Article 29(1) deal with right of any section of the citizens residing in India to preserve their
language, script or culture. In order to invoke Article 29(1), all that is essential is that a section
of the citizens, residing in India should have a distinct language, script or culture of its own. If so,
then they will have the right to conserve the same. Article 29(2) prohibits discrimination in
matters of admission into educational institutions on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
language or any of them. This provision guarantees the rights of individual irrespective of the
community to which he belongs. Article 30 (1) provides that all religious and linguistic
minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
Article 30(2) prevents States from

3
making any discrimination against any educational institution in granting aid on the ground
that it is managed by a religious or linguistic minority.

Article 29(1): Rights of citizens to preserve their language, script and culture.

Definition—Religion.

The term "religion" is not defined in the Constitution. It is not susceptible of any rigid
definition. In Commissioner, H.R.E v. L.T Swamiar,1 the Supreme Court explained:

Religion is a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic.
There are well-known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism, which do not believe in
God or in any Intelligent First Clause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of
beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to
their spiritual well-being.

A religion is, therefore, not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward
expression in acts as well. Religious practices or performance of acts in pursuance of
religious belief, are as much a part of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. 2
Religion is the belief which binds spiritual nature of men to supernatural being. It includes
worship, belief, faith, devotion, etc. and extends to rituals.3 The word ‘religion’ has different
shades and colours. Important shade is dharma (duty), duty towards the society and the soul.4

It has also been said that the word religion in Articles 25 and 26 has to be understood not as is
colloquially understood by the word religion, but in the sense of it comprehending our
concept of dharma. Marking the difference between religion and dharma, Justice Hansaria
explained in Narayana case5 that a "sectarian religion is open to a limited group of people,
whereas dharma embraces all and excludes none." The learned Judge further said that the
word religion in Articles 25 and 26 had to be understood not in a narrow sectarian sense but
encompassing our ethos of.

It is, thus, a settled proposition of law that the protection of Articles 25 and 26 is not limited
to matters of doctrine. They extend also to acts done in furtherance of religion and, therefore,
they contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which
are integral parts of the religion.

The Apex Court in Ratilal v. State of Bombay,6 explained that religious practices or
performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief were as much a part of religion as faith

1
AIR 1954 SC 282. ( Shirur Math Case).
2
Ratilal v. State of Bombay , AIR 1954 SC 388.
3
P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001.
4
Aruna Roy v. Union of India, AIR 2002 Sc 3176, per4M.B. Shah, J. 3191.
5
A.S. Narayana v. State of A.P., AIR 1996 SC 1765.
6
AIR 1954 SC 388.
or belief in particular doctrines. It was further impressed that no outside authority had any
right to say that those were not essential parts of religion and it was not open to the secular
authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they liked under the guise of
administering the trust estate.

Practices which are regarded by a religious community as part of its religion are also matters
of religion. For instance, right to bury dead bodies in a particular manner with particular rites
in consecrated places is part and parcel of certain religions.

Where members of certain denomination had existing right to cremate dead bodies of their
near and dear ones on plot allotted to them, denial of that right would amount to abridgment
of their fundamental right to freedom of religion. So, ruled, the Gauhati High Court in
Worter Kharmalki v. State of Meghalaya,7 held that the petitioner had the right to freedom
of religion to cremate dead bodies of their near and dear ones on plot allotted to them.
However, if it was found to be undesirable and was resulting in polluting the atmosphere, the
authorities would be under a duty to provide them adequate cremation ground.

In Lily Thomas v. Union of India,8 the Supreme Court explained that religion was a matter
of faith stemming from the depth of the heart and mind and that religion, faith or devotion
were not easily interchangeable. The Court further said that if the person feigned to have
adopted another religion just for some worldly gain or benefit, it would be religious bigotry.
Looked at from this angle, the Court ruled that a person who mockingly adopted another
religion where plurality of marriage was permitted so as to renounce the previous marriage
and desert the wife, he could not be permitted to take advantage of his exploitation, as
religion was not a commodity to be exploited. Prosecution of the apostate-husband under
Section 494 of IPC, 1860, did not violate freedom of religion, the Court held.

A. Freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion

Clause (1) of Article 25 provides: "Subject to public order, morality and health and to the
other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and
the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion."

This Clause secures to every person—

a) freedom of conscience; and

b) the right to—

I. profess religion;

II. practise religion; and

III. propagate religion.

5
7
AIR 2010 Gau. 51.
8
AIR 2000 SC 1650.
 (a) Freedom of Conscience

The expression "freedom of conscience" means the inner freedom of a person to mould his
relations with his God in whatever manner he likes. It connotes a person’s right to entertain
beliefs and doctrines, concerning matters, which are regarded by him to be conducive to his
spiritual well-being. It means to believe in one religion or another or none. Every person in
India, therefore, has the freedom to have faith and belief in religious tenets of any sect or
community.

"Freedom of conscience", as stated above, means the freedom to hold or to, entertain
religious beliefs. Any belief which is genuinely and conscientiously held,9 or any religious
belief, as may be approved by his judgment or conscience,10 attracts the protection of Article
25(1). It simply means the freedom of religious opinion. Until this inner belief is expressed in
any outward form, it is merely the "freedom of conscience".

Also, freedom of conscience has no necessary connection with any particular religion or any
faith in God. It also implies the right of a person not to be converted into another man’s
religion or to belong to any religion at all.11

B (i) Right to Profess Religion

Article 25 (1) guarantees the right to profess religion. To "profess" means "to avow publicity;
to make an open declaration of; to declare one’s belief in; as to profess Christ; to accept into
religious order".12 Thus, to profess a particular religion means to declare freely and openly
one’s faith or belief in. When the inner "freedom of conscience" becomes, articulate and
expressed in an outward form, it amounts to profession of religion. It is to declare one’s belief
in such a way that it would be known to those whom it may concern.13

(b)(ii) Right to Practise Religion

To practise religion means to perform religious duties, rites or rituals. The protection is, thus,
not limited to matters of doctrines but extends to rituals and observances. The expression
"practise of religion" signifies acts done in pursuance of religious belief. The guarantee
contained in Article 25(1), not only, protects the freedom of religious opinion, but it protects
also acts done in pursuance of a religion. To enable a person to practise the beliefs and
opinions which he holds, in a meaningful manner, it is essential for him to receive the
relevant information, otherwise, he may be prevented from acting in consonance with his
beliefs and opinions.14

9
BIjoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerela, AIR 1987 SC 748
10
Ratilal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
11
See Stainslaus v, State of M.P., AIR 1975 MP 163.
12 6 v. D.P. Meshram, AIR 1965 SC 1179.
Webster’s New World Dictionary, quoted in Punjab Rao
13
Punjab Rao v. D.P. Meshram, AIR 1965 SC 1179.
14
See Ozair Husain v. Union of India, AIR 2003 Del. 103.
While offering of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location
where such prayers can be offered, would not be an essential or integral part of such religious
practice and not protected under Article 25.15

Practices which constitute integral and essential part of religious practice

Religious practices to which Article 25(1) refers include practices which are an integral part
of the religion itself,16 i.e., the beliefs and doctrines which are regarded by those who profess
religion, to be conducive to their spiritual well-being.17 It is upon the cornerstone of essential
parts or practices that the superstructure of religion is built.18 It means the core beliefs upon
which a religion is founded.19 The integral or essential part of a religion is primarily to be
ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.20 For example, for Hindus,
these may include offerings of food to the idol; performance of periodical ceremonies; recital
of sacred texts; offering oblations to the sacred fire. For Sikhs, the wearing of Kara,21 the
wearing and carrying of Kripans,22 recital of Holy Guru Granth Sahib, are the integral part of
their religion. For Muslims, calling Azan,23 performance of Hajj, are some of the essential
practices which are integral part of their religion.

Therefore, practices which, though religious, have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs,
may in that sense, be extraneous and unnecessary accretions to religion itself.24

Whether a religious practice constitutes essential part of the religion or not, the test always
would be whether it is regarded as such by the community following the religion or not. It is
for the court to decide whether a part or practice is an essential part or practice of a given
religion and the findings of the Court will depend on the evidence adduced before it as to the
conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion.

To determine as to whether a part or practice is essential to the religion, the Apex Court in
Commr. Of Police v. Acharya Jagadeshwarananda,25 explained :

the test is to find out whether the nature of religion will be changed without that part or
practice. If the taking away of that part or practice could result in a fundamental change in the
character of that religion or in its behalf, then such part could be treated as an essential or
integral part.

Holding that Anand Margi Order was in existence between 1955 to 1966, without the practice
of Tandava dance, which was introduced in 1966, the Apex Court ruled that it was not the

15
M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605.
16
John Vallamattom v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 2902.
17
A.S. Narayanan v. State of A.P., AIR 1996 SC 1765.
18
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda, AIR 2004 Sc 2984.
19
Ibid.
20
Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282.
21
Surjeet Singh Chhabra v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 2560.
22
See Explanation I to Article 25.
23
But not the use of a loudspeaker for calling Azan. 7
24
Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402.
25
2004 (3) SCALE 146.
core upon which Anand Margi order was founded and therefore, practice of Tandava dance in
public was not an essential point of that order/faith. Likewise, permitting women to enter the
Shree Guruvayoor Temple, by wearing churidar, could not be prohibited, since the wearing of
traditional saree for entry into the temple was not found to be a customary rule.26

In John Vallamattom v. Union of India,27 the Apex Court held that disposition of property
for religions/charitable uses was not an integral part of Christian religion.

In State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali,28 the Bombay Prevention of Bigamous

Marriages Act, 1946, forbade bigamy among Hindus, was held valid. The Bombay High
Court said that the birth of a natural born son was not an essential and integral part of Hindu
religion. It was why the institution of adoption was created.

In M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar,29 the petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of
the Bihar Prevention and Improvement of Animals Act, 1956. The petitioners inter alia
contended that the impugned Act violated their fundamental right guaranteed by Article
25(1). They argued that the sacrifice of a cow on the occasion of their Bakri Idd Day was an
integral part of their religion. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and held that there
was no material on the record before the Court which would enable them to say that the
sacrifice of a cow on that day was an obligatory overt act for a Mussalman to exhibit his
religious belief and idea.

The Muslim law permits marrying four women. However, the Apex Court in Javed v. State
of Haryana,30 held: "nowhere the law mandates or dictates it as a duty to perform four
marriages, or that marrying less than four women or abstaining from procreating a child from
each and every wife, in case of permitted bigamy or polygamy, would be irreligious or
offensive to the dictates of the religion." Therefore, a statutory provision casting
disqualification for holding an elective office, on ground of having more than two living
children, cannot be held violative of Article 25.31

Likewise, wearing of "Purdha" (BURQA) has been held not forming part of Islam.32 As a
result the Election Commission Photo Identity Cards Scheme was held as not violative of
freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25. Again, it is not an obligatory overt act
enjoined by Muslim religion that an Islamic girl, studying in all girls section, must wear head
covering.33

(b) (iii) Right to Propagation of Religion

26
See K. Mohandas v. State of Kerela, AIR 2007 Ker. 289.
27
AIR 2003 SC 2902.
28
AIR 1952 Bom 84.
29
AIR 1958 SC 731.
30
AIR 2003 SC 3057.
31
Ibid. 8
32
M. Ajmal Khan v. State of T.N., The Tribune, January 23, 2010.
33
See Fathema Hussain Sayed v. Bharat Education Society, AIR 2003 Bom 75.
To propagate religion, means to spread and publicise one’s religious views.34 Holding public
meetings by persons for propagating their religion is held to be guaranteed under Article
25(1)35. But to "propagate religion" indicates persuasion and exposition without any element
of coercion. It does not include the right to insult the religion of others.36 Azan given by the
Imam or the person in charge of the Mosques, though an essential and integral part of Islam,
but, is not a form of propagation.37

In Rev Stainslaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh,38 while upholding the Madhya Pradesh
Dharma Swatantratya Adhiniyam, 1968 and the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967,
which prohibited the forcible conversion of any person to one’s own religion, the Supreme
Court said that the right to propagate religion did not grant the right to convert another person
to one’s own religion. It merely meant the right to transmit or spread one’s religion by an
exposition of its tenets.39

In P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma,40 the Supreme Court held that the right
to practise and propagate religion includes the right to ex-communicate the person belonging
to that religion. The Court said all religious bodies were regarded by courts of law in the
same position in respect of the protection of their rights and the sanction given to their
respective organizations. That, discipline of a Church, however could not affect any person
except by express sanction of the civil power or by voluntary submission of the particular
person. The Court said that one of the effects of ex-communication was that the person
concerned was deprived of the right of worship. It was, under our Constitution, a fundamental
right. Therefore, the Court said that any interference with this right or its deprivation could be
challenged in a Court of law.

It may be noted that the right to freedom of conscience and to profess, practise and propagate
religion, is not restricted or qualified with reference to the number of persons living in a
particular locality.41 Therefore, refusal of permission for construction of Church in a locality,
on ground that only few Christians live therein, is illegal and unconstitutional.42

Restrictions on the Freedom of Religion

The "freedom of conscience" and the right to "profess, practise and propagate religion",
guaranteed by Article 25(1) is subjected to—

a) public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III,43

34
Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282.
35
Sri Lakshamana Yalendrulu v. State of A.P. , AIR 1996 SC 1414.
36
Ramjilal v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620.
37
Moulana Mufti Syed Md. Noorur Barkati v. State Of W.B. , AIR 1999 Cal. 15.
38
AIR 1977 SC 908.
39
Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 775.
40
AIR 1995 SC 2001.
41 9 Mad. 444.
Albert Raj v. District Collector, Kanyakumari, AIR 2005
42
Mohd. Gani v. Supdt. Of Police, AIR 2005 Mad. 359.
43
Opening words of Clause (1) of Article 25.
 b) Any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular
activity associated with religious practice.44

c) Any law providing for social welfare and reforms or the throwing open to all persons
the religious institutions, belonging to their religion, of a public character.45

Article 25, thus, obligates the State to ensure that communal atmosphere be kept clean and
unpolluted.46

(a) Freedom of Religion subjected to public order, morality and health

The free exercise of religion is subjected to State regulation imposed to secure order, public
health and morals of the people. It means that the fundamental right to freedom of religion
must yield to the maintenance of public order, morality and health of the people.47 Therefore,
when a person’s speeches or actions are likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred,
resulting in fissiparous tendencies gaining foot-hold, undermining and affecting communal
harmony, prohibitory orders need necessarily to be passed, to effectively avert such untoward
happenings.48

It has been held that any custom, for instance, the custom of devadasi, or usage, irrespective
of even any proof of their existence in pre-Constitutional days, cannot be countenanced as a
source of law, to claim any rights when it is found to be violative of human rights, dignity,
social equality and the specific mandate of the Constitution and law made by Parliament.49

Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P.,50 is a clear instance, where the freedom of religion was
subjected to the maintenance of public order. The facts briefly were that there had been a
long-Standing dispute inter se between the members of the Shia and Sunni sects of Muslims,
pertaining to the performance of religious rites, practices and observances by the members of
Shia sect on certain plots and properties situated in Mohalla Doshipura, Varanasi. Purely for
the purpose of finding out some permanent solution to the perennial conflict between the two
communities, the Supreme Court, in1982, appointed a Committee of seven persons consisting
of three nominees of Shias and three nominees of Sunnies and the Divisional Commissioner
as its Chairman. The Committee Chairman submitted the report wherein he recommended
that the shifting of the two graves of Sunnies from its original place, so as to separate the
places of worship of Shias and Sunnies, was feasible.

The Supreme Court held that the order of the Court, for implementing the Committee’s
recommendations, was not violative of their rights guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26. The
Court laid down that the rights under Articles 25 and 26 were not absolute but subjected to

44
Clause (2) (a) of Article 25.
45
Clause (2) (b) of Article 25.
46
Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 775.
47
Ratilal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
48 10 2081.
See State of Karnataka v. P.B. Thogadia, AIR 2004 SC
49
See N. Adithayan v. T.D. Board, AIR 2002 SC 3538.
50
AIR 1983 SC 1268.
the maintenance of public order. The Court held that shifting of graves was neither un-
Islamic nor contrary to Koran.51

(b) Regulation of economic, or other secular activities

Clause (2) of Article 25 enables the State to regulate or restrict the economic, financial,
political or other secular activities associated with religious practice. Therefore, a law which
falls within Articles 25(2)(a) or (b) will be constitutionally valid, even if it is found to be
inconsistent with the right guaranteed by Article 25(1).52 However, the words "economic,
financial, political or other secular activities" in Article 25(2) (a) mean those activities which
are not of the essence of religion.53 For example, a provision, directing the management of a
Temple, to send a copy of audit report, to the Government, does not violate the right
conferred by Articles 25 or 26.54

In S.P. Mittal v. Union of India,55 the constitutionality of the Auroville (Emergency

Provision) Act, 1980, which was enacted for taking over the management of Auroville for a
limited period, was upheld.

The Supreme Court, by majority of 4 to 1, held that the teaching of Shri Aurobindo
constituted a philosophy and not religion and that the Society and Auroville township were
not religious institutions. Even assuming them to be a religious denomination, the Court held
that the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980, did not curtail the freedom of
conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Therefore, there
was no question of the impugned Act being hit by Article 25. It had only taken over the
management of the Auroville in respect of the secular matters, which matters could be
regulated by law under Article 25(2)(a).

In Remya Raju v. State of Kerela,56 students belonging to Seventh Day Adventist

denomination, a worldwide Protestant Christian denomination, contended that in terms of the
core faith of the members of that denomination, they had to abstain from any activity from 6
a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and, therefore claimed that special arrangements to be made for
them for appearing for the SSLC Examination, March, 2008, after 6 p.m. Rejecting the
contention the Kerela High Court held: that the Kerela Education Act, 1959 and the Kerela
Education Rules, 1959 were nothing but secular laws, to be enforced, without any
classification on the basis of Caste, religion, etc., except to the extent provisions were made
in tune with the constitutional goals and provisions.

Scheduling of examination, on a day, not acceptable to a class of citizens professing a

particular religion, did not infract the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 25(1).

51
See Abdul Jalil v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 Sc 882.
52
Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
53
Saifuddin Sahib v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853.
54
G.R. Nair v. State of Kerela, AIR 2008 Ker. 96. 11
55
AIR 1983 SC 1.
56
AIR 2008 Ker. 192.
In Sri Adi Viseshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi v. State of Uttar
Pradesh,57 the U.P. Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple Act, 1983, which divested the Pandas of
their right to manage the temple and receive offerings was upheld as not violative of their
right under Article 21. The Court explained that religious freedom guaranteed by Articles 25
and 26, was intended to be guide to a community life and ordained every religion to act
according to cultural and social demands to establish an egalitarian social order. So
interpreted, the right to manage a temple or endowment, was held not integral to religion or
religious practice. The Court further said that the right to receive offerings was not a vested
right of the Pandas but a right coupled with duty to render service, which could be regulated
by the State, by law.

Later, the Apex Court in N. Adhyayan v. Travancore, Devaswom Board,58 held that a
person well versed, properly trained and qualified to perform pooja, in manner conducive and
appropriate to worship of a particular deity, not be denied the appointment as a Priest because
he was not a Brahman by birth or pedigree.

(c) Social Welfare and Reforms

Sub-clause (b) of Clause (2) of Article 25 empowers the State to make laws for social welfare
and reforms. It, therefore, explains that where there is a conflict between a social welfare and
reforms and a religious practice, religion must yield.59

"Social reform" means eradication of practices or dogmas which stand in the way of the
country’s progress as a whole and which do not constitute integral and essential part of
religion. For example, the prohibition of evil practices such as "sati" or the system of
"Devadasi" might be justified under Article 25 (2) (b).

Likewise, a statutory provision casting disqualification on contesting for, or holding an

elective office, on ground of having more than two living children, with a view to popularize
family welfare/family planning programme, has been held not violative of Article 25. The
provision is held to be enacted in the interest of social welfare and reform which are
obviously part and parcel of public order, national morality and the collective health of the
nation’s people.60

Throwing open Hindu Religious Institutions

Article 25 (2) (b) further empowers the State to make laws for "throwing open of Hindu
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus".

The expression "Institution of a public character" means an institution which is dedicated to

the public as a whole and to sections thereof. Article 25(2)(b) protects the right to enter into a
temple for worship. But, it does not follow that the right is absolute and unlimited in
character. No member of the Hindu public would claim under Article 25 (2)(b) that the

57
JT 1997(4) SC 124.
58
AIR 2002 SC 3538. 12
59
Yajnapurusdasji v. Muldas Bhudardas, AIR 1966 SC 1119.
60
Javed v. State of Haryana, AIR 2003 Sc 3057.
temple must be left open at all hours of the day and night and that he should personally
perform those services which the Acharya could alone perform.61 It is also well settled that
the State cannot regulate the traditional and conventional manner in which the worship of the
deity is performed by the authorized pujaris of the temple and by no other devotee, entering
the temple for darshan. The State also cannot regulate the hours and days on which the
temple is to be kept open for darshan or puja for the devotees.62

In Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore,63 the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation

Act, 1947, was enacted with the object of removing the disability imposed on Harijans from
entering into temples which were dedicated to the Hindu public generally. The appellants,
who were Gowda Saraswath Brahmins established the temple in question known as Shri
Venkatramana Temple. They contended that it was a private temple belonging exclusively to
the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins and therefore, did not fall within the purview of the
impugned Act.

The Court held that though the temple was a denominational one, but it was a public
institution. Therefore, it was held that the appellant could not claim exclusive right for the
members of their community to worship in the temple and to exclude all others from the entry
to the temple, as it would be hit by Article 25 (2)(b).

However, the Court upheld that during certain ceremonies and on special occasions, it would
be only members of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community that would have the right to
take part therein and on those occasions, all other persons would be excluded. This, the Court
held, would clearly be a denominational right under Article 26(b).

A restriction on the freedom of religion can be upheld only if it falls within the exceptions of
Clause (1) and Clause (2) of Articles 25. It cannot be imposed on any other extraneous
consideration. Further, that the restriction must have the authority of law.64

Explanation I to Article 25

This Explanation provides: "The wearing and carrying of Kirpans shall be deemed to be
included in the profession of the Sikh religion". It thus recognizes the fundamental right of
the followers of Sikh religion to wear and carry Kirpan as a part of the profession of their
religion. However, neither the Sikh religion nor Article 25 entitles a Sikh to carry without
licence, more than one Kirpan.65

Explanation II to Articles 25

It declares that the expression "Hindus" for the purposes of Article 25(2) (b) shall be
construed as including persons professing the Sikh, Jains or Buddhist religion. It merely
means that even though the religions of the Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists arose out of dissent

61
Venkataramana v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
62
Sastri Yagnapurushadji v. Muldas Bhudardas, AIR 1966 SC 1119.
63
AIR 1958 SC 255. 13
64
Bijoe Emmanuel v. Dtate of Kerela, AIR 1987 SC 748.
65
R. v. Dhyan Singh, AIR 1951 All 53.
from the Hindu religion, for the generality of purposes, these religions should be considered
to be different from the Hindu religion.66 However, for the purposes of Article 25(2)(b), they
should be considered to be governed by the same laws as Hindus.67 This Explanation further
declares that the reference to Hindu religious institutions should be construed reference to
institutions belonging to Sikh, Jains or Buddhist religion.68

B. Freedom of Religion of Religious Denominations (Article 26)

Article 26 provides: "Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right—

a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;

b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;

c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and

d) to administer such property in accordance with law".

It may be noted that while Article 25 is available to all persons, Article 26 is confined to
religious denomination.69

Religious Denomination—Definition

The term "denomination" is not defined in the Constitution. In Oxford Dictionary, it means "a
collection of individuals classed together under the same name, a religious sect or body
having a common faith and. organisation and designated by a distinctive name".70 A
"religious denomination" may be 'denomination" which is based on some particular religion.
It was held in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India,71 that the words "religious denomination" in
Article 26 must take their colour from the word "religion." If this is so, the expression
religious denomination must also satisfy the following three conditions:

a) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which

they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;

b) It must have a common organisation; and

c) It must be designated by a distinctive name.

66
C.W.T. v. Champa Kumari Singh, AIR 1972 SC 2119.
67
Punjab Rao v. D.P. Meshram, AIR 1965 SC 1179.
68
Ibid.
69
Narendra v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1974 SC 2098. 14
70
Quoted in Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282.
71
AIR 1983 SC 1.
The expression "denomination" is also used for each of the sects and sub-sects of a religion.72
So construed, the Arya Samaj,73 Ramakrishna Mission,74 Anandamarga75 Vaishnava (the
followers of Ramanuja), the followers of Madhawacharya, and other religious teachers,
though not separate religions, have been held to be separate religious denomination, and as
such, have the right to the protection of Article 26.76 Similarly, among the Muslims, Hanafee,
Shia, Sunni or Chisthi sects are held to be separate denominations. The Dawoodi Bohara
Community has been held to be a sub-sect of the Shias.77 Likewise, among the Christians,
Roman Catholic, Protestants, are separate denominations.

In Sri K.P.A.S. Committee v. Commissioner of H.R. C. & E.,78 the Supreme Court held
that Arya Vysya Community, the Hindus worshipping Goddess Matha Kanya Kaparameswari
were not denominational section for the purpose of Articles 26(b) and 26(d) of the
Constitution. They were held to be an institution covered by the provision of the Endowments
Act.79 The Court relied on the decision in Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath
Temple, Varanasi, v. State of U.P.,80 wherein the Court had held that Hindu Worshippers of
God Shiva were not a denominational section and therefore, not entitled to the benefit of
Articles 26(b) and 26(d).

It has been explained that for a community to be a religious enomination, the common faith
of the community, should be based on religion and in that they should have common religious
tenets81 and the basic cord, which connects them, should be religion and not merely
considerations of caste or community or societal status.82 So said, the Apex Court in Nellor
Marthandam Vellalar v. Commissioner Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments,83
ruled that Vellala Community could not be said to be a religious denomination so as to seek
the protection under Article 26.

A 'religion’ is not the only common bond for the members of the community to be known as
a "denomination". There may be other basis on which the community are held together, such
as, profession, business or calling. Such a community may be a denomination, e.g. Senguntha
Mudaliar,84 Jehowah’s Witnesses,85 the Aurobindo Society or Anroville.86 But, such

72
Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282.
73
Arya Samaj Education Trust, Delhi v. Director of Education, AIR 1976 Del 207.
74
Bramhchari Sideshwar Shai v. State of W.B. , AIR 1995 SC 2089.
75
Commr. Of Police v. Acharya Jagdishawarananda, AIR 2004 SC 2984.
76
Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282.
77
Saifuddin Sahib v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853
78
AIR 1997 SC 2332.
79
Ibid.
80
JT 1997 (4) 124.
81
See Ramasami Muliadar v. Commr. H.R. and C.E. Admn. Deptt. Madras, AIR 1999 Mad 393.
82
Nellor Marthandam Vellalar v. Commissioner Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, AIR 2003 SC
4225.
83
AIR 2003 SC 4225.
84 15 Mudaliar, AIR 1987 Mad. 187.
Assistant Commissioner H.R. & C.E., Salem v. N.K.S.E.
85
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerela, AIR 1987 SC 748.
86
S.P Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1.
denominations are not "religious denominations" so as to attract the protection of Article
26.87

Article 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination, but also a section thereof.
Therefore, a Math or the spiritual fraternity represented by it will be within the purview of
Article 26.88

(a) Right to Establish and Maintain Institutions [Article 26(a)]

Clause (a) of Article 26 guarantees to every "religious denomination" or any section thereof”
the right "to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes".

The right under Article 26(a), is a group right and is available to every religious
denomination or any section thereof, be it of majority or any section thereof. Article 26(a)
thus, gives the right both to the majority as well as minority communities to establish and
maintain institutions for charitable purposes, which would, inter alia, include educational
institutions.89 It has also been explained that "educational the Articles of the Constitution
means and includes education at all levels from the primary school level up to the post-
graduate level, as well as, professional education.90

The words "establish" and "maintain" in Article 26(a) must be read conjunctively. So, read, it
would mean that only those institutions which a denomination establishes, that, it can claim
the right to maintain those.91

The right guaranteed by Article 26(a) is subjected to 'public order"; “morality” and "health”. 92
It means that the right under Article 26 a may be restricted on the ground only of public
order, morality or health and on no other ground.

The right to maintain an institution for religious and charitable purposes includes the right to
exclude the profession or practices belonging to other religions. In Sanjib Kumar v.
Principal, St. Paul College,93 the Principal of the College established by the Christian
Missionary Society, refused the petitioner to perform Saraswati Puja in the College premises.
The Calcutta High Court held that the Principal was entitled to refuse the performance of
such a religious practice in the exercise of his right to maintain the institution under Article
26(a).

(b) Right to Manage Matters of Religion [Article 26(b)]

Clause (b) of Article 26 guarantees to every religious denomination "the right to manage its
own affairs in matters of religion".

87
Assistant Commissioner H.R. & C.E., Salem v. N.K.S.E. Mudaliar, AIR 1987 Mad. 187.
88
Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282
89
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355.
90
Ibid.
91 16
See Azeez Basha v. Union of India, AIR 1986 Sc 662.
92
Opening words of Article 26.
93
AIR 1957 Cal 524.
The expression "matters of religion" includes religious practices, rites and ceremonies
essential for the practicing of religion. It thus, not merely includes matters of doctrine and
belief concerning the religion, but extends to acts done in pursuance of religion and therefore
contains a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship, which
are essential and integral parts of religion as also the practice thereof.94 "Matters of religion"
however would not include the religious practices unless those practices are found to
constitute essential and integral part of a religion.95

What constitutes an integral or essential part of religion has to be determined with reference
to its doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background, etc., of the given religion.

In Commr. of Police v. Acharya J. Avadhutta,96 the Apex Court elucidated the expression
"an essential part or practice of a religion" to mean those practices that were fundamental to
follow a religious belief.97

The Court observed:

Freedom to manage religious affairs does not mean creation of any right which it never had.
It merely safeguards the existing rights.98

The right to exclude persons who are not entitled to participate in the worship according to
the tenets of the institution, has been held to fall under the expression "matters of religion",
protected by Article 26(b).99

"Matters of religion" also includes acts done in pursuance of religion and therefore, contain a
guarantee for rituals, ceremonies, observances and modes of worshipping, which are regarded
as integral part of religion.100 A provision requiring the members elected to the Board of
Devaswom Temple to subscribe oath before the Secretary to the Government of Kerala, i.e.,
before a Secular Government, who may be a Hindu but may be non-believer of God/temple
worship, has been held interfering with the right of the Hindu Denomination under Articles
25 and 26.101

In Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar,102 (popularly known as Shirur Math case)

Section 21 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, which
empowered the Commissioner of Endowments and his subordinate officers and also persons
authorized by them, to enter the premises of any religious institution or place of worship, for
the purpose of exercising any power conferred or any duty imposed by or under the Act, was
struck down as violative of the guarantee contained in Article 26(b).

94
Commr. of Police v. Acharya J. Avadhuta, AIR 2004 SC 2984.
95
Venkataramana v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
96
AIR 2004 SC 2984.
97
See supra, 392-394, for the test to determine whether a practice is integral to religion.
98
M.P.G. Nair v. State of Kerela, AIR 2005 Sc 3053.
99
Venkataramana v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
100
Sri Adi Vishwara, K.V.T. v. State of U.P., JT 1997 17(4) SC 124.
101
G.R. Nair v. State of Kerela, AIR 2008 ker. 85.
102
AIR 1954 SC 282.
Likewise, the appointment of a person of one sect as archaka of another sect infringes the
right of the later sect to manage its religious matters, under Article 26(b).103

In Saifuddin Sahib v. State of Bombay,104 the Court explained that Article 26(b) ensured a
denomination, the continuity of the denomination. Such continuity was possible only by
maintaining the bond of religious discipline, which would secure the continued adherence of
its members to certain essentials like faith, doctrines, tenets and practices. The right to such
continued existence, the Court held, would involve the right to maintain discipline by taking
suitable action, inter alia, of ex-communicating those who defied the fundamental basis of the
religion.105 The Court, thus, held The Bombay Prevention of Ex-Communication Act, 1949,
which prohibited the head of Dawoodi Bohra Community, from ex-communicating the
members of the community, solely on religious grounds, violative of the right of the
community secured under Article 26(b).

The Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry Authorisation) Act, 1956, authorised
every Harijan to visit and worship in any temple coming under the Act, as any other Hindu,
in general. The Act was challenged by the Satsangis on the ground that it authorised the non-
Satsangis in Sastri Yagnapurushdasji v Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya,106 to enter the places
of worship managed by them, who constituted a separate religious sect. The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the impugned Act as its object was to establish social equality between
all sections of the Hindus in the matters of worship. However, the Court observed that actual
worshipping of the Deity would continue to be performed by the authorised pujaries of the
temple in accordance with the traditional and conventional manner and by no other devotee
entering the temple for darshan.

Apart from these express limitations in Article 26 itself, it has been settled, that Article
26 (b) should be read subject to Article 25(2).107 Article 26 (b) relates to "matters of
religion". It, therefore, indicates that there are other affairs as well, which are not matters of
religion and to which the guarantee given by this Clause would not apply.108

© Right to Own and Administer Property [Articles 26(c) & 26(d)]

Clause (c) of Article 26 secures to a religious denomination or any section thereof "the right
to own and acquire movable and immovable property". Clause (d) further strengthens this
right by guaranteeing to the denomination "the right to administer such property in
accordance with law".

The right contained in Clause (c) of Article 26 is distinguishable from the guarantee
contained in Clause (b) relating to management of religion

103
E.R.J. Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1586.
104
AIR 1962 SC 853.
105
See also Chinnamma v. D.P.I., AIR 1964 A.P. 277.
106
AIR 1966 SC 1119. 18
107
Venkataramana v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
108
See K.V. Narayanan v. State of Kerela, AIR 1985 Ker 160.
affairs. While, Article 26(b) guarantees a fundamental right which cannot be taken away
except on grounds mentioned in Article 25(2), the right contained in Article 26(c) can be
regulated by a law made by a competent Legislature.

The U.P. Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple Act, 1983, inter alia, provided for vesting the entire
property, movable and immovable, in the deity Shri Kashi Vishwanath and the administration
and management of which was entrusted to a Board. The Allahabad High Court in
Trivikram Narain Singh v. State of U.P.,109 held the Act valid. The Court observed that
Articles 26(c) and 26(d) protected the right of the denomination and not of Pujaris and
Shebaits. When the administration and management of temple property was entrusted to
Board, the Court held, it was not divesting the denomination of its right of administration.110

It may be noted that Articles 26(c) and 26(d) do not create rights, in any denomination or its
section, which it never had, they merely safeguard and guarantee the continuance of rights
which such denomination or its section had.

However, a law which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious
denomination and vests it in some secular authority, would be violative of the guarantee
contained in article 26(d).

In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay,111 the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950,
which provided for the, appointment, by a Court, of the Charity Commissioner as a sole
trustee of religious public trusts was struck down as violative of right of the religious
denomination under Article 26(d). The substitution of the Charity Commissioner for the
Mathadhipati, the Court held, would mean a destruction of the institution altogether.

Likewise, a law, which empowers the Commissioner of Endowments to deprive the mahant,
at any moment he choose, of his right to administer the trust property, even if there was no
negligence or maladministration on his part, would be opposed to the guarantee contained in
Article 26(d).

However, it has been held that Article 26 does not interfere with the right of the State to
acquire property.112 Also, the right to own and acquire property under Article 26(c), is not a
part of basic feature of the Constitution.113

C. Freedom from Payment of Taxes for Promotion of any Particular Religion

(Article 27)

109
AIR 1987 All 362.
110
The Act was passed in view of the off and on thefts in kasha Vishwanath Temple, Litigations between pujaris
and Shebaits, rumoured association of pujaries with thieves, unhealthy arrangement of pilgrims and unhygienic
conditions prevailing inside the Temple, its poor upkeep etc.
111
AIR 1954 SC 388. 19
112
M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605.
113
See S.B. Narayancharya v. State of Gujrat, AIR 2001 Guj. 208.
Article 27 provides: "No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes the proceeds of which
are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any
particular religion or religious denomination".

The object behind Article 27 is to protect the secular characteristic of the Constitution of
India which prohibits the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion by the State or
at State’s expenses. Therefore, if such a tax is imposed, no person can be compelled to pay it.

It may be noted that Article 27 prohibits the levy of "tax" and not the imposition of a fee".

The Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939 was enacted "for the better
administration and governance of certain Hindu religious endowments". The Act imposed on
every Math or temple, the annual income of which exceeded Rs. 250/-, an annual
contribution at certain percentage of the annual income, for the purpose of meeting the
expenses of the Commissioner and his staff, appointed under the Act.

The Supreme Court in Sri Jagannath v. State of Orissa,114 upheld the levy and observed
that the annual contribution so imposed was in the nature of a "fee" and not a "tax". The
payment was demanded for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Commissioner and his
office which was the machinery set up for the due administration of the affairs of the
religious institutions concerned.115

In Nasima Khatun v. State of West Bengal,116 the Bengal Wakfs Act, 1934, as amended by
the Amendment Act, 1973, provided for the creation of Wakf Fund and an Education Fund
for the education of poor and meritorious boys and girls professing Islam. Wakf-al-alaulad
were required to pay contribution towards this fund. The Calcutta High Court held that there
was no question of any religious affair involved in the education of poor Muslim boys and
girls and that the contribution that had to be made was not tax within the meaning of Article
27, but it was a fee realised for a secular purpose for the proper management of the Wakf
property and not for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious
denomination.

An imposition under Sections 3 and 4 of the Ganga Sagar Mela Ordinance, 1975, was held
incidental to the measures to be taken under the Ordinance. It was neither for a public
purpose i\or to meet the general expenses of the State. It was held to be a fee and hot a tax
and therefore, the imposition was not violative of Article 27.117

Article 27 not only prohibits the imposition of a tax but it also prohibits the utilisation of
public funds for the promotion or maintenance of a particular religion or religious
denomination. However, reconstruction of the religious and educational places damaged
during communal riots, at the cost of the Government had been held to be valid.118 Likewise,

114
AIR 1954 Sc 400.
115
It was followed in Moti Dass v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942.
116
AIR 1981 Cal. 302. 20
117
Ramchandra Pande v. State of W.B., AIR 1976 Cal. 164.
118
K. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1974 Ker 48.
the acquisition of land for construction of temple meant for the use of public in general had
also been upheld as not violative of Article 27.119

Again, the programme held by the Government for honouring the memory of great sons of
India, who had contributed to India’s cultural heritage, did not amount to favouring of any
particular religion.120

In P.M. Bhargava v. University Grants Commission,121 the Supreme Court ruled that
introduction of Jyotir Vigyan as a course of study, by the University Grants Commission, did
not mean teaching religion. The Court reiterated with approval the observations of the
Madras High Court in Dr. K. Natrajan v. Union of India,122 wherein Hon’ble Justice F.M.
Ibrahim Kalifulla said that inclusion of Jyotir Vigyan as a course of study, would not result in
propagation of a particular religion, merely because the subject had got its basis or origin
traceable to some cult.

D. Prohibition of Religious Instructions in Educational Institutions [Article 28]

Clause (1) of Article 28 provides "No religious instruction shall be provided in any
educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds".

Clause (3) further provides: "No person attending any educational institution recognised by
the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious
instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that
may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person
or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto".

Clause (2), an exception to Clause (1) provides that the prohibition contained in Clause (1)
would not apply to an educational institution which is administered by the State but has been
established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be
imparted in such institution.

Article 28 distinguishes between the following three types of educational institutions in

respect of holding religious instructions or worship.

i. Educational institutions wholly maintained out of State funds.

In these institutions, there is absolute prohibition against imparting of religious instruction.

ii. Educational Institutions which are either recognised by the State or getting aid out
of State funds.

In such institutions, there is no prohibition against imparting of religious instructions or

holding of religious worship. However, no person attending such educational institutions
shall be required to take part in religious instruction imparted therein or attend any religious

119
Papanna v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1983 Kant 94.
120 21
Suresh Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1975 Del 168.
121
AIR 2004 SC 3478.
122
WP No. 135400 of 2001.
worship held therein unless such person has given his consent thereto. If such person is a
minor, consent of his guardian would be required for requiring him to attend the religious
instruction.123

iii. Educational institutions which are administered by the State but have been
established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious
instructions shall be imparted.

As regards such institutions there is no prohibition against imparting of religious instructions.

Article 28 was enacted to ensure that the peaceful atmosphere of educational institutions
should not be disturbed by the controversies with regard to the truthful character of any
particular religion and the erroneous character of the other. It was to provide for a path of
complete safety.124

The Guru Nanak University Act, 1969, provided for the establishment of Guru Nanak
University at Amritsar, with a view to make provision for the study and research on the life
and teachings of Guru Nanak.

In DA.V. College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab,125 the Supreme Court held that the Act
establishing the University did not imply that religious instructions would be imparted
therein. It was to encourage an academic study of the life and teachings of Guru Nanak,
which did not necessarily amount to religious instruction or promotion of any particular
religion. A provision for an academic study of the life and teaching or the philosophy and
culture of any great saint of India in relation to, or their impact on the Indian and world
civilization, the Court held, could not be taken as providing for religious instructions relating
to a particular religion.

In Aruna Roy v. Union of India,126 the Apex Court held that Article 28(1) did not prohibit
education of religion dissociated from "tenets, the rituals, observances, ceremonies and
modes of worship of a particular sect or denomination." The Court distinguished between
"religious instructions" and "study of religion." What is prohibited is the former and not the
latter. "Recommending that students be acquainted with basics of all religions, the values
inherited therein and also a comparative study of philosophy of all religions", the Court held
"neither offends Article 28 nor brings secularism to peril."

E. Religious Freedom and Proselytisation

Proselytisation literally means "conversion from one opinion, creed or party to another". The
question of "conversion" in reference to "freedom of religion" has gone to the Courts in
matter of a Hindu husband contacting second marriage after conversion to Islam, without
getting his first marriage dissolved. In such a matter, learned Justice Chagla, in Robasa

123
See St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1974 SC 1389.
124
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, CAD VII, 883-884. 22
125
AIR 1971 SC 1737.
126
AIR 2002 SC 3176.
Khanum v. Khodadad Irani,127 ruled that the conduct of the husband would be judged on
the basis of the rule of "justice, equity and good conscience". Though, the Hindu husband had
a right to embrace Islam as his religion, but, the learned judge held that he had no right to
marry again without getting his earlier marriage dissolved. Relying on the observations of
Justice Chagla, the Apex Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of India128 held that prosecution of
the apostate-husband under Section 494 of IPC, 1860, did not violate freedom of religion.

23
127
AIR 1947 Bom. 272.
128
AIR 2000 SC 1650.
Bibliography

Books

 Jain MP, Indian Constitutional Law (5th edition), Wadhwa Nagpur Publications, 2004
(reprint)

 Pandey JN. Dr., The Constitutional Law of India (48th edition), Central Law Agency,
2011

 Singh M.M., The Constitution of India, The World Press Private Ltd. Calcutta, 1975

 Kumar Narender, Constitutional Law of India (reprint edition), Allahabad Law

Agency, 2016

 D.J. DE, The Constitution of India, Volume 2nd, 2005

Websites

 https://indiankanoon.org

 http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com

 Legalservicesindia.com

24