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G.R. Nos.

174813-15 March 17, 2009

NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING JAYCEE
CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch
86, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2 October
2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which
denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

The facts of the case are as follows.

On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel and two others before
Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.
The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The
Informations were signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.

On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to
order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and
their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.

On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They
claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the
Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284-86. The Resolution
was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.

On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss
the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding
that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations
before Judge Bay.

On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date.

Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for
Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:

CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A
WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A
MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?2
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when
the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.3

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.4

In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City
Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s
exercise of judicial discretion.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ
of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus is
never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw
Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way,
i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw
Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If
petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the
Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari
against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling
of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not
Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou7:

The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in
the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.

The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the
President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or
convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that will justify a
judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is
a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)

Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan Mayor Antonio
Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order of the respondent Judge therein
denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged rape and homicide.
One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion
of two other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person
against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if
there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in that case, Mayor
Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two other persons.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court,
seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutor’s Office. The
prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr.,9 we reiterated the doctrine
we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul,10 that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in
court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction,
competence, and discretion of the trial court. Thus, we held:

In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to
dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due
process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the
said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound
exercise of its judicial prerogative.

Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have "deferred to the
Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case."11 Petitioners cite the following portion of our
Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12:

In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred
to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material
evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand.13

Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our Decision, carefully cutting
off the portions which would expose the real import of our pronouncements. The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr.
was directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded
nonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis of a
Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The dismissal of the case
in Montesa, Jr. was done despite the disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor’s Resolution by the
Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the latter
ordered was still ongoing, since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We
held that the judge should have waited for the conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting
on whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before proceeding with the
arraignment. Thus, the continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in Montesa, Jr. reads:

Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo vs. Court
of Appeals, this Court ruled:

Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review
of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of
the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss
based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the
Department of Justice.

The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never became final,
for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence,
the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the
prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of
R.A. No. 5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911.14

As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to establish a doctrine
that the judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether or not there is probable cause. On
the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor
retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court
is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the
prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the
court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of
law.15

In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners’ counsel, he tries to convince us that a judge is allowed to
deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners’ counsel states in the
Memorandum:

6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9 pages which
was attached to the URGENT PETITION did not point out any iota of grave abuse of discretion committed by Asst.
City Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor of the sons of the Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued
by RJBAY is NULL and VOID in view of the recent ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ledesma vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states that:

"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the court’s bare denial of a motion to withdraw information
pursuant to the Secretary’s resolution is void." (Underscoring ours).

6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of the OSG because
of its falsity.16

This statement of petitioners’ counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decision in
Ledesma.17 The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the statement allegedly quoted
from said case, provides:

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice

In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice
secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the
secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration - all
of which were submitted to the court - the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion
to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is
inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the
motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the absence of
probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial
without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's recommendation.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in violation of Rule 10.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear that the passages
are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words "Underscoring ours" after the text implies that,
except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original. Accordingly, we are ordering Atty.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar.

To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the
prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal.
Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial
of the Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of
discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment of the
issues presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening paragraph of Ledesma states:

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a
resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the
merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is
required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it
refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere
pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.19 (Emphases supplied.) 1avvphi 1.zw+

Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Order apparently states that
there was no probable cause against petitioners:

WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and acts of
lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw informations is DENIED.

Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24, 2006 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.20(Underscoring
ours.)

Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no probable cause against them, the
Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City Prosecutor should be granted.21

Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of the word "no" in the above
dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed Order states in full:

After a careful study of the sworn statements of the complainants and the resolution dated March 3, 2006 of 2nd
Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, the Court finds that there was probable cause against the herein
accused. The actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness cannot be the basis
of dismissal or withdrawal of the herein cases. Failure to shout or offer tenatious resistance did not make voluntary
the complainants’ submission to the criminal acts of the accused (People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214, 2002). The
complainants’ affidavits indicate that the accused helped one another in committing the acts complained of.
Considering that the attackers were not strangers but their trusted classmates who enticed them to go to the house
where they were molested, the complainants cannot be expected to react forcefully or violently in protecting
themselves from the unexpected turn of events. Considering also that both complainants were fifteen (15) years of
age and considered children under our laws, the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Malones, G.R. Nos.
124388-90, March 11, 2004 becomes very relevant. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed
in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the
norms of behavior expected from adults under similar circumstances. The range of emotions shown by rape victim is
yet to be captured even by calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims (People v.
Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004).

The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and
acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in nature and should be evaluated after full blown trial
on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of prejudgment against the accused.22

As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found probable cause against
the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the reasons for such finding. Indeed, the general rule
is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo
controls. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there
was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.23

In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw
Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving judgment and
discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.24 The trial court, when confronted with a
Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the
prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such
motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar.25

Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding of probable cause by the
trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case. After going through the same, we find that we
are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them
for trial. We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue
influence that might result should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of
probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the proceedings therein. The Regional Trial Court is
directed to act on the case with dispatch.

Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 133759-60 October 17, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
LEONITO LORENZO, appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 4832 and 4833, convicting appellant Leonito Lorenzo of two counts of qualified rape and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of death for each count, and to pay civil indemnity and moral damages, likewise for each count.

The Indictments

On October 12, 1995, an Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4832, was filed, charging the appellant with
qualified rape. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 24th day of July, 1995, at 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Water, Municipality of
Baco, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust, lewd design, and by taking advantage of innocence and minority of LEA VANESSA
ADAY y DELOS REYES, who is only four (4) years old, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had
carnal knowledge to said LEA VANESSA ADAY by touching and inserting in some degree his penis within the labia
of the pudendum of the offended party but was not able to penetrate deeply due to the accused excitement of the
moment caused an untimely ejaculation, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

A second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4833, was filed, where the appellant was also charged with
qualified rape. The accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August, 1995, at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Water,
Municipality of Baco, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, motivated by lust, lewd design, and by taking advantage of innocence and minority of LEA
VANESSA ADAY y DELOS REYES, who is only four (4) years of age, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge to said LEA VANESSA ADAY by touching and inserting in some degree his penis
within the labia of the pudendum of the offended party but was not able to penetrate deeply due to the accused
excitement of the moment caused an untimely ejaculation, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The appellant was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.

The Evidence of the Prosecution4

Delacrosa Aday and her husband had seven children: Richard, 19 years old; Ruel, 12 years old; Leonel, 10 years
old; Leo, 8 years old; Glenver, 7 years old; Lea Vanessa, 4 years old; and Clarissa Apples, 1 1/2 years old.
Delacrosa made a living by selling vegetables and pastries, while her husband was a fisherman. When the couple
parted ways, Delacrosa stayed with her children in Water, Baco, Oriental Mindoro, while her husband resided
somewhere in Batangas. Delacrosa lived about 50 meters away from her aunt Lucinia and the latter’s husband,
Leonito Lorenzo.

In June 1995, four-year-old Lea Vanessa, who was born on May 15, 1991,5 was seated at her mother’s lap.
Delacrosa was talking to her daughter, and told the child that she was growing up, and that she should not allow
others to see or touch her private parts; if she wanted to answer the call of nature, she should be the one to clean her
private parts, and not someone else. When Lea asked her mother why, Delacrosa replied that it was bad. Lea then
asked her mother why her grandfather Leonito Lorenzo, whom she called "Mamay Lito," stripped off her clothes,
fondled her private parts. Lea recounted how Mamay Lito exposed his private organ and rubbed it against her private
parts; she was even asked to hold his private organ and to rub it against her private parts, but she refused. Lea
further stated that she noticed something milky coming out from his penis and that Leonito thereafter placed his
organ inside his pants. Delacrosa was aghast at her young daughter’s revelation. She wanted to confront her Uncle
Leonito, but desisted.

On July 24, 1997 at 10:00 a.m., Delacrosa and Leo left their house to see a doctor as Leo was ill. Ruel and Leonel
were in school, while Richard, Glenver, Lea and Clarissa were left in the house. At about 2:00 p.m., Richard put
Clarissa to sleep and left to gather firewood at the foothills. He told Glenver and Lea to go to sleep. Momentarily,
Leonito arrived and asked Glenver to buy candies. Glenver left, leaving Lea and Clarissa alone in the house. Leonito
removed his pants and Lea’s panties, and placed his penis in her vagina. However, only the tip of his penis touched
her vagina. Shortly thereafter, Leonito left the house.

Delacrosa and Leo arrived home at 4:00 p.m. Lea told her mother that Leonito had been to their house. She narrated
that when Glenver left to buy candies as instructed, Leonito removed his pants He then removed Lea’s panties and
knelt on the floor, caressed her vagina and rubbed his penis against it. He tried to insert his penis into her vagina but
only the tip of his penis touched her organ. Declacrosa examined her daughter’s vagina and saw that it was swollen
and reddish. She saw traces of semen in front of Lea’s panties. Delacrosa was so furious that she wanted to kill
Leonito.

At 1:00 p.m. on August 17, 1995, Delacrosa was at the well washing soiled clothes, about 50 meters away from her
house. She had instructed Leo, Glenver, Lea and Clarissa to sleep, and that she would be back shortly. On her way
to the well, Delacrosa had seen Leonito standing in front of his house. Aunt Lucinia was also at the well, washing
soiled clothes with Delacrosa. The place was also about 50 meters away from a house which was under
construction, that belonged to Eddie delos Reyes, Delacrosa’s younger brother.

In the meantime, Wilson Dulce, a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo, was on his way home after gathering nipa palm. He
passed by the house of Eddie delos Reyes and saw Leonito, holding Lea’s hand. Wilson spoke with Leonito for about
three minutes and then left. It appeared that aside from Lea and Leonito, there was no one else in the house.

After washing and rinsing clothes, Delacrosa went home. The door was locked. When she eventually got inside the
house, she discovered that Lea was not there. Delacrosa was so incensed and, in a loud voice, demanded to know
where Lea was. Leo told his mother that Lea had refused to go inside the house after she left, and to tease their
sister, he and Glenver closed the door to keep her out.

Momentarily, Leonito and Lea arrived. Leonito declared that they had been to the "house under construction" owned
by Eddie delos Reyes. After Leonito left, Delacrosa noticed that Lea was trembling. Unconsciously, Lea lowered her
panties, scratched her crotch and pulled up her panties anew. Suspicious, Delacrosa pulled down Lea’s underwear
and was shocked when she saw traces of semen in her daughter’s navel, her crotch, and the front portion of her
panties. Delacrosa asked Lea what happened, but the child merely shook her head in reply. After a couple of hours,
Lea calmed down and told her mother that Leonito had removed his pants, then her panties and attempted to insert
his penis into her vagina. He failed to do so, as only the tip of his penis was able to penetrate her vagina.

Delacrosa, who was a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo, sought help from their head Avelino Belano and reported the
incident to him. Delacrosa brought Avelino to her house and showed him Lea’s panties. Avelino noticed that the
panties were wet with a sticky substance. He advised Delacrosa to report the matter to the minister of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, who thereafter advised her to report the incidents involving Leonito and her daughter to the police authorities.

On September 22, 1995, Delacrosa brought Lea to the police, where she gave a sworn statement to SPO1 Dante
Abarquez, subscribed and sworn to before the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Puerto Galera.
Delacrosa also executed a sworn statement.6 Mother and daughter signed two criminal complaints for rape against
Leonito, thereafter filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.7 As suggested by the public prosecutor, Delacrosa
brought Lea to the Provincial Health Office on October 19, 1995 where Dr. Romeo G. Andal, Medical Officer V,
conducted a physical examination of Lea. The doctor’s report contained the following findings:

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
HEENT
]
C/L
]No abrasions nor hematoma
Abdomen>
]

VAGINAL SPECULUM & INTERNAL EXAMINATION:

- Absence of pubic hair, with complete healed hymenal lacerations on 2, 5, 7 & 9 o’clock positions.

- Vagina - admits the 5th finger with ease.

LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

Cervice vaginal smear for the presence of spermatozoa revealed.

Negative result.8

The Evidence of the Accused

Leonito denied the charge. He testified that on July 24, 1995, he was busy plowing his ricefield, which was about
nine meters away from his house. At noontime, while he and his wife Lucinia were resting, Delacrosa arrived and
asked Lucinia to take care of her children as Leo had to be brought to the doctor. Lucinia agreed and took care of
Delacrosa’s children until 4:00 p.m. when Delacrosa arrived home from the clinic. There were other previous
occasions when Lucinia took care of the children while Delacrosa was away.

Leonito insisted that he could not have possibly molested Lea on August 17, 1995. He was in the house of Eddie
delos Reyes, which was about ten meters away from his house. Delacrosa and his wife Lucinia were then at the well
washing soiled clothes.

Leonito averred that the charges against him were instigated by Delacrosa because she was envious of him; the
farmland, which her deceased mother and her aunt Lucinia inherited from their parents, were given to him to till and
work on. Instead of suing Leonito and Lucinia, Delacrosa fabricated the charges and ordered her daughter Lea to
testify against him.1a\^/phi1.net

Lucinia corroborated her husband’s testimony. She testified that she asked Delacrosa to have Lea examined by a
doctor but Delacrosa refused. She demanded that Delacrosa drop the charges against Leonito because they were
baseless, but Delacrosa refused.

The Verdict of the Trial Court

After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Leonito with two counts of qualified rape. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the accused Leonito Lorenzo y Maligo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
(2 counts) with the qualifying circumstance that the victim is a child below 7 years old, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the maximum of two (2) death penalties, together with the accessory penalties as provided for by law, and to
indemnify the victim Lea Vanessa Aday the amount of fifty thousand (p50,000.00) pesos for each crime of rape or a
total amount of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.9

In this case, the appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the felonies charged beyond
reasonable doubt. He contends that the private complainant admitted in her testimony that he merely removed her
panties but did nothing to her private parts; and that she was merely instructed by her mother Delacrosa to testify
that the appellant had raped her. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, argues that the appellant merely nit-
picked the testimony of the private complainant and ascribed ill motive to her mother, in a last ditch effort to extricate
himself from certain conviction. It contends that in calibrating the testimony of the private complainant, the entirety of
her testimony must be considered.

We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. In rape cases, the testimony of the private complainant must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety and not merely by truncated portions or isolated passages thereof.10 The true
meaning of answers to isolated questions is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded
to the witness and her answers thereto. To distill the facts established by the testimony of a witness, everything
stated by her on direct examination, on cross-examination, redirect and re-cross-examination must be considered.
Facts imperfectly or incompletely stated in answer to one or more questions on direct examination supplied by her
answers to other questions on redirect or re-cross-examination; and when from one statement considered by itself an
inference may be deduced, that inference may be strengthened or repelled by the facts disclosed in another.11 The
testimonies of witnesses must not be merely selected to conveniently suit the claim of a party.12 In People v.
Ortega,13 this Court ruled:

It is sound policy that self-contradictions in testimonies should be reconciled, if possible, the rule being the same as
that which obtains where witnesses apparently contradict each other. These contradictory statements should be
considered in light of explanations and attending circumstances, and whether inconsistencies or incongruities result
from misconception of an innocent witness or willful and corrupt misrepresentation. ... 14

In this case, the appellant merely quoted a portion of the private complainant’s testimony on redirect examination
which appeared to support the claim that he did not insert his penis into the vagina of the victim:

PROS. SEÑOREN:

Q How did your Mamay Lito sexually abuse you or "hinindot?"

ATTY. ABAS:

Your Honor, it is improper for the prosecutor to ask that question in the redirect.

COURT:

That is a follow-up question.

WITNESS:

A Mamay Lito first removed my pants and then my panty, sir.

PROS. SEÑOREN:

Q What did your Mamay Lito do after he removed your pants and panty?
A He told me to hold his penis, sir.

Q And did you hold the penis of Mamay Lito?

A No, sir.

Q After Mamay Lito told you to hold your penis, what did Mamay Lito do with his penis?

ATTY. ABAS:

Leading, Your Honor.

COURT:

Let the witness answer.

WITNESS:

A Something like milk oozed from his penis, sir.

PROS. SEÑOREN:

Q And what more did your Mamay Lito do to you?

A None anymore, sir.

Q How about his penis, what did he do with his penis after something milky was ejaculated?

ATTY. ABAS:

Incompetent, Your Honor.

COURT:

Answer.

WITNESS:

A He put on his pants, sir.

PROS. SEÑOREN:

Q Lea Vanessa, before your Mamay Lito requested you or directed you to hold his penis, what did Mamay Lito do
with your sexual organ, if any?

ATTY. ABAS:

Very leading, Your Honor.


COURT:

Answer.

WITNESS:

A He just removed my pants but did nothing with my private part, sir.15

By itself, the aforequoted portion of the testimony of the private complainant would negate the charges of qualified
rape against him. He would be guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. However, the rest of the testimony of the private
complainant conclusively proves that she was raped by the appellant. She testified on direct examination, redirect
examination and even on re-cross-examination that the appellant had raped her. On direct examination, she testified
that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her several times:

Q By the way, Lea Vanessa, why do you know Mamay Lito or Leonito Lorenzo?

A Because this Leonito Lorenzo is the husband of Nanay Senia, sir.

Q Do you know, Lea Vanessa, why your Mamay Lito is here now?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why is your Mamay Lito here now?

A Mamay Lito was arrested by the police, sir.

Q Why did the police arrest your Mamay Lito?

A Because he had sexual intercourse with me, sir ("hinindot po ako").

Q Lea Vanessa, how many times did your Mamay Lito or Leonito Lorenzo have sexual intercourse with you?

A Several times, sir.

Q Where did your Mamay Lito have sexual intercourse with you?

A In our house and in the house of Tito Eddie, sir.

Q Who is this Tito Eddie you have just mentioned?

A He is the brother of my mother, sir.

Q How far is the house of your Tito Eddie from your house?

A Near, sir.16

On incisive re-cross-examination by the appellant’s counsel, the private complainant stuck to her testimony on direct
examination that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina several times, thus:

ATTY. ABAS:
Q How may times did Mamay Lito insert his penis to your vagina?

WITNESS:

A Many times, sir.

Q When was the first?

A "Noong matagal na po."

Q The second time?

A "Noong anim pong araw."

Q The third time?

A "Pampito po."

Q When was the fourth time you were abused by Mamay Lito?

A Seven[th] days, sir.

Q The fifth time?

Q Where for the first time were you abused by Mamay Lito?

A In the house of Tita Zeny, sir.

Q The second time, in what place?

A In our house, sir.

Q When you were abused by Mamay Lito the second time, you were together with your brothers and sisters?

A No, sir.

Q Your mother was there?

A My mother at that time brought my brother to a doctor for treatment, sir.

Q You were alone in your house?

A No, sir, Kuya Glen was there but Mamay Lito sent him to a store to buy candies.

Q Immediately, your Kuya Glen returned from buying candies?

A Yes, sir.

Q And your Mamay Lito was still there when your Kuya Glen returned?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you abused by Mamay Lito the third time?

A In the house of Mamay Lito, sir.

Q Who was there?

A That house was still under construction, sir.

Q Were there persons in that house?

A None, sir.

Q The fourth time, where were you abused by Mamay Lito?

A Also in the house of Mamay Lito, sir.

Q And that house was still under construction?

A Yes, sir.

Q No flooring yet?

A Yes, sir.

Q And it had no walling yet at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q No door yet?

A Yes, sir.

Q The next time, in what place were you sexually abused by Mamay Lito?

A He always abused me in the house which was still under construction, sir.17

It bears stressing that the private complainant on redirect examination testified not only on the number of times she
was raped by the appellant, but also indicated the places where she was raped, and revealed the details relating to
the crimes. Although the private complainant mistakenly testified that the house under construction where she was
raped was owned by the appellant, when in fact the house was owned by Eddie delos Reyes, Delacrosa’s younger
brother and the private complainant’s uncle, such mistake should not be taken against a four-year-old girl, who
innocently thought that the appellant owned the house.

The Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Romeo Andal regarding the physical examination conducted on the private
complainant confirms the veracity of the private complainant’s testimony, that she was raped by the appellant not
only on July 24 and August 17, 1995, but on other occasions as well. The doctor found completely-healed hymenal
lacerations at two o’clock, five o’clock, seven o’clock and nine o’clock positions and that the vagina admitted the
entry of the fifth finger with ease.18 In People v. Baring,19 the Court held that when the victim’s testimony of her violation
is corroborated by physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to prove the existence of the
essential requisite of carnal knowledge.20

Apparently, Lea erred when on redirect examination, she failed to mention that the appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina. However, such circumstance should not discredit her and her testimony. It must be stressed that Lea was
barely four years old when she was raped and when she testified. She could not be expected to understand every
question asked of her in the course of examination. Ample margin of error and understanding should be accorded to
Lea who, much more than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the experience of testifying
before a court.

Error-free testimony cannot be expected, most especially when a witness is recounting vivid details of a harrowing
experience, one which even an adult would like to bury in oblivion.21 Victims of rape often take into memory lapses in
their desire to forget their dreadful experiences. These memory gaps should not necessarily be taken as evidence of
false testimony.22 Faultless testimony cannot be expected of a rape victim of tender age for she may be trying not to
recall in her mind, much less, recount in open court every ugly detail of her distressing experience, and the appalling
outrage she went through, as it is too painful and horrific to remember.23 Also, the Court cannot impose the burden of
exactness in the victim’s recollection of her harrowing experience, more so in this case where the victim was barely
four years old. She may have been confused as to the exact details of each and every sexual abuse she was
subjected to by the appellant. It is in fact expected that such a victim would rather wish and even purposely forget the
abhorrent memories of every single occasion. It would be exacting too much should the Court demand a very
accurate and flawless account of the two crimes subject of her charges.24 It is not unnatural for inconsistencies to
creep into the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is of tender age as the victim Lea, in narrating the
details of her shocking experience.25

The Court is inclined to believe that the incident referred to by the private complainant on redirect examination was
that which she revealed to Delacrosa, her mother, in June 1995 as gleaned from the latter’s testimony, thus:

Q Prior to July 24, 1995, did you have any conversation with your daughter Leah (sic) Vanessa about his Mamay
Lito?

A Yes, sir.

Q When was that?

A It was on June 1995, sir.

Q What was the subject matter of your conversation with your daughter Leah Vanessa?

A That afternoon while I was resting, my daughter Leah Vanessa who is by nature cariñosa was then lying on my lap,
I was telling her how to take care of herself, sir.

Q After that what happened?

A What I wanted is that while she is growing up, she should take care of herself, sir.

Q What other things did you talk with your daughter?

A While she was lying on my lap, I touched her vagina and told her not to allow that vagina of hers to be touched and
I told her that if she is going to answer the call of nature she should be the one to fix herself and not allow her
brothers to clean it, sir.
Q What was the reply of your daughter Leah Vanessa after saying that?

A She asked me "why?", sir.

Q And what was your answer?

A I told her to take care of herself not to show her private organ especially so that she is growing up, sir.

Q What was the reply of Leah Vanessa, if any?

A She asked me again and I told her that it is bad, sir.

Q And what was her reply?

A She told me in question manner, "Is it bad?"

Q What other thing did she say?

A When I asked her that she also asked me, "Why is it bad?" and then she told me, "Bakit si Mamay Lito?"

Q What more did she say to you?

ATTY. ABAS:

May I move that the answer be stricken out, Your Honor.

PROS. SEÑOREN:

That is part of her narration, Your Honor.

WITNESS:

She told me that, "Why did Mamay Lito stripped me and touched my private parts.

PROS. SEÑOREN:

Q What happened, if any?

A She told me that after the accused stripped off her clothes and fondled her private parts, Mamay Lito will expose
his private organ and rub it in her vagina, sir.

Q What else did your daughter tell you?

A She also told me that after Mamay Lito exposed his organ, he told her to rub it in her vagina, sir.

Q What else happened?

A My daughter told me that after the accused exposed his penis, he would ask my daughter to hold it, sir.26
The appellant quoted a portion of the private complainant’s testimony on cross-examination to show that she was
instructed by her mother to testify that the appellant had raped her:

Q By the way, who instructed you to tell before this Court that you were raped by your Mamay Lito?

A I withdraw that.

Q You stated before this Court that a child who is telling a lie will go to the sea of fire or as what you call "dagat-
dagatang apoy," correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that was the instruction made by your mother to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q And your mother instructed you to tell the Court that Mamay Lito raped you?

A Yes, sir.27

However, the appellant again failed to mention that the private complainant likewise testified on re-cross-examination
that she was not thus coached:

Q And you are testifying here because your mother told you to testify?

PROS. SEÑOREN:

I think the question has already been answered, Your Honor.

COURT:

Answer.

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

ATTY. ABAS:

Q And all you are saying was coached by your mother?

A No, sir.28

There is no evidence that Delacrosa instructed her daughter to prevaricate or falsely testify that the appellant had
raped her. The Court finds it incredible that a mother would advise her daughter "not to tell a lie lest she be engulfed
in a sea of fire," and thereafter tell the child to falsely testify that the appellant raped her. Indeed, when asked by the
public prosecutor if she instructed her daughter to testify as she did against the appellant, Delacrosa explained:

PROS. SEÑOREN:
Q The accused Leonito Lorenzo, including his wife Luciña (sic) Lorenzo, also testified that the reason why Lea
Vanessa testified against him was because you instructed her to testify in the manner she testified against the
accused. What can you say about this statement?

A It is true that I told my daughter Lea Vanessa to come to Court and narrate but what I told her is to tell the Court all
that Mamay Lito did to her. I also told her to tell all what is only true because I told her that the child who would not
tell the truth would be placed in a sea of fire.

Q Who is this Mamay Lito you are referring to?

A This Leonito Lorenzo is known to my daughter Lea Vanessa as Mamay Lito.

COURT:

Q Are you referring to the accused?

A Yes, Your Honor.29

It bears stressing that the private complainant, who was barely four years old when she testified, was subjected to
intense and sustained cross-examination and re-cross-examination by the appellant’s counsel. The child remained
steadfast in her testimony that she was ravished by the appellant, not only twice, but several times; not only in their
house, but also in the house of Eddie delos Reyes. The private complainant even spontaneously demonstrated to the
trial court, with the use of her fingers, the length and the width of the penis of the appellant:

Q Have you seen the penis of Mamay Lito?

A Yes, sir.

Q How big is it?

WITNESS:

(Demonstrates showing her arm having a diameter of approximately 2 inches).

Q And that size was inserted in your vagina?

A Only the tip of the penis was able to penetrate, sir.

Q How long is the penis of your Mamay Lito?

A Around five inches, sir.

(Witness demonstrates).

Q And you were able to hold that?

A No, sir.

Q Why did you not touch his penis when your Mamay Lito told you to touch the same?
A I didn’t like to hold it, sir.30

It would be at the apex of depravity for a mother to coach her four-year-old daughter into falsely testifying that she
was raped by no less than her grandfather, and subject her daughter to such disgrace if the latter was not after all
raped by the appellant. In this case, Delacrosa sought the prosecution and conviction of the appellant, her uncle no
less, for his bestial acts on her hapless daughter. Before she did, she sought counsel from officials of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, of which she was a member. Her collective acts were not those of a depraved mother, but one who sought
justice for her daughter. Although Lucinia, the appellant’s wife, demanded that Delacrosa withdraw the complaints
against the appellant, Delacrosa was adamant. To quote Delacrosa’s testimony:

Q Luciña (sic) Lorenzo also testified that on October 2, 1995, she requested you to drop your charges against her
husband, Leonito Lorenzo, when you were in your mother’s house, because according to her, there is no truth to
your charges against her husband. And in that occasion, you told her that you would only drop your charges against
her husband if they would leave that place. What can you say about this statement?

A It is true that she approached me and requested me to drop the charges against her husband but did not
acceed (sic) to her request because I know that it is true. Although she was saying that it is not true, it is true.

ATTY. ABAS:

May we move that the Tagalog answer of the witness be put on record.

COURT:

Put the Tagalog answer of the witness on record.

A "Kaya ho siya lumapit ay nakikiusap ho siya sa akin na iurong ko ang demanda laban sa kanyang asawa dahil sa
paniniwala niya na hindi ginawa ng kanyang asawa iyon. Hindi po ako pumayag na iurong ang demanda laban sa
kanyang asawa dahil sa ang totoo ay talagang ginahasa niya ang anak ko.

COURT:

Proceed.31

Delacrosa also belied the claims of the appellant and his wife Lucinia that the appellant was charged with rape
because Delacrosa was envious of him for having been allowed to cultivate a big portion of the properties left by her
grandparents, while she and her family did not have any farm to cultivate. Delacrosa testified that the properties
which her mother and her siblings had inherited from their parents had already been divided among the heirs.
Besides, she explained, she was not interested with the land as she was not a farmer; neither was her husband,
thus:

Q Luciña (sic) Lorenzo likewise stated and it was also the statement of the accused Leonito Lorenzo that the reason
why you filed these two rape cases against the accused Leonito Lorenzo was because you envied him for cultivating
a big portion of land while you and your family do not have any farm to work on. What can you say about this
statement?

A It is not true that I envied him.

Q What is then the truth?


A The farm that they were referring to had already been divided among my mother and her other sisters including
Luciña Lorenzo. They have their own share. I did not envy him because my husband and my children even do not
know how to farm, so, why should I envy him.

Q What is the occupation of your husband?

A Fisherman, sir.

Q How about you, what is your occupation?

A Vegetables and pastries vendor, sir.

Q Do you know how to farm?

A No, sir.32

The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of the private complainant and those of the
other witnesses for the prosecution. Case law has it that the calibration by the trial court of the testimonial evidence
of the parties and its assessment of the probative weight thereof are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if
not conclusive effect, precisely because of the unique advantage of the trial court of observing and monitoring at
close range the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses as they testify. We find no reason to deviate from the
findings of the trial court and its assessment of the credibility and probative weight of the testimonial evidence on
record.

The appellant’s bare denial of the crimes charged are mere negative self-serving evidence and cannot prevail over
the testimony of the prosecutrix and her witnesses, which the trial court found positive, credible and entitled to full
probative weight. The appellant’s alibi is likewise barren of merit, given the proximity of the house of the appellant to
the house of Delacrosa and that of Eddie delos Reyes, where the appellant raped the victim. Alibi is a weak, if not the
weakest of defenses. The appellant is burdened to adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place
other than the situs of the crime at the time of its commission such that it was physically impossible for him to have
committed the same.33 The appellant failed to prove his alibi, relying solely on his fragile testimony.

The Crimes Committed by the Appellant and the Proper Penalties Therefor

The trial court correctly ruled that the appellant is guilty of two counts of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, by Republic Act No. 765934 which reads:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

The trial court also correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty. The private complainant was barely
four years old when she was raped by the appellant. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is a child below seven years old: 1a\^/phi1.net
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

The trial court ordered the appellant to pay to private complainant Lea Vanessa Aday the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity for each of the two crimes. The trial court did not award any moral damages, nor did it order the appellant
to pay to the private complainant exemplary damages. The decision of the trial court shall thus be modified.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4832 and 4833, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant Leonito Lorenzo is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the death penalty for each count. He is also directed to
pay the private complainant Lea Vanessa Aday P75,000 as civil indemnity for each count, for a total amount of
P150,000; P75,000 as moral damages for each count or P150,000; and P25,000 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape or a total of P50,000.35 Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185209 June 28, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,


vs.
RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN, Appellant.
REY VILLATIMA and alias "DEDONG" BARGO, Accused.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction that the appellant conspired with his co-accused in
committing the crime of robbery with homicide. His claim that he acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury could not be sustained because there was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat,
preventing his escape that compelled him to take part in the commission of the offense charged.

Factual Antecedents

On July 19, 1995, an Information1 was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch
60, charging Rene Baron y Tangarocan (appellant), Rey Villatima (Villatima), and alias "Dedong" Bargo (Bargo) with
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Juanito Berallo (Berallo). The Information
contained the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about 9 o’clock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one Juanito Berallo in order to rob, steal
and take away the following:
1) sidecar of the tricycle which costs ₱16,000.00;

2) motorcycle described as Kawasaki HDX colored black with Engine No. G7E-088086 and Chassis No. HDX-
849776 which is worth ₱103,536.00;

3) wallet with cash money of ₱1,250.00;

4) wrist watch and ring worth ₱3,800.00.

and inflicting upon the person of Juanito Berallo the following injuries, to wit:

1. Gaping incised wound, shallow at the extremeties and deeper at the middle portion, 7½ cms. long, from right
lateral aspect of the neck going slightly downward and to the left of anterior neck.

2. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 14 cm. deep, directed slightly upward and to the right, located on the upper chest
below wound # 1.

3. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 12½ cm. deep, directed to the right, located at the left chest, level of 3rd rib.

4. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long 20 cm. deep, directed slightly downward and to the left, located at the middle of the
chest, level of 5th rib.

5. Incised wound 1½ cm long, right cheek.

6. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 6½ cm. deep, directed downward located at the medial aspect of the upper back,
right.

7. Stabbed wound, 2½ cm. long, 10 cm. deep, located at the upper outer quadrant of the back, right.

8. Incised wound, 2 cm. long, located at the middle of the upper quadrant of back, right.

9. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 4 cm. deep, directed downward located at the medial aspect of upper inner quadrant
of back, left.

10. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 5 cm deep, directed downward, located at the middle of upper quadrant of back, left.

11. Incised wound, 2 cm long, located 2 cm to the left of wound # 10.

12. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 7½ cm. deep, directed downward located at the middle of lower back, left.

13. Incised wound, 6½ cm. long, distal third left forearm.

14. Incised wound, 3 cm. long palmar surface left hand.

15. Incised wound, 5 cm. long palmar surface left hand, 2 cm. below wound # 13.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe hemorrhage due to Multiple Stabbed wounds,

which directly caused the death of the victim Juanito Berallo, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in
the amount, to wit:
₱ 50, 000.00 - as indemnity for the death of the victim.

₱ 150, 000.00 - as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, or such amount to be fixed by the court.

ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.

Only the appellant was arrested. Villatima and Bargo remain at-large to date. Appellant entered a plea of "not guilty"
when arraigned. After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.

The Prosecution’s Version

Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case against the appellant is as follows:

On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver, was having a
conversation with Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julie’s Bakeshop at Magsaysay St., Cadiz City. Berallo
arrived and parked his tricycle in front of the bakeshop. The appellant approached Berallo and asked if he could take
him and his companions to Hacienda Caridad for ₱30.00. When Berallo agreed, the appellant called Villatima, then
wearing a fatigue jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallo’s tricycle.

Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julie’s Bakeshop at around the same time Joquino and Ballesteros were
in front of the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle while the appellant was seated behind him.
After buying bread, she approached Berallo and asked if he was going home to Lag-asan, hoping that she could ride
with him. However, Berallo replied that he still had to ferry passengers. She thus decided to cross the street and take
a passenger jeep. While inside the jeep, she saw two more persons boarding Berallo’s tricycle.

On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide incident. Together with other
policemen, he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City, where he saw Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane
plantation about 20 meters away from the highway. They also noticed several traces of footprints near Berallo’s body
and a tricycle sidecar in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue jacket.

Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Berallo. She found that the
victim sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds. Five of them were
considered as fatal and caused the immediate death of Berallo. The wounds also indicated that they could have been
inflicted by more than one person.

The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the appellant as one of the suspects. After having been
apprised of his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took Berallo’s tricycle and, after detaching the
motorcycle from the sidecar, brought the motorcycle to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left
the same at the house of Villatima’s aunt, Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).

Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that her nephew Villatima, together with the appellant, and
another companion, were the ones who brought the motorcycle to her house in Kabankalan.

Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered from the house of Natividad as the one stolen from her
deceased husband. She also testified on the sum of money and the value of the personal property stolen from her
husband. She allegedly spent the sum of ₱2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot.

The Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995, at around 7 o’clock in the evening,
he bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded to the public transport terminal to get a ride home.
A tricycle with two passengers passed by and its driver inquired if he wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He boarded
the tricycle and told the driver that he would alight at Canibugan, but the driver requested him to accompany them up
to Segundo Diez. He agreed out of concern for the safety of the driver. Upon reaching Bangga Doldol, however, the
passengers announced a hold-up. Armed with guns, the passengers told him and the driver not to make any wrong
move, or they would be killed. Thereafter, the passengers tied the hands of the driver and dragged him towards the
sugarcane fields. He no longer knew what happened to the driver since he remained in the tricycle. However, he
suspected that the driver was killed by the two passengers.

Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and detached the sidecar of the tricycle. They then took him to
a house at Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to leave the premises. The following morning, they returned to
Cadiz City. The two passengers even accompanied him to his house and threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not
to report the incident to the police authorities.

On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, policemen came to his house and asked where the
motorcycle was taken. He told them of the location of the vehicle and insisted that he had nothing to do with the
incident. He stressed that the two passengers whose names he did not know, were responsible for the crime
committed.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On February 12, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision2 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused RENE BARON Y TANGAROCAN (detained)
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as charged in the information and
there being the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of DEATH.

The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the
death of the victim, Juanito Berallo and the amount of ₱5,050.00 for the cash and the value of the wrist watch and
ring of the victim plus the amount of ₱2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot by way of reparation and in addition
the amount of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The sidecar and the
motorcycle are hereby ordered returned to the heirs of the victim.

The accused is further ordered to be immediately committed to the National Penitentiary for service of his sentence.

The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately forward the records of this case together with the
Decision of this Court to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

The case against Rey Villatima and alias "Dedong" Bargo [both of whom are] at-large is hereby ordered archived and
[to] be immediately revived upon their arrest.

Cost against accused Rene Baron.

SO ORDERED.3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the appellate court, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as charged and in not
appreciating in his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury. However, the same was disregarded by the CA holding that all the requisites for said circumstances
were lacking. The appellate court found that the alleged threat, if at all, was not real or imminent. Appellant had every
opportunity to escape but did not take advantage of the same. Instead, he waited inside the tricycle as if he was one
of the malefactors. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision4 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the APPEAL is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 12, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 1675-C finding accused-appellant Rene
Baron y Tangarocan guilty of robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION reducing the death penalty
to reclusion perpetua without parole conformably with R.A. 9346 and reducing the award of moral damages from
₱100,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱25,000.00.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

Still aggrieved, the appellant comes to us for a final review of his case. In his brief, he assigns the following
correlated errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
IRRESISTABLE FORCE AND/OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.5

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. To
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of
personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense,
was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor
and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the
killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.6

In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the real intention of the
appellant and his companions was to rob the victim. The appellant and his companions boarded the tricycle of the
victim pretending to be passengers. Midway to their destination, one of the accused declared a hold-up and at gun
point, tied the hands of the victim and brought him towards the sugarcane field where he was stabbed to death. The
victim was divested of his wallet containing ₱1,250.00, a wrist watch and ring. Emerging from the sugarcane
plantation, they boarded the tricycle of the victim, detached the sidecar and dumped the same in a canal beside the
Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one of the accused. They proceeded to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan
and hid the motorcycle in the house of Villatima’s aunt, Natividad.
Concededly, there is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the
crime. However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts
and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.7 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is
such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.8 A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.9

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellant and his co-accused conspired to commit robbery with homicide. When considered together, the
circumstances point to them and no one else as the culprits. We thus agree with the observation of the trial court
that:

A careful examination of the records of this case reveals, [that] no eye witness was presented by the prosecution
pointing to the three accused to be actually responsible in the perpetration of the crime charged except the extra-
judicial narration of the accused Rene Baron but who also tried to exculpate himself from the commission of the
crime by denying his [complicity] in the crime.

Despite this finding however, this Court found from the records of this case, numerous and cumulative material
circumstantial evidence from which one can derive a logical and necessary inference clearly showing the three
accused to be responsible for the crime charged and these are the following; to wit:

1. The fact that at about 8:30 in the evening of June 28, 1995 witness Ernesto Joquino, Jr. while in front of Julie’s
Bakeshop saw the victim Juanito Berallo [park] the latter’s tricycle in front of the bakeshop when accused Rene
Baron hired the tricycle of the victim in going to Hda. Caridad and whose companions were Rey Villatima and
"Dedong" Bargo (TSN-Tan, January 18, 1996, pp. 6-10). Thus, the excerpts of the Transcript of the Stenographic
Notes has this to reveal in vivid fashion, to wit:

"Q. Mr. Joquino, on June 28, 1995 at about 8:30 in the evening where were you?

A. I was in front of Julie’s Bakeshop.

Q. Where is this Julie’s Bakeshop located x x x?

A. At Magsaysay Street, Cadiz City.

Q. What were you doing at Julie’s Bakeshop at that particular date and time?

A. I was x x x having a conversation with Canni Ballesteros.

Q. While you were x x x in front of Julie’s Bakeshop, was there anything that transpired?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. Can you tell us what was that?

A. I saw Juanito Berallo park his tricycle in front of Julie’s Bakeshop.

Q. When you saw Juanito Berallo park his tricycle x x x in front of Julie’s Bakeshop, what transpired after that?
A. Rene Baron approached Juanito Berallo and asked him if he can conduct Rene Baron to Hda. Caridad.

Q. By the way, do you know Rene Baron before June 28, 1995?

A. Yes, ma’am, I know him because we are all drivers of the tricycle.

Q. What about this Juanito Berallo, do you know him before June 28, 1995?

A. Yes ma’am.

Q. Why do you know him?

A. Because he ran as councilor in Cadiz City.

Q. So going back to the incident where you said Rene Baron approached Juanito Berallo and asked Berallo if the
latter would conduct him to Hda. Caridad, what was the answer of Juanito Berallo to Rene Baron?

A. Juanito Berallo asked Rene Baron how much he will pay [to] him and then Rene Baron said that he will pay
Juanito Berallo the amount of ₱30.00 and then again Juanito Berallo asked Rene Baron how many x x x will ride on
the tricycle and Rene Baron said that there were three of them.

Q. By the way, how far were you from where Juanito Berallo and Rene Baron were talking?

A. From here up there. (Witness pointed to a distance of about four (4) meters.)

Q. After Juanito Berallo agreed with Rene Baron and his companions to conduct them to Hda. Caridad, what did
Rene Baron do if there was any?

A. Rene Baron called his companions who were just across the street.

Q. Were you able to recognize x x x the two companions whom Rene Baron called from across the street?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And who were they if you know?

A. Rey Villatima and Dedong Bargo."

(TSN-Tan, January 18, 1996, pp. 6-10)

2. The fact the Rey Villatima was wearing a fatigue jacket when the latter boarded the tricycle of the victim and
proceeded to Hda. Caridad (ibid, p. 12) and it was the same fatigue jacket recovered by the police from the sidecar of
the tricycle at the scene of the crime and this was the last time that the victim was seen alive;

3. The fact that witness Pacita Caratao corroborated the testimony of Ernesto Joquino, Jr. and Berallo sitting on the
latter’s tricycle parked near Julie’s Bakeshop and saw Rene Baron sitting behind Juanito Berallo and the witness
even asked the former if he will be going to Lag-asan to which the victim Juanito Berallo refused because he has
some passengers to be conducted (TSN-Tan, March 13, 1997, pp. 3-4) and has referred to the accused Rene Baron
and his two companions (TSN-Tan, March 13, 1997, pp. 4-5) as his passengers;
4. The fact that the during the police investigation witness SPO2 Jude de la Rama found the dead body of the victim
inside the sugarcane plantation in Hda. Sta. Ana and found many traces of footsteps inside the sugarcane fields
(TSN-Tan, July 8, 1997, p. 4) indicating that more than one person conspired and co-operated with each other in
killing the victim;

5. The fact that the witness De la Rama found the sidecar of the tricycle beside the Martisan Bridge which is just
beside the scene of the incident and also beside the sidecar of the tricycle they found a fatigue jacket and has
recovered inside its pocket a used soap (ibid, p. 5);

6. The fact that when the police officers invited Rene Baron for interview, Rene Baron pointed to his co-accused, Rey
Villatima as the one who was wearing the fatigue jacket the police officers recovered as well as had named his
(Baron) other companion as alias "Dedong" Bargo (ibid, p. 7);

7. The fact that after the three accused had detached the motorcycle from its sidecar, Rey Villatima was pointed to by
the accused Rene Baron as the one who drove it while he (Rene Baron) and "Dedong" Bargo rode behind and all of
them immediately proceeded to the house of the aunt of Rey Villatima in Brgy. Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental (ibid);

8. The fact that it was accused Rene Baron who had guided the police investigators to Kabankalan City, Negros
Occidental, a city in the southern portion of Negros Occidental which is about 150 kilometers away from Cadiz City in
the north, the scene of the crime; and with the cooperation of the Chief of Police of the former place proceeded to the
house of a certain Natividad Camparicio, the aunt of accused Rey Villatima (ibid, pp. 7-8);

9. The fact that Natividad Camparicio affirmed that the stolen motorcycle was brought to her house at around 1:15 in
the morning of July 1, 1995 by her nephew, Rey Villatima together with the latter’s companions and pinpointed to
accused Rene Baron as one of them (ibid, p. 9);

10. The fact that prosecution witness, Police Insp. Eduardo Berena also confirmed they were able to recover the
stolen motorcycle which was kept in the ground floor of the house of Mrs. Camparicio (TSN-Guanzon, October 2,
1997, pp. 8-15);

11. The fact that the stolen motorcycle was positively identified by witness Nemia Berallo as the same motorcycle
driven, owned and registered in the name of the victim, Juanito Berallo (TSN-Guanzon, October 2, 1997, pp. 9-10);

12. The fact that accused Rene Baron admitted during his testimony that he rode in the tricycle driven by the victim
together with the two passengers in going to Segundo Diez but reached only the area of Bangga "Doldol" where the
actual robbery and killing took place (TSN-Tan, May 11, 1999, pp. 9-12);

13. The fact that when the two hold-up men brought the driver inside the sugarcane field, accused Rene Baron who
was left on the road outside the sugarcane field (ibid, p. 11) did nothing and instead of escaping and seeking help,
accused Rene Baron leisurely stayed in the tricycle as if everything [was] normal and nothing [happened], thus
indicating that he (Baron) [was] in conspiracy to rob and kill the victim since as the facts are depicted x x x Rene
Baron would clearly appear that he (Baron) acted as a "look out" while the two companions were killing the victim and
to make matters worse, he (Baron) even went along with the two other accused up to Oringao, Kabankalan City
where they hid the stolen motorcycle (ibid, pp. 12-13);

14. The fact that the accused Baron was left unharmed by the killers of the victim in spite of the fact that he (Baron) is
a potential witness to the serious crime of Robbery with Homicide; and when they were in Oringao, ate breakfast with
them then rode a passenger jeep with many passengers; alighted in Kabankalan proper from Barangay Oringao;
stood and waited in a public place at the Ceres Bus Terminal; rode a public transportation bus to Bacolod City for
three (3) hours then alighted in Libertad Street in Bacolod City; and again rode a passenger jeepney going to a place
known as "Shopping" to take another passenger bus in going back to Cadiz City (ibid, pp. 21-30). 1avv ph!1
From [this] series of proven circumstantial evidence, the inescapable and natural conclusion is the three accused
were in conspiracy with one another to kill the victim and cart away the motorcycle as the combination of these
numerous circumstantial evidence [is] enough to produce the strong moral certainty from an unbiased and
[unprejudiced] mind to safely conclude that no other persons but the three accused conspired to perpetrate the crime
as clearly the series of events indubitably [shows] that there was unity of purpose, concurrence of will, and that they
all acted in concert towards the same end, the accused being together with a group when they rode the tricycle of the
victim; all of them were together at the scene of the crime, they all rode in the same stolen motorcycle going to
Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan City; all of them were together in hiding the stolen motorcycle in the house of
Natividad Camparicio; and they were together as a group going to Cadiz City from Kabankalan City passing [through]
and stopping [at] various cities and municipalities.10

The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all
those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing.11 There was no
evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts
individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the
"act of one is the act of all," the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the
appellant and his co-accused are one and the same.12

The appellant’s attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury fails to impress. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must
establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of
an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.13 A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.14

We find nothing in the records to substantiate appellant’s insistence that he was under duress from his co-accused in
participating in the crime. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Villatima and Bargo dragged the victim towards the
sugarcane field and left the appellant inside the tricycle that was parked by the roadside. While all alone, he had
every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. Surprisingly, he
opted to wait for his co-accused to return and even rode with them to Kabankalan, Negros Occidental to hide the
victim’s motorcycle in the house of Villatima’s aunt.

The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more than 10 hours and
passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape or at least request for assistance from
the people around him.

Robbery with Homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under paragraph 1,
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. We find that the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance
of treachery, which exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make.15 The evidence points that one of the co-conspirators
tied the hands of the victim before dragging him to the sugarcane field.16 Thus, he was unable to defend and protect
himself against his malefactors who were superior in number and armed with knives and guns.

As thoroughly discussed in People v. Escote, Jr.,17 treachery is not a qualifying circumstance but "a generic
aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and
a single and indivisible crime".18 Corollarily, "Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in
diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However,
aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law or which are
included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the
purpose of increasing the penalty".19 In the case at bar, "treachery is not an element of robbery with
homicide".20Neither is it "inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide".21 As such, treachery may be properly
considered in increasing the penalty for crime.

In this case, the presence of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance would have merited the imposition of
the death penalty. However, in view of the subsequent passage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," we are mandated to impose on the appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.22

In line with current jurisprudence, if the death penalty would have been imposed if not for the proscription in RA 9346,
the civil indemnity for the victim shall be ₱75,000.00.23 As compensatory damages, the award of ₱2,400.00 for the
burial lot of the victim must be deleted since this expense was not supported by receipts.24 However, the heirs are
entitled to an award of temperate damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00.25 The existence of one aggravating
circumstance merits the award of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the award of
exemplary damages is proper. However, it must be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.26 Moral damages
must also be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.27 Moreover, the appellant is ordered to return the stolen
items that were not recovered. Should this no longer be possible, there must be restitution in the total amount of
₱5,050.00 representing the cash contained in the victim’s wallet, as well as the value of the wrist watch, the ring, the
motorcycle and sidecar taken by the appellant and his co-accused.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00638 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Actual
damages is DELETED, and in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00. The appellant is also ordered to return the cash of ₱5,050.00 taken from the victim’s wallet and the other
pieces of personal property also taken but not recovered, more particularly his wrist watch, ring, his Kawasaki HDX
motorcycle and its sidecar. Should restitution be no longer possible, the appellant must pay the equivalent value of
the unreturned items.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 2011

FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable
notwithstanding his acquittal.

Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision
set aside the May 21, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-51385 and acquitted the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public document by a private individual
because the Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa through falsification of a public
document.4 However, the CA still adjudged him civilly liable.5

Factual Antecedents

In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto (spouses
Alonto),6secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in Cebu
City.7 Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of
Absolute Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the
spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public.8 Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name
and sold the lots to third persons.

On August 12, 1999,9 an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and with intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a
public document consisting of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803 square meters executed
before Notary Public Gines N. Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987 of the latter’s
Notarial Register showing that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto sold their parcel of land located at Pardo,
Cebu City, for a consideration of ₱130,000.00 in favor of accused by imitating, counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to
be imitated or counterfeited the signature[s] of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto above their typewritten
names in said document as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact as the accused very well knew that spouses Saapia
B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto did not sell their aforestated descri[b]ed property and that the signature[s] appearing in
said document are not their signature[s], thus causing it to appear that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto
participated in the execution of said document when they did not so participate[. Once] said document was falsified,
accused did then and there cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said falsified document,
to the damage and prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto in the amount of ₱130,000.00, the value
of the land .

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".12 After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial
ensued.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for resolution was whether petitioner
committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public document.13 Based on the evidence presented by both
parties, the trial court found that petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to
pay their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the spouses Alonto actually signed; but that
the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized without the spouses Alonto personally appearing before the notary public.
From these, the trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a
private individual under Article 172(1)14 in relation to Article 171(2)15 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not estafa
through falsification of public document as charged in the Information.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felixberto Abellana GUILTY of the crime of
falsification of public document by private individuals under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences
him to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to
SIX (6)YEARS, as maximum.
He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership and possession of the real properties in
question in favor of private complainants. After private complainants shall have acquired full ownership and
possession of the aforementioned properties, they are directed to pay the accused the sum of ₱130,000.00 [with]
legal interest thereon reckoned from the time this case was instituted.

Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession in favor of the private complainants [of] the real
properties in question within a period of six (6) months from the time this decision becomes final and executory, he is
directed to pay said complainants the sum of ₱1,103,000.00 representing the total value of the properties of the
private complainants.

He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the following:

1. ₱15,000.00 for nominal damages;

2. ₱20,000.00 for attorney’s fees;

3. ₱50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;

4. ₱30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;

plus the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.16

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of the crime charged may
nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not specifically charged and alleged and which is not
necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The CA, in its Decision dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the
negative.17 It held that petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of public
document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private
Individual under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the falsification committed in Article
171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs
when the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact
such person did not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged
in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.18 Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial court’s
finding with respect to petitioner’s civil liability. The dispositive portion of the CA’s February 22, 2006 Decision reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside the Decision dated May 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only insofar as it found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is
different from that charged in the Information. The civil liability determinations are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated August 15, 2006.

Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the lone issue of
whether he could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court and the CA.
Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.20 In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist.21 When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action.22 In other
words, the "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist."23

Here, the CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense different from or not
included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of
public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did
not personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of
falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioner’s conviction cannot be sustained because it
infringed on his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.24 The CA, however, found
no reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.25

We do not agree.

In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,26 we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the
same be punishable by law. x x x

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts
he committed had caused damage to the spouses.

Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any
damage to spouses Alonto.

First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses Alonto affixed their
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor.
However, after the presentation of the parties’ respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without
basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged.

Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary public for the
notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties’
transaction.27 Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the
statements contained in the deed. "To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing
evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the
deed must be upheld."28 And since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of
said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones
under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto. 1av vphi1
Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the
recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages. First, it has
absolutely no basis in view of the trial court’s finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of
Absolute Sale are genuine and not forged. Second, "[s]entences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in
the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative."29 While a judge has the discretion of imposing
one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative.30 "He must fix positively and with certainty the
particular penalty."31

In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial court and the CA to hold petitioner
civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them
₱1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties and to pay them nominal damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are AFFIRMED insofar as they set aside the conviction of the
petitioner for the crime of falsification of public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities
on the petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, the payment of ₱1,103,000.00 representing the
value of the property, and the payment of nominal and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173089 August 25, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biliran Province,
Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
the State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June 7, 2006 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP
No. 01289, which dismissed outright its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.

From the records, it appears that on October 7, 2002, at 12:30 o’clock in the morning, respondent Jaime
Abordo (Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by private complainants Kennard
Majait (Majait),Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose Montes (Montes). An altercation ensued between them. Abordo
shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.

Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and N-2213 and one (1)
count of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N-2211 before the Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch
16 (RTC). The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,2 the
RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with
regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the
complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted.

All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to
include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both
the civil and the criminal aspects. For said reason, Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration
and its supplement.

On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majait’s motion for reconsideration while Calvez’s motion to withdraw
was granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed Calvez’ appeal for not bearing the conformity of the
Provincial Prosecutor.

Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno’s Indorsement3 of the October 11, 2005 letter4 of Assistant City
Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the CA based on the following grounds:

GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCE


OF THE PETITION
(Petition for Certiorari before the CA)

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD NO INTENT TO KILL, IN HOLDING HIM GUILTY
OF ONLY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES INSTEAD OF
FRUSTRATED MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. N-2211 AND N-2212,
RESPECTIVELY, AND IN ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. N-2213.

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING FOUR (4) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.5

The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the
petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of
lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorariplaced
the accused in double jeopardy. Specifically, the CA wrote:

x x x. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact – a
mistake of judgment – appeal is the remedy. In view of the improper action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant
petition should be dismissed.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In the instant petition, the Solicitor
General, representing the People of the Philippines is assailing the judgment of the public respondent in finding the
accused guilty of lesser crimes tha[n] the ones with which he was charged and of acquitting him in another. It
appears to us that the Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private complainant Calvez when it
questioned the dismissal of the latter’s Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with respect to the civil aspect of the
case. Although the Solicitor General is allowed to file an appeal under such rule; however, we must point out that in
filing this petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount
to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules
of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.
We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal
or to increase the penalty imposed in a conviction because it would place him in double jeopardy. Hence, this
petition is dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of
judgment but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.6 [emphases and
underscoring supplied]

Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 presenting the following:

GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SEEKING TO ANNUL THE JOINT JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON.
ENRIQUE C. ASIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN, BRANCH 16 IN CRIM.
CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213 WHICH WAS CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THEREBY AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
PLAINLY ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN PROVINCE, BRANCH 16, IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213.7

On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were ordered to submit their respective
memoranda. The parties complied with the order.

We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial
court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of
acquittal is final and unappealable.8 The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases,9 the Court has
entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.
Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,10 the Court has held:

Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing
by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgmentbut also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process,
thus rendering the assailed judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In People v. Laguio, Jr.,11 where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer to evidence, We
pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus:

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s
demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being
considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by
an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is
not violated. [Emphases supplied]

In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordo’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper. Since appeal
1âwphi 1

could not be taken without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was
correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious
error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.

As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition for certiorari were not at all
discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the CA.

A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings.
The OSG’s petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would
be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would
only prolong the disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. "On many occasions, the Court, in the interest of
public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits, instead of
remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the
case."12

The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice."13 The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,14 presents an
instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of
law. "The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion
was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy."15

A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show that the prosecution was
deprived of its right to due process. Primarily, the OSG petition does not mention or even hint that there was a
curtailment of its right. Unlike in Galman, the prosecution in this case was never denied its day in court. Both the
prosecution and the defense were able to present their respective evidence, testimonial and documentary. Both
parties had their opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and scrutinize every piece of evidence. Thereafter, the trial
court exercising its discretion evaluated the evidence before it and rendered its decision. Certainly, there was no
mistrial.

The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a recalibration of the factual
findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of Abordo and
his witnesses. It wrote:

In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private complainants, respondent judge thus accorded full faith
and credit to the testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses Julito Bernadas and Melquiades Palconit. His
findings, however, are contrary to law and the evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16

It further pointed out that the CA "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion."17 Subsequently, in its memorandum, it merely reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in
appreciating and assessing the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a review of
the trial court’s judgment which it claimed to be erroneous.

The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been appreciated by the trial court in its favor and
against Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to kill on his part.
What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating
Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari
cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a
Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave
abuse of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona,18 it was written:

Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the decision of
public respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the former abused her discretion in disregarding the
testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower
court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public respondent that she
considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have
improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the
evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of
evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not
be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public
respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie. [Emphasis supplied]

Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the
ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition
for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the
petition for certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the same for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
BARTOLOME TAMPUS1 and IDA MONTESCLAROS, Defendants.
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

On appeal is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the
commission of rape.

The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Tampus
(Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC4 on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No.
013325-L charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m.
The Information5 in each case reads as follows:

CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L6

That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bartolome Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep
slumber due to drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic]
the latter, who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida
Montesclaros who gave permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape [ABC].

CONTRARY TO LAW.

CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L7

That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,8 at about 1:00 o’clock [sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] [ABC],
who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida
worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to
rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that
she was in the house with Ida and Tampus9 who were both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink
beer10 and after consuming three and one-half (3 ½) glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy.11While
ABC was lying on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to
"remedyo"12 or have sexual intercourse with her.13 Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as
he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell
asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees.
She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short pants were
stained with blood which was coming from her vagina.14 When her mother arrived home from work the following
morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.15

ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her mother was at work at
the beer house.16 Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual
assault to anyone.17 He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again
threatened to kill her if she shouted.18 He undressed himself, spread ABC’s legs, put saliva on his right hand and he
applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis into ABC’s vagina and made a push and pull movement.19After
consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again
ignored her.20

On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie).
She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her.21 ABC, together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic
enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police. On May 9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the
Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical
examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal Report.22 Dr. Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC
revealed a deep healed laceration at the seven (7) o’clock position and a shallow healed laceration at the one (1)
o’clock position on ABC’s hymen.

On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by having
carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She
declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus to rape
her. And again, she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a wooden club by Tampus, who then
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, against her will.

Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the house to go to
the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually
go to the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.23 He denied forcing ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to
allow him to have sexual intercourse with ABC.24 Appellant Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer house
at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the following day.25 She said that she always brought
her daughter to the beer house with her and there was never an instance when she left her daughter alone in the
house.26 She denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission to
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC.27

Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod Headquarters
between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 199528 and that his actual duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m.
of April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for
duty at the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook.
However, on cross-examination, Berdin could not tell whether the signature appearing on the logbook really
belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April
2, 1995 is different from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995.29 It was also revealed that the house of Tampus
is just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the barangay tanod outpost and that the barangay tanod on
duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or without permission.30

Agustos B. Costas, M.D.31 (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification,32 which showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and
was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.

The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal
Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court
appreciated in Ida’s favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power
without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.33 The
dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision states, viz.:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused Bartolome Tampus GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as principals [sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and
Criminal Case No. 013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the
aforementioned cases.

The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an accomplice in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal.

Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of
P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 34

Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November 16, 200035 and his
appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court.36 Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only
with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial court’s
decision with modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida
failed to prove that she was completely deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report
and the testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness
of her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of
rape and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay
moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of
twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 25,000.00).37

We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.

The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of the principal
accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that
the testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida
as an accomplice in the same criminal case.

The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn said
findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.38 The rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.39

The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC and has given full faith and credence to her
testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that the rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape,
implicate her own mother in such a vile act, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public
trial if she has not been a victim of rape and was impelled to seek justice for the defilement of her person.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full credit.40

Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her will on April 1,
1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although
ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement was committed by Tampus, circumstantial
evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.41 In
cases like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired before and after the victim lost
consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.42

The trial court correctly determined, thus:

The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal knowledge of
[ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
that is, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.

xxxx
The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus’ defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in effect against
the positive evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her [on] two occasions.

xxxx

It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see Tampus lie down with her. What she saw was the
aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up. Nevertheless, the Court has taken note of the following circumstances:
(1) The drinking session where the complainant was forced to drink beer by both accused; (2) The conversation
between the two accused when accused Tampus requested accused Ida Montesclaros, and was granted by the
latter, permission to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the complainant were
the only persons left in the house when Ida Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the request of Tampus; (4)
The bloodstained pants, the pain and blood in complainant’s vagina and the pain in her head, groin and buttocks; (5)
The threat made by accused Tampus on the complainant in the dawn of April 4, 1995 that he would kill her if she
would tell about the previous incident on April 1, 1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that immediately ensued.
These circumstances form a chain that points to accused Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal
knowledge of [ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated condition. 43

After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then determined the guilt of Ida. Although Ida was
charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as an accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing
or intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the request of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have
sexual intercourse with ABC did not prove their conspiracy.44 Hence, it held that, "[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros
participated in the commission of the crime by previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not
that of a principal. She is liable as an accomplice."45

In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow her daughter to be raped.
She maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC alone in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed
appellant Ida’s appeal as it also gave credence to the testimony of ABC.

In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE CRIMES OF RAPE
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF RAPE
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 46

We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.

Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The following requisites must be proved in order that a
person can be considered an accomplice:

(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose;

(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.48

The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act
of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus’ request for him to have sexual
intercourse with ABC. Ida’s acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. 1avv phi 1

During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she testified that:

Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?

A No, sir.

Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you first drank beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?

A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.49

xxxx

Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not been used to drinking beer and then,
why suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that time?

A No, sir.

Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer"?

A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.

Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?

A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.

Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?

A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening to maltreat you if you would not
drink that beer?

A Not yet.

Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not drink that beer that she proposed
for you to drink?

A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.

Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to you?

A Yes, sir.50

xxxx

Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house and you overheard Bartolome
asking or proposing to your mother that he would have sexual intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan
dialect "remedyo", Bartolome would want to have a "remedyo" with you. When [sic], particular moment did you
allegedly hear this statement, while you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking beer?

A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting.51

xxxx

Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it was you who was being referred by
Bartolome Tampus when he said to your mother in the Visayan dialect that "gusto siya moremedyo nimo", he wants
to have sexual intercourse with you?

A Yes, sir, but I don’t know the meaning of "remedyo".

Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of "remedyo"?

A Not yet, sir.52

xxxx

Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word "remedyo"?

A Yes, sir53

xxxx

Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not
also bother to tell her of what you suspected that something serious or bad had happened to you in the previous
day?

A Because she already knew, sir.

Q How did you know that she already knew?


A Because I heard her telling Omeng,54 "After you have sexual intercourse with her, leave her immediately!"55

xxxx

Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, "remedyo", when your mother arrived in the
morning of April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother, did you not tell her that, "Is this what you mean by
"remedyo", as what you had agreed with Bartolome Tampus that he would do something to my genitals?

A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.56

All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of
ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had
knowledge of and assented to Tampus’ intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to
drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with
her express consent to Tampus’ plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.

It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the
commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence
shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because
it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to
have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Ida’s consent.

The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They both forced ABC to drink
beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave
her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.

Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice

We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of illness as
would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.

Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months before the incident, from
November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence at
the time of the incident; but, she may have poor judgment. On Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor
Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:

Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional, would you say that the patient [sic]
totally deprived of intelligence or reason?

A Not totally.

Q She will be conscious of her acts?

A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.

Q And there will be loss of intelligence?

A There could be.


Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission of the crime of rape for having
given her daughter to be sexually abused by her co-accused, allegedly convinced by her co-accused on the first day
of April, 1995. Now, if she was then under treatment, Doctor, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, would
you say, Doctor, that having taken this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after January 12, 1995,
she must have acted with discernment?

A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment, and even without any medication,
it may be what we called spontaneous, really it will get back.

Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]

A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.

Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a person is totally deprived of
intelligence, he has still discernment, she is unconscious of her act, she or he may be exempted from any criminal
liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal opinion for the purpose of this proceedings she may be acting with
discernment and with certain degree of intelligence?

A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I think there is a motive, she wants to
gain financial or material things from the daughter if no material gain, then perhaps it was borne out of her illness.
This is my opinion.57

xxxx

Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]

A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between right or wrong.

Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her ailment?

A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother alleged that the sickness could be
more than one year duration, it is in acute stage because she was allegedly destroying everything in the house
according to the mother, so she was in acute stage.58

On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:

Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her sense of judgment?

A I think, so.

Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient lost contact with reality?

A Yes, that is possible.

Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged accusation against her is true, being an
expert on scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable Court as a mother, who would allegedly do such an offense to
her daughter, is it still in her sound mind or proper mental sane [sic]?

A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to gain some material things, if not, it
is because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be rubbished by another person, then there
must be something wrong?

A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.

A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.59

We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the
exercise of the willpower of the accused.60 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was
diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on
the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to
the incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the
exercise of her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.

We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years old at the time
of the incident—could have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased the
imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:

ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties. —

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim;

xxxx

Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the victim’s parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order for them to
serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.61

In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as
the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not
refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the
penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect
following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage,62 every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the
penalty.63Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not state that Ida is the mother
of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted
as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act
No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into
law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.

Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant


The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to indemnify the
offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L."64 The Court of Appeals, however, did
not award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and
proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of
rape. This is distinct from moral damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.65

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. 66 However, Tampus’ civil indemnity ex delicto has
been extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.67 Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.

It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have different
degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a
crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though all the persons
who took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an
accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or accessory.

The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his participation in
the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed
upon the principal in a consummated felony.68 The accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree than
that prescribed by the law for the crime committed69 and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two
degrees.70However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. 71 Apart from the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by
his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.

Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liability—in which the
Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and
accessory—the share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts
have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and
accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment.

Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the
courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the respective
liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily
liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in
solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable."72

As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions dealing with this
matter have been grossly inconsistent.

In People v. Galapin,73 People v. Continente,74 United States v. Lasada,75 People v. Mobe,76 People v. Irinea,77People
v. Rillorta,78 People v. Cagalingan,79 People v. Villanueva,80 People v. Magno,81 People v. del Rosario,82People v.
Yrat,83 People v. Saul,84 and People v. Tamayo,85 the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay jointly and
severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,86 the accomplice was
ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity imposed by the trial court, while the principal was liable for the
other half. In People v. Toring,87 the principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and severally liable
for the entire amount of the civil indemnity.

In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal shares of the civil indemnity.
This makes the accomplice who had less participation in the commission of the crime equally liable with the principal
for the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the crime was not taken into account in the apportionment
of the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the principle behind the treble division of persons criminally
responsible for felonies, i.e., that the liability must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the accused in
the crime committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the execution of the offense but
whose participation is not indispensable to the commission of the crime is made to pay the same amount of civil
indemnity as the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act. It is an
injustice when the penalty and liability imposed are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for
criminal responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should be liable only for the acts
actually committed by him.88 The proportion of this individual liability must be graduated not only according to the
nature of the crime committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the degree and nature of participation of
the individual offender.

In Garces v. People,89 People v. Flores,90 People v. Barbosa,91 People v. Ragundiaz,92 People v. Bato,93 and People
v. Garalde,94 the accomplice was held to be solidarily liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the amount
adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the civil indemnity ex
delicto but was made to pay the moral damages of P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz,
Bato, and Garalde, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the combined amounts of the civil indemnity ex
delicto and moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the principal for half of
the actual damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the principal for half of the
exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.

In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the principal for only half of the amount of
the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes of the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the
offended party. When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by
whom payment has been made shall have a right of action against the other persons liable for the amount of their
respective shares.95 As against each other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share
that corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made.96 In these cases, therefore, payment is made
by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made the payment to the victim could demand payment of the
part of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the principal paid the victim the entire amount of the
civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and
damages. The principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total amount of civil indemnity and he was
solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half. Since the principal paid for the half which the accomplice is
solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would have
become ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while the
accomplice would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.

In People v. Cortes,97 People v. Budol,98 People v. Nulla,99 and People v. Madali,100 the principal was ordered to pay
twice the share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity. In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts for
which the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable for. The principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the
accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited
above where the principal and accomplice were held solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity or
half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for which each shall respond. This is consistent with
Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, which require that the courts should determine the amount for
which the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond to and upon specifying this amount, the principals
are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves for their
quota and the accessories are solidarily liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its
respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other classes, which shall be enforced first against
the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories.101

There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the amount that the accomplice is
liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,102 the civil liability of P6,000.00 was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was
primarily liable for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable in solidum among themselves for the other
half of the indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-
eighth (1/8) of the entire amount of civil indemnity, which is P750.00.

Similarly in People v. Bantagan,103 the principal was required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices should be jointly and severally liable. The three
accomplices were jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in case of their insolvency the principal was
secondarily liable for such amount.

In People v. Castillo,104 the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil indemnity, while
the principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths (3/4).

In People v. Cariaga,105 the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the heirs of the victim amounted to
P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil
indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay the rest of the indemnity and damages amounting to
P500,000.00.

The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares of the civil indemnity and
damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory is determined. Though the responsibility to decide the
respective shares of persons liable for a felony is left to the courts, this does not mean that this amount can be
decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual,
legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation and caprice.

The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among
the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act. Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the
opinion that there are no fixed rules which are applicable in all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil
liability among two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, either because there are different degrees of culpability
of offenders, or because of the inequality of their financial capabilities.106 On this note, he states in his commentaries
on the 1870 Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the determination of the amount of respective liabilities to
the discretion of the courts.107 The courts have the competence to determine the exact participation of the principal,
accomplice, and accessory in the commission of the crime relative to the other classes because they are able to
directly consider the evidence presented and the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.

We must stress, however, that the courts’ discretion should not be untrammelled and must be guided by the principle
behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the crime. The person with greater
participation in the commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a
minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each
principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and
each accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory. Care should also be taken in
considering the number of principals versus that of accomplices and accessories. If for instance, there are four
principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot
assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even
though the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3)
of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the civil liability of every person is
computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because the two-
thirds (2/3) share of the principals—or P4,000.00—is still divided among all the four principals, and thus every
principal is liable for only P1,000.00.

In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of
the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not
take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the
accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped
ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of
criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the
apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members of such class are solidarily
liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The
Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court
in the case at bar.lavvphi1

Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus,
should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida
should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at
P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida
is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for
P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and
moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court
of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before the final
judgment.108 His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because
Tampus’ share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of
this decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However,
since Tampus’ civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Ida’s subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also
eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus’ obligation to pay P66,666.67 —
his quota of the civil indemnity — is the principal obligation, for which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the
extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus,
the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.

On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court of
Appeals.

In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.109 Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication
of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct.110 Exemplary damages may be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in
the information and proved during the trial.111

In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority of
the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of
rape, the presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since the
relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the Information.112 The minority of the rape
victim and her relationship with the offender must both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in
order to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance.113 While the information in the instant case
alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the
relationship between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not
warranted.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of
rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand,
six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen
thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is
DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

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