PIANDIONG ET AL V.

THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On 7 November 1994, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were convicted of robbery with
homicide and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The Supreme
Court denied the appeal, and confirmed both conviction and sentence by judgement of 19 February
1997. Further motions for reconsideration were denied on 3 March 1998.
The Communication:
Piandiong et al complains that the death sentence was wrongly imposed, because the
judge considered that an aggravating circumstance existed, as the crime was committed by more
than three armed persons. According to counsel, however, this was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
They further claim that they were hit in the stomach in order to make them confess.
They further state that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses deserved no credence, because
the eyewitnesses were close friends of the deceased and their description of the perpetrators did
not coincide with the way Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan actually looked. Counsel also states
that the judge erred when he did not give credence to the alibi defence.
They further complain that the death penalty was unconstitutional and should not have
been imposed for anything but the most heinous crime.

The Committee’s View:

The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that it is generally for the courts of States parties,
and not for the Committee, to evaluate the facts and evidence in a particular case. This rule also
applies to questions as to the lawfulness and credibility of an identification. Furthermore, the
Court of Appeal, in addressing the argument about the irregularity of the line-up identification,
held that the identification of the accused at the trial had been based on in-court identification by
the witnesses and that the line-up identification had been irrelevant. In these circumstances, the
Committee finds there is no basis for holding that the in-court identification of the accused was
incompatible with their rights under article 14 of the Covenant.
The Committee reiterates that it is for the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee,
to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, and to interpret the relevant domestic
legislation. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that the facts before it do not reveal a violation
of the Covenant in this respect.
It is not for the Committee to examine issues of constitutionality, the substance of the
claim appears to raise important questions relating to the imposition of the death penalty to
Piandiong et al namely whether or not the crime for which they were convicted was a most serious
crime as stipulated by article 6(2), and whether the re-introduction of the death penalty in the
Philippines is in compliance with the State party's obligations under article 6(1) (2) and (6) of the
Covenant. In the instant case, however, the Committee is not in a position to address these issues,
since neither counsel nor the State party has made submissions in this respect.
The Committee reiterates its conclusion that the State committed a grave breach of its obligations
under the Protocol by putting the alleged victims to death before the Committee had concluded
its consideration of the communication.

PBM Employees Asso. v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

Facts: Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass demonstration in protest for
the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke that the demonstration is a violation of their CBA
agreement however petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable assembly to seek redress
of their grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer. Respondent
dismissed the petitioners and the court sustained their demonstration is one of bargaining in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the petitioners.

Held: The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and
of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. The obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm was for their mutual aid and protection against
alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage
in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. Apart from violating
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of
grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured
by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.

Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994
Facts :

Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case" on
vendors of North EDSA.
Constitutional Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.
Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall
within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights".
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the
government.

Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8
herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their
plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again
been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do
so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Facts: EPZA purchased land from Filoil Refinery Corp. and before petitioner could take possession of lands,
several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from
EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and
signed quitclaims, amongst them private respondents(Valles, Aledia). Ten years later, private respondents filed
in the CHR complaints for violation of Human Rights. CHR issued an injunction commanding EPZA to desist from
committing such acts. EPZA filed in SC this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Does CHR have the authority to issue an injuction order?

Ruling: CHR does not have the authority to issue an injunction order. It is limited only to investigation and not to
try and resolve merits. The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction by Commission of Human Rights are
annulled and set aside.

BALDOZA vs. DIMAANO

A.M. No. 1120-MJ . May 5, 1976
FACTS:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal,
Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of
authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket
records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the
peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court
records but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and
how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper
use or inspection of its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation is not
serious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or
promote public scandal.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report.
At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint but the motion was denied by the Investigating Judge. After formal
investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of
the docket books infringe upon the right of individuals to information.

HELD:
The only evidence the complainant has are the exchanged communication which were all in writing
and attached to the record between him and the respondent. Examination of the communications
between the complainant and the respondent, reveal that there is no showing of abuse of
authority on the part of the respondent. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and
view the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions and under his control and supervision.
The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent
certain conditions and under his control and supervision

David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven
consolidated petitions for cetiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5
implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave
abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional
HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that "the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives". To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws", she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertinent
to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Southern Hemisphere vs Anti-Terrorism Council

FACTS:
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:
Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh
doctrines?

RULING:
No.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

Orquiola v. Tandang Sora Devt. Corp

Petitioners purchased a registered parcel of land from Mariano Lising. Subsequently,private respondent, the
registered owner of Lot 689, filed Civil Case No. Q-12918against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for
allegedly encroaching upon herlot. The trial court adjudged Pedro and Lising to pay damages, remove
allconstructions and relocate the boundaries. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibitionwith the CA to prohibit
the judge from issuing a writ of demolition and the sheriff from implementing the
alias writ of execution against their property. They claimedthat they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-
12918, hence, they would bedeprived of their property without due process of law. The CA dismissed the
petitionruling that as buyers of Mariano Lising, petitioners were privies and could bereached by the execution
order

ISSUE: Whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners
The Supreme Court granted the petition and thereby reversed and set aside theassailed decision. The Court
noted that petitioners acquired the lot before thecommencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. They could
reasonably rely on MarianoLising's certificate of title because at the time of purchase, it was still free from
anythird party claim. As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value,petitioners are proper parties in
any case involving subject property. But sinceprivate respondents failed to implead them in Civil Case No. Q-
12918, petitionerscannot be reached by the decision in said case
Orquiola v. Tandang Sora Devt. Corp

Petitioners purchased a registered parcel of land from Mariano Lising. Subsequently,private respondent, the
registered owner of Lot 689, filed Civil Case No. Q-12918against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for
allegedly encroaching upon herlot. The trial court adjudged Pedro and Lising to pay damages, remove
allconstructions and relocate the boundaries. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibitionwith the CA to prohibit
the judge from issuing a writ of demolition and the sheriff from implementing the
alias writ of execution against their property. They claimedthat they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-
12918, hence, they would bedeprived of their property without due process of law. The CA dismissed the
petitionruling that as buyers of Mariano Lising, petitioners were privies and could bereached by the execution
order

ISSUE: Whether the alias writ of e$ecution ma# be enforced against petitioners
The Supreme Court granted the petition and thereby reversed and set aside theassailed decision. The Court
noted that petitioners acquired the lot before thecommencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. They could
reasonably rely on MarianoLising's certificate of title because at the time of purchase, it was still free from
anythird party claim. As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value,petitioners are proper parties in
any case involving subject property. But sinceprivate respondents failed to implead them in Civil Case No. Q-
12918, petitionerscannot be reached by the decision in said case

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. OLALIA

FACTS:
Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
“accepting an advantage as an agent”, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A
warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms.
On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained.
On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his
extradition.
Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.
Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied by the same judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is nothing in the Constitution or
Statutory law providing a potential extradite a right to bail.

HELD:
The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.

The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due process under the Constitution.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC

Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles
of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by
P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It
was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and
saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition.
Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.

Issue:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults.
On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from
employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
Employment.

ZULUETA VS. CA

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held:

(1) No. The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

31
JUL
FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army
Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked
as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the
truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in
the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased
police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against
her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs
the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data
must be denied.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming,
diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up
Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution
incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that
the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw
the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of
the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very
act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may,
under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would
not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure
for environmental cases.

20 days – Temporary restraining order

IN RE YAMASHITA
327 U.S. 1
1946
FACTS:
Tomoyuki Yamashita, who was a commanding general of the 14th army group of
the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines and charged before an American Military Commission
with crimes against the American and Filipino people, filed a petition for habeas corpus
and prohibition against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the United States
Army Forces, Western Pacific. He alleged that after his surrender, he became a prisoner of war of
the United States of America but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement
as an accused war criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by the
respondent, Lt. Gen. Styer. The petitioner asks that he be reinstated to his former status as prisoner
of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him, upon the
following grounds: (1) that the Military Commission was not duly constituted, and therefore, it is
without jurisdiction; (2) that the Philippines cannot be considered as an occupied territory, and
the Military Commission cannot exercise jurisdiction therein; (3) that Spain, the “protecting
power” of Japan, has not been given notice of the implementing trial against petitioner, contrary
to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and therefore, the Military Commission has no jurisdiction
to try the petitioner; (4) that there is against the petitioner no charge of an offense
against the laws of war; and (5) that the rules of procedure and evidence under which the Military
Commission purports to be acting denied the petitioner a fair trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus and prohibition shall be granted.

HELD:
No. The petition was dismissed. The petition for habeas corpus sought no discharge of
petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war,
to be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases
is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.
Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against the Lt. Gen. Styer. The Military Commission
was not made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged
without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from
trying the petitioner. Furthermore, the Court held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition,
and reiterated its ruling in Raquiza v. Bradford, “an attempt of our civil courts to exercise
jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be considered
as a violation of this country’s faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and
uphold.”