282 DoH CHULĹ SHIN

o'Doľľrrr, G. zoo4. Why the ru]e of law matteĺs. |ournal of Democrađ/, $ (4): 5_:.9'
O'Loucrĺi.rN, J. et al. 1998. The diffusion ofdemo cÍacY,1946_Żoo4. Annals of the Association of
American Geographers, 88 (ą): s+s-ĺ ą.
PłnĺC., and SnlN, D. C. zoo5. Do Asian va1ues deter popular suPport for democracy? Asian cHAPTER r5
Srĺrľey (forthcoming).
Prw RessłncH Cĺ'Nĺnnzoo3. Views of a changing wor1d zoo3' http://peop1e_ press.org/

PERSPECTIVES
reports/display.php3?ReportlD:r85
PuoiINcĺoN, Á., and PIĺNo, A. zoo5. Worrisome signs, modest shifts: the zoo4 Freedom
House Survey, Journal of Democracy' (t): to3-8-

ON POLITICAL
PurNłlĺ,R., with LsoNłnpr, R., and Nĺľsrri,R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Ciuic
Traditions in Modern lĺal7. Princeton: Princeton University Press'
RBIsrNcpn, W., Mrrĺ,pn, A., HEslĺ, V.' and Młrĺtn, K. Poiitical values in Russia, Briĺis
Journal of Political Science, 45:. |83_Ż23.
Rose, R. zoor. A diveĺging Europe. |ournal ofDemocracy'Ĺ2 (r): 93-ro6'
and Mĺsĺrrn,W. r99+. Mass reaction to regime change in Eastern Europe. BriĺisŁ
BEHAVIOR IN
- ]ournal of Politicąl Scieĺce, z4: ĺ59_8z.
and Hłenľrnn, C.1998. Democracy and its alternaĺiyes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
TIME AND SPACE
\,[U}ĺp6' N., and Mlsrĺrtn, W. zoo4. Resigned acceptance of an incomplete democracy:
Russiďs political equilibrium. Post-Soĺiet Affairs, zo (3):795_Ż78'
-
and śrłlľ,D. C. zoor. Democratization backwards: the problem of third-wave democ-

- racíes. British Journal of Political Science,3l (z)'- lll_ĺs'

Rose, R., and MuNno, N. r9q9- Tensions between the democĺatic idea and reality: South
RICHARD ROSE
Korea. Ch. ĺ in Criticat Citizens: Gtobal Support for Democratic Governance, ed. P. Norris.
oťord: oŕord University Press.
Scrłppĺĺn'Ä., and Słnsľĺrro,R- uoo4. Democrats with adjectives. Afrobarometer Working
Paper No. 45.
Snrv, D- C. 1994. On the third wave of democratization: a synthesis and evaluation of recent
theory and research. World Politics, 47 Q): 96-7o- i MoDERNIZÁTIoN involves a rađicaltransformation of a socieĘ' the shift
from a
Lgg9. Mass Politics and culrure in Democratizing Korea.NewYork cambridge university i*ditionď agricultural societr to an educated industĺia] or Post-industrial society
,,
- Press. (u.l]' t9ĺą; |-="me, 1958). Třansformađon on this scale does not happen very often'
pag<, C., and Jĺľc,}. zoo5. Ássessing the shifting qualities of đemocratic citizenship:
the case of South Koĺea. Democtatization, lz (z); zoz_zz.
l and in 1ow-income or developing countries it is only starting or Partiďy achieved.
-
and Werrs, J. zoo5. Is đemocrary ttre oniy game in town? |ouĺnal of Democracy, ś(z);
, B..ause its ef[ect is pervasive' modernization Presents a chďenge to establisheđ
social,

economic, and poliĺcal institutions. The political outcome may be a democratic

88-1o1.
- a totalitarian regime, or a series of changes beťween democratic
and undemo-
Tłnnow S.1998. Power in Movement: Social Movemmts and Contentious Poliĺcs. Cambridge: regime,
CambriđgeUniversity Press. ..u.icregimes(Finer1997,L474ff.;seealsoShíďschapterinthisvolume).
Trssren, M. ,oor. islam and democracy in the Middle East. comparative Politics, 34 ():
The siudy of political behavior is tlpically concerned with individual behavior
337-54. in societies in which modem, anđabove all democratic politicď institutions are
Ton'cłr, M. zooz. Support for democracy and the "consolidation effecť' in new democracies- individuals in
taken for granted. While there are major studies of what happens to
Unpublished manuscriPt. (see e.g. Pye t96z; Inkeles 1983; Scott 1985;
Uĺrrlo NłĺroľsDnvrr-opĺĺoNĺPnocnłĺłlĺp.zooz- Human Developmeĺt Rąort zooz: modernizing or low-income societies
We1zel in this volume), and in totaiitaĺian regimes (Shlapentokh 2oo1),
the primary
DeEening Democracy in a Fragfiented W'orld. New Yoľk. oŕord UniversĘ Press'
focus is on stable modern societies. The typical method of research is conducting
a
in Latin America: Toward a Citizens' Democracy. Peru: Santillana
Publishing Co. survey that produces quantified data. Instead of inferring nationď values from the
-;oo5'-Democĺacy
Zł<ĺruł,F. zoo3. The Future of Freedom: Ihliberal Democĺacy ąt Home and Abĺoad. New York: writings of philosophers, surveys seek to identiff the content and distribution of
W. W. Norton.
* This chapter was prepared by the author as a contribution to a study of diverging pat}rs ď post-
] communist countries ai.o's. ti-" á'd spuc, financed by the British Economic &
Socia] Research Couĺĺcil

. (RIS-ooo-rz-or93).
r
i, 284 RICHARD RosE
-Y
political behavior and values within a ĺepresentative cross-section of the nationď
population. Surveys can produce more reliable evidence than compüations ofanec-
dotes and press cuttings or diary entries. Using survey data avoids the ecological
fallary of drawing inferences about individuals from aggregate data, such as election
ĺesults, oĺ from such reified terms as national history and trađitions(Robinson 195o).
Even though the t1pical potitical behavioĺ article focuses on a sing1e country at a
single point in time, it is often presented within a universalistic framework outside
time and space. Among modern political scientists' Aaron Wi]davsĘ was especially
distinctive in emphasizing universal concerns within narrow confines of time and
space; for example, Implementation, a study of a singie probiem in the city in which
he lived, immediately attracteđworldwide attention because impiementatíon is a
universal problem of governance (see Pressman and WildavsĘ 1973; Rose 1995).
Howeveł a survey about a single country at a singie point in time has something in
common with descriptive reports: there are no logical grounds for geneĺalizing
findings across time and space.
Robust conclusions about politica] behavior can only be arĺived at ifthey are tested
in different temporal contexts and across national boundaries in ordeĺ to determine
under what circumstances and to what extent the findings from a single-country study
aľe generalizable. Even if a national survey is designed to test a generai theory, the
results are country specific; any claim to be general or universal is speculative ratheĺ
than substantiated. To Ęect the influence of time and institutions is to commit the
individualist fallary of "deriving conclusions about a higher level ofaggregation from
data on individuals" (Reisinger L995, 339; for a firll discussion of the term, see
Scheuch 1966).
In reflecting on the chapters in this section, I wili argue that political behavior does
not exist among isolated individuals; it occurs within a three-dimensional space. It is
a function of when and where it occurs as weil as who is involved. To understand
under what circumstances and to what extent differences in nationď institutions and
history are significant, time and space must be incorporated as variables in the
analysis.
Indivi.dual behavior: (f) country, historical time, indiyiduąI attributes + error term
Each of these terms can be expanded greatly, just as individuals differ in many
attributes so countries differ in their political institutions and in ttle timing
of modernization. However, one ť}?e of influence cannot substitute for another.
\Mhereas national institutions and temporal influences are given at the time of a
single national survey, candidates and parties vary from one election to the next, and
even more between democratic and undemocratic political systems. Moreover, the
political institutions and state boundaries ofmost European countries have varied at
least once and often more than that in the past century. Ignoring the influence of
time and space misieadingly assigns to the error term influences that have-been left
out by a researcher on practical grounds (lack ofmultinational data) or through lack
ofawareness ofhistorical context. Bringing society back in turns time and space from
constants to variables.
pERspEcrlvEs oN PoLITIcAL BEHAvToR z'85
r \MIĺEN: TrľĺEMłľľEns
Wen ĺesearch is done affects ľesults, because historicď time is a conte(, not a
constant (Pierson 2oo4). The events ofone year are not like another; the conjunction
of circumstances can vary from one election to the next; and the sequence of events
can either make behavior path dependent or aiter what individuals do before and
afteĺ a given point in time. To conduct a time-series analysis as if it did not make any
difference whether time was 19oo, 1950' oÍ 2ooo is to show a blithe disregard for the
way in which individuals, institutions, and societies change their behavior when the
historical context changes (cf. Robinson r9z9).
r.r Timeless Behavior?
Political behavior research tends to be conducted in the historical present: results
from one year aĺe interchanged with another as ifthey are timeless in theiĺ reievance.
For example, the classic and still cited stĺđyof The American Voter dĺew its empirical
evidence from the relativĄ placid election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as Plesident in
95z aĺd rgĺ6 (CamPbell et al. 196o). Yet a lot has happened in American politics in
the half-century since.
Theories of politicď socialization supPort a timeless approach insofar as they
emphasize the stabitity ofindividuai attitudes and behavior. Individuals begin devel-
oping attitudes and politicď awareness in childhood, and what is leamed in youth can
influence adult behavioĺ and how new experiences are evaluated, reinforcing what was
learned earlier. Thus, an individual's political behavior is expected to be ĺelativeĘ stable
through his or her lifetime. In addition, attitudes and behavior can Persist from one
generation to the next insofar as youths acquire a Pafty identification from their
parents (Butler anđStokes r97o). Theories ofpath dependence postulate that attitudes
and behavioľ persist because the costs in time, money' or emotions are gÍeater than the
immediatĄ perceived benefits of changing behavior and beliefs (Sewell 1996). Such
theories can be invoked to explain the "freezing'' of party ďegiances (Lipset and
Rokkan 1967). The stability of individuat behavioĺ can also characterize political
institutions. David Eastoďs (rg6s) seminal study postulated a regime in a steady-
state equilibľium due to a feedback process relating t}le inputs of citizens, the outPuts
of governors, and the response that citizens made to government's ouęuts. In this way,
democracies are expected to be "stable" or "consolidated."
Insofar as intergenerational political socialization and path dependence create a
steady-state political equilibrium, then the timing of a piece of research may make
little đifference. However, a steady-state equilibrium is an ideai-t1pe tendency, the
mean around which fluctuations occur. In the words of Pelton Young:
Equilibrium can be understood only within a d1ĺramic framework that explains how it comes
about (ifin fact it does). Neoclassical economics describes the way the world looics once the
 286 RICHÁRD RosE Y PERsPEcTivEs oN PoLtT]cAL BEHAvIoR Ż87

dust has settled; we are interested in how it goes about settling. This is not
an idle issue, since
the business ofsettiing may have considerable beaĺing on how things look saw it as a process of"creative destruction," in which one type ofeconomy succeeded
afterwards- More
imp-ortant, we need to recognrTe the dust ..u". .""rly does settrelit anotheĹ a process that occurred with the passage of time. As Schumpeter emphasized
keeps moving about
buffeted by random currents ofair. (1988, r33) (rg+6: r), "No decade in the history of politics, religion, technology, painting, poetry
and what not ever contđnsits own explanation.'' He then added that, in order to
The relativĄ small fluctuations of a steady-state equilibrium will sooner
or lateĺ be understand the impact of modernization and what has since become describeđas
punctuated by political events that challenge individuals and political
elites to alter post-modernization, "You must survey a period of much wider span. Not to do so is
their behavior (Baumgartner and )ones rp9:). The resurt can be a
dynamic reform, in the hďlmark of dilettantism.''
which the political system is intact but a major element is altered. ŕor
example, New in long-established democracies it is necessary to understand the pre-survey-data
Zea7aĺd's shift from a fust-past-the-post to a mixed-member proportional
..pr.r.rr- past in order to understand the evolution of political behavior. Through caĺeful
tation system compelled individua]s to vote đifferentlybecause the
ba]Iot its.r -u. ĺeliance on ecological analysis ofaggregate data and records showing how individuals
changed. When elite initiatives cause parties to be laurrched, bľeak
up, or merge, this voted before the ballot became secret, Watd (lq8r) aĺal1zed the impact of religion on
creates a "floating'' party system that offeĺs the opportunĘ o.
.u"r, fo..., vo-ters to English voting from the late nineteenth centuĺy onwards. An a]ternative is to deflne a
change their behavior. similarly, no sooner had Butler and stokes published
their long-term research issue in a manner that can appropriately be tested with aggregate
tribute to the British two-parĘ system than political events disrupteá
th" corrr.*u- data, for example, Bartolini and Mair's (r99o) study of the stabilization of European
tive-Labour duopoly. when the dust settled, there was a three-party system.
However, electorates through a century ofupheavals fĺom 1885 onwards. It is also the only way
the punctuation of an equilibrium may be fo[owed by a return to
the status quo ante. to come to grips with important twentieth-century issues such as "Who Voted for
In the United States, third-party candidates for the presidenry intermittently
álailenge Hitleĺ?'' (see e.g. Falter r99r).
the duopoly of Democrats and Republicanr, oJy to be folowed by a
return to The passage of time can itself be an influďlce on politicai behavior' While an
competiđonbetween the same two parties as before.
upp"..rrtly stable regime can disappear ul-os{ ou.. ĺgľ't,tt'" consolidation of a
A change in political regime does not cha[enge institutions but disrupts rhem. regime takes time. When a regime is new, individual decisions about whether to
whether the change is from a democratic to an authoritarian regime
or in'the other support it can only be based on hopes of the future or Ęection or commitment to
direction, this forces individuals to relearn norms of politicalĺehavior.
Since the the old regime. With the passage of time, people gain experience of the new regime'
disruption of regimes in Germany and in Spain occurred after the introduction
of After a decade, people can decide whether to suPPort a new regime (assuming it has
suryey reseaÍch' there are survey-based studies showing how individuals
adapted to a nei^/ regime (Linz 1959; Baker, Darton, and Hildebrandt
have suľvived that long), on the basis of its performance rather than prospeđiveor
r98r; Noeile- retrospective judgments.
Neumann 1995; for Spain, Gunther, Sani, and Shabad r9g8, McDonough,
Barnes, and The Soviet Union was transformed into the Russian Federation at the end of r99r.
Lopez-Piĺa 1988). The study of modernization in the chapteľs in thiš part pr.r.,*.
A decade and one-haifafterwards is long enough for a new regime to develop positive
that behavior is not timeless oĺ unchanging.
support-if its perťormance and values are evĄrated positivĄ by its subjects. With
the passage of time the force of political inertia could wear down opposition and
cultivate resigned acceptance ofthe new regime on the grounds that it is a lesser evil
r.2 Changes over Time or simply that there is no alternative, thus making it "the only regime in town" (cf.
There are limited conditions in which political behavior is Linz ĺggo). Empirical data to test the impact of the passage of Ĺime are available by
free of temporal (that is,
historical) influences. Tests of the persistence of attitudes *orrg pooling fourteen New Russia Barometer sample surueys from l99z to zoo5 (see
g..r".utions have
found that ď cohorts teĺd to respond similarly and substantiĘ www.abdn.ac.ulďcspp). Figure r5.r shows the extent to which the month-by_month
to short-term passage of time influences support for the current regime (Steenbergen and Jones
political stimuli (Mishler and Rose zoo6; Inglehart in this volume).
Theories of
modernization imply social changes graduďly alter individual zooz; Raudenbush and Bryk zooz; Luke zoo4).
behavioł for example,
through the spread ofindustrialization and rising standards The principal infiuence on the development of support for the current Russian
ofeducation (cf. Dďton
zoo6). while it is illogical to extrapolate a trend from a regime is the passage of time. Cumulativeiy, fourteen years adds 4o points to regime
single survey, the temptation
to do so is always there. suPPort on a 2ol-point scale running from plus roo to minus 1oo (see Rose, Mishleł and
To ignore influences on poritical behavior prior to the point Munro zoo7, ch. 9). The way in which individuals evaluate the Russian economy also
at which a survey is
conducted is to act as ifthe past had no empiľical existence! has a big impact on regime support, however. Evaluations of the economy go up and
Yet the chiefvariables
that constitute a causal model are not fixeá once and for all down so the direction of its influence fluctuates. By contrast, the impact of the monthly
they are subject to
variation across time. A pioneering schorar of modernization, passage of time is consistently in one direction. Even though one might expect that with
Joseph schumpeter, time Russians would take freedom foľ granted and its influence on support for the
Ż88 RĺCHÁRD RosE
Y PERsPEcŤIvEs oN PoLITIcAL BEHÁvIoR 289
I

current regime would wane, this has not happened. An appreciation of gains in freedom
Regime support under the new regime has remained steady and its impact has remained substantial.
50
1a. Monthlv passaqe of time ConsistentĘ a big majority of Russians view their regime as corntpt. With the Passage
40
36
38 of time, this perception of corruption exercises a steadily increasing influence on the
30 evaluation of the Russian regime-and that iníluence is negative.
26 26
25 20
14 15
10
7

0
0

1992 94 95 96a 96b 98 OOb 01 03 04

z WrrnnE:,CHANGING Plłcns
Crĺłr,r,r,NGEs As s ulĺ p TI oNs
93 2o0oa 2oO5
25
1 b. Evaluation of current economic svstem

4
Because national histories and iĺstitutions differ, whereinđivlduals live affects what
U
people think and what people can do. Comparison turns structural aťtributes of a
-1 -3 society from.a constant into a variabie. For example, elections in both Europe and the
-6
-12 _14 -12 -12 _t+ -t+ United States offer voters a choice, but the form differs between a one-round
presidential ballot and a proportional representation list bďot to elect a parliament.
-25 -22 -22 -18
Such contextual differences create a logical obstacle to generalizing from a single
1992 93 94 95 96a 96b 98 2oOOa oob 01 03 04 2oo5
national study. Even as profounďy inđividualistic a subject as medical science
50 recognizes this: epidemiologists study variations in the incidence of health and
diseases from country to country. Even though quantitative political behavior studies
1 c. Aooreciation of freedom appear different from "thick'' prose anďyses ofarea studies, they often share some-
Ż5
thing in common: each can deď with a single country. A more scientific basis for
14 14 ]5 15 16 16 15 ĺ6 16 17 17 j5 iG r-r'
generalization requires testing findings in more than one context and country as
demonstrated by most of the chapters in this part.

1992 93 94 95 96a 96b 98 2oOOa OOb 01 03 04 2oO5 ,; ĺ

2.1 Comparing Aggľegates without Individuals
:i 0
The study ofcomparative politics need not study individual political behavior; it can
-6 _8 t' focus on political institutions. Nor need it be comparative most studies catalogued
-9 -10 -lz _r3 under this heading are case studies of a single country different than the author's
-16
-2O -17
_Ż5 -17
-21 -23 ._26
country of residence. An American SSRC committee chaired by Gabriel Almond and
id. Perception of corruption t;,, James S. Coleman (196o) pioneeređ conceptually oriented case studies in seven
volumes of research that concentrated on holistic comparisons of national institu-
tions, such as buľeaucracies. The SSRC volume on political culture (Pye and Verba
-50
1992 93 94 95 96a 96b 98 2oooa oob 01 03 04 2005 ,,r': 1965) emphasized homogeneity within national cultures as weIl as compaĺisons
-. -..: i :. ::.:r.1.: ,..,,. across cultures.l Case studies continue to flourish, but they no longer tend to be
Fig. r5.r Changing influences on regime support in Russia, !g9z_zoo5 l chmcteristic of Gabriď Álmondt intďectrral breađth,concunendy he produced a five-nation com-
Source: Rose, Mishler and Munro, 2006: Table g.2. Figure 9.4. Regĺme support measured on a scale with a range pmtive study of The Ciic
Culture that was surĺey_based (Almond and Verba 1963)- Howwer, a major
from plus 100 to minus 1OO. finding-the impoĺtance ofa mixture ofcivic'subject, md wm trađtionaloutlooks-was ambiguous,leaving
oPen the ađentto which this omed within individuals or at the societal level. Subsequendy, Almond md
Verba (r98o) re-emined ďrmges in their research paľadigrn md the comtries studied ovg time.
 Y
29o RicHÄRD RosE
I
,ethnographic descriptions of alien ways. Instead, a case is placed within a conceptual
framework that identifies what more general points it relates to.
Comparative research in public policy focuses on tbe policy outputs of government
ľather than on individual recipiens. This is true whet}rer h1potheses are tested through
an institutionďy detailed comparison of social Policies or by a rigorous quantitative
!1 anaĘis of public expenditure across a dozen or more countries. Huntingtont (1996)
study ofthe clash ofcultrľes postulates the existence oftransnationa] civilizations based
on reiigion. He then proceeds to impute behavíoraldifferences to states and individua_ls
belonging to different civilizations (cf. Inoguchi in this volume). However, no individ-
uď-]evel data aĺe offered to srrpPort his thesis (foľ a challenge, see Rose 2oo24).
Global comparisons can be undertaken with data assembled for as many as t8o
countries by the United Nations, the World Bank, and non-governmental pľoduceľs
of data on freedom (www.freedomhouse.org) and perceptions of corruption
(www.transparency.org). There are a multiplicity of global democrary indices pro-
duced by universiry-based political scientists from Bollen (r99o) to Vanhanen (zoo3:
for a review, see Munck and Verhuilen zooz). While the number and the vaľiety of
countries covered are impressive' none of these databases provides infoĺmation
about individual behavior. Data derived from individuals about such things as
iiteracy oĺ political participation aľe aggregated and reported as a percentage of the
national population. There is no possibility of comparing how individuais within a
country vary around the national mean-or whether there are coÍlmon cross-
national influences on within-nation differences in inđividualbehavior.
2.2 Comparing Individuďs in Context
Paradoxically, comparative analysis is invariably present in studies of political
behavior-but it is a comparison of inđiviđuals within a country for example,
accounting for differences in individual behavior due to đifferences in education,
age, gender, or other variables. However, a single-nation study cannot show to what
extent sociai and demogaphic differences common in many countries have the same
or a different influence elsewhere.
The geographical scope for comparison is today very wide and many different
reasons can justi the choice of a country or countries (Dogan and Pelassy r99o).
The study of political behavior in a single country becomes comparative if it is
intended to replicate conclusions established in previous fieidwork in another coun-
try. Given the ieading role of American political scientists in developing research in
political behavior' this most often involves applying Ämerican theories in another
national setting. However, such research is not comparative in the strict sense, for a
generic model was not the starting point and it can be constricted to points common
between the first and second country łr'hile omitting what is different. For example' a
survey study applying the Michigan model of party identification to Russia reporteđ
a substantial level of party identification there but overlooked the ephemeral natuĺe
PtRsPEcTivEs oN PoĹiTIcÁL BEHAvIoR 29I
of party organizations there. Thus, most of the parties \^/ith which respondents were
said to identify had disappeaređ before the research was published.
Comparison of political behavior in countries deemed most similar in their contextual
characteristics-for example, Norway and Sweden-holds constant many histoľical
characteristics, for the ftvo counEies were formerĘ under one king and shaĺed the
same religion. There is cultuĺai proximĘ (language is mutuďy comprehensible between
Norwegians and Swedes); the countries have a similar levei of socioeconomic develop-
ment; and their political systems-democratic, unitary multi-party proportional
representation, and welfare state-are also similar.
As the chapters in this section show, the number of countries available for
comparison is much eniarged by making comparisons within a universe of countries
that have one majoľ characteristic in common. The characteĺistic can be geograph-
ical (Asia: see Inoguchi in this volume); political (democratic); social (high educa-
tion); or economic (irigh mean national income). Expanding comparison to two
dozen or more countries increases the likelihood of patterns emerging that are
statistically reiiable. While there may be half a dozen ways in which contextual
differences can affect individual behavior, few woulđgo so far as to argue that the
configuration ofcontextual attributes in each oftwo dozen countries is so distinctive
tĺat it constitutes a unique and dominant determinant of individual political
behavior.
The European Union provides a politically meaningful conrext for comparing
individual behavior. Its twenty-seven member states are committed to common
standards and policies in a variety of fields; government of6cials are constantly
interacting in pan-European meetings; citizens ofany country have freedom to travel
and study in other countries; and all can vote in elections of the European Parlia-
ment. Moreoveł the EU's own Eurobarometer survey conducts at least two surveys a
year in which the same questions are asked of individuals in all twenty-seven member
states of the EU (see www.europa.eu/public_opinion). Within the EU context, there
are variations in nationa] institutions and'even more iÍi national histories. The
political socialization of indiviđualcitizens of long_established democracies has
occurred in a different setting than that of individuals in the eight central and east
European countries admitted to the European Union in zoo4, who were socialized as
subjects of a communist regime.
Modernization theories emphasize the achievement of a high level of socioeco-
nomic development regardless of geography and history. In turn, a high level of
economic well-being, education, and urbanization is expected to produce greater
cross-nationai similarities in the behavior of individual citizens, because they are
most exposed to "globalizing" (tbat is, homogenizing) influences (Lipset 1994).
Arguabln modern citizens may also be more democratic, for example, because of
their higher average levei of education. The homogenizing effect of modernization
on the politicai behavior ofindividuals independent ofnational context can be tested
across fouĺ or more continents. If membership in the organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is treated as an indicator of being modern,
292 RICHÁRD RosE PERsPEcTIvEs oN PoĹtTIcÄL BEHAvIoR z93

3.r Politicď Behavior as Both Inputs and outputs

then the behavior of citizens of Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, and the United
States should be similar to citizens of European countries.2
the great bulk of
A single-country sfudy can be conceived as a deviant case, erĺamined in order to The iiterature ofpolitical behavior is unbaianced. Research devotes
identĘ the causes ofexceptions from a rule. Singapore can be considered a deviant case, attention to the inputs of citizens to government through voting and expressing
The đemands that government makes on its citizens to pay taxes and to
because it is modern but not democrađqit offers a context for testing whether and how oPinions.
and
this regime is "buying" support from its subjects. My Northem Ireland survey of .änfo.m with laws and the benefits that public policy Provides to individuals
housetrolds tend to be neglected. Yet citizens spend more time receiving
benefits of
Governing without Corsmsuswas conceived as a deviant case analysis not only within
public policy and earning money to Pay taxes than in voting or going to political
the context of the United Kingdom, but within that of established democracies (Rose
l9zr). India is the outstanding example of hundĺeds of millions of illiterate, impover- *."tir'g.. il igno.. this íact is to dissociate the study of political (sic) behavior from

ished' and rural resiđentsparticipating in elections in a democratic politicď system. the study of govemment.
have only
Deviant case analysis raises a question: What is the norm used to establish As the chalters in the section on participation document, most citizens
voting justifiable because of the
deviation? This question is addressed in the literature of American exceptionaiism. a limited engagement in politics. While studies of are

For Lipset (1996), the norm was a European society in which class politics is importance of elections to government, it does not follow that voting is equally
prominent' a ĺeflection of his own upbringing in New York City as the offspring important to citizens. Consistently, empirical research shows that the majority of
of east European immigrants. A further weakness of the American exceptionalism .itĹ"rrs are only voters. Broadening tbe defrnition of politicď behavior to include
who
approach is that it assumes homogeneity beťĺveen the great majority of European or particiPation in all types of voluntaľy organizations increases the proportion
deemed to be engaged in politics. However, voluntary organizations such
as
oECD countries (Rose r99r). For Hartz (t95), Americďs exceptionďism arose fľom -"y u.
the absence of Europe's feudal history. For students of t}le American sports clubs, hobby groups, and choirs do not recruit members on politicď grounds
South' exceptionďism aľose from the legacy of slavery and incomplete democratiza- *a *r" primary benefits they provide are for individual members (Olson rq6i)'
tion until the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Woodward ry55; Gonzalez and. politics is not an important part of the lives of most people. In the zoo3 European
say that it is important in theiĺ
King zoo4). Quality of Life Survey, family comes 6rst: 98 Percent
lives and more than nine-tenths of Europeans đso regard work, friends, and leisure as
and
important. By contrast, less than haif consider politics as at least fairly important
(Rose zoo6)' Not only do most citizens of
oniy rr percent regard it as very important
political activities a low priority but also many would prefer
democratic systems give
3 WrrłľTo STUDY: INPUTs' to leave the big decisions of government to elected rePresentatives. The
New Europe
admitteđto
Barometer asked citizens in the eight central and east European countries
ouľpuľs' AND/on Vłrups? the European Union in zoo4 whether people like themselves or electeđ politicians
the big decisions of goveŤnment. Even though politicians are widely
should make
distrusted in the region, 68 percent wanted to leave the business of making
major
The study of political behavior is not confined to behaviorď acts; it also includes
decisions to their representatives as against 32 Percent wanting people
like themselves
examining predispositions, preferences, and values. Each element can be linked in a
model that postulates political behavior is a consequence ofpreferences and predis- to be involved (Rose zoo5, 67; see ďso, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse zoor).
job' theirpension,
positions anđlinks both to vďues. However, each of these statements is probabilistic ordinarypeople spend more time thinking abouttheirheďth, their
than about how to vote. All of these concems are điĺectly
or contingent. For example, in a repressive regime behavior will reflect what the or their chi]drent education
affected by pubtic policies both in European welfare states and in Anglo-American
government wants rather than what individuals prefer and in a totďitarian regime
polities in whictr public, prirate, and not-for-profit provision of social seryices
are
opinions that subjects voice in public can be the opposíte ofwhat they think or say in
interdependent. However' theY are not thought of as "politiď' in conventional studies
private.
oĺpoľtĺcabeľravior (for an exception, see Rose 1989; Kumlin in this volume).
The distinction between politics anđpolicy is artificiď, and exacerbated by
English-
language usage; in continentď languages there is not the same contrast between
, The OECD's admission of two developing countries, Turkey and Mexico, is based on the ..p"iĺä''s.ilc" "Policy'' science (Heidenheimer 1986). Consistent with David
"nd
ť*toď, (rg6ĺ) modei of a feedbackbetween govemors and govemed, policyoutputs of
presence there of a significant modern sector m wel] as developing and more traditional seđors,
thus impĘng grounds for within-country comparisons. The membership of these countries not
govemment that are inputs to the dđlylives of ordinary people are also a
form
only reflects their aspirations for national development but also the oECD's d*ire to eĘmd its
scope and influence. áfpolitical behavior. These ouęuts include health care' education, pension income,
 Y
294 RICHÁRD RosE PĚRsPEcTIvEs oN PoLiTIcAL BEHAvIoR 295

education. while most adults do not go to hospitai each year and many
do not see a
cash-transfer payments to the unemployed, mothers and the disabled, and housing
year and in
subsidies. In economic tenns, these benefits constitute plivate goods and services, since doctor, about one-third do have a major need foĺ heďth caĺe during the
the course of a few years, the overwhelming majorify of adults use their country's
ľeciPients could be excluded from them and they coulđbe so|d in the market. HoweveĹ
health service. Government is a major source of income in three difĺerent
in political terms they are public benefits, because they are authorized by legislation, national
financed by taxes, and often delivered by public employees. ways: it provides cash benefits for pensioners, the unemployed, and the disabied
When behavioral anďysis is extended to the ouĘuts of govemment, then 83 percent b"."os. ah.y ur. outside the iabour force; it employs a significant fraction of the
ofEuropean househoids are annually involved in poliry behavior, that is, the consumP- labour force to đeliverpublic services; and it also pĺovides supplementary cash
tion of benefits authorized by legislation anđfunded by taxation (Figure r5.z). The benefits for child care and for social housing'
those who have voted iĺ the
Percentage engageđ in poiicy ouęuts is thus higher than
last national election. MoreoveĹ policy engagement is much more immediately relevant
than does the inđirect and
and has a bigger impact on the life ofan ordinary individual
3.Ż Do World Vďues Exist?
notional effects of voting or attending the meeting of a political organization. beüef
At any given point in time, the median European is the recipient of at least two Whereas behavior is an overt act, values are mental constlucts. Vaiues constitute
systems that are relevant to understanding how individuals view their world' including
major pub[c poliry benefits, for example, working in the public sector anđhaving
children in school, or being a pensioner and receiving health care. One-fifth receive govemment. However, many values, for example, about family and child-rearing'
ielate to contexts remote from politics. Even if people hold values that aĺe
politically
thĺee or more benefits (Figure rs.z). only one in seven are momentarily in receipt of
relevant, most people do not engage in political activities that could advance these
no benefits' being healthy' earning a goođincome in the private sectoĹ and without poliry
vďues. Even ifthe1did, the connection between individual values and public is
cbildren. If collective goods provided by public policies such as clean air and water of
conđngentand remote, since individual values aĺe aggĺegated in a great variety
are included as individual benefits, then everyone r /ould be involved in politics with
every breath of fĺesh air and every glass of water that they drink- intermediary organizations and then input to a policy-making process in which
At some stage in the life cycle, virtually every individual will benefit from major decisions are usuďy arrived at by bargaining or even by a garbage-can Process'
policy outputs. Adult Europeans have ďready benefited from about a dozen years of The comparative study of values in Europe was initiated in 1978 by a group of
Catholic-oriented sociologists forming the European Value Systems Study Group-
Its

first survey covered two dozen countries; results were reported in French by Jean
in the
Stoetzel (1983) and in English (Harding et al. 1986). The study examined vďues
broadest sense, ranging from politics to famity iife, morality, and religion. A second
Households benefiting from: (Ester,
wave was carried out in rggo, and included the united states and canada
Halĺnan, and de Moor de Moor 1995); a third wave occurred in l999-zooo
Pensionf 370/o 1993;
(Halman zoor). Ronald Inglehart then initiated ďWorld Vďues Survey (WVS)' which
Healthcare Easoĺo to
first fielded in r98r, and in zoo5 commenced its fifth round of surveys extending
Education Zzlon more than seventy-five countries (www.worldvďuessuľvey'com)'
and
The World Values Survey is a majoĺ source of cross-national comparative
Pubłic sectorjob |Jzoolo of
trend data. As its name emphasizes, its questionnaire covers a broad range
child benefit lJzzoĺo politically relevant vďues. Ironicďy, much oí Inglehart's publications have aggre-
and then aggregated national means
unemployment, other cash grant ! 140/o lated individual responses into national means,
i-nto cross-national clusters of cultures (see Inglehart t997i cltapter in this volume)'
Socialhousĺng fĺsvo This has produced an Inglehart values Map of the world (www.worldvaluessurvey.
0o/o 100/o zook 300/o 400/o 500/o 600/o
com/library/inđex.html) with eight different clustels chaÍacterized principaily by
religion oĺ geography, such as Protestant Europe and Confucian countries. Seligson
(zoáz) has questioned whether the result is "The Renaissance of Politicď Culture or
Fig. r5.z Participation in poliry outputs the Renaissance ofthe Ecological Fallacy?" (for a reply, see Inglehart
and Welzel zoo3;
Souĺce: Percentages based on replies to 2oo3 European ouality of Life Suruey (Dublin: European Foundation for see also Inglebart and Welzel chaptersin this volume)'
Living and Working Conditions; number of respondents 27,008) with national results weighted to each country's
share of the total population of 28 countrĺes. Health care calculated as those With poor or not very good health or
ľĺ"wvs questionnaire has favored consistency in questions across diverse soci-
eties so that cross-national comparisons can be made within each survey.
This
having a disability.
 Y
296 RTCHARD ROSE PERSPEcTIvEs oN PoĹITicÁĹ BEHAVIoR z97
I

assumes that there is substantial cross-continental commonaliťy in what constitutes cĺeates an analytic construct, but such an abstract concept ís not, ipso facto, a positive
national vďues to make it meaningfr:_l to field a common questionnaire. However, causal force. To treat democratic values ofindividuďs as a reified political culture and
this may produce "an illusory appearance of comparability" (Heath et al. zoo5, 3zt). make it tantamount to a đemocratic political regime goes further: it ]eaves out
Assuming that questions suitable in the United States and Europe will be equally political institutions and the state.
suitable for interviewing respondents in many different continents and national
contexts risk conceptual overstretch. As Canache, Mondak, and Seligson (zoor)
have shown, the meaning of a question about satisfaction with democracy can be
confusing or problematic between and even within countries. This is consistent
with Philip Converse's (1964) cautíon that asking questions that respondents do 4 BnrNcrxc SocrETrEs BAcK rN
not understand oĺ have no interest in can create "non-attitudes.''
Wbile social indicators such as education or income may be conceptually uniform,
Given the intensity with which political behavior is being analyzed in a single time
their application in cross-national ľesearch becomes problematic. National education
and place, 8reateĺ gains in the foreseeable futuĺe are more iikely to come from
systems differ in the minimum number of years of compulsory education; in the Ępes
broadening research by bringing societies back in. Doing so is the only way to test
of schools attended and in the certificates that pupils receive. American categoĺies are
the universalist assumption that inđividualbehavior is unaffected by national con-
aqpical of educationa] quaiifications in most of the world' Thus, any standaĺdized
text. Cross-national analysis turns a context that is a constant for respondents of a
cross-natíonal indícator of education can on]y be approximate. Incomes may be
single survey iĺrto a variable. Thus, it becomes possible to test under what circum-
compared accorđing to a standard unit ofcurrency (e.g. a US doilar subject to ĺoreign
stances and to what extent findings about individuď behavior are or are not affected
exchange fluctuations); by adjusting currencies for purchasing power Pariťy; or by
by differences in space and time. Just as the subjects of behavioral research are
calculating an individualt Position within a national income distribuđonto assigrr
expected to calculate accoÍding to bounded rationality (Simon 1979)> so those who
individuals to high-, medium- and low-income-groups within a society.
study them should think in teľms of bounded generalizability.
The logicď implication of expanding research into national contexts that vary as
Data are no longer a ümitation for testing the generalizability of Propositions
greatly as Asian, African' and Midďe East countries is to increase the need to
about political behavior' Surveys of potitical behavior are now available for hďf the
contextualize research by altering or adding questions to take into account the greater
countries in the world with a population of a million or more (Heath, Fisher, anđ
differences in context. For example, the meaning of a left-right scale can become
Smith zoo5). Moreoveą the global expansion of srrrvey ľesearch has produced data
problematic (see Mair's contribution to this volume). Not to adapt questionnaires to
from many diffeľent t1pes of countries, whether differences are defined in political
context risks omitting information that is contextuaily critical, For example, the fact
terms (the People's Republic of China and Sweden) or economic terms (Inđiaand the
that regime change cannot be studied in long-established democracies is not a reason
United States); or socialization (East and West Germany). Moreover, surveys now
for ígnoring its imPact on political behavior when conducting surveys in post-
coveÍ a span ofup to halfa century. It is no loĄger necessary to treat any one national
communist countries, where regime change does occur (Rose, Mishleł and Haerpfer
eiection as t)?ical: such an assumption can be tested empirically and the cumulative
1998). To ignore such phenomena replaces the minor problem of missing data with
influence of the passage of time can be tested over generations. Noĺ is it necessary to
the major problem of missing concepts.3
speculate about the development of attitudes in new democracies. Whereas the first
If the attitudes of individuals are to influence macropolitical institutions, they
wave of democratization occurred moĺe than a century before survey research, the
must be aggregated into a macro-constnrct such as political culture. Otherwise, there
third wave of democratization came after the institutionalization of survey research.
is no connection between individual values and what governments do. However, as
Comparable questions can be found in many national surveys, reflecting a predispos-
Dieter Fuchs shows in his contribution to this seđion,there are fundamental
ition ofreseaĺchers to replicate what their peers have already published. In mature sociď
problems in aggregating values of individuals into a macropolitical culture. The
science communities, path dependence can explain the persistence ofstandarđ questions
aggregation of individual opinions, whether on the basis of a dominant tendency
(e.g. democratic) oĺ showing a distĺibution between postmaterialists and others, across time as a necessaÍy condition of maintaining a time series. In smďer colrntries
and in countries entering survey reseaIch late! there is also a reađinessto seek integration

3 The same problem faces national income economists in developing countries when they attempt to
account for economic behavior by focming xclusivĄ on economic activities that are officially recorded
by national governments in accord with international procedures for measuring gross domestic product.
However, the less modem an economy, the greater the volme of economic activiry that is omitted,
because it takes place as unreorded cash-in-hmd transactions and within the household without any
money chmging hands (see e.g. Rose zooz4 Thomas zoo3).
in "big'' political science reseaľch. It is also sďe to do so, for the professional weight given
cross-national replication is much stronger than the encouragement to innovate by
asking questions about unfamiliar topics such as paĺicipation in Policy outPuts.
High-speed computers make it easy to ana|yze multinational data sets with tens of
thousands of respondents and statistical methods of multi-level modelling provide
{ \
ł 298 RiCHARD RosE PERsPEcTivEs oN PoLITICAL BEHAVIoR Ż99
I

: the means to apportion variance in individual behavior beťween differences in Błnĺoĺ,rNr,S-,andMłln.,P.l99o.Identity,CompetitionandElectoĺalAyailnbility:TheStabil-

Press'
individual attributes and contextual attributes, whether context is de ned in terms isation of European Democracy, 1885-1985- Cambridge Cambridge Univeĺsity
of space or time. This is a boon for contemporaĺy comparative research. Aľistotle did BłuucĺxiNpą, F., and Joľĺs,B.:r99. Agendas and Instability in Ameĺican Poliĺics. Chicago:
not have a comPuteÍ when he wrote the analysis of politics that inspired Marty Lipset University of Chicago Press.
(t96o,7), and Lipset wrote Political Manvnth only a counrer-sorter and Bsrr' D. ,gią. rh, Coming of PołJndustrial Society' New York Basic Book'
]uan Linz. Bor,rex, K. tqgo. Political democrary: conceptual and measurement traps' Studies in
The ideal research project would anallze national surveys of individuals in multipie
Compaĺatiĺe Internątional Deĺelopment, Ż5: 7_Ż4'
countries and different temporal contexts. However, the greater the diversity of coun-
Burren,D.,andSro<rs,D-tgTo.PoliticalChangeinBritain'zndedn'London:Macmilian'
New
tries in the data set, the greater the demands for contextual knowledge and the gĺeater Cluľseĺ,r,A., CoNvonse, P., Mĺrran, W', and Sľoxr's, D' 19 o' The American Voŕer'
the risk that nominally identical questions do not have the same sigľrificance in different York )ohn WileY.
places. }ust as Robert Merton (1957) invoked theoľies of the middle \^ŕay' so a span of D.' Moĺoĺr,J., and SnrĺcsoN, M'
Cłułcĺĺe, zoor' Meaning and measuĺement in cÍoss_
national research on satisfaction with democracy. Public opinion QuarterĘ
65:. 5o6-z8.
space and time need not be maximalist-as long as it contains enough variations to
Cowense, P. 1964. The nature of beiief systems in mass publics' Pp' ŻoÁ7 iĺ Ideology and
provide a robust test ofgeneric hlpotheses. In any event, it is self-defeating to stipulate
that a maximalist ideal should also be the minimum that is acceptable. Discontent, ed. D. Apter New York Free Press'

A_11research involves inclusion andexciusion: some things are the focus of research anđ
Dłĺroĺ,R. zoo6 . Citizen Politics: Pubtic opinion and Parties in Adyąnced Industrial Democĺacies-
Washington, DC: CQ Press.
lots must be left out. The contemporary tendency of social scientists to publish journal
DocłN,M.,anđPÉLÄss!D.ĺ99o.HowtoCompareNations,zndedn.Chatham,N}:Chatham
articles rather than books greatly reduces the space to include important dimensions of a House.
problem. However, such a limitation is not an adequate justification for totaily ignoring EłsroN, D.1965. A Fĺamałork for Political Analysk' Englewood Ciiffs' NJ: Prentice-Hall'
time and space. A journal article that is expeđedto include detailed discussions of Hł.lłłN,L., and Mooą, R' l99z' The Indiłidualizing Society: Value Change in
Es:ľpt, P.,
samples and of statistical methods shor:ld make space for succinct statements about the Europe and Northern America. Tilburg: Tilburg Universiry Press'
temporal and sPatiď context ofthe research and how this may affect the gen eraIizability FłlĺnĄJ. l99t- Hitlers Wiihler. Mruních:. C' H; Beck'
Flľe& S. 1997. The History of Government,3 vols' oxford: Oxford University Press'
of its findings to other times and places. To omit such a consideration buries the
GoNzłrez,F.,andKrľc,D.zoo4.Thestateanddemocratization:theUnitedStatesin
influence of time anđspace on political behavior within the error term.
comParative perspective. British |ournal of Poĺitimĺ Sciencą 342 793_Ż70 '
cumulative advances in knowledge across space and time require reintegrating GuNrrłrn, R., SłľI,G., and Sgĺoĺo,G. 1988' Spain at'ter Franco: The Making
of a Competitive
politicai behavior in the social sciences in ordeĺ to create a political science field that Party System. Berkeley University ofCalifornia Pĺess, revised edition'
'Waye
is both psychological and sociorogical. Doing so will return the subject to the Hłunĺiľ,L. zool. The European Values SruĄ: A Third Source Book of the l999/zooo
interdisciplinary discourse from which it emerged, for the progenitors of political Euĺopean Values Study Surve7s. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press'
HĺąoINc, S., Pxrrrpq D., aná Focłnrĺ M. 1986. Contrastíng Values in Western
Europe.
behavior research were not only political scientists but aiso sociologists (paul
Lazaľsfeld, S. M. Lipset, and Stein Rokkan), social psychologists (Phiľp Converse), Lonđon: Macmi]lan.
1955. The Liberat Tiadition in America New Yoric Harcourt'
Brace'
and institutionalists (v. o. Key). Many had an excellent grounding in comparative Hĺnrz, L.
Hsĺrĺ,A.,_Frsrłen, S., and SłĺIĺrł,S. zoo5. The clđbďization of Public opinion Research'
history too (e.g. Gabriel Almond and Rokkan). If cumulative progress is to be made,
Annual Review of Political Sciencą 8: 297-333.
it wül be made by standing on the shoulders of such giants. This is best done by HtronľxnIlĺex, A. 1986. Politics policy and policy as coĄcePts in English and
continental
standing on two legs, one reflecting specialist knowledge of individual behavior, and languages. Review of Politics, 48: 3-3o.
the second reflecting the influences of space and time. Hr""i*c,'I., and Trĺniss_Monse, E. eds. zooL. whąt is it about G,vernment that Americans
Dzslike? New York: Cambridge University Press'
HuNrlNcĺoN, S.pge.TheCtąshof CivilizationsandtheRemakingofWorldorder'NewYork:
Simon & Schuster.
INcrErrłnr, R' Modernizntion and Postmodernization. Princeton: Princeton Universiľy
REFERENCES ]t997.
Press.
in
and \MELZ yy c. zoo3. Democratic institutions and politicai culture: misconceptions
Árvoľo, G-, anđCorBułN, }. r9 o. The Politics of Developing Aĺeas. Princeton: Princeton Comparative Politics,36: 61-80'
- addĺessing the ecological
fallacy.
University Press.
INxEres, A.1983. Becoming Modern. New York Columbia UniversĘ Press'
and Veľ'se, S. 963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
LľnNnn, D. 1958. The Passing of Tradiional Society' Glencoe, I1l: Free Press'
- eds- r98o. The Civic Culture Reyisited: An Analytical Sĺĺld1.Boston: Ĺitt]e, Bĺown.
LrNz, i. ipSq. ihe social basei oiWest German politics. New York Columbia
University Ph'D'
Bĺxsn, K., DĺlroN, R., and Hrrorsnĺuor, K. r98r. Germany Transformed: PoliticąI Culture
đissertation in sociology.
and the New Poliĺics. Cambridge' Mass.: Harvard Univeľsity Press. (Summer)' r43- 4'
1990. Transitions to democracy. washington Quarterly

-
 RicHÄRD RosE PERsPECTIvEs oN PoLiTIcAL BEHÁvIoR 301
3oo

in Civil Society: A European Society ApproacŁ' Dublin: European

Lrpsrĺ, S. M. r9 o. Political Man. New York Doubleday. Żĺ1116. Participation

t-zz. Foundation for Living and Working Conditions'

1994. The social requisites ofdemocracy revisited. American SociologicalReview,59
-
f15i11Bp, W., and Hłnneľen, ć' 998' Deĺnocracy
Q.):
and its Altonatiyes: Uĺderstanding
7996' American Exceptionalism: A Doubb-Edged Sľoĺd.New Yoĺk: W.W. Norton.
- Polity Press and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Pľess'
- and Ro<rĺľ,S. eds. 1967. Party Systems andVoteĺ Alignmeĺŕs.NewYork Free Press. Post-Commuĺist Societies.offord:
- and' MuNno, N. 2006. Russiá Transt'ormed: Developing Popular Support for a New
-LuxB, D. zoo4. MuIi-LeveI Modelling. London: Sage Publications Quantitative Ápplications
Regime. Cambridge: Cambĺidge University
Press'
in the Social Sciences o7-r43.
aggregate data: some substantive and
McDoNoucrĺ' P.' BĺnNes, S., and Lopnz PiNł, A. |988. The Cultuĺal D7namics of Democra- Scĺnucrĺ,E. 19 6. Cross-natiorial comparisons osing
ed' R- Merritt and S' Rokken'
tizątion in Spain. ĺthaca, NY: Cornell University Press. methodological prour"-.. ľf' 3v67 in ComparinlNaiorr'
MrnĺoN, R. r95z. Social Structure and Social Theory. Glencoe, Il1.: The Free Pĺess, revised and New Haven: Yale UniversitY Press'
enlarged edition. Sc",r'"'.u*, }. 1946. The economy in the interwar years' American Economĺc
Ámerica"
MIsrĺrBn, W., and Ross, R. zoo6. Generation, age and time: the d1,namics of political leaming Reĺiew,36: l-lo.
Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance' New Haven:
Ya1e
duriĺrg Russiďs transformation. Abeľdeen: CSPP Studies in Public Poliry No. 4rz. Scoĺĺ,i. 1985. Weapons of the Weak:

Moon' R. or ed- i995. Values in Western Societies. Tilburg: Tilburg University Pľess. UniversitY Press-
MuNcr, G., and VrnuurreN, J. zooz. Conceptualizing and measuring democrary: evaluating SrlrcsoN,M.zooz.Therenaissanceofpoliticalcultuĺeortherenaissanceoftheecological
alternative indlces. Comparative Political Studies, 35: 5-34. fal7acy? Comparative Politics,34| 273-9Ż- :^ ŤL- :
sociology' Pp' ząĺ-8o in The Histonc
Nopr.r.r-Nr'uueľN, E. 1995. Juan Linz's doctoral dissertation forty years later. In Politic; Sociery Stwr'rL W. 1996. Thee tempo'jiĺ'''io*"'a an eventfi:l
and Democraq, vol. ii, ed. H. E. Chehabi and Á. Stepan Bouideĺ CoIo.: Westview Press. TurnintheHumanSciences,ed.T.McDonald.AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPĺess.
OrsoN, M. 1965. The Logb of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups SĺrłľtNĺorrł,V.zoor.ÁNormąlTotalitarianSociety:HowtheSoviet(JnionFunctionedand
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Pľess. How It Collapsed. Aĺmonk, NY: M' E' Sharpe'
^ -'':'^'' Economlc
organizations' American
D-^.
Pĺan'soľ, P. zoo4. Poliics in Time: Hbtory Inłirutions and Social AnaĘsis. Princeton: Princeton SIlĺoN' H. 1979. Rational dácision making in business
University Press. Review,69:. 493_5ĺ3.
PnrssĺĺĺN,J., and Wiroĺvsrĺ,A' ĺ973. Implementation. Berkeley: UniveľsiĘ of Califoĺnia SĺenNlencĺľ,M.,andJoľĺs,B.zooz.Modellingmultileveldatastructures.ÁmericanJournal
Press. of Political Science, 46: zt8-37'
Universitaires đeFrance'
Pyr, L. t962. Politics, Personality and Nation Building. New Haven: Yale University Press. s'o'r''"", J. 1983. Les Valeurs du temps présent' Paĺis:-Presses
with theory'' Yet Ägain?
and VERBÄ, S. eds., 1965. Political Culuĺe ąnd Political Devebpffient.PÍ:1Írceton: Princeton Tłĺot'ĺłs,}. zoo3. QuantĘi.rg th" bLct economy: "measurement
University Press. Economic fournal, ro9 (ą56): s8r-9'
- VĺNĺłľrľ,T. zoo3- p"*o'otĺ-ao': A Comparatiĺe Reliew of l7o Countries' London:
Rĺuorr.rousĺł,S., and Bnvĺ<, A. zooz. Hierarchiĺal Linear Modelling Ęplications and Data
AĺnlysísMethods znd edn. Thousand oa}s' Cďif.: Sage Publications Ädvanced Quantitative Routledge.
Techniques in the Social Sciences. Wĺlp,K.7983.CrossesontheBallot:PaxernsofBritishVoterAlignmentsince1885.Princeton:
RnrsrNcen, W. 1995. The renaissance of a rubric political culture as concept and theory. Princeton UniversitY Press'
of democracy: West Germany since 1945'
Inteĺnationąl Journal of Public opinion Research,7: z85-96. \ĺVeIĺ,F. 1987. Cohorts, regimes, and the legitimation
American Sociological Reĺiew,szi 3o8-z4'
o
RosrNsoN, ). 1979. History versus equilibrium. Collected Economic Pąers of Ioan Robínson,
York oxford University Press'
vol. v. oŕord: Oxford University Press. Wooowłto, C. 1955- The stro'ge Co'ee' of |im Crow' New
and SociąI Structure: An Eyolutionary Theory of Institutions.
RoĺlNsoĺ,W. r95o. Ecological correiations and the behavior of individuals. American Socio- Youuc, P. 1998. Individual Si,tratZgy

Iogical Rełiew, ĺ5i 350_7. Princeton: Princeton University Press'

Rosr, R. :'97l. Govemíngwithout Consensus: An Irish Perspectiĺe. London: Faber & Faber.
7989. Ordinary People In Public PoliaJ. London: Sage Publications.
1991. Is American pubiic policy exceptional? Pp. ĺ87_zz9 in Is America Diffeĺent?, ed.
-
- B. Shafer. New York oxford UniversĘ Press.
|995. Aaron WildavsĘ: Ein Mensch fiir die Ganze Welt. Iĺ Budgeting Policy, Politics: An

- Appreciation of Aaron Wldavsky, ed. N. Caiden and J. White. New Brunswick, NJ: Trans-
action PublisheÍs.
zooza. How Muslims view democrary: a Central Asian perspective - Journal of Demoraq,

- 13: 102-11-
2oożb. Economies in transformation: a multidimensional approach to a cross_culturai
problem. East European Constitutional Review, n: 6z-7o.
-
2oo5. Insiders and outsi^ders: Ntw Europe Barometer 2oo4 Glasgow: Centĺe for the Study
of Public Policy Studies in Public Poliry No. 4o4.
-