[G.R. No. 143439. October 14, 2005.

MAXIMO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled "SUSAN RAMIREZ,petitioner, versus, HON.
BENJAMIN M. AQUINO, JR., as JUDGE RTC, MALABON, MM, BR. 72, and MAXIMO
ALVAREZ, respondents." STaIHc
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for
arson 3 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo
Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
"ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear in the witness.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of
proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the
crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May
29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C,
Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law
Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on
the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the
accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan
Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the
family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused;
that as a consequence of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the
house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and together
with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and others.
COURT:
You may proceed.
xxx xxx xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx xxx xxx
 Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that
scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house
of my sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the
court room).
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you
know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he
gave his name as Maximo Alvarez." 4
In the course of Esperanza's direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed "uncontrolled
emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion 5 to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition 6 to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court
directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez
from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. 7The prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. 8
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN,
to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari 9 with application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. 10
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed
Orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in
Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their marriage, neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of
perjury;
 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life,
even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one
spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. 11
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted
cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and
domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life,
which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home. 12
In Ordoño vs. Daquigan, 13 this Court held:
"We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that
laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the
court said:
'The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is
too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule
is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs,
the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one
shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for
a crime committee (by) one against the other.'"
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation
between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed
against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and
love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged
intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences
of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The
criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations
between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no
more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held
that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals
which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v.
Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital
Disqualification Rule."
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were
separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts
presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no
longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the
courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to
offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as
stated by this Court in Francisco 14 ), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity." ADcSHC
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72,
Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in
Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, [October 14, 2005], 509 PHIL 650-658)

[G.R. No. 117401. October 1, 1998.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO,

JR., accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; AFFIDAVIT NOT TESTIFIED UPON BY THE AFFIANT IN
OPEN COURT IS A HEARSAY. — In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on
the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented
on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two
gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants
themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must
be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY EXTRA JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF AN ACCUSED ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE
AGAINST HIS CO- ACCUSED. — The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are
not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an
opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNCOUNSELED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION WITHOUT A VALID WAIVER OF RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. — The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence
of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their
statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the
presence of counsel the next day.
4. ID.; ID.; WITNESSES; MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — With
regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant having
timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the
court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife
from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the
murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case.
This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise
of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital
disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" is a rule familiar
even to law students.
5. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION CANNOT RELY ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE TO GAIN A
CONVICTION; CASE AT BAR. — Admittedly, accused-appellant's defense, to put it mildly, is
dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his
father's house on the strength of the latter's verbalthreats, his incredulous escape from the
clutches of the two, his inexplicable failure to return. home immediately, his failure to seek
assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him immediately after the
incident, and the nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita brothers as
the culprits, all suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion, no
matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution
cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but must established beyond
reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused. This the prosecution
has failed to demonstrate. CaAcSE

DECISION

ROMERO, J p:

Before us is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 4, dated
March 2, 1994, finding accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. guilty of the crime of parricide.
On January 17, 1989, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of parricide before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao. The information reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR. of the crime of Parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about September 17, 1988, in the Municipality of Kaputian, Province of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, who are charged for (sic) Murder in a separate
information, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, with the use of
a bolo and an iron-bar, assault, hack and stab his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., on
the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him wounds which caused
his death, and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damage to the
heirs of the victim.
Contrary to law. 1
Accused-appellant's case was tried jointly with the murder case filed against his co-accused,
Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita who, however, withdrew their "not guilty" plea during the trial
and were accordingly sentenced. Thus, only accused-appellant's case was tried on the merits.
The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its witnesses
accused-appellant's brother Leo Quidato, appellant's wife Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman
Lucrecio Mara. Likewise, the prosecution offered in evidence affidavits containing the
extrajudicial confessions of Eddie Malita and Reynaldo Malita. The two brothers were, however,
not presented by the prosecution on the witness stand. Instead, it presented Atty. Jonathan
Jocom to prove that the two were assisted by counsel when they made their confessions. Similarly,
the prosecution presented MTC Judge George Omelio who attested to the due and voluntary
execution of the sworn statements by the Malita brothers.
Based on the foregoing pieces of evidence, the prosecution's version of the facts is as follows:
Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato.
Being a widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian,
Davao. He owned sixteen hectares of coconut land in the area.
On September 16, 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, herein accused- appellant, and two
hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After
selling the copra, Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left. Bernardo
and accused-appellant went back to Sitio Libod that same day. 2
According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day, September 17, 1988,
accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She overheard the
trio planning to go to her father-in-law's house to get money from the latter. She had no idea,
however, as to what later transpired because she had fallen asleep before 10:00
p.m. 3 Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on the ground that the same was
prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. 4 The judge, acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said testimony
only against accused-appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.
As adverted to earlier, the Malita brothers confessed to their participation in the crime,
executing affidavits detailing how Bernardo was killed. Their version shows that Eddie had been
living with accused-appellant for the past four years. At around 6:00 p.m. of September 17, 1988,
accused-appellant asked Reynaldo to come to the former's house to discuss an important matter.
Upon Reynaldo's arrival at accused-appellant's house, he saw that his brother Eddie was already
there. They started drinking beer. The Malita brothers alleged that it was at this juncture that
accused-appellant proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house only
at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the
house, accused-appellant knocked on the door, asking his father to let them in. When Bernardo
opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo
on the nape and neck. Accused-appellant and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking for
money but they found none; so, the three of them left.
The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by accused-appellant's son, who had gone
there to call his Lolo for breakfast. The cause of death, as stated in Bernardo's death certificate
was "hypovolemic shock secondary to fatal hacking wound on the posterior neck area." 5
On September 27, 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned
that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were
promptly arrested by the police. Aside from arresting the latter two, however, the police also
arrested accused-appellant.
On September 29, 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the
Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their
right to counsel, they signified their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that
the same would be useless if given in the absence of counsel, Mara took down the testimony of
the two but refrained from requiring the latter to sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the
Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO
(now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. 6
Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two
of their constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents of the affidavits,
in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same.
Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits. 7
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the Malita brothers. He claimed that
the Malita brothers were not at his house on the evening of September 17, 1988. They, however,
passed by his house at around 10:00 p.m. and asked him to come with them to his father's house,
threatening him with harm if he refused. Out of fear, he led the way to Bernardo's house and even
knocked on the latter's door until Bernardo opened the same. In the ensuing commotion, he
scampered away, but in his confusion, reached his house only at around 11:00 p.m., although the
same was only about one hundred fifty meters away from Bernardo's house. He did not call for
help. Eddie arrived a while later. Accused-appellant claimed not to have seen the actual killing,
having run away earlier. He, however, admitted finding a bolo, encrusted with blood, at his house.
He turned the same over to his brother, who, in turn, surrendered the same to the police.
Accused-appellant did not feel uneasy having Eddie around even if he knew of the latter's
participation in the crime. 8
After due trial, the court a quo rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused,
Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the
offense of Parricide which falls under Article 246 (of the Revised Penal Code), for
the death of his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, is hereby
sentenced by this court to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the
accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo
Quidato, Sr., the amount of P50,000.00, in accordance with current case doctrines
of the Supreme Court, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
From the aforesaid judgment of conviction, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning
the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF REYNALDO MALITA (EXH. C) AND EDDIE MALITA (EXH. D) IN
CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING (THE) EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE RAISED BY THE
ACCUSED AND DISREGARDING (ANY) ILL-MOTIVE OF REYNALDO AND EDDIE
MALITA IN KILLING THE VICTIM.
Accused-appellant must be acquitted.
In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by
Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to
testify on their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the
character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness
stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial
proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. 10 The voluntary admissions of an accused made
extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been
given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him. 11
The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn statements of the Malita
brothers, cites Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration." The inapplicability of this provision is clearly apparent. The confessions were
made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot
be said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's
existence.
Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same
inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an
uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in
writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. 12 It is undisputed that the
Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they
signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day. As ruled in People vs. Compil: 13
[T]he belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day even if prior to
the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect (of lack
of counsel) for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory
statements from accused-appellant. . . . Thus, in People vs. De Jesus (213 SCRA
345 [1992]) we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations
 without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
With regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant
having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by
the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the
wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. 14 Hence, Gina Quidato could
testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with
accused-appellant's case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant
directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case
without violating the marital disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students.
Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and
Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment
unfavorable to accused-appellant. Admittedly, accused-appellant's defense, to put it mildly, is
dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his
father's house on the strength of the latter's verbal threats, his incredulous escape from the
clutches of the two, his inexplicable failure to return home immediately, his failure to seek
assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him immediately after the
incident, and the nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita brothers as
the culprits, all suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion, no
matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution
cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond
reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused. 15 This the
prosecution has failed to demonstrate.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City in Criminal Case No. 89-9 dated March 2, 1994, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.
Consequently, let the accused be immediately released from his place of confinement unless
there is reason to detain him further for any other legal or valid cause. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Quidato, Jr., G.R. No. 117401, [October 1, 1998], 357 PHIL 674-684)

[G.R. No. 140634. September 12, 2002.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO

PANSENSOY, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Appellant shot to death the lover of his wife. The trial court found him guilty of murder. Hence,
this appeal.
Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in favor of appellant, which
is inconsistent with the findings of treachery and evident premeditation, the Court ruled that he
was guilty only of homicide. Appellant alleged that he saw his wife and the victim lying beside
each other, clad only in their underwear. The wife claimed that they were just resting inside the
house at the time appellant arrived. Under any of these two circumstances, it is easy to see how
appellant acted with obfuscation because of jealousy upon discovering his wife in the company of
another man, and the brazen admission by the man that he loved his wife. The situation was
aggravated by the fact that his wife brought their child along to her trysting place with her lover.
Extreme emotional pain could result from such a situation and produce such passion and anguish
in the mind of a betrayed husband as to deprive him of self-control.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; BURDEN OF PROOF. —

Self-defense as a justifying circumstance may exempt an accused from criminal liability when the
following requisites are met, namely: (1) there has been an unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression are reasonably necessary; and
(3) the person defending himself has not provoked the victim into committing the act of
aggression. The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified
is on the accused. In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution. AICDSa
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT, RESPECTED.
— The conflicting versions of the prosecution and of the defense as to who initiated the aggression
was settled by the trial court which gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Analie over
that of appellant. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand, was convinced of the truthfulness of Analie's testimony and not that of
appellant's. We find no reason to reverse or alter the evaluation of the trial court. We reiterate
the time tested doctrine "that a trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled
to great weight — even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES THAT DO NOT PERTAIN TO THE CRIME. — The
alleged flaws in the testimony of Analie do not serve to impair her credibility or diminish the
truthfulness of her remarks as to who initiated the aggression and fired the shot. The allegedly
incredible statements do not pertain to the act of killing, but rather to minor or incidental
matters which happened before and after the fact of killing. Analie's testimony that she had been
separated from appellant for three years which, as pointed out by appellant, was belied by the
age of their youngest daughter, does not necessarily impair her credibility. Analie's 3-year
separation from appellant does not preclude Analie's still having a child with appellant.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT NEGATED BY AN ALLEGEDLY DIFFERENT REACTION ON AN UNUSUAL INCIDENT.
— As to Analie's version that appellant interrogated Hilario before shooting him, suffice it to say
that it is a matter of common observation that the reaction of a person when confronted with a
shocking or unusual incident varies. As admitted by appellant himself, it was the first time he saw
his wife and Hilario together, veritably confirming what Bisaya had told him some time in April
1994 that Bisaya always saw his wife with someone else. It was not at all strange for appellant to
have asked Hilario if he really loved his wife. Were we to agree with the appellant and treat each
strange or unusual event in the occurrence of a crime, such as appellant's interrogation of the
victim, as basis for reasonable doubt, no criminal prosecution would prevail.
5. ID.; ID.; RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; WAIVED WHEN
NOT OBJECTED TO. — As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analie's testimony would have been
disregarded had appellant timely objected to her competency to testify under the marital
disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to
testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses
generally. The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first
offered as a witness. In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellant's failure to make a
timely objection to the admission of Analie's testimony.
6. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; POSITIVE TESTIMONY AGAINST AN UNCORROBORATED AND
DOUBTFUL SELF-DEFENSE, UPHELD. — From Analie's testimony, it is all too apparent that the first
requisite of self-defense is absent. The unlawful aggression did not come from the victim but
from appellant himself. The aggression not having come from the victim, appellant's claim of
self-defense cannot prosper. The trial court relied on Analie's testimony to convict appellant and
we find that her testimony is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. It is well-settled that
the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused.
On the other hand, a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated, if it is not only
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful by itself as
in the instant case.
7. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; FLIGHT IS INDICATIVE OF GUILT AND NEGATES SELF-DEFENSE. —
Appellant's behavior after the incident runs contrary to his proclaimed innocence. Appellant's act
of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident to the police authorities
are circumstances highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self-defense
8. CRIMINAL LAW; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PASSION AND OBFUSCATION; ELEMENTS. — In
order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following
elements should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant was on his way home from his duty as a
security guard when he met Bisaya who told him that he saw his wife and youngest child board a
jeepney with the victim, Hilario. Appellant and Bisaya followed them. Appellant claims that he
saw his wife and the victim lying beside each other, clad only in their underwear. Analie claims
that they were just resting inside the house at the time appellant arrived. Under any of these two
circumstances, it is easy to see how appellant acted with obfuscation because of jealousy upon
discovering his legitimate wife in the company of another man and the brazen admission by this
man that he loved his wife. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Analie brought their
child along to her trysting place with Hilario. Extreme emotional pain could result from such a
situation and produce such passion and anguish in the mind of a betrayed husband as to deprive
him of self-control. To be blinded by passion and obfuscation is to lose self-control. In this case,
there is a clear showing that there were causes naturally tending to produce such powerful
passion as to deprive the accused of reason and self-control. Furthermore, the act producing the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the appellant might have regained his equanimity. It appears that only a few
minutes elapsed between the time appellant discovered the two in the room and the killing. Thus,
appellant can be given the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. TcCSIa
10. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NOT
APPRECIATED IN THE PRESENCE OF PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. — In view of our earlier
pronouncement crediting in favor of appellant the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, we have to rule out treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances.
Treachery cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation. The reason for this is that in passion, the
offender loses his control while in treachery the means employed are consciously adopted. One
who loses reason and self-control cannot deliberately employ a particular means, method or form
of attack in the execution of the crime. Similarly, the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot co-exist with the circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by calm thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient
to arrive at a composed judgment.
11. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; ELEMENTS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The elements
of evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance are: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will. Verily, a finding that there was a preconceived plan to kill would negate
passion and obfuscation. However, nothing in the records shows how and when appellant hatched
his plan to kill, or how much time had elapsed before appellant carried out his plan. On the
contrary, appellant was on his way home from his duty as a security guard when he chanced upon
Bisaya who told him that he saw his wife and child with Hilario. The mere fact that he brought his
gun along or happened to have it in his person does not, by itself, necessarily indicate a
preconceived plan to kill. The carrying of arms, if customary, does not indicate the existence of
the second requisite.

12. ID.; HOMICIDE; PROPER PENALTY CONSIDERING ONE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND
APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW. — The crime proven is homicide with the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. With the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, the penalty which may be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code isreclusion temporal in its minimum period. Appellant is entitled to the
benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law as well, which allows the imposition of an
indeterminate sentence, with the minimum period within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law and the maximum period within the range of the latter after appreciating
any modifying circumstances. Appellant can thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
13. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; CIVIL INDEMNITY, MORAL DAMAGES AND AWARD FOR LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY, AWARDED IN CASE AT BAR. — Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we sustain the
award of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of Hilario. The amount is awarded without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime and the consequent death of the victim. An appeal
in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of this
Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of an
assignment of error or not. Therefore, we delete the award of P40,000.00 as actual damages. To
seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable. Since the prosecution did not present receipts to prove the actual losses suffered,
such actual damages cannot be awarded. We raise the award of moral damages from P20,000.00
to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence for the pain wrought by Hilario's death as
testified to by Gregoria, mother of the victim. The trial court overlooked the award for loss of
earning capacity despite the testimony of Gregoria on her son's daily income. The absence of
documentary evidence to substantiate the claim for the loss will not preclude recovery of such
loss. Loss of earning capacity is computed based on the following formula. Net Earning Capacity
equals life expectancy multiplied by Gross Annual Income (GAI) minus living expenses (50% of
GAI).

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated September 13, 1999 in Criminal Case No.
94-11527 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, convicting appellant Roberto
Pansensoy ("appellant" for brevity) of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P40,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages.
The Charge
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando L. Gonzales filed an Information 2 charging appellant with
the crime of murder, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 8th day of May, 1994, in the Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and by means
of treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Hilario Reyes y Inovero, hitting him
on his forehead, thereby inflicting upon him a mortal gunshot wound, which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Arraignment and Plea
When arraigned on February 20, 1995, the appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty. 3 Thereafter, trial on the merits followed.
The Trial
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Analie Pansensoy, eyewitness to the
actual shooting of the victim; (2) Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, the medico-legal officer who conducted
the autopsy on the victim; (3) SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote, the police officer who conducted the
investigation of the incident; (4) Gregoria Reyes, mother of the victim; and (5) Rogelio Fullente,
neighbor of the victim. For its part, the defense presented the appellant as its lone witness.
Version of the Prosecution
Analie Pansensoy ("Analie" for brevity), twenty-eight years old, is the legitimate wife of appellant.
She testified that she had been living-in with the victim, Hilario Reyes ("Hilario" for brevity), since
February 1994. On May 8, 1994, she and Hilario were in the house they were renting at Lumang
Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal. Hilario was lying down inside the house. She stood up when she heard a
knocking on the door. As she opened the door, she saw appellant holding a gun. She embraced
appellant and tried to wrest the gun away from him but she failed. Hilario went out of the house
and sat on a bench. Appellant approached Hilario and asked him if he really loves his wife. Hilario
answered in the affirmative. Appellant next asked Hilario if he was still single. Hilario answered
yes. Appellant counted one to three and at the count of three shot Hilario. Hilario was hit on the
forehead and sprawled on the ground. 4
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, physician, conducted the autopsy on the victim at the St. James Funeral
Parlor at past midnight on May 9, 1994. He found a single gunshot wound on the forehead which
was the cause of death. He opined that the entry shows the area of smudging which indicates that
Hilario was shot at close range. The distance of the muzzle of the gun from the forehead could be
less than three inches. He also opined that the person who fired the shot and Hilario were facing
each other. 5
SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote, member of the Philippine National Police, conducted the investigation on
the shooting of Hilario. He took the statements of Gregoria Reyes and Analie in the police station
a day after the incident. He did not conduct an ocular inspection at the scene of the crime. 6
Gregoria Reyes ("Gregoria" for brevity), mother of Hilario, testified that she came to know about
the death of her son through a neighbor, Roger. She found out that her son was dead upon arrival
at the hospital and was taken to the funeral parlor. She saw the gunshot wound on the forehead
of her son. On the same night of May 8, 1994, she went to the police station where she saw Analie
give her statement to the police. She also gave her statement to the police. As a result of the
death of her son, she incurred expenses in the amounts of P10,000.00 and P30,000.00 for the
funeral and the burial, respectively. At the time of his death, her son was managing two
passenger jeepneys, one of which he was also driving. He was earning P800.00 a day. 7
Rogelio Fullente ("Rogelio" for brevity), fifty-six years old, is a co-driver of Hilario in the
Antipolo-Marikina route. He was the neighbor referred to by Gregoria in her testimony as Roger,
who reported to her the shooting incident. He has known Hilario for ten to fifteen years. In the
evening of May 8, 1994, he was in his home in Lumang Bayan which was about ten meters away
from where Hilario was staying. According to him, their houses were separated by a driveway
which could accommodate one jeep. He heard several knocks and opened the door of his house.
When he opened the door he found out that somebody was knocking on the door of Hilario and
ordering him to come out. The first time he saw the man knocking on Hilario's door, the man was
not carrying anything. When he heard a gunshot, he opened the door again and saw the man
carrying something before he left. Rogelio further narrated that when the man asked Hilario to
come out, Hilario was standing by the door. The man asked Hilario if he loved his wife and Hilario
answered yes. The man then fired a shot and Hilario's head bent forward before he fell down. He
does not know the caliber of the gun but just heard the gunshot. He went to the parents of Hilario
to report the incident. On cross-examination, Rogelio testified that when appellant knocked on
the door, it was Hilario who opened the door. Hilario sat on the bench by the door. When Hilario
answered yes to appellant's question of whether he loved his wife, appellant immediately fired a
shot. Rogelio testified that he watched appellant fire the shot and then left to report the incident
to the parents of Hilario. 8
Version of the Defense
As expected, the defense had a different version as told by the appellant himself.
Appellant, twenty-eight years old and a security guard, invoked self-defense in his testimony. He
testified that Analie is his wife and they have three children. According to him, their relationship
as husband and wife was normal.
On May 8, 1994, at about 6:30 p.m., a certain Amadong Bisaya ("Bisaya" for brevity) told him that
he saw his wife with their youngest child and "Tisoy," referring to Hilario, board a jeep on their
way to Lumang Bayan. He had met Bisaya before when the latter told him some time in April 1994
that he always saw appellant's wife with another man. He asked Bisaya to accompany him to
Lumang Bayan where Bisaya pointed to the room where his wife and "Tisoy" entered.
The appellant kicked the door of the room and there he found his wife and "Tisoy" lying beside
each other. They were only clad in their underwear. He dragged his wife out of the room by her
hair and while doing so, he saw "Tisoy" pull a gun from the table which was covered with clothes.
He let go of his wife and jumped on "Tisoy" to grab the gun.
While they struggled for possession of the gun he hit the testicles of "Tisoy" with his knees. "Tisoy"
fell on his knees but was still holding the gun. Still grappling for possession of the gun, appellant
held on to the back portion of the gun and part of the trigger, while his other hand held Hilario's
hand which was holding the butt of the gun. When Hilario knelt down, appellant was able to twist
Hilario's hand and to point the barrel of the gun towards the latter.

The gun suddenly went off. At that moment, "Tisoy" was holding the trigger of the gun. "Tisoy"
was shot on the head and fell down. It was "Tisoy" who was holding the trigger when the gun fired
and hit him on the head. "Tisoy" was still holding the gun when he fell to the floor.
He confronted his wife and pulled her hair and slapped her. His wife was just seated in the corner
of the room. He asked her where their child was. But before she could answer, their child went
inside the room and embraced her mother very tightly. He tried to pull their daughter away from
Analie but the latter did not let go of the child. He told Analie that he would kill her too if she did
not release the child. He started to count "one, two," which made his wife release their daughter.
He left the room with the child and proceeded to their house. "Tisoy" was still sprawled on the
ground face down when he left." 9
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Analie and rejected the
version of the appellant that he acted in self-defense. It found the testimony of Analie credible
and observed that she remained unperturbed during the cross-examination. The trial court also
noted that appellant, who was then a security guard, was charged by his employer with the crime
of qualified theft for the loss of a .38 caliber revolver. Appellant allegedly committed the theft on
May 8, 1994, the very same day the shooting incident happened. The gun used in shooting the
victim was not found at the scene of the crime but the slug recovered was that of a .38 caliber
revolver. Although appellant was subsequently acquitted of the charge, the trial court considered
this as "evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime." The trial court further noted that
appellant went into hiding from the time the shooting incident happened until the case was filed
in court on August 24, 1994.
The trial court pronounced judgment thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt with the crime of murder and is hereby sentenced to the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua. The accused is hereby further ordered to pay the heirs of
Hilario Reyes y Inovero the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and
P40,000.00 and P20,000.00 as actual or compensatory and moral damages,
respectively.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED." 10
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issues
Appellant is before this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE ANY OF THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES."
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue: Self-Defense
Appellant insists that he acted in self-defense. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance may
exempt an accused from criminal liability when the following requisites are met, namely: (1)
there has been an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression are reasonably necessary; and (3) the person defending himself
has not provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression. 11 The burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified is on the accused. 12 In doing so, he
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution. 13
Appellant asserts that the unlawful aggressor was the victim and his death could be attributed to
himself alone. By his own testimony, appellant tried to prove unlawful aggression on the part of
Hilario. According to him, he kicked the door, and when it opened he saw his wife and Hilario
inside the room clad in their underwear. He pulled the hair of his wife and dragged her outside
while she was embracing him. At this point, Hilario pulled a gun from the table. He let go of his
wife, jumped on Hilario and grappled for possession of the gun. While trying to wrest the gun
from Hilario, he hit Hilario's testicles with his knees. Hilario fell on the floor but was still holding
the gun. When Hilario knelt down, appellant was able to hold and twist Hilario's hand, pointing
the gun towards the latter. The gun suddenly went off and Hilario was hit on the head.
On the other hand, Analie testified that when she opened the door to their room, she saw
appellant holding a gun. She embraced appellant and tried to wrest the gun from him but failed.
Hilario went out and sat on a bench. Appellant approached him and asked him questions.
Appellant counted and, at the count of three, shot Hilario in the head.
The conflicting versions of the prosecution and of the defense as to who initiated the aggression
was settled by the trial court which gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Analie over
that of appellant. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand, was convinced of the truthfulness of Analie's testimony and not that of
appellant's.
Undeterred, appellant's first assignment of error is focused on the sufficiency of the evidence for
the prosecution, questioning in particular the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution's eyewitness, Analie. According to him, Analie's testimony is flawed as she insisted
that she and appellant had been separated for more than three years but this is belied by the fact
that their youngest daughter is barely a year old. He also points out that appellant's version that
he dragged his wife outside by pulling her hair was more believable and in accord with human
behavior rather than Analie's version that appellant took time to interrogate the victim regarding
how much the latter loved his wife and other personal circumstances before shooting him.
We find no reason to reverse or alter the evaluation of the trial court. We reiterate the time
tested doctrine "that a trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
weight — even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence." 14 The alleged flaws in the testimony of Analie do not
serve to impair her credibility or diminish the truthfulness of her remarks as to who initiated the
aggression and fired the shot.
The allegedly incredible statements do not pertain to the act of killing, but rather to minor or
incidental matters which happened before and after the fact of killing. Analie's testimony that
she had been separated from appellant for three years which, as pointed out by appellant, was
belied by the age of their youngest daughter, does not necessarily impair her credibility. Analie's
3-year separation from appellant does not preclude Analie's still having a child with appellant. As
to Analie's version that appellant interrogated Hilario before shooting him, suffice it to say that it
is a matter of common observation that the reaction of a person when confronted with a shocking
or unusual incident varies. 15 As admitted by appellant himself, it was the first time he saw his
wife and Hilario together, veritably confirming what Bisaya had told him some time in April 1994
that Bisaya always saw his wife with someone else. It was not at all strange for appellant to have
asked Hilario if he really loved his wife. Were we to agree with the appellant and treat each
strange or unusual event in the occurrence of a crime, such as appellant's interrogation of the
victim, as basis for reasonable doubt, no criminal prosecution would prevail. 16
In any event, a thorough evaluation of the transcript of stenographic notes indicates that Analie,
as observed by the trial court, testified in a candid and straightforward manner as follows:
"Q: Why do you know said Hilario Reyes?
A: He is my live-in partner.
Q: When did you start to be the live-in partner of Hilario Reyes?
A: February 1994.
Q: Up to what time did you become to be the live-in partner of Hilario Reyes?
A: Three months.
Q: What was the reason why your live-in relationship lasted only three months?
A: Because Roberto killed Hilario Reyes.
Q: When was this Hilario Reyes killed?
A: May 8, 1994.
Q: Where was he killed?
A: At Lumang Bayan.
Q: In what municipality?
A: Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal.
Q: How did you know that he was killed?
A: He was shot by Roberto Pansensoy.
Q: How did you know that he was shot by Roberto Pansensoy?
A: Because Roberto went there and he was holding a gun.
Q: On May 8, 1994 that you said Hilario Reyes was shot by Roberto Pansensoy,
where were you?
A: Inside the house, sir.
Q: Whose is that house you are referring to?
A: We are renting that house.
Q: With whom?
A: Hilario Reyes.
Q: Before this Hilario Reyes was shot, what was he doing?
A: He was already lying down.
Q: Lying down where?
A: Inside the house, sir.
Q: How long was he lying down?
A: Around fifteen minutes.
Q: After lying down for fifteen minutes, what did you do next?
A: I stood up because Roberto knocked on the door.
Q: What happened next after this Roberto knocked on the door?
A: I opened the door and I saw Roberto holding a gun.
Q: After you opened the door and you saw Roberto holding a gun, what happened
next?
A: I embraced Roberto and tried to wrestle the gun away from him but I did not
succeed.
 Q: When you were not able to succeed in taking the gun away from him, what
happened next?
A: Hilario went out, sat on the bench and Roberto approached him.
Q: And after Hilario went out and sat on the bench and Roberto approached him,
what happened next?
A: Roberto asked Hilario; do you really love my wife? And Hilario said, Yes.
Q: Who was this wife Roberto was referring to when he asked Hilario?
A: That's me.
Q: After Hilario answered that he really loved his wife which is you that is being
referred to, what happened next?

A: Roberto asked Hilario; are you still single, are you not married?
Q: What was the response of Hilario if there was any?
A: He answered yes.
Q: What happened next?
A: Roberto counted one to three and at the count of 3 he shot Hilario.
Q: Was Hilario hit by the shot that was made by Roberto?
A: Hilario was hit on the forehead and he sprawled on the ground." 17
Analie remained straightforward and consistent all throughout her cross-examination:
Q: Madam witness, you stated that you are the wife of the accused Roberto
Pansensoy, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you legally married to accused Roberto Pansensoy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And if you remember, when were you married?
A: 1990.
Q: Where were you married?
A: At Negros Occidental.
Q: You stated that on May 8, 1994, you were at Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal, am
I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what particular place at Lumang Bayan is that?
A: Inside the village.
Q: What were you doing then inside the village?
A: We are renting a house there.
Q: Who is your companion while renting that house?
A: Hilario Reyes.
Q: And who is this Hilario Reyes?
 A: The victim.
Q: What is your relation with the victim?
A: Live-in partner.
Q: How long have you been living in together, Madam Witness?
A: Three months.
Q: On that date May 8, 1994 you stated a while ago that you were resting together
with Hilario Reyes, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Inside the room of the house being rented by Hilario Reyes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was Hilario Reyes doing then?
A: He was laying (sic).
Q: Lying where?
A: Inside.
Q: Thereafter, what happened next while Hilario Reyes was resting?
A: I heard Roberto knock on the door.
Q: After which, what happened next, Madam Witness?
A: I opened the door and I saw Roberto.
Q: What did you do upon seeing Roberto on the door?
A: He was holding a gun and I embraced him, because I wanted to take the gun
away from him.
Q: Is it not because you feel that Roberto Pansensoy might inflict harm on your
living in partner, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir, I wanted to avoid trouble." 18
From Analie's testimony, it is all too apparent that the first requisite of self-defense is absent.
The unlawful aggression did not come from the victim but from appellant himself. The aggression
not having come from the victim, appellant's claim of self-defense cannot prosper. The trial court
relied on Analie's testimony to convict appellant and we find that her testimony is sufficient to
support appellant's conviction.
As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analie's testimony would have been disregarded had
appellant timely objected to her competency to testify under the marital disqualification
rule. Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants. 19 However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a
criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses
generally. 20The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first
offered as a witness. 21 In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellant's failure to make
a timely objection to the admission of Analie's testimony.
We note that Rogelio was presented to corroborate Analie's testimony, but he gave a rather
confusing account of what he allegedly saw or heard on the night of the shooting. During his direct
examination, he claimed that he heard a gunshot, but on cross-examination he claimed that he
opened the door of his house and actually saw appellant shoot Hilario. In any event, it is
well-settled that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
convict an accused. 22 On the other hand, a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated, if it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also
extremely doubtful by itself 23 as in the instant case.
Moreover, appellant's behavior after the incident runs contrary to his proclaimed innocence.
Appellant's act of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident to the
police authorities are circumstances highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of
self-defense. 24
Lastly, we find it unnecessary to consider as corroborative evidence the charge of qualified theft
for the loss of a .38 caliber revolver filed against appellant by his employer security agency. The
trial court discussed at length that the offense was committed on the same day the shooting
incident happened and that the slug recovered from the scene of the crime was from a .38 caliber
revolver. According to the trial court, while the gun was not recovered from the scene of the
crime, it was "safe to assume that the accused had a gun when he went to the place of the
victim." While SPO1 Anclote testified regarding the nature of the slug, he admitted that he never
inspected the scene of the crime and that the slug was merely handed to him by SPO2 Catanyag
who was not presented in court to testify. Hence, reliance on this as evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime rests on shaky ground and is superfluous in light of Analie's credible
eyewitness account.
Second Issue: Passion and Obfuscation
Appellant argues for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
in his favor. According to appellant, when he confirmed with his own two eyes that his wife was
cheating on him, he lost his self-control and that his actuation arose from a natural instinct that
impels a husband to protect his wounded feelings. There is basis for this claim.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following
elements should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. 25
Appellant was on his way home from his duty as a security guard when he met Bisaya who told him
that he saw his wife and youngest child board a jeepney with the victim, Hilario. Appellant and
Bisaya followed them. Appellant claims that he saw his wife and the victim lying beside each
other, clad only in their underwear. Analie claims that they were just resting inside the house at
the time appellant arrived. Under any of these two circumstances, it is easy to see how appellant
acted with obfuscation because of jealousy upon discovering his legitimate wife in the company
of another man and the brazen admission by this man that he loved his wife. The situation was
aggravated by the fact that Analie brought their child along to her trysting place with Hilario.
Extreme emotional pain could result from such a situation and produce such passion and anguish
in the mind of a betrayed husband as to deprive him of self-control. To be blinded by passion and
obfuscation is to lose self-control. 26 In this case, there is a clear showing that there were causes
naturally tending to produce such powerful passion as to deprive the accused of reason and
self-control. 27
Furthermore, the act producing the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the appellant might have regained his
equanimity. It appears that only a few minutes elapsed between the time appellant discovered
the two in the room and the killing. Thus, appellant can be given the benefit of this mitigating
circumstance.
Third Issue: Qualifying Circumstances
The Information alleges two qualifying circumstances: treachery and evident premeditation. If
appreciated, any one of these will qualify the killing to murder. However, the trial court
convicted appellant of murder without stating the circumstance which qualified the killing to
murder.
In view of our earlier pronouncement crediting in favor of appellant the mitigating circumstance
of passion and obfuscation, we have to rule out treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying
circumstances. Treachery cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation. 28 The reason for this is
that in passion, the offender loses his control while in treachery the means employed are
consciously adopted. One who loses reason and self-control cannot deliberately employ a
particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. 29
Similarly, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot co-exist with the
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. 30 The essence of premeditation is that the execution
of the criminal act must be preceded by calm thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry
out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a composed judgment. 31
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG" for brevity) submits that evident
premeditation is present to qualify the killing to murder. According to the OSG, premeditation is
apparent from the fact that appellant went to the scene of the crime already carrying the gun
which he used to shoot the victim. The OSG argues that while appellant may have been a security
guard, he had no legal justification for bringing the gun to the victim's residence. His act of
bringing the gun to the crime scene is a clear indication of his preconceived plan to kill his wife's
lover. The elements of evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance are: (1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will. 32

Verily, a finding that there was a preconceived plan to kill would negate passion and obfuscation.
However, nothing in the records shows how and when appellant hatched his plan to kill, or how
much time had elapsed before appellant carried out his plan. On the contrary, appellant was on
his way home from his duty as a security guard when he chanced upon Bisaya who told him that he
saw his wife and child with Hilario. The mere fact that he brought his gun along or happened to
have it in his person does not, by itself, necessarily indicate a preconceived plan to kill. The
carrying of arms, if customary, does not indicate the existence of the second requisite. In People
vs. Diokno, 33 the Court held that the accused being from the province of Laguna and it being
customary on the part of the people of Laguna to carry knives, it cannot be inferred with
certainty that the intention of the accused who carried knives was to look for the deceased in
order to kill him. In like manner, it cannot be inferred with certainty that appellant already had
the intention to kill Hilario when appellant carried his gun on his way home after his duty as a
security guard.
Fourth Issue: Damages and Penalty
In view of the foregoing, the crime proven in this case is not murder, but only homicide 34 with
the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The penalty for homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. With the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation, the penalty which may be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Appellant is entitled to
the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law as well, which allows the imposition of an
indeterminate sentence, with the minimum period within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law and the maximum period within the range of the latter after appreciating
any modifying circumstances. Appellant can thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. 35
As for damages, the trial court ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the victim the following
amounts: P50,000.00 as indemnity; P40,000.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages;
and to pay the costs.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we sustain the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of
Hilario. The amount is awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime 36 and the consequent death of the victim.
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the
duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject
of an assignment of error or not. 37 Therefore, we delete the award of P40,000.00 as actual
damages. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable. 38 Since the prosecution did not present receipts to prove the actual losses suffered,
such actual damages cannot be awarded. We raise the award of moral damages from P20,000.00
to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence 39 for the pain wrought by Hilario's death as
testified to by Gregoria, mother of the victim. 40
The trial court overlooked the award for loss of earning capacity despite the testimony of
Gregoria on her son's daily income. The absence of documentary evidence to substantiate the
claim for the loss will not preclude recovery of such loss. 41 Gregoria testified that her son had
been earning P800.00 daily as manager and driver of two passenger jeepneys. 42 This amounts to
P19,200.00 monthly excluding Sundays. The defense did not object to Gregoria's testimony on her
son's earning capacity. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. 43 It was also established that at the
time of his death, Hilario was thirty-six (36) years old. 44 Loss of earning capacity is computed
based on the following formula: 45
Net = life expectancy x Gross Annual - living expenses
Earning Income (GAI) (50% of GAI)
Capacity [2/3(80-age
at death]

x 2(80-36) x GAI - [50% of GAI]

———
3

x 2(44) x P230,400 - P115,200

———
3

x 88 x P115,200
———
3

x 29.33 x P115,200
Net earning capacity = P3,379,200.00
WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City in Criminal
Case No. 94-11527 is MODIFIED. Appellant ROBERTO PANSENSOY is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, instead of murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into account the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to
Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. The
award of actual damages of P40,000.00 is DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and loss of earning capacity in the amount
of P3,379,200.00. AHCaES
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Pasensoy, G.R. No. 140634, [September 12, 2002], 437 PHIL 499-524)

[G.R. No. 125861. September 9, 1998.]

ROSITA G. TAN, EUSEBIO V. TAN, REMIGIO V. TAN, JR., EUFROSINA V. TAN,

VIRGILIO V. TAN and EDUARDO V. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
FERNANDO TAN KIAT, respondent.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioners.

Alan A. Leynes for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Herein private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of property against herein petitioners.
He claimed that he owns the subject properties as he bought it in 1954 from Mr. Tan Keh but was
unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his own favor in view of his foreign nationality at
the time of the sale. He alleged that, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh executed a deed of sale to Remigio Tan,
his brother and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties are to be
held in trust by Remigio for the benefit of private respondent. aSCHcA
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the RTC. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed the trial court's decision.
The flaw in the conclusion of the respondent court that the complaint stated a cause of action is
that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the complaint are deemed
hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a
cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to such rule, i.e.,
that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of
legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law. A more judicious resolution of a motion to
dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the consideration of the facts
alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may consider other
facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which the
courts are bound to take into account, and they are also fairly entitled to examine
records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the
demurrer to the complaint. CaTcSA

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; AVERMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT

DEEMED HYPOTHETICALLY ADMITTED UPON FILING OF MOTION TO DISMISS GROUNDED ON FAILURE
TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION; LIMITATIONS TO THE RULE. — The flaw in this conclusion is that,
while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the complaint are deemed
hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a
cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to such
rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor
allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or
conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor allegations of fact that falsity
of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant
matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to legally
impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading,
or by a document referred to; and nor to general averments contradicted by more specific
averments. aHSAIT
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF MOTION TO DISMISS; COURT NOT RESTRICTED TO THE FACTS
ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND INFERENCES DEDUCIBLE THEREFROM. — A more judicious
resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the
consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
Courts may consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and
jurisprudence which the courts are bound to take into account and they are also fairly entitled to
examine records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling
on the demurrer to the complaint.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION; LESSEE IS ESTOPPED OR PREVENTED FROM
DISPUTING THE TITLE OF HIS LANDLORD. — The execution of a lease contract between Remigio
Tan as lessor and private respondent as lessee over the subject properties, the existence of which
is established not only by a copy thereof attached to petitioners' motion to dismiss as Annex "1"
but by private respondent's own admission reflected in paragraph 6 of the complaint, already
belies private respondent's claim of ownership. This is so because Article 1436 of the Civil Code.
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence consistently instruct that a
lessee is estopped or prevented from disputing the title of his landlord. cEaTHD
4. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED AND SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION OF
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OVER SUBJECT PROPERTIES; ACTS OF STRICT DOMINION WHICH
ARE ANATHEMA TO THE CONCEPT OF A CONTINUING AND SUBSISTING TRUST. — In the
Memorandum of Encumbrances found at the back of TCT No. 53284 issued in the name of Remigio
Tan in 1958 attached as Annex "B" to the complaint, there appears a mortgage constituted by
Remigio Tan over the subject properties in favor of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in
1963 to guarantee a principal obligation in the sum of P245,000.00. Remigio could not have
mortgaged the subject properties had he not been the true owner thereof, inasmuch as under
Article 2085 of the New Civil Code, one of the essential requisites for the validity of a mortgage
contract is that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. There is thus no
denying that Remigio Tan's successful acquisition of a transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 53284)
over the subject properties in his name after having his brother's (Alejandro Tan Keh) title thereto
cancelled, and execution of a mortgage over the same properties in favor of Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, undoubtedly, are acts of strict dominion which are anathema to
the concept of a continuing and subsisting trust private respondent relies upon.
5. ID.; SALE; DOUBLE SALE; BUYER IN POSSESSION OF TORRENS TITLE AND HAD THE DEED OF SALE
REGISTERED PREVAILS. — Private respondent alleged that he bought the subject properties from
Alejandro Tan Keh in 1954 but nonetheless failed to present any document evidencing the same,
while Remigio Tan, as the other buyer, had in his name TCT No. 53284 duly registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Manila on October 13, 1958. Remigio Tan, beyond doubt, was the buyer
entitled to the subject properties since the prevailing rule is that in the double sale of real
property, the buyer who is in possession of a Torrens title and had the deed of sale registered
must prevail.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL EVIDENCE; DEAD MAN'S STATUTE. — Petitioners are in
possession of TCT No. 117898 which evidences their ownership of the subject properties. On the
other hand, private respondent relies simply on the allegation that he is entitled to the properties
by virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is now dead. Obviously, private
respondent will rely on parol evidence which, under the circumstances obtaining, cannot be
allowed without violating the "Dead Man's Statute" found in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. ESCacI
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE RULE. — The object and purpose of the rule is
to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard of the transaction in question on
the part of the surviving party, and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality
in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.
8. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF OWNERSHIP AND OTHER RIGHTS; RIGHT TO SEEK RECONVEYANCE
OF PROPERTY ACTUALLY IN POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFF IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE ONLY IF IT COVERS
SITUATION WHERE POSSESSION IS IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER; HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA VS. CA,
ET AL. — Reliance on the Olvigacase is misplaced. Private respondents in Olviga were actually
occupying the subject land fraudulently registered in the name of Jose Olviga in a cadastral
proceeding as owners. The rightful application of the doctrine highlighted in Olviga that the right
to seek reconveyance of property actually in possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible would
only cover a situation where the possession is in the concept of an owner. But by a further reading
of Olviga which emphasized that ". . . if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual
possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to
the property, does not prescribe. TCHcAE
9. ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case, however, private respondent's occupation of the subject
properties was never in the concept of an owner since he was a mere lessee who, as herein before
discussed, is estopped from denying the title of Remigio Tan as owner-lessor. At best, private
respondent's stay on the properties as lessee was by "license or by mere tolerance" which, under
Article 1119 of the Civil Code, "shall not be available for the purposes of possession." It thus
becomes evident that the filing of private respondent's complaint in 1993 — thirty five (35) years
after TCT No. 53284 in the name of Remigio Tan was registered and eighteen (18) years after the
issuance of TCT No. 117898 in the names of petitioners — was way beyond the ten (10)-year time
limit within which reconveyance of property based on an implied trust should be instituted.
Private respondent's cause of action, assuming that it exists, has clearly prescribed.
10. ID.; LACHES; A LESSEE CANNOT ASSERT ADVERSE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP AGAINST
LESSOR-OWNER. — Private respondent's possession of the subject properties cannot be made the
basis to deflect the effects of laches because he is a mere lessee who, to repeat, cannot assert
any adverse claim of ownership over the subject properties against the lessor-owner. His mistake,
if it is one, is that he tarried for thirty (30) years before formally laying claim to the subject
properties before the court. Considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is
strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to
enforce his right when the same is threatened or invaded. Thus, private respondent is estopped
by laches from questioning the ownership of the subject properties. aSDHCT

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J p:
This petition assails the Decision of public respondent Court of Appeals dated May 28,
1996 1 reversing the Order of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, dated December 15,
1993, 2 dismissing the complaint for recovery of property filed by private respondent Fernando
Tan Kiat against petitioners. Cdpr
The controversy centers on two (2) parcels of land (hereafter, subject properties) situated at 970
M.H. del Pilar Street, Malate, Manila previously owned by one Alejandro Tan Keh and which were
then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35656 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
Private respondent, in his complaint filed on October 18, 1993, 3 claimed that he bought the
subject properties from Mr. Tan Keh in 1954 for P98,065.35, built his house thereon, but was
unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his favor in view of his foreign nationality at the
time of the sale. Nonetheless, as an assurance in good faith of the sales agreement, Mr. Tan Keh
turned over to private respondent the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 35656 and, in addition,
executed a lease contract in favor of private respondent for a duration of forty (40) years.
However, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan, his brother and father
of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties are to be held in trust by
Remigio for the benefit of private respondent and that Remigio would execute the proper
documents of transfer in favor of private respondent should the latter at anytime demand
recovery of the subject properties. TCT No. 35656 was thus cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No.
53284 was issued in the name of Remigio. Another contract of lease was executed by Mr. Tan Keh
and Remigio in favor of private respondent to further safeguard the latter's interest on the
subject properties, but private respondent never paid any rental and no demand whatsoever for
the payment thereof had been made on him. Remigio was killed in 1968. At his wake, petitioners
were reminded of private respondent's ownership of the subject properties and they promised to
transfer the subject properties to private respondent who by then had already acquired Filipino
citizenship by naturalization. Petitioners, however, never made good their promise to convey the
subject properties despite repeated demands by private respondent. In fact, petitioners had the
subject properties fraudulently transferred to their names under TCT No. 117898. Thus, the filing
of the complaint for recovery of property.
On November 10, 1993, petitioners filed a Motion To Dismiss 4 the complaint, claiming that: (1)
the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) the cause of action has long prescribed; (3) the cause
of action has long been barred by a prior judgment; and, (4) the claim has been waived,
abandoned and/or extinguished by laches and estoppel. An Opposition to Motion To Dismiss with
Memorandum 5 was filed by private respondent on November 29, 1993. In turn, petitioners on
December 1, 1993 filed their Memorandum of Authorities. 6
Thereafter, the trial court on December 15, 1993 issued an order dismissing private respondent's
complaint, acceding to all the grounds set forth by petitioners in their motion to dismiss.
Dissatisfied, private respondent appealed to public respondent CA which set aside the dismissal
and ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied by respondent CA in its Resolution dated July 31, 1996. 7
Now before us via this petition for review, petitioners insist on the propriety of the trial court's
order of dismissal, and reiterate, by way of assignment of errors, the same grounds contained in
their motion to dismiss, to wit:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF
ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED.
III.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF
ACTION IS BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S CLAIM HAS
BEEN WAIVED, ABANDONED OR OTHERWISE EXTINGUISHED.
There is merit in the petition.
There are three (3) reasons which warrant the reversal of the assailed decision of respondent
court.
Respondent court's reading of the complaint is that it stated a cause of action, saying that:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The legal right of the appellant as stated in his complaint, is his right to demand
transfer of title to him the property which is held in trust for him by the appellees.
The correlative obligation of the appellees, on the other hand, is to deliver title
over the property to the appellant which they are holding in trust for the former,
upon the termination of the trust relationship, that is, when the appellant finally
demanded that the title of the property be transferred in his name. The act or
omission on the part of the appellees which constitutes the violation of the
appellant's right to secure title to the properties he owns and possesses, is their
refusal to transfer the title of the property in the appellant's name. All these
averments the appellees hypothetically admit when they filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action. The trial court
could have rendered a valid judgment upon these hypothetically admitted
averments in accordance with the prayer in the complaint which is to have the
title to the property held in trust by the appellee transferred in the appellant's
name."
The flaw in this conclusion is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in
the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss
grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, it did not take into account the equally
established limitations to such rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of
mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law;
nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor
allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor
surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insert the opposing
party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record
incorporated in the pleading, or by a document referred to; and, nor to general averments
contradicted by more specific averments. 8 A more judicious resolution of a motion to dismiss,
therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the consideration of the facts alleged
in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may consider other facts
within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which the courts are
bound to take into account, 9 and they are also fairly entitled to examine records/documents
duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the demurrer to the
complaint. 10
Guided by these crucial limitations on hypothetical admissions, the "trust theory" being espoused
by private respondent in his complaint, and upon which his claim over the subject properties is
principally anchored, cannot hold water for the following reasons: LibLex
First: The execution of a lease contract between Remigio Tan as lessor and private respondent as
lessee over the subject properties, the existence of which is established not only by a copy
thereof attached to petitioners' motion to dismiss as Annex "1" 11 but by private respondent's own
admission reflected in paragraph 6 of the complaint, already belies private respondent's claim of
ownership. This is so because Article 1436 of the Civil Code, 12 Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court 13 and settled jurisprudence 14 consistently instruct that a lessee is estopped or
prevented from disputing the title of his landlord.
Second: In the Memorandum of Encumbrances found at the back of TCT No. 53284 issued in the
name of Remigio Tan in 1958 attached as Annex "B" 15 to the complaint, there appears a
mortgage constituted by Remigio Tan over the subject properties in favor of Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank in 1963 to guarantee a principal obligation in the sum of
P245,000.00. Remigio could not have mortgaged the subject properties had he not been the true
owner thereof, inasmuch as underArticle 2085 of the New Civil Code, one of the essential
requisites for the validity of a mortgage contract is that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of
the thing mortgaged. There is thus no denying that Remigio Tan's successful acquisition of a
transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 53284) over the subject properties in his name after having
his brother's (Alejandro Tan Keh) title thereto cancelled, and execution of a mortgage over the
same properties in favor of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, undoubtedly, are acts of
strict dominion which are anathema to the concept of a continuing and subsisting trust 16 private
respondent relies upon.
Third: There being no trust, express or implied, established in favor of private respondent, the
only transaction that can be gleaned from the allegations in the complaint is a double sale, the
controlling provision for which is Article 1544 of the Civil Code, to wit:
"Ar. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith."

Private respondent alleged that he bought the subject properties from Alejandro Tan Keh in 1954
but nonetheless failed to present any document evidencing the same, while Remigio Tan, as the
other buyer, had in his name TCT No. 53284 duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila on
October 13, 1958. 17 Remigio Tan, beyond doubt, was the buyer entitled to the subject
properties since the prevailing rule is that in the double sale of real property, the buyer who is in
possession of a Torrens title and had the deed of sale registered must prevail. 18
Fourth: Petitioners are in possession of TCT No. 117898 which evidences their ownership of the
subject properties. On the other hand, private respondent relies simply on the allegation that he
is entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is now
dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely on parol evidence which, under the circumstances
obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating the "Dead Man's Statute" found in Section 23, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
"Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. —
Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to put the two
parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one
party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. 19
Clearly then, from a reading of the complaint itself, the annexes attached thereto and relevant
laws and jurisprudence, the complaint indeed does not spell out any cause of action.
We agree with the petitioners' submission that private respondent's cause of action has prescribed.
TCT No. 53284 in the name of Remigio Tan was registered on October 13, 1958, while TCT No.
117898 in the name of his heirs, herein petitioners, was issued on April 21, 1975. Private
respondent filed his complaint on October 18, 1993. Respondent court held that the ten (10)-year
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property based on an implied trust cannot apply in
this case since private respondent was in actual possession of the subject properties, citing as
authority the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga v. CA, et al. 20 Thus:
"It is true that the prescriptive period within which to file an action for
reconveyance of property based on an implied trust is 10 years from the date of
issuance of a certificate of title thereon in accordance with Article 1144 of the
New Civil Code and jurisprudence (see Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, 227
SCRA 330 citing the case of Vda. de Portugal v. IAC, 159 SCRA 1780). But this rule
applies only when the plaintiff (the appellant) is not in possession of the property,
since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to
the property, does not prescribe (Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, supra;
underscoring supplied; see also Sapto v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683 and Faja v. Court of
Appeals, 75 SCRA 441 cited in the decision).
"The Court notes that, as alleged in the complaint, the appellant has been in
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property in the concept of an
owner since 1954; which allegation, by the appellees' motion to dismiss, has been
hypothetically admitted. Therefore, the appellant's cause of action is by
jurisprudence, even imprescriptible."
Reliance on the Olviga case is misplaced. Private respondents in Olviga were actually occupying
the subject land fraudulently registered in the name of Jose Olviga in a cadastral proceeding as
owners. The rightful application of the doctrine highlighted in Olviga that the right to seek
reconveyance of property actually in possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible would only
cover a situation where the possession is in the concept of an owner. This is bolstered not only
by Article 1118 of the New Civil Code, falling under the chapter Prescription of Ownership and
other Real Rights, which provides that:
"Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted." (emphasis ours),
but by a further reading of Olviga which emphasized that ". . . if a person claiming to be
the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe." 21
In this case, however, private respondent's occupation of the subject properties was never in the
concept of an owner since he was a mere lessee who, as hereinbefore discussed, is estopped from
denying the title of Remigio Tan as owner-lessor. At best, private respondent's stay on the
properties as lessee was by "license or by mere tolerance" which, under Article 1119 of the Civil
Code, "shall not be available for the purposes of possession." 22
It thus becomes evident that the filing of private respondent's complaint in 1993 — thirty five (35)
years after TCT No. 53284 in the name of Remigio Tan was registered and eighteen (18) years
after the issuance of TCT No. 117898 in the names of petitioners — was way beyond the ten
(10)-year time limit within which reconveyance of property based on an implied trust should be
instituted. Private respondent's cause of action, assuming that it exists, has clearly
prescribed. Cdpr
Finally, private respondent is guilty of laches. In negating the onset of laches, respondent CA
held:
"But the presumption of abandonment in asserting a right or declining to do so
does not apply to appellant. For the appellant has been and still is in actual,
peaceful and continuous physical possession of the property. Being in actual,
peaceful and continuous physical possession of the property cannot certainly be
said as non-assertion of a right to the property. Moreover, the appellee had
acknowledged the trust character of possession of the title, and the appellant
must certainly be granted the right to trust in that express assurance. The very
fact that the appellant asserts his rights vis-a-vis the appellees show that he has
not abandoned to secure the title to a very substantial property located in the
heart of Manila."
Private respondent's possession of the subject properties cannot be made the basis to deflect the
effects of laches because he is a mere lessee who, to repeat, cannot assert any adverse claim of
ownership over the subject properties against the lessor-owner. What ought to be in focus is that,
as alleged by private respondent in his complaint, he was not able to effect the transfer of title
over the subject properties in his favor upon his purchase thereof from Alejandro Tan Keh in 1954
because he was still a foreigner at that time. But private respondent later on claimed that he was
already a Filipino national when he reminded petitioners of his ownership of the subject
properties during Remigio Tan's wake sometime in 1968. It may be reasonably deduced from these
allegations that private respondent acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization, thus entitling
him to own properties in the 1960's, more or less. His mistake, if it is one, is that he tarried for
thirty (30) years before formally laying claim to the subject properties before the court.
Considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the
lack of merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when the same
is threatened or invaded. Thus, private respondent is estopped by laches from questioning the
ownership of the subject properties. 23
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated
May 28, 1996 and its Resolution of July 31, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof,
are hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered DISMISSING private respondent Fernando Tan
Kiat's complaint. cdphil
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125861, [September 9, 1998], 356 PHIL 555-570)

[G.R. No. 127745. April 22, 2003.]

FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA,

EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants, vs. HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, As Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy,respondents-appellees.

Jerry P. Trenas & Efrain B. Trenas for petitioners.

Tirol and Tirol for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS
Petitioners-appellants were claiming that the late Juan Bon Fing Sy owes them money, evidenced
by issued checks. Melecia T. Sy, administratrix of the estate, however, objected thereto and
invoked the Dead Man's Statute under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. She
denied the existence and legality of the loans and dispensed with the presentation of evidence
against the claims.
The Court sustained the claims of petitioners-appellants. Jade Montinola testified, on behalf of
petitioners-appellants Montinola, as to the genuineness of the late Mr. Sy's signature on the
checks. Thus, Mr. Sy was prima facie presumed to have become a party to the checks for value,
following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. This had not been rebutted. As to the
application of the Dead Man's Statute, it does not lie against Jade who was only a witness, not a
party to the case. Neither does it apply to the Sansons, as their separate claims were supported
by checks. As to the authenticity of the signature in their checks, while their testimonies had not
discharged the quantum of proof, the same had not been controverted.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF A RELATIVE; CREDIBILITY AND ADMISSIBILITY

THEREOF. — Relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in
determining either the credibility of the witness or — subject only to well recognized exceptions
none of which is here present — the admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of
relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment
of a witness' testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken as
diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it. aAEHCI
2. COMMERCIAL LAW; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW; CHECKS; PRESUMPTION OF
CONSIDERATION; MADE CONCLUSIVE WHEN NOT REBUTTED. — The genuineness of the deceased's
signature having been shown, he is prima facie presumed to have become a party to the check for
value, following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which reads: Section
24. Presumption of Consideration. — Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have
been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to
have become a party thereto for value. (Underscoring and italics in the original; emphasis
supplied), Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima
facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly
manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has
become conclusive.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; TESTIMONIES; QUALIFICATION OF
WITNESSES; DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF DEATH OF THE ADVERSE PARTY; WHEN NOT
APPLICABLE. — As for the administratrix's invocation of the Dead Man's Statute, the same does not
likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1)parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. . . . The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its
scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are
not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or
transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein. . . .
(Italics supplied)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION. — What the Dead Man's Statute proscribes is the
admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased.
The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and
Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the
bases of said checks.
5. ID.; ID.; PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE; AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS; HOW
GENUINENESS OF HANDWRITING PROVED; HANDWRITING ADMITTED THOUGH RULE NOT
FAITHFULLY DISCHARGED. — While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not
faithfully discharged the quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence which reads: Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of
a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person
because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. . . ., not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison with
the naked eye of the deceased's signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn
from the same account, they appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand. ESAHca

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J p:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision on May 31, 1996 and Resolution of December 9, 1996.
On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as
creditor, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 4497, for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who
died on January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount
of P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of
P360,000.00. 1
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later
filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and
P150,000.00, respectively. 2
By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the petition was raffled,
appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate,
following which she was issued letters of administration. 3
During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife
of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the
objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
otherwise known as the Dead Man's Statute which reads:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. —
Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. (emphasis
supplied)
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with
the deceased which is evidenced by six checks 4 issued by him before his death; before the
deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his (the deceased's) son
Jerry who told her that his father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and after
the death of the deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were
dishonored 5 due to the closure of his account. 6
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the
deceased issued five checks 7 to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the
deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for payment but were returned due to the
closure of his account. 8
Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles,
testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her
husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the
deceased, 9 two to Angeles and the other 10 to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died
or sometime in August 1989, they advised him that they would be depositing the checks, but he
told them not to as he would pay them cash, but he never did; and after the deceased died on
January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but were dishonored as the account against which
they were drawn was closed, 11 hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter 12 dated
February 6, 1990 addressed to the deceased's heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and
Symmels I & II but the checks have remained unsettled. 13
The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever existed, they had been paid and
extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in any event, barred by prescription. 14 And she
objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the
claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the
Dead Man's Statute.
Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted
that they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of
claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on
disqualification. HEcSDa

At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the deceased and
that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank. 15
After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate manifestations
informing the trial court that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their
claims. 16
Finding that the Dead Man's Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in support of the
subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an Order of December 8, 1993, 17 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby ordered, to pay, in
due course of administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the
amount of P603,500.00; Celedonia S. Saquin, in the amount of
P315,000,00; 18 Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P50,000.00 and Eduardo
Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from the assets and/or properties of
the above-entitled intestate estate.
On appeal by the administratrix upon the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] FOR FAILURE TO PAY
THE FILING FEES THEREON
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] BECAUSE [THEY ARE]
ALREADY BARRED BY THE LAW OF LIMITATIONS OR STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT[S'] EVIDENCE OF THE
CLAIM IS INCOMPETENT UNDER THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE, AND INADMISSIBLE.
 IV.
THE ALLEGED CHECKS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, 19
the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court, by Decision of
May 31, 1996, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another order is
entered dismissing the claims of:
1. Felicito G. Sanson in the amount of P603,500.00;
2. Celedonia S. Saquin in the amount of P315,000.00; 20
3. Angeles A. Montinola in the amount of P150,000.00; and
4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00 against the estate of the
deceased JUAN BON FING SY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The claimants' Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Court of Appeals decision having been denied
by Resolution of December 9, 1996, 22 they filed the present petition anchored on the following
assigned errors:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF JADE MONTINOLA IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CLAIMS OF
CLAIMANTS ANGELES A. MONTINOLA AND EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR.
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT
CLAIMANT FELICITO G. SANSON IS DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY [ON] THE CLAIM OF
CELEDONIA SANSON-SA[Q]UIN AND VI[C]E VERSA. (Emphasis in the original) 23
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the administratrix did not
deny the testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to controvert it, and neither did she deny
the execution and genuineness of the checks issued by the deceased (as well as the check return
slips issued by the clearing bank), it was error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the
Montinolas insufficient to prove their claims.
The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not categorically state that she saw the filling up
and signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade
had identical and unitary interest with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a
circumvention of the Dead Man's Statute. 24
The administratrix's counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has never been
recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the witness or — subject
only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here present — the admissibility of the
testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little
more caution in the assessment of a witness' testimony but is not necessarily a negative element
which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it. 25
Jade's testimony on the genuineness of the deceased's signature on the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas is clear:
xxx xxx xxx
 Q: Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and Trust
Company Check No. 84262, in the amount of P100,000,00, is this the check
you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose signature is this?
A: That is the signature of Mr. Sy.
Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A: Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he signed this check.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989, is this the check you are
referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that this is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262 dated
July 6, 1989, in the amount of P50,000.00, in the name of Eduardo
Montinola, are you referring to this check?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?
A: Mr. Sy's signature.
Q: Why do you know that it is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
xxx xxx xxx 26 (Emphasis supplied)
The genuineness of the deceased's signature having been shown, he is prima facie presumed to
have become a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law which reads:
Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. — Every negotiable instrument is
deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every
person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for
value. (italics in the original; emphasis supplied),
Since, with respect to the deceased issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption
was not rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.
As for the administratrix's invocation of the Dead Man's Statute, the same does not likewise lie.
The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so
as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not
included in the above enumeration are not prohibited testifying as to a
 conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took
no active part therein.
xxx xxx xxx 27 (Emphasis supplied)
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case
is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to
those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of
the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of
their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the
transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade,
the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence —
the checks.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as
witnesses to each other's claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man's
Statute; 28 besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she
cross-examined them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on
review, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like
interest, from testifying in each other's favor as to acts occurring prior to the
death of the deceased.
Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without
distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he
should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of "parties
or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and
Saquin on each other's behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the
prohibition. (Citation omitted; italics in the original and emphasis supplied)
But Sanson's and Celedonia's claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions.
Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia's claim. And Celedonia is a third party with
respect to Sanson's claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other's transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Man's Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence
upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to
the giving of testimony. 29 Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by
checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing
on the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonia's account, she "knows" the signature
of the deceased.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit "A" to "E", Please go over
these checks if you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy on
these checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And therefore, you know his signature?
A: Yes, sir.
 xxx xxx xxx 30
Sanson testified too that he "knows" the signature of the deceased:
Q: I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit "A" to "G-1" —
Saquin, please go over this if these are the checks that you said was (sic)
issued by the late Juan Bon Fing Sy in favor of your sister?
A: Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.
Q: Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 31
While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum
of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. . . .,
not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison 32 with the
naked eye of the deceased's signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks
were drawn from the same account, they appear to have been affixed by one and the same
hand.
In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims
against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who,
however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing
with the presentation of evidence against the claims.
WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and
another rendered ordering the intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through
Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay:
1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;
2) Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315,000.00; 33
3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and
4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00. representing unsettled
checks issued by the deceased.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Sanson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127745, [April 22, 2003], 449 PHIL 343-356)

[G.R. No. 180843. April 17, 2013.]

APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia,

and CRISTINA SALAMAT, petitioners, vs. DOMINGA ROBLES VDA. DE
CAPARAS, respondent.
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J p:

Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction." 1 Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas (Pedro) that he
entered into a sharing of leasehold lights with the petitioners cannot be used as evidence against
the herein respondent as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 seeks to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007
Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90403, 4 as well as its December 13,
2007 Resolution 5 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Flora Makapugay (Makapugay) is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Barangay Lugam, Malolos,
Bulacan (the land) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) RT-65932 (T-25198) 6 and
being tilled by Eugenio Caparas (Eugenio) as agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement.
Makapugay passed away and was succeeded by her nephews and niece, namely Amanda dela
Paz-Perlas (Amanda), Justo dela Paz (Justo) and Augusto dela Paz (Augusto). On the other hand,
Eugenio's children — Modesta Garcia (Garcia), Cristina Salamat (Salamat) and Pedro — succeeded
him.
Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio
died, or in 1974, Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement entitled "Kasunduan sa
Buwisan", 7 followed by an April 19, 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract, 8 covering the land. In
said agreements, Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone agricultural lessee and cultivator
of the land. SETaHC
Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, herein respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas
(Dominga), took over as agricultural lessee.
On July 10, 1996, the landowners Amanda, Justo and Augusto, on the one hand, and Pedro's
sisters Garcia and Salamat on the other, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
Lupa" 9 whereby Garcia and Salamat were acknowledged as Pedro's co-lessees.
On October 24, 1996, herein petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint 10 for nullification
of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro's heirs, represented by
his surviving spouse and herein respondent Dominga. Before the office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan, the case was docketed as Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Case No. R-03-02-3520-96.
In their Complaint, Garcia and Salamat claimed that when their father Eugenio died, they entered
into an agreement with their brother Pedro that they would alternately farm the land on a
"per-season basis"; that the landowner Makapugay knew of this agreement; that when Makapugay
passed away, Pedro reneged on their agreement and cultivated the land all by himself,
deliberately excluding them and misrepresenting to Amanda that he is Eugenio's sole heir; that as
a result, Amanda was deceived into installing him as sole agricultural lessee in their 1979
Agricultural Leasehold Contract; that when Amanda learned of Pedro's misrepresentations, she
executed on July 10, 1996 an Affidavit 11 stating among others that Pedro assured her that he
would not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights"; that in order to correct
matters, Amanda, Justo and Augusto executed in their favor the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
Lupa", recognizing them as Pedro's co-lessees; that when Pedro passed away, Dominga took over
the land and, despite demands, continued to deprive them of their rights as co-lessees; that
efforts to settle their controversy proved futile, prompting the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee to issue the proper certification authorizing the filing of a case; and that they
suffered damages as a consequence. Petitioners prayed that the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold
Contract between Pedro and Amanda be nullified; that they be recognized as co-lessees and
allowed to cultivate the land on an alternate basis as originally agreed; and that they be awarded
P50,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of litigation.
In her Answer, 12 herein respondent Dominga claimed that when her father-in-law Eugenio died,
only her husband Pedro succeeded and cultivated the land, and that petitioners never assisted
him in farming the land; that Pedro is the sole agricultural lessee of the land; that Amanda's July
10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even date between her and the
petitioners are self-serving and violate the existing 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract; that
under Section 38 13of Republic Act No. 3844 14 (RA 3844), petitioners' cause of action has
prescribed. Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in possession of the land even while
Eugenio lived; that petitioners have never cultivated nor possessed the land even for a single
cropping; that Pedro has been the one paying the lease rentals as evidenced by receipts; that
when Pedro died in 1984, she succeeded in his rights as lessee by operation of law, and that she
had been remitting lease rentals to the landowners since 1985; and that petitioners had no right
to institute themselves as her co-lessees. She prayed that the Complaint be dismissed; that the
July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" be nullified; that the execution of a new leasehold
agreement between her and the landowners be ordered; and by way of counterclaim, that moral
damages 15 and litigation costs be awarded her. ICAcTa
Ruling of the PARAD
After hearing and consideration of the parties' respective position papers and other submissions,
the PARAD issued on May 4, 1998 a Decision, 16 which decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiffs and Order is hereby issued:
1. ORDERING the dismissal of the case;
2. DECLARING defendant Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas as lawful
successor-tenant;
3. ORDERING plaintiffs to maintain defendant in her peaceful possession
and cultivation of the subject landholding;
4. ORDERING the MARO of Malolos, Bulacan to execute a new leasehold
contract between the landowner and defendant Dominga Robles Vda.
de Caparas;
5. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 17
The PARAD held that Amanda's act of executing the July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa
Buwisan ng Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro's landholding and rights without cause; that
Amanda's 1996 disclaimer, after having installed Pedro as tenant in 1979, was belated and
unjustified; that petitioners have not shown by evidence that they actually cultivated the land, or
that they paid rentals to the landowners; that petitioners' cause of action has prescribed in
accordance with Section 38 of RA 3844; that for failure to timely question Pedro's leasehold, his
rights were transferred, by operation of law, to Dominga upon his death. Finally, the PARAD held
that petitioners' July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" is null and void for being issued
against Pedro's existing 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract, which has not been cancelled by
competent authority.
DARAB Case No. 03-03-10307-99
It appears that sometime after the execution of the July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
and during the pendency of DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, petitioners entered the land and
began tilling the same. For this reason, Dominga filed DARAB Case No. 03-03-10307-99, for
maintenance of peaceful possession with injunctive relief, against the landowners and petitioners.
On petitioners' motion, the case was dismissed. 18
Ruling of the DARAB
Petitioners appealed the May 4, 1998 PARAD Decision in DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96 to the
DARAB, where the case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 9722 19 (DCN 9722). Dominga likewise
appealed the dismissal of DARAB Case No. 03-03-10307-99, which appeal was docketed as DARAB
Case No. 11155 (DCN 11155). On motion, both appeals were consolidated. ADSTCa
On June 15, 2005, the DARAB issued its Decision, 20 the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas as the lawful successor-tenant of
Pedro Caparas over the subject landholding;
2. ORDERING the plaintiffs in DCN 9722 and the respondents in DCN 11155 or any
person acting in their behalves [sic], to maintain Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas
in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding;
3. ORDERING the MARO of Malolos, Bulacan, to execute a new leasehold contract
between the landowner and Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas; and
4. ORDERING for the dismissal of DCN 11155 for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED. 21
In upholding the PARAD Decision, the DARAB held that contrary to petitioners' claim, there was no
alternate farming agreement between the parties, and thus petitioners may not claim that they
were co-lessees; that Pedro merely shared his harvest with petitioners as an act of generosity,
and Dominga's act of stopping this practice after succeeding Pedro prompted petitioners to file
DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96 and claim the status of co-lessees; that Amanda's Affidavit and
the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between the landowners and petitioners cannot defeat
Pedro's 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract and his rights as the sole tenant over the land; that
for sleeping on their rights, petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming that they are
co-lessees; and that petitioners' 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" is null and void for being
contrary to law, morals, public policy, and Pedro's 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract, which
was subsisting and which has not been cancelled by competent authority.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
90403, seeking to set aside the DARAB Decision. The sole basis of their Petition rests on the
argument that as a result of a May 9, 2005 Order issued by the Regional Technical Director (Region
III) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the survey returns and plans
covering TCT RT-65932 have been cancelled, which thus rendered the June 15, 2005 DARAB
Decision null and void and a proper subject of certiorari. SIcCTD
On August 31, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Decision which decreed as follows:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 22
The CA held that the issue raised by petitioners — the cancellation of the survey returns and plans
covering TCT RT-65932 — was not part of their causes of action in the PARAD or DARAB, and this
new issue changed the theory of their case against Dominga, which is not allowed. The CA added
that it could not decide the case on the basis of a question which was not placed in issue during
the proceedings below.
The CA held further that even granting that the issues are resolved on the merits, the petition
would fail; the cancellation of the survey returns and plans covering TCT RT-65932 reverts the
property to its original classification as agricultural land which thus vindicates the leasehold
agreements of the parties. And speaking of leasehold agreements, the CA held that petitioners
may not be considered as Pedro's co-lessees, for lack of proof that they actually tilled the land
and with petitioners' own admission in their pleadings that they merely received a share from
Pedro's harvests; that the original 1974 and 1979 leasehold agreements between Makapugay,
Amanda and Pedro categorically show that Pedro is the sole designated agricultural lessee; and
that without proper legal termination of Pedro's lease in accordance with RA 3844, the
landowners cannot designate other tenants to the same land in violation of the existing lessee's
rights.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing that the land has been re-classified as residential
land, and has been actually used as such. Petitioners cited a 1997 ordinance, Malolos Municipal
Resolution No. 41-97, 23 which adopted and approved the zoning ordinance and the Malolos
Development Plan prepared jointly by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and the
Malolos Sangguniang Bayan. In the assailed December 13, 2007 Resolution, 24 the CA denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Issues
In this petition, the following errors are assigned:
1. . . . RESPONDENT'S ACT OF HAVING BUILT THREE (3) HOUSES (FOR HERSELF
AND TWO OF HER CHILDREN), WAS "CONVERSION OF THE FARMHOLD INTO A
HOUSING-RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION" AND THEREFORE, SHE IS NOT BEING PUT
IN SURPRISE NOR IN UNFAIR SITUATION. CONSEQUENTLY, SHE IS THE PARTY IN
ESTOPPEL. EaCSHI
AND FROM THE TIME BY HER ACTS OF SELF-CONVERSION OF THE LAND, IN THE
EARLY '90S OR EARLIER, SHE "LOST HER SECURITY OF TENURE" AS
AGRICULTURAL LESSEE.
2. THE DECISIONS OF THE DARAB PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR, DARAB CENTRAL
OFFICE, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPEAK OF NO HOMELOT
HAVING BEEN AWARDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
3. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CHANGE IN THE USE OF THE LAND FROM AGRICULTURAL
TO "RESIDENTIAL" MAY OCCUR AFTER TRIAL, BUT DURING THE APPEAL,
WHICH THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MAY CONSIDER.
4. "CONVERSION" (WHICH REQUIRES PRIOR APPROVAL BY THE DAR) HAVING
BECOME A "FAIT ACCOMPLI", SECTION 220 OF THE REAL ESTATE TAX
CODEAND ARTICLE 217 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AFFIRM
THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE TAX DECLARATION THAT IS, THE PREVIOUS
FARMHOLD HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO "RESIDENTIAL" LAND, AND
CONFIRMED BY THE CITY ZONING DIRECTOR.
5. IN NOT HAVING CONSIDERED THE TAX DECLARATION AND THE ZONING
CERTIFICATION . . ., THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A VERY
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR. 25
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply, 26 petitioners this time argue that in building houses upon the land
for herself and her children without a homelot award from the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Dominga converted the same to residential use; and by this act of conversion, Dominga violated
her own security of tenure and the land was removed from coverage of the land reform laws.
They add that the Malolos zoning ordinance and the tax declaration covering the land effectively
converted the property into residential land.
Petitioners justify their change of theory, the addition of new issues, and the raising of factual
issues, stating that the resolution of these issues are necessary in order to arrive at a just decision
and resolution of the case in its totality. They add that the new issues were raised as a necessary
consequence of supervening events which took place after the Decisions of the PARAD and DARAB
were issued. cTEICD
Respondent's Arguments
In her Comment, 27 Dominga argues that the Petition raises questions of fact which are not the
proper subject of a Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules. She adds that petitioners raised anew
issues which further changed the theory of their case, and which issues may not be raised for the
first time at this stage of the proceedings.
Our Ruling
The Petition is denied.
DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedro's death in 1984, has
no leg to stand on other than Amanda's declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit that Pedro
falsely represented to Makapugay and to her that he is the actual cultivator of the land, and that
when she confronted him about this and the alleged alternate farming scheme between him and
petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters had an understanding about it
and he did not have the intention of depriving them of their cultivatory rights." 28 Petitioners
have no other evidence, other than such verbal declaration, which proves the existence of such
arrangement. No written memorandum of such agreement exists, nor have they shown that they
actually cultivated the land even if only for one cropping. No receipt evidencing payment to the
landowners of the latter's share, or any other documentary evidence, has been put forward.
What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda's declaration in her
Affidavit covering Pedro's alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is
inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man's Statute, 29 which provides that "[i]f one party
to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." 30 Thus, since Pedro is deceased,
and Amanda's declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan
sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and which is now the
subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro's surviving spouse and lawful
successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used against the latter,
who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove such
declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro's prior death.
If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual agreement
with Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they should have
confronted Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility of their institution
as co-lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after the passing away of their father
Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant in 1979 and
long after his death in 1984, that they came forward to question Pedro's succession to the
leasehold. As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus
precluded from questioning Pedro's 1979 agricultural leasehold contract. TEcCHD
Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro deceived her into believing that he is the
sole successor to the leasehold. Part of her duties as the landowner's representative or
administrator was to know the personal circumstances of the lessee Eugenio; more especially so,
when Eugenio died. She was duty-bound to make an inquiry as to who survived Eugenio, in order
that the landowner — or she as representative — could choose from among them who would
succeed to the leasehold. Under Section 9 of RA 3844, Makapugay, or Amanda — as Makapugay's
duly appointed representative or administrator — was required to make a choice, within one
month from Eugenio's death, who would succeed as agricultural lessee. Thus:
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or
Incapacity of the Parties. — In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue
between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month
from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the
surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the
next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age: Provided, That
in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during
the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural
year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to
exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in
accordance with the order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold
shall bind his legal heirs. (Emphasis supplied)
Amanda may not claim ignorance of the above provision, as ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. 31 Thus, when she executed the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold
Contract with Pedro, she is deemed to have chosen the latter as Eugenio's successor, and is
presumed to have diligently performed her duties, as Makapugay's representative, in conducting
an inquiry prior to malting the choice.
The same holds true for petitioners. They should be held to a faithful compliance with Section 9.
If it is true that they entered into a unique arrangement with Pedro to alternately till the land,
they were thus obliged to inform Makapugay or Amanda of their arrangement, so that in the
process of choosing Eugenio's successor, they would not be left out. But evidently, they did not;
they slept on their rights, and true enough, they were excluded, if there was any such alternate
farming agreement between them. And after Pedro was chosen and installed as Eugenio's
successor, they allowed 17 years to pass before coming out to reveal this claimed alternate
farming agreement and insist on the same. ITDHcA
With the above pronouncements, there is no other logical conclusion than that the 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda and petitioners, which is grounded on Pedro's
inadmissible verbal admission, and which agreement was entered into without obtaining
Dominga's consent, constitutes an undue infringement of Dominga's rights as Pedro's
successor-in-interest under Section 9, and operates to deprive her of such rights and dispossess
her of the leasehold against her will. Under Section 7 32 of RA 3844, Dominga is entitled to
security of tenure; and under Section 16, 33 any modification of the lease agreement must be
done with the consent of both parties and without prejudicing Dominga's security of tenure.
This Court shall not delve into the issue of re-classification or conversion of the land.
Re-classification/conversion changes nothing as between the landowners and Dominga in regard
to their agreement, rights and obligations. On the contrary, re-classification/conversion can only
have deleterious effects upon petitioners' cause. Not being agricultural lessees of the land,
petitioners may not benefit at all, for under the law, only the duly designated lessee — herein
respondent — is entitled to disturbance compensation in case of re-classification/conversion of
the landholding into residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes. 34 Besides,
a valid re-classification of the land not only erases petitioners' supposed leasehold rights; it
renders them illegal occupants and sowers in bad faith thereof, since from the position they have
taken as alleged lessees, they are not the owners of the land.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed August 31, 2007 Decision and December 13,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Garcia v. Vda. de Caparas, G.R. No. 180843, [April 17, 2013], 709 PHIL 619-635)