Guy Vs Ca Facts:: Civpro April 18 - Abasta - Dy - Federico - Ricaplaza 1

1.
GUY vs CA
FACTS:
 The instant controversies arose from a family dispute. Sps Guy (owner of business) in order to protect the
assets of Northern Islands from their son, who has been disposing the assets of the corporation without
authority, the Stock certificates containing 20,160 shares were registered in the names of respondents sisters.
(Sps Guy previously incorporated Lincoln Continental as a holding company of the 50% shares of stock
(20,160) of Northern Islands in trust)
 Lincoln Continental filed with the RTC, Manila a Complaint for Annulment of the Transfer of Shares of Stock
against respondents. The complaint basically alleges that Lincoln Continental owns 20,160
shares of stock of Northern Islands; and that respondents, in order to oust Gilbert from the
management of Northern Islands, falsely transferred the said shares of stock in respondent sisters' names, and
that they PRAYED for an award of damages, management of Northern Islands be restored to Gilbert. TRO and
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to prohibit respondents from exercising any right of ownership over
the shares.
 RTC issued the TRO prayed for by Lincoln Continental directing respondents to restore to Gilbert the
shares of stock under controversy, as well as the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in a later date
(despite the issuance of TRO by CA to enjoin RTC from further hearing of the Case)
 CA Eighth Division issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction; and
directing Lincoln Continental to turn over the assets and records of Northern Islands to respondents.
 Gilbert filed with SC a petition for certiorari, alleging that the Court of Appeals (Eighth Division), in granting an
injunctive relief in favor of respondents, committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and that respondents resorted to forum shopping.
 Meanwhile Smartnet and Ignacio Law Offices filed with the MeTC, separate complaint for forcible entry
against respondents. The complaint alleges that respondents forcibly occupied its office space when they took
over the premises of Northern Islands
 On December 22, 2004, the Eighth Division issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondents
in CA-G.R. SP No. 87104
 respondents filed with CA 2 Supplemental Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Motion for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to Include Supervening Events.
o 1st - Named as additional respondents were 3-D Industries, Judge Laviña, and Sheriff Rabello, Jr.
This supplemental petition alleges that Gilbert, in an attempt to circumvent the injunctive writ issued
by the Eighth Division of the appellatecourt, filed with the RTC, Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint for
replevin on behalf of 3-D Industries, to enable it to take possession of the assets and
records of Northern Islands. (a writ of replevin in favor of 3D industries was issued by RTC but was
later reversed by CA)
o 2nd - additional respondents were Ignacio and Ignacio Law Offices, Smartnet, , Presiding Judges of
MeTC,, Sun Fire Trading Incorporated, Zolt Corporation, Cellprime Distribution Corporation,
Goodgold Realty and Development Corporation, John Does and John Doe Corporations.
Respondents alleged in the main that the new corporations impleaded are alter egos of Gilbert; and
that the filing of the forcible entry cases with the MeTC was intended to thwart the execution of the
writ of preliminary injunction
 CA admitted the respondent’s new pleading, and rendered its decision reversing and setting aside the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by the RTC and made the writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by CA
permanent
 Meanwhile, RTC, dismissed the complaint filed by Lincoln Continental and the
complaint-in-interventionof Gilbert . The trial court held that Civil Case No. 04-109444 is a baseless and an
unwarranted suit among family members; that based on the evidence, Gilbert was only entrusted to hold the
disputed shares of stock in his name for the benefit of the other family members; and that it was only when
Gilbert started to dispose of the assets of the family's corporations without their knowledge that respondent
sisters caused the registration of the shares in their respective names.
 Both Lincoln Continental and Gilbert timely appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals,
 Meanwhile
o 3-D Industries, Inc.’s petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with this Court assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87104 setting aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC, was DISMISSED
o Gilbert, petitioner in G.R. No. 165849 for certiorari, filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, andMandamus with Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division), dated August 19,
Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 1

2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 87104. This Decision set aside the Order dated October 13, 2004 of the
RTC, Branch 46 granting the writ of preliminary injunction in favor ofLincoln Continental.
o Ignacio and Ignacio Law Offices and Smartnet filed with this Court their petitions for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 170185 and 170186, respectively. Ignacio and Ignacio Law Offices and
Smartnet, petitioners, claim that the Court of Appeals never acquired jurisdiction over their respective
persons as they were not served with summons, either by the MeTC or by the appellate court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87104. Thus, they submit that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it included them in the coverage of its
injunctive writ.
 On February 27, 2006, Lincoln Continental filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari challenging the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) inCA-G.R. CV No. 85937, docketed as G.R. No. 171066.
 On March 20, 2006, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 171066 with G.R. Nos. 165849, 170185, and
170186.
 Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of RTC, dismissing Lincoln Continental's complaint and Gilbert's
complaint-in-intervention,
 Lincoln Continental and Gilbert filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but they were denied. Lincoln
Continental then filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Both Lincoln Continental and Gilbert claim that the latter holds legal title to
the shares in question.
ISSUE:
whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that petitioners Ignacio and Ignacio Law Offices and Smartnet are also covered by its Resolution granting
the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents – NO. CA validly acquired the jurisdiction of the
petitioners
HELD:
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and
determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law.
Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs all cases
originally filed with the Court of Appeals. The following provisions of the Rule state:
SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. — This Rule shall apply to original actions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto.
Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall be
governed by Rule 47, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus by Rule 65, and forquo
warranto by Rule 66.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. — The court shall
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or
resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such
jurisdiction.
SEC. 5. Action by the court. — The court may dismiss the petition outright with
specific reasons for such dismissal or require the respondent to file a comment on the same
within ten (10) days from notice. Only pleadings required by the court shall be allowed. All
other pleadings and papers may be filed only with leave of court.
It is thus clear that in cases covered by Rule 46, the Court of Appeals acquires jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondents by the service upon them of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the
petitions or by their voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. The reason for this is that, aside from the fact

that no summons or other coercive process is served on respondents, their response to the petitions will
depend on the initial action of the court thereon. Under Section 5, the court may dismiss the petitions outright,
hence, no reaction is expected from respondents and under the policy adopted by Rule 46, they are not
deemed to have been brought within the court's jurisdiction until after service on them of the dismissal order or
resolution.
Records show that on April 27, 2005, petitioners in these two forcible entry cases, were served copies
of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) dated April 26, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
87104. The Resolution states:
Private respondents SMARTNET PHILIPPINES, INC., IGNACIO & IGNACIO
LAW OFFICE, SUNFIRE TRADING, INC., ZOLT CORPORATION, CELLPRIME
DISTRIBUTION CORPO., GOODGOLD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP., are hereby
DIRECTED to file CONSOLIDATED COMMENT on the original Petition for Certiorari, the
First Supplemental Petition for Certiorari, and the Second Supplemental Petition
for Certiorari (not a Motion to Dismiss) within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the
original, first and second Petitions for Certiorari.
Pursuant to Rule 46, the Court of Appeals validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
Ignacio and Ignacio Law Offices and Smartnet upon being served with the above Resolution.
But neither of the parties bothered to file the required comment. Their allegation that they have been
deprived of due process is definitely without merit. We have consistently held that when a party was afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process for by such failure, he is deemed to have waived or forfeited his right to be heard without violating the
constitutional guarantee.
2. MOLINA VS. CA
FACTS:
On May 2, 1996, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published a news item, which reads in part:
PACC coddled GO,
2 NBI execs claim
By Teddy Molina
and Juliet Pascual
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau
xxx
NBI agents reportedly raided a vacation house in San Fernando, La Union, owned by
Raymundo Armovit, Gos lawyer, in September. They missed Go, who left the house hours
before the agents came.
The source said Go was also in Vigan in November, during which he attended the wedding
anniversary of a movie couple.[3]
On May 3, 1996, the same newspaper reported that:
NBI exec says Go
tipped off by PACC
By Teddy Molina
and Juliet Pascual
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau

AN OFFICIAL of the National Bureau of Investigation in Northern Luzon accused the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission of leaking out to Rolito Go a planned raid by NBI agents on
a vacation house in San Fernando, La Union, where the convicted killer was hiding at the time.
The raiders belonging to the NBI Special Operations Group missed Go but found some of his
personal belongings near the houses swimming pool, the source, who asked not to be identified
said.
This happened in September at the vacation home of Gos lawyer, Raymundo Armovit, or eight
months before the PACC arrested him on Tuesday in Lubao, Pampanga.
After the La Union raid, it was hard to track Go because he was moving as if he was receiving
advice, the source further claimed.
Raymundo Armovit filed a complaint for libel against petitioners, alleging that they caused to be
published reports that maliciously accused him of harboring and/or concealing a convicted
murderer.
Accordingly, on November 28, 1996, two Informations for libel were filed with the RTC of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur.[6]
On December 12, 1996, petitioners sought a review of the resolution dated October 31, 1996 by
the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. The latter reversed the findings of the Provincial
Prosecutor and directed the latter to withdraw the Informations filed.
However, the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur denied the motion to withdraw the indictments on the
ground that there was probable cause for the filing of the Informations. Petitioners moved to
reconsider the denial, but this motion was similarly denied.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari.
The CA dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals found that the copies of the assailed orders
of the trial court were purportedly certified, but there was no showing whatsoever of the
authority of the person who certified the same. Moreover, the seal of the trial court could not be
identified on the copies of said orders. Furthermore, the petition was not accompanied by all the
pleadings and documents pertinent thereto.
Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but this was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in dismissing the petition
RULING:
A litigation is a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the
facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form
and technicalities, asks that justice be done on the merits.[10] Hence, Rule 1, Section 6[11] of
the Rules of Court mandates that rules of procedure shall be liberally interpreted. In the instant
case, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in stressing too much petitioners
failure to comply with technicalities. We cannot attribute to petitioners the perceived defects on
the attached copies of the trial courts orders because petitioners did not have control over their
preparation. Moreover, Rule 131, Section 3 (ff) [12] of the Rules of Court lays the presumption
in petitioners favor that they followed the pertinent rules on attaching certified copies of the
orders subject of their petition below. As private respondent failed to show evidence to rebut
this presumption, the presumption must stand.
We likewise rule that in the present case, the alleged failure to attach all pleadings and
documents is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. In appropriate cases, the courts
may liberally construe procedural rules in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial
justice.[13] We have held that lapses in the literal observation of a procedural rule will be

overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or
unforeseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party, nor deprived the court
of its authority.[14] In the instant case, petitioners failure to append: (1) herein respondents
Answer to the Petition for Review filed on January 2, 1997; (2) petitioners Memorandum filed on
April 28, 1997; and (3) respondents Memorandum filed on May 16, 1997, all of which were
mentioned in the petition for certiorari before the appellate court do not touch on public policy,
nor do they deprive the appellate court of its authority. No right of respondent is prejudiced or
adversely affected.
Lastly, it is not required under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court that the trial judge
himself be impleaded in a petition for certiorari. The rule clearly states that a petition for
certiorari may be filed against the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.[15] The inclusion of the tribunal, which issued the decision, as nominal party, was
substantially complied with. When petitioners mentioned the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, they also referred necessarily to the judge who issued the assailed
resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
3. NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEAR CORPORATION PHILIPPINES vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS:
 Petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia Publico as a sewer. Under the terms
and conditions of her employment, Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but required
to work from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight.
 At about 10:00 P.M. Publico requested that she be allowed to leave the work
place early, as she was not feeling well due to a bout of influenza. Permission was
refused but nonetheless, Publico went home.
 Publico reported for work. To her mortification and surprise, however, the
security guard prevented her from entering the NYK premises, allegedly on
managements order. Publico requested to see the owner, one Stephen Ng. Her
request was declined. She was instead asked to come back the following day.
 When she was finally able to see Stephen Ng. When she inquired why she was
barred from reporting for work, Mr. Ng told her she was dismissed due to her refusal to
render overtime service.
 Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner corporation and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng.
 Labor Arbiter held Publicos dismissal to be illegal, disposing as follows:
 On appeal, the NLRC, affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.
 Petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a special civil action of
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals Petitioners ascribed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to public respondent NLRC for
affirming the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
 Appellate court dismissed the petition outright. The Court of Appeals pointed out
that there was non-compliance with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as the petition was merely accompanied by a certified xerox copy of the
assailed NLRC decision, instead of a certified true copy thereof as required by the
Rules of Court.

 Petitioners duly moved for reconsideration, explaining that they had requested
for a certified true copy of the NLRCs decision but since the original NLRC decision
was printed on onionskin was not legible, the NLRC itself photocopied the resolution
and certified it afterwards. As proof of payment of petitioners request for a certified true
copy of the NLRC decision, petitioners attached a copy of the official receipts issued by
the NLRC, which described the nature of the entry as CERT. TRUE COPY. Appellate
court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
 Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error in dismissing the case on purely
technical grounds, i.e., that the attached copy of the NLRC decision is a mere photocopy of the
original decision. - NO
RULING:
Petitioners contend that they have substantially complied with the requirements of Section
1, Rule 65, hence, in the interests of justice and equity, the Court of Appeals should have given
due course to their special civil action for certiorari.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners wanton disregard of the
Rule warrant the outright dismissal of their petition. She adds that the present petition raises
factual issues that the Court cannot pass upon at the first instance.
Section 1 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The precursor of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 3-96, which took effect on June 1,
1996, instructs us what a certified true copy is:
1. The "certified true copy" thereof shall be such other copy furnished to a party at his
instance or in his behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or
representatives of the issuing entity as hereinbefore specified.
3. The certified true copy must further comply with all the regulations therefor of the
issuing entity and it is the authenticated original of such certified true copy, and not a
mere xerox copy thereof, which shall be utilized as an annex to the petition or other
initiatory pleading. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the disputed document although
stamped as certified true copy is not an authenticated original of such certified true copy, but
only a xerox copy thereof, in contravention of paragraph 3 of the above-quoted guidelines.
Hence, no error may be ascribed to the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari
outright pursuant to paragraph 5 of Administrative Circular No. 3-96, which provides:
5. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the party using the documents required by Paragraph
(3) of Circular No. 1-88 to verify and ensure compliance with all the requirements therefor as
detailed in the preceding paragraphs. Failure to do so shall result in the rejection of such
annexes and the dismissal of the case. Subsequent compliance shall not warrant any
reconsideration unless the court is fully satisfied that the non-compliance was not in
any way attributable to the party, despite due diligence on his part, and that there are
highly justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to make such other disposition
as it may deem just and equitable. (Emphasis supplied.)
The members of this Court are not unmindful that in exceptional cases and for compelling
reasons, we have disregarded similar procedural defects in order to correct a patent injustice
made. However, petitioners here have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule.
Petitioners are hereby reminded that the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a

natural right nor a part of due process. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. [
Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
4. BULAWAN VS AQUENDE
Facts:
On 1 March 1995, Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages
against Lourdes Yap and the Register of Deeds before the trial court. Bulawan claimed that she
is the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
13733 having bought the property from its owners, brothers Santos and Francisco Yaptengco
who claimed to have inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. Bulawan alleged that Yap
claimed ownership of the same property and caused the issuance of TCT No. 40292 in Yaps
name.
In her Answer, Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of Lot No. 1634-A of Psd-187165,
which she claimed is the controlling subdivision survey for Lot No. 1634. Yap also mentioned
that, in Civil Case No. 5064, the trial court already declared that Psd-153847 was simulated by
the Yaptengco brothers and that their claim on Lot No. 1634-B was void.9 The trial court
likewise adjudged Yap Chin Cun as the rightful owner of Lot No. 1634-B. Yap also stated that
Lot No. 1634-B was sold by Yap Chin Cun to the Aquende family.
On 26 November 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of Bulawan. On 20 July 2001, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Yaps appeal.
On 7 February 2002, the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision became final and executory
per entry of judgment dated 20 July 2001. On 19 July 2002, the trial court issued a writ of
execution.
RD informed Aquende of the Writ of Execution; Aquende questioned it and alleged that he was
unaware of any litigation involving his property having received no summons or notice thereof,
nor was he aware of any adverse claim as no notice of lis pendens was inscribed on the title; All
his motions were likewise denied.
Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. CA ruled in favor of Aquende and reinstated the title to Aquende.
Bulawan filed a MR but was denied by the CA.
CA Ruling: it may still entertain the petition despite the fact that another division of the CA
already affirmed the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision. The other division of the Court of
Appeals was not given the opportunity to rule on the issue of Aquende being an indispensable
party because that issue was not raised during the proceedings before the trial court and on
appeal. The Court of Appeals said that the trial court should have impleaded Aquende under
Section 11, Rule 323 of the Rules of Court. Since jurisdiction was not properly acquired over
Aquende, the Court of Appeals declared the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision void.
According to the Court of Appeals, Aquende had no other recourse but to seek the nullification
of the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision that unduly deprived him of his property.
Issue: W/N the CA erred in ruling in favor of Aquende
SC Ruling: No. In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The

overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. On the other hand, lack of
jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim, and in either case the judgment or final order and resolution are
void. Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack
of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void.
In his petition for annulment of judgment, Aquende alleged that there was extrinsic fraud
because he was prevented from protecting his title when Bulawan and the trial court failed to
implead him as a party. Bulawan also maintained that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person and, therefore, its 26 November 1996 Decision is not binding on him. In its 26
November 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals found merit in Aquendes petition and declared
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Aquende, who was adversely affected by its
26 November 1996 Decision. We find no error in the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Aquende is a Proper Party to Sue for the Annulment of the Judgment: We agree with the Court
of Appeals that Bulawan obtained a favorable judgment from the trial court by the use of fraud.
Bulawan prevented Aquende from presenting his case before the trial court and from protecting
his title over his property. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the 26 November 1996
Decision adversely affected Aquende as he was deprived of his property without due process
Moreover, a person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.
PETITION DENIED.
Moreover, annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.31 Consequently, an action for annulment of
judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully
executed or implemented.32
5. Lopez vs. Esquivel
FACTS:
This case involves two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
in Civil Case No. 96-4193, the RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject
property to Esquivel and Talens. (The subject property, however, was already supposedly
sold by Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar) CA affirmed in toto the decision of RTC
which (1) ordered theLopez siblings to vacate and to convey to Jose Esquivel, Jr. (Esquivel)
and Carlito Talens (Talens) a parcel of land; and (2) directed the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metropolitan Manila, to divest the Lopez siblings of their title over the subject
property and to issue title over the same property in the names of Esquivel and Talens. In its
assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied for lack of merit the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Lopez siblings.

While the first case is pending in SC, Given the foregoing circumstances and the
unsuccessful attempt of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar to intervene in CA-G.R. No. 70200,
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar opted to file with the Court of Appeals a Petition to annul the
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193, granting the reconveyance of the subject
property to Esquivel and Talens. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar prayed in their Petition that the
11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 be annulled for the reason
that they were not impleaded therein even if they were necessary, if not indispensable,
parties. They alleged in their petition that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-interest of
Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land with a total area of 19.4888
hectares. Beginning 20 April 1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar purchased the lots from the
Lopez siblings and their assigns, namely, Atty. Angeles and Amurao, as evidenced by
several Deeds of Absolute Sale and Deeds of Conditional Sale. Immediately after making
such purchases introduced large, scale * improvements on the subject property
CA dismissed the Petition of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar. It held that RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. 96-4193 could not be the proper subject of the said Petition for Annulment of
Judgment given that the very same decision was still pending appeal before this Court in G.R.
No. 168734 and, thus, was not yet final and executory. In addition, should the Court of
Appeals take cognizance of such a Petition, it could result in contrary and inconsistent rulings
by the appellate court and this Court.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar’s Motion for Amendment and/or Reconsideration of the
dismissal of their Petition was DENIED by CA. Hence they filed the instant Petition assailing
the Resolutions of the CA. They contend:
1. that it is neither improper nor premature for Nordec Phil. and Malvar to file a
Petition for the annulment of the Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
96-4193, even though the said Decision, after being affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals, is now pending appeal before this Court, because:
a. They were not impleaded as defendants in Civil Case No. 96-4193
b. remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate
remedies are also no longer available to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
because of the extrinsic fraud committed upon them by the Lopez
siblings, Esquivel, Talens, Atty. Angeles, and Atty. Ang Cheng
c. lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC to take cognizance of Civil
Case No. 96-4193
2. that CA resolved the question of procedure in a manner that was patently not in
accordance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly, when it held
that (1) Rule 47 does not cover the judgment of the RTC in this particular case;
and (2) Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar still had an adequate remedy in seeking
intervention in G.R. No. 167834, the appeal to this Court of the RTC Decision
dated 11 January 2001, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
a. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar insist that since Rules 37, 38 and 41 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on motion for new trial, petition for
relief, and appeal, respectively, simply mention "judgments or final
orders", without making any distinction as to whether or not the same
is final and executory; it should follow that where only the words
"judgments or final orders" are similarly used in Rule 47 on annulment
of judgments, then such words should be understood to also refer to all
judgments or final orders, regardless of whether they are final and
executory.
ISSUE:
whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for Annulment of Judgment for
being premature since the judgment sought to be annulled is still the subject of a Petition for
Review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168734, and is not yet final and executory -
NO
HELD:

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final
and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to
in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is
based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A
person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that
he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion
and he would be adversely affected thereby.
It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is to have
the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation.
If the judgment sought to be annulled, as in this case, is still on appeal or under review
by a higher court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can be no renewal of
litigation because the litigation is actually still open and ongoing. In this light, the
arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that the judgments or final orders need not be final
and executory for it to be annulled must fail.
This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity.
Given that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was still
pending appeal before this Court, the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance of the
Petition for annulment of the same judgment, for if it had done so, then it would risk
promulgating a ruling that could be contrary to and inconsistent with the ruling of this Court on
the appeal of the judgment.
6. Alaban vs CA
GR No. 156021
Facts:
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, for
the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado
(decedent), who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. Respondent alleged that he was
the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in P.D.
Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the
decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the
will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that
they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not
have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not
executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation
clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will

was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no
intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the
properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer belonged to
her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the
estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.
The RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. Moreover, the
RTCs Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners filing of the motion to
reopen.
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA,
seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January
2002. They claimed that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent,
held several conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with
respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a
compromise agreement to implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the
agreement, respondent refused to sign and return the same.
CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of
or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.
It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores (Flores), who is a niece
of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of General Santos City,
claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue, survived by five groups of collateral
heirs. Flores, armed with a Special Power of Attorney from most of the other petitioners, prayed
for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has
jurisdiction since the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the
place where the decedent died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the first court
acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC
added. On 9 January 2002, Flores filed a Notice of Appeal and on 28 January 2002, the case
was ordered forwarded to the CA.
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision
sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies,
contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that respondents offer of a false compromise and his
failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the
annulment of the RTCs judgment.

Issue:
WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted
to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through
no fault of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the
proceedings before the RTC.
Held:
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial
on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same
Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of
damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or
final order is contrary to law. Both motions should be filed within the period for taking an appeal,
or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file
a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding.
It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6)
months after entry thereof.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies
available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it
has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear
therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become
parties to the probate proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will
must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such
that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to
be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.Thus, even though petitioners
were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a
consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of
motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners
filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for
the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was
denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.
or failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to
them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they
would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail
for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the
final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted
to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is
based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A
person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that
he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion
and he would be adversely affected thereby.

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from
having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
7. TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL V. APOSTOL AND OPULENCIA
FACTS:
 Respondent Apostol was hired as assistant manager by petitioner Triumph

International (Phils.), Inc. (TIPI) in March 1991, and was terminated by TIPI on 21
January 2000. On the other hand, respondent Opulencia was hired as a warehouse
helper by TIPI sometime in 1990, and was the company‘s warehouse supervisor at the
time of the termination of his employment on 21 January 2000.
 Apostol was the immediate superior of Opulencia. On 14 and 15 August 1999, TIPI
conducted an inventory cycle count of its direct and retail sales in its Muñoz
warehouse. The inventory cycle count yielded discrepancies between its result and the
stock list balance Sugue (TIPI‘s Marketing Services Manager) sent a ―show-cause
letter‖ to Apostol, TIPI‘s Assistant Manager-Warehouse and Distribution, requiring him
to explain in writing the negative variance based on the inventory cycle count.
 On 21 January 2000, TIPI, through Sugue, served notices to Apostol and Opulencia,
stating that their employment had been terminated for committing infractions of the
company‘s rules and regulations. Specifically, Apostol was found to have committed
Offense No. 3 (Fraud or willful breach by an employee of the trust reposed in him by the
Company) and Offense No. 25 (Using, uttering or saying profane, indecent, abusive,
derogatory and/or indecorous words or language against the employer or supervisor),
while Opulencia was found to have committed Offense No. 3 only.
 On 28 January 2000, Apostol and Opulencia filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other benefits against TIPI.
 Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit.
 On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
 On 20 February 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, reversing and setting
aside the NLRC Decision.
 MR was filed by the TIPI, but was denied, hence this appeal.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether the issues raised by TIPI in this case entail an evaluation of the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals, which is proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari where only
questions of law may be raised.
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it reversed the factual findings
of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
RULING:
(1) Respondents refer to Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which states:
“Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.”
Applying the above rule, respondents maintain that the instant petition should be dismissed
motu proprio by this Court.
As a general rule, petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed before
this Court may only raise questions of law. However, jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions to this rule.
In Almendrala v. Ngo, we have enumerated several instances when this Court may review
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals on appeal by certiorari, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the find ings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
In this case, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are different from those of the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter. These conflicting findings led to the setting aside by the Court of Appeals
of the decision of the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter. In view thereof, we deem a review
of the instant case proper.
(2) The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 has been settled as early as our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC. In
said case, we held that the proper vehicle for such review is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that the case should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is already settled that
under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the Court
of Appeals—pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari—is
specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve
factual issues. Section 9 clearly states:

“x x x
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. x x x”
However, equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily
or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.
In this case, the NLRC sustained the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, these findings
are generally binding on the appellate court, unless there was a showing that they were arrived
at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. Questioned in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, these factual findings were reexamined and reversed by the Court of Appeals
for being “not in accord with the evidence on record and the applicable law or jurisprudence.” To
determine if the Court of Appeals’ examination of factual findings and reversal of the NLRC
decision are proper and with sufficient basis, it is incumbent upon this Court to make its own
evaluation of the evidence on record.
8. NAVARRO VS ES
Facts:
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October
20, 2010 filed by Movant-Intervenors dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the
Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July
20, 2010 Resolution.
On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who
took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on
July 1, 2007.
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina,
former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition
on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed
another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They
alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an
illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large
chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the
area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12
square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
The Court rendered its Decision granting the petition.
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,

2010. They questioned Resolution No. 8790 issued by COMELEC. They further alleged that,
because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected
by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not
reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the
declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put, movants-intervenors election to their
respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous
status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will
have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of
their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as
the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will affect
the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be
restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will
have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In
addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other
proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain
finality.
Movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution,
namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the
minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the
instant case.
The Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that
the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
The Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
become final and executory.
Issue: W/N the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors is
proper
Ruling: Yes. It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event
their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently
shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12,
2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May
10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their
unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this
Court simply because their interest in this case became manifest only after the case had
already been decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their
disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute.
Such decision would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection.
Thus, it is imperative that the movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We
are not only a court of law, but also of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire
repercussions of this controversy should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than
dismissed on account of mootness.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised
requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)

the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[20] The second exception attends this
case.
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[21] where
technicalities of procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the constitutional
issues raised were of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the
attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for intervention should be given due
course since movants-intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in the outcome of
this case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity,
and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010
Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which,
though merely a statutory right that must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an
essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should proceed with caution not to deprive
a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant,
including those who would be directly affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of
attendant extraordinary circumstances.[23] The power to suspend or even disregard rules of
procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had
already declared final.[24] In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the
movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the
judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct
interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government
units. In this manner, the thrust of the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the
LGC with respect to decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter
elucidated, will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court finds
that the first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative
consideration.
9. Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca

FACTS:
Pantaleon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land located in Cagayan de Oro. Upon his
death, the property was inherited by his wife, brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
(collectively referred to as the Jomoc heirs). The respondents, Lucila Jomoc Obliosca and
Abundia Jomoc Balala, sisters of the deceased, and Elvira Jomoc, a niece, were among
those who inherited the property.
the Jomoc heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of
Registered Land in favor of petitioner, Maura So, over the property for P300,000.00.
However, the three respondents and Maura So failed to affix their signatures on this
document. Moreover, the document was not notarized. Nonetheless, petitioner made a
partial payment of P49,000.00 thereon.
Thereafter, petitioner demanded the execution of a final deed of conveyance but the Jomoc
heirs ignored the demand. petitioner filed a Complaint for specific performance against the
Jomoc heirs to compel them to execute and deliver the proper registerable deed of sale over
the lot. The Jomoc heirs, except for the respondents, were impleaded as defendants. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8983.
the Jomoc heirs executed again a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of
Registered Land in favor of the spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King for P200,000.00.
The spouses Lim intervened as defendants in Civil Case No. 8983.

RTC decided the case in favor of the petitioner, which CA affirmed on appeal. Upon filing of
petition for review by defendant heirs and Lim, SC uphold the petitioner’s better right over the
property. The decision became final and executory on November 25, 1991.
petitioner filed a motion for execution of the said decision. The respondents opposed the
motion on the ground that they did not participate in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land and they were not parties to the case.
Despite the opposition, the trial court granted the motion for execution. The respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied the same.
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Jomoc heirs (alleging same: not a party to the
case hence should not be bound) , holding that respondents were bound by the said decision.
The CA ratiocinated that respondents were aware of the pendency of the case, yet they did
not intervene, and that the case is barred by res judicata.
SC denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by the respondents, holding
1. that the contract of sale between the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc and the private
respondent Maura So is valid and effective between the parties.
2. that their failure to intervene in said suit for the protection of their rights binds them
to the decision rendered therein (finding them that petitioners were aware of the
pendency of the case)
3. that a writ of execution may be issued against a person not a party to a case where
the latter's remedy, which he did not avail of, was to intervene in the case in
question involving rights over the same parcel of land
4. that res judicata is applicable
The resolution became final and executory on June 20, 1994.
It appears that, on March 12, 1992, respondents also filed a complaint for legal redemption
against petitioner with RTC of Misamis Oriental. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
92-135. Respondents posited therein that, since they did not sell their shares in the property
to petitioner, they remained co-owners, who have the right to redeem the shares sold by the
other heirs.
On April 27, 1994, the RTC resolved the case in favor of the respondents, allowing the
plaintiffs to exercise their substantive right of legal redemption. Upon denial of petitioner’s
MR, RTC granted respondents' motion for execution.
CA denied the (heirs of Maura substitute) petitioner’s petition for annulment of judgment,
holding that the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available since
petitioner Maura So had already filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the same
orders of the trial court. Apparently, on December 19, 1994, prior to the filing of the petition
for annulment of judgment with the CA, petitioner Maura So filed a petition for review
oncertiorari with this Court assailing the same RTC Order and Resolution. the Court denied
the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and for being the wrong remedy.
CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its decision denying the petition for
annulment of judgment. Petitioners then filed this petition for review
ISSUE:
W/n petition for annulement of judgment is available to the petitioners - NO
HELD:
First, annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Thus, it may not be invoked
(1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or
other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence.

We, therefore, agree with the CA that the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no
longer available to petitioners since their predecessor-in-interest, Maura So, had already
availed herself of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Further, none of the grounds for annulment of judgment, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, is present in this case.
ISSUE:
W/n CA erred in not holding that the RTC acted without jurisdiction because SC had
previously ruled that the lot in question had been sold twice by all the heirs to Maura So and
later to Sps Lim and said final decisions and resolutions cannot be reversed by RTC – NO
HELD:
1. Petitioners clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
2. Notwithstanding these principles (doctrine of immutability of final judgment,
and doctrine of finality of judgment), however, the higher interests of justice and equity
demand that we brush aside the procedural norms. The Court has the inherent power and
discretion to amend, modify or reconsider a final judgment when it is necessary to
accomplish the ends of justice.
The present case is peculiar in the sense that it involves three final and executory
judgments. The first is this Court's Decision in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860 which upheld
the sale of the whole property by the Jomoc heirs, including the herein respondents, to
petitioner Maura So. The second is the Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 110661, which
sustained the order of execution of the said decision against the herein respondents
despite the fact that they were not party-defendants in the first case. And the third is the
Court's Minute Resolution in G.R. No. 118050 which denied Maura So's petition for review
of the RTC Decision granting respondents' right to redeem the property.
It is the third judgment that is apparently in conflict with the two previous
judgments. It rendered final and executory the April 27, 1994 Resolution of the RTC which
recognized the right of respondents, as co-owners, to redeem the disputed land from
Maura So. To recall, the RTC premised its decision on its finding that respondents did not
actually sell their shares in the property to Maura So because they did not sign the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of So; hence, they
remained co-owners. This ruling is patently erroneous because this Court had already
pronounced in the first two final and executory judgments (in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860,
and G.R. No. 110661) that the whole property had already been sold to Maura So. The
RTC was barred from holding otherwise under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment.
10. DAY V. RTC OF ZAMBOANGA
FACTS:
petitioner Victorino Day is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Tomas Claudio
St., Zamboanga City. Private respondent Go Chu is the owner of a building constructed on the
said lot occupying an area of 101 square meters.
Private respondent was asked by petitioner to peacefully vacate and remove that
portion of the former's building standing on the latter's lot. Due to private respondent's refusal
to vacate the premises, petitioner instituted a formal complaint against respondent with the
Office of the Barangay Chairman, Zone I, Zamboanga City. As no amicable settlement could
be reached in the case, the Barangay Chairman, on April 20, 1982, issued a certification that
conciliation of the dispute at the barangay level had failed

Petitioner agreed to accept P1,000.00 from private respondent as rental for the use of his
lot from 1979 to December 1984. As petitioner had received the P1,000.00as compensation
for respondent's use of his land, respondent claimed the existence of a lease contract between
them. Respondent Go Chu, however, failed to prove the existence of a formal or even verbal
contract of lease.
Petitioner again made another demand on private respondent to remove the

building. Because of private respondent's adamant and continued refusal to vacate the
disputed lot, petitioner filed on March 25, 1985 an action for unlawful detainer with application
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Apparently, petitioner Day did not use the
former Barangay Certification in commencing the said suit against private respondent. On
April 15, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Day.
Without having first filed a motion for reconsideration, private respondent Go Chu filed an
original action for certiorari with respondent court, against Judge Cabato and
petitioner Victorino Day. Pending hearing of the application for preliminary injunction,
respondent court issued a temporary restraining order in the case.
Respondent court issued an order resolving all the matters and issues in the petition in favor of
herein petitioner Day, that the petition on its main is "lacking in merit except that there are still
certain matters which the respondent court would like to resolve after hearing thereon." (Rollo,
p. 3). The application for preliminary injunction was likewise denied. At the hearing, respondent
court gave the parties opportunity to adduce additional arguments on the merits of the
case. They, however, submitted the case for decision without further arguments, relying
therefore on the pleadings and documents on record.
On July 8, 1986, however, respondent court issued another order granting the petition
for certiorari and setting aside the decision of Judge Cabato of the Municipal Trial Court. In
connection therewith, the parties were directed to submit their dispute before the Lupong
Tagapayapa pursuant to the requirements of PD 1508. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court may grant a Writ of Certiorari on grounds other than those
specified under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
In an original action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the grounds
for the issuance of the Writ of Certiorari are as follows, to wit:
(a) Lack of jurisdiction;
(b) Grave abuse of discretion; and
(c) When the court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction.
We have consistently adhered to the principle that only errors of jurisdiction are
correctible by certiorari. As early as in the case of Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Phil 245, 271,
the Supreme court ruled: "The office of the Writ of Certiorari has been reduced to the
correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose."
Clearly, the only grounds which may serve as the basis for the respondent court to raise the writ
of certiorari are lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by the inferior court or that the
said inferior court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in its appreciation of
the barangay certification as constituting sufficient compliance with P.D. 1508.
In the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against private respondent, the lower court undoubtedly
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of then defendant (now private

respondent) by the filing of the complaint and service of summons upon then defendant (now
private respondent) and the filing by the latter of his answer. Thus, it cannot be said that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to render the decision set aside by respondent court. Assuming
that the lower court committed a mistake on the merits of the case, it was in the exercise of
such jurisdiction. The error, if at all, is at most one of judgment and not of jurisdiction, which
cannot be the object of a petition for certiorari. The proper remedy in such case was
appeal. Errors in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a
court after it has acquired jurisdiction over a case, are correctible only by appeal
(So Chu vs. Nepomuceno, 29 Phil. 208; Valencia vs. Victoriano, 50 O.G. 5815, Dec. 1954 (CA)
citing Herrera v. Barreto, et al., 26 Phil. 245).
Neither can it be said that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded
its jurisdiction when it appreciated the barangay certification as sufficient compliance with P.D.
1508. In the petition for certiorari filed by private respondent before the respondent court, he
did not allege that the lower court's decision was outside or in excess of its jurisdiction, or was
issued in grave abuse of discretion. Private respondent merely alleged that the
lower court "erroneously": appreciated facts and evidence, issued interlocutory orders, and
appreciated the issues. He also challenged the soundness of the decision. These do not
constitute excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It must be remembered that there
is "excess of jurisdiction" where the court has jurisdiction but has transcended the same
or acted without any statutory authority.
11. ROMYS FREIGHT SERVICE v. CASTRO
FACTS:
Private respondent Castro was hired by petitioner as a mechanic and promoted to supervisor.
He suffered a stroke and he took a leave of absence from work. Petitioner Roman G. Cruz
sent him several letters first urging him to return to work. Cruz also filed complaints
for estafa and qualified theft against him. Because of these, Castro was constrained to file a
case for illegal dismissal against petitioner on the ground that Cruzs acts constituted
constructive dismissal.
On the other hand, private respondent Veloria was hired by petitioner as a carpenter. After
several years, he was promoted to mechanic and, as senior mechanic. He figured in an
accident. He was forced to absent himself from work to undergo recuperation. During his
absence, he received several letters from Cruz. One letter required him to explain the loss of
several tools, another ordered him to pay his loan and still another required him to explain his
absences. He was later charged for qualified theft of the missing tools
Because of petitioners acts against him, Veloria joined Castro in filing a case for illegal
constructive dismissal against petitioner.
 Executive labor arbiter - Petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay
private respondents the total amount representing 13th month pay, backwages,
separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and
attorneys fees.

 Petitioner appealed to the NLRC - reversed and set aside the labor arbiters ruling. It
found private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and dismissed their
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.[
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for not finding that
they were constructively dismissed by petitioner.
 Appellate Court - appellate court granted the petition. the CA reversed and
set aside the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the labor
arbiter.

 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but
the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petition for certiorari of private respondents should have been dismissed outright
for failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before filing the petition for
certiorari with the CA
RULING: No. The SC affirm the CA decision.
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this
rule. Private respondents petition for certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions.
The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether
private respondents were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same
issue raised before the NLRC and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and private respondents was impressed with public
interest.[6] Thus, it was proper for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case even if no
motion for reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.
The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze,
assess and weigh them all over again to ascertain if the trial court or quasi-judicial agency and
the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of
one party or the other. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public respondents evaluation of the evidence
and the factual findings based thereon. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari fails insofar
as it questions the affirmation by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that private
respondents were illegally dismissed, entitling them to an award of backwages, unpaid
benefits, separation pay and attorneys fees.

12. FAJARDO VS BAUTISTA
Facts: This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to annul the 4 September 1991
Order of the respondent Judge dismissing the complaints of the petitioners for lack of
jurisdiction, and the 20 September 1991 Order denying the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. The respondent Judge had ruled that jurisdiction over the cases pertained to
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB) and not the Regional Trial Court. The
petitioners asseverate that the RTC has jurisdiction over the cases.
Private respondent Isabelo Jareño and Purita Jareño are the owners and developers of a
subdivision known as the Calamba Central Compound. On various dates, they as SELLERS,
and the petitioners as BUYERS signed separate contracts, each designated as a CONTRACT
TO SELL, under which, for the considerations therein stated, they bound themselves to sell to
the petitioners the lots subject thereof, and after the latter shall have paid the purchase price
and interest, to execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding deeds of transfer of title,
free from any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided for in the Contract to Sell.
On the other hand, private respondent Fernando Realty and Development Corporation as
SELLER, and petitioner Emily Yu Fajardo as BUYER signed on 22 February 1985 a
CONTRACT TO SELL 7 under which for the considerations therein stated, FERNANDO agreed
to sell to Fajardo Lot No. 10, Block No. 3, also located at the Calamba Central Compound
Subdivision, and upon full payment of the agreed price and interest thereon, to execute a deed
of absolute sale in favor of Fajardo.
It appears, however, that the JAREÑOS sold the aforesaid lots subject of the different contracts
to sell to private respondent Ruben Habacon under separate documents denominated as
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan." HABACON caused the cancellation of the certificates of title covering
the said lots and the issuance of new ones in his name.
When the petitioners learned of these, they filed separate complaints with the court a quo for
annulment of the sales in favor of HABACON and of the new certificates of title issued to him,
for reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by those issued to HABACON, and for
accounting and damages.
HABACON filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the ground that the plaintiffs (petitioners
herein) have no legal capacity to sue because they were not parties to the "BILIHAN."
With the show cause order, the petitioners maintained that it is the trial court, and not the HLRB,
which has jurisdiction over the complaint. They contend that Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal is
inapplicable because in their cases: (1) the title of the developers, the JAREÑOS, had already
passed to a third person, HABACON; (2) their action is for the annulment of the title of a third
person; (3) HABACON is not a developer; and (4) Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129 vests upon the
Regional Trial Court the jurisdiction to hear and decide all civil actions which involve title to or
possession of any real property or any interest therein, except actions for unlawful detainer and
forcible entry.
The trial court dismissed the aforesaid civil cases for lack of jurisdiction. MR was denied hence
this petition.
Issue: W/N the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, the
complaints of the petitions
Ruling: No. Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a
final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari. 30 The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. 31 Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an
ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of
the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. 32 Nevertheless,

certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, 33 where such loss is
occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. 34
The petitioners admit that they received a copy of the trial court's order dismissing their
complaints on 4 October 1991. 35 The instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond
the 15-day period to appeal from the order. The petitioners have not even attempted to explain
why they were unable to appeal from the challenged order within the reglementary period. This
civil action then was resorted to as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and
since none of the exceptions to the rigid rule barring substitution of remedies was alleged to
exist in this petition, or even indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be dismissed.

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1.

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 1

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 2

PACC coddled GO,

2 NBI execs claim

and Juliet Pascual

PDI Northern Luzon Bureau

On May 3, 1996, the same newspaper reported that:

NBI exec says Go

tipped off by PACC

and Juliet Pascual

PDI Northern Luzon Bureau

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 3

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 4

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

3. NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEAR CORPORATION PHILIPPINES vs. NATIONAL LABOR

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 5

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 6

Issue: W/N the CA erred in ruling in favor of Aquende

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 7

5. Lopez vs. Esquivel

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 8

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 9

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 10

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 11

The petition is devoid of merit.

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 12

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

 Respondent Apostol was hired as assistant manager by petitioner Triumph

 On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 14

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 15

The Court rendered its Decision granting the petition.

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 16

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9. Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 18

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 19

10. DAY V. RTC OF ZAMBOANGA

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 20

Petitioner again made another demand on private respondent to remove the

(a) Lack of jurisdiction;

(b) Grave abuse of discretion; and

(c) When the court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 21

11. ROMYS FREIGHT SERVICE v. CASTRO

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 22

RULING: No. The SC affirm the CA decision.

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 23

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 24

Civpro April 18|Abasta|Dy|Federico|Ricaplaza 25

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