CIVIL PROCEDURE I

DIGESTED CASES
II. JURISDICTION
1. AMECOS INNOVATIONS, INC.& ANTONIO MATEO v. ELIZA LOPEZ
2. CHARLES BUMAGAT, et al. v. REGALADO ARRIBAY
3. INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.,v. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO
4. EUSTACIO ATWEL Vs CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE ASSOC., INC
5. PADLAN VS DINGLASAN
6. MENDOZA VS SORIANO
7. HALAGUENA, et. Al v. PAL
8. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION v. SPOUSES RABINA
9. BORRA vs. CA, HAWAIIAN PHILIPPINE COMPANY (HPC)
10. MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs CULLEN
11. BF HOMES, INC. VS MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
12. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN VS JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP
13. MACASAET VS CO
14. CABRERA vs FRANCISCO
15. THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY VS THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE
16. HECTOR TREAS VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
17. THE CITY OF MANILA VS HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO
18. JIMENEZ VS SORONGON
19. FELIPE N. MADRIAN VS FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN
20. MAGNO VS PEOPLE
 (1)
AMECOS INNOVATIONS, INC.& ANTONIO MATEO v. ELIZA
LOPEZ
G.R. No. 178055, 2 July 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Amecos Innovations, Inc. (Amecos) was complained by the Social

Security System (SSS) for alleged delinquency in the remittance of
SSS contributions. Amecos attributed its failure to remit the SSS
contributions to Eliza R. Lopez (Lopez) claiming that it hired Lopez but
she refused to provide Amecos with her SSS Number. Hence,
Amecos no longer enrolled Lopez with the SSS and did not deduct her
corresponding contributions up to the time of her termination. The
complaint was withdrawn upon settlement of the obligation by
Amecos. Lopez did not heed the demands of Amecos, thus, the latter
filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Lopez before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Amecos claimed that because of
Lopez’s misrepresentation, they suffered actual damages by way of
settlement and payment of its obligations with the SSS. Amecos’
contention is that the employer-employee relationship between
Amecos and Lopez is merely incidental, and does not necessarily
place their dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
tribunals but the true source of Lopez’s obligation is derived from
Articles 19, 22, and 2154 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Do the regular civil court have the jurisdiction over claim(s) for
reimbursement arising from employer-employee relation?

HELD:

No. SSS contributions and recovery of damages arising from

employee-employer relationship is under the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters. This Court holds that as between the parties, Article
217(a)(4) of the Labor Code is applicable. Said provision bestows
upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims
for damages arising from employer-employee relations. The
observation that the matter of SSS contributions necessarily flowed
from the employer-employee relationship between the parties –
shared by the lower courts and the Court of Appeals (CA) – is correct;
thus, Amecos’ claims should have been referred to the
labor tribunals. In this connection, it is noteworthy to state that “the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by
labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.”
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At the same time, it cannot be assumed that since the dispute
concerns the payment of SSS premiums, Amecos’ claim should be
referred to the Social Security Commission (SSC) pursuant to
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282. As far
as SSS is concerned, there is no longer a dispute with respect to
Amecos’ accountability to the System; Amecos already settled their
pecuniary obligations to it. Since there is no longer any dispute
regarding coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties to speak of,
the SSC need not be unnecessarily dragged into the picture.

(2)
CHARLES BUMAGAT, et al. v. REGALADO ARRIBAY
G.R. No. 194818, 9 June 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J:

FACTS:

Bumagat and others are the registered owners of about eight hectares
of agricultural land. They filed a complaint for forcible entry against
Arribay before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) alleging that
with the aid of armed goons and through the use of intimidation and
threats of physical harm, the latter entered the former’s parcels of land
and ousted them from their lawful possession. Arribay sought for the
dismissal of the complaint, claiming that the subject properties are
agricultural lands – which renders the dispute an agrarian matter and
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) denied the motion for failure to show the existence of a
tenancy or agrarian relationship between the parties. The Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) found that no tenancy or other agrarian
relationship existed between the parties. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and
agreed that the dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

ISSUE:

Is the dispute within the jurisdiction of DARAB?

HELD:

No. The CA failed to realize the fact that as between the parties, there
is no tenurial arrangement, not even an implied one. For the DARAB
to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy
relation between the parties. “In order for a tenancy agreement to take
hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable
elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant
of agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is
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an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part
of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In the
present case, it is quite evident that not all of these conditions are
present. For one, there is no tenant, as both parties claim ownership
over the property.

(3)
INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.,v. ENGR. SALVADOR
ADVIENTO
G.R. No. 171212, 20 August 2014
PERALTA, J:

FACTS:

Engr. Salvador Adviento was hired by Indophil Textile Mills, Inc.

(Indophil) to maintain its thread manufacturing business in Bulacan.
Adviento alleged that there were no adequate safety measures
introduced by Indophil when he conducted a maintenance check on
the dye house area.The workplace is very hot and emits foul chemical
odor. According to Adviento, the air washer dampers and all roof
exhaust vests are blown into open air, carrying dust thereto. He
recommended to management to place roof insulation but such was
turned down by management due to high cost. Twelve years later,
Adviento experienced weakness and dizziness, and was thereafter
diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis and Allergic Rhinitis. Adviento
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, alleging that he
contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross
negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy and
workable environment. Indophil argued that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because the same
falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.RTC sustained its jurisdiction on the ground that the case is a
quasi-delict, that Indophil's failure to provide its employees with a safe,
healthy and workable environment is an act of negligence.

ISSUE:
Does RTC have jurisdiction over a negligent employer who xfailed to
provide a safe and healthy working environment?

HELD:
Yes, the jurisdiction rests on the regular courts. According to the
Court, not all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by
labor courts, specifically when the law provides otherwise. The Court
formulated the “reasonable causal connection rule,” wherein if there
is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the
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employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction
of the labor courts; and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts
that have jurisdiction. In the case at bar, Adviento's claim for damages
is specifically grounded on Indophil's gross negligence to provide a
safe, healthy and workable environment for its employees –a case of
quasi-delict. The Court ascertained this from reading the complaint,
which enumerated the acts and/or omissions of Indophil relative to the
conditions in the workplace. It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter resolved
only after and as a result of a trial.Neither can jurisdiction of a court be
made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his
answer or motion to dismiss. In this case, a perusal of the complaint
would reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for damages
arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's
jurisdiction. Adviento alleges that due to the continued and prolonged
exposure to textile dust seriously inimical to his health, he suffered
work-contracted disease which is now irreversible and incurable, and
deprived him of job opportunities. Clearly, injury and damages were
allegedly suffered by respondent, an element of quasi-delict. It also
bears stressing that respondent is not praying for any relief under the
Labor Code of the Philippines. He neither claims for reinstatement nor
backwages or separation pay resulting from an illegal termination. The
cause of action herein pertains to the consequence of petitioner’s
omission which led to a work-related disease suffered by respondent,
causing harm or damage to his person. Such cause of action is within
the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs
to the regular courts.

Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor

management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and
conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general
civil law, such claim falls outside the area of competence of expertise
ordinarily ascribed to the LA and the NLRC. The RTC has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of respondent’s complaint praying for moral
damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored
on petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a safe and
healthy working environment for respondent

(4)
EUSTACIO ATWEL Vs CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE ASSOC.,
INC.
GR No. 169370 , April 14, 2008
CORONA, J:

FACTS:

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Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive
Association. As CPAI president, he bought a parcel of land in behalf
of the association. The property was later on converted into a wet
market where agricultural, livestock and other farm products were
sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for various forms of
amusement. The income generated from the property, mostly rentals
from the wet market, was paid to CPAI. When Emiliano Melgazo died,
his son, petitioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as CPAI president
and administrator of the property. On the other hand, petitioners Atwel
and Pilpil were elected as CPAI vice-president and treasurer,
respectively. Other elected officers and members formed their own
group and registered themselves in the Securities and Exchange
Commission as officers and members of respondent CPAI. However,
petitioners not listed as members. CPAI alleged that it was the owner
of the property and petitioners, without authority, were collecting
rentals from the wet market vendors. Petitioners filed a case in the
SEC for mandatory injunction where they contended that since the
property was purchased using the money of petitioner Manuel
Melgazo's father, it belonged to the deceased and it was impossible
for the CPAI to have acquired ownership over the property in 1968
when it was only in 1997 that it was incorporated and registered with
the SEC. It ruled that CPA to be one and the same as CPAI, CPA as
the owner of property and not Melgazo. It ruled in favor of CPAI.
Petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction of the SEC
special commercial court over the case. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are estopped from questioning

jurisdiction after participating in the proceeding.

HELD:

The Court agreed with the petitioners that estoppel cannot apply
because a court's jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the
Constitution or by law, not by the parties' agreement or by estoppel.
The jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and
other cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD : 902-A was transferred to
the courts of general jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the elements of
an intra-corporate controversy are not present. The records reveal
that petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI. CPAI itself
admitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were the only
remaining members of CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that
was registered in the SEC. The determination as to who is the true
owner of the disputed property entitled to the income generated
therefrom is civil in nature and should be threshed out in a regular
court - conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of
the special commercial court The rule remains that estoppel does not
confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the
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cause of action or subject matter of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI,
no exceptional circumstance appears in this case to warrant
divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not available here.

(5)
PADLAN VS DINGLASAN
G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel

of land which is covered by TCT. While on board a jeepney, Elenita’s
mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura Passion regarding
the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate
agent, Lilia borrowed the owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and
gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots
under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan.
Through a falsified deed ofsale bearing the forged signature of Elenita
and her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different
buyers. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold one of the lots to Lorna Ong
(Lorna), who later sold the lotto petitioner Editha Padlan for
P4,000.00. Thus, TCT issued under the former’s name was cancelled
and another TCT was issued in the name of Editha Padlan.
Respondents filed a case Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
before the RTC. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner
through her mother, Anita Padlan.

The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good

faith and, consequently, dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied,
respondents sought recourse before the CA. CA rendered a
Decision in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the CA reversed
and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of
the TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival
of respondents’ own title.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner

argued that not only did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and
the person of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case.

HELD:
No. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint
must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
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complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action.

In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property
is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to
petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even
presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In
fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’ counsel informed the court
that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next
hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial
Assessor’s Office.

However, they did not present such copy. To reiterate, where the
ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it
should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof.

Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the

disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are
null and void
(6)
MENDOZA VS SORIANO, et al.,
G.R. No. 164012, June 08, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

At around 1:00 a.m., July 14, 1997, Sonny Soriano, while crossing
Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue in Quezon City, was hit
by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano was
thrown five meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25
meters from the point of impact. Gerard Villaspin, one of Soriano’s
companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but
after checking out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the
FX, only to flee. A school bus brought Soriano to East Avenue
Medical Center where he later died. Subsequently, the Quezon City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide against Macasasa.

On August 20, 1997, respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann

Soriano, Soriano’s wife and daughter, respectively, filed a complaint
for damages against Macasasa and petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza,
the registered owner of the vehicle.

Respondents prayed that Macasasa and petitioner be ordered to pay

them: P200,000 moral damages; P500,000 for lost income; P22,250
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for funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for interment and
lapida; P8,066 for hospitalization, other medical and transportation
expenses; P28,540 for food and drinks during the wake; P50,000
exemplary damages; P60,000 indemnity for Soriano’s death; and
P25,000 for attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance.

After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner. It
found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using
a small gap in the island’s fencing rather than the pedestrian
overpass. Respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court but reduced payment by twenty (20%) per cent due to the
presence of contributory negligence by the victim as provided for in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

While the appellate court agreed that Soriano was negligent, it also
found Macasasa negligent for speeding, such that he was unable to
avoid hitting the victim. It observed that Soriano’s own negligence did
not preclude recovery of damages from Macasasa’s negligence. It
further held that since petitioner failed to present evidence to the
contrary, and conformably with Article 2180[8] of the Civil Code, the
presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection and
supervision of employees stood.

Hence, petitioner appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to try the case.

HELD:

Petitioner argues that the amount claimed by respondents is within the

jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. She posits that to
determine the jurisdictional amount, what should only be considered
are the following: P22,250 for funeral services; P45,000 for burial
lot; P15,150 for interment and lapida; P8,066 for hospitalization and
transportation; P28,540 for food and drinks during the wake;
and P60,000 indemnity for Sorianos death. She maintains that the
sum of these amounts, P179,006, is below the jurisdictional amount
of the Regional Trial Court. She states that under Section 19(8) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the following claims of
respondents must be excluded: P200,000 moral damages, P500,000
for lost income; P50,000 exemplary damages; P25,000 attorneys fees
plus P500 per court appearance. Petitioner thus prays that the
decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and the dismissal of the
case by the trial court be affirmed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, states the pertinent law.
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SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro
Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

But relatedly, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 expressly states:

xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining
the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP
Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause
of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court. (Underscoring supplied.)

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are

primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money
for the damages for tortious acts. In this case, respondents claim
of P929,006 in damages and P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per
court appearance represents the monetary equivalent for
compensation of the alleged injury. These money claims are the
principal reliefs sought by respondents in their complaint for damages.
Consequently then, we hold that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City possessed and properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.

(7)
HALAGUENA, et. Al v. PAL
G.R. No. 172013, October 2, 2009
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners were employed as flight attendants of respondent on
different dates prior to November 1996. They are members of FASAP
union exclusive bargaining organization of the flightattendants, flight
stewards and pursers. On July 2001, respondent and FASAP entered
into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement
for the years 2000 to 2005 (compulsory retirement of 55 for female
and 60 for males).

In July 2003, petitioner and several female cabin crews, in a letter,

manifested that the provision in CBA on compulsory retirement is
discriminatory. On July 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for
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Declaratory Relief with issuanceof TRO with the RTC Makati. The
RTC issued a TRO. After the denial of the respondent on itsmotion for
reconsideration for the TRO, it filed a Petition with the CA. CA granted
respondent’s petition and ordered lower court to dismiss the case.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
Yes. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
exclusively cognizable by the RTC. Being an ordinary civil action, the
same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the

employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the
employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of
action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.

Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of

labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying
the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution,
labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply
and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of
trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH &
Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an
employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and
the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under
Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to dispute arising from an
employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code other labor statutes, or their collective
bargaining agreement.

(8)
MANILA BANKING CORPORATION v. SPOUSES RABINA
G.R. No. 145941, December 16, 2008
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Marenir Development Corporation (MDC), owner/developer of a

subdivision project in Quezon City obtained a loan from the Manila
Banking Corporation (MBC). To secure the payment of such loan, it
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forged a real estate mortgage covering real estate
properties including the lot which was subject of a Contract to Sell to
Amante Sibuyan (Sibuyan). Sibuyan transferred the lot via
―Assignment and Transfer of Rights‖ to Celestina Rabina (Rabina),
with the conformity of MDC. The said document mentioned the
Contract to Sell which MDC had executed in favor of Sibuyan.

After Rabina had fully paid the amortization payments for the lot, she
asked MDC for the transfer to her of its title. MDC, however, failed,
prompting Rabina to institute a complaint for non-delivery of
titles, annulment of mortgage and incomplete development of the
subdivision project Reymarville Subdivision, against MDC before the
Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). MBC contended
that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over it by virtue of Section 29 of
Republic Act 265, as amended by Executive Order No. 289.
Housing and Land Use Arbiter Cesar Manuel found in favor of the
Rabina and ordered for the payment of moral damages. Upon MBC‘s
appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners affirmed the Arbiter‘s
decision. MBC then elevated the case to the Office of the President
(OP) but the same have been dismissed.

On elevation to the Court of Appeals, the appeal was dismissed and

the CA affirmed the Orders of the OP. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over the case at bar under
Presidential Decree 957

HELD:
The act of MDC in mortgaging the lot, without the knowledge and
consent of lot Spouses Rabina and without the approval of the
HLURB, as required by P.D. 957, is not only an unsound real estate
business practice but also highly prejudicial to them.

The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad
enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of
mortgage. To disassociate the issue of nullity of mortgage and lodge
it separately with the liquidation court would only cause inconvenience
to the parties and would not serve the ends of speedy
and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the laws
vesting quasi-judicial powers in the agency.

(9)
Borra vs. CA, HAWAIIAN PHILIPPINE COMPANY (HPC)

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 G.R. No. 167484 September 9, 2013
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

On September 12, 1997, herein petitioners filed with the NLRC

Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI in Bacolod City two separate
complaints which were docketed as RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97
and RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97. RAB Case No.06-09-10698-97
was filed against herein private respondent alone, while RAB Case
No. 06-09-10699-97 impleaded herein private respondent and a
certain Fela Contractor as respondents. In RAB Case No. 06-09-
10698-97, herein petitioners asked that they be recognized and
confirmed as regular employees of herein private respondent and
further prayed that they be awarded various benefits received by
regular employees for three (3) years prior to the filing of the
complaint, while in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97,herein petitioners
sought for payment of unpaid wages, holiday pay, allowances, 13th
month pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary
damages also during the three (3) years preceding the filing of the
complaint. On January 9, 1998, private respondent (HPC) filed a
Motion to Dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-0698-97 on the ground of res
judicata. The Labor Arbiter granted the same. Petitioners appealed to
the NLRC which set aside the Order of the Labor Arbiter, reinstated
the complaint in RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 and remanded the
same for further proceedings. HPC appealed to the CA which affirmed
the decision of the NLRC. The SC likewise affirmed the decision of
the CA and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter to determine which
among Fela contractor and HPC is the real employer of the petitioners.
In the meantime, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in RAB Case
No. 06-09-10699-97 holding that there is no employer-employee
relations between private respondent and petitioners. And no appeal
was taken therefrom. Thus, the same became final and executory. As
a consequence of the finality of the Decision in RAB Case No. 06-09-
10699-97, herein private respondent again filed a Motion to Dismiss
RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 on the ground, among others, of res
judicata. Private respondent HPC contended that the final and
executory Decision of the Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 06-09-
10699-97, which found no employer-employee relations between
private respondent and petitioners, serves as a bar to the further
litigation of RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97. Said Motion to Dismiss
was denied. As a result, private respondent HPC filed a petition for
certiorari (Rule 65) before the CA which granted the same. Hence, this
petition.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not HPC availed of the proper remedy when its Motion To
Dismiss was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 06-09-
10698-97.

HELD:
Yes. It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by law and it is not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In this regard, it
should be reiterated that what has been filed by private respondent
with the CA is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the Labor
Arbiter's Order which denied its motion to dismiss. Section 3, Rule V
of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, which was then prevailing at the time
of the filing of private respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA,
clearly provides: SECTION 3. MOTION TO DISMISS. - On or before
the date set for the conference, the respondent may file a motion to
dismiss. Any motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, or that the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment, prescription or forum shopping, shall be immediately
resolved by the Labor Arbiter by a written order. An order denying the
motion to dismiss or suspending its resolution until the final
determination of the case is not appealable. The Labor Arbiter
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it did not dismiss RAB
Case No. 06-09-10698-97 upon motion of HPC on the ground of res
judicata. The Court explained: Conclusiveness of judgment finds
application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment
or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with
them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while
the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper
authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or
question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action
between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest,
in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for
the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of
parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.

(10)
MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs
CULLEN
G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013
PERALTA, J.:

13 | P a g e
FACTS:

Respondent purchased from Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI) a

condominium unit of the Medical Plaza Makati Condominium
Corporation (MPMCC). On September 19 2002, petitioner demanded
from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and
assessments amounting to P145,567.42. Respondent disputed this
demand claiming that he had been paying his dues as shown by the
fact that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that respondent’s obligation
was a carry-over of that of MLHI. Consequently, respondent was
prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the
2002 election of petitioner’s Board of Directors. Respondent clarified
from MLHI the said claim but MLHI claimed that such had already
been settled. Thereafter, a Complaint for Damages was filed by
respondent against petitioner and MLHI. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss, two of the grounds for the dismissal were the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction as the case involves an intra-corporate controversy and
citing prematurity for failure of respondent to exhaust all intra
corporate remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the controversy involves intra-corporate issues as
would fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court.

HELD:
Yes. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations
in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction
also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate

controversy, two tests are used, namely, the relationship test and the
nature of the controversy test. An intra-corporate controversy is one
which pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its
franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the
corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or
14 | P a g e
associates themselves. Thus, under the relationship test, the
existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations makes the case
intra-corporate.

Under the nature of the controversy test, “the controversy must not
only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but
must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative
rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal
and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.” In other
words, jurisdiction should be determined by considering both the
relationship of the parties as well as the nature of the question
involved.

Applying the two tests it was held that the case involves intra-
corporate controversy. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate
relations between the parties as petitioner is a condominium
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, and
respondent, on the other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No.
1201 and is thus a stockholder/member of the condominium
corporation. Clearly, there is an intra-corporate relationship between
the corporation and a stockholder/member.

This action partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate controversy,

the jurisdiction over which pertains to the SEC. Pursuant to Section
5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities
Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has
been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as Special
Commercial Courts. While the CA may be correct that the RTC has
jurisdiction, the case should have been filed not with the regular court
but with the branch of the RTC designated as a special commercial
court. Considering that the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 was not
designated as a special commercial court, it was not vested with
jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. The CA,
therefore, gravely erred in remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. Further, the questions involved pertain to their rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and matters relating to the
regulation of the corporation.

(11)
BF HOMES, INC. VS MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 171624, December 6, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

15 | P a g e
BF Homes and PWCC distributes water drawn from deep wells using
pumps run by electricity supplied by MERALCO in BF Homes
subdivisions in Paraaque City, Las Pias City, Caloocan City, and
Quezon City. In Republic v Meralco, the SC ordered MERALCO to
refund its customers, which shall be credited against the customers
future consumption, the excess average amount of P0.167 per
kilowatt hour starting with the customers billing cycles beginning
February 1998. Due to this ruling, BF Homes and PWCC asked for
refund in the amount of P11,834,570.91. Accordingly, MERALCO
disconnected electric supply to BF Homes and PWCCs’ 16 water
pumps located in BF Homes in Paranaque, Caloocan, and Quezon
City, which thus disrupted water supply in those areas. Meralco
demanded from BF Homes and PWCC the payment of electric bills
amounting to P4,717,768.15. BF Homes and PWCC then requested
that such amount be applied against the P11,834,570.91 worth of
refund asked from Meralco. Denied. Again, 5 more water pumps was
were cut off power supply. Meralco threatened to cut
more power supply. BF Homes and PWCC filed a case in RTC asking
for damages plus writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order.
In Meralco’s answer, it allege that the service contracts provides that
“The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the
customer is in arrears in the payment of bills” and such right is
sanctioned and approved by the rules and regulations of ERB. As to
the refund, Meralco claims that the refund has to be implemented in
accordance with the guidelines and schedule to be approved by the
ERC. Meralco also allege that RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HELD:
No, the Court has no jurisdiction over the case of refund. In
determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, the better policy
is to consider not only the status or relationship of the parties but also
the nature of the action that is the subject of their controversy. In
Meralco v ERB, the Court traced the legislative history of the
regulatory agencies which preceded the ERC to determine the
legislative intent as to its jurisdiction. Accordingly, ERC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines,
and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its powers,
functions and responsibilities.

Administrative agencies, like the ERC, are tribunals of limited

jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are specifically
granted to them by the enabling statutes. In relation thereto is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies even if the question
involved is also judicial in nature. Courts cannot and will not resolve a
16 | P a g e
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially when the question demands the
sound exercise of administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The court cannot
arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction of which is initially lodged with the administrative body of
special competence.

The cause of action originates from the Meralco Refund Decision as

it involves the perceived right of the BF Homes and PWCC to compel
the latter to set-off or apply their refund to their present electric bill.
Such right of refund however must comply with the approved schedule
of ERC. Hence, jurisdiction lies with ERC. Since RTC has no
jurisdiction, it was also devoid of any authority to act on the application
of BF Homes and PWCC for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction contained in the same Petition.

(12)
THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN VS JODY KING CONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP
G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
The Province of Aklan and Jody King Construction entered into a
contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Port and
terminal (phase 1). In the course of construction, Petitioner Aklan
issued a change orders for additional works and again entered into a
negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of Passenger
Terminal Building (Phase 2). After the construction of Phase 1 and
change orders were agreed, respondent allegedly failed to settle.
Then, respondent sued petitioner to RTC for collection a sum of
money. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment,
Petitioner denied any unpaid balance. RTC rendered decision in
favour of respondent, issued a writ execution and garnished
petitioners funds deposited in different banks. Petitioner filed petition
in the CA, but it was denied for its failure to file a timely motion for
reconsideration and is stopped from invoking the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction as it stopped from making the doctrine or primary
jurisdiction as it only raised after its notice of appeal was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is stopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC and the applicability of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
17 | P a g e
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. COA has primary jurisdiction over money claim
and petitioner is not stopped from not raising the issue of jurisdiction.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are
many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved
is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warranto proceedings. All the proceedings and decisions of the court
in violation of the doctrine rendered null and void.

(13)
MACASAET VS CO
G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the
Western Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid
of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing
Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its
Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its
Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages
because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in
the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit, docketed as Civil
Case No. 0097907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due
course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including
Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing
Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana
Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila. In the morning of
September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the
stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the
address were futile because the defendants were then out of the office
and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a
second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that
18 | P a g e
petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to
substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s
return dated September 22, 2005.

ISSUE:
Whether or not jurisdiction over the petitioners have been acquired

HELD:
Yes. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the
power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the
parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential
in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi
in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in
rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action
as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter
of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process.

The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in

personam, on the one hand, and an action in rem or quasi in rem, on
the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen, thusly:

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi
in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by
these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is
based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his
right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate
of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose,
through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly
upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel
a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a
pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the property to determine its
state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against
the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-
settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs,
the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights
and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered
adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.

19 | P a g e
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the
discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening
the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or
liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the
parties who joined in the action.
As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant
who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an action in rem or
quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter
instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the
defendant, and such extraterritorial service of summons is not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that
the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against
him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him
or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if
he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant in an action
in personam does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, our
courts cannot try the case against him because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in
court.

As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits

himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory
pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary
appearance in the action.

The significance of the proper service of the summons on the

defendant in an action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The
service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely:
(a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant;
and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the
claim brought against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in
personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper service
of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the
ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly does
an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal
20 | P a g e
jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As
to the latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may
have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the
summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard
on the claim against him, he may also waive the process. In other
words, compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly
be effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such
personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to
the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and
sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is to be
rigidly enforced in order to ensure the realization of the two
fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons,
the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time,
the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving
a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at
his office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted
service because the service of the summons on the defendant is made
through his substitute.

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the

summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address,
the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the
afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet
and Quijano were “always out and not available” and the other
petitioners were “always roving outside and gathering news.” After
Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second
attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the
office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded
that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time
would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He
was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal
service by all means and at all times, considering that he was
expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be
unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that
regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the
circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal
service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the
circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit
of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

(14)
CABRERA vs FRANCISCO
21 | P a g e
 G.R. No. 172293, August 28, 2013
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

On October 25, 1976, respondents’ father, Atty. Lorenzo C. Gella

(Atty. Gella), executed a private document confirming that he has
appointed Severino Cabrera (Severino), husband of Araceli and father
of Arnel as administrator of all his real properties located in San Jose,
Antique consisting of about 24 hectares of land described as Lot No.
1782-B and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16987.

When Severino died in 1991, Araceli and Arnel, with the consent of
respondents, took over the administration of the properties.
Respondents likewise instructed them to look for buyers of the
properties, allegedly promising them "a commission of five percent of
the total purchase price of the said properties as compensation for
their long and continued administration" thereof.

Accordingly, petitioners introduced real estate broker and President of

ESV Marketing and Development Corporation, Erlinda Veñegas
(Erlinda), to the respondents who agreed to have the said properties
developed by Erlinda’s company. However, a conflict arose when
respondents appointed Erlinda as the new administratrix of the
properties and terminated Araceli’s and Arnel’s services.

Petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondents and demanded for

their five percent commission and compensation to no avail. Hence,
on September 3, 2001, they filed a Complaint for Collection of Agent’s
Compensation, Commission and Damages against respondents
before the RTC. Attached to their Complaint is a copy of the tax
declaration for Lot No. 1782-B.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s findings that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; that the Complaint
states no cause of action; and that petitioners Araceli and Arnel have
no legal capacity to sue in behalf of the other heirs of Severino.

HELD:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is

not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
22 | P a g e
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).

It can be readily seen from the allegations in the Complaint that

petitioners’ main purpose in filing the same is to collect the
commission allegedly promised them by respondents should they be
able to sell Lot No. 1782-B, as well as the compensation for the
services rendered by Severino, Araceli and Arnel for the
administration of respondents’ properties. Captioned as a Complaint
for Collection of Agent’s Compensation, Commission and Damages,
it is principally for the collection of a sum of money representing such
compensation and commission. Indeed, the payment of such money
claim is the principal relief sought and not merely incidental to, or a
consequence of another action where the subject of litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money. In fact, petitioners in this case
estimated their claim to be equivalent to five percent of the purchase
price of Lot No. 1782-B. Therefore, the CA did not err when it ruled
that petitioners’ Complaint is not incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Court cannot also give credence to petitioners’ contention that

their action involves interest in a real property. The October 25, 1976
letter of Atty. Gella confirming Severino’s appointment as
administrator of his properties does not provide that the latter’s
services would be compensated in the form of real estate or, at the
very least, that it was for a compensation. Neither was it alleged in the
Complaint that the five percent commission promised to Araceli and
Arnel would be equivalent to such portion of Lot No. 1782-B. What is
clear from paragraph 4 thereof is that respondents instructed
petitioners to look for buyers of their properties and "were promised
by respondents a commission of five percent of the total purchase
price of the said properties as compensation for their long and
continued administration of all the said properties." Also, petitioners’
allegation in paragraph 6 that respondents failed to pay them "in cash
or in kind" of what is due them negates any agreement between the
parties that they should be paid in the form of real estate. Clearly, the
allegations in their Complaint failed to sufficiently show that they have
interest of whatever kind over the properties of respondents. Given
these, petitioners’ claim that their action involves interest over a real
property is unavailing.

To determine whether the RTC in this case has jurisdiction over

petitioners’ Complaint, respondents correctly argued that the same be
considered vis-à-vis Section 19(8) of BP 129, which provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
23 | P a g e
xxxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests,

damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00).

This jurisdictional amount of exceeding ₱100,000.00 for RTC’s

outside of Metro Manila was adjusted to ₱200,000.00 effective March
20, 1999 in pursuance to Section 5 of RA 7691 which further provides:

SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec.
33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be
adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00). Five (5)
years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further
to Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00): Provided, however,
That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of
this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00).

Hence, when petitioners filed their Complaint on September 3, 2001,

the said increased jurisdictional amount was already effective. The
demand in their Complaint must therefore exceed ₱200,000.00 in
order for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Petitioners prayed that they be paid five percent of the total purchase
price of Lot No. 1782-B. However, since the Complaint did not allege
that the said property has already been sold, as in fact it has not yet
been sold as respondents contend, there is no purchase price which
can be used as basis for computing the five percent that petitioners
are claiming. Nevertheless and as mentioned, petitioners were able to
attach to their Complaint a copy of the tax declaration for Lot No. 1782-
B showing a total market value of ₱3,550,072.00. And since "the fair
market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller,
who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not
compelled to buy," the RTC correctly computed the amount of
petitioners’ claim based on the property’s market value. And since five
percent of ₱3,550,072.00 is only ₱177,503.60 or below the
jurisdictional amount of exceeding ₱200,000.00 set for RTCs outside
of Metro Manila, the RTC in this case has no jurisdiction over
petitioners’ claim.

There is no merit to petitioners’ averment that their demand for moral

damages should be included in the computation of their total claims.
Paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129 expressly speaks of demand which
is exclusive of damages of whatever kind. This exclusion was later
24 | P a g e
explained by the Court in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated
June 14, 1994 as follows:

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in

determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies
to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Here, the moral damages being claimed by petitioners are merely the
consequence of respondents’ alleged non-payment of commission
and compensation the collection of which is petitioners’ main cause of
action. Thus, the said claim for moral damages cannot be included in
determining the jurisdictional amount.

In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC’s
conclusion that it has no jurisdiction over petitioners’ claim.

(15)
THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY VS THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 210987, November 24, 2014
VELASCO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner The Philippine American Life and General Insurance
Company (Philamlife) used to own 498,590 Class A shares in Philam
Care Health Systems, Inc. (PhilamCare), representing 49.89% of the
latter's outstanding capital stock. In 2009, petitioner, in a bid to divest
itself of its interests in the health maintenance organization industry,
offered to sell its shareholdings in PhilamCare through competitive
bidding. Thus, on September 24, 2009, petitioner's Class A shares
were sold for USD 2,190,000, or PhP 104,259,330 based on the
prevailing exchange rate at the time of the sale, to STI Investments,
Inc., who emerged as the highest bidder.3

After the sale was completed and the necessary documentary stamp
and capital gains taxes were paid, Philamlife filed an application for a
certificate authorizing registration/tax clearance with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) Large Taxpayers Service Division to facilitate
the transfer of the shares. Months later, petitioner was informed that it
needed to secure a BIR ruling in connection with its application due to
potential donor’s tax liability. In compliance, petitioner, on January 4,
25 | P a g e
2012, requested a ruling4 to confirm that the sale was not subject to
donor’s tax, pointing out, in its request, the following: that the
transaction cannot attract donor’s tax liability since there was no
donative intent and ergo, no taxable donation, citing BIR Ruling [DA-
(DT-065) 715-09] dated November 27, 2009;5 that the shares were
sold at their actual fair market value and at arm’s length; that as long
as the transaction conducted is at arm’s length––such that a bona fide
business arrangement of the dealings is done inthe ordinary course of
business––a sale for less than an adequate consideration is not
subject to donor’s tax; and that donor’s tax does not apply to saleof
shares sold in an open bidding process.

On January 4, 2012, however, respondent Commissioner on Internal

Revenue (Commissioner) denied Philamlife’s request through BIR
Ruling No. 015-12. As determined by the Commissioner, the selling
price of the shares thus sold was lower than their book value based
on the financial statements of PhilamCare as of the end of 2008.6 As
such, the Commisioner held, donor’s tax became imposable on the
price difference pursuant to Sec. 100 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC).

ISSUE:
Whether Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction.

HELD:
The petition is unmeritorious. Preliminarily, it bears stressing that
there is no dispute that what is involved herein is the respondent
Commissioner’s exercise of power under the first paragraph of Sec. 4
of the NIRC––the power to interpret tax laws. This, in fact, was
recognized by the appellate court itself, but erroneously held that her
action in the exercise of such power is appealable directly to the CTA.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, Sec. 4 of the NIRC readily
provides that the Commissioner’s power to interpret the provisions of
this Code and other tax laws is subject to review by the Secretary of
Finance. The issue that now arises is this––where does one seek
immediate recourse from the adverse ruling of the Secretary of
Finance in its exercise of its power of review under Sec. 4?

Admittedly, there is no provision in law that expressly provides where

exactly the ruling of the Secretary of Finance under the adverted NIRC
provision is appealable to. However, We find that Sec. 7(a)(1) of RA
1125, as amended, addresses the seeming gap in the law asit vests
the CTA, albeit impliedly, with jurisdiction over the CA petition as
"other matters" arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by
the BIR.

(16)
HECTOR TREAS VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
26 | P a g e
 G. R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted

to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It
was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito
Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private
complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita,
for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters name. Hector
informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her
aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a

corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a]
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector
gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she
consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.
When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake
and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a

Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in
the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the
PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason
that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and
verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of
Estafa was filed against him.

On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City

Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City.

ISSUE:
WON the court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
No, Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by
petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an

27 | P a g e
element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is

nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of
the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is
settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be
considered motuproprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings
or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by
express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law
in the manner and form prescribed by law.

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a

defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is
not the court of proper venue. Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that subject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed
or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. This fundamental
principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to,
and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in
looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.

This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to

distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing
health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges
against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati,
the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

(17)
THE CITY OF MANILA VS HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO
G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty
Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to
December 2002 against the private respondents.In addition to the
taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section
28 | P a g e
14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said
assessment covered the local business taxes. private respondents
were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under
protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of

Pasay City the complaint denominated as one for “Refund or
Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local Business
Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied.

Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but
the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it has
no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which
was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA
9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed
with the CTA. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local
tax case.

HELD:
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax
cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended
to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no
perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as
partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early
as the case of J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil.
1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its
29 | P a g e
appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court
of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court
stated that “a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

(18)
JIMENEZ VS SORONGON
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012
BRION, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management
Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos,
Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and MarkosAvgoustis (respondents)
are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc.
(TMSI), another local manning agency.

On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the

Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the
respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The
petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their
stockholdings in TMSIs articles of incorporation secure a license to
operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA).

On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their

joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavits
allegations.RespondentsAvgoustis and Alamil did not submit any
counter-affidavit.

ISSUE:
WON Alamil submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC

HELD:
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction. As
a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal
of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.

30 | P a g e
 (19)
FELIPE N. MADRIAN VS FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN
G.R. No. 159374, July 12, 2007
CORONA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel,

petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2
of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals
for their 2 minor sons on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their
education and deprived them of their mother’s care. Petitioner filed a
memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of
their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for
habeas corpus filed by respondent.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to

take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent
was entitled to custody of the minors. Petitioner challenges the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus
and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts
under RA 8369

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas

corpus cases involving custody of minors.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The

Court of Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. The concurrent
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family
courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
(April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that: “Section
20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus”. – A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to
which the Family Court belongs.

31 | P a g e
 (20)
MAGNO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171542, April 6, 2011
BRION, J.:

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple

frustrated murder and double attempted murder against several
accused, including Magno, who were public officers working under the
National Bureau of Investigation. During the scheduled arraignment,
Magno, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy,
who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on
behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman. The oral objection was
reduced to writing when Magno filed an opposition before the RTC of
Mandaue City.

The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment, while the

accused submitted their joint opposition. The respondents likewise
submitted their comments to the opposition of the other co-accused.
The RTC issued an Order, that the Ombudsman is proper, legal and
authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other
entity/person other than those authorized under the law. The Office of
the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the Order, which
was denied by the RTC.

The respondents, through the Ombudsman, filed a petition for

certiorari before the CA, contending that the RTC committed a grave
abuse of discretion in prohibiting the appearance of Atty. Sitoy as
counsel for the private offended parties, as the Rules of Court
expressly provides for such intervention in the prosecution of
offenses. Magno, insisted that what he questioned before the RTC
was the appearance and authority of the private prosecutor to
prosecute the case in behalf of the Ombudsman. That the Office of
the Ombudsman can designate prosecutors to assist in the
prosecution of criminal cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing or
authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to fiscals,
state prosecutors and government lawyers and does not extend to
private practitioners/private prosecutors. He further stressed that
while the Order of the RTC states that the Office of the Ombudsman
is the proper legal and authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did
not affect the right to intervene personally, as the Office of the
Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the private respondents in
prosecuting the civil aspect of the case.

The CA declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the
petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil
32 | P a g e
aspect of the case is concerned. The respondents moved for the
reconsideration of the CA decision. The CA amended its decision,
ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in
Criminal Case to intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged
in collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to
prosecute the case. Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the
amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute to the SC through
a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has the appellate jurisdiction over the RTC’s
decision in not allowing Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of
the Ombudsman.

HELD:

The Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over the RTC’s

decision.

The law provides that other offenses or felonies whether simple or

complex with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees shall be within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. In the
present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for
certiorari. The Ombudsman should have filed the case before the
Sandiganbayan, which has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the RTC since the accused are public officials charged of committing
crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the NBI. The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether
in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided. Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
the CA’s judgment, issued without jurisdiction, is VOID.

Therefore, based on law and facts the CA has no appellate jurisdiction

over the RTC’s decision for it is the Sandiganbayan’s which has
jurisdiction of the case.

33 | P a g e