Phil 8: Introduction to Philosophy of Science

Outline 15: Pre-paradigmatic and Normal Science

I. Background

A. We’ve talked a decent amount so far about the justification of scientific

theories. But we basically completely ignored the process by which actual
scientific discoveries are made.

B. When we have thought about the scientific process, we’ve been basing our
beliefs from a picture of science as presented in finished scientific work: e.g.
classic scientific texts/textbooks.

C. That picture of science is one of development-by-accumulation. Scientists of

have discovered more and more and more in a steady march toward
objective progress.

D. But, Kuhn will argue that that picture of science is not the one that emerges
from an investigation into the actual history of science.

E. This history shows that the processes by which theories that we now think of
as wildly out-of-date were developed is the same process by which
contemporary theories are developed. (Example: The process that gave us
phlogiston is the same process that gave us the electron.)

F. A study of the history of science will reveal to us that experimentation and

observation constrain our scientific beliefs, but they don’t determine them.
There’s always an arbitrary element to that goes into determining the
scientific beliefs of a community at a time.

II. Introduction to Paradigms and Normal Science

A. Kuhn introduces the term “paradigm” to refer to scientific achievements that

a scientific community takes, at least for some period of time, to supply the
foundation of its practice.

B. Examples of paradigms: Ptolemaic Astronomy, Copernican Astronomy,

Newtonian Dynamics, Wave Optics

C. Paradigms are marked by two essential features: 1. The paradigm is

sufficiently unprecedented that it attracts followers away from rival
conceptions of the topic and 2. The paradigm is sufficiently open ended to
leave plenty of problems for practitioners to work on.
 D. Paradigms change as time passes: The recent paradigm about the nature of
light has it that light is photons, but prior to that the paradigm about light
was wave theory, and before that Newton’s Opticks had it that light was
material.

E. Kuhn introduces the term “normal science” to refer to research based on a

paradigm.

F. Scientific work (normal science) that is conducted under a shared paradigm is

work that is committed to a shared set of rules and scientific practice. For
example, when Newton’s theory of light was the paradigm, it made sense to
test for pressure exhibited by light particles. That experiment didn’t make
sense during the wave paradigm.

III. Pre-paradigmatic Science

A. There can be recognizably scientific work prior to the acceptance of the first
paradigm for a given topic.

B. Before the first paradigm about the nature of light, some took light to be
particles emanating from material bodies, some took light to be some
modification of the medium between a material body and our eyes, some
thought light involved an emanation from the eye, etc. There was no general
agreement.

C. Nevertheless, each view had evidence in it’s favor. These pre-paradigmatic

researches conducted experiments and gathered data in a way that is recognizably
scientific, though different from normal science.

D. The writing of pre-paradigmatic science is characterized by the author having to

always defend the first principles of his favored theory. Each published work
had to build the theory anew, since there were no beliefs about light that could
be taken for granted.

E. During pre-paradigmatic science, there isn’t any general agreement on what class
of facts is relevant. Fact gathering progresses more or less at random. For
example, in histories of heat, you find facts that will later seem relevant (heating
by mixture) next to facts that won’t later seem relevant (the warmth of dung
heaps.)

F. Pre-paradigmatic science gives way to paradigmatic science typically when one of

the pre-paradigmatic sciences makes some big achievement. For example, in
pre-paradigmatic studies of electricity, there was disagreement over whether
electrical phenomena was primarily fluid (which dealt well with conductivity but
not well with attraction and repulsion) or whether it was primarily the
phenomena of attraction and repulsion (which had a hard time explaining
conductivity). The fluid theorists developed a Leydan Jar (inspired by the
 thought that they could trap electrical “fluid”), and the attraction/repulsion
theorists managed to explain the Leydan Jar, which led to the
attraction/repulsion theory being the paradigm.

G. The paradigm must be an achievement significant enough to attract adherents,

but not everyone is going to convert. Those that don’t convert, however, simply
are read out of the profession.

H. Movement from pre-paradigmatic science to paradigmatic science brings with it

shared beliefs and methodologies, so scientists don’t have to defend first
principles in each of their works. The result is highly specialized writing and
professional journals that are opaque to a general audience.

IV. Normal Science

A. Normal science is a process of “mop-up work” done after the shift to a

paradigm. This is the activity that most scientists will spend most of their
professional lives engaged in.

B. During normal science, there are three kinds of factual investigation:

determination of significant fact, matching facts with theory, and
articulating theory.

C. First, there is fact gathering of the sort of facts the paradigm has deemed
relevant. This usually involves the development of new or more precise
tools of measurement.

D. Second, there’s the project of fitting gathered facts to the predictions of

the paradigm. Surprisingly, often a paradigm will come with few points
of contact with the observable world. And those predictions that it
makes won’t quite fit the actual world. This also involves a ton of work.
For example, Copernican Astronomy made predictions about stellar
parallax that were inconsistent with contemporary observations of
parallax. So, better telescopes had to be developed.

E. Third, much empirical work needs to be done to articulate the theory.

For example, in the Newtonian paradigm lots of work needed to be
constructed to identify the gravitational constant, which Newton hadn’t
identified at all.

F. Also, there is the development and improvement of auxiliary hypotheses

to increase the points of contact between the theory and the world, and
the accuracy of those predictions. Still, we often only get approximate
match, but normal science aims to improve that.
 G. And there is a reformulation of the paradigm to improve its logical
structure, get rid of clumsy articulations, etc. This often involves high
level mathematics.

V. Puzzle Solving

A. You might be surprised, then, by how little of normal science involves

anything novel. It’s a matter of gathering data, fitting that data to theory,
and elaborating the theory. And the results of that process are often
predictable way before any of it is done. Very little, if anything,
surprising happens during normal science.

B. What is its appeal, then, to such brilliant minds?

C. Kuhn sees the project of normal science as one of puzzle solving.

D. Puzzles are only possible when (1) there’s the promise of a possible
solution and (2) there are rules governing the solving of the puzzle.

E. For example, taking half of the puzzle pieces of one set, and half of the
puzzle pieces of another, and saying “okay, solve the puzzle!” isn’t to give
someone a genuine puzzle. That’s because there’s no possible solution.

F. And, solving a jigsaw puzzle isn’t just making any old picture. There are
rules about what counts as a solution. (Pieces have to be face up, can’t
force pieces together, resulting picture has to match original picture, etc.)

G. And, solving puzzles is fun because it’s a test of the solver’s ingenuity.

H. Scientific paradigms are necessary for problem solving to occur, because

they present the promise of a solution (the paradigm is taken for granted
as correct) and they present the rules of acceptable solutions.

I. These rules take the form of:

i. Explicit statements of scientific laws.
ii. Commitments to certain instruments and ways those
instruments can be used.
iii. Quasi-philosophical commitments (e.g. to determinism)
iv. Methodological commitments.

J. So the vast majority of science is devoted to solving highly technical

puzzles, most of which have little practical import, most of which
wouldn’t be conceivable outside of the paradigm, and the empirical
results of which are not surprising or novel.

K. That’s a very different conception of science than one where scientists

spend their time coming up with grand theories that better describe the
world.