REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
ADMINISTRATION LAW
 It is the branch of modern law by which the executive
department acting under quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
body interferes with the conduct of individual for the purpose
of promoting the well-being of the community
 It is branch of modern law because it is the consequence of
growing complexities in society by globalization,
modernization, and population exploitation
TRADITIONAL DEPARTMENT
 This are the existing departments
NOTE: There is a need to interfere with the conduct of an individual
for the welfare of community because the government is simple and
problems are relatively simple but because of complexities of society
by globalization, modernization and population exploitation. The
legislative department to create administrative bodies to:
1. Address simple details
2. Courts to resolve factual issues
3. Executive Department to enact law
SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
1. Statutes setting up administrative authorities
2. The body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation,
operation, and effect of determinations and regulations of such
administrative authorities
3. Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative authorities
in pursuance of the purposes for which administrative
authorities were created or endowed
4. Determinations, decisions, and orders of such administrative
authorities in the settlement of controversies arising in their
particular fields
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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
 It is an organ of the Government other than the Legislative and
Judicial Body which affects the rights and interest of private
parties either through adjudication or rule-making
 It refers to either:
1. Functional unit of Government (department or bureau)
2. Institution or occupied by individual person, whose
functions are define by law or regulation.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS ASSOCIATION OF
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK
FACTS:From a submission agreement of the LDB and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose
an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the
MOA on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their
respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary
Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper ; LDB, on the other
hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the
Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no
Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a
decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered
to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside
the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from
enforcing the same.
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC

ISSUE:Whether the Voluntary Arbitrator performs a quasi-judicial Reorganization, is the process

function of restructuring the
RULING:An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. organizational and the
Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are functional set up of the
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a administrative agency to make
government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is it more viable in terms of
performed. The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, economy, efficiency,
contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental effectiveness, and to make it
power for the performance of a state function. more responsive to the needs
of modernsociety.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a
governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in
the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the NOTE: As a general rule Reorganization does not create
term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact administrative agency except when the statute/law expressly
that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does provide.
not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-
REASONS FOR CREATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.
1. UNCLOG COURT DOCKETS
 To relieve court of the burden of resolving all
HOW ADMINISTRATIVE
controversies, specialized agencies have been created to
AGENCY IS CREATED: ABOLITION
hear and decide particular disputes
1. Constitution  Constitutional
2. TO MEET THE GROWING COMPLEXITIES OF
amendments
MODERN SOCIETY
 Amendments by mere
 As problems of modern society multiply, which can
executive order cannot
hardly be met by the legislature administrative agencies
demolish it
are established to promptly cope with such problems
2. Legislative enactment Through legislative enactment 3. TO HELP THE REGULATION OF RAMIFIED
3. Authority of Law Legislature exercise the power ACTIVITIES OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
to create or abolish by 4. TO ENTRUST TO SPECIALIZED AGENCIES WITH
delegating it to the President or THEIR SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE, EXPERTISE AND
to another executive officer. CAPABILITY THE TASK OF DEALING WITH
The means by which the PROBLEMS
legislative delegates it through
 As they have the experience, expertise and power of
reorganization. dispatch to provide solution thereto.
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1. Quasi-Legislative Powers
 It is the authority delegated by the law making
body to the administrative body to adopt rules and
regulation intended to carry out provisions of law and
implement legislative policies.
WHAT CANNOT BE DELEGATED:
1. The powerto make the law or to determine what the law should
be and to alter or repeal it
2. The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law
3. To determine to purpose or policy to be achieved by the law
4. Fix the limits within which the law shall operate is purely
legislative
WHAT MAY BE DELEGATED:
1. The discretion as how the law shall be enforced
2. To exercise police power
3. To issue rules to fill the details
4. To ascertain facts on which the law will operate
5. To fix rates and wages.
NOTE: To be valid, however, the delegation has to passthe
completeness and sufficiency of standard test
THE COMPLETENESS TEST
 The law must be complete in all its items and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
 A statute may be complete when the subject, the manner, and
the extent of its operation are stated in it.
 Whether the provision is sufficiently definite and certain to
enable one to know his rights and obligations
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 Whether it describes what must be done, who/must do it, and
the scope of his authority.
 The operation of a statute is complete in itself may be made
dependent upon the existence of some contingency fixed
therein or some ascertainable facts.
Illustration: US VS ANG TANG HO
Facts:In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special
session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary
Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued
Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20,
1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold.
On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of
rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said
amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The
sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919,
he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that
there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issue:Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor
General.
Ruling:First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed
because he committed the act prior to the publication of the
EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.
Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of
an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the
order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
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CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails
to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that
could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its
terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST
 The standard may be express or implie
 The standard may be found within the framework of the statute
under which the act is to be performed, or may inhere in its
subject matter or purpose, and a clearly defined field of action
may implicitly contain the criteria which must govern the
action.
 The standard may also be found in other pertinent legislation or
an executive order or in the field of law governing the
operation of the agency.
 The standard must be reasonably adequate, sufficient and
definite for the guidance of the administrative agency in the
exercise of the power conferred upon it and must also be
sufficient to enable those affected to know their rights and
obligations.
 The sufficiency standard depends upon the nature of the
power exercised and the nature of the right restricted by
such power.
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As a general rule, standards are sufficient for a valid delegation
of police power, but are inadequate as basis for a valid
delegation of the power to implement other statutes.
Public interest or welfare, for instance may be upheld as an
insufficient standard in a particular statute but the same
standard used in another statute may be held as a sufficient
basis for validity of the rules or orders issued thereunder.
Illustration: EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS AUDITOR
GENERAL
FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued
executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides that:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of
an municipality and may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer,
filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from
disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities.
Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that
Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section
3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created
or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by
Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this
new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?”
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and
that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a
municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further
maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to
create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress
may delegate to another branch of the government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of
the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and
(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec.
68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means
to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the
public welfare may require” – which would mean that the
President may exercise such power as the public welfare may
require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place,
what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is
the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is “the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may
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be changed by the President when public welfare so requires
and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
Illustration: EDU VS ERICTA
FACTS: Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and
Admin Order No. 2 which implements it. Under the law, a
vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having
reflective device prior to being registered at the LTO.
The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists,
filed a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an
invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the
due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a
manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that,
in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute
constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing
such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative
power.
ISSUE: Whether Reflector Law is unconstitutional, and w/n
AO2 is valid
RULING: YES, both the law and AO 2 are valid.
It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation
enacted under the police power to promote public safety. What
is delegated is authority which is non-legislative in character,
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
Congress being assumed.
1. Police Power
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute
of government. "the most essential, insistent, and at least
illimitable of powers," (Justice Holmes) aptly pointed out "to
all the great public needs."
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation.
2. Delegation of Legislative Power
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the government,
subject to the exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is
the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all
its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to
the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes
what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of
his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A
distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of
power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
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and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be
regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lay down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety.
Illustration: CALALANG VS WILLIAMS
FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
1. Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm;
and
2. along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18,
1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548
which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary
the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The
Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on
August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their
owners but of the riding public as well.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
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Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
RULING:No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of
the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should
not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall
into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty
is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
TWO KINDS OF RULE:
1. Interpretative
 It is persuasive and advisory
2. Legislative Rules
 It has force and effect of law.
A. Supplementary
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
 3052 would automatically become effective. Cruz does not
B. Contingency
 It is issued pursuant to authorities is determine...
Illustration: CRUZ VS YOUNGBERG
FACTS: Mauricio Cruz brought a petition for the issuance
of a writ of mandatory injunction before the CFI Manila
against the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry,
Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the
landing of 10 large cattle imported by him from Australia
and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the
constitutionality of Act 3155, which prohibits the
importation of cattle from foreign countries into the
Philippine Islands. The Director demurred to the petition on
the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons,
namely, (1) that if Act 3155 were declared unconstitutional
and void, Cruz would not be entitled to the relief demanded
because Act 3052 would automatically become effective
and would prohibit the Director from giving the permit
prayed for; and (2) that Act 3155 was constitutional and,
therefore, valid. The court sustained the demurrer and the
complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of Cruz to
file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, Cruz
appealed to the Supreme Court.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
appealed from; with the costs against Cruz.
1. Nullity of Act 3052 would make it impossible for
Director to grant permit for the importation of cattle
If Act 3155 is declared unconstitutional, still Cruz cannot
be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason
that, while Act 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act
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present any allegation in regard to Act 3052 to show its
nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that
in the absence of Act 3155 the former act would make it
impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry to grant Cruz a permit for the importation of the
cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding
department.
2. Unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal
former laws
An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal
former laws or parts of laws by implication, since, being
void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws.
3. Court does not pass upon constitutionality of statutes
unless it is necessary
The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
statutes unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Aldanese
and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259). In the present case, it is not
necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute because
even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner
would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act 3052 is not
in issue.
4. Provisions of Acts 3052 and 3155 entirely; Promotion of
industries affecting the public welfare are objects within
scope of police power; Court not to determine if measure is
wise or best
Aside from the provisions of Act 3052, Act 3155 is
entirely valid. The Legislature passed Act 3155 to protect
the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the
introduction of cattle diseases through the importation of
foreign cattle. The promotion of industries affecting the
public welfare and the development of the resources of the
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CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
country are objects within the scope of the police power.
Act 3155 was promulgated as there was reasonable
necessity therefore when it was enacted and it cannot be
said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the
Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate
the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to
determine whether the measures are wise or the best that
might have been adopted.
5. Distinction between delegation of power to make law
and conferring an authority or discretion as to execution
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as
to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made (Wilmington and Zanesville
Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County). In the
present case, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative
power.
6. Act 3155 is a complete statute; does not amend but
merely supplemental to the Tariff Law
Act 3155 is a complete statute in itself. It does not make
any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the
importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by
the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine
measure, a statute
adopted under the police power of the Philippine
Government.
REQUISITES OF VALIDITY OF RULES:
1. The promulgation is authorize by the Legislative
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2. It must be within the authority given by the Legislative
Illustration: BAUTISTA VS JUINIO
FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of
Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in response to the
protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto,
respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P.
Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission
issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the
penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of
registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found
violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion
Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the
energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding
with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that
"while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable,
to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use
private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair,
discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and
thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover,
for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process,
more specifically,” of their right to use and enjoy their private
property and of their freedom to travel and hold family
gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays."
It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular
No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle
and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for
being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of
legislative power."
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as
implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of
certain constitutional rights.
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CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
HELD: The petition was dismissed because of the
"presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different words
"a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional
limitations." There is need then for a factual foundation of
invalidity. The principle has been nowhere better expressed
than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court summed up
the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a
subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are
asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method
of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact
may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in
the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute.' "
In fact, the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of
Instruction makes it clear that the substantive due process,
which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, was not
ignored, much less infringed. Furthermore, in the interplay
between such a fundamental right and police power, especially
so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of
one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. Due
process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the
Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has
been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the
great public needs.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of
the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived
of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police
power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which
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enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society.' "
Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no violation of
equal protection. There was a situation that called for a
corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the
President expressing a power validly lodged in him,
recommended itself. He decided that what was issued by him
would do just that or, at the very least, help in easing the
situation. If it did not cover other matters which could very
well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of
nullity. The President "is not required by the Constitution to
adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. Araneta).
Absent, therefore, of the alleged infringement of constitutional
rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection
guarantees, the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No.
869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. The Memorandum
Circular No. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it
is limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment
and it relates solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the
law.
Illustration: PEOPLE VS ECHEGARAY
FACTS: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon
him of the death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659
and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode
of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE
METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out
the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being
violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines'
obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation
of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection
as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has
already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,
and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the
most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier
to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to
respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power
DAVP
to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of
Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the
attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae.
They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The
court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a)
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our
international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation
of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
ISSUE:
1. it an undue delegation of legislative power?
2. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
RULING:
1. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which
define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate
the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the
lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to
the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal
injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also
mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration
of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance
of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose
would be served by requiring greater detail. The question
raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal
offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already
imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the
administrative officials concerned is, canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not
be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears
missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which
provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was
supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the
implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has
practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual
on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and
approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department
of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate
a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-
making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent
abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said
paragraph invalid.
2. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing
Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as
for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by
respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17
DAVP
amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A.
No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE
DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall
not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next
following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant,
nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this
latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for
being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid
exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary.
Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when
lethal injection may be suspended, without an express
amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while
she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor
upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17
of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death sentence
is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence
no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a
woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory
basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention
of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited
must not override, but instead remain consistent and in
harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with prescribed
procedure
Illustration: TAÑADA VS TUVERA
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws
to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause
to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved
for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette
is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
DAVP
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be
the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there
shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word
“shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or
of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no
force and effect.
All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
4. It must be reasonable
Illustration: LUPANGCO VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take
the licensure examinations in accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing,
conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school,
college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of
the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three
days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to
the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees
preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year,
filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain
the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution
and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21,
1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction
to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In
an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that
it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10,
DAVP
1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The petition
was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is
constitutional.
Held:CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC
are co-equal branches. They relied heavily on the case of
National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where
the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere
with the orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.
SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is
glaringly apparent that the reason why the Court ruled that
the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the
orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law.
Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government
agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically
limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred when it
place he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no
law providing for the next course of action for a party who
wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is
clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office
of the President for general direction and coordination.
Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of
the Office of the President may be reviewed by the RTC. In
view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to
entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its
resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the
resolution has a commendable purpose which is to preserve
the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the
resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
attend and review class, briefing, conference or the like or
receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center. The
unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught
committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives will
be barred from taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary,
it also infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to
dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the
steps they take are lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it
violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that
review schools and centers believe would best enable their
enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the means and
methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and
centers may not be stopped from helping out their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee
that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will
be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be
done by the respondent is to find out the source of such
leakages and stop it right there.
Illustration: TAXICAB VS BUREAU OF
TRANSPORTATION
FACTS: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila,
Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public
DAVP
Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila
and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular
traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation
(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which
reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and
Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the
BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC
No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of
taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models
which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned
memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required
by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with
the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential
Decree No. 101, would the implementation and
enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate
the petitioners’ constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
classification and standard?
RULING: As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the
challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers
posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the
exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may
also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded”.
Illustration: PEOPLE VS QUE PO LAY
FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in
possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars,
U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about
$7,000. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents within one day following the receipt of
such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The
appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was
not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or
omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently,
said circular had no force and effect.
Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act.
No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be
published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice
of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering
DAVP
this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and
2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette
of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in
order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to
have the force and effect of law.
RULING: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the
absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of
the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of
the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil
Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has
the force and effect of law according to settled
jurisprudence.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially
like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question
which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation
or circular must first be published and the people officially
and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular,
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CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal
effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official
Gazzette or after November 1951
INTERPRETATIVE RULE
 It is mere persuasive and advisory
 It is the exception to statues, ordinances, etc.
Illustration: MPC VS PINATUBO
FACTS:NPC Circular No. 99-75[5] dated October 8, 1999 set the
guidelines in the disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-
reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good
housekeeping in NPC installations and to generate additional
income for NPC." Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provide:
3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS
3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are
partnerships or corporations that directly use
aluminum as the raw material in producing
finished products either purely or partly out of
aluminum, or their duly appointed
representatives. These bidders may be based
locally or overseas.[6]
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-
qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap
ACSR cables.Respondent Pinatubo Commercial, a trader of
scrap materials such as copper, aluminum, steel and other
ferrous and non-ferrous materials, submitted a pre-qualification
form to NPC. Pinatubo, however, was informed in a letter
dated April 29, 2003 that its application for pre-qualification
had been denied.Petitioner asked for reconsideration but NPC
denied it.
DAVP
Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of
NPC Circular No. 99-75, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Pinatubo argued that the circular was
unconstitutional as it violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution, and ran counter to the
government policy of competitive public bidding.
In this petition, NPC insists that there was no need to publish
the circular since it was not of general application. It was
addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely
the disposal committees, heads of offices, regional and all other
officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs. NPC also
contends that there was a substantial distinction between
manufacturers and traders of aluminum scrap materials
specially viewed in the light of RA 7832. According to NPC,
by limiting the prospective bidders to manufacturers, it could
easily monitor the market of its scrap ACSRs. There was
rampant fencing of stolen NPC wires. NPC likewise maintains
that traders were not prohibited from participating in the pre-
qualification as long as they had a tie-up with a manufacturer.
RULING: In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have
to be published since it was merely an internal rule or
regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an
existing law but was merely a directive issued by the NPC
President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and
efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus,
NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the
different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification,
bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for the
deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the
approval of the award, mode of payment and release of
awarded scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed to
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap
ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in
general or of any other person not involved in the bidding
process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only
remotely, indirectly and incidentally
REGULATIONS WITH PENALTIES
REQUISITES:
1. The law itself must make violation of the administrative
regulation punishable
2. The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the
violation of regulation
3. The regulation must be published
Illustration: PESIGAN VS ANGELES
FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the
evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from
Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were
provided with three certificates:
1. A health certificate from the provincial veterinarian,
2. Permit to transfer/transport from the
provincial commander; and
3. Three certificates of inspections.
In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the
provincial veterinarian and the town’s police station
commander while passing through Camarines Norte. The
confiscation wasbased on EO No. 626-A which prohibits the
transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to
another.
DAVP
ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 626-A, providing for the
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos
transported from one province to another, dated October 25,
1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette
on June 14, 1982
RULING: No. The said order is not enforceable against the
Pesigans on April 2. 1982 because it is a penal regulation
published more than two months later in the OG. It became
effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of
the Civil Code and Sec-11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word “laws” in article 2 includes circulars and regulations
which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the
saidpenalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential
executive orders having general applicability should be
published in the Official Gazette. It provides that “every order
ordocument which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to
have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a
violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation and
forfeitureprovision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It
results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the
carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The
recipients of thecarabaos should return them to the Pesigans.
However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas
because they are now bound by the said executive order.
Neither can theyrecover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and
dispersal of the carabaos.
Judgment: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of
the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore
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CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
carabaos, with the requisite documents, to petitioners for
theirown disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No
costs.
Important point: Publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice and
fairnessdictate that the public must be informed of that
provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.
DELEGATION OF RATE-FIXING POWER
 The legislature usually delegates its rate-fixing power to
administrative agencies for the latter to fix the rates which
public utility may charge the pulic.
 The administrative agencies perform this function either by
issuing rules and regulations in the exercise of their quasi-
legislative power or by issuing orders affecting a specified
person in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.
 In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard
which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance
of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable
and just.
 Its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of
power becomes unconstitutional.
 The fixing rate is quasi-legislative when the rules or the rates
are meant to apply to all enterprise of a given kind
throughout the Philippines, in which case notice and
hearing are not required for their validity
 It is quasi-judicial when the rules or rates apply exclusively to
a named person or entity and predicated upon a finding of
facts, on the basis of which the rules and rates are based, in
which case the valid exercise of which demands previous
DAVP
notice and hearing, whether or not the order fixing the
rates is permanent or provisional or temporary.
Illustration: VIGAN ELECTRIC VS PUBLIC SERVICE
FACTS: In an alleged letter-petition, petitioner was charged
with black market of electric meters and that its meters were
installed in bad faith to register excessive rates. Petitioner
received a communication from General Auditing Office
(GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued subsequently a
subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce before
PSC, during a conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain
book of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash such subpoena.
The conference was postponed twice until it was finally
cancelled. In May 1962, PSC issued an order, which after
finding that petitioner had an excess of revenues by 18%,
lowered the present meter rates of petitioner. Hence, this
petition for certiorari is instituted.
ISSUE: Whether notice and hearing is required
RULING: Yes.In support to its special defense, respondent
PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that
legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be
exercised without previous notice or hearing. Although the
rule-making power and even the power to fix rates – when such
are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout
the Philippines – may partake of legislative character, such is
not the nature of the order complained of. Here, the order
exclusively applies to petitioner. What is more, it is predicated
upon the finding of fact, whether the petitioner is making a
profit more than 12% of its invested capital which is denied by
the petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine
the maker of the said report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
same, as well as to refute the conclusions drawn therefrom by
the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact,
respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial
character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice
and hearing.
Indeed, Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of CA No. 146, explicitly
require notice and hearing.
Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved
in the order complained of partakes the nature of quasi-
judicial function and that, having been issued without previous
notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of the due
process clause, and hence, null and void.
PROVISIONAL/TEMPORARY RATE
 It need not prior hearing and notice but it suject to final
disposition after hearing
Illustration: MACEDA VS ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD
FACTS: Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on
August 1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the
ERB their respective applications on oil price increases. ERB
then issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42
per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition
seeking to nullify said increase.
ISSUE: Whether the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board
should be subject to presidential review.
HELD:Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering a
provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or
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not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it further or
to deny the application. The provisional increase is akin to a
temporary restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that
“the ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its
decision,” except that there is no law at present authorizing the
same. The Court suggested that it will be under the scope of
the legislative to allow the presidential review of the decisions
of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is
still “ an administrative body under the Office of the President
whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the
established principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies,” especially on a matter as transcendental as oil price
increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.
Illustration: PHILCOMMSAT VS ALCUAZ
FACTS: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was
granted the authority to “construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services
from the communications satellite system and ground terminal
or terminals” in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides
satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe)
and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt
from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public
Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive
Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed
PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC.
Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate
from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however
directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%.
NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose
Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the
enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates
for public service communications, does not provide the
necessary standards which were constitutionally required,
hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT
asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for
the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of
EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of
NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in
the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to
mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is
undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power
to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express
conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether there is an undue delegation of power.
RULING: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the
NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable
rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements
of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the
rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only
upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided
and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed
the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
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Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in
this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-
confiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power,
the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe
for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate
be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in
the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness,
this standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the
rates was done without due process since no hearing was made
in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
RE-DELEGATION IS NOT ALLOWED
 One restriction on the delegation of legislative power is the
doctrine of potestas delegata non delegari protest.
 What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This is based on
the ethical principle that such delegated power constitute not
only a right but a duty to be performed y the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.
 A further delegation of such power would negate the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandate to
discharge it directly.
EXCEPTION: IF THE DELGATION IS PURELY
MINISTERIAL THEN RE-DELEGATION IS
ALLOWED.
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CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER applicability
 It is the power to hear and determine certain facts and decide
on the application of rule of law to the facts ascertained in the IN Reviewable before Reviewable before
enforcement of administration of law. DETERMINATION the Appellate Courts the RTC or Courts of
OF APPROPRIATE General Jurisdiction
JUDICIAL POWER VS QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER REMEDY
JUDICIAL POWER QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER APPLICATION OF Applies to quasi- Not applicable to
Power to try, determine, hear This also applies to EXHAUSTION OF judicial determination quasi-legislative
case at law and equity brought administrative agencies but ADMINISTRATIVE of administrative determination of
before the courts with the qualification that this REMEDIES agencies administrative
is being done in the agencies
enforcement in the
administration of law POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
1. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
If the duty is primarily to If the function is primarily
decide questions of legal rights administrative and the power to 2. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
and not merely incidental to hear and determine
some administrative function controversies is granted as an QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER IS FURTHER CLASSIFIED AS:
incident to an administrative
duty 1. ENABLING POWER

 Permits the doing of an act to which the law requires,

If the expertise is the If it is limited by the expertise
determination of legal question to the ascertainment of decisive regulates and which would be unlawful if not with the
facts government permission.

QUASI-JUDICIAL QUASI- 2. DIRECTING POWER

POWER LEGISLATIVE
 Orders the doing or performance of a particular act
POWER
FUTURITY It investigates, Prospective as to to ensure the compliance with the law and often
declares and enforces looks to the future exercised for corrective purposes.
liabilities based on
present and past facts
GENERARLITY/ Applies to a named Applied to unnamed
PARTICULARITY and specified parties parties and situations
or situation or general
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CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
DIRECTING POWERS INCLUDES THE
FOLLOWING POWERS:
1. DISPENSING POWERS DUE PROCESS
 Allows the administrative officer to  The right to due process is not a statutory right. It is a
relax the general operation of a law or constitutional right. It is observed not only in judicial
exempt from the performance of a proceedings but also in administrative proceedings.+
general duty.
2. SUMMARY POWERS QUESTION: WHAT IS THE REASON FOR THE
 Involves the use by administrative REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS?
authorities of force upon person or
things without necessity of judicial QUESTION: WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IN
warrant. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS?
3. EXAMINING POWERS
 Enables the administrative body to
inspect records or premises or QUESTION: WHEN WE SAY “OPPORTUNITY TO BE
investigates the activities of persons or HEARD”, IS ACTUAL HEARING MANDATORY?
entities within their jurisdiction.
NOTICE AND HEARING
QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE TWO (2)
CONDITIONS/REQUISITES FOR THE PROPER EXERCISE NOTICE
OF QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER?
 Party to a quasi-judicial proceeding is entitled to notice.
ANSWER:
1. JURISDICTION QUESTION: WHAT SHOULD THE NOTICE CONTAIN?
2. DUE PROCESS
ANSWER: The notice must be sufficient as to the contents to let the
party prepare his defense or address the issues.
QUESTION: May administrative agencies enlarge their
jurisdiction?
HEARING

QUESTION: May jurisdiction by the administrative agencies be

enlarged by contract, agreement, consent or waiver by the parties?
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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
 Hearing must be full and fair which includes the right to 3. Decision must have something to support itself
present and submit evidence to know the claims of opposing
party and to meet them. 4. Evidence must be substantial

5. Decision must be based on evidence presented at the hearing

QUESTION: IS A TRIAL TYPE HEARING REQUIRED
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES? 6. Tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy
ANSWER:
ANSWER: 7. Board must render its decision in such a manner that the parties
General Rule: Decision is rendered based on position papers,
affidavits and admissions. are a proceeding can know the various issues involved and the
Exemption: If there are issues of facts which cannot be decided by decision rendered.
affidavits, admissions and position papers, then trial type hearing is
required. AIR MANILA VS BALABAG the cardinal rules are
simplified into four:

QUESTION: IS NOTICE AND HEARING ALWAYS 1. Right to notice

REQUIRED? 2. Right to the opportunity to appear and defend his rights
to introduce evidence relevant to his favor
ANSWER: 3. Right to a tribunal to give impartiality and competent
ANSWER: jurisdiction
General Rule: Yes
4. Right to a decision supported by substantial evidence
Exemption: if it is justified by urgency of immediate action or police
power because due process is subordinate to police power. presented at the hearing.

COMMON QUESTION: WHAT IS THE RULE REGARDING

Example: mad dog and closure of filthy theaters.
“THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL” IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?
WHAT ARE THE CARDINAL RULES TO COMPLY WITH
ANSWER: It is not imperative in administrative proceeding.
DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS:

1. Right to a hearing REASON:

Such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented facts that merit disciplinary action of erring public officials or
employees for the purpose of maintaining the dignity of the

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REVIEWER IN ADMINISTRATION LAW AND ELECTION LAWS UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERASNOTES BY: RUBEN AGPALO AND CARLO
CRUZCOLLEGE OF LAWLECTURE BY: ATTY. GRAY TAMBIAC
government service. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

 Whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided

GUIDELINES ON ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL
1. The authority of the higher administrative office to reverse the
decision must be exercised sparingly
2. The review must not be arbitrary
3. Administrative review is generally a review de novo.
4. The reviewing officer must be other than the officer whose
decision is being reviewed
5. Final and executory decisions are not subject to review.
by law, no judicial recourse can be made until such remedies
have been available of and exhausted.
DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESORT OR DOCTRINE OF
PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION
 Where there is competence or jurisdiction vested upon
administrative body to act upon a matter, no resort to courts
may be made before such administrative body shall have acted
upon the matter.
EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES

QUESTION: IS APPEAL TO THE OFFICE OF THE 1. When the question is purely legal
PRESIDENT MANDATORY?
2. When the administrative body is in estoppels
ANSWER:
3. When the act complained of is patently illegal

4. When there is urgent need for judicial intervention

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS? 5. When the claim involved is small
ANSWER: It is well settled in our jurisdiction that quasi-judicial acts 6. When irreparable damage will be suffered
have upon finality has the force and binding effect of final judgment.
This grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy, the 7. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
awards of quasi-judicial agency must become final at some definite
date fixed by law. 8. When strong public interest is involved
NOTE: The rule on Res Judicata applies only to quasi-judicial
proceedings. 9. When the subject of the controversy is private land

10. In quo warranto proceedings.

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