Admin_Digest_02_Cipres 1 of 7
Edu vs. Ericta,
35 SCRA 481, No. L-32096 October 24, 1970
Facts:
Galo, filed on his behalf and that of other motorist a suit
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner
assailing the validity and constitutionality of Reflector
Law and Administrative Order No. 2 contending that it is
an invalid exercise od police power and violative of the
due process clause.
Respondent Judge Ericta ordered the issuance of the
preliminary injuction directed against the enforcement of
such administrative order.
Hence this petition for Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Administrative Order No.2 violates
the principle of non-delegation.
Ruling:
Under Admin Order No. 2 “No motor vehicles of
whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall
be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such
reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector
commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous
paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be
maintained visible and clean at all times such that if
struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters
away at night." Then came a section on dimensions,
placement and color. As to dimensions the following is
provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches
in diameter or not less than 3 inches square;
Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12
inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger
at the discretion of the vehicle owner." Provision is then
made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed,
installed, pasted or painted." There is the further
requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall
be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each
side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed,
pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of
the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors,
whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or
reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor
vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on
the sides and in the rear shall all be red.
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be
imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with the requirements
contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to
refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if
already registered, its registration maybe suspended in
pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136;
[Provided], However, that in the case of the violation of
Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof,
a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall
be imposed. It is not to be lost sight of that under
Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an
amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation
Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and
regulations for its implementation as long as they do not
conflict with its provisions. It is likewise an express
provision of the above statute that for a violation of any
of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50
could be imposed.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate
its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local
governments may over local affairs participate in its
exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority
under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the
statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. To determine whether
or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature
does not abdicate its functions when it describes what
job must be done, who is to do it, and what the scope of
his authority is. For a complex economy, that may
indeed be the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation
of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercise
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to
be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion
by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety.
In People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this
jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally

delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and
proved for the multifarious and complex situations that
may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards
that the law prescribes.
It is true that, under our system of government, said
power may not be delegated except to local
governments. However, one thing is to delegate the
power to determine what the law shall be, and another
thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in
the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the
law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated
powers fall under the second category, if the law
authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable
standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which
the Administrator is to act so that it may be known
whether he has kept within it in compliance with the
legislative will."
Petition granted. Order set aside.
Agustin vs. Edu,
88 SCRA 195, No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
Facts:
Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos.
Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by
Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3
of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to
read as follows: 3. The Land transportation
Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner
to procure from any and present at the registration of his
vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device,
as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor
vehicle. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
also promulgate such rule and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order.
Subsequent letter was suspended for implementation
insofar as the installation of early warning device is
concerned.
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model
13035, already properly equipped when it came out
from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft,
which could very well serve as an early warning device
in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations in Administrative
Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," alleged that said Letter of Instruction No.
229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and
delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are
"oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society. Hence this petition.
Admin_Digest_02_Cipres 2 of 7
Issue:
Whether or not there is an infringement of principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.
Ruling:
The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of
non-delegation of legislative power is equally without
any support in well-settled legal doctrines. Had
petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with
authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he
would not have the temerity to make such an assertion.
An excerpt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta
sheds light on the matter: “To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
heard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is
to be effected, It is the criterion by which legislative
purpose may fee carried out. Thereafter, the executive
or administrative office designated may in pursuance of
the above guidelines promulgate supplemental roles
and regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In
the Reflector Law, clearly, the legislative objective is
public safety.
The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of
the assailed Letter of Instruction: “[Whereas], the
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization
(U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which
was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices: * * *:” It cannot be disputed then that this
Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
possesses relevance: “The Philippines * * * adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land, * * *: The 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of
such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.

Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc.
426 U.S. 548 (1976)
Facts:
Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as
amended by the Trade Act of 1974, provides that, if the
Secretary of the Treasury finds that an "article is being
imported into the United States in such quantities or
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security," the President is authorized to "take
such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary
to adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so
that . . . imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair
the national security."
When it appeared that a prior program established
under § 232(b) for adjusting oil imports was not fulfilling
its objectives, the Secretary of the Treasury initiated an
investigation. On the basis of this investigation, the
Secretary found that crude oil and its derivatives and
related products were being imported into the United
States in such quantities and under such circumstances
as to threaten to impair the national security, and
accordingly recommended to the President that
appropriate action be taken to reduce the imports.
Following this recommendation, the President promptly
issued a Proclamation, inter alia, raising the license fees
on imported oil. Thereafter, respondents -- eight States
and their Governors, 10 utility companies, and a
Congressman -- brought suits against petitioners
challenging the license fees on the ground, inter alia,
that they were beyond the President's authority under §
232(b). The District Court denied relief, holding that §
232(b) is a valid delegation to the President of the power
to impose license fees on imports, and that the
procedures followed by the President and the Secretary
in imposing the fees fully complied with the statute. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 232(b) does
not authorize the President to impose a license fee
scheme as a method of adjusting imports, but
encompasses only the use of "direct" controls such as
quotas.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an invalid delegation of power.
Ruling:
Section 232(b) authorizes the action taken by the
President.
(a) Section 232(b) does not constitute an improper
delegation of power, since it establishes clear
preconditions to Presidential action, including a finding
by the Secretary of the Treasury that an article is being
imported in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security. Moreover, even if these preconditions are met,
the President can act only to the extent he deems
necessary to adjust the imports so that they will not
Admin_Digest_02_Cipres 3 of 7
threaten to impair the national security, and § 32(c) sets
forth specific factors for him to consider in exercising his
authority.
(b) In authorizing the President to "take such action and
for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of [an] article and its derivatives," § 232(b)'s
language clearly grants him a measure of discretion in
determining the method used to adjust imports, and
there is no support in the statute's language that the
authorization to the President to "adjust" imports should
be read to encompass only quantitative methods, i.e.,
quotas, as opposed to monetary methods, i.e., license
fees, of effecting such adjustments; so to limit the word
"adjust" would not comport with the range of factors that
can trigger the President's authority under § 232(b)'s
language.
(c) Furthermore, § 232(b)'s legislative history amply
indicates that the President's authority extends to the
imposition of monetary exactions, i.e., license fees and
duties, and belies any suggestion that Congress,
despite its use of broad language in the statute itself,
intended to confine the President's authority to the
imposition of quotas and to bar him from imposing a
license fee system such as the one in question.
Reversed and remanded.
Leon White et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. C. Vaughn
Roughton et al
530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976)
Facts:
Roughton is supervisor of the town of the City of
Champaign Township. In this capacity he administers
the general township assistance program which
provides locally collected taxes for distribution as
welfare to needy township residents. White claim that
defendant Roughton
(1) operates the general assistance welfare program
without published standards for eligibility or the amount
of aid given; (2) terminates general assistance without
giving the recipient notice and a hearing prior to that
termination;
(3) denies applications for general assistance welfare
without giving the applicant notice and a hearing after
the denial of the application;
(4) fails adequately to inform recipients and applicants
of their right to appeal.
Roughton terminated the assistance being received by
plaintiffs White and Walker and denied the application
for assistance of plaintiff Silagy.
A preliminary injunction was filed by White et al, but was
denied hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not due process of the law was observed.

Ruling:
No.
The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard.' . . . The hearing must be 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' . . . In the
present context these principles require that a recipient
have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons
for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity
to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.
Certain basic eligibility requirements, however, are
provided in the General Assistance statute itself.
Roughton as administrator of the general assistance
program has the responsibility to administer the
program to ensure the fair and consistent application of
eligibility requirements. Fair and consistent application
of such requirements requires that Roughton establish
written standards and regulations. At the hearing in the
district court on the preliminary injunction, Roughton
admitted that he and his staff determine eligibility
based upon their own unwritten personal
standards. Such a procedure, vesting virtually
unfettered discretion in Roughton and his staff, is
clearly violative of due process.
Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Court of
Appeals,
240 SCRA 368, G.R. No. 108358 January 20, 1995
Facts
On 22 August 1986, during the period when the
President of the Republic still wielded legislative
powers, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated
declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income
taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's
taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981
to 1985.
R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in October
1986 and November 1986, its Tax Amnesty Return and
paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due.
Prior to this availment, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, in a communication received by ROH on 13
August 1986, assessed the latter deficiency income and
business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 September
1981 and 30 September 1982. The taxpayer wrote back
to state that since it had been able to avail itself of the
tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice should be
cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied by
the Commissioner and had construed the amnesty
coverage to include only assessments issued by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue after the
promulgation of the executive order on 22 August
1986 and not to assessments theretofore made.
The CTA reversed the CIR’s decision which was
affirmed by the CA hence this petition.
Admin_Digest_02_Cipres 4 of 7
Issue:
Whether or not the Revenue Memorandum Order 4-87
is valid.
Ruling:
The authority of the Minister of Finance (now the
Secretary of Finance), in conjunction with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of internal revenue laws cannot be
controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules
and regulations, as well as administrative opinions and
rulings, ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by
the courts. Much more fundamental than either of the
above, however, is that all such issuances must not
override, but must remain consistent and in harmony
with, the law they seek to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to
carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law;
We agree with both the Court of Appeals and Court of
Tax Appeals that Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit
and requires hardly anything beyond a simple
application of its provisions. If, as the Commissioner
argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended
to include 1981–1985 tax liabilities already assessed
(administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could
have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. lt
did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the
executive order has been designed to be in the nature
of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the
cases specifically excepted by it.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
249 SCRA 149, G.R. No. 118712, G.R. No. 118745
October 6, 1995
Facts:
Yap, Heirs of Santiago and AMADCOR are owners of
parcels of land. These lands were acquired by the DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.
Yap et al filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
against the AO No. 9 series of 1990 which permits the
opening of trust accounts by the Landbank. The CA
granted the petition hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid
exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49
of RA 6657.
Ruling:
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of
Private Lands —

xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of
the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. . . .
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be
made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” Nowhere does it
appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be
made in any other form. If it were the intention to include
a “trust account” among the valid modes of deposit, that
should have been made express, or at least, qualifying
words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly
deduced that a “trust account” is allowed. In sum, there
is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant
an expanded construction of the term “deposit.”
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is
not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there
is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed
that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power
of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary
to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled
is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case
there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails.
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the
limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it
issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis
in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because,
as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is
very specific that the deposit must be made only in
“cash” or in “LBP bonds.” In the same vein, petitioners
cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54
because these implementing regulations cannot
outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent
court therefore did not commit any error in striking down
Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
The promulgation of the “Association” decision
endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Admin_Digest_02_Cipres 5 of 7
Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the
farmer. But despite this, cases involving its
implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts’
dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the
goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their
bondage will be attained in due time. It must be
stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective,
vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally
important because social justice cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners, who under our
Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.
Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc., et al. vs. Social
Security System,
17 SCRA 1077, No. L-21223 August 31, 1966
Facts:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., a domestic
corporation since the start of its operations in 1957, has
been employing Japanese technicians under a pre-
arranged contract of employment, the minimum period
of which employment is 6 months and the maximum is
24 months.
From April 28, 1957, to October 26, 1958, the
corporation had in its employ 6 Japanese technicians.
PBM Co. sent an inquiry to the SSS whether these
employees are subject to compulsory coverage under
the System which replied that they are compulsory
covered but the amount paid can be rebated.
The Assistant General Manager in behalf of the
employees filed a claim with the SSS for the refund of
the premiums paid on the ground of termination of the
members' employment. This claim was controverted by
the SSS, alleging that Rule IX of the Rules and
Regulations of the System, as amended, requires
membership in the System for at least 2 years before a
separated or resigned employee may be allowed a
return of his personal contributions. Under the same
rule, the employer is not also entitled to a refund of the
premium contributions it had paid.
The petition for rebate was denied because previous
rule as to refund was subsequently amended that delete
such rebate only if they have been members for at least
2 years.
It is this resolution of the Commission that is the subject
of the present appeal, appellants contending that the
amendment of the Rules and Regulations of the SSS,
insofar as it eliminates the provision on the return of
premium contributions, originally embodied in Section
3(d) of Rule I, constituted an impairment of obligations
of contract. It is claimed, in effect, that when appellants-
employees became members in September, 1957, and
paid the corresponding premiums to the System, it1 is
subject to the condition that upon their departure from
the Philippines, these employees, as well as their

employer, are entitled to a rebate of a proportionate
amount of their respective contributions.
Issue:
Whether or not the subjected amendment to the rules is
valid.
Ruling:
Membership in the Social Security System is not the
result of a bilateral, consensual agreement where the
rights and obligations of the parties are defined by and
subject to their will. Republic Act 1161 requires
compulsory coverage of employers and employees
under the system. It is actually a legal imposition on said
employers and employees, designed to provide security
to the working men. Membership in the Social Security
System is, therefore, in compliance with a lawful
exercise of the police power of the State, to which the
principle of nonimpairment of the obligation of contract
is not a proper defense.
Under Article 2 of the New Civil Code, the date of
publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material for
the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the
statutes themselves do not so provide. When the
original Rules and Regulations of the Social Security
System specifically provide that any amendment thereto
subsequently adopted by the Commission, shall take
effect on the date of its approval by the President, the
delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official
Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which
is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the
President.
Tañada vs. Tuvera,
146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Facts:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
They sought to publish:
1. Presidential Decrees
2. Letter of Instructions
3. General Orders
4. Proclamations
5. Executive Orders
6. Letters of Implementation
7. Administrative Orders
Admin_Digest_02_Cipres 6 of 7
Issue:
Whether or not the abovementioned requires
publication.
Ruling:
After a careful study of this provision and of the
arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot
in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.
lt is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a
law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after
an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member
of the body politic may question in the political forums
or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice.
In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the
law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
 Admin_Digest_02_Cipres 7 of 7

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and We also hold that the publication must be made
executive orders promulgated by the President in forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at possibility, of course, although not suggested by the
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a
Administrative rules and regulations must also be mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
published if their purpose is to enforce or cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need
not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directy affects
only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say,
those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued
by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.
ss
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement
of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret
and apply the law as conceived and approved by the
political departments of the government in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have
no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.