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Dat Nguyen
Greg Spendlove
PHIL-1000-403-Sp18
18 APR 2018
Position Paper
In this paper, I will argue that physical determinism and human moral responsibility are

incompatible. Ethics and morals are created by humans as a standard for how humans should act

and behave in a civilized society. David Risser in his article “Collective Moral Responsibility”

talks about how we are expected to hold a standard for moral responsibilities whether it be as a

group, a company, a country and even the whole human race. This standard can only be carried

out by humans if they have the free will and the ability to choose and decision to do so. In other

words, a person has the option of being able to live by a set of rules only if they choose to. If

they choose to disregard the set of rules and their decision was not affected by any outside force

impending on them then their decision is was done by free will and thus they have the ability to

embrace the expectations of human moral responsibility. In a physical deterministic world, their

decision isn’t acted upon by free will so therefore they are not responsible for their actions.

Some people may disagree and say that physical determinism and human moral responsibility

are compatible since humans still have free will even with physical determinism but I disagree

because with true physical determinism, everything has a reason for it. Every event in time is a

consequence of the past. People who say physical determinism and human moral responsibility

are compatible might take this into account and say that the events in the present is a result of

past events and past decisions that were made from free will so therefore physical determinism is

compatible. Many people may see how this is a valid argument to the incompatibility of

determinism and moral responsibility but they fail to see that true physical determinism also
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entails the future affecting the past. In other words, things that occurred in the past affects the

future but things that occur in the future also affect the past.

There are two main arguments for incompatibilism which is the consequence argument and

the origination argument as stated by Kevin Timpe in his article on free will. The consequence

argument pretty much states that because of the natural flow of time, the future is affected by the

past and the future differs from the past in the way that it is still open unlike the past. In other

words, you can’t change the past. An example of the argument is;

(1)Proposition: A terrorist attack on 9/11 in 2001 happened where two planes flew into the twin

towers of World Trade Center is true, (2)You travel back in time and prevent the two planes

from flying into the world trade center on 9/11. (3) If you were able to travel back in time and

prevent the terrorist attack, that would make the proposition (1) false. (4) A proposition cannot

be both true and false. (5) Therefore, (2) is false.

Some may say that even though the past is closed off, we still have free will since the future is

open unlike the past and with free will we are able to choose what happens next and make

decisions based on our previous mistakes. This leaves the past closed off once we carry through

with our decisions but then we are able to make further decisions from there on, this can be said

to be the garden of forking paths as described by Jorge Luis Borges. The consequence argument

rejects this idea of an open future because if determinism is true then the future is just as fixed as

the past meaning there is absolutely no possible way that it could happen any other way.

Kevin Timpe also brought up the origination argument which is the one that I stand by the

most for arguments against the compatibility of free will and determinism. In the origination

argument, our actions are not caused by free will but rather manipulated by a number of laws and

factors such as personal beliefs. If we go back to the 9/11 example, we may say that if
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determinism is true then those terrorists chose to hijack the planes because of their beliefs and

desire. Those beliefs and desires can just just products of causal chains that begin billions of

years ago so therefore the decisions didn’t really originate from those terrorists, therefore they

are not acting on their free will and therefore they are not responsible for their actions. They can

only have free will if they are the original source of their actions and if determinism is true then

everything they do is caused by a predetermined chain of events that were out of their control

and therefore they are ultimately not responsible for their actions which makes it so that

determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. Another way to look at it is if we were to

imagine if the chain of events played out differently, those terrorists could have been born in

Provo, Utah instead of the middle east and ended up serving a mission and doing world renown

humanitarian efforts instead of killing thousands but those events are set in place and there is

nothing we can do about it because there couldn’t have been any other possible way for it to

happen due to physical determinism.

In Leigh Vicen’s article on theological determinism, she brought up a similar problem as far

as theological determinism and free will goes. If god knows everything and determines

everything then how can we be free. Leigh Vicen also explained that if there is a God then how

how come god created evil? Some people will actually use this as a defense for determinism and

moral responsibility being compatible and argue that evil exists because we have free will. The

problem with this defense is that you can’t really combine the foreknowledge of God with the

free will of man as stated by Norman Swartz in his article on foreknowledge. We run the same

problem with physical determinism as we cannot say that we are free and acting upon our free

will if everything is determined by events out of our control.


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The Universe is governed by strict laws, which makes no exceptions. Everything happens as a

result of events occurring in both the present and the past. If you are on a timeline and you travel

to any part of the timeline, things will always be the same no matter how many times you visit

that same point on the timeline. If we are free then in theory, we would make an exception to the

strict laws of the universe and since the universe is governed by strict laws which makes no

exceptions, this would counteract physical determinism and therefore making physical

determinism and human moral responsibility incompatible.

People are not responsible for their actions in a physical deterministic world because

everything they do and every event is because of events that happen on purpose and not by

chance. This eliminates the idea that we have free will and if we don’t have free will then how

are we responsible for our actions and take moral responsibility? Even though some people may

disagree and say that you can still be free even with physical determinism since you have the

ability to choose and change the future, that contradicts the laws of the universe and doesn’t take

into account the fact that with true determinism, the future can also affect the past so therefore

you don’t have free will making physical determinism and human moral responsibility

incompatible.
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Bibliography

Dowden, Bradley. “Time.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/time/.

Risser, David T. “Collective Moral Responsibility.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

www.iep.utm.edu/collecti/.

Swartz, Norman. “Foreknowledge and Free Will.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

www.iep.utm.edu/foreknow/.

Timpe, Kevin. “Free Will.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/freewill/.

Vicens, Leigh. “Theological Determinism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

www.iep.utm.edu/theo-det/.

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