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PUBLIC OFFICERS
I. Introduction
a. Definition
Public Office
People of the Phils V. Roger Posadas
FACTS: Posadas was appointed chancellor of UP Diliman,
as such, he formed Task Force TMC which later on entered
into a MOA with PDS/PTAF where he projects of Task
Force TMC was to be funded by Canadian Development
Agency. Later on, Posadas, after he and other officials
were granted authority to travel to China, he appointed
Vice-Chancellor Dayco as OIC of UP Dil from Oct 5 to Nov
5, 2006 when he’s supposed to return but it was extended
for another day. Incidentally, on the extended day, Dayco
designated Posadas as Project Director of TMC Project,
and then as consultant to same project. Both
appointments made retroactive to Sept 18, 1995. Later,
COA auditor issued notice of suspension noting several
deficiencies in the payments to the personnel of TMC. A
tribunal was constituted to hear admin complaint against
Posadas and Dayco for “Grave Misconduct and Abuse of
Authority”, which recommended dismissal of the
respondents, but modified by Board of Regents to forced
penalty. On the basis of the BOR’s decision, a criminal
case was filed against Posadas and Dayco for violation of
Sec 3(e) of RA 3019 and 7(b) of RA 6713.
HELD: Guilty in both charges. Under Sec 3(e) of RA
3019 and 7(b) of RA 6713, the accused is a public officer
who discharges administrative, judicial or official
functions. In this case, there is no dispute that Posadas
and Dayco are public officers. Posadas being the
Chancellor and a faculty member, while Dayco was Vice-
Chancellor for Administration and the OIC of the Office of
the Chancellor.
There was a violation of RA 3019 since they acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, which caused injury to the government. As to
RA 6713, a public officer is not allowed to practice his
private profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
by law. The University Code allows private practice of
profession but it must be with prior permission, no
showing in this case that Posadas had prior permission to
engage in private practice as technology manager.
Definition under the RPC, Art. 203
ART. 203, RPC WHO ARE PUBLIC OFFICERS – For the
purpose of applying the provisions of this and the
preceding titles of this book, any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the government of Philippine Islands, or
shall perform in said government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a
public officer.
Public Officer Vs. Public Employee
Throop Vs. Langdon 40 Mich 673
FACTS: Information was in the nature of a quo warranto
questioning the appointment of Langdon as the chief clerk
in the assessor’s office of Detroit. The crux of the matter
was whether or not a “chief clerk” in the office of the
assessor is an “office” against whom a quo warranto would
lie.
HELD: The chief clerk is not a public officer against whom
proceedings in the nature of a quo warranto to try his title
to office may be brought. An office is a special trust or
charge created by competent authority. If not merely
honorary, certain duties will be connected with it, the
performance of which will be consideration for its being
conferred upon a particular individual, who for the time
will be the officer. The officer is distinguished from the
employee in the greater importance, dignity and
independence in his position; in being required to take an
official oath, and perhaps to give an official bond; in the
liability to be called to account as a public offender for
misfeasance or nonfeasance in office, and usually, though
not necessarily, in the tenure of his position.
There is no law creating an office of a chief clerk. The
fact an oath is being taken cannot prove a clerk is an
officer. Nor do the duties usually performed by a chief
clerk indicate an office rather than an employment as
nothing but custom has defined them. He is wholly
subordinate to the assessor and his duties are those of
mere clerkship. Also, court found no significance in the
fact that he is independent of the assessor in the tenure of
his position.
Peclaro Vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty by Sandiganbayan for
violation of RA 3019 Sec 3(b). He allegedly demanded
kickback as Manager/Consultant of the Chemical Mineral
Division, Industrial Technology Development Institute of
the DOST, in a government project. In his appeal, he
raises the issue whether or not he should be considered a
public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019, since he
is neither elected nor appointed to a public office but
rather a private individual hired by ITDI on a contractual
basis for a particular project and for a specified period.
HELD: He is a public officer. “Public Officer” under Sec
2(b) includes “elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exemption services receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government. The
word “includes” used in definition shows that it is not
restrictive. The terms “classified or unclassified or
exemption services” were the old categories in the civil
service which have been reclassified into “Career and Non-
Career Service” by PD 807 providing for the CSC and
Admin Code of 1987. Under Admin Code, Non-Career
Service shall include “Contractual personnel or those
whose employment in the government is in accordance
with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in the
employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific
period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and
performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under
his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and
supervision from the hiring agency..”

The fact that he is not required to record his working
hours by bundy clock or that he did not take an oath of
office became unessential considerations in view of the
provisions of law including petitioner in the definition of a
public officer.
Nature of Public Office
Elements of a Public Office
Barney Vs HawkinS
FACTS: This is an action to enjoin payment of salary to
Grant Reed, who while being a Representative in the
Magnolia Legislature was designated as auditor for the
board of railroad commissioners and its ex officio
commissions. The contention was that the appointment of
Reed is void in view of the Constitution prohibitins against
appointment of a Senator or Representative to any civil
office during his term.
HELD: After an exhaustive examination of conflicting
authorities, the court held that the indispensable elements
of a Public Office are as follows:
1. Must be created by the Constitution or by the
Legislature or created by a municipality or other
body trough authority conferred by the
Legislature;
2. Possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign
power of govt, to be exercised for the benefit of
the public;
3. Powers conferred, and the duties to be
discharged, must be defined, directly or
impliedly, by the Legislature or thru Legislative
authority;
4. Duties must be performed independently and
without control of a superior power other than
the law, unless they be those of an inferior or
subordinate office, created or authorized by the
Legislature, and by it placed under the general
control of a superior officer or body;
5. It must have some permanency and continuity,
and not be only temporary or occasional. In
addition, in this state, officer must take and file
official OATH, hold a commission and give an
official bond, if required by proper authority.
Court found that Reed is was not holding a civil office.
It held that while the Board of Railroad Commissioners,
which appointed Reed, could create a position, it cannot
create an office. The position he holds does not possess
any delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of the
government. He is merely an employee, terminable at the
pleasure of the employing power. Therefore, no violation
of the prohibition in the Constitution.
Manner of Creation
1) Constitution
2) Statute
3) Authority of Law
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Characteristics
OCA Vs Fuentes
FACTS: An administrative case was filed against Sheriff
Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service, in violation of PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree,
in relation to the hasty implementation of a writ of
execution against the DPWH. The court noted of the
anomaly in that no notice was served on the OSG on the
Notices of Levy of scrap irons, as well as the irregularities
in the sale thereof and the fact that the private party took
also serviceable equipment in excess of the levy.
HELD: Guilty. Presumption of regularity has been
rebutted by evidence of record showing undue haste in
the execution, unjust bias and hidden ploy of the sheriff.
A public office is a public trust. All public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people. They ought to perform their duties with utmost
responsibility, integrity, competence and loyalty, and with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives, and uphold
public trust over personal interest. Respondent sheriff is a
court employee required to conduct himself with propriety
and decorum, but he failed to comply with the strict
standards required of all public officers and employees.
Saura Vs Sindico
FACTS: In question in this case was the binding effect of
a written agreement containing a pledge that the losing
party in the Nationalista Convention should respect the
result of such convention and shall not run as rebel or
independent candidate for Representative. While Saura
was elected to be the candidate of Nacionalista party,
Sindico disregarded the agreement and filed her certificate
of candidacy.
HELD: The agreement is a nullity. Among those that
may not be a subject matter of contracts are certain rights
of individuals, which the law for public policy deemed wise
to exclude from the commerce of men. Such include
political rights of citizens—right to vote, to run for office
and be voted for, provided that all the qualifications
prescribed by law obtain. Such rights therefore may not
be bargained or surrendered for consideration by the
citizen nor be unduly curtained, for they are not conferred
for individual or private benefit but for public good and
interest. Constitutional and statutory provisions fix the
qualifications for certain public offices, which may neither
be enlarged nor reduced by mere agreements between
private parties.

Mathay Vs. CA
FACTS: Former mayor appointed Civil Service Unit
employees pursuant to PD 51, which was later on declared
invalid for lack of publication. However, a QC ordinance
provided for the absorption of the CSU employees to the
Department of Public Order and Safety created therein.
Mayor Mathay, however, refused to renew the contracts of
the CSU employees. CSC ruled that petitioner Mathay
should reappoint.
HELD: The ordinance encroached upon the power of the
local chief executive, which according to the law applicable
BP 337 and not the Local Government Code of 1992, has
the power to appoint. The ordinance refers to personnel
and not to positions. Even the CSC cannot substitute its
own judgment for that of the appointing power; it could
merely approve or disapprove and cannot direct the
appointment of a particular individual.
Even if the ordinance provides only for an absorption,
fact still remains that the CSU’s employees’ appointments
in the defunct CSU were invalid ab initio and they have to
be extended original appointments after the revocation PD
51. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is
not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law
expressly or impliedly creating or conferring it. Since PD
51 never became a law, it could not be a source of any
right.
Classification
II. Requirements for Public Office
A. Selection
Election
Appointment
Definition
Vs. Designation
Triste Vs. Leyte State
FACTS: Vice-presidency of the Leyte State College is in
question in this case. Petitioner, incumbent is questioning
her replacement by the Board of Trustees. The Board
argues that she was merely “designated” and not
“appointed” to the position.
HELD: While in a line of cases, the term “appoint” is
applied to the nomination or designation of an individual.
Common usage, however, oftentimes puts a distinction in
such that “appointment” connotes permanency while
“designation” implies temporariness. Thus, to designate a
public officer to another position may mean to vest him
with additional duties while he performs the functions of
his permanent office; or in some cases, a public officer
may be “designated” to a position in an acting capacity.
However, in this case, the Court ruled that the laws
contemplate of a duly appointed vice-president. As such,
petitioner could be removed only for justifiable reason and
after she was accorded due process.
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Binamira Vs. Garrucho
FACTS: Petition for quo warranto was filed by Binamira
for his reinstatement as the General Manager of the Phil
Toursim Authority. He was designated by the then Minister
of Tourism, approved by Pres. Aquino. However, later
the president declared that such designation is invalid
having been made by the Minister and not by herself as
president.
HELD: PD 564, which created the PTA, provides that the
General Manager thereof shall be appointed by the
President. It is not disputed that Binamira was not
appointed by the president but merely designated by the
Minister. Court made a distinction between appointment
and designation—appointment may be defined as the
selection by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office
and when completed, appointment results in security of
tenure; while designation connotes merely the imposition
by law of additional duties to an incumbent official.
Designation may be loosely defined as an appointment,
however where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office in
a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority; it does not confer security of tenure.
People Vs. Posadas, supra
Types
Permanent/Temporary or Acting
Felix Vs. Buenaseda
FACTS: Petitioner assails his dismissal as Medical
Specialist I of the National Center for Mental Health as
illegal and violative of the constitutional provision on
security of tenure allegedly because there was an invalid
reorganization. He was a temporary Senior Resident
Physician appointed and promoted to a Medical Specialist I
in a temporary capacity. DO 347 was issued by DOH
making a board certification a prerequisite for renewal of
specialist position. Petitioner was one of the medical
specialist adversely affected since he was not yet
accredited.
HELD: Residency or Resident physician position in a
medical specialty is never a permanent one. Residency
connotes training and temporary status and promotion to
the next graduate year is based in merits and
performance. Therefore, petitioner’s insistence on being
reverted back to his old position would be akin to a college
student asking to be sent back to high school and staying
there.
Also, petitioner is already estopped as he raised no
objection to his promotion to the position of Medical
Specialist I about the change of position or the temporary
nature of the designation.
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Valencia Vs Peralta
The Appointing Power
FACTS: Petitioner Valencia was “designated Acting
Chairman” of the BOD of the National Water Sewerage
Authority, by Pres. Garcia, however, he took an oath of Nature of the Appointing Power:
office to the position “Chairman Ad Interim” and was Intrinsically Executive
confirmed by the COA. Later on, Pres. Macapagal
appointed Respondent Peralta ad interim to said position,
Concepcion Vs. Paredes
which petitioner now questions.
FACTS: Section 148 of the Admin Code, amended by Act
HELD: The designation of petitioner, being revocable and
no. 2941, which requires drawing of lots for judicial
temporary in character, could not ripen into a permanent
positions was sought to be declared unconstitutional by
appointment even if it was subsequently confirmed by the
CFI judge.
Commission on Appointments because confirmation
presupposes a valid nomination or recess appointment
HELD: The provision is unconstitutional. The Organic Act
which is not the case here. Neither does his taking of
vests supreme executive power in the Governor General,
oath as ad interim appointee help his case, since the oath
thus, he has the authority to appoint and commission
clearly does not correspond to the temporary designation
officers subject to confirmation by Senate. Appointment to
as Acting Chairman that was accorded him.
an office is intrinsically an executive act involving exercise
of discretion. In this case, chance is being substituted for
Ad interim/regular executive judgment. Appointment by lot is not
appointment by the Governor General, nor is it
appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Matibag Vs Benipayo

FACTS: The validity of his transfer being dependent on Exceptions to the inherently executive
the validity of the appointment of the Commisioners of nature of appointments
COMELEC, petitioner Matibag tests the validity of the
appointments of Benipayo et al, as commissioner and
deputy commissioners of COMELEC. Benipayo et al were Constitution
appointed by PGMA as commissioners for 7-year terms • Supreme Court, Art. VIII Sec. 9
ending Feb 2, 2008. President submitted the ad interim
appointments to COA for confirmation but COA failed to Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges
act on it. Several renewals were made, although the COA of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President
adjourned still failing to act on the ad interim from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
appointments. Petitioner says that the appointments of Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
the commissioner undermines COMELEC independence appointments need no confirmation.
and violates Consti prohibitions against temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and
members. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of
HELD: An ad interim appointment is a permanent the list.
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
Constitutional Commissions- SCS,
subject to confirmation by COA does not alter its COMELEC, COA
permanent character as the Consti imposes no condition in
the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, which General Doctrine of Separation of Powers
terminates upon disapproval of COA or until the next
e.g. Congress
adjournment of Congress without being acted upon by
COA. The term “ad interim appointment”, means a
permanent appointment by the President in the meantime Limitations on the power to appoint
the Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary
appointment that can be revoked or withdrawn anytime.
• Qualifications
Withdrawal is possible only if it is communicated to the
appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any • As endowment
withdrawal thereafter is already tantamount to removal eg, citizenship, age, professional
from office. As a general rule, ad interim appointment and government examinations,
disapproved by COA can no longer be reappointed if it was
upon merits and qualifications. Such is not the case when
profession, educational
the appointment is merely by-passed due to lack of time qualifications, experience but see
or failure of COA to organize since it is not upon merits, so Maguera Vs. Borra
no final decision was ever given. An ad interim
appointment that lapsed by inaction of COA does not
constitute a term of office and therefore the President is
free to renew, subject to the 7-year term limit in the
Constitution.

Maguera Vs. Borra
FACTS: RA 4421 requires all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices to post a surety bond
equivalent to one-year salary or emoluments of the
position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be
forfeited if the candidate loses and fails to obtain at least
10% votes, there being at least 4 candidates for the same
office. Issue was whether or not such qualification could
be imposed.
HELD: The provision is unconstitutional as it imposes
property qualification, inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system ordained in the Consti,
which is premised on the tenet that the sovereignty
resides in the people and all the government authority
emanates from them, necessarily implying that the right
to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent on
wealth. It is also inconsistent with the principle of social
justice that presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and
poor alike. No person shall, by reason of poverty, be
denied the right to be elected to public office.
Lack of disqualifications
• As an act
• Confirmation by Commission on
Appointments:
ART VII, Sec. 16
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Sarmiento Vs. Mison
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to enjoin the respondent Mison
from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs on the ground that
his appointment was not confirmed by the COA.
HELD: COA confirmation is not required. The records of
the Constitutional Commission reveal the heads of
bureaus are purposely excluded from requirement of
confirmation by COA, although it may result that higher
officers does not require confirmation while some positions
lower do require confirmation. Art VII Sec 16 par 1 of the
Constitution provides 4 groups of officers whom the
president shall appoint. First, the heads of executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
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appointments are vested in him in the Constitution;
second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
third, those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint; and fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress maw by law vest in the
President alone. Only in the first category that the
confirmation of the COA is required. For the second
category, the records of the Consti Commission that
necessity of confirmation by COA was expressly removed.
On the last category, the use of the word “alone: after the
word “president” is just a mere slip or lapses in
draftsmanship as it was merely copied from the 1935
Consti, therefore cannot be held to mean that in cases
where the law does not provide that appointment is
vested in the President alone, confirmation of COA is
required.
Quintos Deles Vs Comm on Appointments
FACTS: This case resolves the question whether or not
the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the House to be confirmed by the COA.
HELD: It requires confirmation by COA. The court
reiterated the holding in Sarmiento v. Mison with respect
to Art VII Sec 16 par 1 of the Constitution. The power to
appoint is essentially executive and requirement of
confirmation is a limitation on such power and therefore
must be strictly construed. It is only in the first category
of officers that the confirmation of COA requirement is
clearly stated. However, since seats reserved for sectoral
representatives may be filled by appointment by President
by express provision of Art XVII, Sec 7 of the Constitution,
it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House
are among the “other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution” referred to in
the first sentence of Art. VII Sec 16, that is subject to the
confirmation of COA.
Bautista Vs. Salonga
FACTS: President designated petitioner Bautista as
“Acting Chairman of Commision on Human Rights”, but
realizing the Consti mandate that appointment should be
permanent pursuant to the requirement of CHR
independence, the appointment was made permanent.
Bautista took her oath of office and discharged the
functions of the office. However, COA later on requested
from Bautista documents in connection with the
confirmation of her appointment. Petitioner held that COA
had no jurisdiction as the position of Chairman of CHR
requires no confirmation by COA. COA later on
disapproved her “ad interim appointment” in view of her
refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of COA. President
appointed another as “Acting Chairman of CHR” pending
resolution of Bautista’s case.
HELD: COA confirmation is not required. After her
appointment was made permanent by the President, all
that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept
the office. Obviously, she accepted, therefore her
appointment is a completed act.
The Court also found untenable the contention of COA
that it is within the Pres’ prerogative to voluntarily submit
the appointment to COA for confirmation. It was held that
neither Executive or Legislative can create power where
the Constitution confers none. The evident constitutional
intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the

matter of appointments to public office, between the Pres
and the Congress (acting through COA). The exercise of
political options by the Executive that finds no support in
the Consti cannot be sustained. Nor can the COA, by
actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
review presidential appointments, create power to confirm
appointments that the Conti reserved to the Pres alone.
Therefore, the Pres’ act of voluntarily act submitting
appointments mandated by the Consti to be made without
participation by the COA, and the latter’s act of confirming
or rejecting the same, are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
Eligibility, qualifications and
disqualifications
Definitions
1. Eligibility – all of the
qualifications and none of the
disqualifications
Ineligibility
Qualification
Vargas V. Rilloraza
FACTS: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Sec
14 of the People’s Court Act on the following grounds: (1)
it provides for additional qualifications of members of SC
other than those provided in the Consti (2) it authorizes
appointment of members to SC who do not posses
qualifications in the Consti (3) it removes from office
members of SC by a procedure other than impeachment
(4) it deprives COA of its constitutional prerogative to
confirm or reject appointments (5) it creates 2 SC’s (6) it
impairs the rule-making power of the SC.
HELD: There is a clear case of repugnancy to the
fundamental law. For repugnancy to result, there is no
need for an actual removal; what matters is not only that
the Justice continue to be a member of SC but that he be
left unhampered in the exercise of his functions of his
office. To disqualify in cases of treason any Justice who
held any office or position during Japanese government is
a deprivation of his judicial power.
Art VIII, Sec 5 of the Constitution requires that members
of SC should be appointed by the Pres with the consent of
COA. The “designation” of Justice at Large or Cadastral
Judges as members of SC under Sec 14 of People’s Court
Act by the President cannot possibly be a compliance of
the Consti requirement.
The lack of confirmation by the COA is an additional
disqualifying circumstance of the “designee” Furthermore,
certain “designees” do not possess the qualifications of a
regular member of the SC as prescribed in the Consti (i.e.
the Judge at Large or Cadastral Judge need not be at keat
40 y.o. nor have for ten years or more a judge of court or
in the practice of law).
No temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the
Consti. The clause “unless otherwise provided by law” in
Art VII Sec 4, Consti, cannot be construed to authorize
any legislation to alter the composition of the SC even for
how brief a time. The clause refers to the number of
Justices who were to compose the Court upon its initial
organization under the Commonwealth and its manner of
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sitting.
Cuyegkeng Vs. Cruz
FACTS: The issue in this case was WON the president is
mandated by law, RA 2382, to make his appointments of
the members of the Board of Examiners solely based on
the list of recomendeed submitted to him by the Executive
Council of the Phil Medical Association. Respondent Cruz
was appointed though he was not in the list, so petitioners
who were included in the nominees of filed quo warranto.
HELD: SC was divided into 3 groups. First group
believed that Sec 14 containing all qualifications for
membership in the Board of Examiners are mandatory and
the inclusion in the list of nominees by Council of PMA
under Sec 14 is not one of the qualifications, also
asseverating that by confining the selection to the list
effectively limit and curtail the President’s power of
appointment; second group held that Sec 13 is merely
directory and the petitioners themselves in their pleadings
referred to the list as “letter of recommendation”, and the
persons named as mere “recommendees”; third group,
deems it unnecessary to inquire into the constitutionality
of Sec 13 or determine whether it is mandatory or
directory. The last composed the majority.
Respondent’s professional competency was never in
dispute. In fact, he was a member of said Board before
his reappointment. SC held that the person reappointed
need not be included in the list of recomendees in Sec 13,
because reappointment is sanctioned by a later provision
(Sec 15). Court also noted that the petitioners may not
avail of quo warranto proceeding as none of them, while
nominated, shows any claim of title to the position since
they were not appointed.
Manalang Vs. Quitoriano
FACTS: Petititoner Manalang was Dir of the Placement
Bureau, abolished by RA 761 which provided for the
organization of the National Employment Service. RA
provided that the Commissioner of NES shall be appointed
by the Pres. While recommended by the Sec of Labor, pet
was not appointed as Commissioner of Nes but rather
Respondent Quitoriano. Manalang claims that there is no
abolition but only fading away of the title Placement
Bureau. He also claims that the item of NES
Commissioner is not new and is occupied by the
petitioner, entitling him to the position “automatically by
operation of law” in view of the provision of RA 761
relative to transfer of “qualified personnel” of the
Placement Bureau.
HELD: Court found petitioner’s contentions without merit.
The law is explicit that it intended abolition of the
Placement Bureau. NES is a new entity as it merely
includes the functions of Placement Bureau, in addition to
those of the former Office in the Commission of Social
Welfare.
On his contention that he is entitled to the office of
Commissioner of NES by operation of law, Court held that
his own pleadings recognize that he needs a new
appointment. RA 761 expressly requires that appointment
be made by the President with consent of COAS. The
“transfer” referred to by the petitioner shall be affected
only upon organization of the NES, which does not take

place until the appointment of at least the Commissioner
thereof. Congress cannot impose upon the Pres the duty
to appoint any particular person as Commissioner of NES,
the appointing power being an exclusive power of the
Pres, upon which no limitation may be imposed by
Congress.
Flores Vs. Drilon
FACTS: Sec 13 of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992) is being questioned, among
other grounds, on that it is a legislative encroachment
upon the appointing power of the president. It’s proviso
provides that for the first year of the operations of the
Subic Authority, the mayor of Olongapo City shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer.
HELD: There is encroachment. “Appointment involves
the exercise of discretion by the appointing power; it is
not ministerial. The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Hence, when the Congress clothes the
President with the power to appoint, it cannot at the same
time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. When only one candidate meets the
qualifications prescribed by the Congress, such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power. In the CAB, while Congress willed that the
President shall appoint the Administrator of Subic
Authority, it unduly limits the appointing power to only
one eligible---the Mayor of Olongapo City.
Qualification as endowment
Qualification as act
Sec. 40, Book 1 (Chap 10) Adm. Code of 1987
Time of possession of qualifications
Aguila vs. Genato
FACTS: Borje was elected Director of the Misamis
Occidental Cooperative. Sec 21 of PD 269 provides that
elective officers, except barrio captains and councilors,
shall be ineligible to become officers and/or directors of
cooperative, while the By-Laws of the MOELC provides
that no person who holds an elective office in the
government above the level of a Brgy Capt shall be
eligible to be or remain a Board member of the Coop.
Borje filed his cert of candidcy as member of Sangguniang
Panglunsod of Ozamis. NEA issued Memo Circ 18 to the
effect that official and employees of electric cooperatives
who run and win a public office shall be considered
resigned.
HELD: He is ineligible. PD 269 providing for
disqualification clearly bars him, the term barrio modifies
both captains and councilors for the exclusion to the
ineligibility. Moreover, MOELC By-Laws is explicit in its
prohibition. The argument that PD 269 does not prohibit
board members from continuing in their position prior to
their election is untenable. Eligibility to an office should
be construed as a continuing requirement and must exist
at the commencement of the term and during the
occupancy of the office. Therefore, his election and
subsequent assumption of office as city councilor
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disqualified him to continue as board member of the
cooperative.
Frivaldo Vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon Jan
22, 1988. On the basis that he is a naturalized American
citizem the League of Municipalities filed with COMELEC a
pet for annulment Frivaldo’s election and proclamation.
Frivaldo claims that he was naturalized only because of
fear of Marcos and he could not have repatriated himself
before 1988 elections because the Special Committee on
Naturalization had not been organized yet. Lastly, he
prays that the petition to disqualify him be rejected for
being time-barred under Sec 253 of the Election Code.
HELD: The Constitution, Local Government Code and the
Election Code requires that a candidate be a Filipino
citizen. The Court rejected Frivaldo’s plea that he was
naturalized involuntarily and held that his forfeiture of his
American citizenship did not automatically restored his
Filipino citizenship. It was held that the qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment, election or
assumption of office but also during the officer’s tenure.
Furthermore, the will of the people as expressed through
the ballots cannot cure the vice of ineligibility specially if
mistakenly believed to be otherwise.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC *later decision
FACTS: In June 1995, Frivaldo was elected again as
Governor of Sorsogon, his co-candidate Lee petitions for
his disqualification due to non-Filipino citizenship.
HELD: Frivaldo’s latest attempt to acquire Filipino
citizenship through the last mode Repatriation under PD
725, which remains effective, is valid. Contrary to the
allegation of Lee, there was no indecent haste in
processing Frivaldo’s application as it was filed years past,
and was just resubmitted.
As to the timeliness of his repatriation, the Court held
that Sec 39 of the LGC speaks of qualifications of
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS and not CANDIDATES. An official
begins to govern or discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law prescribes his term
to start. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his Filipino citizenship
on the very day of his proclamation, it is valid.
If the law intended to make citizenship qualification to
possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not
have made citizenship a separate qualification. The law
abhors redundancy. Moreover, the purpose of the two
qualifications are different—citizenship to ensure that we
are not governed by aliens; being a registered voter to
ensure familiarity with territory he seeks to govern.
Another reason why citizenship is reckoned from date
of proclamation and not date of filing certificate of
candidacy is Sec 253 of the Omnibus Elec Code which
gives any voter, including defeated candidates,
opportunity to question eligibility of a candidate through
quo warranto within 10days after proclamation. Hence it is
only at such time, the issue of ineligibility can be taken
cognizance by the COMELEC.
To settle all doubts, the Court just held that in any
case, the repatriation of Frivaldo had retroactive effect as
PD 725 is a curative or remedial statute. It retroacted to
the time Frivaldo filed his application as early as August
1994.

Castaneda Vs. Yap
FACTS: After winning post of municipal mayor, Yap’s
ineligibility was questioned by Castaneda pointing to the
fact that Yap was less than 23 y.o. when proclaimed, in
violation of Revised Admin Code. Yap claims goodfaith
and estoppel against Castaneda for latter’s knowledge of
such ineligibility even before election.
HELD: Plea of estoppel would not hold for the right to an
elective office can be contested, under existing legislation,
only after proclamation. Good faith does not cure
candidate ineligibility. In any case, Yap was not in
goodfaith as he knew for a fact that he was underage.
The requirement that a candidate for public office possess
a certain age is based on public policy. No specific harm or
damage needs to be shown and as per Section 173 of the
Revised Admin Code, any candidate for same office may
question ineligibility of the proclaimed candidate within
one week after proclamation through quo warranto
petition before CFI.
vi. Specific Qualifications and
Disqualifications
common
general prohibitions
property
b. religious,
Const. Art. 3, sec. 5 but see Sec. 2175, RAC
Art. III Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
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Pamil Vs. Teleron
FACTS: Petitioner Pamil and Respondent Gonzaga were
both candidates for position of municipal mayor in Bohol.
Respondent, a priest, was elected into the position.
Petitioner assails Gonzaga’s election on the basis of Sec
2175 of the Revised Admin Code of 1917. Respondent
Gonzaga counters that the said provision was impliedly
repealed by the Election Code of 1971.
HELD: The majority opinion held that Sec 2175 was
repealed, not by the Election Code which does not
expressly refer to ecclesiastics, but rather by the
Constitution. In the 1935 Constitution, it is explicitly
declared that “No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.”, hence the ban against
ecclesiatics from running for public office under Admin
Code cannot survive. The Court cited Torcaso v. Watkins.
However, this position failed to get the requisite 8 votes,
thus the attack on Sec 2175 having failed, it remains valid
and should be applied. Respondent was ordered to vacate
the position.
Note: Concurring opinions, agreeing to the result, held
basically that Election Code did not repeal Sec 2175 since
the ecclesiastics are not included in the enumeration of
those who may already file certificates of candidacy
although previously prohibited under Sec 2175. It was
also held that there is repugnancy between the Consti and
Sec 2175, inasmuch that Sec 2175 does not constitute a
religious test but merely a disqualification. Sec 2175 is
derived from Sec 15 Article XV of the Constitution
providing for separation of the church and the state, citing
the horrible results when the two are mixed up—a
religious sect obtaining a dominant hold over civil
government—as experienced in the past, specially during
the Spanish colonization of the Philippines.
Torasco Vs. Watkins
FACTS: Appellant Torasco was appointed by the Gov of
Maryland to the office of a Notary Public, but was denied
commission because he could not declare his belief in God
as required by the Maryland Constitution. He now cries
for violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
HELD: The Maryland test for public office cannot be
enforced because it unconstitutionally invades freedom of
belief and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment
and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from
infringement by the States.
The fact that a person is not compelled to hold a public
office is not an excuse for barring him from office by a
state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution. An
abstract right to public employment exists.
vii. Qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution – go back to the
provisions on qualifications
prescribed by the 1987 Consti for
the Pres, VP, the Congress and all
other constitutional offices
President,

Const ART VII, Sec 2
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election.
2. Vice-President
ART. VII Sec 3
There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and
in the same manner, as the President. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
3. Senator
ART VI, Sec. 3
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not
less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
4. Congressman
ART VI, Sec. 6
No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
5. SC Justice
ART VIII
Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and
must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of
judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed
judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
6. Civil Service Commissioners
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ART IXB, Sec 1(1)
The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment.
COMELEC Commissioners
ART IX-C. Sec. 1(1)
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective positions in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
COA Commissioners
viii. Disqualifications
Monsanto Vs Factoran
FACTS: Sandiganbayan convited Monsanto, then
assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, et al. of complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public docs. SC
affirmed, but during MFR was pending, Monsanto was
extended absolute pardon by then Pres Marcos. So, she
requested for reinstatement in her former post. Minister
of Finance held that while she may be reinstated without
necessity of new appointment, she is still civilly liable.
Exec Sec Factoran, however, was of the view that she is
not entitled to automatic reinstatement and liable for civil
liability.
HELD: The Court subscribed to the modern view rejecting
the unduly broad wiping out of all effects of previous
violation in case of pardon. It held that the very essence
of pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. It does not
wash out moral sin, forgiveness and not forgetfulness. A
pardon looks into the future and not retroactive.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from
all penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all
his civil rights, when expressly stated. But unless
expressly grounded on person’s innocence, it cannot bring
back lost reputation. Therefore Garland case
notwithstanding, the Court is of the opinion that pardon
does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his
eligibility for re-appointment. Public offices are intended
primarily for collective protection safety and the benefit of
the common good. Court further notes that petitioner may
apply for re-appointment, but of course the facts
constituting her offense must be evaluated and taken into
account in determining whether she should still be
entrusted with public funds.

Garcia Vs COA
FACTS: Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the
Bureau of Telecommunications summarily dismissed on
the ground of dishonesty as per Ministry of Pub Works,
Transpo and Comm in the Admin case. However, he was
acquitted in the Criminal case by the trial court. He
sought reinstatement in view of the acquittal, but was
refused by the Bureau of Telecommunications. Acting on
the favorable indorsements of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications and the CSC, he was
granted Executive Clemency. He claimed with
Commission on Audit payment of backwages from the
time he was dismissed, but this was denied.
HELD: The Court harked back to Monsanto v. Factoran
citing the general rule is that it does not effect blotting out
of the offense for all purposes. Unless grounded on
innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Since it does not
entitle to automatic reinstatement, offender cannot also
claim backwages. However, the Monsanto rule stated
otherwise is applicable in this case. If the pardon is based
on innocence, it has the effect of making the person a new
man as if not found guilty. He is restored his clean name,
good reputation and unstained character prior to the
finding of guilt.
In the CAB, the acquittal of the petitioner by the TC is
not due to lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but
rather on the fact that he did not commit the acts as
charged. In fact, his plea for pardon was bolstered by
favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by
Ministry of Telecom and the CSC. Further noted that the
dismissal of petitioner was not a consequence of the a
criminal conviction where it is an accessory penalty but
rather of an administrative decision—and the Executive as
its head has the power of control, that is to alter, modify
or nullify what his subordinates has done in the
performance of their duties and substitute his own
judgment. The clemency nullified his dismissal, therefore,
petitioner is entitled to backwages.
CLU Vs. Executive Secretary
FACTS: Petitioners maintain that EO 284 is
unconstitutional as it allows members of the Cabinet, their
usecs,and asst. secs to hold government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions, contrary to
Sec 13 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. They contend
that the only exceptions referred to by “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution” in Sec 13 are: (1) Vice Pres
appointed as Cabinet member under Sec 3 Art VII (2) Sec
of Justice as an ex-officio member of the Judicial Bar
Council under Sec 8(1) Art VIII. They further argue that
the exception to the prohibition in Sec 7 par 2 of Art IXB
on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and
employees of the Civil Service in general and cannot be
made to apply to Sec 13 of Art VII which specifically
applies to the Pres, Cice-Pres, Mems of the Cabinet and
their deputies and assistants.
HELD: The Court ruled for the petitioner holding that
intent of the framers was to curtail abuses which became
prevalent during the Marcos regime. The framers inspite
of the blanket prohibition under Art IX-B still saw it fit to
formulate another provision in Sec 13 Art VII, specifically
applicable to the officials enumerated therein. Noting
further that the prohibition imposed on the President and
his official family in Sec 13 Art VII is even broader than
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those found in other provisions in the Consti dealing with
members of Congress, armed forces and Civil Service
employees, such that the ban is not limited to other
positions in the Government, but rather it provides for
absolute disqualification in any position, office or
employment.
Moreover, respondents’ interpretation would render
certain parts of the Constitution inoperative, such as Sec
3 Art VII allowing VP to be appointed as a cabinet
member, Sec 7 Article VII authorizing the VP to act as
President without relinquishing Vice-Presidency where the
Pres shall not have been chosen or fails to qualify, and
Sec 8 (1) Art VIII allowing the Sec of Justice to serve ex
officio as member of the Judicial Bar Council. These
clearly are intended to be the only exceptions
contemplated in “unless provided by this Constitution” of
Sec 13 Art VII.
However, the Court clarifies that Sec 13 Art VII should
not be interpreted to apply to posts occupied by Executive
officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law or as required by the primary
functions of said officials’ office. These posts do not
comprise “any other office” within the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials.
Caasi Vs. CA
FACTS: In question in this case is the qualification of
Merito Miguel, a green card holder, to the position of
municipal mayor of Bolinao in view of Sec 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
HELD: Sec 18 Art IX of the Consti provides that Public
officers and employees owe State and the Consti
allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law. Sec 86 of the Elec Code, on the other
hand, any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run
for any elective office unless he waives such status in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws. While Sec 18 of Art IX is not applicable
to Miguel for he acquired his immigrant status prior to
election and not during his tenure, Sec 68 of the Elec Code
is applicable.
The law requires that a greencard holder must have
“waived his status as resident or immigrant of a foreign
country” to be qualified to run for a public office.
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy did not
itself constitute a waiver of his status, it should be
manifested by some act or acts done prior to filing his
candidacy. Without such, he is “disqualified to run for any
elective office”.
Frivaldo, supra

III. DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS
a. Definition
State Vs. Carroll
FACTS: The judge of the city Court of New Haven was
absent because he was sick. The clerk of court took to
himself to request Morse, a justice of peace residing in
New Haven to act in the sick judge’s place. While Morse
was acting as judge, a complaint was brought before
against Caroll for libel and breach of the peace. He was
found guilty. Caroll then assails the judgment questioning
Morse’s authority to sit as judge. He also claims that the
charter which allows for appointments of acting judges is
unconstitutional and that the court was not legally
organized because the letter calling Morse was not
recorded.
HELD: The decision of Morse is valid. Morse was an
officer de facto. The Court defined a de facto officer as
one who acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the
law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so
far as they involve the interests of the public and third
persons, where the duties of the office were exercised,
first, without a known appointment or election, but under
such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were
calculated to induce people, without inquiry to submit to
or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he
assumed to be;
second, under the color of a known and valid
appointment or election but where the officer has failed to
conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as
to take oath, give bond etc.; third, under color of known
election or appointment, void because the officer was not
eligible, or because there was a want of power in electing
or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power, or defect being unknown to the public; fourth,
under color of an election or appointment by or pursuant
to unconstitutional law, before the same is declared to be
as such.
b. Distinctions
c. De Facto Officers
i. Conditions and elements
Tuanda Vs SB
FACTS: Private respondents were designated as sectoral
representatives for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud,
Negros and took their oath of office. Petitioner Mayor
Tuanda et al filed with the Office of the Pres. For review
and recall of said designation, but it was denied ordering
him to recognize private respondents. Petitioner then filed
with RTC to declare designations null and void. Meantime,
private respondents filed with Sandiganbayan charging
Petitioners Tuanda et al for badfaith and partiality in
refusing to pay their their salaries. RTC declared
designation void ab initio for non-compliance with the
requirements in BP 337 for appointment of sectoral
representatives, particularly, a prior determination by the
Sanggunian that the sectors are sufficient in number after
consultation with those belonging to the sector concerned.
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This was appealed, and currently pending. Petitioners
moved for the suspension of the Sandiganbayan case
contending that the validity of the designation is a
prejudicial question. SB denied.
HELD: The Court ruled that there is a prejudicial question
since the outcome of the question on the validity of the
designation would determine the merits of the charges
against the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan. The
Court found unmeritorious SB’s thesis that in the event
respondents’ designations are finally declared invalid they
may still be considered de facto officers. SC enumerated
the conditions and elements of de facto officership:
1.) there must be a de jure office;
2.) there must be color of right or general acquiescence
by the public; and
3.) there must be actual physical possession of the office
in good faith.
All must be present. There can be no de facto officer
where there is no de jure office, although there may be a
de facto officer in a de jure office.
Tayco Vs. Capistrano
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition enjoining
respondent Judge Capistrano in taking cognizance of
certain civil and criminal election cases in which
petitioners are parties. They base their petition on three
major allegations, first on the understanding that the
auxiliary judge would here election and criminal cases;
second that Judge Capistrano is bias against them; third
that having reached the age of 65, Judge Capistrano has
therefore automatically ceased as judge of the CFI and
that he is neither a judge de jure or de facto.
HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. On the first, the
mere understanding cannot deprive a judge of his
jurisdiction as prescribed by law. On the second, court
basically held the determination WON a fiscal properly
filed a case lies within the sound discretion of a judge. As
to the third, the Court noted at the outset that whether a
judge is de facto or de jure may only be determined in a
quo warranto proceeding. Respondent judge has been
duly appointed to his office to serve until they reach 65.
While he may not be a de jure officer, he is still a
judge de facto. Briefly defined, a de facto judge is
one who exercises duties of a judicial official under
color of an appointment or election thereto. He
differs from a mere usurper, who undertakes to act
officially without any color of right, and on the other
hand, from a judge de jure who is in all respects
legally appointed, qualified and whose term has not
expired.
General rule seems to be that an incumbent of
an office will hold over after conclusion of his term
until the election and qualification of a successor.
When a judge in good faith remains in his office
after his title has ended, he is a de facto officer.
Rodriguez Vs. Tan
Eulogio Rodriguez filed a complaint against Carlos Tan,
alleging that the latter had usurped his office as Senator
of the Philippines. The Senate Electorate Tribunal
rendered a judgment against Tan and declared Rodriguez
to have been duly elected to the office, but failed to rule
upon his claim to salaries. Rodriguez now appeals this

decision claiming that Tan should reimburse him.
WON Tan may be held liable for the payment of
Rodriguez’s salary
No he may not. There is no question that Tan acted as a
de facto officer. A senator who has been proclaimed and
had assumed office, but was later on ousted as a result of
an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he
held office, and is entitled to the compensation,
emoluments and allowances to which our Constitution
provides for the position.
Doc Avila: Compare this case with Monroy v. Court of
Appeals where the court ruled that the government official
(Mayor) was not entitled to his compensation as he was
deemed to have resigned. That case involved a USURPER
and not a de facto officer.
General Rule: Public Officer takes the salary at his own
risk, that is – subject to an attack by the de jure officer.
Lino Luna Vs. Rodriguez
In an election contest involving the office of governor of
Rizal, Judge Barreto signed an opinion (favorable to Luna)
on January 14, 1917 but this was only filed with the clerk
of court on January 17, 1917. Rodriguez contests the
propriety of the judge’s ruling and argued that it was
invalid, as Barreto ceased to be a judge when he assumed
the position of Secretary of Finance on January 16, 1917.
WON the decision was validly filed and promulgated
The Supreme Court held that the issue should be resolved
in a new trial, but it gave the following guidelines:
In order that a court may promulgate a legal decision or
judgment, the following elements are necessary:
1. There must be a court legally organized or
constituted;
2. There must be a judge or judges legally
appointed or elected and actually acting, either
de jure or de facto
Judge de Jure – One who exercises the office of judge as a
matter of right; an officer of law fully vested with all the
powers and functions conceded under the law.
Judge de Facto – One whose acts are valid under
principles of policy and justice insofar as they involved the
interest of the public and third persons, where the duties
of the office were exercised:
1. Without a known appointment or election but
under such circumstances of reputation as were
calculated to induce the people to submit to his
action.
2. Under color of a known or valid appointment or
election, where the officer has failed to conform
to some precedent, requirement or condition.
3. Under color of a known election or appointment,
but was void because the officer was not eligible
or by want of power on the part of the appointing
power.
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Solis Vs. CA
In a case involving the malversation of public funds, Judge
Leuterio (who was then judge-at-large assigned to the
case) penned a decision finding Gregorio Solis et al, guilty
of the crime charged against them. A day before the
promulgation of judgment, RA 1186 took effect, and
abolished all existing positions of Judges-at-Large. Hence,
when judgment was to be promulgated, a judge of
another sala of the court, Judge Palacio, promulgated the
judgment of Judge Leuterio. Solis appeals the validity of
the promulgation of judgment.
WON the judgment rendered by Judge Palacio was
valid.
No it was not. A decision is void if promulgated after the
judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a
judge of the court where he sat in judgment. Thus, a
judgment is a nullity if it had been promulgated:
1. After the judge had actually vacated the office
and accepted another office;
2. When the term of the judge has ended
3. When the judge has left the Bench
4. After the judge had vacated his post in view of
the abolition of his position as Judge-at-Large
(RA 1186)
5. After the cessation or termination of his
incumbency.
ii. Effects
Menzon Vs. Petilla
As there was no Governor proclaimed in the province of
Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government designated the
Vice-Governor – Petilla, as acting Governor of Leyte.
Menzon, a Senior member of the Sanngguniang
Panlalawigan was subsequently appointed as Vice-
Governor. The Provincial Administrator through a
resolution in the Sangguninang Panlalawigan,
subsequently held the Menzon’s appointment to be invalid,
and argued that BP 337 has no provision relating to
succession in the Office of the Vice Governor in case of a
temporary vacancy
WON the Secretary of Local Government has the
authority to make temporary appointments for the
position of Vice-Governor
Yes he does. The Local Government Code is silent on the
mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in
the Office of the Vice-Governor. There is no question that
Sec. 49 in connection with Sec. 52 of the Local
Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for
continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-
Governor. By virtue of the surrounding circumstances in
this case, the mode of succession provided for permanent
vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a
temporary vacancy occurring in the same office.
WON Menzon is entitled to compensation for the
position of Vice-Governor
Even if the Secretary of Local Government possesses no
power to appoint Menzon, the latter is at the very least, a
de facto officer entitled to compensation. He was

acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte, upon the
principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is
based and basic considerations of justice, it would be
highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary die him for
the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-
Governor of the province of Leyte.
Malaluan Vs COMELEC
Malaluan and Evangelista were mayoralty candidates in
town of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Evangelista was
proclaimed winner, but after an election protest filed by
Malaluan in the RTC, was later disqualified. On appeal to
COMELEC, Malaluan was ordered to vacate the position
and pay Evangelista actual damages (for xerox copies,
unearned salary and other emoluments).
WON the award of damages was proper
No it was not. COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion as the long-standing rule (citing Rodriguez v.
Tan) is that notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a
result of an election protest, an elective official who has
been proclaimed by COMELEC as winner in an electorate
contest and who assumed office and entered in the
performance of the duties of that office is entitled to the
emoluments, allowances and compensation legally
provided for the position.
Malaluan was a de facto officer, who, in good faith, has
had possession of the office and had discharged the duties
pertaining thereto and is thus legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office.
Flores Vs. Drilon, supra
WON the acts of Gordon as SBMA Chair while he was
still Mayor are null and void
No, these acts are valid as Gordon is a de facto officer,
who acted under color of authority (Bases Conversion and
development Act of 1992). Furthermore, as a de facto
officer, he is entitled to all per diems, allowances and
other emoluments which may he may have received
pursuant to his appointment.
iii. Challenges
Tayco, supra
WON any private individual may question the public
judicial functions of a judge
No. As far as third persons are interested and the public
are concerned, the acts of a de facto judge are just as
valid as those of a de jure judge. The title of a de fact
officer cannot be indirectly questioned in a proceeding to
obtain a writ of prohibition to prevent him from doing an
official act. Having at least a colorable right to the office,
his title can be determined only in quo warranto
proceeding or information in the nature of a quo warranto
at the suit of the sovereign.
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Page 13 of 45
IV. The CIVIL SERVICE
Const. ART IX(B);
Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by
the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and
two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for
public administration, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by
competitive examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall
engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees.
(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be
given such protection as may be provided by law.
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central
personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit
and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an
oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the

standardization of compensation of government officials
and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, taking into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to,
and the qualifications required for, their positions.
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall,
within one year after such election, be appointed to any
office in the Government or any Government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
Government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor
accept without the consent of the Congress, any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as
additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Meram Vs. Edralin
Meram and Agravio opposed the appointment of Edralin to
the position of Administrative Officer in the Administrative
Division of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Meram and Agravio contend that they are “next in rank”
to the position. The BFD, after considering the findings of
the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) and the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), issued the appointment to
Meram but its decision was overturned upon the letter-
request of Edralin to the Office of the President.
WON the Office of the President has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case
No it did not. There is nothing in PD 807 which connotes
exclusivity of jurisdiction of the Office of the President.
Meram correctly filed her petition before the MSPB in
accordance with PD 1409.
Civil service laws are not enacted to penalize anyone.
They are designed to eradicate the system of appointment
to public offices based on political considerations and to
eliminate as far as practicable the element of partisanship
and personal favoritism in making appointments.
Edralin was not next in rank for the position and is hence,
not qualified.
Doc Avila: So what do we learn from this case? Follow
protocol, and if you’re unsatisfied with the procedure and
want to appeal to the Office of the President, be humble
about it.
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National Service Corp Vs NLRC
Credo was employed as a lady security guard of the
National Service Corporation (NASECO), she was later
promoted to Clerk Typist and then later, Chief of Property
Records. Credo was later administratively charged for not
complying with a memorandum (regarding certain entry
procedures in the NASECO). After the investigation,
Credo was dismissed from her employment. On appeal,
the NLRC found that Credo was illegally dismissed and
ordered her reinstatement to the position. NASECO
contends (amongst others) that the NLRC had no
jurisdiction to order Credo’s reinstatement, since it is a
subsidiary of the National Investment and Development
Corporation (NIDC), which in turn is owned by the PNB,
the terms and conditions of employment of its employees
are governed by the Civil Service Law and not the NLRC.
WON employees of GOCCs with no original charters
are exempt from the NLRC rules
No they are not. The case relied upon by NASECO (NHC
v. Juco) was based on the 1973 Constitution. The
situation sought to be avoided and expressed by the court
in NHC v. Juco appear to be relegated to relative
insignificance by the 1987 Constitution that: The Civil
Service embraces GOCCs with original charters and
therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not
include GOCCs which are organized as subsidiaries of
GOCCs under the General Corporation Law (or those
without original charters).
As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a
subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a GOCC without an
original charter, whose employees are subject to the NLRC
rules.
Fontanilla Vs. Maliaman
Garcia was employed by the National Irrigation Authority
as a driver for one of its trucks. In the course of his
employment, Garcia was involved in a vehicular accident
that led to the deaths of 3 people. The victim’s parents
filed a suit against NIA and the trial court found NIA liable
for its driver (Garcia) and ordered it to pay moral and
exemplary damages.
WON the award of damages is proper, considering
the principle on non-suability of the State
Yes the award is proper. Applying Art. 2176 of the New
Civil Code, the State’s agent, if a public official, must not
only be specially commissioned to do a particular task, but
such task must be foreign to said official’s government
functions. If the State’s agent is not a public official and is
commissioned to perform non-government functions, then
the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and
will be held liable as such for its agent’s tort.
Where the government commissions a private individual
for a special government task, it is acting through a
special agent within the meaning of Art. 2176 of the New
Civil Code.
Rafael Vs EACIB
RA 3137 was enacted creating an Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board. The said act provides for
 PUBOF A2007
Page 15 of 45
the composition of a Board that will approve/deny the
application for the license to import textile for the WON Regis’ removal was justified
manufacture of leather goods. Cecilio Rafael, a textile
manufacturer, questioned the validity of the said act as No it was not, as the provisional appointment remained
Congress specified the persons to be appointed as valid and subsisting.
members of the Boards. Accordingly, since the act
prescribes that the Chairman and members should come TEMPORARY PROVISIONAL
from specified offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by APPOINTMENTS APPOINTMENTS
Congress as to who should be appointed. Designed to fill a position Intended for a
needed for only a limited contingency that a
WON RA 3137 is invalid insofar as it deprives the period not exceeding 6 vacancy occurs and the
President the power to appoint months filing thereof is necessary
in the interest of the
No it is not. The chairman and members of the Board, service and there is no
except for the representatives for the private sector, are appropriate register of
ex-officio. In order to be designated, they must already eligibles at the time of the
be holding positions in the offices mentioned in the law. appointment
No new appointments are necessary. This is as it should There exists an occasional Interest of service
be because the representatives so designated merely work to be done (less requires that a certain
perform duties in the Board in addition to those they than 6 months) work be done by a regular
already performed under their original appointments. employee
All the law enjoins is that The appointment may be
This situation is not violative of the established doctrine preference in filing such a extended only to a person
that “the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of position be given to who has not qualified in
the President, upon which no limitation may be imposed persons on appropriate an appropriate
by Congress, except those resulting from the need of eligible lists. Merely examination but who
securing the concurrence of the Commission on giving preference otherwise meets the
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power presupposes that even a requirements for
to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive non-eligible may be appointment to a regular
office. appointed position in the competitive
service
Achacoso Vs. Macaraig Temporary appointment One which may be
given to non-civil service
Achacoso was the Administrator of the POEA for two eligible is without a issued upon prior
years, he filed his courtesy resignation (accordingly in definite tenure of office authorization of the
compliance with a request by the President). When a new and is dependent upon
appointee was named, Achacoso opposed and demanded the pleasure of the
Commissioner of
that he be reinstated to his position. As a member of the appointing power. Civil Service to a
Career Service of the CSC, he enjoys security of tenure
and that he submitted his resignation only out of duress.
person who has not
qualified in an
WON Achacoso is entitled to security of tenure examination but who
No he is not, as his appointment as Administrator of the meets other
POES was merely temporary. The mere fact that a requirements
position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant Cuevas Vs Bacal
even if he does not possess the required qualifications.
Bacal, a CESO III employee was appointed by Pres.
The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to Ramos to the position of Chief of Public Attorney in the
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of the official functions Public Attorney’s Office (CES Rank I). Four years later,
by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending Pres. Estrada appointed Demaisip to the position of “Chief
the selection of a permanent or another appointee (citing Public Defender”. Bacal was subsequently “appointed” to
Austria v. Amante) Regional Director of the Public Defender’s Office. Bacal
filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her
Doc Avila: Expiration of a term is not covered by the replacement as Chief Public Attorney, the trial court and
Constitutional provision on security of tenure. Court of Appeals ruled in her favor and ordered her
reinstatement. The Secretary of Justice, Serafin Cuevas,
Regis Vs Osmena appealed to the Supreme Court and disagreed with the
CA’s findings that Bacal had acquired security of tenure
Regis was appointed by then Mayor Dueterte as driver of and may therefore be transferred/removed without just
the Cebu Police Department, his appointment was cause,
renewed three times until he took the examination and
became a civil service eligible. Regis was subsequently WON Bacal had acquired security of tenure
removed from office by the next mayor (Osmena). Regis
contests his removal and argued that he enjoys security of No she did not. Bacal is a CESO III and the position of
tenure, having been provisionally appointed to the Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office
position. The trial court ruled that Regis’ appointment was corresponds to her CES Rank III and Salary Grade 28. As
merely temporary and therefore his removal was justified. Bacal did not have the rank and position for the position of

Chief Public Attorney (Rank I and Salary Grade 30),she
can not claim security of tenure in respect of that position.
As in the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, a permanent
appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
requirements.
The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the
Career Executive Service (CES) does not extend to the
particular positions to which they may be appointed but to
the rank to which they are appointed by the President.
In this case, Bacal may have been considered for
promotion to Rank I to make her appointment as Chief
Public Attorney permanent, but this fact did not
materialize as Demaisip was appointed in her place. If
Bacal was paid a salary equivalent to Salary Grade 30
while she was holding that office, it was only because
under the law, if a CESO is assigned to a position with a
higher salary grade than that corresponding to his or her
rank, he/she will be allowed the salary of the CES position.
Even in the other branches of the civil service, the rule is
that, unless an employee is appointed to a particular office
or station, he can claim no security of tenure in respect of
any office.
Bacal, could therefore be transferred, even without her
consent as within the Career Executive Service, personnel
can be shifted from one position to another without
violation of their right to security of tenure because their
status and salaries are based on their ranks and not their
jobs.
Delos Santos Vs. Mallare
De Los Santos was first appointed City Engineer of Baguio.
Mallare was thereafter appointed to the said office but De
Los Santos refused to yield his position contenting that as
City Engineer, he could not be removed from office
without just cause. Mallare however contends that the
Office of the City Engineer is a position that is highly
technical in character and is therefore not covered by Sec.
4 Art. XII of the 1935 Constitution which reads “No officer
or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended wxcept for cause as provided by law”.
WON the Office of the City Engineer belongs to the
unclassified service, who serves at the pleasure of
the appointing authority
No it does not. A city engineer does not formulate a
method of action for the government or any of its
subdivisions. It is technical, but not highly so, as a matter
of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently
administrative in character and could have very well be
discharged by non-technical men possessing executive
ability.
Three specified classes of positions are excluded from the
merit system and may be dismissed at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. These are policy-determining,
primarily confidential and highly technical. These
positions involve the highest degree of confidence, or are
closely bound up with and dependent on other positions to
which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature.
PUBOF A2007
Page 16 of 45
It may be truly said that the good of the service itself
demands that appointments coming under this category
become terminable at the will of the officer who makes
them.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more
than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a
position that is primary confidential. The latter phrase
denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals
of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
De Los Santos is therefore entitled to remain in office as
City Engineer.
Corpus Vs. Cuaderno
Martino Corpus (Special Assistant to the Governor in
charge of the Export Department of the Central Bank) was
administratively charged by his co-employees with
dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and conduct
unbecoming of a public official. The Monetary Board
suspended Corpus and after investigation, issued a
resolution and declared Corpus to have resigned because
the Governor had lost confidence in Corpus. Corpus
contends that his removal was improper
WON Corpus’ removal was valid
No it was not. Corpus is protected by the Civil Service
Law and his removal or suspension must be for cause
recognized by law.
The loss of confidence by the Monetary Board was a mere
afterthought by the Monetary Board when the charges
were not proven or substantiated.
Art. XII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution merely makes the
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring
appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis
of merit and fitness as determined from competitive
examination
This should be read in line with Art. XII, Sec. 4, which
provides that no officer or employee of the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided
by law.
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential
positions ends upon loss of confidence but the situation is
different for those holding highly technical positions.
PAGCOR Vs Rilloraza
Carlos Rilloraza, a Casino operations manages of PAGCOR
was administratively charged for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and loss of confidence for having facilitated a
check of P5000.
Rilloraza was dismissed from PAGCOR, an on appeal to the
CSC was subsequently reinstated. PAGCOR appeals the
decision and maintains that Rilloraza was a confidential
employee and therefore could be fired at will.
WON Rilloraza is a confidential employee whose

employment may be terminated by the appointing
authority.
Yes he is a confidential employee but he is guilty of only
simple negligence and must therefore be reinstated to his
position.
It is the nature of the position which finally determines
whether a position is primarily confidential, policy
determining or highly technical. Executive
pronouncements, such as PD 1869 can be more be than
an initial determination and are not conclusive in case of
conflict. It must be so. Or else it would then lie within the
discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by
executive fiat, the protection of Art. XII Sec. 4 [now Art.
IX-B Sec. (23) of the 1987 Constitution].
In other words, Sec. 16 of PD 1869 cannot be given a
literal stringent application without compromising the
constitutionally protected right of an employee to security
of tenure.
Doc Avila: Note Justice Regalado’s comments
• The classification of positions that amount to
executive or legislative declarations are not conclusive
upon the courts
• The exemption provided for in PD 1869 refers to
exemption from competitive examination.
• Positions that are policy determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical are exempt from
competitive examinations as a means for determining
merit and fitness. These positions are covered by
security of tenure, although they are considered non-
competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto
do not have to undergo competitive examinations.
Espanol Vs CSC
Espanol (Chief of the Engineering Division) competed with
Orlando Bulseco (Chief Design Engineer) the position of
Regional Manager of the National Irrigation Administration
(NIA). Despite being lower in rank, Bulseco was
appointed to the position. Espanol contested Bulseco’s
appointment and claimed that he should have been
appointed since he was “next-in-rank”.
WON Espanol (who was next in rank) had the right
to be appointed to the vacant position
No he did not. An appointment is essentially a
discretionary power and must be performed according to
the best lights of the appointing authority, the only
condition being that the appointees shall possess the
qualifications required by the law.
Art. VIII of PD 807 provides:
“An employee appointed on a permanent basis to a
position previously determined to be next in rank to the
vacancy proposed to be filled and who meets the
requisites for the appointment thereto as previously
determined by the appointing authority and approved by
the respondent commission”
In this case, both Espanol and Bulseco met the minimum
qualifications for the position.
The concept of next-in-rank does not import any
PUBOF A2007
Page 17 of 45
mandatory or preemptory requirement. The rule neither
grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a
ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote
such person to the next higher position.
To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose
a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the
policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible,
the appointing authority is granted discretion and
prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for the
appointment.
Pineda Vs Claudio
Jovito Claudio, the City Mayor of Pasay appointed Villa, a
state prosecutor in the DOJ as Chief of Police of Pasay.
The Civil Service Commissioner held the appointment in
abeyance until other persons who had a preferential right
to the appointment had been considered. This included
Pineda, the deputy chief of police. The CSC eventually
upheld the appointment of Villa. Failing to secure a
favorable ruling from the CSC, Pineda now appeals to the
Supreme Court, contending, principally that, as deputy
chief, he was next in rank to the position of Chief of Police
and that it was mandatory on the part of the city mayor to
appoint him to the position.
WON it is a mandatory and ministerial duty on the
part of the Mayor to appoint Pineda (an officer next
in rank) to the position of Chief of Police
No it is not. The Civil Service Act does not peremptorily
require the mayor to promote the officer next in rank. It
means that as far as practicable, the person next in rank
should be promoted, otherwise, the vacancy may be filled
by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification,
as the appointing power sees fit, provided the appointee is
certified to be qualified and eligible, which is the basic
requirement in the Civil Service Act.
The principle of seniority and next-in0rank embodied in
Sec. 23, with its corollary requirements to set forht the
special reason/s in case the officer next in rank is not
appointed to the vacant position applies only to cases of
promotion.
Therefore, when the appointing power chooses to fill the
vacancy not by promotion but by transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment or certification, he is under no duty
whatsoever to explain his action.
The reason for this distinction is that when a person who
is a junior jumps over his senior, the ranking is disturbed
and the person next in rank is actually bypassed and so it
is reasonable to require the appointing power to give his
“special reason/s”.
In case of a transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or
certification – the person next in rank is not really
bypassed because the person appointed is one who holds
a position of equivalent rank as the vacant position. To
the appointee, the new position is hardly a higher one.
Garcia Vs Chair, supra
Garcia’s automatic reinstatement to the government
service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to
afford relief to Garcia who is innocent from the start and
to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of

his unjust dismissal from service. To rule otherwise would
be to defeat the very intention of executive clemency.
Gloria Vs De Guzman
Cerillo was temporarily appointed to the position of Board
Secretary of the Philippine Air Force College of
Aeronautics. The Board of Trustees thereafter revoked
her appointment by reason of loss of confidence. Cerillo
thereafter filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional
Trial Court to compel the Board of Trustees to reinstate
her to her position.
WON Cerillo’s action for mandamus is proper
No it is not.
Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor
for reappointment. Still to be considered by the
appointing authority are: performance, degree of
education, work experience, training, seniority and
whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and
trust of the appointing power.
Reappointment to a position that is discretionary cannot
be subject of an application for the writ of mandamus.
Such discretionary power of appointment cannot be
controlled (not even by the Court) as long as it is
exercised properly by the appointing authority.
The termination of Cerillo’s appointment was proper and
legal, it being the consequence of the Board of Trustee’s
power to appoint.
Sison Vs. Pangramuyen
Sison (Chief Deputy Assessor) and Maliwanag (Senior
Deputy Assessor) were both considered for the position of
Assistant City Assessor of Olongapo City. After a
recommendation made by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), Mayor Pangramuyen thereafter appointed
Maliwanag to the said position. After his appeal was
denied by both the Regional Director and CSC, Sison
contested the validity of the appointment and claimed that
at the time of Maliwanag’s appointment, he (Sison) was
next in rank and also had superior educational and
appropriate civil service eligibilities over Maliwanag.
WON Maliwanag’s appointment was valid
Yes it was. The Supreme Court respected the findings of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and noted that the
latter is primarily charged with the administration of Civil
Service Law and rules, absent the showing of grave abuse
of discretion.
Sison’s arguments were based mostly on the
organizational charts and the description of positions by
the CSC. These charts do not carry the approval of the
Mayor as Department Head and are therefore not
controlling.
Eugenio Vs. Torrijos
Eugenio (Educational Supervisor of the Education and
Training Division of the National Science Development
Board) contested the appointment of Torrijos (Librarian
Documentation in the Philippine Textile Research Institute)
to the position of Assistant Chief of the Scientific Library
PUBOF A2007
Page 18 of 45
Documentation Division (SLDD).
The office of the SLDD was created as a result of the
implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan of
the National Science Development Board.
Eugenio claims that she has a preferential right over the
position being next in rank.
WON Eugenio had a preferential right over the
vacancy in the newly created office
No she did not. No person could claim to be next-in-rank
to a newly created position, as at the time of the creation
of the office, there was no established ranking of positions
as yet. Such being the case, the contested position is
open to all qualified NSDB personnel.
Discretion should be granted to those entrusted with the
responsibility of administering the offices concerned – the
department heads. They are in the most favorable
position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of
the office thus vacated. In this case, Torrijos was deemed
to be a qualified eligible and could therefore be validly
appointed to the position.
Debulgado Vs. CSC
The incumbent Mayor of the San Carlos, Negros
Occidental, appointed his wife (who had been in the City
Government service for 32 years) as head of the Office of
General Services. The CSC recalled the approval of the
appointment and found it to be a nepotic appointment.
Debulgado questions this decision and maintains that the
prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only
to original appointments and not promotional
appointments
WON the appointment was a nepotic appointment,
and therefore invalid
Yes it was. A promotional appointment is covered by the
legal prohibition against nepotism (under Sec. 59 of the
revised Administrative Code).
The following however are exempted from the operation of
the rules on nepotism
1. Persons employed in a confidential capacity
2. Teachers
3. Physicians
4. Members of the Armed forces of the Philippines
By providing for a list of exemptions, a textual
examination of Sec. 59 reveals that the prohibition was
cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms.
The purpose of Sec. 59 is precisely to take out of the
discretion of the appointment and recommending
authority the matter of appointment or recommending for
appoint a relative.
De Guzman Vs COMELEC
De Guzman filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the validity of Sec. 44 of the Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996, providing for the Reassignment
of Election Officers, for being violative of the constitutional
guarantee on security of tenure of civil servants.

Sec. 44 provides that no election officer shall sit in an
office in pa particular municipality for more than 4 years.
Any officer who has served at least 4 years in a particular
city or municipality shall be deemed automatically re-
assigned by the COMELEC.
WON the Voters Registration Act of 1996, providing
for unconsented transfers, violates the
constitutional guarantee to security of tenure
No it does not. As held in Sta. Maria v. Lopez, the rule
that outlaws unconsented transfers applies only to an
appointed officer and not to a particular station. It does
not prohibit a transfer carried out under a specific statute
that empowers the head of an agency to periodically
reassign the employees and officers in order to improve
the qualities of the agency.
The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution
is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only
means that an employee cannot be dismissed or
transferred from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and after due process is accorded to the
employees. What is seeks to prevent is the capricious
power to dismiss.
Monsanto Vs Factoran, supra
WON Monsanto may automatically be reinstated to
her position after she obtained the Pardon
No she may not. Monsanto’s guilt and punishment were
expunged by her pardon, and disability was likewise
removed but pardon cannot go beyond that. She may
apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited
by reason of her conviction.
Philippine Retirement Authority Vs Rupa
The Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) filed a
compliant against its employee, Rupa, after numerous
instances of office quarrels and complaints. The Civil
Service Commission found Rupa guilty of the grave
offense of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the best interest
of service for neglecting to promptly process the request
of 2 Indian retires. Consequently, Rupa was suspended.
On appeal, the CSC absolved RUPA of the charges and
found her liable only for the less grave offense of simple
neglect of duty.
WON Rupa was guilty of Gross Neglect of duty and
may therefore be dismissed from employment
No she was not, she committed only simple neglect of
duty, and should therefore have only been suspended.
Mere delay in the performance of one’s function has been
consistently considered as a less grave offense of simple
neglect of duty.
Gross Neglect of Duty Simple Neglect of Duty
Flagrant and culpable Disregard of a duty
refusal or unwillingness of resulting from
a person to perform a carelessness or
duty indifference.
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Doc Avila: The PRA should have given more ground for
Rupa’s suspension, while there might be cause against
Rupa, the PRA did not have the right to automatically
terminate her employment.
Manuel Vs. Calimag
A complaint for serious misconduct was filed against Judge
Calimag, for allegedly having caused the sale of a
carnapped motor vehicle. Judge Calimag was able to
secure the conditional release of the case by executing
under oath that he would hold himself criminally or civilly
liable for violation of any of the conditions in the
conditional release. The plaintiff in the case alleges that
the judge committed serious misconduct providing for the
conditional release of the vehicle.
WON the judge is guilty of serious misconduct
No he is not. Misconduct in office has a definite and well-
understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it
is misconduct such as affect his performance of his duties
as an officer and not only as such as affects his character
as a private individual. In such cases, it is necessary to
separate the character of the man from the character of
the officer.
Misconduct, misfeasance or malfeasance warranting
removal from office of an officer must have direct relation
and be connected with the performance of official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of
the office.
Manuel failed to present evidence showing that the acts
complained of were related to the Judge’s official duties.
Selling a car is not even remotely related to or connected
with the discharge of his offical functions.
GSIS vs CSC
Salazar questions the validity of the termination of her
employment from the GSIS, claiming that she had been
granted security of tenure. She first questioned the order
before the Review Committee which then referred her
case to both the Merit Systems Promotion Board (MSPB)
and the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC
directed her reinstatement but the MSPB had a contrary
ruling and affirmed the termination. Salazar thereafter
filed a motion for reconsideration of the MSPB’s order in
lieu of the CSC’s ruling. The MSPB thereafter set aside its
ruling and ordered the Salazar’s reinstatement.
GSIS then appealed this ruling but was denied, and on
appeal to the Supreme Court, the GSIS maintained that
the MSPB had no jurisdiction to rule over Salazar’s motion
for reconsideration
Which among the MSPB or CSC has jurisdiction over
Salazar’s appeal
It is the MSPB and not the Civil Service Commission that is
vested with jurisdiction to hear and try cases appealed to
it by those aggrieved by personnel actions of appointing
authorities.
The Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is
the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil
Service.
 PUBOF A2007
Page 20 of 45
BUT in0rank, or by reinstatement or by original appointment if
the employee making the protest is not satisfied with the
PD 1409, creating the MSPB provides that the MSPB shall reasons given by the appointing authority for such
take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by appointment.
decisions of the appointing officers involving personnel
action. The Commission therefore cannot take original
cognizance of the cases specifically provided for under PD
1. Preventive Suspension
1409.
Gloria Vs. CA
In this case, Salazar’s appeal was endorsed by the review
Committee to the MSPB and CSC. In the absence of a The case arose from dismissal of several public school
decision by the MSPB, the CSC cannot legally assume teachers who staged a strike to question the legality of
jurisdiction over the appeal. their termination from employment. Pending
investigation, the teachers were preventively suspended.
Doc Avila: Therefore, the appeal on decisions regarding The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the teachers
personnel action should be as follows: and ordered their reinstatement and the payment of their
back wages. DECs Secretary Gloria moved for a
1) Department Head → 2) MSPB → 3) CSC→ 4) Supreme reconsideration of this decision insofar as the Court of
Court Appeals ordered the payment of the teacher’s salaries
while they were preventively suspended.
Mantala Vs. Salvador
WON the teachers are entitled to compensation
during their preventive suspension
Dr. Mantala was temporarily appointed to the position of
Division Chief of the Monitoring and Evaluation Division of
Yes they are, but only for the period exceeding 90 days,
the TB Control Service, Office of Public Health of the DOH.
during appeal.
Dr. Regino filed a formal protest with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) against the Dr. Mantala’s appointment,
The court first made a distinction and noted that there are
alleging that she (Regino) should have been appointed to
2 kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees
the position. The CSC ruled against Dr. Regino, and on
who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
appeal to the Merist System Promotion Board (MSPB),
suspension – (1) preventive suspension pending
Regino won. DOH appealed the decision of the MSPB to
investigation and (2) preventive suspension pending
the CSC. Pending appeal, the DOH made Mantala’s
appeal is the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority
appointment permanent. Subsequently, the CSC
is suspension or dismissal, and after review the
dismissed the MSPB’s ruling and upheld Mantala’s
respondent is exonerated.
appointment. Regino then filed a petition for Quo
Warranto in the Regional Trial Court which then ruled in
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a
her favor.
penalty, it is a measure intended to enable the disciplining
authority to investigate charges against respondents by
Mantala now appeals the ruling of the RTC on the ground
preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way
of jurisdiction
influencing witnesses against him.
WON the CSC has exclusive jurisdiction over
Employees who are preventively suspended pending
Mantala’s appointment
investigation are not entitled to the payment of their
salaries, even if they are not exonerated. The reason
Yes it does. Disciplinary cases and cases involving
given is that salary and perquisites are the reward of
“personnel actions” affecting employees in the Civil
express or implied service s and therefore cannot belong
Service, including “appointment through certification,
to one who could not lawfully perform such service.
promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
reassignment, demotion and separation” as well as
Employees who are considered preventively suspended
employment status and qualification standards are within
pending appeal are entitled to payment of their salaries if
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
they are subsequently found innocent. Preventive
suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it
The CSC is the central personnel agency of the
is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is
Government with the power and authority to:
exonerated and the administrative decision finding him
1. Administer the civil service
guilty is reversed.
2. Promulgate its own rules
3. Render decision in any case or matter brought
Doc Avila: What the law authorizes is preventive
before it within 60 days from the date of the
suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days, beyond
submission for decision or resolution.
that the period is illegal.
The CSC’s rules on administrative disciplinary and protest
cases provide for the Commission’s exercise of final and Orbos Vs. Bungbung
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
the MSPB involving contested appointments or The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Police Force filed a
promotions. complaint with the Administrative Action Board against its
Manila Port District Manager, Bungbung for dishonesty and
Protest Cases – Are those involving appointments made in conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
favor of another next-in-rank employee who is not Bungbung filed several motions and injunctions against his
qualified; those made in favor of one who is not next- preventive suspension. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the CA ordered the immediate reinstatement of

Bungbung together with the payment of his salaries. The
PPA appeals this decisions and argues that the 90 day
preventive period of suspension had been interrupted by
the filing of the several injunctions and hence could not
have been completed, therefore the payment of wages
and back salaries is premature.
WON there was an interruption in the 90 day
suspension period
Yes there was. Restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions inhibiting proceedings in the administrative
case, obtained by the suspended respondents from the
courts of justice interrupt the 90-day period of preventive
suspension and should be excluded in the reckoning of its
permissible duration.
Upon the lapse of the balance of the period of the
preventive suspension, Bungbung shall have the right to
reinstatement but they are not entitled to the payment of
back salaries during the period of their preventive
suspension not exceeding 90 days.
Deloso Vs. Sandiganbayan
Amador Deloso, Governor of Zamboanga was charged
with the violation of the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019) for
having allegedly awarded licenses to operate fish corrals in
the municipal waters of Botolan (at that time, he was the
incumbent Mayor). After due investigation, Deloso was
preventively suspended pursuant to Sec. 13 of RA 3019.
The order however does not indicate the duration Deloso’s
suspension. The Sandiganbayan denied Deloso’s plea on
the ground that its calendar could not accommodate an
earlier date to set trial.
WON Deloso may be suspended indefinitely
No he may not. In the given case, Delos’s term of
Governor is for only 3 years. The order of suspension
does not have a definite period so that Deloso may be
suspended for the rest of his very short term. Considering
that the Sandiganbayan denied his plea for an earlier
setting if the trial, an extended suspension is highly
possible.
The preventive suspension which initially may be justified
becomes unreasonable thus raising a question on due
process. Implicit in the right to suffrage of the people is
the right to the services of the people whom they elected.
Also, even in cases if an acquittal, an indefinite preventive
suspension would already have nullified the elective
officials right to hold office. The preventive suspension
thus becomes a penalty without a finding of guilt.
Sandiganbayan’s order of preventive suspension without a
definite period is struck down. Deloso’s suspension should
be limited to 90 days under Sec. 42 of PD 807 (The Civil
Service Decree)
WON under Sec. 13 of RA 3019, an official can only
be preventively suspended with regard to the office
he was still holding at the time of the charge
Deloso contends that as the acts complained of were done
while he was still a Mayor, he could no longer be
prevented from discharging his functions as governor.
The Supreme Court however maintained that the provision
on preventive suspension applies to any office that the
PUBOF A2007
Page 21 of 45
officer charged maybe holding, and not only the particular
office under which he was charged.
Bautista Vs. Peralta
Bautista was administratively charged with dishonesty and
violation of office regulation in the course of his
employment at the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority. He was consequently preventively suspended
pending the resolution of the administrative investigation.
After 5 years of preventive suspension, Bautista was
thereafter found guilty of the offense charged and was
dismissed from the NWSA. After successfully appealing
his case, Bautista was reinstated to his position but he
was not given back wages during the 5 years that he was
suspended.
WON Bautista is entitled to back wages during his
preventive suspension
Yes he is. Preventive suspension in administrative cases
is not a penalty in itself. It is designed merely as a
measure of precaution so that the employee who is
charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the
scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being
investigated.
Denying Bautista his back wages would in effect increase
the 2 months of suspension meted out to him and convert
the preventive suspension into a penalty in itself.
Lastimosa Vs. Vasquez
An administrative complaint for grave misconduct,
insubordination, gross neglect of duty was filed against
Gloria Lastimosa, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Cebu. Despite the Ombudsman’s order to set the case
for preliminary investigation, Lastimosa refused the
directive and was subsequently placed under preventice
suspension. Lastimosa questions the validity of the
suspension order as there was no prior notice or hearing
that was communicated to her. Lastimosa also maintains
among others that the Office of the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the
crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a
public office.
WON the Office of the Ombudsman has power to call
on the provincial prosecutor to assist it in the
prosecution of the case
Yes it does. The power of the Ombudsman has been held
to include investigation and prosecution of any crime
committed by a public official regardless of whether the
acts or omissions complained of are related to, or
connected with, or arise from the performance of his
official duty. It is enough that the act was committed by a
public official.
WON Lastimosa is entitled to notice and hearing
No she is not. Suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. Being a mere preliminary
step and not being a penalty, prior notice and hearing is
not required. (citing Nera v. Garcia).
WON Lastimosa should be suspended for only 90
days

Lastimosa claims that her preventive suspension of 6
months is over and beyond the period provided by law.
The Supreme Court however held that the 90-days cap
applies only to cases where the law is either silent or
expressly limits the period of suspension to 90 days. In
the given case, Lastimosa was preventively suspended
under Sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically
provides for a duration of “not more than 6 months”.
Garcia Vs. Mojica
A complaint was filed against Mayor Garcia and 8 other
city officials of Cebu City for the alleged anomalous
purchase of asphalt from F.E. Zuellig. The Ofc of the
Ombudsman issued an order placing the said officials
under preventive suspension without pay for a maximum
period of 6 months. The said contracts were entered into
four days before the local election. Garcia was reelected
as Mayor.
WON the Deputy Ombudsman committed GAD when
he set the period of preventive suspension at 6
months.
YES. Under Sec. 74 of LGC, preventive suspension may
be imposed when, among other factors, the evidence of
guilt is strong and the period must not exceed 6 months.
The determination of WON the evidence of guilt is strong
rests with the Ombudsman. In this case, the imposition of
the 6 month suspension is unwarranted because the
purpose for the suspension, which was to enable the
investigating authority to gather documents without
intervention from Garcia, was already achieved during the
nearly month-long suspension of Garcia.
WON a public official maybe suspended before the
issues are joined.
YES. Administrative complaints filed before the
Ombudsman are distinct from those initiated under the
LGC. There is nothing in the LGC that would indicate that
it has repealed, expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. There could be
preventive suspension even before the charges against
the official are heard, or before the official is given an
opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive
suspension is merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation.
PUBOF A2007
Page 22 of 45
forwarded to the Governor with a request for prompt
action. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to
the Governor that Mayor be preventively suspended for 45
days pending the investigation of the administrative
complaint. Mayor was placed under preventive
suspension. So Mayor filed “Petition for Certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order
before the RTC. RTC judge issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Gov from implementing the Order of
suspension.
WON the Governor has the power to suspend Mayor.
YES.Citing Sec. 63, Chap IV of the LGC, the provincial
governor is authorize by law to preventively suspend the
municipal mayor at anytime after the issues had been
joined and any of the following grounds were shown to
exist:
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained
of;
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.
The Mayor’s recourse to the RTC is premature for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. He should have
sought relief first from the Sec of DILG. As a general rule,
the office or body that is invested with the power of
removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the
necessity and sufficiency of the cause. Unless a flagrant
abuse of the exercise of that power is shown, public policy
and a becoming regard for the principle of separation of
powers demand that the action of said officer or body
should be left undisturbed.
2. Civil Service, Right to Self
Organization,
ART III, Sec. 8
The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.

WON the Ombudsman can hold Garcia

administratively liable considering that the latter
was reelected?

NO. A reelected local official may not be held

administratively liable for acts committed during his prior
term of office. Although the deliveries of the asphalt were
made during the second term of Garcia, the contract was
perfected on the date it was signed- 4 days before the
election. Any culpability Garcia may have in signing the
contract became extant on the day that it was signed.

Espiritu Vs. Malgar

A complaint was filed against Mayor Malgar for, among

others, grave misconduct, oppression and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the public service before
the DILG Secretary. Another complaint was filed with the
Presidential Action Center, Ofc of the Pres. This was

MPSTA Vs. Laguio
Some 800 public school teachers held mass-concerted
action to press for, among others, the immediate payt of
their chalk, clothing allowances and 13th month pay. DECS
Sec. issued an order directing them to return to work
within 24 hours or face dismissal. However, the teachers
did not heed the Sec’s call so the latter filed administrative
complaints against the former.
Held: The teachers’ resort to the SC for prohibition is
premature. Their remedy is not to halt the administrative
proceedings but to take part, assert and vindicate their
rights therein and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the CSC; or
if pending said proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial
authority was believed necessary because the Sec acted
with grave abuse or in excess of his jurisdiction, to apply,
not directly to the SC, but rather to ht RTC, where there
would be an opportunity to prove relevant facts
warranting corrective relief.
SSSEA Vs. CA
WON employees of the SSS have the right to strike.
NO. The Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize. But it is silent as to whether such
recognition includes the right to strike. EO 180 provides
that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the govt service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress. Memo Circ No. 6 s. 1987 if the Civil Service
Commission enjoins all govt officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations and other forms of mass
actions. SSS employees are covered by the Civil Service
Laws; hence, this prohibition applies to them too.
But the employees may negotiate where the terms and
conditions of employment involved are not among those
fixed by law. They may, thru their unions, either petition
the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of their employment, which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those that
are not fixed by law.
TUP Vs. NHA
Trade Union of the Phils and Allied Services filed a petition
for the conduct of a certification election to determine the
exclusive bargaining agent of the workers in Natl Housing
Corp. This was dismissed by the med-arbiter. On appeal,
this was reversed by the BLR Director. But, this order was
set aside by the Officer in charge.
WON the employees of NHC have the right to self-
organization.
Yes. The right to form unions is explicitly recognized and
granted to both the govtl and private sectors. This is
enshrined in the Bill of Rights as well as in the 2 nd
paragraph of Sec.3 ART XIII on Social Justice and Human
Rights and in Paragraph 5 Sec. 2 ART IX-B of the
Constitution. Moreover, under the present Constitution,
the civil service now covers only GOCCs with original
charters and not those incorporated under the Corporation
Code. NHC, being a GOCC without an original charter, is
governed by the Labor Code. Under Art 244 of the Labor
Code, employees of govt corps established under the
Corpo Code shall have the right to organize and bargain
PUBOF A2007
Page 23 of 45
collectively with their respective employers. All other
employees in the civil service shall have the right to form
associations for purposes not contrary to law.
In so far as certification elections are concerned, the
distinction between the two types of GOCCs and the laws
governing employment relations therein have been
rendered academic by the 1987 Constitution and the
Labor Code. Whether the employees of NHC are covered
by the Labor Code or by the civil service laws, a
certification election may be conducted.
V. SCOPE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS
A. Duration
B. Where exercised
C. How exercised
D. Types of Duties
Discretionary
Lamb Vs. Phipps
Held: Discretion maybe defined as the act or the liberty to
decide, according to the principles of justice and one’s
ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances,
without willfulness or favor. When applied to public
functionaries, discretion means a power or right conferred
upon them by law, of acting officially, under certain
circumstances, according to the dictates of their own
judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment
or conscience of others.
Ministerial
Binamira Vs. Garrucho
Binamira was designated Gen Mgr of the Phil Tourism
Authority by Gonzales, the Minister of Tourism and
Chairman of the PTA Board. Almost 4 years since his
designation, the new Secretary of Tourism, Garrucho,
demanded Binamira’s resignation. Pres. Aquino designated
Garrucho as GM since the designation of Binamira was
invalid because PD 564 requires that designation shall be
made by the President and not by the Secretary. Binamira
claimed security of tenure.
WON Binamira’s designation by the Minister of
Tourism was valid.
NO.PD 564 provides that the GM of the PTA shall be
appointed by the President. There is a difference between
appointment and designation. Appointment is the
selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. On the other hand, designation connotes merely
the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion,
which because of its nature, cannot be delegated. Hence,
it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume that
discretion as an alter ego of the President.
Assuming arguendo that the power conferred on the
President could be validly exercised by the Secretary

(doctrine of qualified political agency?), such doctrine does
not apply in this case. The doctrine presumes the acts of
the Department Head to be the acts of the President when
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business and such acts are valid only if not disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive. In this case, the act of
Minister Gonzales were reprobated by the President upon
the latter’s designation of Garrucho as GM of the PTA.
Lamb Vs. Philipps
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment,
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him
the right to decide or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
VI. SALARY AND BENEFITS
A. Definitions
i. Salary
ii. Wage
GSIS Vs. CSC, supra
B. Right to Compensation
C. Restrictions on Compensation
D. Honoraria and per Diems, Se. 267
and 268, COA Gov’t Auditing Rules
and Regulations
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Page 24 of 45
Santiago Vs. COA
Santiago was employed in the COA as State Auditor IV
with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. He was later
designated s Asst GM for Finance and Administration of
the MIAA. The salary for such position was P13,068.00.
MIAA issued a resolution stating among others, that
Santiago’s compensation from MIAA shall be the difference
between the salary of Asst GM of MIAA and that of State
Auditor IV of the COA. When Santiago retired from govt
service, COA paid his retirement benefits on the basis of
his monthly salary as State Auditor IV. Sol Gen argued
that additional compensation received by Santiago was
merely an honorarium and not a salary, such that if it’s a
mere honorarium it should not be included in the
computation of the retirement benefits under Sec. 9 of EO
966.
WON the retirement benefits shall be computed on
the basis of his salary as State Auditor IV.
No. Honorarium is defined as something given not as a
matter of obligation but in appreciation for services
rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services
that admit of no compensation in money. The additional
compensation given to Santiago was in the nature of a
salary because it was received by him as a matter of right
in recompense for his services rendered as Acting Asst
GM.
As to the argument that Santiago was merely designated
and not appointed as Asst GM, the SC ruled that in Sec. 9
of EO 966, the term “appointment” was used in a general
sense to include “designation.” This interpretation is
reasonable considering that the provision includes in the
highest salary rate “compensation for substitutionary
services or in an acting capacity.” Such would not always
need a permanent appointment. It cannot be said that his
second office is merely an extension of his job as State
Auditor IV because the former was distinct and separate
from the latter. For such additional services, he was
entitled to additional compensation, which should be
included in the highest basic salary rate for purposes of
computing his retirement benefits.
E. Other Benefits, Cruz p. 152-155
F. Retirement, Cruz, p. 156-159
i. GSIS
1. compulsory
2. optional
Cena Vs. CSC
Issue: May a govt employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has
rendered 11 yrs, 9 mos and 6 days of govt service, be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15 year
service reqt to enable him to retire with the benefits of an
old-age pension under the Revised GSIS Act?
Held: Yes. The powers granted to the CSC by the
Administrative Code of 1987 do not vest upon it the
authority to limit to only 1 year the extension of service of
an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service,
when said limitation has no relation to or connection with
the provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect.
Also a general law such as the Admin Code cannot modify
or alter a specific law such as the Revised GSIS Act,

otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on
retirement and pension of the said ACT would be rendered
nugatory. It should be noted that under the GSIS Act, if
the employee has less than 15 years of service, he shall
be allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15
years.
ii. Local Government
Officials, Civil Code Art
32, RA 7160 Sec. 340;
342
iii. Ministerial Officers
iv. Liability for Acts of
Subordinates
v. Remedies
G. Rights and Privileges
VII. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL
RELATIONS
Modes
1. Expiration of Term
Paredes Vs. Abad
Held: Sec. 9 Art XVII of the transitory provision of the
1973 Constitution made indefinite the 4 year term of
elective provincial, city and municipal officials as it
provided for a hold-over. Such that those who were duly
elected shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
law or decreed by the President. They hold their offices
under the term to which they have been elected, although
the same is now indefinite.
A term of ofc is different from the right to hold ofc. A
“term” of ofc is the period during which an elected officer
or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions
and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. On the other
hand, a “right” to hold ofc is the just and legal claim to
hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the ofc.
Nueno Vs. Angeles
Manila was still under the Japanese occupation so the
general election to elect the Members of the Municipal
Board of the city was not held as mandated by the
Constitution. The President of the Commonwealth
appointed Angeles et al and 4 of those elected in the
previous election as members of the Board. Nueno et al
alleged that since they were elected in the last elections,
their term did not yet expire because they were not able
to serve their term completely due to the Japanese
occupation.
WON Nueno et al are entitled to hold-over as mems
of the Municipal Bd notwithstanding the expiration
of their term of office.
No. Term of office must be distinguished from tenure.
Term refers to the time during which the officer may claim
to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which several incumbents shall succeed another. Tenure
PUBOF A2007
Page 25 of 45
refers to the term during which the incumbent actually
hold the office. The term of office is not affected by the
hold-over. Since their term expired in 1943, their ofc
became vacant. Until the elections be held, under CA No.
357, the President has the power to fill the temporary
vacancies.
Lecaroz Vs. Sandiganbayan
Lenlie Lecaroz was the outgoing chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay . However, in the 1985 elections, he
did not run as he was already overage, and Jowil Red won.
Red was then appointed by Pres Marcos as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz. However, he was not
allowed to sit in the Sanggunian by Mayor Lecaroz.
WON Lecaroz can hold on to the ofc after the
expiration of his term.
Yes. When applied to a public officer, the concept of hold-
over implies that the office has a fixed term and the
incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. The law
usually provides that a person appointed for a fixed term
shall remain in ofc not only for that term but until their
successors have been elected and qualified. And where
this provision is found, the ofc does not become vacant
upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor
elected and qualified to assume it.
Although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian
member can continue to occupy his post after the
expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify,
it does not say that he is proscribed from holding over.
The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be
clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative
enactment, otherwise, it is reasonable to assume that the
law-making body favors the same.
Since Red never qualified for the post due to his invalid
oath taking, Lecaroz remained KB rep to the Sanggunian,
albeit in a carry-over capacity, and was a de jure officer
entitled to receive the salaries and all of the emoluments
appertaining to the position.
2. Resignation
Estrada Vs. Desierto
WON Erap resigned as President of RP.
Yes he did. Resignation is a factual question and its
elements are:
1. there must be an intent to resign; and
2. the intent must be coupled with acts of
relinquishment
There is no form governing the validity of a resignation.
As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
Using the totality test – totality of prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue- the SC held that Erap
resigned as Pres. This was shown in the following acts:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of GMA as pres of
RP;

2. He emphasized that he was leaving the Palace for the
sake of peace and in order to start the healing
process of the nation;
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them;
4. he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service
of our country; and he called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity.
Ortiz Vs. Comelec
Ortiz was appointed commissioner of the COMELEC by
Pres. Marcos. Together with 2 other commissioners, they
sent a letter to Pres. Aquino saying that they are placing
their position at her disposal. Aquino accepted their
resignation. However, COMELEC ruled that that they are
not entitled to retirement benefits because they resigned
from their position.
WON Ortiz resigned.
No. Ortiz’s separation from govt service as a result of the
reorganization ordained by the Aquino administration may
not be considered ‘resignation’ in contemplation of law.
Resignation is the act of giving up or the act of an officer
by which he declines his office and renounces the further
right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act
of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear
intention to relinquish or surrender his position
accompanied by the act of relinquishment.
A courtesy resignation cannot be properly interpreted as
resignation in the legal sense because it is not necessarily
a reflection of a public official’s intention to surrender his
position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of
the political authority and the appointing power. Hence, a
stringent interpretation of courtesy resignation must be
observed, particularly in cases involving constitutional
officials.
Ortiz’s case should be placed in the same category as one
holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends
upon his superior’s loss of confidence in him.
3. Abandonment
Floresca Vs. Quetulio
Floresca is not entitled to his previous position as pre-war
justice because he has abandoned it when he refused to
assume the said post after being required by the proper
authorities to do so. Also, he subsequently accepted other
employments. In his application submitted to the
committee in charge of passing upon government
positions in Ilocos Norte, he made it clear that he wanted
to be appointed to any position other than that of the
justice of peace. To reinstate him in his previous position
would be to allow a govt official to subordinate public
interest to personal comfort and convenience.
City of Manila Vs. Subido
Mayor Villegas submitted to the Commissioner of Civil
Service about 500 appointments of for Manila. But Subido
refused to take action saying that Villegas is no longer
Mayor as he assumed the position of Director for
PUBOF A2007
Page 26 of 45
NAWASA.
WON Villegas abandoned his position as Mayor upon
joining the NAWASA Board.
No. Villegas did not abandon his post as Mayor as he was
merely designated as Acting Director of NAWASA. Also,
Subido has no authority to indirectly oust an incumbent
official by refusing to approve any appointment extended
by the latter. The law provides that an official may be
ousted by the filing of a quo warranto proceeding by the
Sol Gen or by the party who claims to be entitled to the
office.
Santiago Vs. Agustin
Santiago was an elected member and the President of the
Municipal Bd of the City of Manila. He was appointed as
Acting Mayor by the Gov Gen. However, his appointment
was not confirmed by the Phil Senate. So he reassumed
the office of member of the Municipal Bd. But a
preliminary injunction was issued restraining him from
discharging the duties of the said ofc. In the meantime,
Agustin was appointed by the Gov Gen to Santiago’s ofc.
WON Santiago’s position was vacant
No. A public ofc may become vacant by abandonment. To
constitute as such, the abandonment must be total, and
under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an
absolute relinquishment. Temporary absence is not
sufficient.
In the case at bar, Santiago did not abandon his ofc as he
never took the oath of ofc as City Mayor. In fact, he
indicated to the Municipal bd his intention to fill the new
ofc temporarily and then return to his position as member
of the Bd.
4. Acceptance of Incompatible Office
Canonizado Vs. Aguirre
Canonizado was a commissioner of the National Police
Commission. But due Sec. 8 of RA 8551, he was removed
from office. Subsequently, the SC declared the said
provision as unconstitutional for being violative of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
During the pendency of the case, Canonizado was
appointed as Inspector General of the Internal Affairs
Service of the PNP. By accepting the said position Exec.
Sec. Aguirre contend that Canonizado is deemed to have
abandoned his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM
since the offices of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and that as
Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible.
Held: Abandonment of an office is the voluntary
relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the
intention of terminating his possession and control
thereof. To constitute as abandonment, two requisites
must be met: 1) an intention to abandon; and 2) an overt
or external act by which the intention is carried into effect.
A person holding a public office may abandon such office
by non-user or acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect
to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. But
nonperformance of the duties of an office does not
constitute abandonment where such nonperformance

results from temporary disability or from involuntary
failure to perform. On the other hand, acquiescence refers
to the agreement of the officer in his wrongful removal or
discharge. But, where there is no willfull desire or
intention to abandon the office, the public officer vacates
it in deference to the requirements of a statute which is
later declared to be unconstitutional, such a surrender will
not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may
recover the office. In this case, Canonizado was
compelled to vacate his office on the strength of Sec. 8 of
RA 8551.
Canonizado’s acceptance of the second position did not
result in the abandonment of his claim to reinstatement to
the NAPOLCOM. The incompatibility rule states that he
who, while occupying one office, accepts another
incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first
office and his title is thereby terminated without any other
act or proceeding. The incompatibility contemplated is not
the mere physical impossibility in the performance of
duties of the two offices, but that which proceeds from the
nature and relations of the two positions to each other as
to give rise to contrariety and antagonism should one
person attempt to faithfully and impartially discharge the
duties of one toward the incumbent of the other. This does
not apply in this case because at no point did Canonizado
discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously.
Zandueta Vs. Dela Costa
Zandueta was presiding over the 5th Branch of CFI Manila
by virtue of the appointment issued to him on June 2,
1936. On Sept 8, he received a new ad interim
appointment issued in accordance with CA 145 to
discharge the ofc of judge of CFI with authority to preside
over the 5th branch of CFI Mla and CFI Palawan.
WON Zandueta abandoned his first appointment
when he accepted his second appointment.
Yes. The territory over which Zandueta could exercise
jurisdiction is wider in his second appointment. This
showed the incompatibility between the two
appointments. In accepting this appointment and by
taking the necessary oath and in discharging the duties,
Zandueta abandoned his appointment dated June 2.
The rule of equity provides that when a public official
voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly
created or reorganized by a law, qualifies for the discharge
of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and
enters into the performance of his duties by executing
acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office
and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be
considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying
by virtue of his former appointment.
By accepting his second appointment, he is estopped from
questioning the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which he has been appointed.
5. Removal
Ingles Vs. Mutuc
Ingles et al, who are civil service eligibles, received a
communication from Exec. Sec. Mutuc advising them that
their services with the Govt are terminated.
PUBOF A2007
Page 27 of 45
Held: The positions of Ingles et al (as secretaries in the
President’s Private Ofc) do not indicate that they their
positions are “primarily confidential” in nature. The
compensation attached and the designation given suggest
the purely, or, at least, mainly clerical nature of their
work. The burden of proof to show that the position of
Ingles et al belong to positions which are policy
determining, primarily confidential and highly technical
rests with the defendant.
The incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds
office at the pleasure of the appointing power. So when
such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not
“removed” or “dismissed” from office, but rather, his
“term” merely “expires.”
Lacson Vs. Romero
Lacson was appointed as provincial Fiscal of Negros
Oriental. Subsequently, he was appointed as provincial
fiscal of Tarlac while Romero was appointed as fiscal of
Neg. Or. But, Lacson neither accepted nor assumed the
office of fiscal of Tarlac.
WON Lacson is entitled to his position as Provincial
Fiscal of Neg. Or.
Yes. For the appointment as fiscal to be complete, the
following reqts must concur: a) nomination by the Pres.;
b) confirmation by the CA; and c) acceptance of the
appointee by his assumption to the office. Since Lacson
did not accept the post as fiscal of Tarlac, he continues as
fiscal of Neg. Or. and no vacancy in the said position was
created by his nomination and confirmation as fiscal of
Tarlac.
The position of a provincial fiscal is included in the Civil
Service. Hence, he could not be removed except for a just
cause. His transfer to Tarlac was equivalent to his removal
as fiscal of Neg. Or, and such removal was illegal and
unlawful for lack of valid cause as provided by law and the
Constitution.
Cruz Vs. Navarro
Rodriguez was exonerated from the administrative cases
filed against him and the SC has ordered his
reinstatement to his previous position. Despite of this
order, the Sec. of Health issued an order relieving
Rodriguez of his position as Chief of the National Mental
Hospital, and reassigning him on temporary detail to the
Bureau of Medical Services.
Held: Although the general rule is that, public officials
maybe temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties
even over his objection without necessarily violating his
fundamental and legal rights to security of tenure in the
civil service for the good of public service and whenever
public interest demands. But such cannot be undertaken
when the transfer of the employee is with a view to his
removal and if the transfer is resorted to as a scheme to
lure the employee away from his permanent position
because such attitude is improper as it would in effect
result in a circumvention of the prohibition which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the
civil service.
Cuevas Vs. Bacal

Bacal holds the rank of CESO III and was appointed to the
position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s
Ofc, which has a CES Rank Level I. She was subsequently
transferred to the Ofc of the Regional Director of the PAO
without her consent.
Held: Bacal’s appointment to the position of Chielf Public
Attorney cannot be considered permanent because she
does not have the rank appropriate for such position. A
permanent appointment can be issued only to a person
who meets all the reqts for the position to which she is
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.
Also, appointments, assignments, reassignments, and
transfers in the Career Executive Service are based on
rank. Hence, security of tenure in the career executive
service is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to
position. Within the Career Executive Service, personnel
can be shifted from one office or position to another
without violation of their right to security of tenure
because their status and salaries are based on their ranks
and not on their jobs. In this case, Bacal did not acquire
security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed
to the higher position of Chief Public Atty since she was
not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I.
6. Impeachment
7. Forfeiture
Perez Vs. Provincial Board
Perez was nominated twice to the position of provincial
fiscal of Nueva Ecija and his confirmation was bypassed
twice too. Still he took his oath of office pursuant to his
first appointment. The Provincial Bd passed a resolution
ordering the Provincial Treasurer to stop the payment of
his salaries as acting provincial fiscal.
The issue of whether or not the Provincial Bd has the
power to enact a Resolution not recognizing Perez’s
assumption to office as acting provincial fiscal was
rendered moot and academic when Perez filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of the mayor in the
local elections. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy
constitutes forfeiture of his right to the controverted office
under Sec. 29 of the Election Code of 1978.
PNOC Vs. NLRC
While holding the position as Geothermal Construction
Secretary, Pineda filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of councilor of the Municipality of Kananga.
Although he was elected and assumed office as councilor,
he continued working for PNOC-EDC. Eventually, PNOC-
EDC terminated his employment. So, Pineda filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
WON an employee in a GOCC without an original
charter falls within the scope of Sec. 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Yes. In the review of the Omnibus Election Code, Congress
did not distinguish between the two classes of GOCCs-
whether incorporated under an original charter or a
general law- as regards the rule that any employee in
GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. The SC held
PUBOF A2007
Page 28 of 45
that a GOCC does not lose its character as such on the
basis of how it was created, and that its employees, even
if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor Code,
are nonetheless “employees in GOCCs,” and come within
the ambit of Sec. 66 of the OEC, declaring them ipso facto
resigned from office upon filing of their cert of candidacy.
Hence, Sec. 66 of the OEC constitutes just cause for the
termination of employment in addition to those set forth in
the Labor Code.
8. Recall, Const. Art. X, Sec. 3; RA
7160 Secs. 69-75
Garcia Vs. COMELEC
Some mayors, vice mayors and members of the 12
municipalities of the province of Bataan constituted
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate
the recall election of Governor Garcia. A resolution was
passed for the recall of Garcia on the ground of loss of
confidence. Garcia filed before the COMELEC a petition to
deny due course to the said resolution alleging that it
failed to comply with the substantive and procedural
requirements. This was dismissed by the COMELEC and a
recall election was scheduled thereafter. Garcia filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC
alleging that Sec 70 of the Local Govt Code is
unconstitutional because the people have the sole right
WON to initiate recall proceedings and that it violated the
right of elected local officials to equal protection of law.
Held: There are two reasons why the alternative mode of
initiating the recall process thru an assembly was
adopted: 1) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall
thru the direct action of the people; and 2) to cut down on
its expenses.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that the
people have the “sole and exclusive” right to decide on
whether to initiate a recall proceeding. On the contrary,
the Constitution mandates that Congress enact a local
govt code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local govt structure through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum. Pursuant to this mandate,
Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of
initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode
of initiation by direct action of the people.
PRAC is initiation by the people, albeit indirectly. The
people can act thru their representatives. Also, the PRA
resolution of recall merely starts the whole process.
The equal protection clause is not violated as the
composition of the PRA is politically neutral. Its
membership is not apportioned to political parties. It
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned.
Also, the only ground to recall a locally elected public
official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of
the PRAC are representatives of the people and as such,
loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences
in political party affiliations.
9. Abolition

De la Llana Vs. Alba
Dela Llana et al (judges) questioned the validity of BP
129. Said law mandated that justices and judges of
inferior courts from the CA to municipal circuit courts,
unless appointed to the inferior courts established by
BP129, would be considered separated from the judiciary.
Held: The abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. So that the abolition of an office would not
amount to illegal removal of the incumbent, the abolition
must be done in good faith.
Dario Vs. Mison
Pursuant to the executive orders and directives issued by
the President on the reorganization of various government
offices, Mison, as Commr of Customs, issued a Memo
containing guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders. He also constituted a
Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating
appeals from removals under the said Memo. He then
issued notices to various customs officials terminating
their services and that they are performing their functions
on a hold-over capacity. 394 officials and employees of
the BOC were given individual notices of separation. The
CSC promulgated a ruling ordering the reinstatement of
the 279 employees who appealed before it.
Held: Mison’s reorganization of the BOC was invalid. The
SC made a distinction between removals from separations
arising from abolition of office not by virtue of the
Constitution as a result of the reorganization carried out
by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of
functions and removals undertaken to comply with clear
and explicit constitutional mandates. In the former, the
government must prove GOOD FAITH, while in the latter,
the govt is not hard put to prove anything simply because
the Constitution allows it.
PUBOF A2007
Page 29 of 45
office is pending before the SC, the SC set aside his
conviction in the criminal cases. The subject of the
Criminal Cases are the very same acts for which Larin is
held to be administratively liable.
Held: The position of Asst Commr of the BIR is part of the
Career Executive Service. Under the law, Career Executive
Service officers are appointed by the President and as
such, they are under the direct disciplining authority of the
President. This power of removal is not absolute. Under
the Admin Code of 1987, career service is characterized
by security of tenure, as distinguished from non-career
service whose tenure is coterminus with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited
to a period specified by law or to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose the employment was
made.
Although administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission, the acquittal
of Larin in the criminal case necessarily carries with it the
dismissal of the administrative action against him because
of the categorical and clear finding of the Court that the
acts for which he was administratively held liable are not
unlawful and irregular.
Mendoza Vs. Quisumbing
Held: Any reorganization in Govt must follow the bona-
fide rule. The executive implementers of the policy of
reorganization required to abide by the intent and purpose
stated in the grant of power and to follow the guidelines
set out for them.
The reorganizations embodied in this consolidated petition
were set aside because the heads of the departments and
agencies concerned have chosen to rely on their own
concepts of unlimited discretion and progressive ideas on
reorganization.

Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the

purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In this case, there is no dismissal or separation
because the position itself ceases to exist. But if the
abolition is nothing else but a separation or removal done
for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of
tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition
take place and whatever “abolition” is done is VOID AB
INITIO.

In this case, good faith was belied by the fact that Mison
replaced the 394 Customs personnel with 522 employees.

Larin Vs. Exec Sec.

The Sandiganbayan convicted Larin, then Asst

Commissioner of the BIR and his co-accused for violations
of the Tax Code. An Executive Committee was created to
investigate the administrative charge against Larin.
Meanwhile, Pres. Ramos issued EO 132, streamlining the
BIR. The Specific Tax Service, where Larin was the Asst
Commr, was abolished by the said executive order.
Thereafter, Larin was found guilty of grave misconduct in
the administrative charge and was imposed the penalty of
dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement
benefits. While the petition questioning his removal from
 PUBOF A2007
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SLIDES FROM PROF. AVILA’s LECTURE

Casting and Counting

Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)

The primary function of the BEI for each precinct is
to conduct the voting and counting of votes
in their respective polling places.

Composition (§ 13, R.A. No. 6646)

1. Chairman - public school teacher

2. Member - public school teacher

3. Poll Clerk - public school teacher

Composition (§ 2, R.A. No. 8436)

For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections,

there shall be special members composed of:

a 4th member in each precinct; and,

a Comelec representative who is authorized to
operate the counting machine.

Both shall conduct the counting and recording of

votes of the national ballots in the designated
counting centers.

Disqualification (§ 167, BP Blg. 881)

Relationship - No person shall serve as chairman or

member of the BEI if he is related within the
4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity:

to any member of the BEI; or,

to any candidate to be voted for in the polling

place or his spouse.

CASTING OF VOTES

Voting hours?
7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., except when there are
voters present within 30 meters in front of
the polling place who have not yet cast their
votes

The voting shall continue but only to allow said

voters to cast their votes without interruption
(§ 190, B.P. Blg. 881).

Voter verifies if his name is on the list

Chairman delivers the ballot
Voter chooses from the list of candidates
Voter secretly fills his ballot
Voter fills his ballot
Chairman detaches the coupon then deposits the
folded ballot in the compartment for valid
ballots

Persons allowed in and around the polling place
Members of the BEI
Watchers
Comelec representatives
Voters casting their votes
Voters waiting for their turn to get inside the booths
Voters waiting for their turn to cast their votes
whose number shall not exceed 20 at any
one time (§ 192, B.P. Blg. 881).
Persons not allowed to enter or stay inside the
polling place?
Any officer or member of the AFP and PNP
Any person belonging to any extra-legal police
agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike
forces, home defense units, barangay tanod,
or other similar forces or para-military forces,
including special forces, security guards,
special policeman, and all other kinds of
armed or unarmed extra-legal police officers
Any barangay official except to vote or when
serving as a watcher or member of the BEI (§
192, B.P. Blg. 881).
Under the Manual System, how does a voter fill his
ballot?
By writing in the proper space for each office the
name of the individual candidate for whom he
desires to vote (§ 195, B.P. Blg. 881).
Manual System – Official Ballot
Manual System – Official Ballot
Under the Automated Election System, how does a
voter fill his ballot?
By completely blackening the oval before the
candidate name of his choice.
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Automated System – Proposed Official Ballot
Procedure for challenging an illegal voter?
PUBOF A2007
Page 31 of 45
1. Any voter, or watcher may challenge any
person offering to vote:
for not being registered;
for using the name of another; or,
for suffering from existing disqualification.
2. The BEI shall satisfy itself as to whether or not
the ground for the challenge is true by
requiring proof of registration or the identity of
the voter (§ 199, B.P. Blg. 881).
3. The voter’s failure or inability to produce his
voter's affidavit upon being challenged, shall
not preclude him from voting if:
his identity be shown from the photograph,
fingerprints, or specimen signatures in his
approved application in the book of voters;
or,
he is identified under oath by a member of the BEI
and such identification shall be reflected in
the minutes of the BEI (§ 199, B.P. Blg.
881).
Book of Voters
Book of Voters
Is there a required “record of challenges”?
Yes.
The poll clerk shall keep a prescribed record of
challenges and oaths taken in connection
therewith and the resolution of the BEI in
each case and, upon the termination of the
voting, shall certify that it contains all the
challenges made (§ 202, B.P. Blg. 881).
Is there a prohibition on premature announcement
of voting?
Yes. No member of the BEI shall, before the
termination of the voting, make any
announcement as to:
whether a certain registered voter has already
voted or not
how many have voted or how many so far have
failed to vote
any other fact tending to show or showing the state
of the polls
 how a person voted, except as witness
before a court (§ 205, B.P. Blg. 881).
 PUBOF A2007
Page 32 of 45
Counting – Manner of Counting
COUNTING OF VOTES (§ 210, BP Blg. 881)
1. Unfold the ballots and form separate piles of 100
1. Opening of the ballot box ballots each
2. Removal of excess ballots
3. Removal of marked ballots 2. BEI chairman - takes the ballots of the first pile
4. Reading and Recording one by one and READS the names of
5. Alteration and Correction in the ERs candidates voted for and the offices for which
6. Announcement of the result they were voted
7. Issuance of Certificate of Votes
8. Delivery of the ballot boxes The watcher should be able to read the names and
Election Return see to it that the chairman reads the vote as
Election Return written on the ballot.
Election Return
Clear the table of all unnecessary writing
What are the so-called “rules for the appreciation of paraphernalia!
ballots”?
3. Poll clerk - records on the ER each vote as the
These are the rules enumerated under § 211 of B.P. names are read
Blg. 881 that should be observed by the BEI
in the reading of the ballots. 4. Third member – on the Tally Board

Under these rules, it is presumed that every ballot
is valid unless there is clear and good reason
to justify its rejection since the object of the
election is to obtain the expression of the
voter's will.
What are some examples of these rules?
1. If there are 2 or more candidates with the
same full name, first name or surname and one
of them is the incumbent, and on the ballot is
written only such full name, first name or
surname, the vote shall be counted in favor of
the incumbent (No. 2, § 211 of B.P. Blg. 881).
5. BEI chairman - signs and affixes his thumbmark
at the back of the ballot immediately after it
is counted
Check the recording of the votes on the ELECTION
RETURN and the Tally Board.
See to it that the same are correctly accomplished.
After finishing the first pile of 100 ballots:
1. BEI determines the total number of votes
recorded for each candidate

2. When on the ballot is written a single word
which is the first name of a candidate and
which is at the same time the surname of his
opponent, the vote shall be counted in favor of
the latter (No. 5, § 211 of B.P. Blg. 881).
3. When in a space in the ballot there appears a
name of a candidate that is erased and another
clearly written, the vote is valid for the latter
(No. 9, § 211 of B.P. Blg. 881).
2. The sum is noted on the Tally Board and on the
Election Return.
“In case of discrepancy such RECOUNT as may be
necessary shall be made”.
Demand for a recount now.
After all the ballots have been read, the BEI shall
sum up the totals recorded for each
candidate.

4. Any ballot written with crayon, lead pencil, or The aggregate sum shall be recorded both on the
in ink, wholly or in part, shall be valid (No. 16, Tally Board and on the Election Return.
§ 211 of B.P. Blg. 881).

5. If the candidates voted for exceed the number More Tips

of those to be elected, the ballot is valid, but
the votes shall be counted only in favor of the Election Returns and Paper Seals have serial
candidates whose names were firstly written by numbers!
the voter within the spaces provided for said Different
office in the ballot until the authorized number Separately printed
is covered (No. 18, § 211 of B.P. Blg. 881).
Ballot boxes and the metal seals have serial
numbers.

Manual System - Election Return


Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Manual System - Election Return
Automated System – Proposed Election
Automated System – Proposed Election
Automated System – Proposed Election
Automated System – Proposed Election
Automated System – Proposed Election
Automated System – Proposed Election
BEI to issue a certificate of the number of votes
received by the candidates (§ 215, B.P. Blg.
881)
PUBOF A2007
Page 33 of 45
Case:
Romualdez vs. RTC (Sept. 14, 1993)
Residency Requirement
Philip Romualdez is the son of Kokoy Romualdez
and a nephew of Imelda Marcos.
1980 – he constructed his house in Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Later, he became the
Barangay Captain.
Return
Return 1986 EDSA Revolution – he “fled” the country and
Return sought “asylum” in the U.S.
Return
Return Dec. 23, 1991 – departed from the U.S. for RP and
Return immediately returned to Barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte.
Feb. 1, 1992 (or after 40 days) – he registered
anew as a voter of Precinct No. 9 of Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte, for the May 11, 1992 elections.

After the announcement of the results of the
election and before leaving the polling place,
it shall be the duty of the BEI to issue a
certificate of the number of the votes
received by a candidate upon request of the
watchers. All the members of the BEI shall
sign the certificate.
His registration as a voter was challenged before
the MTC via a Petition for Exclusion because he
had “just recently” arrived in RP.
In view of the “1 year” and “6 months” residency
requirements, is Romualdez qualified to
register as a voter for the 1992 elections?

Certificate of Votes (§ 16, R.A. 6646)
The certificate of votes shall contain the number of
votes obtained by each candidate written in
words and figures, the number of the
precinct, the name of the city or municipality
and province, the total number of voters who
voted in the precinct and the date and time
issued, and shall be signed and thumbmarked
by each member of the BEI.
Yes because he did not voluntarily abandon his
“residence” in RP nor established his “domicile”
elsewhere.
The term “residence” as used in election law is
synonymous with “domicile”.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return.

The fixed permanent residence or domicile, in the

Certificate of Votes as evidence (§ 17, R.A. 6646)
The certificate of votes shall be admissible in
evidence to prove tampering, alteration,
falsification or any anomaly committed in the
election returns concerned, when duly
authenticated by testimonial or documentary
evidence presented to the BOC by at least 2
members of the BEI who issued the
certificate.
Failure to present any certificate of votes shall be a
bar to the presentation of other evidence to
impugn the authenticity of the election
returns.
case of Romualdez, was established in the early
1980’s to be at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
Residence, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile.
To lose the “old” residence and acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur:
Residence or (actual) bodily presence in the
new locality;
Intention to remain there (animus manendi)
for an indefinite period of time; and,

CONTINUING REGISTRATION OF VOTERS Intention to abandon the old domicile

(animus non revertendi) which should
be voluntary.

Case:
Marcos vs. Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995)
Residency Requirement
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was born in Manila, in
1938 - When she was 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City).
1952 - She went to Manila to work with her cousin,
Daniel Z. Romualdez, in his office in the House
of Representatives.
1954 - She married Congressman Ferdinand E.
Marcos of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter.
1959 - When FM was elected Senator, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter.
1965 - When FM was elected President, they lived
together in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
1978 onwards - She served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila.
February 1986 - She claimed that she and her
family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii.
November 1991 - She came back to Manila.
1992 - She ran for election as President of the
Philippines and filed her COC wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered
voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
January 28, 1995 - She registered as a voter of
Tolosa, Leyte.
March 8, 1995 - She filed her COC for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte.
March 23, 1995 - Congressman Cirilo Roy Montejo,
the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same
position, sought her disqualification on the
ground that she did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency.
May 14, 1995 - the canvassing was completed. The
results:
Marcos - 70,471 votes
Montejo - 36,833 votes
PUBOF A2007
Page 34 of 45
Does Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfy the one (1)
year residency requirement mandated by
Article VI, § 6 of the 1987 Constitution?
Yes, Marcos held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte.
Domicile means an individual's "permanent home",
"a place to which, whenever absent for business
or for pleasure, one intends to return”.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the
factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in
a given area, community or country.
Residence involves the intent to leave when the
purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. If a person's intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established, it is
residence.
It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to
have different residences in various places.
A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another.
A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence.
Absence to pursue studies or practice a profession
or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence. The mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss
or change of domicile.
Registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin not sufficient to
constitute abandonment of such residence.
It finds justification in the natural desire
and longing of every person to return to
his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment… must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for
another.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost.
The Comelec was directed to order the BOC to
proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
 PUBOF A2007
Page 35 of 45
Case: To successfully effect a change of domicile he
must prove
Aquino vs. Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995) an actual removal or an actual change of
Residency Requirement domicile,
a bona fide intention of abandoning the
March 20, 1995 – Butz Aquino filed his COC for former place of residence and
Representative for the new 2nd District of establishing a new one; and
Makati City. definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.
April 24, 1995 - Petition to disqualify Aquino filed
on the ground that he lacked the residence
qualification.

May 8, 1995 - Elections were held with the following

results:
Aquino - 38,547 votes
Agusto Syjuco - 35,910
votes

Aquino must prove that he has established not just

residence but domicile of choice.

Aquino, in his COC for the May 11, 1992 elections,

indicated not only that he was a resident of San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he
was a resident of the same for 52 years
immediately preceding that election.

At that time, his COC stated that he was also a

registered voter of the same district.

From data furnished by Aquino himself to the

Comelec at various times during his political
career, what stands consistently clear and
unassailable is that this domicile of origin of
record up to the time of filing of his most recent
COC for the 1995 elections was Concepcion,
Tarlac.

Aquino’s connection with the 2nd District was

an alleged lease agreement of condominium
unit in the area.

The fact that Aquino himself claims that he has

other residences in Metro Manila coupled
with the short length of time he claims to
be a resident of the condominium unit in
Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile
in Tarlac) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his “physical residence" is not
to acquire new residence or domicile "but
only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of
Makati City."

Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his

domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the
facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is
not easily lost.

These requirements are hardly met by the evidence
adduced by Aquino. In the absence of clear
and positive proof, the domicile of origin is
deemed to continue.
ABSENTEE VOTING
RA No. 9189: The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003
Enacted into law February 10, 2003
The Congress shall provide xxx a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad (§ 2, Art. V, 1987 Constitution).
Overseas absentee voters may vote for?
President
Vice-president
Senators
Party-list representatives
Disqualifications
The following shall be disqualified from voting :
Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship
Those who expressly renounced their Philippine
citizenship and who pedged allegiance to a
foreign country;
Those who convicted in a final judgment of an
offense punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one (1) year, including those who
have committed and been found guilty of
Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Commission
may take cognizance of final judgments
issued by foreign courts or tribunals only
on the basis of reciprocity and subject to
the formalities and processes prescribed by
the Rules of Court on execution of
judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident
recognized as such in the host country,
unless:
he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years
from approval of his/her registration under
this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country.
Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
PUBOF A2007
Page 36 of 45
e) A citizen of the Philippines abroad
declared insane or incompetent by
competent authority in the Philippines or
abroad.
Requirements for Registration
a) A valid Philippine passport or
certification of the DFA that the
applicant submitted documents
sufficient to warrant issuance of a
passport, or is a holder of a valid
passport but cannot produce it for a
valid reason;
b) Accomplished registration form
c) AFFIDAVIT in the case of immigrants
(declaring the intention to resume
actual physical permanent residence
within 3 years)
Registration Procedure
In person
Qualified Filipino citizens may apply for registration
with the Election Registration Board of the
city or municipality where they were
domiciled immediately prior to their
departure from the Philippines, or with the
representative of the Commission at the
Philippine embassies, consulates and other
foreign service establishments that have
jurisdiction over the locality where they
temporarily reside
The registration form shall be transmitted within (5)
days to the Commission, which shall
coordinate with the Election Officer of the
city or municipality of the applicant's stated
residence for verification, hearing and
annotation in the permanent list of voters.
(Sec. 6, RA 9189)
The election officer shall set the app;lication for
hearing
All petitions for exclusion must be filed within 210
days before election day with the court;
court must decide within 15 days on the
basis of documents submitted; if court does
not decide on time, ruling of the election
registration board is deemed affirmed
If disapproved – petition for inclusion within five
days with the court
If approved, Certificate of Registration is
issued
Application to Vote in Absentia
Every qualified citizen of the Philippines
abroad previously registered as a voter
may in every national election, file with
the embassy, consulate or other foreign
service establishment an application to
vote in absentia (11.1).

Application may be done personally or by
mail. (11.2)
Consular and diplomatic services rendered
in connection with the overseas
absentee voting processes shall be
made available at no cost to the
overseas absentee voter Application to
Vote in Absentia. —
The application shall be transmitted by the
embassy, consulate or other foreign
service establishment shall transmit to
the Commission within five (5) days
from receipt.
Requirements for Registration
a) A valid Philippine passport or
certification of the DFA that the
applicant submitted documents
sufficient to warrant issuance of a
passport, or is a holder of a valid
passport but cannot produce it for a
valid reason;
b) Accomplished registration form
c) AFFIDAVIT in the case of immigrants
(declaring the intention to resume
actual physical permanent residence
within 3 years)
How does an absentee voter register?
Every application to vote may be done personally
at, or by mail to, the embassy, consulate or
foreign service establishment, which has
jurisdiction over the country where he/she has
indicated his/her address for purposes of the
elections.
How does an absentee voter vote?
Voting: Personal Appearance
The overseas absentee voter shall personally
accomplish his/her ballot at the embassy or
consulate or at any polling place designated and
accredited by the Comelec.
The overseas absentee voter shall cast his ballot
within 30 days before the day of elections. In
the case of seafarers, they shall cast their
ballots anytime within 60 days before the day of
elections.
Voting: By Mail
For the May, 2004 elections, the Comelec shall
authorize voting by mail in not more than 3
countries (Canada, Japan and United Kingdom
per Comelec Resolution No. 6179 dated May 26,
2003).
Only mailed ballots received by the Philippine
embassy, consulate and other foreign service
establishments before the close of voting on the
day of elections shall be counted.
PUBOF A2007
Page 37 of 45
How are the votes counted and canvassed?
Counting and Canvassing:
The counting and canvassing of votes shall be
conducted on site in the country where the
votes were actually cast.
The Comelec shall ensure that the start of
counting in all polling places abroad shall be
synchronized with the start of counting in
the Philippines.
The Certificates of Canvass and the
accompanying SOVs as transmitted via
facsimile, electronic mail and any other
means of transmission equally safe, secure
and reliable shall be the primary basis for
the national canvass.
Case:
Makalintal vs. Comelec (July 2003)
Absentee Voting
§ 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 provides that the
following shall be disqualified from voting under
this Act:
An immigrant or a permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he executes, upon
registration, an affidavit xxx declaring
that he shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in RP not later
than 3 years from approval of his
registration. Such affidavit shall also
state that he has not applied for
citizenship in another country.
Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant
or permanent resident from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia.
A “green card” holder immigrant to the United
States is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines (Caasi
vs. Court of Appeals, November 8, 1990).
Citing Caasi, Makalintal argued that § 5(d) is
unconstitutional because it violates § 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that
the voter must be a resident in RP for at least 1
year and in the place where he proposes to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding an
election.

Does § 5(d) allowing the registration of voters who
are immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to
the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in § 1 of Article V of the
Constitution?
Supreme Court: NO.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice
versa; a person cannot be at the same time,
both a resident and an absentee. However, an
absentee remains attached to his residence in
the Philippines as residence is considered
synonymous with domicile.
As finally approved into law, § 5(d) specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident
who is “recognized as such in the host country”
because immigration or permanent residence in
another country implies renunciation of one’s
residence in his country of origin.
However, the same Section allows an immigrant
and permanent resident abroad to register as
voter for as long as he executes an affidavit to
show that he has not abandoned his domicile.
The affidavit required in § 5(d) is not only proof
of the intention of the immigrant or
permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit
expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is
not correct to say that the execution of the
affidavit under § 5(d) violates the
Constitution that proscribes “provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote
in a political exercise.”
To repeat, the affidavit is required of
immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host
countries, they are presumed to have
relinquished their intent to return to this
country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine
domicile shall remain.
CONTINUING REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
What is “registration”?
Registration is
the act of accomplishing and filing a sworn
application for registration
by a qualified voter
PUBOF A2007
Page 38 of 45
before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides
and including the same in the book of
registered voters upon approval by the
Election Registration Board (ERB).
Why register?
Registration is an indispensable precondition to the
right of suffrage.
To exercise the right to vote, a citizen is obliged by
law to register under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996.
How does one register prior to the Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996?
On the 7th and 6th Saturdays before a regular
election or on the 2nd Saturday following the
day of the proclamation calling for a new special
election, plebiscite or referendum, any person
desiring to be registered as a voter shall
accomplish in triplicate before the BEI a voter's
affidavit (§ 126, B.P. Blg. 881).
Upon receipt of the voter's affidavit, the BEI shall
examine the data therein. If it finds that the
applicant possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications of a voter, he shall
be registered. Otherwise, he shall not be
registered (§ 129, B.P. Blg. 881).
What is the policy of the State in enacting the
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996?
To systematize the method of registration in order
to establish a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters.
How does one register under the Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996?
Under a system of continuing registration, the
personal filing of application shall be conducted
daily in the office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours.
No registration shall, however, be conducted during
the period starting 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before a special election.
 PUBOF A2007
Page 39 of 45
DATA CAPTURING MACHINES What is the remedy of a person whose application
Continuing Registration of Voters for registration has been disapproved by the
Data Capture Workstation ERB or whose name has been stricken out
from the list of voters?
Continuing Registration of Voters
Digital Photograph File a Petition for Inclusion (§ 34, RA No. 8189)
Continuing Registration of Voters Challenges to Applications for Registration (§ 18,
Digital Signature Card RA No. 8189)

Digital Fingerprints
Continuing Registration of Voters
Digital Signature
Continuing Registration of Voters
Left Thumb
Continuing Registration of Voters
Left Index Finger
Continuing Registration of Voters
Right Thumb
Continuing Registration of Voters
Right Index Finger

What are the penalties for violating the Voter’s

Registration Act of 1996?
Violation of any of the provisions of R.A. No. 8189 is
considered an election offense

Penalties

Imprisonment of not less than 1 year but not more

than 6 years.

Political party - fine of not less than P 100,000 but

not more than P 500,000.

Suffer disqualification to hold public office and

deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Shall not be subject to probation.

If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported after the

prison term has been served.

CHALLENGES TO THE RIGHT TO REGISTER

What are the modes of challenging the right to
register?
1. Challenge the Application for Registration (§
18, RA No. 8189)

2. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the

Permanent List of Voters (§ 35, RA No. 8189)

3. Annulment of Book of Voters (§ 39, RA No.

8189)

Safety mechanisms that gives a measure of

protection against flying voters, non-qualified
registrants, and the like.
 PUBOF A2007
Page 40 of 45
Who may file? - Any voter, candidate or Decisions of the MTCs may be appealed to the RTC
representative of a registered political party. within 5 days from receipt of notice thereof.

The Challenge and oppositions thereto will be heard The RTC shall decide the appeal within 10 days
by the ERB. from the time it is received and the decision
shall immediately become final and executory.
Physical presence of the applicant concerned is No MR shall be entertained.
mandatory where objections against his Case:
application have been filed for him to rebut or
refute evidence presented in opposition thereto Domino vs. Comelec (July 19, 1999)
(§ 17, RA No. 8189). Powers of the Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Courts in
Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings
Petition for Exclusion (§ 35, RA No. 8189)
Who may file? - Any registered voter, 1995 - Juan Domino filed his COC for Congressman
representative of a political party or the Election in the 3rd District of QC for the 1995 elections.
Officer
June 22, 1997 – Domino registered as a voter of
When? – At any time except 100 days prior to a Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City.
regular election.
October 22, 1997 - Domino sought the cancellation
The 100 days prohibitive before the MTC of QC of his registration as
period serves the voter in QC and applied for the transfer of his
purpose of securing the registration from QC to Sarangani.
voter’s substantive right
to be included in the list January 18, 1998 - the MTC declared him a resident
of voters. of the Province of Sarangani, approved and
ordered the transfer of his voter’s registration
Annulment of Book of Voters (§ 39, RA No. from Precinct No. 4400-A of Old Balara, Quezon
8189) City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion,
Alabel, Sarangani.
Who may file? - Any voter or Election Officer or duly
registered political party March 25, 1998 - Juan Domino filed his COC as
Congressman for the Lone Legislative District of
Where to file? - The Comelec Sarangani for the May 1998 elections.

Grounds? - The book of voters was:
not prepared in accordance with RA 8189;
or,
prepared through fraud, bribery, forgery,
impersonation, intimidation, force or
any similar irregularity; or,
contains data that are statistically
improbable.
Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the List (§
34, RA No. 8189)
Who may file? - Any person whose application for
registration has been disapproved by the ERB or
whose name has been stricken out from the list.
When? - At any time except 105 days prior to a
regular election.
The petition shall be decided within 15 days after
filing.
What court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of
voters?
The MTC
A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was filed on the ground
that Domino is not a resident of Sarangani
and/or he lacks the 1 year residency
requirement.
Presented as evidence was Domino’s Voter’s
Registration Record dated June 22, 1997
indicating Domino’s registration at Precinct No.
4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City.
During the elections, Domino garnered the highest
number of votes.
Whether or not the judgment of the MTC declaring
Domino as resident of Sarangani is final,
conclusive and binding upon the whole world,
including the Comelec.
No, it does not preclude the Comelec, in the
determination of Domino’s qualification as a
candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance
with the residency requirement.

Except for the right to remain in the list of voters or
for being excluded therefrom for the particular
election in relation to which the proceedings
had been held, a decision in an exclusion or
inclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of
res judicata.
The factual findings of the MTC and its resultant
conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on
matters other than the right to vote in the
precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not
conclusive upon the Comelec.
Moreover, the MTC exceeded its jurisdiction when:
it declared Domino a resident of Sarangani;
and,
approved and ordered the transfer of his
voter’s registration from Precinct No.
4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, QC to
precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion,
Alabel, Sarangani.
It is not within the competence of the MTC, in
an exclusion proceedings, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another
municipality.
The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion
cases is limited only to “determining the right of
the voter to remain in the list of voters” or to
“declare that the challenged voter is not
qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is
registered,” specifying the ground of the voter’s
disqualification.
The MTC has no power to order the change or
transfer of registration from one place of
residence to another. That is the function of
the ERB (§ 12, R.A. No. 8189).
What are the penalties for violating the Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996?
Violation of any of the provisions of R.A. No. 8189 is
considered an election offense
Penalties
Imprisonment of not less than 1 year but not more
than 6 years.
Political party - fine of not less than P 100,000 but
not more than P 500,000.
Suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Shall not be subject to probation.
PUBOF A2007
Page 41 of 45
If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported after the
prison term has been served.
Certificate of Candidacy
A formal manifestation to the whole world
of the candidate's political creed or lack of
political creed.
Sinaca vs. Mula
Statement of a person seeking to run …
certifying that he announces his
candidacy for the office mentioned and
that he is eligible for the office, the name
of the political party to which he belongs,
if he belongs to any, and his post-office
address for all election purposes being as
well stated.
Sinaca vs. Mula
No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn
certificate
of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
Sec. 73, BP 881
Effect of failure to file:
Votes in favor of the candidate void.
Candidate has no right to contest the
election.
Deadline for Filing:
Not later than the day before the date of the
beginning of the campaign period. (Sec. 7,
RA 7166)
If filed beyond the deadline – not valid (Gador
v. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 431)
Certificate which did not include the position for
which the candidate is running may be
corrected. (Conquilla v. COMELEC, 332
SCRA 861)
Effect of multiple filings for more than one office:
Not eligible for any one of them.
Before deadline, the candidate may
withdraw all except one (Sec. 73, OEC)
Defects, General Rule:
Prior to the election – Strict construction,
requirements are mandatory.
After the election – Liberal construction,
merely directory

OATH
Certificate must be sworn. (Sec. 73, OEC)
The election of a candidate cannot be annulled
because of formal defects in his certificate,
such as lack of oath. (De Guzman vs.
Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil 211)
Name
Civil Registrar/Baptismal Certificate
May include stage/screen name or a nickname
by which he is generally known (sec. 74,
OEC)
2 or more with same name – state paternal and
maternal surnames, except incumbent
(equity of incumbent)
Disqualification
Insane/incompetent
Final judgment for –
Insurrection or rebellion
Offense for which he was sentenced
to a
penalty of more than 18 months
Crime involving moral turpitude
Permanent resident/immigrant to a foreign
country unless he waives his status.
Removal
Insane/incompetent – declaration of
removal of status of being
insane/incompetent
Conviction
Plenary pardon
Amnesty
Lapse of 5 years after service of
sentence
Disqualifications under the Local Government Code
Those sentenced by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude or an
offense punishable by imprisonment of
at least one year, within 2 years after
service of sentence.
Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case
Convicted by final judgment of violating his
oath of allegiance to the Republic
Those with dual citizenship
Fugitives from justice
Permanent resident/immigrant to a foreign
country (Caasi vs. CA, 191 SCRA 229)
Insane or feebleminded
Disqualifications under the Revised Adm Code-
Municipal Office
Eccleciastics (Pamil vs. Teleron)
Persons receiving compensation from
municipal or provincial funds
Contractors for public works of the
municipality (Sec. 2175 RAC)
PUBOF A2007
Page 42 of 45
Effect of Filing
SECTION 66. Candidates holding appointive office
or positions. — Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
SECTION 67. Candidates holding elective office.
— Any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
[F]orfeiture is automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for another office. Only the
moment and the act of filing are considered.
Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever
forfeited.
Monroy vs CA, 20 SCRA 620
Dimaporo vs Mitra, 202 SCRA 779
An appointive public official is considered resigned
upon filing of his certificate. (Sanciangco vs
Rono)
Includes government appointive officials in GOCCS
under the Corporation Code (PNOC Energy
Dev’t. Corporation vs. NLRC)
Substitution
Substitution is governed by Sec. 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Grounds for Substitution:
Official candidate:
Dies
Withdraws
Is disqualified for cause
Who may substitute: only a person belonging
to, and certified by, the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified.
The substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his certificate
of candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of the day of the election. If the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should
occur between the day before the election and
 PUBOF A2007
Page 43 of 45
'mid-day of election day, said certificate maybe Certificate of Candidacy
filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, Two opposing factions of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD
in the case of candidates to be voted for by the filled in separate candidates for the position
entire electorate of the country, with the of mayor of the Municipality of Malimano,
Commission. Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by
Robert Z. Barbers nominated Grachil G.
Canoy, while the other group lead by
Francisco T. MATUGAS endorsed the
candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr.
Miguel H. Mula, a candidate for vice-mayor and
belonging to the "BARBERS Wing," filed
before the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification against TEODORO which was
docketed as SPA 98-021. On 8 May 1998, the
Second Division of the COMELEC issued a
resolution disqualifying TEODORO as
candidate for mayor of Malimono, Surigao del
Norte. It ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy because of prior
conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral
turpitude.

Sinaca vs. Mula

On 10 May 1998, TEODORO filed a MOR of the
aforesaid resolution. On the same date,
petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, an independent
candidate, withdrew his certificate of candidacy
for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and
became a member of the LAKAS party and was
nominated by the LAKAS "MATUGAS Wing" as
the substitute mayoralty candidate for the
Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.
On the basis of said nomination, EMMANUEL filed
his certificate of candidacy attaching his
certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty
candidate signed by Governor Francisco T.
MATUGAS, the party provincial chairman.
On 11 May 1998, MULA filed another petition
for disqualification, this time against
EMMANUEL. MULA contended that the
nomination of EMMANUEL as substitute
candidate was illegal on the following
grounds:
a) Before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy as
LAKAS candidate, SINACA was an
independent candidate. Being so, he cannot
rightfully substitute the disqualified one;

b) Sinaca’s nomination bore only the approval

of Matugas and without consent of Mr.
Barbers who has also a say on nomination
of candidates within his jurisdiction.
c) Substitution generally takes place when by
reason of a candidate's disqualification the
party to which he belongs loses such
representation. In this case, the
disqualification did not prejudice LAKAS
because Mr. Garchil G. Canoy is still there
representing the party after the
disqualification. states:

The COMELEC’s 2nd Division dismissed the
petition for disqualification and upheld the
candidacy for mayor of EMMANUEL on the
ground that Matugas was clothed with
authority to nominate the Sinaca as
substitute candidate for the position of
mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, vice
the disqualified candidate.
On 6 October 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution which set aside the resolution of the
Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL, for
the following reasons:
Sinaca was an independent candidate for councilor
at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor as a substitute of a disqualified
candidate. Thus, he did not belong to the same
political party as the substituted candidate.
The substitution of disqualified mayoralty candidate
Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel
D. Sinaca was not valid because the latter was
an independent candidate for councilor prior to
his nomination as substitute for a Lakas party
member.
On 6 October 1998, the COMELEC en banc set aside
the resolution of the 2nd Div. and disqualified
EMMANUEL, for the following reasons:
Sinaca was an independent candidate at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor as
a substitute of a disqualified candidate. Thus,
he did not belong to the same political party as
the substituted candidate.
The substitution of disqualified mayoralty candidate
Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel
D. Sinaca was not valid because the latter was
an independent candidate for councilor prior to
his nomination as substitute for a Lakas party
member.
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party who
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy is governed by Sec.
77 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides:
PUBOF A2007
Page 44 of 45
If after the last day for … filing…, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not
later than mid-day of the day of the election.
If the death, withdrawal or disqualification
should occur between the day before the
election and 'mid-day of election day, said
certificate maybe filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Sinaca vs. Mula
The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent
candidate prior to his nomination is
immaterial. What is more significant is that
he had previously withdrawn his certificate of
candidacy before he filed his certificate of
candidacy as a substitute for TEODORO at
which time he was, for all intents and
purposes, already deemed a member of the
LAKAS "MATUGAS wing.
Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a
member of the LAKAS party after the
disqualification of TEODORO, will not affect
the validity of the substitution. There is
nothing in the Constitution or the statute
which requires as a condition precedent that
a substitute candidate must have been a
member of the party concerned for a certain
period of time before he can be nominated as
such. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code only mandates that a substitute
candidate should be a person belonging to
and certified by the same political party as
the candidate to be replaced.
Votes cast for the substituted candidate
In case of valid substitutions after the ballots have
been printed, the votes cast for the substituted
candidates shall be considered as stray votes
but shall not invalidate the whole ballot.
For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide
spaces where the voters may write the name of
the substitute candidates if they are voting for
the latter.
If the substitute candidate has the same family
name, the above rule shall not apply.
Sec 12 RA No. 9006

Opposition against filing of Certificates of Candidacy
Petition to deny due course
Petition to cancel certificate of candidacy
ONLY GROUND: ANY MATERIAL REPRESENTATION
CONTAINED IN THE CERTIFICATE IS FALSE.
Petition must be verified
Petition to deny due course
Petition to cancel certificate of candidacy
NATURE OF PETITION: Similar to QUO
WARRANTO
WHY? Basis is qualification
Two instances questioning qualifications:
Sec. 78, Sec. 253
SECTION 253. Petition for quo
warranto. — Any voter contesting the
election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for
quo warranto with the Commission within
ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60,
BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978
EC)
PUBOF A2007
Page 45 of 45
election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for
quo warranto with the Commission within
ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60,
BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978
EC)
NATURE OF PETITION: Similar to QUO WARRANTO
WHY? Basis is qualification
Failure to file within the 25-day pd. Under Sec. 78 –
not completely helpless – file a petition for quo
warranto within 10 days from proclamation.
NUISANCE CANDIDATES
GROUNDS:
Certificate has been filed to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute;
Candidacy filed to cause confusion by the
similarity of names of a registered
candidate;
Other circumstances indicating that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to
run

Period of filing: 25 days from the time of filing of

the Certiciate of Candidacy and shall be
decided, after due process and hearing, not
later than 15 days before the election. Sec. 78,
BP 881.

15 d. period merely directory (Aznar vs.

COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703; Loong vs.
COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760)

ONLY GROUND: ANY MATERIAL

REPRESENTATION CONTAINED IN
THE CERTIFICATE IS FALSE.
Meaning:
False statement as to residence (Abella vs.
Lazarrabal);
False statement as to citizenship (Labo vs
Comelec 211 SCRA 297)

Test: Is there intent to deceive? Salcedo vs.

COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447 – using
husband’s surname even when
marriage is void.

NATURE OF PETITION: Similar to QUO

WARRANTO
WHY? Basis is qualification

Two instances questioning qualifications:

Sec. 78, Sec. 253
SECTION 253. Petition for quo
warranto. — Any voter contesting the