World Affairs Institute

"Sunshine" or Showers for Korea's Divided Families?

Author(s): JAMES A. FOLEY
Source: World Affairs, Vol. 165, No. 4 (SPRING 2003), pp. 179-184
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672668
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 Vol. 165 No. 4 Spring 2003 179

"Sunshine" or Showers for Korea's

Divided Families?

By JAMES A. FOLEY five South Korean sailors lost their lives and James A. Foley is a teaching
fellow in the School of East
nineteen were wounded, some seriously. The Asian Studies, University of
S outh Korea's "sunshine" policy of engage ROK's patient efforts at engagement with a state Sheffield, UK.
ment with the economically embattled and in which elements of the leadership seemed
determined to maintain the tension between the
reclusive North Korean state, while in many
ways continuing the efforts at engagement two Koreas brought their greatest reward with
the announcement in March 2000 of the deci
attempted by Kim Dae Jung's predecessors, dif
fers from previous policies in one all-important sion to hold the first summit meeting between
aspect. Economic aid is not to be made condi leaders of the two Koreas in Pyongyang in June
tional on political progress between the two of that year.
Koreas.
"SUNSHINE'S" SUCCESSES AND
In the early days of the policy this led to some FAILURES
rather absurd juxtapositions of events. In spite of
the South Korean government's view that "sun The summit meeting between Kim Jong Il
shine" was more likely to bring about positive and Kim Dae Jung was a historic event that
change in Pyongyang's attitude to its southern caught the imaginations of Koreans and non
neighbor than the "cold wind" of a policy of Koreans, as the leaders of the two states
containment of North Korea, in June 1998 a involved in what is widely perceived as the last
North Korean submarine was captured after bastion of the cold war met and warmly shook
intruding into South Korean territorial waters hands on the tarmac of Sunan Airport in
off Sokcho, and three weeks later another was Pyongyang, North Korea. However, the joint
found off Mukho. In June 1999, while South declaration presented to the world during the
Korean tourists were on a cruise on the East Sea meeting confirmed the view of many experts
to visit the scenic North Korean resort area of that the summit was strong on atmosphere and
the Diamond Mountain, or Keumgang-san as it symbolism while lacking in content. While
is known in Korean, a naval battle was being reconfirming the measures agreed by the two
fought on the West Sea between North and Koreas in the 4 July 1972 Joint Communiqu6,
South Korean forces over the long-disputed nau the first diplomatic agreement to be signed by
tical demarcation line-the so-called Northern the two Koreas, the 15 June Declaration, added
Limit Line-between the two Koreas' areas of little. It failed to improve on the 1991 Basic
maritime sovereignty. It was estimated at the Agreement signed by the prime ministers of the
time that North Korea lost more than thirty two Korean states.
sailors in that engagement. In spite of North Progress in inter-Korean economic coopera
Korea's vows of vengeance, however, the Kim tion was boosted by the announcement that the
Dae Jung government stuck to its pledge to sep two leaders had agreed to reconnect the long
arate agreed economic aid programs from polit closed railway between the two halves of the
ical progress and persevered with its pursuit of peninsula. Should this be accomplished, the
"sunshine." A similar incident on the day that ramifications for the two Koreas will be indeed
the South Korean soccer team was playing important. South Korean goods will reach
Turkey for third place in the World Cup also did Europe in eight days by rail, rather than the
not derail the "sunshine" policy-despite the three weeks it presently takes to ship them. It is
predictions of many Korea experts-although estimated that North Korea's benefit from such

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 1808Worl
traffic will be $100 million per year. Although
North-South Korean relations have seen little
progress since the coming to power of the Bush
administration, an agreement signed between
Kim Jong Il and Russian Federation President
Putin in August 2001, agreeing to link the
North Korean rail network to the Trans Siberian
Railroad, bodes well for the future completion
of the inter-Korean project.
North Korean requests for energy from met with a freeze on inter-Korean rapproche
South Korea, however, have been rejected. Fol
Both Korean leaders reportedly agreed in principle
that "all Koreans should have the right to live
wherever they choose in Korea."
lowing the Berlin Declaration by Kim Dae
Jung in 1999, in which the South Korean pres
ident agreed in principle to help the North
refurbish its electricity transmission and supply
grid, to help Pyongyang overcome its chronic
energy crisis, North Korea has been exerting
pressure on Seoul to accede to its demands for
electricity. However, the technical difficulties
involved, the enormous cost of such a project,
and the perceived lack of progress in inter
Korean relations since the summit in reducing
tension and establishing "normal" relations
have meant that for the ROK government,
undertaking such a scheme would amount to
political suicide. If Seoul were to supply elec
tricity to the North, it would also undermine
U.S. efforts to engage with the DPRK through
the 1994 Agreed Framework.
Kim Jong Il has not made things any easier
in the priorities he expressed during the North's
recent flurry of diplomatic activity. During his
month-long visit to the Russian Federation in
July/August 2001, his renewed call for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea did seri
ous damage to ROK President Kim Dae Jung's
efforts to build support for the "sunshine" poli
cy. On his return from Pyongyang in June
2000, Kim Dae Jung had proudly announced
that Kim Jong Il had pledged to drop long
standing demands for withdrawal of American
troops from South Korea. As that demand had
hitherto formed the sine qua non of North
Korean conditions for engagement with the
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ROK, Kim Jong Il's pledge was seen as an
important first concession and reward for the
sunshine policy. Although Kim Jong Il never
publicly confirmed North Korea's willingness
to accept an American military presence, his
silence on the matter was interpreted as tacit
consent. Bush's victory in the American presi
dential election, however, and the hardening of
American attitudes toward North Korea were
ment and a reversion to old bargaining stances.
Kim Jong Il's renewed demand for American
withdrawal, when re-establishing ties with
Moscow, seriously embarrassed Kim Dae Jung
and provided support for the view that Kim
Jong Il's diplomatic offensive has always been
aimed at establishing relations with the United
States rather than at true inter-Korean rap
prochement.
This perception was strengthened by the
DPRK's admission to U.S. Under Secretary of
State James Kelly in October 2002 that it was
indeed involved in a program to produce
enriched uranium. While controversy raged as
to whether this constituted an infringement of
the 1994 Agreed Framework signed by the
United States and the DPRK-Washington
claiming that it did and Pyongyang somewhat
predictably claiming that it did not-the fact
that the program was clearly in contravention
of the 1991 South-North Agreement on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,
signed by Seoul and Pyongyang, was largely
ignored, reinforcing the view in the South that
North Koreans obeyed the terms of agreements
signed with Seoul only when it suited them.
Although the amount of economic aid Seoul
is providing for North Korea may not be partic
ularly large, a common conception in South
Korea is that North Korea "takes all and gives
nothing." Kim Jong Il's reneging on promises
made at the June 2000 summit and his total dis
regard for the 1991 treaties (usually referred to
as the Basic Agreement) have strengthened this
view. In such an atmosphere, the large-scale
expenditure that would be required if Seoul
were to agree to provide energy to the North
would be unacceptable to the majority of South
Koreans.
However, despite the growing criticisms of
"'sunshine" and what many have dubbed its
naive approach, it is undeniable that inter-Kore
an relations are better now than they have ever
been. Perhaps as a hedge against further hard
ening of U.S. attitudes and certainly with an
eye toward the desperately needed revenues
 Vol. 165 No.
that cooperation will bring to Pyongyang, the
DPRK has pledged to push forward on joint
South-North cooperative projects, including the
proposed rail link.
WHAT THE SOUTH KOREAN PUBLIC
WANTS
North Korea's economic crisis is common
knowledge among the South Korean public.
4 Spring 2003 181
problem. For the families involved, "reunion" is
perhaps a misnomer; after a brief series of
meetings with their relatives, amounting to
about six hours over three days, they are again
parted from their loved ones with no idea
whether they will ever see them again. No
mechanism as yet is in place to allow families
to maintain contact with relatives after they
return to North or South.

Reports that have emerged from the North of The paucity of the agreed format together
the disastrous economic situation and conse with the intense emotional manipulation of
quent famine have reached a wide audience. South Koreans by the media during the
Clearly, when South Koreans talk about North reunions have ensured that the meetings have
Korean reciprocity for South Korean largesse, raised more questions than they have answered
they are not expecting economic reciprocity regarding the efficacy of the measures thus far
from a state that cannot even feed its own peo agreed by the two Koreas.
ple. The key areas of worry for South Koreans
A MORE ACCEPTABLE FORMAT
are security, a reduction in military tensions
between the two states, and humanitarian My research in South Korea indicates that
issues, chief among which is the problem of there are approximately 500,000-750,000 sur
Korea's many divided families. While little viving first generation divided family members
progress has been made most issues, some has in Korea, North and South.2 Although this fig
been made on reuniting divided families. ure is far from the ten million families often
Clearly aware of the emotional power of that cited in the South Korean and international
issue, Kim Dae Jung prioritized family reunions press, if we remember that each divided family
after coming to power in 1998. Both Korean member has relatives and a family "on the other
leaders reportedly agreed in principle at the June side," we can see that this issue is an enormous
2000 summit that "all Koreans should have the social and political problem. During the course
right to live wherever they choose in Korea." of my research in South Korea in 1997, I car
The subsequent agreement reached by the ried out a postal questionnaire survey of sixty
Red Cross societies of North and South Korea to first generation divided family members all of
arrange reunions for first generation family whom had been born in what is now North
members was greeted with universal approval in Korea and had moved to the South before or
the South. However, while the reunions did pro during the Korean War. Among the respon
ceed, they have highlighted the inadequacy of dents, 83 percent had no idea as to the fates of
the measures agreed to rather than ameliorating their relatives in the North; after nearly fifty
the enormous problem in any significant way. years of separation, they had no idea whether
The two sides have held three rounds of their relatives had survived the war or of their
exchange visits for divided family members. In whereabouts. Although 88 percent stated that
the latter ones all of the participants have met at they wanted to contact their relatives, 68 per
the North's tourist resort of Kumgang Moun cent said that they had made no attempt to do
tain. In each of the exchange reunions, one hun so. The most commonly cited reason for this
dred first generation divided family members was "fear of incurring problems" for their rela
from the South visited the North, while the tives in the North. Only 3 percent said they had
same number from the North visited South no desire to contact their relatives. Further
Korea to be briefly reunited with relatives not research in South Korea in summer 2001,
seen or heard from for fifty years. The only pre among relatives of those born in the South who
vious occasion on which divided family mem went to the North before or during the Korean
bers from North and South were exchanged was War, has supported these findings..3
in 1985, when one hundred divided family Given the scale and nature of the problem,
members-fifty from each side-were allowed it is obvious that rather than expensive, elabo
to briefly meet their relatives in Seoul and rate reunions in the world's media spotlight, a
Pyongyang.1 Held in a blaze of publicity and in more practical and efficient mechanism is
required to alleviate the suffering of Korea's
the full glare of the Korean and international
media, these emotional reunions have merely many divided family members. The first prob
scratched the surface of the divided family lem is clearly to allow verification of divided

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182 World Affairs

family members' status in North or South agreement ever signed by the two Koreas-the
Korea. Second, the exchange of correspon 1972 July 4th Joint Communiqu6-emerged as
dence between separated family members a result of contacts that began in 1971 between
should be facilitated. Finally, the establishment the two Korean Red Cross societies on the issue
of a permanent meeting place for divided fam of divided families. Later efforts at rapproche
ily members, out of the glare of the media, ment in 1984-85 and 1990-91 also included
would be a considerable improvement on the talks on the divided families problem. There
currently agreed format. The implementation fore, both states already possess a broad degree
of these three relatively simple measures is sup of knowledge of the problem. However, it also
ported by all first generation divided family means that both states' attitudes toward the
members that I interviewed. problem were formed and hardened in the
depths of the cold war, long before any real
THE DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECT OF THE
desire for rapprochement in the Korean conflict.
PROBLEM
The implicit competition between the two
Prior to the first round of reunions in August Koreas is still apparent in the zero sum logic of
2000, stories in the South Korean press pointed the format for the reunions that resulted from
out the glaring inadequacy of the reunion for the success of the sunshine policy. Each side
mat, given the scale of the problem. Although provides the same number of family members;
North Korean divided family members appar each provides the same lavish treatment in lux
ently were chosen on the basis of their per ury hotels whether in Seoul or Pyongyang;
ceived value and loyalty to the North Korean each person meets with his/her relatives for the
regime, divided family members from South same length of time, and the many restrictions
Korea were chosen in a computer lottery of apply equally to those from the North and those
those who had applied. Shortly before the first from the South.5
meetings, it was announced in the South Kore In spite of the changes that have come about
an press that three of those chosen from the since the advent of the sunshine policy, the two
South had died on the eve of being reunited Koreas' attitudes to the problem still differ in
with their long-lost relatives. their fundamental characterization of the divided
The demographic aspect of the divided fami families problem. In the South, the view that the
lies problem was dramatically emphasized by problem is a humanitarian one that should be
the South Korean Red Cross in June 2001, when solved outside the greater issues of Korea's divi
it was announced that of the 117,000 first gen sion and reunification was formed in the early
eration divided families who had applied for the 1970s. However, Pyongyang has always viewed
meetings, 12,000 had already passed away the issue as an integral part of the wider problem
within a year of making their applications. of Korea's division and eventual reunification.
This rate of depletion of the first generation Differences in the social and political sys
is expected to increase as time progresses, leav tems of the two Korean states have exacerbated
ing less time in which to find a comprehensive the divergence of views. In South Korea, the
solution to the problem. The term "first gener rapid development of democracy since the
ation" is applied to those with living memories mass protests that brought an end to the reign
of the relatives from whom they are separated. of South Korea's last military dictator, Chun
As the Korean War began over fifty years ago, Doo-hwan, in 1987, meant the strengthening of
the youngest of that generation-those separat the view that the divided families issue is a
ed at fourteen or fifteen years of age, for exam humanitarian problem. The progress toward the
ple-will now be at least sixty-five years of development of a civic society in South Korea
age, and the majority of them over seventy. Life has also added the importance of public opin
expectancy in South Korea is 69.2 years for ion to the factors that government must consid
males and 76.3 for females.4 er when formulating policies. South Koreans
have suffered in the past because of the so
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
called "guilt by association system,"6 according
PROBLEM-NORTH AND SOUTH to which relatives of those who went to the
In the absence of diplomatic relations North before or during the Korean War were
between the two Koreas, the divided families considered untrustworthy and were discrimi
issue has long provided a key avenue of contact nated against, particularly in the field of
for the two Korean states through their respec employment. However, South Korea's democ
tive Red Cross societies. The first diplomatic ratization process has meant an end to such an

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 Vol. 165 No. 4 Spring 2003 183
iniquitous system and a new-found willingness uncensored information will present to its rigid
on the part of divided family members to speak social and political systems. Pyongyang's cau
out about their situations and family histories. tion thus far in its relations with its more afflu
Although South Korea's recent history has ent southern neighbor and the reluctance the
been a catalogue of rapid change and develop North has shown in opening its society would
ment, North Korea has shown little sign of will indicate that this is perhaps one of North
ingness to relax its strict authoritarian rule. Korea's chief worries.
Pyongyang appears to have no intention of What has long been regarded as one of the
allowing a separation of politics from the divid sunshine policy's key strengths-the separation
ed families issue. The little information we of economic and humanitarian aid from politi
have about North Korean society indicates that cal progress-has evidently become one of its
it is a non-issue in the North. Two factors play key weaknesses. Such a separation has meant
the greatest role in this state of affairs: first, the that North Korea is free to obtain the maximum
North Korean government does not consider economic assistance from the South, while
public opinion and the media when formulating under no real obligation to show progress on
policy; second, in North Korea's highly strati issues such as divided families. Although South
fied social system, it is a disadvantage to have Korea has followed the precepts of "sunshine"
relatives "on the other side." In the majority of to demonstrate Seoul's good will toward
cases, North Korean divided family members Pyongyang, North Korea has consistently and
are extremely unlikely to discuss their situation somewhat successfully exploited this element
with other North Koreans. That has left to obtain the maximum in rewards at the lowest
Pyongyang free to exploit the issue in whatever perceived risk to its hold on power. Each
way it has seen fit without having to worry reunion or step forward is invariably preceded
about domestic public opinion or a free press. by the announcement of some new package of
As North Korea's crisis has deepened, aid, usually food or chemical fertilizer for the
Pyongyang's preferred vision of rapprochement North's hard-pressed agricultural sector.
with South Korea has become easier to identify. Pyongyang's recent clumsy attempts at
While willing to accept any form of economic influencing the political scene in South Korea
or humanitarian aid, the North Korean regime is have met with resounding failure. The first
clearly anxious to restrict contacts among North attempt at influencing the South Korean politi
Korean citizens and foreigners-especially cal process since the launch of the sunshine
South Koreans-to a bare minimum for fear of policy came with the announcement-made on
alerting the North Korean population to the the eve of South Korean National Assembly
huge disparity between standards of living in elections-of the June 2000 summit. The sus
the North and South. This is particularly evi picion, widely voiced by conservative elements
dent in the case of the divided families, as these of the South Korean press, was that Pyongyang
people have friends and relatives in North and had made the announcement at such a sensitive
South Korea and, of course, speak Korean. time to give a boost to Kim Dae Jung's Millen
nium Democratic Party. If that was the case,
CONCLUSIONS
however, the attempt failed and despite the fan
The most frequently asked question regard fare surrounding the announcement of the his
ing Pyongyang's attitude toward the divided toric summit and the widespread public sup
families issue is whether the North Korean port, the MDP failed to win a majority in the
regime has the necessary good will to solve the National Assembly. Perhaps the most obvious
problem. The possible "ideological contamina attempt to influence the South Korean political
tion" of its citizens resulting from increased process was in August 2001, when after a six
human contacts across the DMZ and the result month hiatus in the North-South rapproche
ing threat to the regime's power have been the ment process, and on the eve of a National
key issues behind Pyongyang's reluctance to Assembly motion of no-confidence in ROK
allow effective measures to be taken to solve Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, the North
this problem. announced-via television rather than the
There is also a question as to whether the usual hotline telephone call-that it was pre
reclusive and impoverished North Korean state pared to restart ministerial level talks between
can withstand the strain of allowing human the two states. The following day South
contacts between the citizens of the two Koreas Korea's National Assembly passed the no-con
and the challenge that the resulting flow of fidence motion and Lim was forced to resign.

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184 World
The efforts on the part of the North to manip
ulate the political process in the South have had
a generally negative impact on levels of support
for the sunshine policy and have eroded the
good will of the South Korean public toward the
Kim Jong Il regime. Apart from a failure to
understand the political process in the South,
Pyongyang's greatest weakness is perhaps its
inability to grasp the enormous development
South Korea's society has made since democra
tization. South Koreans are becoming increas
ingly intolerant of corruption and incompetence
on the part of South Korean politicians, and the
public's patience is rapidly being exhausted by
lack of progress in inter-Korean relations. The
economic difficulties the South has had to sur
mount and the sacrifices its people have made to
overcome the Asian financial crisis of 1997
have also sharply focused the South Korean
public's attention on the cost of unification.
Although most South Koreans still, in principle,
support the idea of assisting the beleaguered
North, any engagement policy will have to show
results in terms of a change in attitude on the
part of the North Korean leadership if it is to
enjoy popular support in South Korea.
North Korean good will and reciprocity in
allowing the implementation of the measures
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outlined above to bring about a satisfactory and
equitable solution to the divided families prob
lem in return for the aid it has received and con
tinues to receive from the South would certain
ly go far toward solidifying vital South Korean
public support for the continuation of a com
prehensive engagement policy with the North.
The key question is whether Pyongyang
desires, or is able, to implement such measures
and face the challenge they pose to the North
Korean system.
NOTES
1. Only sixty-five actually succeeded in meeting
their relatives?the remaining thirty-five were told
that their relatives could not be traced.
2. James A. Foley, "Divided Families in the
Republic of Korea," (PhD diss., University of
Sheffield, UK, 2000).
3. James A. Foley, Korea's Divided Families:
Fifty Years of Separation (London: RoutledgeCur
zon, 2002).
4. World Health Organization 1999 indicators.
5. Restrictions here include the number of rela
tives a person can meet (five); denial of access to
ancestral graves and hometowns; and, of course, the
limited time in which divided families can actually
meet their family members (six hours over three
days).
6. In Korean, yeonjwaje.