SIL Midterm Case Digests

Aguila, Kirsten S.
JD 2-4
Bayan Muna vs Romulo
641 SCRA 244 (2011)
Definition of terms:
 Treaty - an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation.
 Signatory state - only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty,
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
 State-Party - legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith, under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Parties: Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, Rep. Crispin Beltran, and Rep. Liza L. Maza
Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Blas F. Ople
Charge d'Affaires of the Philippine Mission to the UN, Enrique A. Manalo
US Ambassador to the Philippines Francis J. Ricciardone
Facts:
In 2000, through Charge d'Affaires, Philippine Mission to the United Nations, New York Enrique A.
Manalo, the Philippines signed the Rome Statute subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory
states.
US Ambassador to the Philippines, Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the DFA
proposing the terms of the Non-Surrender Bilateral Agreement between the USA and the RP which aims to
protect "persons" who are current or former Government officials, employees, or military personnel or nationals
of one Party of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.
Via Exchange of Notes, the RP agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US
Embassy Note. Ambassador Ricciardone replied that the exchange of notes constituted a legally binding
agreement under international law thus, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US
Senate.
Bayan Muna, a duly registered party list group seeking to nullify the Agreement on the ground that it
takes away jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to try criminals of high crimes in contravention of the
Rome statute and that the bilateral agreement was invalid for it was not concurred by 2/3 of senate as mandated
by the constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly and whether or not it is null and void for not being
submitted to the Senate for concurrence.
Ruling:
Yes, the Agreement was contracted validly and does not need the ratification of the Senate.
The Supreme Court upheld the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in the Constitution, wherein the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after
executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require
legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than
treaties.
The Constitution does not classify any subject to be in the form of and ratified as a treaty. It merely
prescribes that treaties need the concurrence of the 2/3 of all the members of the Senate to complete the
ratification process to be valid and effective. It is the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval. In the instant case, the Non-Surrender Agreement
embodied in an exchange of notes is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written
contract among nations which validly dispenses with concurrence of Senate being part of the President's power
to conduct its external affairs for the nation without legislative intervention validated by the international
community by long usage.
Moreover, it should be noted that RP was only a signatory and not a state-party to the said treaty hence
only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.
Aguila, Kirsten S.
JD 2-4
Abaya vs Ebdane Jr.
GR No. 167919, February 14, 2007
 Exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each
of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. The
accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters
may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes
is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process
of legislative approval.
 Principle of pacta sunt servanda provides that [a]ny treaty or international or executive agreement
affecting a subject matter to which one State is a signatory shall be observed in good faith.
Parties: Plaridel M. Abaya, Commodore Plaridel C. Garcia (Retired), PMA 59 Foundation, Inc., Rep. by its
Presiednt, Commodore Carlos L. Agustin (Ret.), petitioners
Secretary of DPWH Hermogenes E. Ebdane Jr.
Secretary of DBM Emilia T. Boncodin
Secretary of DOF Cesar V. Purisima
Treasurer of Bureau of Treasury Norma L. Lasala
China Road & Bridge Corporation
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
Ambassador of Japan to the Philippines Yoshihisa Ara
Secretary of DFA Domingo L. Siazon
Facts:
In 2004, Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the DPWH issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012,
approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez, recommending the award to China Road & Bridge
Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists
of the rehabilitation of the 79.81km San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road in Catanduanes.
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the Japan Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC) and the RP pursuant to the exchange of notes executed by and between Ambassador Ara
and Secretary Siazon, with the aim of promoting economic stabilization and development efforts.
Petitioners, as taxpayers, questions the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) for having a variance
of 25.98% from the ABC, violating Sec. 31 of RA 9184, Government Procurement Reform Act, which provides
that exceeding ceiling for bid prices shall be disqualified outright. They further contend that the Loan Agreement
is neither an international nor an executive agreement because the parties of the Agreement were not two
states but between the RP and the JBIC, a separate juridical personality from the Japanese government.
Issue: Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is a
kind of a treaty.
Ruling:
Yes, it is an executive agreement taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes between the Japan
and the PH.
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with a private law
contract. It also refers to international instruments binding at international law resulting from the long practice
among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations regarded as
international customary law.
With regard to the issue involving examination of the coverage of RA 9184, its Section 4 provides that
any treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of the Act to which the Philippine
government is a signatory shall be observed. Following the fundamental principle of international law of pacta
sunt servanda, the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-P204,
rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works for the CP I project to private respondent
China Road & Bridge Corporation.
Bautista, Maria Angela
JD 2-4
COMMISSIONER vs. EASTERN SEA TRADING
G.R. No. L-14279
Parties to the Case:
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, petitioners
EASTERN SEA TRADING, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Valentin Gutierrez for respondent.
DOCTRINE: Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
Senate or by Congress.
FACTS: Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to
Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial
Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive
agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be
invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was implementing
was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled
in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the
members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly
referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements —
whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be
difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive
agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered
into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character,
that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of
agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal
matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of
claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
JD 2-4
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. JUDGE LANTION
G.R. No. 139465
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
DOCTRINE: The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over municipal law in the municipal sphere.
FACTS: The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the United
States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the
procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for
copies of the request and that he be given ample time to comment on said request. The petitioners denied the
request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
ISSUE: Whether treaty stipulations must take precedence over an individual’s due process rights.
HELD: The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situation where there is conflict between a rule of the international law
and the constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to give effect to both
but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over municipal
law in the municipal speher. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
JD 2-4
DBM-PS vs. KOLONWEL
G.R. No. 139465
DEPARTMENT of BUDGET and MANAGEMENT PROCUREMENT SERVICE (DBM-PS) and the Inter-Agency
Bids and Awards Committee (IABAC), Petitioners
KOLONWEL TRADING, Respondent
DOCTRINE: Foreign loan agreements with international financial institutions partake of an executive or
international agreement within the purview of Sec. 4 of RA9184.
FACTS :
This is a petition for review, with a prayer for temporary restraining order to nullify and set aside the Order dated
Dec. 04, 2006 of the Manila RTC.
In the middle of 2005, DepEd requested the services of the DBM-PS to undertake procurement project which is
to be jointly funded by the World Bank (WB), thru the Second Social Expenditure Management Program (SEMP2)
of the RP-IBRD Loan Agreement No. 7118-PH and the Asian Development Bank (ABD) thru SEDIP Loan No. 1654-
PHI. In October 2005, the DBM-PS called for a bidding for the supply of the Makabayan textbooks and teachers
manuals. Of the entities, foreign and local, only eleven (11) bidders submitted, including private respondent
Kolonwel.
Following the bid and the book content/body evaluation process, DBM committee issued a resolution
disqualifying, among others, Kolonwel for “failure in cover stock testing “. Kolonwel was informed of this and
subsequently filed with RTC Manila a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for TRO. In support of its TRO
application, Kolonwel alleged, among other things, that the supply-awardees were rushing with the
implementation of the void supply contracts to beat the closing-date deadline. After summary hearing, the
Manila RTC issued a 20-day TRO, and later issued a decision wherein Resolution 001-2006-A of the DBM was
annulled and set aside. Hence this petition.
ISSUE :
Will the petition prosper?

RULING :
The petition is granted and the assailed decision of the Manila RTC is hereby nullified and set aside.
Under the fundamental international principle of pacta sunt servanda, the RP, as borrower bound itself to
perform in good faith the duties and obligations under Loan No. 7118-PH. Applying this postulate, the DBM
IABAC, was legally obliged to comply with, or accord primacy to the WB guidelines on the conduct and
implementation of the bidding/procurement process in question.
Foreign loan agreements with international financial institutions, such as Loan No. 7118-PH, partake of an
executive or international agreement within the purview of Sec. 4 of RA9184. Significantly, whatever was
stipulated in the loan agreement, shall primarily govern the procurement of goods necessary to implement the
main project.
CAMARTIN, MARY GRACE P.
JD 2-4
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines
vs. Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque II; Health Under Secretaries Dr. Ethelyn P. Nieto, Dr. Margarita M. Galon,
Atty. Alexander A. Padilla, and Dr. Jade F. Del Mundo; and Assistant Secretaries Dr. Mario C. Villaverde, Dr. David
J. Lozada, and Dr. Nemesio T. Gako
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
Administrative order – enforceable order issued by a public authority to an individual or an organization

to take certain corrective action, or to refrain from an activity.
Customary law – as aspect of international law involving the principle of custom.
Executive Order – a rule or order issued by the president to an executive branch of the government and
having the force of law.
Soft law – non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Does not fall into
any of the categories of International law.
PARTIES:
Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines
Respondents: Health secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the DOH.
FACTS:
By virtue of legislative power granted to former President Corazon Aquino, the latter issued an Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) to give effect to the Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). WHA adopted Resolutions
promoting breastfeeding and prohibiting nutrition and health claims for breastmilk substitutes. The Milk Code
provides, among others, that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials of breastmilk substitutes may
be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
Respondents then issued A.O. No. 2006-0012 entitled Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
E.O. No. 51, otherwise known as “The Milk Code,” Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations
thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Said RIRR provides, among others, some labeling requirements on
substitute milk, such that the statement that the product offered is not a substitute for breastmilk.
The petitioner as representative of the manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes assails the validity of
said RIRR. It posits that said RIRR is amending and expanding the coverage of The Milk Code.
Respondents countered that the RIRR implements the Milk Code and some International Instruments
such as WHA Resolutions regarding infant and young child, form part of the law of the land.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Milk Code forms part of the law of the land?
2. Whether or not WHA Resolutions are customary international laws hence form part of the law of the
land?
RULING:
1. Yes.
Milk Code is a product of local legislation which transformed ICMBS into domestic law.
2. No.
Enable for International Rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being
followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with. WHA Resolutions, although
signed by most of the member states, were not enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member
states. WHA Resolutions may constitute soft law. Hence, unless legislated into domestic law, cannot form part
of the law of the land.
Under the 1987 Constitution, International law can become a part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an International law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, International law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
JD 2-4
Priscilla C. Mijares, Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Hilda B. Narciso, Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, SFIC, and Joel C. Lamangan
in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of
Hawaii
Vs.
Hon. Santiago Javier Ranada, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, RTC Makati City, and the Estate
of Ferdinand E. Marcos, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States
District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.
Alien Tort Act – also called Aline Tort Claims Act (ATCA) allows foreign citizens to seek remedies in US
courts for human-rights violations for conduct committed outside the US.
Comity – a friendly social atmosphere.
Estate – the things left by someone who has died.
Juridiction – the power or right to make judgments.
Pecuniary – consisting of or measure in money.
PARTIES:
Petitioner: Prominent victims of human rights violations.
Respondent: Honorable Ranada and Estate of Marcos.
FACTS:
A class suit composing of 10,000 members, who were victims of human rights abuse by military forces
during the Marcos regime, filed a complaint with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of
Hawaii against Marcos Estate, invoking the Alien Tort Act as basis for the said Court jurisdiction. Trial ensued,
and the petitioners were granted an award for compensatory and exemplary damages for a total of
$1,964,005,859.90. Petitioners then filed before the RTC of Makati for the enforcement of the said relief. The
Marcos Estate posits that there was no proper payment of docket and filing fee, the said being only Php 410.00.
Petitioners countered that the action filed is not capable of pecuniary estimation, hence the amount paid is
correct. RTC of Makati dismissed the petition for enforcement and required the petitioners a filing fee worth
Php 472,000,000.00 enable to effect the judgment of foreign court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for enforcement of award by a final judgment of foreign court is capable of
pecuniary estimation?
RULING:
Yes.
Section 7(b)(3) of the Rule 141 Rules of Civil Procedure “other actions not involving property” governs
the computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint. Notably, the amount paid by the petitioners is
equivalent to the amount based on the said provision.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized state
by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. The conditions required by the
Philippines is outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to wit:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. – The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, wat of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
JD 2-4
Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., Chief PNP; Chief Superintendent Raul Castaneda, Chief, CIDG; Police Senior
Superintendent Leonardo A. Espina, Chief PACER; and Gen. Joel R. Goltiao, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP
Vs.
Mary Jean B. Tagistis
Enforced disappearances – considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Incorporation method – applies when by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law.
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention)
– provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a
state of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency.
International law – a body of rules established by custom or treaty and recognized by nations as binding
in their relations with one another.
Writ of Amparo – a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
PARTIES:
Petitioner: PNP forces
Respondent: Wife of Engineer Morced N. Tagistis. The latter was enforced disappeared.
FACTS:
Engineer Morced N. Tagistis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme. He went missing while in Jolo for a seminar. In a
petition for Writ of Amparo filed by his wife, it was alleged that a couple of burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives, forcibly took Engineer Tagistis and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle and sped away.
It was further alleged that Engr. Tagistis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with CIDG,
PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect him
with the different terrorist groups. As per petitioners’, various moves were made to locate Engr. Tagistis, one of
which is Task Force Tagistis. In the said task force, an intelligence reports were gathered, stating that Engineer
Tagistis has reportedly taken and carried away, more or less Php 5,000,000.00 deposited and entrusted in his
personal bank account by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was intended for
IDB Scholarship.
The CA ruled that the disappearance of Engr. Tagistis was an enforced disappearance under the UN
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disappearance of Engr. Tagistis was an enforced disappearance?
RULING: Yes. Enforced disappearances had been a phenomenon in various countries in the past, hence making
it an International concern. In Argentina for example, it was reported that 6,000 to 24,000 disappeared during
the military regime. In general, follows were three different kinds of “disappearance” cases:
1. Those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents
and are never found again;
2. Those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military
authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and
3. Those of victims of salvaging who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances fall within the first two categories.
From the perspective of International Law, enforced disappearances are considered a flagrant violation of
human rights, since it also affects the victims’ families and the latter right to information regarding on the missing
victims. The United Nations, to remedy the same, issued Resolutions, Declaration and Convention relative to
enforced disappearance.
The Philippines is not yet a signatory to the Convention on enforced disappearances and has not yet declared
enforce disappearance as a crime. However, enforce disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by
international community so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of the law of the land, hence
the Philippines is bound by it.
Generally accepted principles of International law, through incorporation, form part of the laws of the land.
Enable to be a generally accepted principles, they must have the following elements:
1. The established, widespread, and consistent practice of the States; and
2. A psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.
DE CASCO, DEXSIE
JD 2-4
PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 124772, 14 August 2007
Parties of the case: Presidential Commission on Good Government and
Magtanggol C. Gunugundo, in his capacity as Chairmain thereof, petitioners
Sandiganbayan and Officeco Holdings, N.V., respondents
Doctrine: Act of State Doctrine
Act of State Doctrine – states that courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another in due deference to the independence of sovereignty of every sovereign state.
Res judicata - provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action
Facts:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote the Federal Office for Police Matters in Berne, Switzerland,
requesting assistance for the latter office to: (a) ascertain and provide the OSG with information as to where
and in which cantons the ill-gotten fortune of the Marcoses and other accused are located, the names of the
depositors and the banks and the amounts involved; and (b) take necessary precautionary measures, such as
sequestration, to freeze the assets in order to preserve their existing value and prevent any further transfer
thereof (herein referred to as the IMAC request). The Office of the District Attorney in Zurich, pursuant to the
OSG’s request, issued an Order directing the Swiss Banks in Zurich to freeze the accounts of the accused in PCGG
I.S. No. 1 and in the "List of Companies and Foundations."3 In compliance with said Order, Bankers Trust A.G.
(BTAG) of Zurich froze the accounts of Officeco Holdings, N.V. (Officeco).
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in not dismissing Civil Case No. 0164 on the grounds of:
(1) res judicata;
(2) lack of jurisdiction on account of the "act of state doctrine";

(3) lack of cause of action for being premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and
(4) lack of cause of action for the reason that mandamus does not lie to compel performance of a discretionary
act, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioners.
Ruling: The Court dismissed the instant petition. The ruled the case as follows:
1.) On the issue of res judicata, the court discussed For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be
enforced, the following requisites must obtain: (1) The former judgment or order must be final; (2)
It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) It must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) There must
be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties. While
the first three elements above are present in this case, we rule that the fourth element is absent.
Hence, res judicata does not apply to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Civil Case
No. 0164. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the
other.32 Causes of action are identical when there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both actions.33 The test
often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
facts or evidence would support and establish the former and present causes of action.34 More
significantly, there is identity of causes of action when the judgment sought will be inconsistent
with the prior judgment.35 In the case at bar, allowing Civil Case No. 0164 to proceed to its logical
conclusion will not result in any inconsistency with the 31 May 1989 decision of the Swiss Federal
Court. Even if the Sandiganbayan finds for Officeco, the same will not automatically result in the
lifting of the questioned freeze orders. It will merely serve as a basis for requiring the PCGG (through
the OSG) to make the appropriate representations with the Swiss government agencies concerned.
2.) Even assuming that international law requires the application of the act of state doctrine, it bears
stressing that the Sandiganbayan will not examine and review the freeze orders of the concerned
Swiss officials in Civil Case No. 0164. The Sandiganbayan will not require the Swiss officials to submit
to its adjudication nor will it settle a dispute involving said officials. In fact, as prayed for in the
complaint, the Sandiganbayan will only review and examine the propriety of maintaining PCGG’s
position with respect to Officeco’s accounts with BTAG for the purpose of further determining the
propriety of issuing a writ against the PCGG and the OSG. Everything considered, the act of state
doctrine finds no application in this case and petitioners’ resort to it is utterly mislaid.
3.) It was thus error for petitioners to treat Officeco’s request for the lifting of the freeze orders as a
request under Secs. 5 and 6 of its rules. First, the PCGG cannot even grant the remedy embodied
in the said rules, i.e., lifting of the freeze orders. Second, any argument towards a conclusion that
PCGG can grant the remedy of lifting the freeze order is totally inconsistent with its earlier argument
using the act of state doctrine. PCGG’s cognizance of such a request and treating it as a request
under Secs. 5 and 6 of its rules would require a re-examination or review of the decision of the
Swiss court, a procedure that is prohibited by the act of state doctrine.
4.) A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. The hypothetical admission extends to
the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
assessed by the defendants
DE CASCO, DEXSIE
JD 2-4
BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA VS. SABBATINO
376 U.S. 398, 1964
Parties of the case: Banco Nacional de Cuba, petitioner
Sabbatino, respondent
Doctrine: Act of State Doctrine
Act of State Doctrine – states that courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another in due deference to the independence of sovereignty of every sovereign state.
Facts:
Respondent American commodity broker contracted with a Cuban corporation largely owned by United
States residents to buy Cuban sugar. Thereafter, subsequent to the United States Government's reduction of
the Cuban sugar quota, the Cuban Government expropriated the corporation's property and rights. To secure
consent for shipment of the sugar, the broker, by a new contract, agreed to make payment for the sugar to a
Cuban instrumentality which thereafter assigned the bills of lading to petitioner, another Cuban instrumentality,
and petitioner instructed its agent in New York to deliver to the broker the bills of lading and sight draft in return
for payment. The broker accepted the documents, received payment for the sugar from its customer, but
refused to deliver the proceeds to petitioner's agent. Petitioner brought this action for conversion of the bills of
lading to recover payment from the broker and to enjoin from exercising dominion over the proceeds a receiver
who had been appointed by a state court to protect the New York assets of the corporation. The District Court
concluded that the corporation's property interest in the sugar was subject to Cuba's territorial jurisdiction, and
acknowledged the "act of state" doctrine, which precludes judicial inquiry in this country respecting the public
acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory. The court nevertheless
rendered summary judgment against the petitioner, ruling that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable when
the questioned act violated international law, which the District Court found had been the case here. The Court
of Appeals affirmed, additionally relying upon two State
Department letters which it took as evidencing willingness by the Executive Branch to a judicial testing of the
validity of the expropriation.
Issue:
Does the judiciary have the authority to examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a
foreign sovereign even if the taking violated international law?
Ruling:
The privilege of resorting to United States courts being available to a recognized sovereign power not at war
with the United States, and not being dependent upon reciprocity of treatment, petitioner has access to the
federal courts. The propriety of the taking was not governed by New York law, since the sugar itself was
expropriated. This suit is not uncognizable in American courts as being one to enforce the "public" acts of a
foreign state, since the expropriation law here involved had been fully executed within Cuba.The Government's
uncontested assertion that the two State Department letters expressed only the then wish of the Department
to avoid commenting on the litigation, obviates the need for this Court to pass upon the "Bernstein exception"
to the act of state doctrine, under which a court may respond to a representation by the Executive Branch that,
in particular circumstances, it does not oppose judicial consideration of the foreign state's act. The scope of the
act of state doctrine must be determined according to federal law.
The act of state doctrine applies and is desirable with regard to a foreign expropriation even though the
expropriation allegedly violates customary international law.
(a) Disagreement exists as to relevant standards of international law concerning a State's responsibility toward
aliens.
(b) The political branch can more effectively deal with expropriation than can the Judicial Branch.
(c) Conflicts between the Judicial and Executive Branches could hardly be avoided were the judiciary to
adjudicate with respect to the validity of expropriations. Even if the combination alleged in this case of
retaliation, discrimination, and inadequate compensation made the expropriation here violative of international
law, a judicial determination to that effect would still be unwise as involving potential conflict with or
embarrassment to the Executive Branch in later litigation. Pp. 376 U. S. 432-433.
A foreign country's status as a plaintiff does not make the act of state doctrine inapplicable reversed and
remanded.
DE CASCO, DEXSIE
JD 2-4
TOLENTINO VS. THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY ET AL
90 Phil 83, 1951
Parties of the case: Hilarion Tolentino, plaintiff-appellant
The Board of Accountancy, Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans Hausamann, defendants-appellees
Doctrine: Act of State Doctrine; Guarantee of Equal Protection
Amicus curiae – an experienced and impartial attorney invited by the court to appear and help in the disposition
of issues submitted to it.
Facts:
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a Filipino citizen and a certified public accountant duly admitted to the
practice of accountancy. The Board of Accountancy is an administrative body created by law and vested with
the power and authority to regulate and supervise the practice of the profession of accountancy in the
Philippines, and that the defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans Hausamann are foreigners, the former being
a British subject and the latter a Swiss subject, both admitted to the practice of accountancy in the Philippines;
that said two defendants have been and are practicing their profession as certified public accountants under the
trade name "Fleming and Williamson"; and that Section 16-A of Act No. 3105 as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 342, authorizing accountants to practice their profession under a trade name, is unconstitutional on the
ground that it excludes persons engaged in other callings and professions from adopting or acquiring or using a
trade name.
In their answer the defendant Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans Hausamann practically admitted the foregoing
allegations of the complaint. Said defendants allege that Commonwealth Act No. 342 amending Act No. 3105,
authorizing the use of a trade name in the practice of the profession of accountancy is not a class legislation,
nor does it violate the provision of the Constitution with respect to equal protection of the laws; that the plaintiff
has no right or interest adversely affected by said law and that he is entitled to the benefits thereof and may use
a trade or name firm name in the practice of his profession as accountant.
Issue:
(1) whether or not the plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth
act No. 342; and
(2) whether or not said Act is constitutional.
Ruling:
The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be
predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must
have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. These
requisite facts are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.
Commonwealth Act No. 342 does not offend against the equal protection clause of our Constitution on the
ground of class legislation, for the reason that said Act applies alike to all persons pursuing the same calling or
profession under the same conditions or requirements. It is a general rule that legislation which affects alike all
persons pursuing the same business under the same conditions is not such class legislation as is prohibited by
constitutional provisions. The discrimination which are open to objection are those in which persons engaged in
the same business are subjected to different restrictions or are held entitled to different privileges under the
same conditions. Part of the liberty of a citizen consists in the enjoyment, upon terms of equality with all others
in similar circumstances, of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding, and
selling property. The constitutional guaranty as to the equal protection of the laws, moreover, requires that no
impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by others
under similar circumstances and that no greater burdens in engaging in a calling should be laid upon one than
are laid upon others in the same calling and condition.
Assuming that Commonwealth act No. 342 grants to accountants a privilege not accorded to members of other
professions or callings, that alone would not render the Act discriminatory or violative of the equal protection
clause of the constitution, for that clause only means "that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances".
Ducta, Erich Leigh C.
JD 2-4
ISABELITA VINUYA, ET AL. VS. ALBERTO ROMULO, ET AL.
GR NO. 162230
Parties : Vinuya Et al, petitioner
Exec. Sec. Romulo, et al. , respondent
Definition of Terms:
• erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
• jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom
Facts: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War. They have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. Respondents maintain that all claims of the
Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and
the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
Issue: Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING: No. Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. The question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the
political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
JD 2-4
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansa Makabayan) VS Executive Secretary Zamora
GR NO. 138570
Parties : BAYAN, petitioner
Exec. Sec. Zamora , respondent
Definition of Terms: Lex specialis derogat generali - special provision or law prevails over a general one.
Facts: The Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which
formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel.
To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into
a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Upon the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military
bases agreement. The Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18,
1997, the United States panel met with the Philippine panel to exchange notes on the complementing strategic
interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other
things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Then President Ramos approved the VFA.
On 1998, President Estrada ratified the VFA.
The petitioners in this case assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein
respondents’ grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its
concurrence to the VFA.
Ruling : Yes. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute
as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The phrase recognized as a treaty means
that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Even if the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international
law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
JD 2-4
PIMINTEL ET AL. VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 158088
Parties : Senator Aquilino Pimintel Et al, petitioner
Exec. Sec. Romulo, et al. , respondent
Doctrine: An intervention program formulated by the national government itself but implemented in
partnership with the local government units to achieve the common national goal development and social
progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
Facts: The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the
1987Constitution. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the
most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by
the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require
that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state. Petitioners contend that
ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty
of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the
signature of the President.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect
of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the
President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. It
should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,
or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty
to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state
to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such
decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ
of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties.
Dy, Darlyn
JD 2-4
THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the
Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.
Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of
the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC
and Tropicana petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition
to the motion was filed by private respondent.
The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner
“shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith
elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own
behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private
entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See,
through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government
since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to
the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized
only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when
it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said
claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not
for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary
for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force
in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the
same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of
the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly
refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can
ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against
the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of
its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against
Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once
the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner
is DISMISSED.
Dy, Darlyn
JD 2-4
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION VS. HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED
SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU
G.R. NO. 85750. SEPTEMBER 28, 1990
FACTS:
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist
rule confronted the international community. In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an Agreement was
forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby
an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to
be established in Bataan.
ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in
Morong, Bataan. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the
Philippines, its activities are parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration (ICM) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election
among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is
an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. On 5
February 1987, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
Subsequently, however, on 15 July 1988, the Philippine Government, through the DEFORAF, granted ICMC the
status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a
Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC.
On 10 January 1989, the DEFORAF, through its Legal Adviser, retired Justice Jorge C. Coquia of the Court of
Appeals, filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that, as the highest executive department with the competence
and authority to act on matters involving diplomatic immunity and privileges, and tasked with the conduct of
Philippine diplomatic and consular relations with foreign governments and UN organizations, it has a legal
interest in the outcome of this case. Over the opposition of the Solicitor General, the Court allowed DEFORAF
intervention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the
application Philippine labor laws
RULING:
Immunity to ICMC and IRRI is granted to avoid interference by the host in internal workings. The grant of
immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in
their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat
the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with
international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States
of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. ICMC employees
are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled.—Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that "each specialized
agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other
disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the
Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC and the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of
privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Thus: "Article
IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities.—1. The Commission shall cooperate at all times with the
appropriate authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of Philippine laws, rules and regulations,
facilitate the proper administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any abuse of the privileges and
immunities granted its officials and alien employees in Article III of this Agreement to the Commission. "2. In the
event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of the privileges and immunities granted
under this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the Government and the Commission to determine
whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government shall withdraw the privileges and immunities
granted the Commission and its officials."
Dy, Jeffrey Egamen
JD 2-4
WHO vs. Aquino
48 SCRA 242, 1974
Parties of the case: THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT, petitioners,
HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, MAJOR WILFREDO
CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, and CAPTAIN PEDRO S. NAVARRO of the Constabulary Offshore Action
Center (COSAC), respondents.
Doctrine: It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination
by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch of the government it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government.
1. Quashal – an act of quashing something; opposed the quashal of the indictment; to put a stop to
(something) by the use of force
2. Inter alia – among other things
Facts: Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of
Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties and
taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly
dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino
issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity
from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the
Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined
Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in
asserting diplomatic immunity.
Issue: Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.
Held: Yes. The executive branch of the Philippines has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent
judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the
government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal
of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by
the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim
of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General
in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure
and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of
petitioner Verstuyft.
Dy, Jeffrey Egamen
JD 2-4
BAER vs. TIZON
57 SCRA 1, 1974
Parties of the case: DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales,
petitioner,
HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and EDGARDO GENER,
respondents.
Doctrine: It is a widely accepted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article
II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of another
state or its own courts without its consent.
1. Doctrine of State Immunity - the protection which a state is given from being sued in the courts of other
states
Facts: Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for injunction with the Court of First Instance of
Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. He alleged
that he was engaged in the business of logging and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging
operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging
operations. A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge. Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the
American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction
of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.
Issue: Whether the contention of the petitioner that the respondent judge acquires no jurisdiction on the ground
that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.
Held:
Yes. The contention of the petitioner is tenable. In the case of Parreno v. McGranery, the court ruled that: "It is
a widely accepted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3
of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its own
courts without its consent."
The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the
sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an
affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important public function of any government -
the defense of the state - is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act." That such an appraisal
is not opposed to the interpretation of the relevant treaty provision by our government is made clear in the
aforesaid manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae, wherein it joined petitioner for the grant of the
remedy prayed for.
There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the
Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may
therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to
the government which he represents.
Thereafter, in the cited cases of Syquia, Marquez Lim, and Johnson, the parties proceeded against were
American army commanding officers stationed in the Philippines. The insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of
respondent Judge is that a foreign sovereign without its consent is haled into court in connection with acts
performed by it pursuant to treaty provisions and thus impressed with a governmental character.
Dy, Jeffrey Egamen
JD 2-4
RAQUIZA VS. BRADFORD
75 Phil 50, 1945
Parties of the case: LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.
Doctrine: The right to due process of law is an immanent and alienable right of every person which cannot be
dispensed either in time of war or in time of peace.
1. Immanent – existing or operating within; inherent
2. Alienable – able to be transferred to new ownership
Facts: Petitioners, invoking the writ of habeas corpus were arrested by the United States Army and have since
then been detained under the custody of the respondents by virtue of a proclamation issued by General
MacArthur providing military measures for the apprehension of Filipino citizens who have voluntarily
collaborated with the enemy.
Petitioners have not been informed of the nature of the accusation against them; no complaint with any specific
offense has been filed against them, and has not been given even a summary hearing.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to afford relief to the petitioners.
Held: Yes. The affirmative and dissenting vote is based on the following considerations. First, the right to due
process of law is an immanent and alienable right of every person which cannot be dispensed either in time of
war or in time of peace. Second, the assailed proclamation is either a bill of attainder or a military order that
apprehends and held in restraint violators without a trial by a military tribunal. Third, the petitioners being
illegally confined without due process are entitled to be discharge under habeas corpus (Sec 1, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court).
Jadap, Carelle Mae N.
JD 2-4
Syquia vs Lopez
84 Phil 312 [1949]
Parties of the case:
PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and LEOPOLDO SYQUIA, petitioners,
NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge of Court of First
Instance of Manila, GEORGE F. MOORE, ET AL., respondents.
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Definition of term:
Real party in interest - is the one who actually possesses the substantive right being asserted and has a legal
right to enforce the claim (under applicable substantive law).
Facts:
Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in Manila, namely, the North
Qyauia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they executed contracts for
lease of the apartments to USA, with the term being until the war has ended and six months after, or unless
terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of te US armed forces
stationed in the Manila Area. George Moore, a Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief
of the Real Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the command of Moore, was said to be in
control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of USA to assign officers of the army to the
buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, the lease would
be terminated six months after. The petitioners approached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and
requested the buildings to be returned to them, as per contract agreement. However, they were advised that
the US Army wanted to continue their occupancy of the buildings, and refused to execute new leases but advised
that they will vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the contract agreement.
Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of Manila with the demand to get the properties as their
agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals until the premises were vacated.
Respondent-defendants were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the court. The MC of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit, sustained by the CFI of Manila,
hence the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity,
that USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.
Ruling:
The case was dismissed, the Supreme Court affirming in majority the decision of the Municipal Court of Manila.
Reason: Considering the circumstances, the real defendant party is the United States of America, as it was the
U.S. Army who were occupying the buildings, with the rent being paid for by their government. USA has not
given their consent to be sued in this case, and any action against them without the consent would constitue a
lack of jurisdiction.
JD 2-4
Sanders vs Veridiano
162 SCRA 88 [1988]
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City,
ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.
Doctrine of State Immunity
Principle of the sovereign equality of states - which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations.
Facts: Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private
respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and
who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On October 3,
1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s
report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents
allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for
damages against petitioners.
Issues:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the
private respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters, the
petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As such, the complaint
cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The
private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites
States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.
JD 2-4
USA vs RODRIGO
(GR No. 79470)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/SGT. USAF, WILFREDO BELSA, PETER ORASCION AND
ROSE CARTALLA, petitioners,
HON. RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court (BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad,
Benguet and FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Definition of terms:Doctrine of incorporation - Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to
comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
Facts: Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at
Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the
soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended
his dismissal.
Issue:Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by
them in the performance of their official duties.
Ruling: In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a
business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for
profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity
because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against
petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as
the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.
Laurio, Riza
JD 2-4
ORTIGAS COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO and DOLORES V. MOLINA,
G.R. No. 109645(7), July 25, 1994
PARTIES OF THE CASE: Ortigas And Company Limited Partnership, petitioner vs.
Hon. Judge Tirso Velasco and Dolores V. Molina,

respondents.
DOCTRINE:
If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the
property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and executory.
Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice of publication is not sufficient but such notice must be actually
sent or delivered to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution.
Special Civil Actions - These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal
and special proceedings. (a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, (1a, R2) A civil action may either be ordinary or special.
Torrens title - is a system of land registration, in which a register of land holdings maintained by the state
guarantees an indefeasible title to those included in the register. Land ownership is transferred through
registration of title instead of using deeds.
Ex parte -means a legal proceeding brought by one person in the absence of and without representation
or notification of other parties. It is also used more loosely to refer to improper unilateral contacts with a court,
arbitrator, or represented party without notice to the other party or counsel for that party.
Public Land -Known in some countries as crown land. This is land that belongs to the government who owns
the title to the land. This land is not owned by a company or individual and the government decides its use. It
can sell it to a company for development or it can develop it itself. It is often vacant land and is left vacant unless
the governemrnt has a good reason to sell it.
Supplemental pleadings - refer to pleadings that present subsequent matter related to the claim or defense
presented in the original pleading. A supplemental proceeding can modify the amount or nature of the relief
prayed for in the original pleading.
Acquisitive prescription - is a method of acquiring property by meeting statutory requirements of continuous

possession, which vary by state. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the role of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Conveyance -is the act of transferring an ownership interest in real property from one party to
another. Conveyance also refers to the written instrument, such as a deed or lease that transfers legal title of a
property from the seller to the buyer.
Pro forma - a Latin term literally means “for the sake of form” or “as a matter of form.”
In the world of investing, pro forma refers to a method by which financial results are calculated. This method of
calculation places emphasis on present or projected figures.
Inter Alia - [Latin, among other things.] A phrase used in pleading to designate that a particular statute
set out therein is only a part of the statute that is relevant to the facts of the lawsuit and not the entire statute.
Inter alia is also used when reporting court decisions to indicate that there were other rulings made by the court
but only a particular holding of the case is cited.
Publication - Making something known to the community at large, exhibiting, displaying, disclosing, or
revealing.
Publication is the act of offering something for the general public to inspect or scrutinize. It means to convey
knowledge or give notice.
In Copyright law, publication is making a book or other written material available to anyone interested by
distributing or offering it for sale. In the law of Libel and Slander, publication means communicating the
statement in issue to a third person other than the plaintiff (the individual whom the alleged defamatory
statement concerns).
Publication of a will refers to the testator's informing the witnesses to the document of his or her intent to have
the instrument operate as a will.
In the procedural rules governing the Practice of Law, publication of a summons is the process of publishing it in
a newspaper, when required by law, in order to notify a defendant of the lawsuit.
FACTS:
Nov. 14, 1991 – Molina filed a petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. 124088 but subsequently moved to
withdraw her petition for she had to go to US. Judge Velasco granted her motion to withdraw and dismissed the
case.
July 13, 1992 – Molina filed an Ex Parte Motion for review of LRC Case No. Q-5404. The Office of the Solicitor
General objected to the Ex-parte Motion on the Ground that the owners of the adjacent properties were not
notified. Thus, the motion was opposed by Ortigas & Company Limited.
September 23, 1992, Judge Velasco granted Molina’s petition and directed the Quezon City Register of Deeds
to reconstitute T CTNO TCT No. 124088 in Molina’s name. Ortigas filed an opposition about the petition.
During the hearing, Molina did not mention that she acquired the land through prescription. Instead, she
testified that the he obtained the title of the land through the aid of President Ferdinand Marcos way back
Martial Law period. She said the title was actually delivered to her by Col. Balbino Diegoin November 1990 at
her house in Quezon City.
Judge Velasco granted Molina’s petition and directed the Quezon City Register of Deeds to reconstitute the said
TCT in Molina’s name. The order was opposed by Ortigas and Mormons, however denied. Subsequently, Judge
Velasco granted Molina’s Motion for Execution pending appeal.
ISSUE:
1. WN the respondent Court may hear and decide the case on reconstitution of title without the
requirement of notice of publication.
2. WN the case could be reinstituted or revived be mere motion despite its earlier dismissal and the lapse
of the case reglementary period
RULING:
1. No. The respondent Court acquired no jurisdiction over the subject matter for failure to issue notice of
publication in the reconstitution case. Hence, null and void.
The Supreme Court provides that the respondent Court heard and decided the reconstitution case without
having acquired jurisdiction of the nature or subject matter. Republic Act No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing a
Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed," specifies the requisites
to be met in order that the court may acquire competence to act on a petition for reconstitution of title and
grant the appropriate remedy:
Sec. 13 The Court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is
situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to
be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose
address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. Said notice shall state among other things
the number of the lost or destroyed certificates of title if known, the name of the registered owner, the name
of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having
any interest therein must appear and file their claim of objection to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.
2. NO. The case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action,
but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing
fees prescribed by law.
The Supreme Court provides that the dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to
reconsider or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court's docket. Even
assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere
motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of course, by
the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of finality of
the dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses jurisdiction and control over it and
can no longer make any disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal.
Laurio, Riza
JD 2-4
DEUTSCHE GESSELLSCHAFT TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ) v. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009, TINGA, J.
PARTIES OF THE CASE: DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also known as
GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ) HANS PETER PAULENZ and ANNE NICOLAY, Petitioners,
petitioner
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARIEL CADIENTE SANTOS, Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch,
National Labor Relations Commission, and BERNADETTE CARMELLA MAGTAAS, CAROLINA DIONCO,
CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, MELVIN DELA PAZ, RANDY TAMAYO and EDGARDO RAMILLO, respondent
DOCTRINE:
The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important
barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our
Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the
laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking
immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred by the very same
statute or general law creating the instrumentality or agency.
Federal Republic - it is a federation of states with a republican form of government.[1] At its core, the
literal meaning of the word republic when used to reference a form of government means: "a country that is
governed by elected representatives and by an elected leader (such as a president) rather than by a king or
queen".
Auxiliary personnel - An individual or group that assists or functions in a supporting capacity: a volunteers'
auxiliary at a hospital. 2. A member of a foreign body of troops serving a country in war. 3. Grammar An auxiliary
verb.
Harbor Dues - fees payable in return for permission to moor a boat at a particular harbor.
Negotiations - are formal discussions between people who have different aims or intentions,
especially in business or politics, during which they try to reach an agreement.
Jurisdiction -generally means the power of a court to hear and render a decision in a given
situation. There are different categories of jurisdiction; in rem jurisdiction, in personam or personal jurisdiction,
subject matter jurisdiction, federal or state jurisdiction, original jurisdiction, and pendent jurisdiction are the
most commonly discussed.
National Labor Relations Commission (Filipino: Pambansang Komisyon sa Ugnayang Paggawa, abbreviated NLRC)
- is a commission organized by the Philippine government to resolve, investigate and settle disputes
between employees and employers
Sovereign immunity, or crown immunity - is a legal doctrine by which the sovereign or state cannot
commit a legal wrong and is immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution. It is a principle of international law
which exempts a sovereign state from the jurisdiction of foreign national courts. Sovereign immunity is based
on the concept of sovereignty in the sense that a sovereign may not be subjected without its approval to the
jurisdiction of another sovereign.
FACTS : The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an agreement
which lead to the Social Health Insurance-Networking and Empowerment (SHINE) program wherein said
program seeks to provide health care to Filipino families, especially the poor. The Republic of Germany assigned
the GTZ as the implementing corporation for the program, while the Philippines designated the Department of
Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. Private respondents, as employed by GTZ for the
implementation of the SHINE, had a misunderstanding with the Project Manager of SHINE. This lead to an
exchange of letters which was interpreted to be the resignation of the private respondents. Private respondents
then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. GTZ contends that it is immune from suit as it is
the accredited agency of the Federal Republic of Germany.
ISSUE : Whether or not the GTZ is immune from suit.
RULING : A state immunity from suit may be waived by general or specific law. The special law can
take the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. Jurisprudence is replete with
examples of incorporated government agencies which were ruled not entitled to invoke immunity from suit,
owing to provisions in their charters manifesting their consent to be sued. In this case however, GTZ did not
presented any evidence to support their claim that they are immune from suit, and has failed to obtain a
certification of immunity from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs. If GTZ has done so, then there would
be no ambiguity in their claim that they are immune from suit.
Laurio, Riza
JD 2-4
DFA VS. NLRC
G.R. NO. 113191. SEPTEMBER 18, 1996, VITUG, J.
Parties of the case: Department of Foreign Affairs, petitioner vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER NIEVES V.

DE CASTRO and JOSE C. MAGNAYI,
DOCTRINE:
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to
convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
Diplomatic Immunity- A principle of International Law that provides foreign diplomats with protection from legal
action in the country in which they work.
Reinstatement -to place again (as in possession or in a former position); to restore to a previous effective state.
Malfeasance -the performance by a public official of an act that is legally unjustified, harmful, or
contrary to law; wrongdoing (used especially of an act in violation of a public trust).
Misfeasance -A term used in Tort Law to describe an act that is legal but performed improperly.
Restraining Order -A command of the court issued upon the filing of an application for an Injunction,
prohibiting the defendant from performing a threatened act until a hearing on the application can be held.
Public international law - refers to those laws, rules, and principles of general application that deal with the
conduct of nation states and international organizations among themselves as well as the relationships between
nation states and international organizations with natural and juridical persons.
International organization - is an organization with an international membership, scope, or presence.

There are two main types: International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs): non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that operate internationally.
Extraordinary Remedy - The designation given to such writs as Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, and Quo
Warranto, determined in special proceedings and granted only where absolutely necessary to protect the legal
rights of a party in a particular case, as opposed to the customary relief obtained by the maintenance of an
action.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari filed by DFA (for ADB) against the NLRC invoking its diplomatic immunity
from suit.
ADB was charged of illegal dismissal and its violation of the "labor-only" contracting law under the NLRC. Upon
receipt of the summon, the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and
Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank
(the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government
Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic
immunity from suit and declared the complainant as a regular employee of respondent ADB, and the termination
of his services as illegal.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. The DFA referred to NLRC a "formal vacation of the void judgment.
Dissatisfied, DFA filed this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether ADB is covered by sovereign immunity?
RULING:
Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, ADB shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal
process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to
guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities. In addition, under Article 55 of the
Charter;
“All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including experts performing missions
for the Bank:
(1) shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity, except
when the Bank waives the immunity.”
Furthermore, one of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction,
i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found.
The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts
would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even
influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction
would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-
states.
The petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED
for being NULL AND VOID.
Pabalay, Cloyd
JD 2-4
JUSMAG Philippines vs. The National Labor Relations Commission Second Division and Florencio
Sacramento, Union President, JPFCEA
Immunity – exemption of the state and its organ from the judicial jurisdiction of another state
Principle of the Sovereign Equality of States – one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of
the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal)
Parties:
JUSMAG Philippines
National Labor Relations Commission
Florencio Sacramento
Facts:
Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at Joint United
States Military assistance Group to the Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines) and was the incumbent
president of JUSMAG Philippines-Filipino Civilian Employees Association (JPFCEA), a labor organization. He was
terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. Florencio filed a complaint against JUSMAG for illegal
suspension and dismissal from service. JUSMAG invoked its immunity from suit as an agency of the US and
alleged that it has no juridical personality to sue or be sued. Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed the complaint
for want of jurisdiction but such was reversed by the NLRC on the ground that it waived its right to immunity
from suit when it hired the services of Florencio. The case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint against JUSMAG may prosper
Ruling:
No; Immunity of State from suit is one of the generally accepted principles of international law which is
recognized and adopted as part of the law of the land. Under the principle, a state cannot be sued in the courts
of another State, without its consent or waiver. The application of the doctrine has been restricted to sovereign
or governmental activities and cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts. In this case,
when JUSMAG took the services of Florencio, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the US
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. Since US has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint
cannot prosper.
Pabalay, Cloyd
JD 2-4
Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng) vs. People of the Philippines
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations – an international treaty that defines a framework relation between
independent countries. It specifies the privileges of a diplomatic mission that enables diplomats to perform their
function without fear of coercion or harassment by the host country
Diplomatic Agent – head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission
Parties:
Jeffrey Liang
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Jeffrey Liang, an economist working with the Asian Development Bank, was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against Joyce Cabal, a fellow worker. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant but was released to the
custody of the Security Officer of ADB after paying bail. The judge received an office of protocol from the
Department of Foreign Affairs stating that he is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of ADB in the country.
The judge dismissed the case without notice to the prosecution. The prosecution filed for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA and was denied by the metropolitan trial court. The prosecution then filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig which ruled for the reversal of the ruling and
enforcement of the warrant of arrest earlier issued. He elevated the case to the Court arguing that he is covered
by immunity under the agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Jeffrey Liang is immune from prosecution
Ruling:
No; the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso fact result in the dropping of the charges. The
DFA determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect
in courts. The immunity mentioned in the agreement is not absolute but subject to the exception that the act
was done in official capacity. Slandering a person, specifically imputation of theft, is ultra vires and cannot be
part of official function. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official
functions. But the commission of a crime is not a part of official duty
PADILLA, JOANA LIZA
JD 2-4
NICOLAS vs.. ROMULO,
G.R. NO. 175888, FEBRUARY 11, 2009, AZCUNA, J.
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner,
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al., Respondents.
DOCTRINE:
The 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, require the other contracting State to convert their
system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the
enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under international law.
FACTS:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces who was
charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, sometime on November 1, 2005. Pursuant to the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, the
United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings. The case was
transferred to RTC Makati for security reasons, and during the aforesaid period, the United States Government
faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was
required. After the trial, the court found defendant Smith guilty and ordered him detained at the Makati City jail
until further orders. Subsequently, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine
law enforcement agents, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States
government pursuant to the Romulo-Kenney Agreement, in accordance with the VFA.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the
VFA is void and unconstitutional. Hence, this present action.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional?
RULING:
The VFA is constitutional. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements
involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the
parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can
exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is
curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including
rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another
State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some
aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of
State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another
States territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
PADILLA, JOANA LIZA
JD 2-4
SUPLICIO VS. NEDA
G.R. No. 178830, July 14, 2008
Parties to the Case: ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, et
al. Respondents.
DOCTRINE: Under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but
to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of
our government. It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the
foregoing facts without introduction of evidence.
FACTS:
Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary
injunction were filed and consolidated before the SC which sought the annulment of the award of the contract
for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation and to enjoin any activity in connection with
the said deal. Petitioners contend that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the
execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy. However, during the pendency of
the case, the OSG manifested to the court that the Philippine Government has already decided not to continue
with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project, hence, the case is already rendered moot.
Petitioners argue that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition, which
among others, included the President’s use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan agreements,
this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice the
government or public interest. Explaining the nature of the NBN Project as an executive agreement, respondents
stress that it remained in the negotiation stage, hence, beyond the power of the court to inquire.
ISSUE: Whether courts can take judicial notice of this official act of the President of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes, the court can take judicial notice of the acts of the President. Under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the
President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided in the
rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we
consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the
meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive department,
the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.
PADILLA, JOANA LIZA
JD 2-4
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERSAND INVESTIGATIONS
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, Petitioner,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, et al., Respondents.
DOCTRINES:
• Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome
only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to
resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government in the manner that preserves the
essential functions of each Branch.
• For the claim of executive privilege to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. A formal and proper claim of executive
privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality.
FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos), to be financed by
the People’s Republic of China.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by inviting cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project,
including the petitioner. During the hearing, petitioner testified before respondent Committees and disclosed
that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
ISSUE: Whether the aforementioned communications are covered by executive privilege.

RULING:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The elements of presidential communications privilege:
(1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”; (2)
The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and
(3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing
of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, the court ruled that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Pitallano, Nicky Jonna
JD 2-4
BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. HON. CRISPIN C. LARON
G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
Issue: Locus Standing
Facts:
The City of Dagupan awarded a lease contract in favor of respondent P and M Agro-Development Corporation
over a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. By reason of P and M's failure to comply with the conditions
of the contract, the City filed an action to rescind the lease contract with the RTC of Pangasinan in Dagupan City.
P and M filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. However, during the pendency of the
resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Dagupan adopted
Resolution No. 1462-87 "Authorizing the City Mayor to Enter Into a Contract of Lease with Bugnay Construction
and Development Corporation over the same parcel of lot. P and M, through its counsel, herein private
respondent Regino R. Ravanzo, Jr., filed an action for Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order, Annulment of Contract, and Damages, claiming that while their motion for
reconsideration was still pending, its lease contract with the City continued to exist, hence the lease contract
executed by the City with herein petitioner is allegedly null and void ab initio and an ultra vires act. A temporary
restraining order initially issued by the court was subsequently dissolved on the ground that no great or
irreparable injury would result to the therein applicant P and M if no restraining order will be issued. Private
respondent Ravanzo, Jr., professedly in his capacity as a resident and taxpayer of Dagupan City, filed with the
RTC in Dagupan City the action for "Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order and
Damages". The City and its Acting Mayor filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Ravanzo is not the real
party in interest; the complaint states no cause of action; there is another pending between the same parties
involving the same subject matter, issues, purpose and prayer; and, in effect, there was forum-shopping.
Respondent Judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
1. W/N the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondent Ravanzo, in spite of the
clear pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause was proper.
2. W/N respondent Ravanzo has the personality to file a taxpayer’s suit against the defendants.
Held:
1. No. On the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, or litis pendentia
as a ground for dismissal, there must be between the action under consideration and the other action (1) identity
of the parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions, (2) identity of the rights asserted
and prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, (3) the identity in both cases is such that the
judgment which may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other case. This ground is also referred to as lis pendens or auter action pendant.
In the case at bar, while it may superficially appear that there are two different plaintiffs in the separate cases,
there can be no dispute that both represent the same interest. It is admitted that Ravanzo is the counsel of
record of P and M. After the restraining order in said case was lifted and P and M's prayer for preliminary
injunction to restrain herein petitioner from continuing with the construction of the market building in the
aforesaid case was not acted upon, Ravanzo personally applied for another temporary restraining order and
another writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the very same act of construction, this time under the guise of
a taxpayer suit with himself as the plaintiff. It is all too ludicrously transparent and readily apparent that
respondent Ravanzo merely sought in another branch of the same court, figuratively using the hat of a taxpayer,
what he failed to obtained in one branch, under the hat of a representing counsel.
2. No. The essence of a taxpayer's right to institute such an action hinges on the existence of that requisite
pecuniary or monetary interest. It is also exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can
invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to an member of the public.
JD 2-4
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act
(R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
In the case of Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary, petitioner sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than
7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they
themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian
reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
In the case of Manaay vs Juico, Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO
228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and
that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation. Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners
may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian
reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class
and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not
see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress
is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is
no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just
compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if
the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,
the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not
agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction
for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be
used for just compensation.
JD 2-4
PHILCONSA VS. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ
G.R. NO. 113105 AUGUST 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic
Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994.
Issue: W/N the Senate has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed
on an item in an appropriation bill.
Held: Yes. Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the
President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises. To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the
Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which
can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.
San Diego, Febrie
JD 2-4
GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)
JUSTICIABLE QUESTION calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies wherein there are rights
(property or personal rights) involved which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is one which is proper
to be examined or decided in courts of justice because its determination would not involve an encroachment
upon the legislative or executive power.
POLITICAL QUESTION is one which under the Constitution “is to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the validity or legality,
of a particular measure or a contested act.
PLEBISCITE is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people.
PARTIES:
RAMON A. GONZALES - Petitioner
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL - Respondents.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA) - Petitioner
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS - Respondent.
FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed Resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3.
1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum
of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member.
2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed of
two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held
on the second Tuesday of November 1971.
3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic
Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions
No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November
14, 1967.
Two cases were filed against this act of Congress:
1. G.R. No. L-28196: An original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, a
Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf
of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.
2. G.R. No. L-28224: Case filed by PHILCONSA, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of
law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution?
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
RULING:
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.
In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths
of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, said resolutions are null
and void because Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution
calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen (based upon Section 5, Article
VI, of the Constitution, no apportionment has been made been made by Congress within three (3) years since
1960. Thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that
Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen);
However, As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a
constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends —
in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority
— upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the
main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum
number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority
given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto,
to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who constitute the
minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly,
constitutional.
One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional
amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested
in the issues involved in the election.
Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to indicate that the
election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment
to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to
submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
San Diego, Febrie
JD 2-4
DAZA VS. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
POLITICAL REALIGNMENT means the “convergence of like-minded political players in a common spot (party,
coalition) to better and more effectively pursue their common ideals.”
POLITICAL QUESTION is one which under the Constitution “is to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the validity or legality,
of a particular measure or a contested act.
PARTIES:
REP. RAUL A. DAZA - Petitioner
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS - Respondent
FACTS:
The House of Representatives (HoR) proportionally apportioned its twelve (12) seats in the Commission of
Appointments (CoA) among several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec
18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House
of Representatives. Twenty four (24) members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party
to only seventeen (17) members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission of
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December
5th, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the
Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO
that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed
that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political
realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of
the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved
here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission
on Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
San Diego, Febrie
JD 2-4
BASCO VS. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING, CORPORATION, 197 SCRA 52 (1991)
LEGAL STANDING (Locus standi) is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
PARTIES:
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ - Petitioners
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) - Respondent
FACTS:
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by Presidential Decree
1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos
on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence
in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate
all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. They claim
that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local
autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to waive its right
to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
3. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
RULING:
1. Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty,
under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given
to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
(Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the
same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking
they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement
and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they
were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have
since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
2. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not
clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse
racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869
for one, unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does
not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit
the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they
were the same.
3. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was
clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may
provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The
Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations
are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its
“general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or
even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are
owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governments.
San Jose, Geno
JD2-4
KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. GUINGONA
G. R. NO. 113375, MAY 5, 1994
Parties of the case: KILOSBAYAN Inc., petitioner
Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,, Respondent
Doctrine: Contracts entered by Governmental instrumentalities shall not be contrary to law. Law shall promote
general welfare of the people; develop good moral and ethical considerations. It shall not be contrary to law,
good moral, custom and public welfare.
Definition of Terms: Good Moral pertains to principles of right conduct or distinction between right and wrong.
Conveying truth to the counsel as to right conduct.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the
authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO
decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its
sources of funds. After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya
Group Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has
been long engaged in lottery operations in Asia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.
As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors
in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC),
which was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the
project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line
lottery system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids
and Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office
of the President. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that respondent PGMC may finally
operate the country's on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be
submitted for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Petitioners also
submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an
arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or
"association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities
"in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or
domestic." Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC)
in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.
RULING:
The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by respondent PCSO and
respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the
petitioners which was raised by the respondents should be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition
to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a
category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays
of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are
as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier
which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, is
indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint
venture" with any other party. Thus, the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary
to law.
San Jose, Geno
JD 2-4
LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (IAC)
G.R. NO. L-66614 JANUARY 25, 1988
Parties: Leveriza, Parungao and Vasco, Petitioners
IAC, Respondent
Definition of Terms: Contract is a voluntary arrangement between two or more parties that is enforceable by
law as binding agreement.
Doctrine: General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally
be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute
prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one designed therefore specially should prevail.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines (RP) through the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) entered into a lease
contract (Contract A) on April 2, 1965 with Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square
meters, for 25 years.
On May 21, 1965, another lease contract (Contract B and in effect a sublease) was entered into by and between
Rosario C. Leveriza and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. (MOPI) over the same parcel of land, but reduced to
3,000 square meters for 25 years.
On June 1, 1968, a new lease contract (Contract C) was entered into, by and between CAA and MOPI over the
same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years, without the approval of the secretary of
the Public Works and Communications (PWC).
Due to the overlapped term of the lease contracts between CAA, Leveriza and MOPI, the CAA seeks the rescission
or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and
depends has already been cancelled by the CAA and maintains that Contract C with the CAA is the only valid and
subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned. On the other
hand, Leverizas' claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and still
valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between MOPI and CAA which should be declared void.
The lower court and Intermediate Appellate Court ruled in favor of CAA, hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the administrator of CAA had the statutory authority, without the approval of the then secretary
of the PWC, to enter into or cancel a lease contract over a real property owned by the RP.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court upheld CAA’s authority to enter into and cancel a contract of lease over a property
owned by the RP without the approval of the secretary of the PWC.
Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), such contract of lease must be executed: (1) by the
President of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer expressly vested by
law. It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for
the government under the third category.
As provided in Section 32 of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation
and existence, administers properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and it is on these properties
that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and execute
contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold,
purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary.
The basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes
are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore specially should prevail.
San Jose, Geno
JD 2-4
STO. DOMINGO VS. DELOS ANGELES
G. R. NO. L-30135, FEB 21, 1980
Parties of the case: Sto. Domingo, Mapile, Tuason and Reyes, petitioners
Hon Judge Delos Angeles.,, Respondent
Doctrine: General legislation gives way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally must be so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable.
Definition of Terms: Preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. It is not a

punishment.
FACTS:
On October 24, 1968, SAN PASCUAL filed a Complaint with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV (Civil Case No. Q-12528), presided by respondent Judge de los Angeles
against Mayor Sto. Domingo, the members of the Board of Investigators of San Juan, the Chairman and
Commissioner of the POLCOM, and REYES. SAN PASCUAL alleged that the complaint filed against him before the
POLCOM was capricious and without factual and legal basis and prayed for damages as well as for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the oppressive exercise of authority by defendants therein and to restrain them
from proceeding with the administrative investigation, and/or preventively suspending SAN PASCUAL.
Additionally, SAN PASCUAL raised the question of legality and constitutionality of the procedure laid down in
Republic Act No. 4864 7and the creation of the Police Commission there under, which he claimed was in conflict
with the Decentralization Law, or Republic Act No. 5185, and contended that the latter law should prevail. On
November 8, 1968, respondent Judge granted the Writ prayed for. Enjoining the respondents (petitioners
herein) and the office of which they act, the Police Commission and Local Board of Investigators of San Juan,
Rizal, and any and all of the defendants in proceeding or taking any action on the aforesaid complaint or issuing
an order based on the said complaint or any provisions of the Police Act of 1966 like that of suspending the
plaintiff from his position as Police chief of San Juan, Rizal, upon filing of a bond in the sum of P1,000.00
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge have grace abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of preliminary
Injunction
RULING:
Yes, the Orders dated November 8, 1968 and December 24, 1968, respectively, issued by respondent Judge are
nullified and set aside and the Restraining Order heretofore issued converted into a permanent Writ of
Injunction.
In the final analysis, the Decentralization Act does not vest any specific power in the Commissioner of Civil
Service in addition to what has been granted by the Civil Service Law. For it is essentially a mere restatement of
the rule that the suspension or removal of civil service employees in general "shall be subject to the provisions
of civil service law, rules and relimations." Under that law, by the terms of Section 16 (i), the power of the Civil
Service Commission 'to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all
permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service ...' is qualified by the phrase "except
as otherwise provided by law." As regards members of local police forces, there is such a statute, the Police Act
of 1966 which confers such disciplinary power in the Police Commission.
Tampico, Eldene L.
JD 2-4
DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
120 SCRA 760, 1983
Parties of the case: Rogelio de Jesus, petitioner
Ananias Hibo, private respondent
Doctrine of the case: Legislative intent
Legislative intent— a practice used by judges, lawyers and other court officials to determine the goals of
legislators at the time of a bill's passage
Jurisdiction— the power of a court to adjudicate cases and issue orders
Facts: Ananias Hibo, defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of
Casiguran, Sorsogon in the local elections of January 18, 1980, filed with the COMELEC a complaint
charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978
Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan
prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89
and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. The
following information, was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the
Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In its opposition, the
prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan’s exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute, and
try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office.
Held: It is noted that while Section 184 of the Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4
of PD No. 1606 speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to
their office. Needless to state, as between specific and general statute, the former must prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does. PD 1606 should be understood to
refer to offenses other than election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office.
The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses
to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would
result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right
and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional
provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its
prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses
committed by public officers in relation to their office, as contradistinguished from the clear and
categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance
under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
Tampico, Eldene L.
JD 2-4
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Parties of the case: Ernesto B. Francisco
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino Inc.
Doctrine of the case: Political question doctrine
Political question— the idea that an issue is so politically charged that federal courts, which are typically viewed
as the apolitical branch of government, should not hear the issue
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of
the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
Velasco, Dianne
JD 2-4
G.R. No. 175888 February 11, 2009
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO Et al.
G.R. No. 176051
JOVITO R. SALONGA, Et al. vs.
DANIEL SMITH, Et al.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176222
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), Et al. vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Et al.
Facts
These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in Smith v. Hon. Pozon, dated January 2, 2007.
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged
with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005. Pursuant
to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, the United
States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings. During the trial, the
United States Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court
every time his presence was required.
Pursuant to The RTC Makati’s guilty order, Smith was ordered detained at the Makati jail until further orders.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine
law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders and brought to a facility for detention under the
control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the
United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:
xxx that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal
Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:
xxx that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of
Smith from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy
Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military
personnel. The Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States
is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.
The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007 to DISMISS the petition
for having become moot.
Hence, the present actions.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the
VFA is void and unconstitutional. They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign
power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. Against
the barriers of res judicata vis-à-vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis-à-vis all the parties, the reversal of the previous
ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the
Republic, as well as a specific mandate of the Constitution under Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting State.The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence
of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and
the foreign sovereign State involved.
Issues
1. Whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed
"under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."
2. Whether or not the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 and the Romulo-Kenney
Agreement of December 22, 2006 are valid.
Ruling
1. Yes. First, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty
by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this
is a matter of internal United States law. As it can be clearly gleaned from the agreement, joint RP-US military
exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions
of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-
US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty.
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit
the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act
within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a
binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII,
Sec. 25 of our Constitution. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter
of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
Article V, Section 6 of the VFA provides that in cases of offenses :
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense
until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by
the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any
investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged. In
extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government
regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine
judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations
under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year
period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States
authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to
do so.
The Court finds no violation of the Constitution. The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a
substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements
involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the
parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can
exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. Nothing
in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of
jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State,
diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s
territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
2. No. Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when
it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the
rule that governs is Article V, Section 10 of the VFA which states:
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out
in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving
sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention
after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific
arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities
of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney
Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United
States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States
towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the
VFA.

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Aguila, Kirsten S.

COMMISSIONER vs. EASTERN SEA TRADING

G.R. No. L-14279

Parties to the Case:

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, petitioners

EASTERN SEA TRADING, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.

Valentin Gutierrez for respondent.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. JUDGE LANTION

G.R. No. 139465

Parties to the Case:

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

DBM-PS vs. KOLONWEL

G.R. No. 139465

Parties to the Case:

KOLONWEL TRADING, Respondent

Will the petition prosper?

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines

Administrative order – enforceable order issued by a public authority to an individual or an organization

Customary law – as aspect of international law involving the principle of custom.

Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines

Respondents: Health secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the DOH.

Comity – a friendly social atmosphere.

Estate – the things left by someone who has died.

Juridiction – the power or right to make judgments.

Pecuniary – consisting of or measure in money.

Petitioner: Prominent victims of human rights violations.

Respondent: Honorable Ranada and Estate of Marcos.

Mary Jean B. Tagistis

Petitioner: PNP forces

1. The established, widespread, and consistent practice of the States; and

Parties of the case: Presidential Commission on Good Government and

Magtanggol C. Gunugundo, in his capacity as Chairmain thereof, petitioners

Sandiganbayan and Officeco Holdings, N.V., respondents

Doctrine: Act of State Doctrine

(1) res judicata;

(2) lack of jurisdiction on account of the "act of state doctrine";

376 U.S. 398, 1964

Parties of the case: Banco Nacional de Cuba, petitioner

Doctrine: Act of State Doctrine

90 Phil 83, 1951

Parties of the case: Hilarion Tolentino, plaintiff-appellant

Doctrine: Act of State Doctrine; Guarantee of Equal Protection

(2) whether or not said Act is constitutional.

ISABELITA VINUYA, ET AL. VS. ALBERTO ROMULO, ET AL.

Parties : Vinuya Et al, petitioner

Exec. Sec. Romulo, et al. , respondent

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansa Makabayan) VS Executive Secretary Zamora

Parties : BAYAN, petitioner

Exec. Sec. Zamora , respondent

PIMINTEL ET AL. VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 158088

Parties : Senator Aquilino Pimintel Et al, petitioner

Exec. Sec. Romulo, et al. , respondent

G.R. NO. 85750. SEPTEMBER 28, 1990

WHO vs. Aquino

48 SCRA 242, 1974

2. Inter alia – among other things

BAER vs. TIZON

RAQUIZA VS. BRADFORD

75 Phil 50, 1945

Parties of the case: LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,

LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.

1. Immanent – existing or operating within; inherent