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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

ARTICLE 21-88

PEOPLE v ARROJADO
G.R. No. 130492 | January 31, 2001

TICKLER: Cousin murder aka suicide. Suplada.

DOCTRINE: The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1,


2000, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but
also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in
the light of the well settled rule that “statutes regulating the procedure of the court
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. Thus
herein aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant
for failure to allege the same in the information.

FACTS:

Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins, their fathers
being brothers. The victim's father, Alberto Arrojado, who was living in Canada,
suffered a stroke for which reason he decided to come home to Roxas City and
spend the remainder of his days there. The victim accompanied her father to the
Philippines. They eventually settled in a house in Brgy Tanque, Roxas City, where
they lived on the financial support of the victim's siblings.

Thereafter, Salvador lived with the victim and her father. He helped care for the
victim's father, for which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary. One morning,
Salvador went to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had
committed suicide. In response, Erlinda, together with her husband Romulo
Magdaluyo and her father Teodorico Arrojado, went with Salvador to the house in
Brgy Tanwue where they found the victim dead. The victim, who was bloodied, was
lying on her left side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped together. On
her bed was a rosary and a cruifix. Near her was a knife. Erlinda recognized it to be
the knife kept in the kitchen. Erlinda also noticed that the electric fan was turned on
full blast, while all the windows were closed except the window on the east side
which was slightly open. As he went to the other room, where the victim's father
stayed, Salvador told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be suspected as the one
responsible for the victim's death. The matter was reported to the police which
noticed that the victim's room "was very neat as if nothing happened." The police
saw no signs of forcible entry. They made a sketch of the victim's position in relation
to the whole house and took pictures of her. The postmortem examination of the
victim showed that she died at around midnight from fatal wounds. The doctor listed
"HEMORRHAGIC SHOCK as the victim's immediate cause of death and "multiple
stab wounds" as the antecedent cause.

Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim and

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

Salvador had been strained as the victim constantly picked on the latter even for the
slighest mistake. Erlinda remembered the scolding that the victim gave Salvador
over lost keys. Salvadort was badly hurt by the victim's tonguelashing, according to
Erlinda, and complained to the victim, "You're too much.”

Another relative of accused-appellant and the victim, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated


Erlinda's testimony. Other testimonies from relatives testified that they knew the
victin to be a snob ("suplada") and overly strict.

Salvador testified in his behalf. He told the court that one Alberto Arrojado asked him
for food, so he went to the kitchen to find out if the victim had already prepared
breakfast. When he found that the victim was not in the kitchen, he proceeded to the
victim's room. From the doorway, he saw the victim lying on her bed, bloodied. He
thought that the victim had committed suicide because the victim had told him that
she felt tied down taking care of her father. She in fact once remarked that "It would
be better that my father and I commit suicide." Salvador further said that the victim
scolded him only once and that was for buying rotten cabbage. He said that the
victim was the one who was constantly being scolded by her father who often found
fault with her. When presented with the knife found on the victim's bed (he admitted
he was familiar with the knife as he saw the victim using it in kitchen.

CRIME CHARGED: MURDER

RTC: MURDER, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659, and, there being
no aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him to imprisonment of thirty (30)
years of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Mary Ann
Arrojado in the amount of P60,000.00, pay them moral damages of P80,000.00, and
pay the costs of this action. In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of
liberty, the accused, who is a detention prisoner and not otherwise disqualified, shall
be credited with the full time of his confinement under preventive imprisonment,
provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

RTC maintaining that the accused was the only person in the world who had the
strong motive to eliminate from earthly existence the deceased. Further, it held that
suicide was physically impossible and there being no shared of evidence showing
that an intruder could have surreptitiously entered the house as all doors and
windows were securely closed, the killing could have been done only by someone
who was already inside the house. Reinforcing this conclusion is the admission of
the accused that when he peeped into the room of the deceased and allegedly saw
for the first time the lifeless body of the victim, he was already sure, even without
going near or touching her body and asking aloud what happened to her, that she
was already dead because he stabbed her not only once, but ten (10) times,
inflicting five (5) mortal wounds. And he had the gall to attribute his cousin's untimely
death to suicide because he could not concoct any other reason to save himself.

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

CA: N/A

ISSUES:
• 1. Was the victim murdered by Arrojado?
• 2. Can the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence be appreciated, and
would elevate the penalty of murder from reclusion perpetua to death even though it
was not alleged in the said information?

RULING:

1. YES. In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the


perpetrator of the crime:
a) Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latter’s father were the only ones
living in the house in which the crime was committed in the evening of May
31, 1996.
b) No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were
locked and the windows had grills.
c) Accused-appellant had access to the victim’s bedroom because the
bedroom doors were left unlocked so that the victim could check on her
father’s condition during the night. Accused-appellant sleeps in the same
bedroom as the victim’s father.
d) The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the
occupants of the house. As the Solicitor General observed, common sense
dictates that if an outsider entered the house with the intent to kill the
victim, he would have brought his own weapon to ensure the execution of
his purpose.
e) None of the victim’s belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that
the motive for the crime was not gain but revenge.
f) Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half
of which were fatal), the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger
toward the victim. Accused-appellant had admitted those feelings to Erlinda
Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado.
g) Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge
against the victim.
h) As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellant’s behavior in
the morning of June 1, 1996 was inconsistent with someone who had just
found his cousin and employer, a person he claims to get along with, dead.
By his testimony, he did not even go inside the room to check on her
condition on the lame excuse that he was afraid. He also did not inform his
neighbors about the incident for the equally flimsy reason that he did not
know them nor did he go to the police.

2. YES. (Ang weird though, kasi walang AC sa RTC Ruling but SC held the
former was correct in appreciating treachery.)

With respect to the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the

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Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
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Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To


appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked np opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or
consciously adopted. Both requisites have been established in this case.

Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the
victim was not in a position to fight the assailant and that she might have been
stabbed while she was asleep. As regards the second requisite, the number
and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim lead to no other conclusion
than that accused-appellant employed means in killing the victim which tended
directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from
the defense so many wounds, a total 10, half of which were fatal, if he had not
deliberately adopted such manner of attack. Abuse of superior strength also
attended the killing since accused-appellant, a man and armed with a knife,
attacked the victim, an unarmed and defenseless woman. However, since
abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, there is no need to
appreciate it separately as an independent aggravating circumstance.

The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation
since the requisites have not been established in this case.

Nor can the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated


against accused-appellant since the latter and the victim lived in the same
house.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present


in this case. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show
that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such
as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit
the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the
commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's
belied that the former would not abuse said confidence.

In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for
which reason she entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed as shown by the fact that she
took back her personal effects from Erlinda Thinking that accused-appellant
would not do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim
allowed accused-appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left
the bedroom doors unlocked.

Even though, the murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659 on December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from
reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in

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4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should
have imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant.

However, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1,


2000, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying
but also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given
retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that “statutes regulating the
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent.

In this case, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence was not


alleged in the said information, thus the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence cannot be appreciated to raise the penalty to death.

DECISION: The decision of the RTC, Roxas City, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and to its full extent

PEOPLE v NELMIDA
G.R. No. 184500 | September 11, 2012

TICKLER: Mayor Tawan-Tawan ambushed.

DOCTRINES:

1. When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.

2. In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in


the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only
one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex
crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex
crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.

FACTS:

Mayor Tawan-tawan was with his security escorts composed of some members of
the PNP with civilian aides while the appellants and their co-accused surreptitiously
waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. The moment the vehicle
of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by them, the appellants and their co-accused opened
fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered firearms. Both Macasuba

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

and PFC Tomanto saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road with an
armalite rifle. Macasuba was also able to identify other appellants as among the
ambushers. On the occasion of the ambush, two security died, while others suffered
injuries.

Defense: Denial and alibi.

CRIME CHARGED: Amended Information: DOUBLE MURDER with MULTIPLE


FRUSTRATED MURDER and DOUBLE ATTEMPTED MURDER.
RTC: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC Decision.
ISSUE: Was there complex crime?

RULING: NO.

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes
of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus,
only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is
known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of
two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result
in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire
from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.

Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances
present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of
the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and
their co-accused. Appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act
but several individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."

DECISION: Appellants should be convicted of SEPARATE CRIME – two (2) counts


of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder – and NOT of a COMPLEX
CRIME.

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PEOPLE v ARTURO PUNZALAN


G.R. No. 199892 | December 10, 2012

TICKLER: Philippine Navy in Zambales. “All-in-One” to “Aquarius.” “Patayin ang ilaw”


into “Sinong papatayin?”

DOCTRINE:

1. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.

2. In view of the enactment of RA 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death


penalty, the penalty for the killing of each of the two victims is reduced to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

FACTS:

In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1
Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were
among the members of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education
and Training Command (NETC) at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales.

On August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the “All-in-One”
Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a
nearby videoke bar, “Aquarius,” where they continued their drinking session. Shortly
thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a
flickering light bulb inside “Aquarius.” When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be
turned off (“Patayin ang ilaw”), appellant who must have misunderstood and
misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement belligerently reacted asking, “Sinong
papatayin?,” thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried
to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in
behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible
words and pounding his fist on the table.

To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave “Aquarius” and return to the
NETC camp. They walked in two’s, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the first
group, followed by the group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna in the last group, with each group at one arm’s length distance from the other.
Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which was being manned by SN1
Noel de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time. SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue before proceeding to
follow their companions.

Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN

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Dimaala flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number
DRW 706. The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking
of liquor, as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered, “kasi chief, gago ang mga ‘yan!,” while
pointing toward the direction of the navy personnel’s group. Even before he was given
the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while uttering,
“papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!”

While F1EN Dimaala was writing the van’s plate number and details in the logbook, he
suddenly heard a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away
towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy
personnel prompting him to exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, “chief, binangga ang tropa!” SN1
De Guzman then asked permission to go to the scene of the incident and check on the
navy personnel.

When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown
away towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost consciousness.
When they came to, they saw SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the ground. SN1 Cuya
tried to resuscitate SN1 Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to chase the van. SN1
Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group and was pushed away from
the path of the speeding van. He was able to see the vehicle’s plate number. He also
tried to chase the van with SN1 Bacosa but they turned around when the vehicle made a
U-turn as they thought that it would come back for them. The vehicle, however, sped
away again when other people started to arrive at the scene of the incident.

CRIME CHARGED: Complex Crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with


Multiple Attempted Murder attended by aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle

RTC: GUILTY of Complex crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with multiple
Attempted Murder attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Defense: Art 11, par 4 and no treachery

CA: AFFIRMED the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: Is appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted
murder?

SC: YES, the felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court
of Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime
contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 48. Penalty for complex
crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Appellant
was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act

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of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the
navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same
time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1
Domingo. The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law
attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for
murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty. Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Article 63[56] of the same Code provides that if the penalty prescribed
is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there is an
aggravating circumstance the higher penalty should be imposed. Since use of vehicle
can be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance, treachery, by itself, being
sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper imposable penalty the higher sanction is death.
In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty for the killing of each of the two victims is reduced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.

DECISION: Complex crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder: reclusion
perpetua

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v DANTE DULAY


G.R. No. 194629 | April 21, 2014

TICKLER: Orlando Sr. and Jr., grenade thrown.

DOCTRINE: Pursuant to RA 9346, the penalty of death which would have been
imposable is properly reduced to reclusion perpetua but the RTC erred in stating in
the body of the decision that Dulay was guilty as well of “frustrated murder” as
charged in the Information with respect to the bomb-injured Orlando Legaspi, Jr., and
yet convicted him in the dispositive part only of “attempted murder”.

FACTS:

In the evening of December 30, 2002 at around 6:30 in the evening, Orlando Jr.
(Junior), was outside the kitchen of their house in Aglipay, Province of Quirino. His
father, Orlando Sr., was also somewhere in the yard. Junior was then playing with a
flashlight and directed its beam towards the grassy area where he discovered his
Uncle Dulay, whom he recognized because of the characteristic “mumps” below his
left ear. Melanie, Junior’s sister, also saw Dulay as he was staring at their father.
Thereafter, their uncle, suddenly threw something that resembled a ball towards the
cemented part of the yard. It turned out to be a grenade and it landed seven meters
from where Junior and his father were. Dulay then went away on his bicycle towards
the direction of his house. When the grenade exploded, Junior was hurt in his pelvic
area, while his father was fatally hit by shrapnel, causing his death.

Defense of the accused: Alibi

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CRIME CHARGED: Murder (Orlando Legaspi Sr.); Frustrated Murder (Orlando


Legaspi Jr.)

RTC: GUILTY of Complex Crime of Murder with Attempted Murder and is sentenced
to Reclusion Perpetua
1. He is further ordered to pay the heirs Orlando Legaspi Sr., the sum of 50,000
as civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of 50,000;
2. Also, he must pay 30,000 pesos as moral damages to Orlando Legaspi Jr.;
3. 115, 956 as actual expenses/damages for the hospitalization of the two victims
namely: Orlando Legaspi Sr. and Orlando Legaspi Jr.

CA: AFFIRMED conviction with MODIFICATION. Complex Crime of Murder and


Frustrated Murder

Sentenced to suffer:
1. Penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
2. The award of actual damages in the amount of 115, 956 for the hospital
expenses of the two victims;
3. The award of civil indemnity for the death of Orlando Sr., in the increased
amount of 75,000;
4. The award of moral damages in the respective amounts of 75,000 and 55,000
for Orlando Senior and Junior; and
5. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of 30,000 each for both
Orlando Senior and Junior.

The CA held that pursuant to RA 9346, the penalty of death which would have been
imposable is properly reduced to reclusion perpetua but the RTC erred in stating in
the body of the decision that Dulay was guilty as well of “frustrated murder” as
charged in the Information with respect to the bomb-injured Orlando Legaspi, Jr., and
yet convicted him in the dispositive part only of “attempted murder”. The prosecution
was able to establish that all acts of execution, not merely preparatory acts, were
performed to produce the felony as a consequence, but Junior nevertheless survived
for reasons independent of the will of the perpetrator; that is, the timely medical
assistance to him.

ISSUE: Is the amount of indemnities to be paid to the victim as determined by the CA


proper?

RULING:

YES. The Court retains the award by the CA of 75,000 as moral damages, exemplary
damages at 30,000 and civil indemnity at 75,000 to the heirs of Orlando Legaspi Sr.,
in conformity with our Ruling in People v. Barde. Next, the Court awards moral and
exemplary damages to Junior in the amounts of 50,000 and 20,000. (*Before the CA
Moral 55,000 and Exemplary Damages 30,000). The Court upholds the CA’s decision

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

with regard the amount of 115, 956 as actual damages.

The Court imposes an interest of six percent per annum on the award of civil
indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.

DECISION: The Court thus AFFIRMS the CA decision, with modification on the
awarded indemnities.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v HON. JUSTICE GARCHITORENA


G.R. No. 109266 | December 2, 1993

TICKLER: Unqualified aliens, Anti-graft and corrupt practices act.

DOCTRINE: For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are
united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside:
(a) the Resolution in Criminal Case No. 16698 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) of
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena
of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the
Resolution of said court promulgated inwhich deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended
Informations against petitioner.

Petitioner was charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly
committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
Program. Petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she
was then a presidential candidate. Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding
Justice Garchitorena. Criminal case was set for arraignment. Petitioner moved to defer
the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that
petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars to which the Sandiganbayan
denied. Petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars alleging that petitioner had
approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and
advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was
furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and
prepare for trial. At the hearing, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32 Amended
Informations. Justice Garchitorena denied the motion for his disqualification.
Sandiganbayan admitted the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post
the corresponding bail bonds. Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division): Acting on the petition for the issuance of a


restraining order issued a resolution ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE
and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally
resolved by this Court.
CA: N/A.

ISSUE:
1. Should Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice be disqualified?
2. Was there a denial of due process?
3. Is petitioner guilty of a crime delito continuado?

RULING:

1. Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the


publication of is letter issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged"
the validity of the information filed against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding
Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the conclusions he has
subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on
the merits of the case . . ." The letter in question was written in response to an
item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the Philippine Star, criticizing the
Sandiganbayan for issuing a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno
wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the
lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice. In particular, petitioner considered
as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena that petitioner
had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified
aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program." The statement
complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in
connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. It appears that
petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order. The letter of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court,
with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the
letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. It should be taken
into consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices
in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving at
any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the
Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on
the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena.

2. Claim of denial of due process

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were
violated by reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
Here, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled
because of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the
original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first
reported in an issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the
investigatory process was set in motion. The case was handled by a panel of four
prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the charge. Petitioner
has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information against her in the petitions filed.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts
complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations. Petitioner claims that the Amended Informations did not allege that
she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are
two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

3. Delito continuado

The public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after


manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended
information. We also noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the
motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the original
information. Technically, there was only one crime that was committed in
petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file
against her. The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito
continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a
period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions
are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the
same criminal purpose or aim. A delito continuado consists of several crimes but
in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator. Such offense as
consistitutes of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.
Under Article 10 of the RPC, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws,
unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles in RPC may be
applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws. Here,
the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act —
that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under
the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the
criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive
Order No. 324, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government,

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

and (iii) was done on a single day. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced
verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word
"aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of
the individual whose stay was legalized. At the hearing of the motion for a bill of
particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file only one
amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. The 32
Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period
of time. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or
the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen,
as when the approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public
prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury. Sandiganbayan stated in its
resolution that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is
concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the
law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the
country in granting citizenship to those not qualified.

DECISION: The Decision of Sandiganbayan (First Division) was affirmed is resolution in


Criminal Case No. 16698 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32
Amended Informations into one information charging only one offense under the original
case number. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED insofar as
to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

PEOPLE VS. QUIACHON


G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006

TICKLER: Deaf-mute minor raped by father.

DOCTRINES:
1. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.
2. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, are not
eligible for parole.
3. Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9346, the
Supreme Court has resolved, as it hereby resolves, to maintain the award of
P75,000.00 for rape committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty would have been imposed prior
to R.A. No. 9346.

FACTS:

On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and
they were covered by a blanket. His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and
Rowel could hear Rowena crying. The following morning, he told his mother's sister

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

Carmelita about what he had witnessed. They went to the police to report what had
transpired. Rowena, who was only 8 years old at the time, deaf-mute, testified that her
father had sexual intercourse with her and even touched her breasts against her will.
Appellant Rowel denied raping Rowena and alleged that Virginia Moraleda and
Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his deceased common-law wife, held a grudge
against him because he abandoned his family and was not able to support them;
while his son Rowel was already hostile to him because he was closer to his
daughters.

CRIME CHARGED: QUALIFIED RAPE

RTC: GUILTY of QUALIFIED RAPE. Death Penalty, P75,000.00 as compensatory


damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The case was automatically elevated to the Supreme Court by reason of the death
penalty imposed on appellant. However, pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People v.
Mateo, the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals.

Doctrine in People v. Mateo: Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible
avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused,
and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals particularly on the factual issues would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals
should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it
could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the
circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the
entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.

CA: Death Penalty (minority and relationship are special qualifying circumstances
in the crime of rape that warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death);
modified damages: P75,000 as civil indemnity; P75,000 as moral damages; and
P25,000 as exemplary damages.

In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (re: death penalty cases resolution) which
took effect on October 15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the entire records of the case was elevated to the Supreme
Court for review.

ISSUE: Is the appellant guilty of qualified rape as to warrant imposition of death


penalty?

RULING: YES. The RTC and CA correctly found the appellant guilty of qualified rape,
however, in view of the enactment of RA No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion
perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be


imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code;
or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not
make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code.

The afore-quoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the
principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws
which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied
under Article 22 of the RPC “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time
of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same.”

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346
provides that “persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not
be eligible for parole.”

With respect to the award of damages, the SC affirmed the CA. Even if the penalty of
death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No.
9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense.

DECISION: AFFIRMED the CA Decision. RA 9346 applicable.

PEOPLE v SALOME
G.R. No. 169077 | August 31,2006

TICKLER: 13 years old, pregnant, neighbor, fishing

DOCTRINE: In light of the passage of RA 9346, which was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death
penalty has been prohibited. Pursuant to said law, the penalty shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua but accused shall not be eligible parole under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. The automatic appeal in cases where the trial court imposes the death
penalty will not apply, so that there is a need to perfect an appeal if appeal is desired,
from a judgment of conviction for an offense where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua in lieu of death.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

FACTS:

The victim Sally and the accused were neighbors. Sally, then 13 years old, was
sleeping with her 3 year old brother when she was awakened by accused who was
poking a knife at her neck. While holding the knife with one hand, accused undressed
her and threatened that he would kill her and her family if she told anyone about the
incident. He removed his shorts, spread her legs and was able to insert his penis into
her vagina. According to Sally, she merely closed her eyes while the rape was being
committed and did not call for help because the next house was around 800 meters
away. After having his way, accused left after repeating his threat. Fearful for her and
her family’s safety, Sally left the province and went to Manila to work as a domestic
helper. Four months later, she complained of stomach aches and upon having an
ultrasound, she confirmed that she was pregnant. A criminal complaint for rape was
filed against the accused.

Version of the defense: accused claimed that on the alleged date of the incident he
was out fishing with Villarey and Torralba. While the latter confirmed that they indeed
went fishing with accused, they testified that they went home early and were not
aware of accused’s activities after that.

CRIME CHARGED: RAPE

RTC: GUILTY of RAPE with aggravating circumstance of dwelling and use of a


deadly weapon; sentenced to DEATH

CA: AFFIRMED RTC Decision

ISSUES:
1. Was accused correctly convicted of the crime of rape?
2. Should the death penalty be imposed?

RULING:
1. YES. In the crime of rape, if the lone testimony of the victim is credible,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the natural course of things,
it is competent to establish the guilt of the accused. This is even more so if it
involves the testimony of a reap victim of tender or immature age such as in
the instant case. The victim’s failure to resist the advances of accused or shout
for help does not negate the commission of rape. Intimidation is subjective and
must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception at the time of the crime.
The act of holding a knife to the neck of the victim is suggestive of force or at
least intimidation. Sally’s delay in reporting the rape case due to threats on her
life was justified.

2. NO. Since the accused committed the crime with the use of a deadly
weapon, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The crime is further
aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling. Art. 63 of the RPC provides that in

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when an aggravating
circumstance is present in the commission of the crime. Thus, the imposable
penalty is death. In light, however, of the passage of RA 9346, which was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. Pursuant to said law, the
penalty shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua but accused shall not be eligible
parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. It should be noted that while the
new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for
by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous.
Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still 75,000. The automatic
appeal in cases where the trial court imposes the death penalty will not apply,
so that there is a need to perfect an appeal if appeal is desired, from a
judgment of conviction for an offense where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua in lieu of death.

DECISION: The decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED, in light of RA 9346


prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty. Accused is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.

ARNEL COLINARES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 182748 | December 13, 2011

TICKLER: Huge stone.

DOCTRINE: The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of
liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. With a higher court’s finding that the accused
is guilty only of a lesser crime, the accused, with the new penalty should be allowed
to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

FACTS:

Prosecution:
Rufino Buena testified that at around 7:00pm, he and Jesus Paulite went out to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with
Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice
on the head with a huge stone (15 inches diameter). Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus
fled.

Ananias Jallores testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the
right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

Paciano Alano testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be
smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought
Rufino to the hospital.

The Medico-Legal Certificate showed that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on
the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were
serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

Defense:
Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening
when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked
Rufino where he supposed the Mayor was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him,
causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back.
Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending
himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged
towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and
hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house. He
voluntarily surrendered at the Municipal Police Station.

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party
on the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home,
Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.

CRIME CHARGED: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

RTC: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. The Court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment


from 2years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment
under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

CA: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. Arnel argues that he should be entitled to apply for
probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the
Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has
perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

ISSUES:
1. Is Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide?
2. If Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationablepenalty, may he still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court?

SC: Attempted Homicide, entitled to apply for probation.


1. NO. Arnel is guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. Indeed, Rufino
had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred
fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in 7 or 8
days. There is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecutions
claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention.

2. YES. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he


having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and
holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to
imprisonment of 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to
allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction. Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide,
he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel
has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to
apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2
years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the
lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the
privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the
judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

If the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it
would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to
instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the
probation law.

DECISION: PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond


reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, without prejudice to petitioner
applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been
remanded for execution to the RTC.

VILLAREAL v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 151258 | December 1, 2014
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

NOTE: This is a part of a consolidated case, together with People v CA, Vincent
Tecson, et al. The facts are the same, but the issues are different.

TICKLER: Lenny Villa case. Aquila Legis Fraternity. Hazing.

DOCTRINE:
1. According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to
final judgment.

2. The term “personal penalties” refers to the service of personal or imprisonment


penalties, while the term “pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias)” refers to fines
and costs, including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of
(i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However, civil liability based on a source of
obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is
recoverable through a separate civil action.

FACTS:

Seven freshmen law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law, including
Leonardo “Lenny” Villa, signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). After dinner at Rufo’s, they went to the house of Musngi who briefed the
neophytes on the initiation. Afterwards, they were brought to the Almeda Compound for
the commencement of their initiation. The neophytes received threats and insults prior
while inside the van. After alighting from the van, Aquilans delivered physical blows to
them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites."
These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of
two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol
Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the
wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their
legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes
during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with
knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which
the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. After
the first and second day of being inflicted physical pain and being indoctrinated with
fraternity principles, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head
of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the
carport. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed
his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his
condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.The trial court
rendered judgment, holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The CA, however, set aside the finding of conspiracy and modified the criminal liability
according to each’s participation against the 25 (one of the accused passed away):
1. Nineteen of the accused appellants – Victorina et al.: acquitted,as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson et al.: were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim.
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal: guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor to 17 years of heirs of Lenny Villa.

CRIME CHARGED: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

RTC: CONVICTED the petitioner of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.

CA: MODIFIED the felony to RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SERIOUS


PHYSICAL INJURIES.

ISSUE: Did the death of Artemio Villareal pending resolution of his case extinguish his
criminal liability?

RULING: YES, it did.

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution,
this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal
penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability
for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

term “personal penalties” refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,


while the term “pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias)” refers to fines and costs, including
civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex
delicto). However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than
the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil
action.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his
criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability
directly arising from the delict complained of.

DECISION: As regards Artemio Villareal, petition was DISMISSED, and the criminal
case against him deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

PEOPLE v CA, VINCENT TECSON ET AL.


G.R. No. 154954 | December 1, 2014

NOTE: This is part of a consolidated case, together with Villareal v People. The facts
are the same, but the issues are different.

TICKLER: AQUILA PROBATION

DOCTRINE: Sec, 4 of Probation Law – Application for probation must be made with
the court of origin AND to be eligible for probation, applicant must not appeal the
judgment of conviction; an ineligible applicant may be allowed to reapply for probation
in light of Colinares v. People.

FACTS:

Seven freshmen law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law, including
Leonardo “Lenny” Villa, signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Fraternity
(Aquila Fraternity). After dinner at Rufo’s, they went to the house of Musngi who
briefed the neophytes on the initiation. Afterwards, they were brought to the Almeda
Compound for the commencement of their initiation. The neophytes received threats
and insults prior while inside the van. After alighting from the van, Aquilans delivered
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of
Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the
floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were
held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being
hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity
to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. After the first and second day of being

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

inflicted physical pain and being indoctrinated with fraternity principles, accused non-
resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal
(Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it
sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense
pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny
could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. After an
hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as
they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was
really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.The trial
court rendered judgment, holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The CA, however, set aside the finding of conspiracy and modified the criminal liability
according to each’s participation against the 25 (one of the accused passed away):
4. Nineteen of the accused appellants – Victorina et al.: acquitted,as their
individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson et al.: were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim.
6. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal: guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor to 17 years of heirs of Lenny Villa

Respondents Tecson et al. filed a motion for clarification as to the effect of the
decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation
after the CA lowered their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which
carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries
a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have
already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications
for Probation on various dates in January 2002 pursuant to PD 968, as amended,
otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that Caloocan City RTC Branch

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

130 had already granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October
2002 and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them
from probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on various
dates in April 2003.

The OSG asserts that: 1) the probation applications of Tecson et al. before the
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 because the trial court did not have competence to
take cognizance of the application since it was not the court of origin of the criminal
case, which is Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC; and 2) when Tecson et al.
appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of the Probation Law.

CRIME CHARGED: HOMICIDE


RTC: HOMICIDE

CA: SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

ISSUE: Are the respondents entitled to probation under the Probation Law?

RULING:

NO. First, the respondents filed their applications for probation with the wrong court.
According to the Probation Law:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction. x x x x

From the foregoing provision, the law requires that an application for probation be
filed with the trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the
court of origin. Hence, the application should have been filed with Branch 121 of the
Caloocan City RTC. Applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they
may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is
substantive and not merely procedural.

Second, besides the aforementioned, RTC Branch 130 also had no jurisdiction to act
on the probation application since according to Article 78 of the RPC, if the case was
previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order
must be attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of
the court from which the appeal was taken. The court of origin then reacquires
jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the
execution thereof, including the convicts’ applications for probation.

In this case, the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al. The accused filed their respective applications while a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the CA and the records were still with that
court. The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August
2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications
with the trial court. In September 2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of
the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the probation applications, the OSG
had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA and this
Court. The records of the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this
Court in 2008.

Lastly, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it.
According to Sec. 4, “…Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.” All offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their
reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.

In this case, the application should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130 since
they appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were originally
found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their
conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor,
which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC
should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.

Incidentally, “Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified


offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal.
In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state
affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration record by making them
undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to
help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self-respecting
individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.”

It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is
an act of grace or clemency conferred by the state. It is a special prerogative granted
by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly,
the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest
the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies,
unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person

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4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.

HOWEVER, in light of the decision in Colinares v. People, the respondents may


now reapply for probation. Despite their ineligibility since they appealed the
judgment of conviction, the Court cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have
fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have
eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the
trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in
resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the
terms, conditions, and period thereof.
DECISION: ALLOWED the REAPPLICATION for PROBATION.

NEIL E. SUYAN v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CHIEF PROBATION


AND PAROLE OFFICER, DAGUPAN CITY

G.R. No. 189644 | July 2, 2014


TICKLER: Case of illegal possession or use of regulated drug under RA 6425.
DOCTRINE: Probation order shall be rendered ineffective upon commission of another
offense by the offender, or the person under probation.
FACTS:

On 27 October 1995, an information was filed against petitioner, charging him with
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, illegal possession or
use of regulated drug. During arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The RTC
thereafter proceeded with trial.

On 22 November 1995, petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional and to pay the
costs. On even date, he filed his application for probation.

On 16 February 1996, the RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6)
years. While on probation, petitioner was arrested on two occasions, more specifically
on 2 September and 20 October 1999 for violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No.
6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him, both of which were filed with
the RTC of Dagupan City. One of these cases was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-
03073-D before Branch 43 (Branch 43 case), and the other case as Criminal Case No.
99-03129-D before Branch 41.

On 1 December 1999, Atty. Simplicio Navarro, Jr., then the Chief Probation and Parole
Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation. Atty. Navarro alleged that
petitioner has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation. The
former further alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose commission of
other offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof. Atty.
Navarro also pointed out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with the

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4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
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conditions of the latter’s probation, in view of his incarceration.

On 15 December 1999, the RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner
and directing him to serve the sentence imposed upon him. It denied his Motion for
Reconsideration.

Aggrieved, on 6 April 2000 petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA (first CA
case), wherein he assailed the revocation of his probation. He argued that he was
denied due process as he was not furnished with a copy of the Motion to Revoke; and
when the motion was heard, he was not represented by his counsel of record.

On 2 January 2006, the CA in its Decision, granted the Rule 65 Petition by annulling
and set aside RTC’s revocation of petitioner’s probation. The CA ruled that the trial
court had not complied with the Probation Law and the procedural requisites for the
revocation of probation under the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and
Procedures.

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the
purpose of affording petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 968, and the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.

On 31 March 2006, the RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. It ruled that it had
granted petitioner due process by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion
to Revoke; but that instead of rebutting the Violation Report, he merely questioned the
absence of a violation report when his probation was first revoked. The RTC further held
that there was positive testimony and documentary evidence showing that petitioner
had indeed violated the conditions of his probation. He never rebutted the fact of his
commission of another offense and conviction therefore while on probation. He filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Was the probation validly revoked?
RULING:

YES, it has been validly revoked. Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been
convicted, and that he has served out his sentence for another offense while on
probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct violation of
Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11
of the Probation Law.

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall
render the probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:

Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect upon its
issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof
and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the
said order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


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San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
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the offense under which he was placed on probation.

Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of petitioner and
ordering him to serve the penalty for the offense for which he was placed on probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full


obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of
revocation of this privilege. Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him
by the RTC to remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of his
violation. The Court's discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having
the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.

ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS, ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and
ANTONIO P. MATIAS
G.R. No. 188191 | March 12, 2014

TICKLER: Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries.


Probation. “Uncooperative, habitually absent.”

DOCTRINE: An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the


judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction.

FACTS: Petitioner is accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in


homicide and multiple physical injuries. On 8 January 2007, the MTC found him
petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007,
reasoning that he was informed of his conviction only upon being served the warrant
for his arrest. The prosecutor opposed his application on the ground that he was
known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even neglected to inform the
court of his change of address. The MTC denied his application, thus petitioner filed a
special civil action for certiorari assailing the denial of his application for probation.
Upon appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the ruling of MTC and remanded the
case to the latter. CA however reversed the RTC ruling and upheld the MTC’s
decision in denying the application for probation.

CRIME CHARGED: Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple physical


injuries; Special Civil action of Certiorari assailing the denial of probation.

RTC: RTC REVERSED the ruling of MTC and REMANDED the case to MTC for
further proceedings
CA: CA REVERSED RTC’s decision and upheld the decision of the MTC.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
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ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to probation?

SC: NO, petitioner is not entitled to probation.

Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred
by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly,
the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised
primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of
the accused.

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It


essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to
immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to
jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation as an
"escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction. Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the
accused, the rationale for the treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused
applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for
probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to
the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was
amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of
conviction – even if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an
acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question
the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right
to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed
the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial
of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by
P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we DENY the instant Petition for
lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
103030 dated 26 September 2008 and 29 May 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED,
respectively.

MORENO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 168550 | August 10, 2006

TICKLER: Petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running as Punong Barangay.


Arbitrary Detention, previous crime.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


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San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
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Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
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DOCTRINE/S:
1. Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law
for the offense of which he was convicted. Thus, the Probation Law lays out
rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation.

2. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers
offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which
also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not
specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This
omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to
treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the
disqualification.

3. The Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local


Government Code.

FACTS:

Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Urbano M. Moreno from running for
Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he
was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia,the
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was
thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of
1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him
all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000
allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a
result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
elections.

The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that
Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.

COMELEC 1st Division: ADOPTED the recommendation of the investigating office.


MR was filed with the Comelec en banc.

COMELEC En Banc: AFFIRMED the resolution of the Comelec 1st Division citing Sec.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


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San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
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40 (a) of the Local Government Code which provides “that those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.”

Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall
commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno
merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification
from running for an elective local office.

Comelec en banc further held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutiacited by Moreno and the Probation Law
because it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of elective local officials.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:

1. The disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those
who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter
do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be
read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law
which applies only to probationers.
2. Even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous
misconduct. In its Comment dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the
COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela
Torre v. Comelec definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction
for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted
probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

ISSUE: How should the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence found in Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code should be construed?

RULING:

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is
not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. SC
held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. SC thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


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San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
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disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with
service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that
the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of
probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but
is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in
this case. They focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality
upon his application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had
been served. The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying
the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally
disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving
sentence.

This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence
by reason of the grant of probation which should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office
because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not even begin to run.

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies
his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that [t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of
his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for
which probation was granted. Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the
courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case
was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant
who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense
of which he was convicted. Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards
regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of
probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of
the State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
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punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine
of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are
already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law
became applicable.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty
which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not
specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission
is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers
as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.

Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted
in 1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the
legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v.
Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification from holding public office. That it
chose not to include probationers within the purview of the provision is a clear
expression of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.

On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later
law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the
Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of
statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute.

In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the
scope of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious
error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong
Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his
conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh
mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec where he said that it would be far
better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


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San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
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ARTICLE 89-113

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ANASTACIO AMISTOSO


G.R. No. 201447 | August 28, 2013

TICKLER: Rape of 12-year old daughter. Died of cardio-respiratory arrest.

DOCTRINE: Extinction of Criminal Liability

FACTS:

Amistoso was found guilty with the rape of his 12-year old daughter. He was
convicted of QUALIFIED RAPE and was given the death sentence in 2006 by the
Masbate RTC.

In 2011, he appealed the decision of the RTC. The CA affirmed Amistoso’s conviction
for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act
No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Institution of the Death Penalty). Accordingly, the
penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.

In January 9, 2013, Amistoso appealed the CA decision to the SC, which simply
affirmed it in toto.

However, in February 7, 2013, barely a month after the SC appeal, Officer-in-Charge


Ramon Roque of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the court that Amistoso died in
Bilibid of Cardio Respiratory Arrest in December 11, 2012. Apparently, Amistoso
was already dead even when the PAO filed an appeal with the SC.

This was confirmed in a February 12, 2013 letter by Fajardo Lansangan of the
Maximum Security Compound of New Bilibid Prison. Lansangan attached a copy of
Amistoso’s death certificate to his letter.

Then in June 20, 2013, Lansangan sent the SC a certified true copy of Amistoso’s death
certificate confirming his death to be on December 11, 2012.

ISSUE: Were Amistoso’s criminal liability and civil liability extinguished?

RULING: YES. Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision
dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction, irrelevant and
ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still
has the jurisdiction to set it aside. This is in pursuance of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.

In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to
final judgment:

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Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
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1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his


criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore.”

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, The Court moves to SET ASIDE it January 9, 2013


decision.

PEOPLE v CONSORTE
G.R. No. 194068 | November 26, 2014

TICKLER: Assails identification as perpetrator but died during appeal.


DOCTRINE: Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished: (1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
FACTS:

Accused-appellant raises the incredibility of his identification as the perpetrator of the


crime. He avers that despite the alleged positive identification made by Rolando Visbe
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
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San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
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(Visbe), the testimony of prosecution witness Aneline Mendoza clearly shows the
impossibility of the same. Moreover, further casting doubt on the alleged identification
of accused appellant is Visbe’s unbelievable and inconsistent statements on how
such identification was made. Meanwhile, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid
Prison (NBP) informed the Court that accused appellant died on 14 July 2014, as
evidenced by the attached Death Certificate.
ISSUE: Are the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused appellant extinguished
by his death prior to final judgment?
RULING:

YES.

Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished: (1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.

Also, in People v. Brillantes, the Court, citing People v. Bayotas, clarified that the
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.1âwphiIn the case at bar,
accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for
reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore becomes
necessary for us to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to
have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.

PEOPLE v. CLEMENTE BAUTISTA


G.R. No. 168641 | April 27, 2007

TICKLER: Slight physical injuries, 60-day period of prescription

DOCTRINE: The filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of
the prescriptive period.

FACTS: On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused
Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the
other. Private complainant was issued a Certification to file action dated August 11,
1999 for failing to reach a settlement at the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila,
where he initially filed a Complaint. He then filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein respondents on August
16, 1999. After conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-
Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an
Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the
City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but
the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was,
however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on
June 20, 2000.
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Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the
time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the
commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed.

CRIME CHARGED: SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

MeTC: The offense had NOT YET PRESCRIBED.

RTC: AFFIRMED.

CA: GRANTED, REVERSED MeTC’s and RTC’s decisions. The 60-day prescriptive
period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with the OCP of
Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had
prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the MeTC.

Ratio: Although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP Junsay-Ong bears no
date, it effectively terminated the proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day
period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his designated alter ego, to act on the resolution is
extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last day of
the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or
already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To use once again the language of
Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was "unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very much more
than the prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The offense charged had,
therefore, already prescribed when filed with the court on June 20, 2000.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in holding that the prescriptive period began to run anew after
the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal information
against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor?

SC: YES, the CA erred when it agreed with the respondent that upon approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an information against
respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. It is a well-settled rule that
the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the
prescriptive period.

The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's
approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed
with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either
convicted or acquitted by the proper court.

The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information
but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State
and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte, it is unjust to deprive the injured

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution
is to file the requisite complaint.

The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the
petitioner in the present petition considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct
of preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information after the
City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to
file the information. Administrative disciplinary actions should instead be filed against
the erring officials.

DECISION: Petition GRANTED. The action had not yet prescribed because of the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively tolled the
prescriptive period.

(Guys, feel ko sa barangay nag-start. Kasi kung 60-days counted from June 12, 1999,
prescribed na siya by August 11, 1999. Ewan ko ba dito sa Supreme Court. Basta
beyond the control of the private complainant naman yung interpretation na ‘to at
hindi sinabi kung kalian niya na-receive yung Certification from the Barangay.)

RISOS-VIDAL AND LIM v COMELEC


G.R. No. 206666 | January 21, 2015

TICKLER: Erap Plunder case. Pardon. Local Election for City of Manila-Mayor

DOCTRINE: In Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided


under the 1935 Constitution, wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the
President shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present 1987
Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled
by legislative action." The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v.
Factoran, Jr. thereby establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon,
being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action."
Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the exercise of
the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with
by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution.
FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the


Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder. However, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada. The third preambular clause of the pardon
provides that: "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office."

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in
the COMELEC. However, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform
grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting
president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President
Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for a public office. The
subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En
banc.

Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought recourse to this


Court and filed a petition for certiorari. But in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the
Court dismissed the aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering
that former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post,
that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against
former President Estrada before the COMELEC. Risos Vidal anchored her petition on
the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office
because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to
Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."
She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides the disqualification from running for
any elective position.

CRIME CHARGED: No crime charged. Petitioner seeks to disqualify former Pres.


Erap from running as mayor.

Comelec (2nd Division): the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification for lack of merit. Risos-Vidal failed to present cogent proof sufficient to
reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that
[former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been effectively restored
by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this
Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled
matter lest indulged in wastage of government resources."

The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied.

CA: No More CA.

Note: While this case was pending before the Court, or on May 13, 2013, the
elections were conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into
office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day, the local board of

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.

Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents for the position of Mayor, moved for
leave to intervene in this case.

Contention of parties: Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President


Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon granted to the
latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, given that former
President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes
obtained by the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer with
313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful winning candidate
for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.

Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however, Risos-Vidal
insists that the same did not operate to make available to former President Estrada
the exception provided under Section 12 of the OEC, the pardon being merely
conditional and not absolute or plenary.

Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible requirements provided under


Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. She avers that in view of the foregoing
provisions of law, it is not enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such
pardon carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of Articles 36
and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights without categorically making
mention what specific civil and political rights are restored "shall not work to restore
the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal."

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for public respondent COMELEC, maintains
that "the issue of whether or not the pardon extended to [former President Estrada]
restored his right to run for public office had already been passed upon by public
respondent COMELEC way back in 2010. The restoration of his right to run for any
public office is the exception to the prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as
provided under Section 12 of the OEC. As to the seeming requirement of Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express restoration/remission of a
particular right to be stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid
interpretation of Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] x x x would be stretching too
much the clear and plain meaning of the aforesaid provisions."

ISSUE: Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be
voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President
Arroyo?

SC: NO, it did not. The petition for certiorari lacks merit.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office,
the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered
by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-
C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any
act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of
the President.

In Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under the 1935
Constitution, wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the President shared
similar phraseology with what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court
then unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action." The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby
establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is
unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the exercise of the
pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by
Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution.

All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in the
pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the
remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, he or she
should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her
intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point,
the President retains the power to make such restoration or remission, subject to a
prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and
imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned
which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that
"(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights" as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an
act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."

DECISION: Petition DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MA. THERESA PANGILINAN


G.R. No. 152662 | June 13, 2012

TICKLER: 9 checks, B.P. 22

DOCTRINE: The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted


against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

FACTS:

Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9 checks
with the aggregate amount of P9,658,592 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon
Malolos' presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on Sept. 16, 1997,
Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan.
On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
performance against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan also
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

filed on December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of


Prejudicial Question". On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay
recommended Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. Malolos, then, raised the matter before the DOJ. On January 5, 1999,
Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and
ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in connection with
Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving the other checks were
dismissed. So, two counts of violation for BP 22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed
against Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon City. On June 17, 2000,
Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City, alleging that the
criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

The motion was granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC reversed the
decision of the MeTC. According to the RTC, the offense has not yet prescribed
"considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997". Dissatisfied, Pangilinan
raised the matter to the Supreme Court for review but it was referred to the CA "for
appropriate action". On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
recognized Feb. 3, 2000 as the date of the filing of the informations.

ISSUE: Did the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16
September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense?

RULING:

YES. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases,
“violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules:… after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years.” Under Section 2 of
the same Act, “the prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person. The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against
respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only
on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of
proceedings on the ground of “prejudicial question”. The matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City. Clearly, it was
respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion
she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the
1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

DECISION: The instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice
is ORDERED to re-file the Informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
respondent.

SEC vs. Interport Resources Corp

G.R. No. 135808 | October 6, 2008

TICKLER: Prescription, Stocks transaction

DOCTRINE: The prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings


for the prosecution of the accused. In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating
the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under the
Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of
a complaint with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio.
Only after a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a
preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in
1995, soon after it discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively
interrupted the prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted
by the DOJ in criminal cases, such investigation would surely interrupt the
prescription period.

FACTS:

On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC (Interport Resources Corporation)


approved a Memorandum of Agreement with GHB (Ganda Holdings Berhad). Under
said agreement, IRC acquired 100% of the entire capital stock of GEHI (Ganda
Energy Holdings Inc.) which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine
power generating barge. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded
capital stock of IRC. On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital of PRCI
(Philippine Racing Club).

IRC alleged that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent
to the Philippine Stock Exchange through facsimile and the (SEC), but the facsimile
machine of the SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC received reports that the
IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that
some of its directors, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider
information. For this reason, the SEC required the directors to appear before the SEC
to explain the alleged failure to disclose material information as required by the Rules
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

on Disclosure of Material Facts.

CRIME CHARGED: Violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act

SEC: Unsatisfied with the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC
violated the Rules in connection with the then Old Securities Act when it failed to
make timely disclosures of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC found that
the directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of the
Revised Securities Act (RSA).

CA: Respondents filed a petition before the CA questioning the orders of the SEC.
During the proceedings before the CA, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining the SEC and its agents from investigating and
proceeding with the hearing of the case against respondents which the CA granted.

The CA determined that there was no implementing rules and regulations regarding
disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the RSA which the respondents
allegedly violated. It likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to
initiate and file any suit for civil liability. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or
administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without
violating their rights to due process and equal protection. SEC filed an MR but was
denied thus the case was brought before the SC.

Respondents have taken the position, before the SC, that this case is moot and
academic, since any criminal complaint that may be filed against them resulting from
SEC's investigation of this case has already prescribed. They point out that the
prescription period applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such as
violations of the RSA, is twelve years under Section 1 of Act No. 3326. Since the
offense was committed in 1994, they reasoned that prescription set in as early as
2006 and rendered this case moot.

ISSUE: Whether the case against respondents had prescribed?

RULING: NO, the case against respondents has not prescribed. It is an


established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription period.
Preliminary investigation is essentially a determination whether an offense has been
committed, and whether there is probable cause for the accused to have committed
an offense.

Under Sec. 45 of the RSA, SEC has the authority to "make such investigations as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate
any provision of this Act." After a finding that a person has violated the Revised
Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation
and prosecution. While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails
substantially similar duties as the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ, this
process cannot simply be disregarded.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
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In Baviera v. Paglinawan, the SC enunciated that a criminal complaint is first filed with
the SEC, which determines the existence of probable cause, before a preliminary
investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. The said case puts in perspective the
nature of the investigation undertaken by the SEC, which is a requisite before a
criminal case may be referred to the DOJ. The Court declared that it is imperative that
the criminal prosecution be initiated before the SEC, the administrative agency with
the special competence.

In the present case, it should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings
against the respondents as early as 1994. This investigation effectively interrupted the
prescription period. However, said proceedings were disrupted by a preliminary
injunction issued by the CA on 5 May 1995, which effectively enjoined the SEC from
filing any case against the respondents herein. The SEC was bound to comply with
the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and writ of injunction issued by the
CA enjoining it from continuing with the investigation of respondents for 12 years. Any
deviation by the SEC from the injunctive writs would be sufficient ground for
contempt. Moreover, any step the SEC takes in defiance of such orders will be
considered void for having been taken against an order issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction.

To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and make a finding of
probable cause in accordance with the doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan.
In this case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary investigation since
the SEC was halted by the CA from continuing with its investigation. Such a situation
leaves the prosecution of the case at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor the DOJ
can conduct any investigation against the respondents, who, in the first place, sought
the injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do in order to break
the impasse was to have the Decision of the CA overturned, as it had done at the
earliest opportunity in this case. Therefore, the period during which the SEC was
prevented from continuing with its investigation should not be counted against it. The
law on the prescription period was never intended to put the prosecuting bodies in an
impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed way beyond their
control; for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy, they would still be
barred from investigating and prosecuting the case.

Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for


the prosecution of the accused. In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating
the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under the RSA
and the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the
SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a finding of
probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary investigation.
Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon after it
discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted the
prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by
the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, such investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

DECISION: The Decision of the CA is REVERSED and LIFTS the permanent


injunction issued pursuant thereto. SC further declared that the investigation of the
respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may
be undertaken by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulations
Code.

LUMANTAS vs CALAPIZ
G.R. No. 163753 | January 15, 2014

TICKLER: Appendectomy + Circumcision + Cystostomy


DOCTRINE: The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his absolution
from civil liability.
FACTS:
Spouses Calapiz brought Hanz, 8 yr old son, to Misamis Occidental Prov. Hospital for
appendectomy. Petitioner was the attending physician. Petitioner suggested to the
spouses that Hanz would also undergo circumcision to spare him the pain. Thus, with
spouses' consent petitioner performed the coronal type circumcision. The following day,
Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters; and testicles were
swollen. The abnormality complained of was dismissed by petitioner as normal.
Hanz was admitted again due to abscess formation between the base and shaft of his
penis. He was then referred to Dr. Go who found out that Hanz has damaged urethra.
Hanz underwent cystostomy, then operated three times to repair the urethra. However,
the damaged urethra could not be repaired. Spouses brought criminal charge against
petitioner for RI resulting to Serious Physical Injuries.
On his defense, petitioner contended that he performed the operation successfully
however the abscess formation between the base and the shaft had been brought about
by Hanz's burst appendicitis.

RTC: ACQUITTED of the CRIME charged for insufficiency of evidence.


NONETHELESS, petitioner LIABLE for MORAL DAMAGES (50K) because there was
preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had received trauma from his
circumcision by the petitioner.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC Decision, SUSTAINED the award. It added that even if
acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal not necessarily mean he had not
incurred civil liability.
ISSUE: Is it correct to impose civil liability despite petitioner's acquittal of the crime
charged?

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

RULING:
YES, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish
his civil liability. It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
There are two kinds of acquittal, as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the
civil liability of the accused. FIRST, acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may
be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. SECOND,
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. THUS, unless the
court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment frm still being rendered
on the civil aspect of the criminal case.
IN THIS CASE, the failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral
certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of
his negligence to hold him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz
had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or
incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court
must concur with their uniform findings. In Hanz’s case, the undesirable outcome of the
circumcision performed by the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other
procedures on his penis in order to repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and
moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as moral
damages.
DECISION: CA Decision AFFIRMED.

DALURAYA v OLIVA
G.R. No. 210148, December 8, 2014

TICKLER: Nissan Vanette/Quezon Avenue flyover/Hit and Run

DOCTRINE: While it is true that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable and the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability, it is also true that acquittal based on the
conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist,
will also extinguish the civil liability.

FACTS:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information for Reckless Imprudence


Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that
sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street
when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the
Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to
the hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter,
herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.

MeTC: GRANTED Daluraya's demurrer and DISMISSED the case for insufficiency of
evidence.

RTC: DISMISSED the appeal and AFFIRMED the MeTC's ruling, declaring that "the act
from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist."

CA: REVERSED the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of
P152,547.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.

In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC's Order showed that Daluraya's acquittal was
based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability.

ISSUE: Was the CA correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva's death
despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence?

RULING: NO.

Daluraya's acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to
establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is
clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the
accused precisely committed the crime charged against him."

SOLIDUM v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192123 | March 10, 2014

TICKLER: Part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical operation conducted
on a three-year old patient.

DOCTRINE:

1. The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

2. The following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident
was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

3. “Reasonable doubt of guilt” is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the


lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy
for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the
responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both
sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of
certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and
crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof
beyond the possibility of mistake.

FACTS:

Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus.
Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one
end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.

On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila
for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and
was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The
anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr.
Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum).

During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no
longer see, hear or move.

Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged
a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians. Upon a finding of
probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr.
Solidum.

The information against Solidum reads: “by failing to monitor and regulate properly the

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

levels of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using


100% halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence of his
said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a
cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning
insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage
and prejudice.”

CRIME CHARGED: Reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries

RTC: Guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries; Solidarily liable
with Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella

After MR: Solidary liability of the hospital, So and Abella were omitted

CA: Affirmed RTC basing Solidum’s liability on res ipsa loquitur

ISSUES:
1. Is res ipsa loquitur present in the case at bar?
2. Is Solidum guilty of criminal negligence?

RULING:

1. NO, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case.

Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus,
res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the
harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence
as the cause of that harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to
determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law,
permit a given inference.

The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second
and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the
instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the
patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty
of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz
delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-
through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound
body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he
experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and
rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the
brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation,

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did
not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending
to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could
have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer
atropine to the patient.

2. NO, he is NOT guilty of reckless imprudence.

Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who
underwent a pull-thru operation and was administered general anesthesia by a
team of anesthesia residents. The patient, at the time when the surgeons was
manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it down in preparation for the
anastomosis, had bradycardia. The anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause
thereof was the triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to block
it but despite the administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued.
As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures were administered and
spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5) minutes and that
oxygen was continuously being administered throughout, unfortunately, as later
become manifest, patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.

In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of


anaesthesia, the committee find that the same were all in accordance with the
universally accepted standards of medical care and there is no evidence of any
fault or negligence on the part of the anaesthesiologists.

The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has
engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt,
and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according to United
States v. Youthsey:

x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a


captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate
position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a
fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the
conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead
you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life,
you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a
mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake.

We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt
him from civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable
because the circumstances that have been established here do not present the
factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from
reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration
of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia
that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge
Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We
are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.

DECISION: ACQUITTED; No civil liability.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.


4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy

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