G.R. No.
L-29742 March 29, 1972 *** The case originally started in the City Court of Davao, Branch II, where appellant
VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EMILIO MAPAYO,
defendant-appellee.
Facts:
1. Appellant filed a complaint in the City Court of Davao to recover
from defendant Mapayo the sum of P2, 800, which represented an
unpaid balance of the purchase price of an engine (Gray Marine), sold
to defendant.
2. The defendant admitted the said transaction in his answer but he
alleged that the engine had hidden defects causing him to spend the
same amount for the repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed
to waive the balance due on the price of the engine and counterclaimed
for damages and attorneys' fees.
3. The Court disallowed the defenses and ordered the defendant to pay
plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs.
4. Defendant Mapayo appealed to CFI and filed an answer that was a
virtual reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court.
5. The defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court
scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court
ordered plaintiff to present his evidence but it failed to do so. The
plaintiff's counsel refused to comply and instead of calling his
witnesses, he moved the Court to present them after the defendant had
presented their evidence. The court asked said counsel twice whether
he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused
to do so and sticked to his demand that he would introduce his
witnesses only in rebuttal.
6. This prompted the court to dismiss the case on ground of failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute, hence this appeal.
Issue: W/N the CFI validly dismissed the case on ground of
plaintiff's failure to prosecute
Ruling: NO. The court held that the dismissal in untenable and
contrary to law. The defendant was not able to support his special
defenses. The answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the
complaint, and pleaded special defenses hence the plaintiff had every
right to insist that it was for the defendant to come forward with
evidence in support of his special defenses. Judicial admissions do not
require proof.
therein had filed suit to recover from defendant Emilio Mapayo the sum of P2,800,
representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold
by the plaintiff to the defendant, plus attorney's fees. The answer admitted the
transaction and the balance due but contended that by reason of hidden defects of the
article sold, the defendant had been forced to spend P2,800 for repairs and labor,
wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of the engine, and
counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees. The City Court, after trial, disallowed
the defenses and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2,500.00 and costs (Record
on Appeal, pages 9-16).
Defendant Mapayo appealed to the Court of First Instance, filing an answer therein that
was a virtual reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court. When, after several
continuances, the case was called for hearing on 13 March 1968, the defendant, as well
as his counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled the case for hearingex parte on
the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to present his evidence, and from the
unchallenged stenographic notes quoted in appellant's brief, pages 11-14 (Transcript,
pages 4-7), the following transpired:
ATTY. LOZANO:
If your Honor please, before I present my witness I should like to present the issue
because all the allegations of the complaint are admitted and I am going to specify by
the answer, your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)
COURT:
The issue is void on the hidden defect.
ATTY. LOZANO:
That is why, if your Honor please, the point if your Honor please, is I do not have to
prove that there is a gasoline engine that was taken by the defendant from the plaintiff
for an agreed amount of P6,800.00 because the allegation in paragraph 1, No. 2 and
No. 3, is admitted in the answer.
In other words, if your Honor please, the promissory note in the amount of P2,800.00
... (interrupted by court).
COURT:
Wait a minute, are you going to present evidence or not?
ATTY. LOZANO:
Will you please give me a chance, if your Honor please, because my purpose is, it will
turn out that it will be the defendant to present evidence to prove that there is hidden
defect. He admitted the allegation, he admitted that there is a balance of P2,800.00; it
is not paid by him but at the same time he said that there is a hidden defect.
In other words, if your Honor please, it should be the defendant to present the evidence
... (interrupted by court).
COURT:
Are you going to present evidence, substantial, oral, or not? Answer the question of the
Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
If your Honor please, on the complaint, on the allegation of the complaint, all are
admitted by the defendant ... (interrupted by court).
COURT:
The attorney does not answer the question of the Court.
Answer the question, are you going to present evidence OR NOT AND SUBMIT THE
CASE ON THE PLEADINGS. (Capitals supplied)
ATTY. LOZANO:
Would you please allow me, your Honor, because in the answer of the defendant ...
(interrupted by court)
COURT:
I do not need discussion; I want you to answer the question of the Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
I am not going to present my evidence yet because this moment I am submitting my
evidence on the pleading until after the defendant will present evidence and I reserve
my right to present rebuttal evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
COURT:
Make it of record that the attorney refuses to present evidence either oral or
documentary when required by the Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
Motion for reconsideration, if your Honor please, that is not what I said, if your Honor
please, I manifested that it should be the defendant to prove first, to present evidence
and we reserve our right to present rebuttal evidence, if your Honor please. (Emphasis
supplied).
COURT:
All right, denied.
Submit the case for the consideration of the Court.
The court then issued an order on the same day in the following terms (Record on
Appeal, page 24):
ORDER
Make it of record that the attorney for the plaintiff refuses to present evidence, either
oral or documentary, when required by the Court.
Submit the case for the consideration of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration having been filed by counsel for plaintiff, it was denied by
the court by an order of 21 March, and the case was dismissed for lack of prosecution
(Record on Appeal, pages 34-35), the trial judge reasoning that —
When the case is called for trial on 19 March 1968, defendants counsel asked again for
another postponement of the trial on the ground that defendant and his witnesses were
not able to come for lack of transportation, notwithstanding a stern warning by the
Court, per its order of 9 March 1968 that it would not entertain further motion for
continuation of trial. Counsel for the plaintiff vehemently objected to such motion and
insisted in presenting his evidence which the Court grants inspite of another civil case
and one miscellaneous case which were ready for hearing at the same time.
Court ordered the plaintiff to present his evidence. Plaintiff's counsel refused to comply
with said order. Instead of calling his witnesses, he moved the Court to present them
after the defendant had presented their evidence. The court asked said counsel twice
whether he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do
so and sticked to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal.
This is dictation to the Court to disregard its lawful command and a violation of the
order of trial provided in the Rules of Court.
This is an appealed case from the Municipal Court elevated to this Court on 18 May
1963 and from that time several postponement were granted at the instance of the
parties which cause delay and is detrimental to the interest of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, let this case be dismissed for failure to prosecute on the part of
counsel for the plaintiff without pronouncement as to costs.
Finding defendant's counterclaim not meritorious, same is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Further motions to reconsider having proved futile, the plaintiff appealed.
We find for plaintiff-appellant. Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation as
stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded, plaintiff had every right
to insist that it was for defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his
special defenses. Section 2 of Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly supports appellant:
Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in
the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be
contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.
While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge, We can not refrain
from observing that the trial judge's despotic and outrageous insistence that plaintiff
should present proof in support of allegations that were not denied but admitted by the
adverse party was totally unwarranted, and was made worse by the trial judge's
continual interrupting of the explanations of counsel, in violation of the rules of Judicial
Ethics.
Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal of the case was
manifestly untenable and contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby revoked and set aside, and the
court below is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
for the sum of P2,800.00, plus attorney's fees which this Court considers just and
reasonable (Civil Code, Article 2208, paragraph 11). Costs against defendant-appellee.
Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964 12 SCRA 648
Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage
License on August 23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on
September 4, 1954. All the necessary preparations were undertaken for
the said event. However, two days before the wedding, Francisco left a
note for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not push through
because his mother opposed the union. The following day, he sent her
a telegram stating that he will be returning very soon. Francisco never
showed up and has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently
sued Francisco for damages. The trial court ordered Francisco to pay
Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration which was
denied by the trial court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court,
asserting that the judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision
in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.
Issue: May Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach
of promise to marry?
Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil
Code, which provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance
with Article 21.
______________________________________________________________
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage.
They decided to schedule it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer
made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations,
bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding
necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez
sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend
the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one
day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising
her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon.
However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never
filed an answer and eventually judgment was made in favor of
Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor
of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled
wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he
cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be
grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral
damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not
tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was
not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise,
Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable
withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21
of the Civil Code which provides in part “any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party
to receive an award for moral damages as properly awarded by the
lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is
also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in
breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.
 GREGORIO APELARIO vs. INES CHAVEZ & COMPANY, LTD.
Facts:
1. Gregorio Apelario filed a complaint against Ines Chavez & Company,
Ltd., a limited partnership, and its general partner, Ines Chavez. It was
therein averred, in substance, that on or about October 28, 1958, the
defendant partnership had purchased on credit from plaintiff ten sets
of axle assemblies for the sum of P2,400.00 (par. 3); that on December
6, 1958, defendant delivered in payment to the plaintiff two postdated
cash checks for P1,200.00 each, drawn against the Philippine Bank of
Commerce (par. 4); that when the checks were presented for
payment, they were dishonored for lack of funds, whereupon the
defendant took back the checks and replaced them with two other
checks, also postdated, for the same amount as before (par. 5); that
these checks were also dishonored (par. 6); that the plaintiff, on
February 23, 1959, demanded payment in cash, but defendant refused
to pay (par. 7); that because of such malicious and willful refusal,
plaintiff had to engage the services of counsel for an agreed fee of
P750.00 (par. 8); that defendant was about to remove and dispose of
its properties with intent to defraud the plaintiff, wherefore a writ of
attachment became necessary (par. 9); and prayer was made for
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
P2,400.00, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, and for
P750.00 attorney’s fees, with expenses and costs. Plaintiff also moved
and duly obtained a writ of attachment.
2. Defendants obtained the lifting of the attachment by filing a
counterbond on April 14, 1959; and on May 7, 1959, they filed an
answer admitting the allegations of paragraphs 1 to 6 of the
complaint; admitting that plaintiff had demanded payment of P2,400,
but pleaded that —
"defendants could not pay the plaintiff, because they have so many
accounts receivables which have not yet been paid to them, of
which fact the defendant, was duly informed by the plaintiff and
thereby requested to wait a while."
3. Defendants further averred having no knowledge or information of the
allegations of paragraph 8 of the complaint concerning the attorneys’
fees; denied having performed any act of removal or disposal of its
property, branding plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 9 to be false
and malicious; and prayed for dismissal of the complaint.
4. Upon motion of the plaintiff, and over the objection of defendants, the
trial court rendered judgment on the pleadings, sentencing defendants
to pay P2,400, plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint; and
P500 attorney’s fees. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred to have rendered judgment
on the pleadings, because the answer raised material issues.
Held: NO
As pointed out in the judgment complained of, the defendants-
appellants had admitted all the material allegations of the complaint
concerning the existence of the debt and its non-payment. The
pleaded excuse, that they had requested plaintiff to, wait because
appellants’ many accounts receivable had not yet been collected, is
clearly no defense, for a debtor cannot delay payment due just to suit
its convenience, and the creditor is not an underwriter of his debtor’s
business unless so stipulated.
The denial of the averment concerning the stipulated fees of plaintiff’s
attorney tendered no genuine issue, for even without such allegations,
it was discretionary in the court to allow reasonable attorneys’ fees by
way of damages, if it found just and equitable to allow their recovery
(Civ. Code, Art. 2208). In this case, allowance of such fees was justified
since defendant admitted having issued to the creditor checks
without funds, not once but twice. It is well to note that the P750
attorney’s fees claimed by plaintiff were reduced P500 only. Nor does
the denial of the complaint’s averments concerning the fraudulent
removal and disposition of defendant’s property constitute a bar to a
judgment or the pleadings, since the defendant neither claimed nor
asked for any damages on account of the issuance and levy of the
writ of attachment.