Powers and functions of administrative agencies

In general

Calalang v William

Petition that the National Traffic

Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30
p. m. and
from 1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p. m…

the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of
Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable

The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of cases, namely: 'The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain
provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable
distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by
the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a
specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained
of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by
the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The
delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a
national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Locke's Appeal (72
Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to
rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a
state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the
court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its
own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon
which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."

Matienzo V Abellera

Same; Same; Same; To determine whether a board or

commission has a certain power, the authority given should be
liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was
created and that which is incidentally necessary to a full
implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being
germane to the law.—It is a settled principle of law that in
determining whether a board or commission has a certain power,
the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of
the purposes for which it was created, and that which is
incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative
intent should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily,
too, where the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed
given.

seeking the annulment and inhibition of the grant or award of provisional permits or special authority by the
respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) to respondent taxicab operators, for the operation and
legalization of “excess taxicab units” under certain provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 101 “despite the lapse of the power to do so thereunder,” and “ operain violation of other
provisions of the Decree, Letter of Instructions No. 379 and other relevantrules of the BOT.”

The petitioners and respondents are all authorized taxicab operators however the respondents are involved
with operationg colorum. The respondents asked for the authorization of the said units in accordance with
February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board for the legalization of
their unauthorized “excess” taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101, promulgated on January 17,
1973, “to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to
become legitimate and responsible operators.”

respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and granting applicants
provisional authority to operate their “excess taxicab units” for which legalization was sought.

The petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for
legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in
the Board of Transportation the power, among others “To grant special permits of limited term for the
operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or
convert clandestine operators into legitimate and responsible operators.” (Section 1, PD 101)
Citing, however, Section 4 of the Decree which provides:
“SEC. 4. Transitory Provision.—Six months after the promulgation of this Decree, the Board of Transportation,
the Bureau of Transportation, The Philippine Constabulary, the cityand municipal forces, and the provincial
and city fiscals shall wage a concerted and relentless drive towards the total elimination and punishment of
all clandestine and unlawful operators of public utility motor vehicles.”

the petitioners argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor any member thereof had the
power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize clandestine operations under PD 101 as
such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on
January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses andbecomes functus officio.

the issue is MOOT and ACADEMIC. Only the issue on legalization remains under consideration.
Justifying its action on private respondent’s applications, the respondent Board emphasizes public need as
the overriding concern. It is argued that under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the State “to eradicate the
harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and
responsible ones” (Whereas clause, PD 101). In view thereof, it is maintained that respondent Board may
continue to grant to “colorum” operators the benefits of legalization under PD
101, despite the lapse of its power, after six (6) months, to do so, without taking punitive measures against
the said operators. Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board
to issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the
alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to
suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely
provides for the withdrawal of the State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their illegal
acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless
drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise of
jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to
achieve the avowed purpose of PD
101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the
authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that
which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being
germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given
(Martin,
Administrative Law, 1979, p. 4

Villegas v Subido

Same; Public officers; Powers; There is no presumption of

power.—Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public
official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is
merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed
and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted
with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there
is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be
a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the
absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power.

Respondent Commissioner directed that petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced as –station
commanders of the three police precincts of Manila, as their continued employment as such was illegal, the
eligibility required being that of an inspector first class, allegedly not possessed by them issuing and trying to
enforce the directive in question."
What cannot be denied, as stressed in such decision, is the absence of any law "which prescribes that precinct
commanders be police majors," resulting necessarily in the directive of respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service being declared null and void, the writ of prohibition thus being the appropriate remedy, with an
injunction perpetually restraining him from the commission of the acts complained of.

The question, to repeat, is one of power. What is clear is that it is petitioner City Mayor that could so
designate the other petitioners to assume the position of station commanders That power is his, and his
alone. He is not required by law to share it with respondent Commissioner, who must justify by the valid
conferment of authority the action taken by him in requiring that the City Mayor replace the other petitioners.

Power is not to be presumed, it must be shown. Respondent Commissioner failed to do

so. It was not surprising therefore that the lower court ruled against him. As set forth at the outset, we sustain
the lower court and affirm the judgment appealed from.

1. The power of petitioner City Mayor as to who could be designated as station commanders of the three
Manila police precincts is conceded. No dispute as to his authority to do so exists. The Charter is clear. The
narrow question, therefore, is whether such designation could be frustrated by the directive of the
respondent Commissioner. For this official to be justified in interposing a negative, he must show that an
applicable law authorizes him to do so.

It is well-settled that respondent Commissioner at the most may inquire only as to the eligibility of the person
accorded to the exercise of the authority to appoint by the official entrusted by law to do so and the minimum
interference allowed the Commissioner of Civil Service under his power to inquire into the eligibility of the
appointee lends further support to the conclusion arrived at. It would appear clear, therefore, that
respondent Commissioner does not possess any statutory authority to interfere with the power of petitioner
City Mayor to make the designation of the other petitioners.

There was no creation of a Civil Service Commission. No such official as a Civil Service Commissioner was
provided far. Respondent's position is a statutory creation, the
extent of his powers being thus limited and circumscribed. It would thus be futile on his part to trace the
existence of an alleged authority to the Constitution.

The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its
officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such
there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There
must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are
devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed, In
the appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be conceded
that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute."

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Same; While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative

agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law,
it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has alsosuch powers as are necessarily implied in
the exercise of its express
powers.—Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a “cease
and desist order” were not expressly conferred by law, there is
jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such
authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a
fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers
as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers In
the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as
a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to
issue a “cease and desist order” is, perforce, implied Otherwise, it
may well be reduced to a “toothless” paper agency.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the
general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, to determine the effects of the operation of the
dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention,
it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power
and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay
Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction

SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Functions

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above
provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions
to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard
that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective
the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila,
Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.

Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and
approve or disapprove all plans, programs and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies
within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, Having thus
resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue:

Issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a “cease and desist” order under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative. The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to
have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws,
cannot be stamped as an unautho-rized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D.
No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to “make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution.”
24
(Italics for
emphasis) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a “cease and desist order” were not expressly conferred by
law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be
express.

While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to
it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied I the exercise of its express powers.

In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a “cease and desist
order” is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a “toothless”
paper agency.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under
the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City
Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

Discretionary and Ministerial

Carino v Capulong

Same; The issuance of a permit to operate an educational

institution cannot be compelled by mandamus.—In the present
case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial
duty of the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on
the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in
accordance with—and not in violation of—the law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Regional Director Venancio R. Nava,

Region IX-DECS, received AMA’s letter of intent to operate
as an educational institution in Davao City.
2
Responding to
the said letter, Regional Director Venancio R. Nava
reminded AMA “of the provisions of the Rules and
Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, specifically
Article E, Section 7, Rule III, Part III that the filing of
application shall be at least one (1) year before the opening
of classes” and the “provisions of the Private School Law
reiterated in the Educational Act of 1992 which prohibits
the operation of unauthorized schools or course.”
3
Nevertheless, AMA proceeded to announce its opening
through news and print media, and thereupon, started to
enroll students in elementary, secondary and tertiary
levels. Taking remedial action, the DECS Regional Director
directed AMA to stop enrollment and to desist from
operating without prior authorization AMA, however, not only continued the enrollment but
even started to hold regular classes, and thereafter, on 15
June 1990, filed a formal application to operate

After careful deliberation, the Court holds that the

petition is meritorious; hence, the same should be granted.
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of his jurisdiction in
issuing the order of 15 November 1990 directing the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and in issuing
the writ on 16 November 1990

As a rule, a writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary

or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a litigant
to protect or preserve his rights or interest, and for no
other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action.
Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be
a clear showing by the complainant that there exists a
right to be protected and that the acts against which the
writ is directed are violative of said right.
33
In the case at bar, the private respondents’ application
for a permit to operate AMACC-Davao City as an
educational institution was denied by the petitioners.
Otherwise stated, the private respondents do not have a
permit to operate or a certificate of recognition from the
government to undertake educational or school operations.
In fine, the private respondents do not have any existing
right that needed to be protected during the pendency of
their principal action for mandamus. Hence, the “closing”
and/or “padlocking” of AMACC-Davao City would not and
did not violate any right of the private respondents.
Moreover, it is not the function of the writ of injunction
to restrain a public officer from performing a duty imposed
by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared
unlawful.
34
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the establishment
and operation of schools are subject to the prior
authorization of the government. And, as sanctions for
operating without government permit, the DECS is
authorized either to impose the total closure of the school
and/or to disqualify the school from conferring title or
degree in the non-recognized program or course of studies.
In ordering the total closure of AMACC-Davao City, the
petitioners were only performing their duties as publicofficers; hence, the respondent Judge should not have
issued the writ of preliminary injunction. In issuing the
writ, he allowed the private respondents to continue the
operation of AMACC-Davao City as an educational
institution without a permit or certificate of government
recognition, thereby sanctioning an act which is unlawful.

35
Finally, the action filed by the private respondents in
the court below is a petition for mandamus to compel the
petitioners to approve their application to operate AMACCDavao
City as an educational institution. As a rule,
mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty but not a discretionary function.
36
A
ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to
leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is
that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment.

As explained in the case of Symaco vs. Aquino,

37
—
“A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a
discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.”

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question

is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is a
discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners
because it had to be exercised in accordance with—and not
in violation of—the law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of

the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is a
discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules
and regulations prescribed.
In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school
without a permit in blatant violation of law. Public respondent
has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a
school in Davao City before petitioner has even filed an
application or before his application has been first processed in
accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter.
Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant
such permit or to allow such operation without a permit, without
first processing an application. To do so is violation of the
Educational Act.”
Errors in the exercise of powers

CIR v CTA
Decision: Set aside and remanded

Administrative Law; The Government is not bound by the

errors committed by its governmental agents.—It is a long and
firmly settled rule of law that the Government is not bound by the
errors committed by its agents. In the performance of its
governmental functions, the State cannot be estopped by the
neglect of its agent and officers. Although the Government may
generally be estopped through the affirmative acts of public
officers acting within their authority, their neglect or omission of
public duties as exemplified in this case will not and should not
produce that effect.

dministrative Law; Public Officers; Courts; The Supreme

Court will unhesitatingly react to any bane in the government
service, with a replication of such response being likewise expected
by the people from the executive authorities.—The Court cannot
end this adjudication without observing that what caused the
Government to lose its case in the tax court may hopefully be
ascribed merely to the ennui or ineptitude of officialdom, and not
to syndicated intent or corruption. The evidential cul-de-sac in
which the Solicitor General found himself once again gives
substance to the public perception and suspicion that it is another
proverbial tip in the iceberg of venality in a government bureau

the Court of
Tax Appeals ordered herein petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to grant a refund to herein private
respondent Citytrust Banking Corporation (Citytrust) in
the amount of P13,314,506.14, representing its overpaid
income taxes for 1984 and 1985, but denied its claim for the
alleged refundable amount reflected in its 1983 income tax
return on the ground of prescription

It appears that in a letter dated August 26, 1986, herein

private respondent corporation filed a claim for refund with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in the amount of
P19,971,745,00 representing the alleged aggregate of the
excess of its carried-over total quarterly payments over the
actual income tax due, plus carried-over withholding tax
payments on government securities and rental income, as
computed in its final income tax return for the calendar
year ending December 31, 1985.
3
However, on June 24, 1991, herein petitioner filed with
the tax court a manifestation and motion praying for the
suspension of the proceedings in the said case on the
ground that the claim of Citytrust for tax refund in the
amount of P19,971,745.00 was already being processed by
the Tax Credit/Refund Division of the BIR, and that said
bureau was only awaiting the submission by Citytrust of
the required confirmation receipts which would show
whether or not the aforestated amount was actually paid
and remitted to the BIR.
7
Citytrust filed an opposition thereto, contending that
since the Court of Tax Appeals already acquired
jurisdiction over the case, it could no longer be divested of
the same; and, further, that the proceedings therein could
not be suspended by the mere fact that the claim for refund
was being administratively processed, especially where the
case had already been submitted for decision. It also
argued that the BIR had already conducted an audit, citing
therefor Exhibits Y, Y-1, Y-2 and Y-3 adduced in the case,
which clearly showed that there was an overpayment of
income taxes and for which a tax credit or refund was due
to Citytrust. The foregoing exhibits are allegedly conclusive
proof of and an admission by herein petitioner that there
had been an over-payment of income taxes.

Petitioner alleged that through an

inter-office memorandum of the Tax Credit/Refund
Division, dated August 8, 1991, he came to know only lately
that Citytrust had outstanding tax liabilities for 1984 in
the amount of P56,588,740.91 representing deficiency
income and business taxes covered by Demand/Assessment
Notice No. FAS-1-84-003291-003296.

**After a careful review of the records, we find that under

the peculiar circumstances of this case, the ends of
substantial justice and public interest would be better
subserved by the remand of this case to the Court of Tax
Appeals for further proceedings.
It is the sense of this Court that the BIR, represented
herein by petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
was denied its day in court by reason of the mistakes
and/or negligence of its officials and employees. It can
readily be gleaned from the records that when it was herein
petitioner’s turn to present evidence, several
postponements were sought by its counsel, the Solicitor
General, due to the unavailability of the necessary records
which were not transmitted by the Refund Audit Division
of the BIR to said counsel, as well as the investigation
report made by the Banks/ Financing and Insurance
Division of the said bureau, despite repeated requests.
17
It
was under such a predi-cament and in deference to the tax
court that ultimately, said records being still unavailable,
herein petitioner’s counsel was constrained to submit the
case for decision on February 20, 1991 without presenting
any evidence.
For that matter, the BIR officials and/or employees
concerned also failed to heed the order of the Court of Tax
Appeals to remand the records to it pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 7 of the Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals which
provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Commissioner of Customs shall certify and forward to
the Court of Tax Appeals, within ten days after filing his
answer, all the records of the case in his possession, with
the pages duly numbered, and if the records are in separate
folders, then the folders shall also be numbered.
The aforestated impassé came about due to the fact that,
despite the filing of the aforementioned initiatory petition
in CTA Case No. 4099 with the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Tax Refund Division of the BIR still continued to act
administratively on the claim for refund previously filed
therein, instead of forwarding the records of the case to the
Court of Tax Appeals as ordered.
18
It is a long and firmly settled rule of law that the
Government is not bound by the errors committed by its
agents.
19
In the performance of its governmental functions,
the State cannot be estopped by the neglect of its agent and
officers. Although the Government may generally be
estopped through the affirmative acts of public officers
acting within their authority, their neglect or omission of
public duties as exemplified in this case will not and should
not produce that effect.
Nowhere is the aforestated rule more true than in the
field of taxation.
20
It is axiomatic that the Government
cannot and must not be estopped particularly in matters
involving taxes. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation
through which the government agencies continue to
operate and with which the State effects its functions for
the welfare of its constituents.
21
The errors of certain
administrative officers should never be allowed to
jeopardize the Government’s financial position,
22
especially
in the case at bar where the amount involves millions of
pesos the collection whereof, if justified, stands to be
prejudiced just because of bureaucratic lethargy.
Further, it is also worth noting that the Court of Tax
Appeals erred in denying petitioner’s supplemental motion
for reconsideration alleging and bringing to said court’s
attention the existence of the deficiency income and
business tax assessment
The Court cannot end this adjudication without
observing that what caused the Government to lose its case
in the tax court may hopefully be ascribed merely to the
ennui or ineptitude of officialdom, and not to syndicated
intent or corruption. The evidentialcul-de-sac in which the
Solicitor General found himself once again gives substance
to the public perception and suspicion that it is another
proverbial tip in the iceberg of venality in a government
bureau which is pejoratively rated over the years. What is
so distressing, aside from the financial losses to the
Government, is the erosion of trust in a vital institution
wherein the reputations of so many honest and dedicated
workers are besmirched by the acts or omissions of a few.

Vinzon-Chato v Fortune

(Decision affirmed)

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the
manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which
are “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” cigarettes

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act

No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior
to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion,” “Hope,” and
“More” were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1,
1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and
“More” as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.
4
RMC 37-93 in
effect subjected “Hope,” “More,” and “Champion” cigarettes to the provisions of RA
7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,
5
(c)(1) on locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and
taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of “55%
provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five
Pesos (P5.00) per pack.”

1994, the CTA ruled that

RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and
further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency
tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by
this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals.
10
It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has
fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative
issuance.
6

respondent filed before the RTC a

complaint
11
for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be
held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss

12
contending that: (1)
respondent has no cause of action against her because she
issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official
function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed
that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and
therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2)
the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or
bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping
was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule
that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should
sign the same.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse

contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the
performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is
Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should
be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only
when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code,
specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for
violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the
liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public
officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the
instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a
cause of action.

**On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is
not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within
the scope of his assigned tasks.
15
An officer who acts within
his authority to administer the affairs of the office which
he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against
the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent.
16
However, a public
officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being
outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the

Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there
is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a
superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same
Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public
officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence.

Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the

pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to
official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in the nature of a tort.

Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only
public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for
violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil
Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this
Article should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that
there is a violation of the constitutional right of the
plaintiff.
26

joint
tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the
Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil
liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts
done in the performance of their duties. For both superior
and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith,
malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make
them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions
deal in particular with the liability of government officials,
the subject thereof is general, i.e.,“acts” done in the
performance of official duties, without specifying the action
or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the
official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear
and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an “act” that
may give rise to an action for damages against a public
officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and
liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that
deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by
public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers
are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative
Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on
Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a
public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular
class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public
officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil
liability arising from errors in the performance of duties,
Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which
must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under
Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and
malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of
the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same
will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The
courts below

Determinitive/Investigatory

Carino v CHR
(annulled and set aside)

Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human

Rights; Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have
no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of
cases like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.—The threshold question is whether or not the
Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
rights violations in volving civil or political rights. The Court
declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to

the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.—The most that may be conceded to the
Commission. in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a

judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the

faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly
and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations invoking civil and
political rights.—As should at once be observed, only the first of
the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and
categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to
such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations
of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth.
It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct
of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on
Human Rights having merely the power to investigate cannot and
should not try and resolve on the merits the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775.—Hence it is that the
Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power “to
investigate,” cannot and should not “try and resolve on the
merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90–775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil
or political rights had been transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters
are undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education and also within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission.—These are matters undoubtedly
and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
Teachers were participating to peaceful mass action and later learned that they were replaced and were
suspended for 9 months without notice

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate,

that is to say, determine with character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon
and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture 6,
Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission,
this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service
Commission on said matters, if still timely.

Issue: The threshold question is whether or not the

Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice, 19
or even a quasi-judicial agency,
20
it has jurisdiction
or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide,
or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving
civil or political rights.

Ruling: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to

have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in

the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law.
21
This function, to repeat, the
Commission does nothave.
22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional
provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on
Human Rights. The Commission was created by the 1987
Constitution as an independent office.
23
Upon its
constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the
effectivity of the Constitution,
24
Its powers and functions
are the following:
25
Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;
xxxxx

As should at once be observed, only the first of the

enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance
to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly
and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its
own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as
it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of
its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in
extending such remedy as
may be required by its findings.
26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial
bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.
“Investigate” commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of “investigate” is “to observe or
study closely: inquire into systematically: “to search or
inquire into: xx to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct
an official inquiry."
27
The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry
“Adjudicate,” commonly or popularly understood, means
to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule
on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as “to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case)
on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: xx act as judge."
30
And “adjudge” means “to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasijudicial
powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy xx."
31
In the legal sense, “adjudicate” means: “To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights,

having merely the power “to investigate,” cannot and
should not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90
–775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do
so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no
power to “resolve on the merits” the question of (a) whether
or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the
teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on
and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their
classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and
regulations warranting administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of
by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by
each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may
properly be imposed for said acts or omissions,

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the

original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him
under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the

conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in
disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on
substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings
themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary
of Education had in truth committed “human rights
violations involving civil and political rights,” are matters
which may be passed upon and determined through a
motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary of
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict,
may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and
eventually by the Supreme Court.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on

Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power
anyway to reverse the Secretary’s conclusions. Reversal
thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission
and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission
can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is
to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency
or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission.
35
It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Department of Health v Camposano

(Partially granted; Annulled)
PAGC.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Department Secretaries
are authorized to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary actions for officers and employees under their
jurisdiction.—The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department
secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the
former’s jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary
authority over respondents. Note that being a presidential
appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of
the President, in line with the principle that the “power to remove
is inherent in the power to appoint.” While the Chief Executive
directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized
the health secretary’s disciplinary authority over respondents
when he remanded the PCAGC’s findings against them for the
secretary’s “appropriate action.”

Same; Same; Same; As a matter of administrative procedure,

a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate
and report the facts from which a decision may be based; Neither
the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating
Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose any
administrative sanctions directly—their authority was limited to
conducting investigations and preparing their findings and
recommendations.—As a matter of administrative procedure, a
department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and
report the facts from which a decision may be based. In the
present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to
investigate to the PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor
the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had
the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their
authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing
their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining
authority,
who had to observe due process prior to imposing penal
On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed
a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A.
Ringpis (hereinafter the Resident Ombudsman) against Dir. IV
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio
Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged anomalous
purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg.
with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth
P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13,
1996.

then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres

issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating
an ad hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed
against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to
the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(hereafter PCAGC) on October 26, 1996

“On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the investigation

from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution on
January 23, 1998 disposing [respondents]’ case as follows: respondents are
Guilty…
“On April 20, 1998, President Ramos issued [Administrative
Order No. 390 (hereinafter AO 390)] that reads:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U.
Majarais is hereby found guilty as charged and, as recommended by the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the
Penalty of dismissal from the service.

Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued an

Order disposing of the case against [respondents] and [Horacio
Cabrera] :dismissed

The appellate court held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction

over administrative complaints pertained only to
presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no
power to investigate the charges against respondents.
6
Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the
PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of health failed to comply
with administrative due process.
7

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Investigate
Executive Order (EO) No. 151
10
granted the PCAGC the
jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints
against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft
and corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it
is evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to
investigate charges against presidential, not nonpresidential,
appointees. In its Preamble, specifically in its
“Whereas” clauses, the EO “specifically tasked [the
PCAGC] to x x x investigate presidential appointees
charged with graft and corruption x x x.” More pointedly,
Section 3 states that the “Commission shall have
jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving
graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against
presidenxxxx

On the basis of the foregoing verba legis approach,

respondents claim that the PCAGC did not have
jurisdiction over them, because they were not presidential
appointees.
The Court notes, however, that respondents were not
investigated pursuant to EO 151. The investigation was
authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated
October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee
to look into the administrative charges filed against
Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano

The Investigating Committee was composed of all the

members of the PCAGC: Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo,
Commissioner Dario C. Rama and Commissioner Jaime L.
Guerrero. The Committee was directed by AO 298 to
“follow the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40 of
the Civil Service Law (PD 807), as amended.” It was tasked
to “forward to the Disciplining Authority the entire records
of the case, together with its findings and
recommendations, as well as the draft decision for the
approval of the President.”

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc

Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President
has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law.
13
With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.
Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with
regard to cases involving non-presidential appointees was
rectified in Executive Order No. 12,
14
which created the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). Nonpresidential
appointees who may have acted in conspiracy,
or who may have been involved with a presidential
appointee, may now be investigated by the PAGC.
Second and Third Issues:
Validity of Health Secretary’s Decision
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department
secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and
employees under the former’s jurisdiction.
16
Thus, the
health secretary had disciplinary authority over
respondents.
Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda
Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in
line with the principle that the “power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint.”
17
While the Chief
Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he
nonetheless recognized the health secretary’s disciplinary
authority over respondents when he remanded the
PCAGC’s findings against them for the secretary’s
“appropriate action.”

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department

secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and
report the facts from which a decision may be based.
19
In
the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the
power to investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
power to impose any administrative sanctions directly.
Their authority was limited to conducting investigations
and preparing their findings and recommendations. The
power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining
authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing
penalties.
Due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes
the right to
present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be
observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support
itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the
law and the facts of the controversy and must not have
simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the
decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the
various issues involved.
20
The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process
had not been observed in the present factual milieu.
Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident
from the health secretary’s Order dismissing the
respondents xxx

Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and

the authority to decide what action should be taken against
officials and employees who have been administratively
charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of
the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a prior
independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure
to comply with this requirement results in an invalid
decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and
solely rely on an investigator’s recommendation, but must
personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There
can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the
reputation, and the livelihood of the person
administratively charged.

In the present case, the health secretary’s two-page

Order dismissing respondents pales in comparison with the
presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the
issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V.
Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctor’s case. He even
noted a violation that had not been considered by the
PCAGC.
22
On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita
N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive
portion of the Commission’s Resolution. She even
misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the
recommendation with regard to Respondents Enrique L.
Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
The Order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents’
Motion for Reconsideration also failed to correct the
deficiency in the initial Order.
23
She improperly relied on
the President’s findings in AO 390 which, however, pertained only to the administrative charge against Dr.
Majarais, not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief
Executive recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction over
respondents belonged to the health secretary,
24
who should
have followed the manner in which the President had
rendered his action on the recommendation.
The President’s endorsement of the records of the case
for the “appropriate action” of the health secretary
25
did not
constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of
respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of
Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding
and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and
thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so
desired.
Quasi Legislative/Rule Making

Ople V Torres

(Null and void)

Same; Same; Same; The Administrative Code of 1987 has

unequivocally vested the President with quasi-legislative powers in
the form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders and circulars and general or special orders.
—The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the
President with quasi-legislative powers in the form of executive
orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum
orders and circulars and general or special orders. An
administrative order, like the one under which the new
identification system is embodied, has its peculiar meaning under
the 1987 Administrative Code: SEC. 3. Administrative Orders.
—Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE
EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING
ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
CONGRESS;

II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O.
No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power

is not indistinct. Legislative power is “the authority, under
the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them.”
8
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their
original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this
power in the Congress of the Philippines.
9
The grant of
legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.
10
The legislative body possesses plenary
power for all purposes of civil government.
11
Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
has lodged it elsewhere.
12
In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws.
14
The executive power is vested
in the President.
15
It is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws.
16
It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.
17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is
the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a
whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department.
18
He has control
over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This
means that he has the authority to assume directly the
functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of its officials.
19
Corollary to
the power of control, the President also has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs.
21
It enables the President to
fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents.
22
To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No.
308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
“Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.—Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.”
23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy.
24
We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative
Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and “incorporates
in a unified document the major structural, functional and
procedural principles of governance”
25
and “embodies
changes in administrative structures and procedures
designed to serve the people.” The Code is divided into
seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General
Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of
the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of
the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on
the Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National
Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative
Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the
organization, powers and general administration of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government,
the organization and ad-ministration of departments, bureaus and offices under the
executive branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as
well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative
agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The
Code covers both the internal administration of
government, i.e., internal organization, personnel and
recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of
the functions performed by administrative officials on
private individuals or parties outside government.
27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308
merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state
policies—the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossiergathering by government,
the choice of policies, etc.

Smart Communications v NTC

(granted)

Administrative Law; National Telecommunications

Commission; Powers; Quasi-Legislative Power; Administrative
agencies possess quasilegislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
—Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rulemaking
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

Same; Same; Same, Quasi-Judicial Power; The

administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature.—Not to be confused with the
quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative
agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power.
This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises
its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an
act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature,
where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasijudicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a
judicial nature.

Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the

National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on
June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services.

Petitioners lslacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that

the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such
jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that
the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative
of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation ofproperty without due process of law; that the Circular will
result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid
cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and
expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and
call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they
prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void
ab initio.

Held: We find merit in the petitions.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines
of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers.
16

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies

promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature
to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with,
the standards prescribed by law.
17

They must conform to and be

consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in
order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules
and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative
body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to
regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations
which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in
derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of
conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the
former must prevail.
18

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rulemaking

power of an administrative agency is its quasijudicial
or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive
or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in
a judicial nature.
19

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule

or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant
to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power

However, where what is assailed is the validity or

constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasilegislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts.
25

This is within the scope of judicial

power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
of the political departments

**Important** In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of

Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum
dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative
or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in
invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances. In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court,
petitioners averred that the Circular contravened Civil
Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional
prohibition against the deprivation of property without due
process of law. These are within the competence of the trial
judge. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the
issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical
matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will
resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of
the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and
call cards—and this is judicially known to be within the
knowledge of a good percentage of our population—and
expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the
Constitution.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear
and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of
Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court
and in dismissing the case.