1114
2, APRIL 2017
Triggered Current Limiters—Their Arc Flash
Mitigation and Damage Limitation Capabilities
Jay Prigmore, Member, IEEE, and John S. Schaffer, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Triggered current limiters (TCL) have traditionally
been applied to protect overdutied switchgear in medium volt-
age substations but increasing trends include the applications of
damage limitation and Arc Flash mitigation. TCLs are effective at
minimizing damage from short circuits due to their speed, which
results in their peak current limitation capabilities. Their subcycle
response time (extinction in 1/4–1/2 cycle) can often reduce the I2 t
available in the system to less than 1% of its potential value com-
pared to a fice-cycle breaker. TCLs are capable of reducing the
incident energy enough to reduce the Arc Flash hazard category
and required personal protective equipment for onsite personnel.
A TCL can commonly reduce the Arc Flash hazard category from
category 4 to category 2 in medium voltage. For low voltage, most
applications should be reduced to category 0 or 1. This paper aims
to address the applications of Arc Flash reduction and damage lim-
itation for substation design and generating stations, and highlights
the benefits a TCL can provide.
Index Terms— Arc flash and arc blast, electrical safety, fault
current limiters, occupational safety, power system faults, power
system protection, substation design, substation protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
S electrical energy demand continues to grow, additional
A sources are often added to existing substations or new
substations are constructed to accommodate this increase in de-
mand. These additional sources often increase fault currents
to levels which can destroy system equipment even if the sys-
tem is operating within its circuit breaker interrupt ratings. The
additional sources may also exceed existing installed equip-
ment ratings potentially causing catastrophic failure to multiple
pieces of system equipment. This may require lengthier repair
times and expensive repair costs or replacement. In addition,
a short-circuit event may reduce the service life of substation
equipment due to through-fault damage. Not only can the in-
terrupt ratings of protective devices be exceeded, but also the
thermal and mechanical ratings of other equipment in the fault
circuit.
Furthermore, the incident energy available on the system can
exceed all available Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) rat-
Manuscript received February 16, 2016; revised June 2, 2016; accepted July
30, 2016. Date of publication August 24, 2016; date of current version March
22, 2017. Paper no. TPWRD-00195-2016.
The authors are with the System Protection Division, G&W Electric Co.,
Bolingbrook, IL 60440 USA (e-mail: jprigmore@gwelec.com; jschaffer@
gwelec.com).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRD.2016.2602098
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 32, NO.
ings [1], [2]. Onsite personnel can be exposed to hazardous
levels of system energy when working in the vicinity, should
an arc fault occur. Lowering or removing the available incident
energy in the system can not only save equipment from damage
but also minimize exposure of personnel.
Traditional approaches for limiting fault currents and mini-
mizing system damage are highlighted below [3]–[5]:
1) Upgrade system equipment
2) Addition of a current limiting reactor
3) Open bus ties or disconnect sources
4) Addition of current limiting fuses (CLFs) when <1000V
or in branches of medium voltage systems [6]. Yet their
effectiveness may be limited by melt characteristics or
availability of sufficient continuous duty ratings.
II. TRIGGERED CURRENT LIMITER
Triggered Current Limiters (TCLs) also referred to as Com-
mutating Current Limiters (CCLs) are devices which consist
of a main continuous current conduction path with a parallel
mounted current limiting fuse [7]. TCLs have voltage ratings up
to 38 kV with continuous current capabilities up to 5000 A and
interrupt ratings up to and sometimes exceeding 200 kA rms,
sym. TCLs have successfully interrupted up to 311 kA rms, sym
at 15.7 kV [7].
The TCL, as shown in Fig. 1, is externally powered and does
not derive its control power from the bus voltage. As the control
logic requires a few cycles to power up, if one closes into a
short-circuit condition the TCL may not operate before the first
peak current is reached and would not provide the protection
the system requires. By externally powering up the TCL, this
undesirable situation can be avoided and protection is provided
if one closes into a fault. TCLs are commonly powered from the
same station batteries that are used for tripping circuit breakers
or other equipment.
A. Operation
Under normal (non-faulted) operating conditions, a high
percentage of the continuous current (>99%) flows through
the main conduction path with the remaining portion flowing
through the parallel mounted current limiting fuse. Upon occur-
rence of a short-circuit current event, the TCL senses the current
and determines whether to operate or not based on its preset
“trigger level.” The main conduction path consists of a copper
bus bar with thin sections that are pyrotechincally cut and folded
back upon themselves, creating physical gaps and associated arc
PRIGMORE AND SCHAFFER: TRIGGERED CURRENT LIMITERS
Fig. 1. Typical components of a triggered current limiter
voltages. This forces commutation of main conductor currents
to the shunt current limiting fuse(s). Electrically, the cutting op-
eration mimics a separation of contacts, but at extremely high
speed. To pyrotechnics are used to achieve this high speed nec-
essary for the TCL to function in a current limiting mode. The
current limiting fuse melts and ultimately interrupts the fault
current within 1/4 to 1/2 of a cycle (before the first peak current
occurs) shortly before the “voltage zero” of the system [8]. The
TCL uses two basic principles in determining when to operate.
The first principle is instantaneous overcurrent (threshold). The
second principle is an extremely brief time-delay where the cur-
rent flowing must exceed the threshold value for the specific
minimum time before a “short-circuit” is determined to have
occurred and the TCL operates [9]. The built in time delay is a
filtering means to avoid operating on non-fault system transients.
It is not desirable to utilize rate-of-current-rise (di/dt) sensing
as it can have a higher probability of unwanted nuisance trips.
Short-circuits, system transients and capacitor bank discharges
all have a high di/dt characteristic and it is not always possi-
ble to reliably determine, in the sub-cycle timeframe required
for the TCL to operate, which system event is occurring. For
timeframes greater than 1 cycle the differences between short-
circuits, transients and capacitor bank discharges can be readily
observed. By not using di/dt sensing, nuisance trips can be more
readily avoided.
B. Energy/Damage Limitation Comparison
A more recent trend relates to Damage Limitation of failed
devices and surrounding equipment. In this case, equipment may
be properly rated for its fault duty, but the catastrophic effects of
a fault are greatly limited by a TCL, as opposed to the more tra-
ditional techniques using relays, breakers and current limiting
reactors. It is well known that traditional current limiting fuses,
in lower continuous current ratings, can be very effective in dam-
age limitation. Commutating limiters, such as the TCL, can pro-
vide this effectiveness for the higher continuous current ranges
than traditional CLFs, especially in the medium voltage range
where CLFs with high continuous current ratings do not exist.
1115
Fig. 2. Let-through I2 t comparison.
Fig. 2 compares the let-through I2 t of a 5 cycle breaker, a 5
cycle breaker plus reactor combination where the reactor lim-
its the current to half, a traditional 200 A continuous medium
voltage current limiting fuse and the TCL with its 40 kA rms,
sym interrupt rating for a medium voltage application. The let-
through I2 t for a 5-cycle breaker for a 40 kA rms, sym fault
current is 133 million A2 sec at 60 Hz. When a reactor is in-
serted to provide a 50% reduction, the let-through I2 t is reduced
to one quarter of its original value or 33 million A2 sec. A 200 A
continuous current limiting fuse would reduce the let-through
I2 t to approximately 1 million A2 sec. The TCL for this scenario
can reduce the let-through energy to 0.6 million A2 sec which
is less than 1% of the let-through I2 t as compared to a 5 cycle
breaker.
A quick comparison is shown by the red horizontal bar rep-
resenting the relative let-through I2 t just below each sub-plot
in Fig. 2. The TCL provides the excellent damage limitation
as a traditional current limiting fuse but at elevated continu-
ous current ranges. Regarding damage limitation and Arc Flash
mitigation, it can be seen in Fig. 3 that the worst-case exposure
when using a TCL is based on the trigger level and its associated
rms, symmetrical fault level, below which the breaker or similar
device is expected to clear and the TCL will not trigger. Divide
the TCL instantaneous trigger level by 1.414 to determine the
associated rms, symmetrical fault. This rms, symmetrical value
can be applied by the user in their Arc Flash analysis programs
as a maximum exposure.
It should also be noted that the three (3) trigger levels, in
Fig. 3, represent only the maximum values for a certain oper-
ating range of a TCL and that lesser values for each range will
similarly reduce the exposure. The low end of each trigger level
range for each interrupt rating will be the maximum trigger level
for that interrupt rating divided by 3.5. Other ranges are avail-
able and custom trigger levels can be set. For faults reaching
the trigger level due to asymmetry of a lesser rms, symmetrical
fault, this will result in a triggering at a lower value, to effec-
tively mitigate those asymmetrical faults as well. In other words,
the TCL will also protect against asymmetrical faults. For fault
energy, similarly consider the fault currents, below which the
TCL does not operate as worst-case.
1116
Fig. 3 Comparison of let-through I2 t for different protection devices based on available rms, sym current for a low voltage system.
Fig. 3 shows the let through I2 t of a 3 cycle breaker, a 3 cycle
breaker and reactor combination where the reactor limits the
available short-circuit current to 50% of its available value, a
4000 A continuous high speed current limiting fuse and the TCL
with multiple interrupt ratings and trigger levels. The high speed
current limiting fuse performs adequately while operating in its
current limiting region at limiting let-through I2 t but performs
poorly due to its long time to melt when below its current
limiting region. This can be seen in Fig. 3 at 70 kA rms, sym
where the graph appears to be discontinuous. Below 70 kA rms,
sym, the traditional current limiting fuse quickly exceeds the
maximum scale in Fig. 3.
The breaker and the breaker plus reactor combination both
exceed the maximum scale for Fig. 3 but they reach it at differ-
ent available fault currents. The TCL is reliant on its individual
trigger level setting to determine the worst-case let-through I2 t.
Fig. 3 demonstrates why the trigger level selection is very im-
portant in limiting the let-through I2t. The TCL will follow the
breaker curve until its trigger level is reached which acts as a
step function for any available fault currents greater than the
trigger level.
III. TCL APPLICATIONS
A. Arc Flash and Arc Blast
An outgrowth of the damage limitation application and recog-
nized for many years is the use of TCLs in personnel protection.
This occurs not only by limiting equipment destruction to which
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 32, NO. 2, APRIL 2017
an individual may be exposed, but also by mitigating the effects
of direct exposure to an arcing fault. Energy limitation is critical
in Arc Flash Mitigation. It should be noted that the personnel
and equipment are not just coping with the energy release of an
Arc Flash and Arc Blast event through PPE or the routing of
energy release to other locations. Instead, the TCL effectively
reduces the arc fault energy by reducing the current in both time
and magnitude. A large percentage of TCL applications are fo-
cused on Energy Limitation for the purpose of Arc Flash and
Arc Blast mitigation.
The 5 main factors that determine an Arc Flash injury severity
are given below.
1) Proximity
2) Temperature
3) Sound, Light, Pressure Wave
4) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
5) Duration of Arcing Fault.
The majority of Arc Flash mitigation technologies are focused
on limiting the duration of the arcing fault by interrupting the
arcing fault as quickly as possible. The TCL minimizes the
duration of the arcing fault more than conventional technologies
once the TCL’s trigger level is exceeded. It has a far more
pronounced effect in that it limits the magnitude of the fault,
where the energy is related to the square of the current magnitude
(integrated over time).
A typical Arc Flash application is depicted in Fig. 4. The
TCL is installed directly on the secondary of the main trans-
former. Alternatively, the TCL can be installed on the incomer
PRIGMORE AND SCHAFFER: TRIGGERED CURRENT LIMITERS 1117

TABLE I
INPUT DATA FOR ARC FLASH ANALYSIS

Medium Voltage Low Voltage

Equipment Class Switchgear Switchgear

Grounding Grounded Grounded
Available Short-Circuit Current 38.85 kA 85.18 kA
Current Through Protective Device 29.88 kA (FLA/0.07) 72.16 kA (FLA/0.05)
System Voltage 13.8 kV 480 V
Gap Between Conductors 6 in (152 mm) 1 in (25.4 mm)
Working Distance[10], [11] 36 in (914 mm) 24 in (610 mm)
Arc Duration Device Specific Device Specific

Fig. 4. Typical arc flash application. TCLs are installed on the major source
to cut-off a significant portion of system energy.
for a Motor Control Center (MCC). The TCL will protect all
equipment downstream of its location. If installed on the MCC,
it will protect the MCC and limit associated damage. The Arc
Flash application is similar to the Damage Limitation applica-
tion but differs in the overall protection objective and ultimately,
the trigger level.
For Arc Flash mitigation the criteria may be a targeted Per-
sonal Protective Equipment (PPE) level. It is common to reduce
exposure down a few levels from that encountered without the
TCL, and in some cases to hazard level “0” for low voltage ap-
plications. For these cases, the trigger level is critical, since the
maximum exposure is typically at a current level just beneath
that of the TCL trigger or instantaneous pick-up level. This can
be readily noted on Fig. 3, where the dashed vertical lines are
indicative of the rms, symmetrical current level beneath which
the TCL will not operate, thus permitting the breaker or similar
device to clear the fault.
1) Trigger Level Selection: Follow the steps below when
selecting the appropriate TCL ratings and trigger level for an
Arc Flash or personnel protection application:
Step 1 – Determine the maximum amount of fault current
flowing through the TCL that will need to be interrupted in both
directions. This may or may not be the total amount of fault
current on the system. Select the next highest interrupt rating
from the TCL interrupt ratings and corresponding standard in-
stantaneous trigger levels. For example, if the system has 60 kA
rms, sym available but only 40 kA rms, sym will flow through
the TCL (to be interrupted by the TCL), the proper interrupt
rating would be an associated interrupt rating above this 40 kA
rms, sym value.
Step 2 – Calculate the maximum worst-case inrush of down-
stream motors or transformers by determining the maximum
total KVA simultaneously energized. This can either be the
highest KVA of a single motor/transformer or it can be a sum
of individual motors/transformers within this KVA grouping.
Calculate the total full-load amperes (FLA) for motors and then
for transformers that makes up the maximum simultaneously
energized KVA. For motors multiply the FLA by 15; and for
transformers multiply the FLA by 30 for very conservative re-
sults.
Step 3 – Based on the inrushes, select a standard trigger level
from the manufacturer that is just greater than the maximum
expected inrush value, which also provides for a device with
sufficient interrupt capability. If a standard trigger level is not
desirable, a custom trigger level may be set. If the expected
inrush exceeds the maximum trigger level for the selected inter-
rupt rating, then select the next highest interrupt rating that has
a trigger level above the expected maximum inrush.
Step 4 – The worst-case condition occurs when the fault cur-
rent is just below the TCL’s trigger level. Below this level the
circuit-breaker or similar device is expected to clear over a
longer period of time and the TCL will not trigger. To determine
the associated rms, symmetrical fault current, divide the TCL’s
instantaneous trigger level by 1.414 or 2. This rms, symmetri-
cal value can be applied by the end user in their Arc Flash anal-
ysis programs as a worst-case fault current let-through. Please
note, a lesser magnitude rms, sym fault current offset by asym-
metry could still operate the TCL.
2) Application Examples: All example calculations assume
an infinite bus and ideal conductors when calculating short-
circuit current and arcing fault current. The incident energy
calculations and hazard level results were performed using the
software package in Arc Flash Analysis by ARCAD Inc. The
values used in the calculations are given below in Table I. Only
the duration of interruption was modified to correspond to the
appropriate protective devices.
Medium Voltage:
For a medium voltage application example of Fig. 4, the
equipment ratings are given below.
1) Main Transformer Rating
– 50 MVA
– 60 Hz
– VSECONDARY = 13.8 kVL−L
– Z% = 7%
– FLA = 2,091 A
– Fault Current (ISC ) = 29.88 kA rms, sym
2) Motor Ratings
– Total Lumped MVA = 40 MVA
– FLA = 1.67 kA
– Backfeed ISC = 5 ∗ FLA = 8.37 kA
– Largest Individual Motor = 10 MVA
1118 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 32, NO. 2, APRIL 2017

TABLE II TABLE III

MEDIUM VOLTAGE ARC FLASH COMPARISON LOW VOLTAGE ARC FLASH COMPARISON

Breaker TCL Operation up to TCL Below Breaker + TCL Operation up to TCL Below
+ Relay Max Fault Current Trigger Level Relay Max Fault Current Trigger Level

Arc Duration 83 ms∗ 10 ms 83 ms Arc Duration 50 ms∗ 10 ms 50 ms

Incident Energy 28 6.4 6.5 Incident Energy 4.8 0.9 1.0
(cal/cm2 ) (cal/cm2 )
Hazard Level 4 2 2 Hazard Level 2 0 0
Arc Flash Boundary 174 in 83 in (739 mm) 84 in (1384 mm) Arc Flash Boundary 61 in (1554 mm) 19 in (487 mm) 21 in (523 mm)
(4418 mm) Initial Blast Pressure 258 lbs/ft2 53 lbs/ft2 59 lbs/ft2
Initial Blast Pressure 171 lbs/ft2 40 lbs/ft2 (Mainly due to 40 lbs/ft2 (lbs/ft2 )
(lbs/ft2 ) Motor Backfeed) TNT Mass Equivalent 0.46 lbs 0.07 lbs (31 grams) 0.08 lbs
TNT Mass Equivalent 1.99 lbs 0.25 lbs (115 grams) 0.26 lbs (211 grams) (35 grams)
(903 grams) (120 grams)
∗
The arc duration for the breaker scenario may increase significantly on lower magnitude
∗
The arc duration for the breaker scenario may increase significantly on lower magnitude faults.
faults.

An important note, the main breaker may trip and interrupt

– Largest Motor FLA = 600 A rms, sym
– Highest Inrush = 6.3 kA inst. (peak)
3) Maximum Downstream Transformer Rating
– 3.5 MVA
– Primary FLA = 146.4 A
– Backfeed limited to 0.6 kA
– Highest inrush = 4.4 kA inst. at 13.8 kV
Based on the system voltage and continuous current ratings,
the proper ratings for the TCL would be a 15.5 kV, 3000 con-
tinuous class device without any de-rating factors due to the
environment or elevation. The maximum amount of fault cur-
rent required to be interrupted is 29.88 kA rms, sym. An in-
terrupt rating greater than 30 kA rms, sym is required for this
application (Step 1).
The maximum inrush for the downstream transformer is
4.4 kA inst. and the largest motor inrush is 6.3 kA inst. The
site operating philosophy is to energize each piece of down-
stream equipment individually. Therefore the maximum inrush
current is 6.3 kA instantaneous and not a combination of both
the largest motor and downstream transformer (Step 2).
The next highest standard trigger level is 8 kA instanta-
neous, although 10 kA inst. can be selected for extra margin. In
this example, the 10 kA instantaneous trigger level is selected
(Step 3). The 10 kA inst. trigger level equates to a 7.07 kA
rms, sym current (Step 4). The 7.07 kA rms, sym value can be
used to limit the maximum fault current output by the source as
applied in an Arc Flash software package. Since a 10 kA trig-
ger level is chosen, the 40 kA rms, sym interrupt rating of the
TCL is the correct rating as the selected trigger level is within
the standard trigger level range for this particular the interrupt
rating based on the manufacturer’s data sheet. A higher rated
TCL can be chosen but the peak cut-off and energy let-through
will also increase.
The results of the Arc Flash analysis are shown below in Ta-
ble II. It is assumed the medium voltage circuit breaker requires
5 cycles to operate (83 ms). The Arc Flash relay operates in 1-4
ms and is included in the 83 ms total operation time to clear the
arc fault. In this medium voltage example, Lee’s method was
used as it is more conservative than the IEEE 1584 method for
medium voltage [3].
the source contribution but it does not interrupt the backfeeds
which can prolong the arc duration and increase accumulative
damage and the hazard level.
The TCL operation yields an approximate let-through I2 t of
140,000 A2 sec. Adding this let-through I2 t to the I2 t value of the
residual 8.97 kA rms, sym yields a combined I2 t of 7.2 million
A2 sec. The combined I2 t value equates to 9.05 kA rms, sym for
5 cycles. This 9.05 kA rms, sym value is used as the worst case
fault current when the TCL does operate and is an input to the
software.
When the fault current is below the trigger level, the TCL
does not operate. The worst-case fault current would be the
combination of the rms, sym trigger level and the residual fault
current from motors and downstream transformers. If the fault is
only at a percentage of the maximum prospective fault current
due to arc impedance, the backfeeds will also be reduced to
that same percentage. In this application, the backfeeds will be
reduced to 23.66% of their prospective value. The worst-case
fault current is 9.19 kA rms, sym (7.07 rms, sym trigger level
plus the percentage reduced motor backfeed current of 2.12 rms,
sym). Limiting the source current to the 7.07 rms, sym trigger
level in any software package typically models the worst-case
condition through the TCL. An alternative approach would be
to implement a custom TCC with a straight line at the 7.07
rms, sym trigger level. For Arc Flash purposes, the TCL would
essentially be a switch that operates above the 7.07 kA rms, sym
limit and would not operate below as the TCL would already be
cleared at 0.01 sec, before traditional TCCs even start. A lower
asymmetrical current could still operate the TCL but exposure
would be less.
As shown in Table III, the TCL reduces the Arc Flash and
Arc Blast exposure considerably. In this example, it reduces
the hazard level from 4 to a worst-case level 2. Note that an
Arc Flash relay operation is applicable only to a lineup of gear
and that the TCL is effective both inside and outside of the
lineup – a zone effect with further coverage. In medium voltage
applications, installing a TCL in the system can typically reduce
the hazard level from a level 4 to a level 2.
Low Voltage: Modifying the ratings for the previous exam-
ple to accommodate low voltage applications (<1000 V), the
equipment ratings are given below. This is a standalone example
PRIGMORE AND SCHAFFER: TRIGGERED CURRENT LIMITERS
and does not reference any data in the previous medium voltage
example.
1) Main Transformer Rating
– 3,000 kVA
– 60 Hz
– VSECONDARY = 480 VL−L
– Z% = 5%
– FLA = 3.608 kA
– Fault Current (ISC ) = 72.16 kA rms, sym
2) Motor Ratings
– Total Lumped KVA = 2,000 kVA
– Lumped FLA = 2.405 kA
– ISC = 5 ∗ FLA = 12.02 kA rms, sym
– Largest Individual Motor = 500 kVA
– Largest Motor FLA = 600 A rms, sym
– Highest Inrush Current = 9 kA inst.
3) Downstream Transformer Rating
– 200 kVA
– FLA = 240 A
– Worst-case inrush = 7.2 kA inst.
– 1 kA rms, sym backfeed
The system voltage and continuous current determine the
nominal operating ratings of the TCL. A 750 V, 4000 A con-
tinuous current TCL should be used if there are no additional
de-rating factors such as elevation or maximum ambient tem-
perature. The total fault current available is the sum of main
transformer contribution and the total contribution from all
downstream sources or 85.18 kA rms, sym. Since the TCL
is installed on the secondary of the main transformer, it is re-
quired to interrupt the contribution from the main transformer
for a downstream arc fault. Based on the short-circuit flowing
through the device, an interrupt rating greater than 73 kA rms,
sym must be used (Step 1).
The maximum worst-case inrush current of both the down-
stream motors and the downstream transformer is shown above.
However, one must be cautious to use the largest sum of mo-
tors or the largest motor energized at one time to get the most
accurate worst-case inrush current. In this example, the motor
inrush is 9 kA instantaneous and the downstream transformer
inrush is 7.2 kA instantaneous. The maximum inrush current
is 9 kA (Step 2). Looking at the standard trigger level ranges
for the TCL based on its voltage rating, continuous current rat-
ing and an acceptable interrupt rating, the next highest standard
trigger level range is 12 kA instantaneous (Step 3). However,
the site personnel desire extra margin and agreed upon an 18 kA
inst. trigger level. The 18 kA instantaneous selected trigger level
equates to 12.72 kA rms, sym (Step 4). This 12.72 kA rms, sym
equivalent trigger level can be used in an Arc Flash analysis
program to determine the worst-case incident energy exposure.
A 4000 A continuous current circuit breaker is assumed to
have an operating time of 50 ms including relay time. The
Arc Flash relay which is typically light and pressure sensor
based is assumed to operate in 1-4 ms. The light and pressure
sensor allows the Arc Flash relay to pick-up lower magnitude
faults much quicker than an over current relay at that same low
magnitude. The circuit breaker operating times are viewed as
optimal times.
1119
The TCL forces a current zero to occur during its interruption
process. This is in contrast to a breaker in which the breaker
waits for a current zero to interrupt the arc fault and allows the
full sine wave and its associated peaks to be reached. For this
application, when the TCL operates, it would have an approxi-
mate let-through I2 t of 525,000 A2 sec. The residual current I2 t
plus the TCL let-through I2 t is approximately 9 million A2 sec
which equates to a 3 cycle (50 ms) arcing current of 13.4 kA
rms, sym. The 13.4 kA for 3 cycles is used as the input into
the Arc Flash program. The results are shown in Table III for
when the TCL operates as a breaker would have to clear the
residual arcing current after the TCL operates. When the fault
currents are below the trigger level and the TCL does not op-
erate, the worst-case symmetrical current is 15.02 kA rms, sym
(12.72 rms, sym trigger level plus the percentage reduced
(17.64%) backfeed contribution of 2.3 kA rms, sym). Note at
lower magnitude fault currents, the over current relay pickup
time may incur a significant delay which in turn will add greatly
to the exposure value.
The worst-case Arc Flash exposure is not when the TCL op-
erates as shown in Table III but instead just below the TCL’s
trigger level as a circuit breaker must interrupt the arc fault.
In this example, the trigger level is selected as 18 kA instanta-
neous (12.72 kA rms, sym). Re-running the software using the
12.72 kA rms, sym trigger level as the current through the device
instead of the available 72.16 kA rms, sym yields elevated expo-
sure levels assuming a 50 ms breaker plus relay operation time,
which may be extended at lower current magnitudes. The inci-
dent energy exposure increases from 0.9 cal/cm2 to 1.0 cal/cm2
with an increased Arc Flash boundary limit of 21 in (523 mm).
The hazard level remains at level 0. The initial blast pressure
has increased to 59 lbs/ft2 due to the larger arcing current and
the TNT mass equivalent has also increased slightly to 0.08 lbs
(35 grams).
Overall, the PPE requirements of site personnel have been
reduced from hazard level 2 with optimal assumptions before
the TCL was applied to hazard level 0 after the TCL is applied.
Typically a TCL can reduce low voltage applications to a hazard
level of 0 or 1.
B. Damage Limitation
A typical design for damage limitation applications is shown
in Fig. 5. One TCL is installed on each individual feeder. Even
if equipment is rated properly to withstand the available fault
duty, the let-through energy of a fault may still result in costly
damage. Traditional equipment such as relays, circuit breakers
and current-limiting reactors are far less effective at mitigating
damage. At lower continuous currents, current-limiting fuses
prevent this damage. For higher continuous currents where tra-
ditional CLFs do not exist (medium voltage) or are less effective
(low voltage, high continuous current), a TCL provides effec-
tive current-limiting performance of a much lower rated fuse,
through its electronically controlled operation.
Selection of trigger levels (pick-up) for minimizing damage
is more subjective. Normal, non-fault current levels that must
flow through the TCL should be considered. This may be the
1120
Fig. 5. Typical damage limitation application. TCLs are installed on each
individual feeder.
instantaneous peak of a motor or transformer inrush, or instan-
taneous peak fault level of equipment reflected to the opposite
side of the transformer where the TCL resides. Let-through I2 t
value, peak current let-through value or similar criteria may
also be targeted. Unlike traditional overdutied equipment appli-
cations, in cases where there is not a distinct peak let-through
(cutoff) current value required for the TCL, a minimum trigger
level which avoids response to typical expected inrushes should
be considered.
1) Trigger Level Selection:
Step 1 – Same as in the Arc Flash Mitigation Application.
Step 2 – Same as in the Arc Flash Mitigation Application.
Step 3 – Based on the inrushes, select a standard trigger level
from the manufacturer’s trigger level selection table that is just
greater than the maximum expected inrush value. For medium
voltage sectors of a utility distribution system, the trigger level is
commonly selected to prevent triggering on inrush to a network
transformer and also on the peak asymmetrical instantaneous
current value on the low voltage side as reflected to the medium
voltage side of the system [12]. If a standard trigger level is
not desirable, a custom trigger level may be set. If the expected
inrush exceeds the maximum trigger level for the selected inter-
rupt rating, then select the next higher interrupt rating that has a
trigger level above the expected maximum inrush. Maintaining
the lowest trigger level will maximize the protection.
Step 4 – The worst-case condition occurs when the fault cur-
rent is just below the TCL’s trigger level. Below this level the
circuit-breaker or similar device is expected to clear and the
TCL will not trigger. To determine the associated rms, symmet-
rical fault current, divide the TCL’s instantaneous trigger level
by 1.414 or 2. This rms, symmetrical value can be applied by
the user, with an appropriate breaker opening time, to calculate
the let-through I2 t. This is commonly used as a measure of dam-
age assessment, similar to let-through energy. This is calculated
using the square of the rms, sym current value above, times
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 32, NO. 2, APRIL 2017
the operating time of the breaker in seconds (usually between
.05 and .083s), depending on the combined relay plus breaker
speed. Please note a lesser magnitude rms, sym fault current off-
set by asymmetry could still operate the TCL but for worst-case
purposes, the rms, sym current should be used.
2) Damage Limitation Example: The main objective for the
damage limitation application is to limit the available I2 t down-
stream of the TCL to protect underrated equipment. Another
source of restriction may be a local municipality or utility re-
quirement to not exceed a certain amount of short-circuit current
or I2 t on specific circuits. These protected circuits maybe a crit-
ical circuit feeding into downtown metro networks, or it may
contain aging equipment that has been de-rated over the years
and requires improved protection against the available current.
It is commonly applied to keep manhole covers from being
launched by electrical explosions in underground systems.
1) 13.8 kV System Voltage
2) 1200 A Continuous Current Rated Bus
3) 25 kA rms, sym available fault current
4) 10 kA rms, sym desired maximum limit
5) 10 kA instantaneous worst-case inrush
Based on the system voltage and continuous current require-
ments, the most appropriate TCL rating is the 15.5 kV, 1200
A continuous current class (Step 1). Any environmental ratings
have been ignored but altitude and temperature may affect the
overall ratings due to their de-rating affects in dielectric strength
and continuous current capability of the TCL, in agreement with
industry practice.
The total current flowing through the TCL is 25 kA rms,
sym. A properly rated TCL should have an interrupt rating
greater than 25 kA rms, sym (Step 2). The maximum inrush
current through the TCL is 10 kA instantaneous so any trigger
level above 10 kA instantaneous would suffice. The goal is to
select a trigger level that avoids tripping on inrush current but
still meeting the I2 t requirements. One must also balance the
increased probability of operating with a lower trigger level if
multiple trigger levels would meet the requirements (Step 3).
For example, the desired maximum fault current available
on the system is 10 kA rms, sym. The 10 kA rms, sym tar-
get value has a crest of 10∗ 2 or 14.14 kA instantaneous.
One can choose a 12 kA trigger level from manufacturer sup-
plied tables to stay below the 14.14 kA instantaneous value
or a less conservative 14 kA instantaneous trigger level. A
10 kA fully symmetrical fault current has an equivalent 5 cy-
cle let-through I2 t of 8,333,333 A2 sec. Therefore the require-
ment to trip the TCL must be below this value. By selecting
the 14 kA instantaneous trigger level (9.89 kA rms, sym), the
worst-case let-through I2 t when below the TCL trigger level is
8,166,667A2 sec. If some additional margin is desired to be built
in the system, a 12 kA instantaneous (8.48 kA rms, sym) trig-
ger level may be selected. The 12 kA trigger level lowers the
5 cycle let-through to approximately 6,382,000 A2 sec. Either
the 12 kA instantaneous or 14 kA instantaneous trigger level
would be acceptable for this example (Step 4). The increased
trigger level has a higher let-through I2 t but statistically has a
smaller probability of operating while the 12 kA trigger level
has a lower let-through I2 t but a slightly increased probability of
operating. The trade-off must be decided for each application.
PRIGMORE AND SCHAFFER: TRIGGERED CURRENT LIMITERS
IV. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS WHEN USING
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Traditionally, both Damage Limitation and Arc Flash Mitiga-
tion applications have been addressed by using more traditional
protection technologies such as current limiting fuses, expul-
sion fuses, circuit breakers, current limiting reactors and three-
phase earthing switches. One must carefully consider the below
design considerations if selecting one of the more traditional
technologies.
Traditionally a circuit breaker has much slower clearing times
which allow for far greater energy let-through. Some recent low
voltage, low continuous current (250 A) circuit breakers can op-
erate sub-cycle but the main breakers, where the higher current
TCLs would be installed, would be much slower. A relay or some
other external mechanism is required to send the trip signal to
the circuit breaker which may further delay circuit interruption
per the relay coordination curve. A traditional current limiting
fuse has reduced current-limiting capabilities at the low magni-
tude currents and often provides no status feedback. It also must
be able to handle motor starts, lightning surges and heavy tran-
sients without damaging any of the internal meltable elements
otherwise a change in performance may occur and replacement
may be necessary. This is not a concern with TCLs.
A current limiting reactor is physically large and may not
be able to fit physically in retrofit applications or locations
with little real estate. The reactor adds continuous conductor
resistive losses during normal operation, imposes a regulating
voltage drop and blocks VARs transfer out of generators. The
three phase earthing switch eliminates the arc by inducing a
3-phase “bolted fault” on the system (typically upstream) which
can add extra stress to the entire source side electrical system
and may incur progressive through-fault damage and potentially
reduce the life expectancy of system components.
Alternative fault current limiting (FCL) technologies such as
saturable core FCLs, superconducting FCLs and power elec-
tronic FCLs typically only “limit” the short-circuit current and
do not fully “interrupt” the current as these devices rely on a
breaker to clear the current, some number of cycles later. Their
I2 t limitation characteristics are more commonly less effective
as compared to the TCL due to their waiting for the breaker
to clear the limited, but yet remaining currents. These devices
also cannot lower the incident energy as effectively as a TCL.
Their operational philosophy is to introduce an inductance or
resistance in the circuit upon a short-circuit condition that is nor-
mally bypassed. For saturable core FCLs, one must consider the
voltage drop across the windings, the on-state losses due to the
resistance in those windings, fault current backfeed into the DC
biasing system, physical space, time to return from a limiting
state to a nominal state and a cooling system if superconductors
are used.
Some design considerations when applying superconduct-
ing FCLs, one must recognize the time to return from a non-
superconducting limiting to a superconducting state as well as
the losses and power system operation effects associated during
this time, the service and maintenance of a cooling system and
the operational steps if the cooling system fails.
1121
When applying power electronic FCLs, one must consider
the constant voltage drop across the semiconductor themselves,
their associated losses, the ability of the power electronic devices
to switch the fault current over to the parallel resistance or
inductance, its transient withstand capability, rate of current rise
(di/dt) and rate of voltage rise (dv/dt). The end user must also
have an operational plan if the FCL should fail as a short.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, TCLs can provide effective damage limita-
tion and Arc Flash mitigation for substations. Their sub-cycle
response and energy absorption capabilities make them an at-
tractive solution to utility and industrial power systems for the
purpose of Arc Flash and Arc Blast mitigation in addition to
damage limitation. PPE only addresses the Arc Flash (heat) and
does not substantially protect personnel against the Arc Blast
(concussion). A TCL effectively mitigates both the Arc Flash
and the Arc Blast, thereby providing improved protection for
site personnel as compared to the slower operating devices such
as circuit breakers and relays.
The TCL can protect equipment by selecting the trigger level
based on the desired let-through I2 t to accommodate regulatory
mandates and limit damage to downstream equipment. A TCL
can avoid splitting buses to lower fault currents while keeping
reliability unchanged. These are predictable devices over their
wide range of trigger levels and available fault currents within
their ratings.
REFERENCES
[1] National Fire Protection Association, “NFPA 70E Standard for Electrical
Safety in the Workplace,” 2015.
[2] National Fire Protection Association, “National Electrical Code(R)
(NEC(R)), 2014 Edition,” 2014.
[3] A. C. Parsons, W. B. Leuschner, and K. X. Jiang, “Simplified arc-flash
hazard analysis using energy boundary curves,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl.,
vol. 44, no. 6. pp. 1879–1885, Nov./Dec. 2008.
[4] C. Rapids, “Arc-flash application guide arc-flash energy calculations for
circuit breakers and fuses,” Energy, vol. 2, pp. 1–16, 2006.
[5] J. R. Prigmore, J. A. Mendoza, and G. G. Karady, “A neodymium hy-
brid fault current limiter,” Int. Trans. Elect. Energy Syst., vol. 25, no. 7,
pp. 1366–1380, 2015.
[6] R. L. Doughty, T. E. Neal, T. L. Macalady, V. Saporita, and K. Borgwald,
“The use of low-voltage current-limiting fuses to reduce arc-flash energy,”
IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl., vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 1741–1749, Nov./Dec. 2000.
[7] J. S. Schaffer, “Triggered current limiters for closing bus ties, bypassing
reactors and improving power quality,” in Proc. 44th Annu. Rural Electr.
Power Conf. Pap., 2000, pp. 1–6.
[8] J. S. Schaffer and T. Hazel, “Ensuring switchgear integrity in High-Power
installations,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl., vol. 51, no. 3. pp. 2641–2650,
May/Jun. 2015.
[9] G&W Publication, Guide to the methodology of trigger level selection for
the G&W CLiP., Bolingbrook, IL, USA, G&W Publ., 2010, pp. 1–8.
[10] Guide for Performing Arc-Flash hazard Calculations, IEEE 1584-2002,
2002.
[11] K. J. Lippert and C. W. Kimblin, “Understanding arc flash hazards,” in
Proc. IEEE IAS Pulp Paper Ind. Conf., 2004, no. 2, pp. 120–129.
[12] B. Deal, “Improving urban safety by installation of current limiting fuses
on network feeders,” in Proc. Southeast Elect. Exchange Conf. Paper Ind.
Excellence Award, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2009.
[13] J. R. Prigmore, “A neodymium based hybrid fault current limiter,” Ph.D.
dissertation, School Elect., Comput. Energy Eng., Arizona State Univ.,
Tempe, AZ, USA, 2013.
1122
Jay Prigmore (M’07) received the B.Sc. degree in
electrical engineering from Lamar University, Beau-
mont, TX, USA, and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in
electrical engineering from Arizona State University,
Tempe, AZ, USA.
Currently, he is with G&W Electric Co. in the
System Protection Division.
Dr. Prigmore is a Member of the Power and Energy
Society, the Power Electronics Society, Industrial Ap-
plications Society, and the Magnetics Society. He is
a Member of Sigma Xi, Eta Kappa Nu, and Tau Beta
Pi. He is the Chair for the IEEE IAS Executive Subcommittee for Early Career
Professionals. He is a registered professional engineer in the State of Illinois.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 32, NO. 2, APRIL 2017
John S. Schaffer (SM’90) received the BSEE and
BSME degrees from Marquette University, Milwau-
kee, WI, USA, in 1974 and 1976, respectively, and
the MBA degree from Lewis University, Romeoville,
IL, USA, in 1988.
He has been with G&W Electric Co. since 1982
and he has been the General Manager of its Sys-
tem Protection Division since 1992. Prior to join-
ing G&W, and he was affiliated with Allis-Chalmers
Corp. for 7 years, in the engineering of high volt-
age circuit breakers, motors, and DC traction sys-
tems. He has authored and coauthored numerous technical papers on fusing
and switchgear topics for IEEE, the American Power Conference, CIGRE, and
CIRED. He is a holder of four U.S. patents and their foreign counterparts.
Mr. Schaffer is a member (now primarily inactive) of the IEEE High Voltage
Fuse Subcommittee, and a number of its working groups, in the IEEE promul-
gation of associated fuse standards. He has also been a member of the NEMA
High Voltage Fuse Technical committee. He has been a registered professional
engineer in the State of Wisconsin for more than 30 years.