Liedtke

Jessica Liedtke

Gregory Spendlove

PHIL 1000-403

April 18, 2018

Are Physical Determinism and Human Moral Responsibility Compatible?

The argument over physical determinism and human moral responsibility is often

stemmed from the debate on what we have control over and the extent of that control. If physical

determinism claims that the laws of nature and our past events control our future, then we do not

have free will. If we do not have free will then we cannot have moral responsibility. In this paper,

I will argue that physical determinism and human moral responsibility are not compatible.

Physical determinism, as described by Kevin Timpe, is “the thesis that the course of the

future is entirely determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature” (Free Will).

Free will is our capacity to control our actions with the ability to do otherwise. Therefore, if

physical determinism says we do not have control over our future events and choices because

they are the cause of the laws of nature and our past events, then we are not free. If we are not

free, we cannot be morally responsible and therefore, they are not compatible. There is also a

principle of alternate possibilities that states that a person is morally responsible for what they

have done only if they could have done otherwise (Honderich). Again, because of physical

determinism, our actions are already predetermined and so we could not have chosen otherwise

so we cannot be morally responsible if physical determinism is true. Physical determinism and

moral responsibility cannot coexist.

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The main objection with this argument is that people deny the principle of alternate

possibilities and claim people should be held responsible for their actions even if they couldn’t

have chosen otherwise. It is believed that moral responsibility is not defined by free will or the

ability to choose otherwise. There’s a belief that someone should be held morally responsible for

something even if it was physically determined that they should do that thing. This objection

does not hold strong because moral responsibility is determined by free will and the ability to

choose otherwise. The mere unbelief in this is not sufficient to cause it to be false.

Moral responsibility is often associated with reactive attitudes and the justification to

place blame or praise based on someone’s actions reflecting their good or ill will (Eshleman;

Williams). If someone’s actions are already determined then there is no justification for this

praise or blame and they cannot be held morally responsible. Thus, supporting the claim that they

are incompatible.

The argument against the incompatibility of physical determinism and moral

responsibility is summarized as:

P1: If I am responsible for my actions then I must have control of my actions.

P2: If all events in the universe are determined by the laws of nature and events of the

past, then I am not in control of my actions.

C1: Therefore, I am not responsible for my actions.

C2: So, physical determinism and moral responsibility are not compatible.

In this paper I have argued that human moral responsibility and physical determinism are

not compatible with one another because if physical determinism is true, then we are not free,

and if we are not free we cannot be morally responsible. 


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Works Cited

Eshleman, Andrew. “Moral Responsibility.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford

University, 6 Jan. 2001, plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/.

Honderich, Ted. “ HARRY FRANKFURT: ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES AND MORAL

RESPONSIBILITY.” The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website, www.ucl.ac.uk/
~uctytho/dfwCompatFrankfurt.htm.

Timpe, Kevin. “Free Will.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/freewill/#H3.

“Moral Responsibility.” The Information Philosopher, www.informationphilosopher.com/

freedom/moral_responsibility.html.

Williams, Garrath. “Praise and Blame.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/

praise/#H2.