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2 Letters to the Editor

4 A Joint Context for Training at the Combat Training Centers


Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army; Brigadier General Timothy D. Livsey, U.S. Army; and
Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Totleben, U.S. Army
Acknowledging the combat potential of a combined arms team, the Army drills collective warfighting skills at the CTCs. The shift to a
modular-unit training strategy includes a joint context so Army formations can rapidly contribute to the joint team.
12 Understanding Fourth Generation War
William S. Lind
After Lind introduced the Three Generations of Maneuver Warfare, the U.S. Marine Corps asked, “What will the Fourth Generation be
like?” The result was “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” copies of which were found in the caves at Tora Bora,
the al-Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan. Here, Lind expands on his earlier work.

Civilians on the Battlefield


17 The Law of War and Civilians on the Battlefield: Are We Undermining
Civilian Protections?
Lieutenant Colonel Mark David “Max” Maxwell, U.S. Army
Civilians and paramilitary operatives accompany U.S. forces in military operations. If they are captured should they receive the
protections of international law, or does their presence on the battlefield violate the principles of the law of war?
26 Targeting Decisions Regarding Human Shields
Captain Daniel P. Schoenekase, U.S. Army National Guard
Human shields protect objects or areas from attack, but the use of human shields is illegal under international humanitarian law.
The Army must be aware of the consequences of war in the presence of innocent bystanders.
32 Engaging Civil Centers of Gravity and Vulnerabilities
Major Richard K. Sele, U.S. Army
Global environments require Army doctrine to recognize civil centers of gravity and related vulnerabilities. Civil-military operations are
now as important as battlefield operating systems.

Winning the Fight


38 Blue Force Tracking: A Subset of Combat Identification
Colonel Kurt Dittmer, U.S. Air Force, Retired
When the Army in Transformation considers new combat identification (CID) capabilities, it would do well to look at the U.S. Air Force’s
Blue Force Tracking and Situational Awareness CID methodology. Its kill chain process is designed to destroy the enemy it detects.
41 Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare
Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army
Employing terror to attack the United States at home and abroad, America’s enemies use guerrilla tactics to protract the war in Iraq and
to erode America’s will.
47 Winning the Nationbuilding War
Staff Sergeant George E. Anderson, U.S. Army National Guard, Ph.D.
Many countries have won the conventional war but lost the nationbuilding war. To win hearts and minds, nationbuilders must remember
that all politics is local.
51 Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality?
Lieutenant Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army
Latin America’s Tri-Border Area, bounded by Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, is an ideal
breeding ground for terrorist groups. While not currently the center of gravity in the Global War on Terrorism, the area is important in the
strategy for combating terrorism.

Colonel William M. Darley Vaughn Neeld


Consulting Editors
Lieutenant General
Editor in Chief
Supervisory Editor
Colonel

William S. Wallace
Lieutenant Colonel
John H. Garabedian
Haroldo Assad Carneiro

Dexter Q. Henson
Associate Editor
Brazilian Army,

Commander,
Brazilian Edition

USACAC
Managing Editor Nancy Mazzia Lieutenant Colonel

Major Chris Lukasevich


Books and Features Editor
Hugo Alfredo Leonard

Brigadier General
Editor, Latin American Editions
Winona E. Stroble
Argentine Army,

Volney J. Warner
Major Jeffrey L. Wingo
Webmaster

Hispano-American Edition

Deputy Commandant,
Lieutenant Colonel

Production Manager
Patricia L. Wilson
Hernán Diáz

USACGSC

D. M. Giangreco
Secretary
Chilean Army,

Design Editor
Hispano-American Edition

Headquarters, Department of the Army


U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Volume LXXXIV — September- October 2004, No. 5
www.leavenworth.army.mil/MILREV milrev @ leavenworth.army.mil
Professional Bulletin 100-04-9/10

56 Tactical Information Operations in Kosovo


Major Marc J. Romanych, U.S. Army, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Krumm, U.S. Army
As part of Multi-National Brigade (East), MNB(E), the 1st Armored Division employed tactical information operations to persuade hostile
Serbian and Albanian factions in Kosovo to support the MNB(E)’s peacekeeping mission.

Mental Preparedness
62 Military Application of Performance-Enhancement Psychology
Nathaniel Zinsser, Ph.D.; Colonel Larry D. Perkins, U.S. Army, Retired;
Major Pierre D. Gervais, U.S. Army; and Major Gregory A. Burbelo, U.S. Army
The U.S. Military Academy’s Center for Enhanced Performance and other outreach units have developed a program to improve perform­
ance during military training. Many of the program’s elements, particularly teambuilding, have implications for 21st-century Armed Forces.
66 Zero-Defect Leaders: No Second Chance?
Major Claire E. Steele, U.S. Army
Four illustrious officers—Chester Nimitz, John Lejeune, George S. Patton, Jr., and Henry H. “Hap” Arnold—rose to the top of their military
professions despite serious mistakes and poor officer evaluation reports. Would this happen today in the zero-defect military services?
71 Machines, the Military, and Strategic Thought
Colonel Antonio M. Lopez, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.; Colonel Jerome J. Comello, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.;
and Lieutenant Colonel William H. Cleckner, U.S. Army, Retired
Throughout history, the military has used machines to gain operational advantage over opponents. Now the Army is poised to use comput­
ers with artificial intelligence to read Clausewitz, analyze the enemy’s center of gravity, and share strategic conclusions with commanders.
78 Mentorship: Growing Company Grade Officers
Major Nate Hunsinger, U.S. Army
In 1985, Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham, Jr., designated “leadership” as that year’s Army theme and ordered senior
leaders to challenge officers to mentor subordinates. Mentoring quickly became an Army paradigm.
86 From One to Three Sixty: Assessing Leaders
Major Craig Whiteside, U.S. Army
The Army has yet to address how subordinates or peers evaluate their leaders. A 360-degree leader-evaluation tool would help the Future
Force produce better leaders.

89 Swiss Armed Forces and the Challenges of the 21st Century


Lieutenant Colonel Laurent Michaud, Swiss Army
Military transformation requires effort and engenders debate and controversy. Despite its unique geopolitical sphere of influence and
political neutrality, Switzerland is engaged in military reform.
94 Mountain Warfare: The Need for Specialized Training
Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army
Mountain warfare is specialized combat with unique characteristics. Military leaders and soldiers need training and experience to under­
stand the peculiarities of mountainous environments and how they affect combat.
103 A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula: Beyond the Nuclear Crisis
Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S. Army
North Korea might become a member of the nuclear club and provide nuclear capabilities to rogue states and terrorist organizations.
But this is only one problem that exists on the divided Korean Peninsula.

109 Review Essay


Osama bin-Laden Interview, June 1999: Entering the Mind of an Adversary
Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy
113 Book Reviews contemporary readings for the professional

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Letters
Letters to Military Review should be sent to 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027­
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Understanding Hamas consider the two to be that similar. rection that then paves the way for
Ms Chong Yee Ming, Librarian, For example, a direct quote from John future operational doctrine. In a
Institute of Defence and Strategic E. Jessup, Jr., Robert W. Coakley, and sense, all the lessons provide some
Studies, Nanyang Technological James Lawton Collins’s text, A Guide insight; the tragedy is, these experi­
University, Singapore —I refer to to the Study and Use of Military ences were rarely documented, and
Lieutenant Commander Youssef History [University Press of the Pa­ the Army has had to rely heavily on
H. Aboul-Enein’s Review Essay, cific, Honolulu, HI, 2000], in relation the memories of its soldiers to pre­
“Hamas: Understanding the Organi­ to operations in the Philippines, serve many of the lessons from the
zation,” published in the July-August states, “This irregular warfare, far war, just as it had during the earlier
2003 Military Review. While arguing different from what the Army had Native American campaigns. In the
the righteousness of the Islamist known against the Indians, raised continuing hope to prevent repeat­
cause of liberating Palestine, it is new problems of bringing the enemy ing the same mistakes, the article was
important to understand Hamas’s to terms.” meant to cement some past insight
inner workings. Heavily modeled on A host of rationales for this par­ into present thought.
the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has ticular position vary, from dissention
created community services while within the United States in conduct­
maintaining military wings that carry ing these operations, to the actual Kudos to Paparone
out suicide bombings. conduct of cooperation and amity LTC Stewart A. Underwood, Com­
between the Filipinos and the Ameri­ mander, Mountain Warrior Recruit­
cans at the conclusion of hostilities. ing Battalion, Beckley, WV—Please
An Unconventional War Another example is derived from pass on to Colonel Christopher R.
LTC Rosser Bobbitt, U.S. Army, Andrew J. Birtle’s book U.S. Army Paparone, U.S. Army, that his article,
Retired — In Major Thomas S. Counterinsurgency and Contin­ “What is Joint Interdependence Any­
Bundt’s article, “An Unconventional gency Operations Doctrine 1860­ way?” in the July-August 2004 Mili­
War: The Philippine Insurrection, 1941 [Diane Publishing Co., Collings­ tary Review, was great, tremendous!
1899,” in the May-June 2004 Mili­ dale, PA, 1998], which states, “From I have sent the article to a dozen
tary Review, he presupposes the Civil the frontier, the men who directed the other battalion commanders and com­
War as the experience base of the operational level of the Philippine mand sergeant majors and to each of
Army going into the Philippines. He my subordinate commanders!
War brought with them a mindset
seems to miss completely the Army’s that was accustomed to conducting
experience in America’s Indian Wars,
in which it used many of the same
small-unit constabulatory operations Additional Information
from dispersed posts and that en­ on Sea-Basing
tactics and procedures Bundt says couraged adaptability, individual ini­
the Army leaned toward in the Phil­ Mike Weaver, Command and Gen­
tiative, and aggressiveness. These eral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
ippines. attributes contributed much more to KS—Major Henry B. Cook has done
Bundt’s Reply the Army’s success than did the a good job gathering facts for his
MAJ Thomas S. Bundt, U.S. Army, transference of any specific tech­ article, Sea-Basing and the Maritime
Ph.D.—I would like to thank Lieu­ niques of Indian-fighting or prairie Pre-positioning Force (Future), in
tenant Colonel Rosser Bobbit for his field craft, few of which could be di­ the July-August 2004 Military Re­
insight. I completely agree that the rectly applied in the Philippine’s tropi­ view. His description of the require­
Army’s involvement in the Native cal jungles. By blending old con­ ments for a Maritime Pre-positioning
American campaigns did produce cepts with techniques adapted to the Force (MPF) (Future) (F) is particu­
strong examples of select guerrilla- situation at hand, the old frontier larly good. However, I think it would
warfare experiences. However, even Army successfully adjusted to the be helpful to address some key con­
if the earlier Native American cam­ demands of overseas constabulatory cepts that are misleading. I would
paigns had been used as the basic service.” also like to provide additional
building blocks for training the Army As these statements attest, there sources of information.
of 1898 in guerrilla-warfare tactics, is relevance for the Native American Cook correctly identifies sea-bas­
textbooks related to the Spanish- campaigns experience, but this is not ing as an enabler of U.S. Navy (USN)
American War and the Philippine indicative of the established tech­ and U.S Marine Corps (USMC) con­
Insurrection from 1898 to 1907 do not niques used in the Philippine insur­ cepts. One concept—Objective Ma­

2 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


neuver from the Sea (OMFTS)—was Sea-basing is also not solely a I would like to thank Mike Weaver
developed in response to future USN/USMC concept; it is a joint for providing additional insight, com­
threats along the littorals, which are concept. The Defense Science Board ment, and clarification to my article
characterized by large cities, well- (DSB) identified sea-basing as a “Sea-Basing and the Maritime Pre-
populated areas, and the intersection “critical future joint capability . . . that Positioning Force (Future).” I am fa­
of trade routes. A USMC concept replaces or augments the fixed, in- miliar with the USN/USMC concepts
paper, “Operational Maneuver from theater airports and seaports, on that are espoused in Seapower 21.
the Sea: A Concept of Naval Power which past military operations have The “rear” I refer to is represented on
Ashore” [no date given], states, focused and depended, with a ma­ a nonlinear battlefield, which is any­
“What distinguishes OMFTS from neuverable facility at sea so a com­ where a Threat is not or does not
other maneuver concepts is the ex­ mander can exploit enemy weakness.” expect you to be. In essence, ship­
tensive use of the sea by the com­ [Department of Defense, DSB Task to-object maneuver (STOM) is a
mander to gain an advantage while Force on Sea-Basing, Memorandum “deep operation” in legacy terms.
avoiding disadvantageous engage­ for the Commander, 14 August 2003.] Weaver is correct in saying the sea-
ments such as opposed amphibious Also, MPF is not three squadrons base concept encompasses all the
landings.” [See on-line at <www.dtic. of forward-deployed ships. What vessel assets in an offshore or littoral
mil/jv2010/usmc/omfts.pdf>.] Cook is describing is Maritime Pre- area of operation, not just the MPF
Cook’s statement that OMFTS’s Positioning Ships (MPS), which is or MPF(F).
goal is to place a combat force in part of MPF. And, when it is joined When I originally wrote the paper,
the Threat’s rear is misleading. The with the Marine air-ground task force, open-source literature considered
concept paper continues, “The en­ a Navy Support Element, and naval sea-basing a completely naval con­
emy rear area may be an area the coastal warfare ships, MPS provides cept. The DSB paper on sea-basing,
commander chooses to interdict; the commander with a rapidly de­ dated 14 August 2003, was not avail­
however, as previously discussed, ployable, integrated combat team able in open source until December
OMFTS is a means of gaining advan­ capable of short-term sustainment. 2003. However, I do agree with the
tage, an avenue for friendly move­ When employed, the MPF can form DSB’s report that says the U.S. Army
ment that is simultaneously a barrier a part of the sea-base that supports and U.S. Air Force (USAF) should
to the enemy, and a means of avoid­ the overall force. provide “meaningful participation” in
ing disadvantageous engagements.” The following websites provide a developing a joint sea-based concept
Cook also states that the basis of more complete understanding: by sharing the responsibility and the
sea-basing is the implementation of Sea-basing, <www.usni.org/pro­ cost. In late June 2004, the Pentagon
the MPF. Understanding what the ceedings/articles03/proseabasing approved the initiation of a Sea-Bas­
sea-base is composed of, and what 01.htm>. ing Joint Integration Concept that
the MPF is, will help the reader un­ OMFTS, <www.acq.osd.mil/ will (hopefully by the end of 2004)
derstand how the two are integrated. dsb/seabasing.pdf>. integrate the Joint Force Command
The sea-base is far more complicated MPF, <www.dtic.mil/jv2010/ and the USN/USMC concepts. [See
than [simply] forward-deploying usmc/omfts.pdf>. John T. Bennett, “Fusing Concepts
equipment and supplies aboard Navy, <www.msc.navy.mil/pm3/. will culminate in Joint Sea-basing
ships. The sea-base includes weap­ Capability Plan, Inside Pentagon (12
ons systems, ships, aircraft, logistics, Cook’s Reply August 2004).] I am delighted that
information systems, cargo handling, MAJ Henry B. Cook, U.S. Army sea-basing is now considered a joint
and transportation networks. National Guard, Laurel, MS— continued on page 120

Corrections (July-August 2004)


On the contents (page 1), byline as a means of financing their vision.” In the “The Recognition-Primed
(page 50), and biography (53) of Also, Aboul-Enein is with the Medi­ Decision Model,” by Karol G. Ross,
the article “Will We Need a Space cal Service Corps, not the Military Gary A. Klein, Peter Thunholm, John
Force?” Major Richard D. Moore­ Sealift Command. F. Schmitt, and Holly C. Baxter, the
head’s service affiliation should have The title of Major Gregory A. book title in Klein’s biography should
been listed as U.S. Air Force. Daddis’s July-August 2004 article read, Intuition at Work. Schmitt is
In the same issue, a line on page should read, “Understanding Fear’s a former major in the U.S. Marine
95 of Lieutenant Commander Yous­ Impact on Unit Effectiveness.” In the Corps. The article was prepared
sef H. Aboul-Enein’s Review Essay, section titled “Combating Fear,” on through collaborative participation
“Islamic Militant Cells and Sadat’s page 24, lines 4-6 should read, “Dave in the Advanced Decision Architec­
Assassination,” should read, “Faraj Grossman’s book On Killing is re­ tures Consortium sponsored by the
viewed Egypt’s Christians as plotting plete—perhaps overly so—with the U.S. Army Research Laboratory
to establish a separate state in the costs that the expectation to kill en­ under the Collaborative Technology
southern Egyptian province of Qina tails.” Note 36 on page 27 should Alliance Program.
and looked on their collection plates read, 36. Ibid.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 3


A Joint Context for
Training at the Combat
Training Centers
Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army;
Brigadier General Timothy D. Livsey, U.S. Army; and
Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Totleben, U.S. Army

The lesson of this war [Afghanistan] is that ef­ collective warfighting skills at the CTCs. The Army’s
fectiveness in combat will depend heavily on shift to modular units drives its training strategy to
jointness and how well the different branches of include a joint context in key training events so Army
the military can communicate and coordinate formations can rapidly contribute to the joint team.
their efforts on the battlefield. . . . Achieving joint- DOD’s T2 strategy acknowledges that to achieve
ness in wartime requires building that jointness success on future battlefields we must fight as part
in peacetime. We need to train like we fight and of a joint team. The DOD T2 strategy expands be­
fight like we train and, too often, we don’t. yond interoperability issues and deconflicting service
—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld1 operations, providing training guidance and specific
programs to achieve joint interdependence down to

T HE COMBAT Training Center (CTC) Pro­


gram has been an engine of change and a cul­
ture driver in the Army since its inception. This revo­
the lowest tactical levels, while changing the con­
cept of what we have historically understood as
“joint.”
lutionary shift in the collective training strategy has The strategic plan for transforming DOD train­
matured over the past 23 years with new training ing states that “[t]he focus of [DOD] Training Trans­
support technology; expanding to brigade combat formation is to better enable joint operations in the
team (BCT) rotations; adding reception, staging, on­ future, where ‘joint’ has a broader context than the
ward movement, and integration into the CTC ex­ traditional military definition of the term. [DOD] must
perience; and refining techniques for an effective be able to plan, coordinate, and synchronize its ac­
after-action review (AAR). tions across the full spectrum of service, joint, inter­
Within the past 3 years, adapting a contemporary agency, intergovernmental, and multinational opera­
operational environment (COE) as a standard con­ tions.”2
dition at the CTCs has been another evolutionary This white paper establishes a framework for
shift, along with a freethinking, capabilities-based op­ analysis and discussion on continuing the CTC
posing force (OPFOR) that is quite different from program’s evolution with a joint context for training
a predictable Cold War training threat. The CTC at the CTCs. Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)
program’s evolution has generated a level of train­ General Peter J. Schoomaker’s guidance to the
ing superiority unmatched by any other army and CTC/Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)
has been credited for the successes achieved in op­ focus area task force was clear: “Rescope the CTC
erational missions. Both allies and potential adver­ program to train in a joint context.”3 This condition
saries have tried to copy the program. We must con­ must be present at the maneuver CTCs and in the
tinue to evolve the CTCs to retain training superiority. BCTP Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training
A training-transformation (T2) effort across the constructive simulation and applied to the tactical
Department of Defense (DOD) is driving the next unit’s rotational experience just as we have applied
evolution in the CTC program. The Army has long the COE.
acknowledged the combat potential gained by fighting The physical presence of joint, interagency, or
as part of a combined arms team and has drilled multinational (JIM) participants in a CTC rotation is

4 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


JOINT CONTEXT FOR THE CTCS
within the revised scope of the CTC program and nent for JNTC, will adjust these elements of joint
will help create a joint context. We must recognize, context to specific joint tasks and objectives in a
however, that because of operational missions and JNTC event as follows:
scheduling conflicts, full JIM participation, in the Appropriate mix of L-V-C forces required to
physical sense, will not be routine. Our effort to es­ accomplish joint training objectives.
tablish a joint context at the CTCs must identify the Realistic joint command and control (C2) tai­
specific joint effects we want the rotational training lored to meet joint training requirements.
unit to experience and influence, regardless of JIM OPFOR tailored to meet joint training require­
participation. ments to include planning, integration, and C2.
Through live-virtual-constructive (L-V-C) training Scenario that supports joint training objectives/
integration, coupled with exercise design and con­ joint tasks.
trol (EXCON), the CTCs apply the effects as con­ Ability to provide timely feedback on joint task
ditions in the training scenario. CTCs should inject performance based on common ground truth.
the effects at specific points in the rotation to facili­ Use of joint doctrine and TTP.
tate leader and unit joint cognizance and drive the An event control group that supports accom­
learning objectives with OPFOR activity. As ob­ plishment of joint training objectives/joint tasks.
server-controllers develop their AAR topics, they Pre-event joint task training in support of se­
should highlight joint issues and tactics, techniques, lected joint training objectives.
and procedures (TTP) to increase the level of joint Appropriate observer-trainer and senior men­
competence. tor support.
JFCOM’s elements of joint context provide a list
Defining Joint Context of capabilities and characteristics required to accredit
The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), the any training event as a participant in an overarching
centerpiece DOD T2 program, is designed to in­ JNTC-enhanced event. Most of these elements are
crease joint warfighting proficiency. This integrated technical or procedural for exercise control and for
global network of L-V-C training enablers will establishing a joint C2 structure. Vertical and inte­
create a seamless environment to support a broad grated JNTC events will bring a greater level of joint
range of joint and service training requirements. context because joint headquarters and staffs will
Modeled after the Army’s CTC program, JNTC actually participate in the event. Following the CSA’s
identifies the elements of joint context that enhance guidance to “nest” the CTC program with JNTC,
service training and core competencies. U.S. Joint each CTC should possess these capabilities and
Forces Command (JFCOM), as the DOD propo- characteristics. CTC annual training calendars

Restated Mission and Essential Tasks


Develop a strategy to refocus the roles and missions of the CTCs under conditions
of a realistic joint, interagency, or multinational (JIM) / joint operational environment
(JOE) to produce decisive, self-aware, adaptive units and leaders.
Develop self-aware and adaptive leaders for full-spectrum JIM operations.
Integrate COE/JOE training environments into the CTCs.
Recommend strategies focused on execution of simultaneous, noncontiguous,
distributed, and continuous full-spectrum operations in a JIM context.
The Way Ahead
Mission: Develop a strategy to refocus the roles and missions of the CTCs under
conditions of a realistic JIM / JOE to produce decisive, self-aware, adaptive units and
leaders.
CTCs have made great progress to date in adjusting scenarios and opposing
forces to replicate the contemporary operating environment.
We have a program that makes sense. Joint is the direction.
Allow approved recommendations to compete for additional resources.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 5


Soldiers watch for movement
of enemy forces during a field
training exercise.
US Army

recognize that few rotations will be linked to a JNTC units are ready to operate in a JIM environment. Still,
event, and JNTC might narrow the focus of joint establishing a joint context for training goes beyond
context to a specific joint tactical task or joint train­ establishing the joint C4ISR structure around an
ing objective. However, each CTC must provide joint Army exercise.
context across all battlefield operating systems re­ The working draft of “Serving a Nation at War–
gardless of any link to a JNTC event. A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expe­
The 2003 draft of DOD’s A Strategy for Joint ditionary Mindset” describes five key interdependen­
Training explains that joint context includes joint C2 cies between the Army and the joint team.5 The
architectures above the functional component and/ CTCs must establish the right conditions in each of
or tactical forces, using real-world command, con­ these areas to build on these interdependent rela­
trol, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil­ tionships and foster the understanding that operat­
lance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities.4 Our ing jointly implies that the battlespace will be shared
historical relationship between a BCT and a division among members of the joint team.
headquarters has mitigated the need to train in a joint
context at the CTCs. That relationship has also Joint Battle Command
evolved. The doctrinal concepts for a modular unit (Joint Publication [JP] 6-02, Joint Doctrine for Em­
of action (UA) will employ future BCTs in a joint ployment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control,
environment and require them to have the C4ISR Communications, and Computer Systems)6
connectivity to a division that might be acting as a The joint force command, control, communication,
joint task force (JTF) or be directly connected to and computer (C4) structure will allow command­
higher levels in the joint C2 structure. ers to “pull” information from theater- and national-
Important to note is that creating a joint context level information sources, establish a common op­
for tactical operations at the CTCs is not intended erational picture (COP) of the joint area of
to dictate joint training objectives or create a JTF responsibility (AOR), and see the relationship be­
headquarters training opportunity. The BCT’s tween JIM team members. This top-down network
capstone collective training event should replicate includes the protocols and standards for joint C4
these C4ISR relationships so leaders, soldiers, and interoperability and information management. Spe­

6 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


JOINT CONTEXT FOR THE CTCS

Combat Training Center Operations


Future CTC rotations include simulations and transitional events across the full spectrum
of conflict . . . all within a joint, interagency, and multinational context.

WARFIGHTING
WARFIGHTING

OFF DEF
MRX (OEF/OIF)
OFF DEF STAB SPT
MRE (SFOR/KFOR)
OFF DEF STAB SPT

STAB SPT

Commander’s assessment and nature of mission dictates proportion and


relationship of the types of military action.
CTC - combat training center; DEF - defense; KFOR - Kosovo Force; MRE/MRX - mission rehearsal exercise; OEF - Operation

Enduring Freedom; OFF - offensive; OIF - Operation Iraqi Freedom; SFOR - stabilization force; STAB - stabilization; SPT - support

cial considerations are needed for interagency and with a prewar scenario.
multinational battle command integration. CTC higher headquarters control cell (HICON)
The Battle Command System (BCS) for modu­ provides the BCT with a standing joint task force
lar brigades will enable these UAs to rapidly inte­ (SJTF) standard operating procedures (SOP) for
grate with the joint C4 architecture and will facili­ reports, information management, and battle rhythm.
tate all joint interdependencies. The BCS will be a If the BCT/UA is conducting a mission rehearsal
network operating in a secure, distributed, collabo­ or readiness exercise in preparation for a known de­
rative environment using standard software and ployment, the CTC HICON should issue the actual
equipment and will provide the science to enable the deployment higher headquarters’ SOP to the train­
art of leadership and decisionmaking while facilitat­ ing BCT/UA.
ing situational understanding. Although the technical CTC has the capability to provide a relevant,
aspects of C4 connectivity and simulation wrap­ joint wraparound COP that can simulate or stimu­
around are essential for battle command, there are late data in the BCT’s BCS. Information require­
additional measures that can establish a joint con­ ments include friendly locations (including intelli­
text for training at the tactical level, as seen in the gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; fire
following examples: support; and air defense sensors, enemy informa­
CTC scenario has the BCT working directly tion, joint graphic control measures, joint information
for a unit of employment X (UEx) or a JTF head­ data bases, joint text messaging).
quarters rather than a U.S. Army Training and Doc­ CTC replicates print or broadcast media out­
trine Command common scenario unit (52d Mecha­ lets (domestic or foreign) in support of training unit
nized, 21st Infantry Division [Light], 10th Corps). information operations (IO). These outlets should
CTC scenarios “cycle” modular BCTs into the have a positive or negative influence on a unit’s IO
rotation with a relief in place (under pressure) of plan, and the OPFOR can use them for counter IO.
the previous training unit, rather than starting BCT establishes 360-degree communication with or

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 7


exchanges liaison officers (LNOs) between JIM be delivered by air, land, naval, SOF, and space
team members. assets.
BCT directed to provide security or support to Lethal weapons effects include those from naval
interagency sites or operations. surface fire support, indirect fire support, maneuver
Known or unknown JIM operations within the operations, SOF direct-action operations, air opera­
BCT AOR affect or provide support to the BCT’s tions, and even nuclear weapons. Nonlethal-weap­
operations. ons effects include those from electronic warfare
BCT leaders and staff understand the roles, (EW); certain psychological operations; some IO,
missions, capabilities, and potential friction points such as disrupting the enemy’s information net­
among JIM team members. works; and the use of special-effects munitions such
ISR is a critical subset of joint battle command at as illumination, smoke, or incapacitating agents.
the tactical level. The joint ISR structure integrates Within their AO, land-force commanders synchro­
strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence opera­ nize joint fires with maneuver and have the author­
tions in support of the joint force commander and ity to designate target priority, effects, and timing.
subordinate force commander priorities and require­ At the tactical level, maneuver BCT command­
ments. CTCs must balance the need to provide ac­ ers and staffs will not normally participate directly
tionable intelligence in support of training objectives in the joint targeting process, but they can reap the
against any expectation of perfect intelligence. Simu­ benefits of such fires via appropriate nomination
lated and stimulated intelligence products from joint and monitoring. The BCT must understand the
ISR systems must be realistic presentations reflec­ process and products in order to influence the al­
tive of a thinking adversary who works hard to avoid location of joint fires to receive the greatest effect
detection. The context for joint ISR in a maneuver on the targets they nominate. Besides establish­
BCT’s CTC experience can include the following: ing connectivity between the tactical and joint
BCT commander and staff understand the joint fire support C4 systems, other measures and effects
ISR environment, its content, and available products are needed to develop a joint context for training and
and must pull information from these resources to to ensure the soldier has all assets at his disposal
support their own intelligence requirements. during battle. Examples include the following:
Provide reasonable intelligence products (im­ BCT understands the air tasking order process
agery, human, signal and measurement and signa­ and timeline and can influence the process to syn­
ture intelligence) from strategic, operational, or ad­ chronize the allocation of close air support (CAS)
jacent tactical unit sources. with their maneuver plan.
BCT receives limited unmanned aerial vehicle BCT fire-support system is populated with joint
(UAV) feeds in support of their operations. airspace and fire support control measures.
BCT receives specified ISR task in support of BCT is tasked to provide fire support to SOF
joint ISR requirements. operating within or near the BCT AO.
Interagency role players in the BCT area of BCT fire-support assets are dedicated to ex­
operations (AO) provide information or request in­ ecuting joint suppression of enemy air defense
telligence products from the BCT (with varying lev­ (SEAD) missions for limited periods, requiring adap­
els of cooperation). tive synchronization.
BCT is tasked with specified missions in sup­ BCT is tasked to provide assets for target ac­
port of JIM ISR operations in the BCT AO. quisition in support of a joint force commander’s tar­
get within the BCT AO.
Joint Fires Emphasis is on enlisted tactical air controllers
(JP 3-09, Fire Support)7 and tactical air control party employment as the key
Joint fire support, the synergistic product of three to CAS integration.
subsystems (target acquisition, C2, and attack re­ Provide supporting fires from joint assets (le­
sources) links weapons effects to land, maritime, thal and nonlethal) in support of the BCT scheme
amphibious, and special operations forces (SOF) of fires.
movement, maneuver, and control of territory, Provide immediate CAS at specific opportuni­
populations, and key waters. The lethal and non­ ties from Air Force, Navy, Marine, or multinational
lethal effects from joint fires are integrated with the air assets.
supported force’s fire and maneuver to achieve a Interagency activity in the BCT AO generates
synergistic application of combat power and can restrictive fire control measures or procedures.

8 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


JOINT CONTEXT FOR THE CTCS

Soldiers plot a fire


mission during a
night exercise at
Baghdad Inter­
national Airport.

US Army
Joint Air and Missile Defense defensive counterair measures. Besides establishing
(JP 3-01, Counterair)8 connectivity to the air and missile defense C4ISR
The purpose of joint counterair operations is to at­ network, there are other measures to effectively rep­
tain a degree of air superiority to allow freedom of licate this to create interdependency. Examples in­
action and to protect the force. Joint counterair mis­ clude the following:
sions might employ aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, CTC replicates the AMD TF headquarters and
surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, SOF, or IO populates the BCT’s Air and Missile Defense Work­
against a variety of threats. Offensive measures at­ station with airspace control measures and opera­
tempt to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the tional information.
launch of air threats, while defensive counterair at­ JTF HICON operations order (OPORD) or
tempts to defeat the threat after launch. Key C2 fragmentary order restricts aircraft engagement au­
nodes in this effort include, but are not limited to, thority for certain periods.
the Air Operations Center, the Air Force Control and JTF HICON OPORD directs specific identi­
Reporting Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Air fication, friend or foe, procedures.
Operations Center, the Navy AEGIS Control Infor­ BCT understands the AMD TF’s active and
mation Center, and the Army Air and Missile De­ passive support capabilities in the BCT AO and their
fense (AMD) Task Force (TF) headquarters. AMD ability to provide situational awareness and airspace
TFs are modular and tailorable units that can sup­ management.
port a BCT with active AMD measures to protect BCT integrates air defense assets into the
the force. AMD TFs are also linked to a joint iden­ AMD TF and the joint defensive counterair plan.
tification engagement authority and can assist in air­ BCT is linked to and receives timely early
space management. warning on ballistic missile, UAV, cruise missile, and
Tactical training at CTCs might include offensive asymmetric attacks on BCT high-value assets.
counterair operations (raids, SEAD, EW), if the unit BCT maintains a COP (through CTC wrap­
lists those operations as part of their training objec­ around) of enemy air and missile activity in adjacent
tives. The joint air and missile defense-training con­ unit areas. If BCT does not increase protective mea­
text at the CTCs should include active and passive sures, they also receive attacks.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 9


BCT is tasked to provide air defense cover­ Interagency and private organizations request
age to critical joint assets in or near the BCT AO. logistical support from the BCT.
BCT is tasked to provide route security or force BCT is tasked to manage or provide common-
protection for Patriot units operating in the BCT AO. user logistics (maintenance, medical, salvage, mor­
Joint and/or AMD TF assets reinforce BCT tuary affairs, transportation, Class I, and so on) to
assets in the reception and staging areas and at cer­ other JIM team members or go to other joint CSS
tain decisive points in the rotation. units for support.
BCT is required to coordinate with contractors
Joint Logistics or host-nation agencies for logistics support.
(JP 4-0, Logistics Support)9
Joint logistics is a rapidly changing area in both
Joint Force Projection
(JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations and
organization and execution. Currently, the regional JP 4-01-2, Sealift Support)10
combatant commander (RCC) level plans and moni­ U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANS­
tors joint logistics, but service components execute COM) has the mission to provide strategic common-
it. Joint logistics functions include supply distribution, user, air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, em­
maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health ploy, support, and redeploy forces in support of
services, and other services. The RCC retains the combatant commander requirements. USTRANS­
authority to issue directives to subordinate com­ COM normally retains control of intra-theater lift
manders and shift logistic resources within the the­ assets and serves as the single manager for com­
ater. Each service is responsible for accomplishing mon-user port operations. JFCOM’s joint deployment,
RCC-specified tasks and supporting their own forces employment, and sustainment project is also rapidly
unless the support is specifically tasked through as­ changing this interdependent relationship.
signments to common, joint, or cross-servicing sup­ For maneuver BCT training at a CTC, strategic-
port directives and agreements. force projection might be outside the scope of joint
At the maneuver BCT level, joint logistics do not context capabilities. CTCs could support limited
radically alter the standard methods of combat ser­ strategic lift from home station to the CTC, with a
vice support (CSS). BCTs will still rely on their ha­ “fight off the ramp” scenario at company or platoon
bitually associated CSS unit for logistics, even when levels. Intra-theater lift is the more feasible context
division or corps support command structures trans­ at the CTCs, but it still requires physical JIM trans­
form into Army expeditionary support commands. portation assets to participate in the rotation. This
Besides establishing connectivity between BCT CSS might be difficult to coordinate given scarce re­
and joint logistics C4 structures, there are other ef­ sources; however, the CTCs can still adjust their
fects that can help develop end-to-end logistical in­ operations to replicate realistic force-projection
terdependencies. We must continue to monitor the effects and train in a joint context. Examples include
changes in joint logistics and replicate emerging op­ the following:
portunities to establish the right joint context for train­ Replicate Air Mobility Command, Military
ing. Examples include the following: Sealift Command, Military Traffic Management
BCT is required to coordinate with JIM-spon­ Command, defense contractors, or host-nation sup­
sored and/or contractor-provided support in the CTC port offices and coordination points in the CTC re­
reception and staging areas (intermediary staging or ception and staging areas.
forward operating base operations, Force Provider, Provide resupply from joint intra-theater assets
Harvest Eagle/Falcon) and within the BCT AO. (precision aerial guided Global Positioning System
Training unit is under the provisions a SJTF heavy drop or sling load) and combat configured
SOP for logistics reports, management, and execu­ loads directly from depot-level resources.
tion.
Training unit receives support from a joint or Joint SOF Integration at the CTCs
multinational logistics organization. Although this is not a specified interdependency
Training unit logisticians and leaders understand in the joint and expeditionary mindset white paper,
and interact with the joint logistics centers, offices, SOF integration with conventional forces at the
and boards for CSS planning and execution. tactical level of war and sharing the battlespace
Training unit must provide contracting officers have increased the need to train this relationship
to receive essential services from the support area at the CTCs. While joint doctrine normally em­
or within their AOR from host-nation assets. ploys these highly capable assets in a compart­

10 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


JOINT CONTEXT FOR THE CTCS

mentalized joint special operations task force, tive target missions in the BCT rear area.
Operations Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom ex­ BCT coordinates aviation operations in support
periences and lessons learned have driven a more of joint SOF requirements.
integrated relationship between conventional BCT is directed to provide security or logisti­
units and SOF and might signal changes in joint cal support to SOF ODA during operations or at a
doctrine. As with joint participation, operational forward operating base. Support should include Class
requirements often limit SOF participation at the I and III(b) forecasting and distribution and medical
CTCs. The CTCs can, however, still create full evacuation.
SOF integration effects for training throughout Unanticipated SOF aircraft enter the BCT AO.
the entire rotational period. Examples include the SOF operations within the BCT area that af­
following: fect or provide support to BCT operations.
BCT is required to create a flexible, respon­ BCT commander and staff understand the ca­
sive C2 relationship with SOF operating in the BCT pabilities of joint SOF teams and can integrate SOF
battlespace for short periods. operations into conventional operations.
CTC scenario includes covert and overt joint
SOF activity in and around the BCT, creating coor­ The Future
dination requirements for converging forces. The Army will organize, equip, train, and sustain
Scenario includes SOF acting as advisers to its first modular BCTs by the end of fiscal year 2004.
coalition, host-nation, or irregular forces in the BCT The CTCs are directly involved in ensuring these
area. UAs are a relevant and ready now land power for
SOF units under tactical control (TACON) to the combatant commander and in preparing them to
the BCT or BCT units TACON to SOF for short operate as decisive members of the joint team. Work
periods to execute time-sensitive targets. on the effort to establish a joint context for training
BCT is tasked to provide a reaction force to at the CTCs has begun.
assist SOF in the zone of action and is required to CTC EXCON and HICON cell adjustments and
effect appropriate coordination. a more extensive L-V-C wraparound can realis­
BCT and SOF units exchange valuable/action­ tically replicate many of the desired conditions
able intelligence, which answers priority intelligence and effects. Still, we must continue to develop
requirements and affects BCT courses of action. this concept through discussion, innovation, sharing
BCT establishes contact or exchanges LNOs ideas, and leveraging the initial JNTC experiences.
with the joint SOF team. The CTC program continues to evolve, but its role
Directed no-fire areas around SOF Opera­ as a culture driver and engine of change remains
tional Detachment (ODA) A or SOF time-sensi­ steady. MR
NOTES
1. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, remarks at the National Defense 4. U.S. Department of Defense, “A Strategy for Joint Training,” Washington, D.C., draft.
University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 31 January 2002, on-line at <www.defense 5. Joint and Expeditionary Mindset (JEM) white paper, “Serving a Nation at War: A
link.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html>, accessed 28 July 2002. Campaign-Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset,” draft.
2. Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training,” 6. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 6-02, Joint Doctrine for Em-
memorandum, Washington, D.C., 10 June 2002, on-line at <www.t2net.org/ ployment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Sys­
StrategicPlanMemo_061002.pdf>, accessed 28 July 2004. tems (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 October 1996).
3. Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, address to the CTC/BCTP 7. JCS, JP 3-09, Fire Support (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1988).
Focus Area Task Force. See Gary Sheftick, “Focus TF linking joint virtual training to 8. JCS, JP 3-01, Counterair (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1989).
‘box,’” Army Chief of Staff Focus Series, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 9. JCS, JP 4-0, Logistics Support (Washington, DC: GPO, April 2000).
Pennsylvania, on-line at <http://Carlisle-www.army.mil/banner/focus.htm>, accessed 28 10. JCS, JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, August 2001),
July 2004. and JP 4-01-2, Sealift Support (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1998).

Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army, is the commanding general of the
Combined Arms Center (CAC) and Fort Leavenworth. He attended the Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and the U.S.
Naval War College. He has an M.S. in Operations Analysis and an M.A. in International Rela­
tions. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States
(CONUS), Vietnam, Germany, and Iraq.
Brigadier General Timothy D. Livsey, U.S. Army, is the deputy commanding general for CAC-
Training. He graduated as a distinguished military graduate from North Georgia College, and
he is a graduate of the CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies and the Army War College.
He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, and Korea.
Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Toleben, U.S. Army, is chief of the Combat Training Center
Directorate, Fort Leavenworth. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, and he has been
selected to attend the U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies Program. He has served
in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, and Bosnia.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 11


Understanding
Fourth Generation War
William S. Lind1

R ATHER THAN commenting on the specif­


ics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might
be a good time to lay out a framework for under­
century, the battlefield of order began to break down.
Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight
(an 18th-century soldier’s main objective was to
standing that and other conflicts. I call this frame­ desert), rifled muskets, then breechloaders and ma­
work the Four Generations of Modern War. chine guns, made the old line-and-column tactics at
I developed the framework of the first three gen­ first obsolete, then suicidal.
erations during the 1980s, when I was laboring to The problem since then has been a growing con­
introduce maneuver warfare to the U.S. Marine tradiction between military culture and the increas­
Corps (USMC).2 The Marines kept asking, “What ing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of
will the Fourth Generation be like?” The result was order that was once consistent with the environment
an article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Ga­ in which it operated has become more and more at
zette in 1989: “The Changing Face of War: Into the odds with it.
Fourth Generation.”3 (Our troops reportedly found The Second Generation. Second Generation
copies of the article in the caves at Tora Bora, the War was one answer to the contradiction between
al-Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.) the culture of order and the military environment.
Developed by the French Army during and after
Modern Warfare World War I, Second Generation war sought a
The Four Generations began with the Peace of solution in mass firepower, most of which was indi­
Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty rect artillery fire. The goal was attrition, and the doc­
Years’ War. With that treaty, the state established a trine was summed up by the French as “the artil­
monopoly on war. Previously, many different enti­ lery conquers, the infantry occupies.” Centrally
ties had fought wars—families, tribes, religions, cit­ controlled firepower was carefully synchronized (us­
ies, business enterprises—using many different ing detailed, specific plans and orders) for the infan­
means, not just armies and navies. (Two of those try, tanks, and artillery in a “conducted battle” where
means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue.) the commander was, in effect, the conductor of an
Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war orchestra.
in any way other than fighting state armed forces Second Generation war came as a great relief to
similar to themselves. soldiers (or at least their officers) because it pre­
The First Generation. The First Generation of served the culture of order. The focus was inward,
Modern War, war of line-and-column tactics, where on rules, processes, and procedures. Obedience was
battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly, more important than initiative. In fact, initiative was
ran roughly from 1648 to 1860. The relevance of not wanted because it endangered synchronization.
the First Generation springs from the fact that the Discipline was top-down and imposed.
battlefield of order created a military culture of or­ Second Generation war is relevant today because
der. Most of the things that distinguish military from the U.S. Army and USMC learned Second Genera­
civilian—uniforms, saluting, careful gradations of tion war from the French during and after World
rank—were products of the First Generation and War I, and it remains the American way of war, as
were intended to reinforce the culture of order. we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq. To Ameri­
The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th cans, war means “putting steel on target.”

12 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


UNDERSTANDING FOURTH
GENERATION WAR
Soldier , UK Ministry of Defence

British paratroopers
on patrol in Northern
Ireland. Note that
protective screens on
the center vehicles
are similar to those
added to Stryker com­
bat vehicles in Iraq.

Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of method. During 19th-century wargames, German
most firepower, but otherwise (and despite the junior officers routinely received problems that could
USMC’s formal doctrine, which is Third Generation only be solved by disobeying orders. Orders them­
maneuver warfare), the U.S. military today is as selves specified the result to be achieved, but never
French as white wine and cheese. At the USMC the method (Auftragstaktik). Initiative was more im­
desert warfare training center in California, the only portant than obedience. (Mistakes were tolerated as
thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General long as they came from too much initiative rather
Maurice Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is than too little.) And, it all depended on self-discipline,
true at the Army’s Armor School at Fort Knox, Ken­ not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the
tucky, where one instructor began his class by say­ Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in real­
ing, “I don’t know why I have to teach you all this ity, they had broken with the culture of order.
old French crap, but I do.” The Fourth Generation. Characteristics such
The Third Generation. Third Generation war, as decentralization and initiative carry over from the
also a product of World War I, was developed by Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects
the German Army and is commonly known as blitz­ the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change
krieg or maneuver warfare. Third Generation war since the Peace of Westphalia. In Fourth Genera­
is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, sur­ tion war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over
prise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tac­ the world, state militaries find themselves fighting
tically, in the attack, a Third Generation military seeks nonstate opponents such as al-Qaeda, Hamas,
to get into the enemy’s rear areas and collapse him Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
from the rear forward. Instead of “close with and Colombia. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.
destroy,” the motto is “bypass and collapse.” In the Fourth Generation war is also marked by a re­
defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut turn to a world of cultures, not merely states, in con­
him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where flict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian
forces attempt to hold or advance a line. Third Gen­ West’s oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam.
eration war is nonlinear. After about three centuries on the strategic defen­
Tactics change in Third Generation war, as does sive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege
military culture. A Third Generation military focuses of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic
outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result offensive expanding outward in every direction. In
the situation requires, not inward on process and Fourth Generation war, invasion by immigration can

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 13


1st Armored Division soldiers on patrol
in downtown Fallujah, Iraq, May 2003.
US Army

be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army. Group members recently decided it was time to
Nor is Fourth Generation war merely something go public with a few of the ideas it has come up
we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a uni­ with. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some
versal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that cri­ thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the
sis means many countries will evolve Fourth Gen­ whole task might be hopeless; state militaries might
eration war on their soil. America, with a closed not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation
political system (regardless of which party wins, the enemies no matter what they do. But for what they
Establishment remains in power and nothing really are worth, here are some of our thoughts.
changes) and a poisonous ideology of multicul­ Points to Ponder
turalism, is a prime candidate for the homegrown If America had some Third Generation ground
variety of Fourth Generation war, which is by far forces capable of maneuver warfare, we might be
the most dangerous kind. able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to
Where does the war in Iraq fit into this frame­ fight battles of encirclement is what led to the fail­
work? I suggest that the war we have seen thus ure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where
far is merely a powder train leading to the maga­ al-Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away, suffering
zine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a few casualties. To fight such battles we need some
wide variety of Islamic nonstate actors, directed at true light infantry that can move farther and faster
America and Americans (and local governments on its feet than the enemy can, has a full tactical
friendly to America) everywhere. The longer repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and call­
America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance the ing for fire), and can fight with its own weapons in­
magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all. stead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate
For almost 2 years, a small group has been meet­ that USMC infantry today has a sustained march
ing at my house to discuss how to fight the Fourth rate of 10 to 15 kilometers per day; German World
Generation war. The group is made up mostly of War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilo­
Marines, but it includes one Army officer, one Na­ meters.
tional Guard captain, and one foreign officer. We felt Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to
somebody should be working on the most difficult the Geneva Conventions, but some might be open
question facing the U.S. Armed Forces, and no one to a chivalric code governing how war with them
else seemed to be. would be fought. This is worth exploring.

14 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


UNDERSTANDING FOURTH
GENERATION WAR
How U.S forces conduct themselves after the opposing armies the ‘honors of war,’ tell them what
battle might be as important in Fourth Generation war a fine job they did, make their defeat ‘civilized’ so
as how they fight the battle. they can survive the war institutionally intact and
What the USMC calls cultural intelligence is of then work for your side. This would be similar to
vital importance in Fourth Generation war, and it 18th-century notions of civilized war and contribute
must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Ma­ greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the
rines seem to be grasping this much better than the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their
U.S. Army. own population, is always a serious mistake but one
What kind of people do we need in Special Op­ that Americans are prone to make. [The] ‘football
erations Forces (SOF)? We think minds are more mentality’ we have developed since World War II
important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. works against us.’”6
SOF understand this. In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war
One key to success is integrating troops as much between the forces of Fourth Generation war and
as possible with the local people. Unfortunately, the those of the Brave New World (BNW). Fourth Gen­
U.S. doctrine of force protection works against in­ eration forces understand this, while the international
tegration and generally hurts us badly. A quote from elites that seek BNW do not. The minutes read,
the minutes of one of our meetings says, “There are “Osama bin-Laden, though reportedly very wealthy,
two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security, but it is also
One way is the way we are currently doing it, which leadership by example. It may make it harder to
is to separate ourselves from the population and to separate (physically or psychologically) Fourth Gen­
intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable eration war leaders from their troops. It also makes
alternative might be to take the opposite approach it harder to discredit those leaders with their follow­
and integrate with the community. That way you find ers. This contrasts dramatically with the BNW elites
out more of what is going on and the population pro­ who are physically and psychologically separated (by
tects you. The British approach of getting the hel­ a huge gap) from their followers. (Even the gener­
mets off as soon as possible may actually be saving als in most conventional armies are to a great ex­
lives.”4 tent separated from their men.) The BNW elites are
What “wins” at the tactical and physical levels in many respects occupying the moral low ground
might lose at the operational, strategic, mental, and but don’t know it.”7
moral levels, where Fourth Generation war is decided. In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during
Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the Brit­ World War II, the Italians in many ways were more
ish have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the Brit­ effective than the Germans. The key to their suc­
ish Army has taken more casualties than it has in­ cess is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus,
flicted.5 This is something the Second-Generation U.S. the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion
military has great trouble grasping because it defines as more effective than the British or the Austrians
success in terms of comparative attrition rates. because the Argentines did not want to fight. What
We must recognize that in Fourth Generation war, lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?
we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite How would the Mafia do an occupation?
all our firepower and technology. When we have a coalition, what if we let each
What can the U.S. military learn from cops [po­ country do what it does best; for example, having
lice officers]? U.S. Army Reserve and National the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. fire­
Guard units include lots of cops. Are we taking ad­ power and logistics, and the Italians the occupation?
vantage of what they know? How could the U.S. Department of Defense’s
One key to success in Fourth Generation war (DOD’s) concept of Transformation be redefined to
might be “losing to win.” Part of the reason the wars come to grips with Fourth Generation war? If you
in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that read the current Transformation Planning Guid­
our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a ance put out by DOD, you will find nothing on Fourth
happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. Generation war, indeed nothing that relates at all
In a world where the state is in decline, if you de­ to either of the two wars we are now fighting; it
stroy a state, it is difficult to recreate it. Another is oriented toward fighting state armed forces that
quote from the minutes says, “[W]hile war against fight us symmetrically.8
another state may be necessary, one should seek to We asked, “Will Saddam’s capture mark a turn­
preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the ing point in the war in Iraq?” The conclusion?

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 15


Don’t count on it. Few resistance fighters have been guerrilla tactics. Other tactics, including much of what
fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam’s capture we call terrorism, are classic Arab light cavalry war­
might lead to a fracturing of the Ba’ath Party, which fare carried out with modern technology at the op­
would move us further toward a Fourth Generation erational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.
situation where no one can re-create the state. It Much of what we are facing in Iraq today is not
might also tell the Shiites that they no longer need yet Fourth Generation war, but a War of National
America to protect them from Saddam, giving them Liberation fought by people whose goal is to restore
more options in their struggle for free elections. a Ba’athist state. But as that goal fades and those
However, if the U.S. Army used the capture of forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more
Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage and more to the fore. What will characterize it are
ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resis­ not vast changes in how the enemy fights but, rather,
tance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. (But I in who fights and what they fight for. The change
do not think we will be that smart.) in who fights makes it difficult to tell friend from foe.
A good example is the advent of female suicide
“Getting It” bombers. Do U.S troops now start frisking every
When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems Muslim woman they encounter? The change in
no one in the U.S. military “gets it.” Recently, a fac­ what our enemies fight for makes impossible the
ulty member at the National Defense University political compromises that are necessary to ending
wrote to USMC General James Mattis, commander,
any war. We find that when it comes to making
1st Marine Division, asking for his views on the im­
peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk
portance of reading military history. Mattis responded
about. The end of a war like that in Iraq becomes
with an eloquent defense of making time to read his­
inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leav­
tory, one that should go up on the wall at all of our
ing behind either a stateless region (as in Somalia)
military schools: “Thanks to my reading, I have never
or a façade of a state (as in Afghanistan) within
been caught flatfooted by any situation. It doesn’t
which more nonstate elements rise and fight.
give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a
Mattis is correct that none of this is new; it is only
dark path ahead.”9
new to state armed forces designed to fight other
Still, even such a capable and well-read com­
mander as Mattis seems to miss the point about state armed forces. The fact that no state military
Fourth Generation war. He said, “Ultimately, a real has recently succeeded in defeating a nonstate en­
understanding of history means that we face noth­ emy reminds us that Clio, the patron goddess of his­
ing new under the sun. For the ‘Fourth Generation tory, has a sense of humor; she teaches us that not
of War’ intellectuals running around today saying all problems have solutions. MR
that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, NOTES
the tactics are wholly new, and so on, I must re­ 1. This article is a slightly edited compilation of short commentaries published by
William S. Lind on the subject of “Fourth Generation Warfare.” Used by permission.
spectfully say, ‘Not really.’”10 2. The word “generation” as used here is shorthand for “dialectically qualitative shift.”
3. William S. Lind, COL Keith Nightengale, CPT John F. Schmitt, COL Joseph W.
Well, that is not quite what Fourth Generation in­ Sutton, and LTC Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Genera­
tion, Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989): 22-26. Published simultaneously in Mili­
tellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have tary Review (October 1989): 2-11.
4. Seminar minutes are not available to the public.
pointed out over and over that the Fourth Genera­ 5. Martin van Crevald, lecture, Norwegian Naval Academy, Bergen, Norway, 14 May
2004.
tion is not novel, but a return—specifically a return 6. Minutes.
7. Ibid.
to the way war worked before the rise of the state. 8. U.S. Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2003), on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/
Now, as then, many different entities, not just gov­ transformationplanningapr03.pdf>, accessed 22 July 2004.
9. GEN James Mattis, letter to a faculty member at the National Defense University.
ernments of states, will wage war, and they will wage No other information given.
10. Ibid.
war for many different reasons, not just “the exten­ 11. Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century (New
sion of politics by other means.” They will use many York: Ballantine Books, 1979).

different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves


William S. Lind is the director of the Center for Cul­
to what we recognize as military forces. When I am tural Conservatism of the Free Congress Foundation.
asked to recommend a good book describing what He received a B.A. from Dartmouth College and an
a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually sug­ M.A. from Princeton University. He served as a leg­
islative aide for armed services for Senator Robert
gest Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror: The Taft, Jr., of Ohio, and held a similar position with
Calamitous Fourteenth Century.11 Senator Gary Hart of Colorado. He writes a weekly
We also are not saying that Fourth Generation column, “On War,” on-line at <www.military.com>.
tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tac­ He lectures internationally on military theory, doc­
trine, and tactics.
tics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard

16 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


The Law of War and
Civilians on the Battlefield:
Are We Undermining

Civilian Protections?

Lieutenant Colonel Mark David “Max” Maxwell, U.S. Army

A RMY PRIVATE Jessica Lynch captured the


interest of the entire world when, on 2 April
2003, a special operations team rescued her from
his status as a civilian accompanying the force. The
paramilitary operative has no such card. Both wear
civilian attire, but the paramilitary operative has a
captivity in the Saddam Hospital compound in weapon; the civilian accompanying the force is
Nasiriya, Iraq.1 On 23 March, her unit’s convoy had unarmed.
taken a wrong turn and was ambushed by Iraqis. The capture of these civilians brings to the fore­
Lynch became a prisoner of war (POW) under the front whether they should be afforded the same pro­
law of war—the international body of law principally tections as Lynch received under international law.
made up of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva But, should they be deprived of such protections be­
Conventions.2 Her dramatic rescue brought home cause their presence on the battlefield somehow vio­
one of the realities of war—the potential of enemies lates the principle of “distinction” embedded in the
to capture U.S. troops during armed conflict. law of war; that is, the principle that civilians must
As a member of the regular Armed Forces, Lynch be distinguished from combatants?
had the right to be classified as a POW, which should
have guaranteed to her a certain level of treatment The Principle of Distinction
while in captivity. A second critical right she received The principle of distinction is fundamental to the
is immunity from prosecution under the enemy’s law law of war and “is the foundation on which the codi­
for any lawful, precapture, warlike acts. This impor­ fication of the laws and customs of war rests[.]”4
tant immunity is referred to as “combatant immu­ Under customary international law (law adhered to
nity.”3 Thus, if Lynch had shot and killed an Iraqi by custom) distinction imposes a two-part obligation
soldier during the ambush, she could not be tried for on the parties to the conflict. First, civilians must be
murder; she would be “cloaked in a blanket of im­ distinguished from combatants. Second, with com­
munity” for her combatant acts. batants distinguished from civilians, the parties to a
Lynch’s POW status and the privileges that flow conflict can target only combatants and military ob­
from that status were never in doubt. The real de­ jectives. This two-part obligation, codified in 1977 by
bate as to status lies elsewhere—with civilians on Article 48 of the First Additional Protocol of the
the battlefield. The modern battlefield is increasingly Geneva Conventions of 1949, says, “[T]o ensure re­
populated with civilians and paramilitary operatives spect for and protection of the civilian population and
who accompany U.S. forces in support of military civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
operations. times distinguish between the civilian population and
Assume, for a moment, that civilians are in combatants and between civilian objects and mili­
Lynch’s convoy. When the firefight ensues, several tary objectives and accordingly shall direct their op­
Iraqis are killed, and the enemy captures two civil­ erations only against military objectives.”5
ians. The Iraqis quickly discover that one civilian is To accomplish the first prong of distinction—the
a contractor hired by the Army to maintain power distinction between civilians and combatants—a line
generators; the other is a CIA paramilitary opera­ must be drawn between what constitutes a combat­
tive responsible for organizing resistance movements ant and what constitutes a civilian. An individual can
within Iraq. The civilian contractor accompanying hold only one status of the two under the law of war:
the force produces an identification card indicating combatant or civilian. A combatant is one who has

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 17


“the right to participate directly in hostilities.”6 For two distinct classes is perhaps the greatest triumph
example, members of the Armed Forces of a party of International Law. Its effect in mitigating the evils
to the conflict are combatants. The right to partici­ of war has been incalculable.”12 The law of war has
pate in hostilities provides them with two important historically been focused on this separation.
rights on capture: POW status and combatant im­ As early as the mid-19th century, targeting civil­
munity. ians was implicitly forbidden: “The only legitimate ob­
POW status affords the individual certain privi­ ject which States should endeavor to accomplish
leges while being detained by the enemy: humane during war is to weaken the military forces of the
treatment, equality of treatment, protection from in­ enemy.”13 In fact, “distinction between belligerents
sults, free medical care, and immunity from repris­ [combatants] and the civilian population ha[s] found
als. Combatant immunity is immunity from prosecu­ acceptance as a self-evident rule of customary law
tion for precapture or warlike acts. However, unlike in the second half of the 19th century.”14 During the
POW status, which is accorded to certain civilians, 20th century, the Hague Regulations and Geneva
combatant immunity is available only to combatants.7 Conventions and their additional protocols “explic­
The Third Geneva Convention (Geneva Conven­ itly confirm[ed] the customary rule that innocent ci­
tion III, relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) vilians must be kept outside hostilities as far as pos­
also identifies members of militias and organized re­ sible and enjoy general protection against danger
sistance movements belonging to a party to the con­ arising from hostilities.”15
flict as having a right to participate in hostilities. Un­ The real push to prohibit explicitly the direct tar­
der international law, however, these militia members geting of civilians came in the aftermath of World
and members of resistance organizations must meet War II and the vast amount of destruction dealt the
four conditions to be regarded as combatants: European and Asian continents. As Article 51 of the
1. They must be commanded by a person respon­ First Additional Protocol states, “The civilian popu­
sible for subordinates. lation . . . shall not be the object of attack.”16 The
2. They must have a fixed distinctive sign recog­ official commentary to this article boldly pronounces,
nizable at a distance. “Article 51 is one of the most important articles in
3. They must carry their arms openly. the Protocol.”17
4. They must conduct their operations in accor­
dance with the laws and customs of war.8 Civilians Accompanying the Force
Regardless of titles, however, all combatants “are Protecting the civilian population is a goal of in­
obligated to distinguish themselves from the civilian ternational law. If wars must occur, they must be
population while they are engaged in an attack or in fought between military forces. Distinction between
a military operation preparatory to an attack.”9 combatants and civilians is crucial to accomplishing
On the other hand, the term “civilian” is defined this goal. While, inevitably, combatants will kill or in­
under international law in the negative. In essence, jure civilians, the hope is that international law will
a civilian is any person who is not a combatant. Ar­ make such loss unintended and much less likely than
ticle 50 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva if civilians were not protected.
Conventions states, “In case of doubt whether a per­ No direct or active participation. W. Hays
son is a civilian, that person shall be considered to Parks, a scholar of international armed conflict, has
be a civilian.”10 Unlike combatants, civilians do not noted, “Civilians and the civilian population are pro­
normally receive or require POW status, as they are tected from intentional attack, so long as they do not
protected under a different set of international take an active part in hostilities.”18 Protocol I says,
rules—the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the civilians “are not authorized to participate directly in
Protection of Civilian Persons.11 hostile actions.”19 Under the law of war, direct or
The second prong of distinction, that of targeting active participation in hostilities is defined as action
only combatants and military objectives, is only made taken “to cause actual harm to the personnel and
possible when the parties to a conflict have distin­ equipment of the enemy armed forces.”20 Although
guished combatants from civilians. Once distin­ a seemingly bright-line test, this clarity is now blurred
guished, combatants such as members of the Armed by civilians who accompany forces into areas of
Forces may be lawfully targeted by the enemy, while combat operations.
civilians may not. J.M. Spaight, an early 20th-cen­ Geneva Convention III identifies some limited cat­
tury scholar observed, “The separation of armies egories of civilians who might be held on the cessa­
[combatants] and peaceful inhabitants [civilians] into tion of hostilities but who, in return, are to be afforded

18 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD

POW status, even though they are not combatants. A Polish contractor
This group of individuals are “[p]ersons who accom­ wearing body armor
pany the armed force without actually being mem­ in Al Tufail, Iraq,
28 June 2004.
bers” of the Armed Forces.21 To be afforded POW
status, these civilians can take no direct or active
part in hostilities: “[C]ivilian members of the military
aircraft crews . . . , supply contractors, [and] mem­
bers of labor units or of services responsible for the
welfare of the armed force” are examples of civil­
ians who qualify as lawful civilians accompanying
the force.22
Some commentators, understanding the different
nature of “general population” civilians and civilians
who accompany the force, have referred to the lat­
ter category as “quasi-combatants.”23 Yet, there is
no mention of this distinction in international law. In
fact, a special quasi-combatant status was proposed
during the drafting of the Additional Protocol and

US Army
was specifically rejected.24 International law contin­
ues to recognize only two valid status labels: com­
batants and civilians. When any unit now deploys, the ratio of civilians
Under international law, if any civilian commits a to combatants is increased in terms of the numbers
hostile act; that is, takes a direct or active role in of civilians who deploy; “[t]he tasks [of civilians ac­
hostilities, that civilian is subject to attack. Further­ companying the force] have changed as well.”26
more, if the same civilian is captured, the civilian can While some civilians perform traditional support roles,
be tried for such hostile acts. The effect of this rule such as building airfields and providing billeting sup­
is clear: a civilian accompanying the force who en­ port and food services, an increasing number of ci­
gages in a hostile act receives little protection, ei­ vilians are providing frontline troops with technical
ther with regard to targeting decisions the enemy support on state-of-the-art weapons systems.27
makes or in being afforded immunity from trial for For commanders the result is an increased pool
warlike acts. The goal for commanders, therefore, of civilians who are increasingly placed in harm’s
is to ensure that civilians under their command are way and for whom they are responsible. While the
not placed in positions of jeopardy, but that if they commander is responsibe for protecting frontline ci­
are, they understand the risks they assume when vilians, the civilians, while not actually pulling the trig­
they engage in activities that constitute or might be ger, are working hand-in-hand with combatants to
construed as constituting direct or active participa­ ensure that soldiers can pull the trigger. The result
tion in hostilities. might well mean an enemy could justifiably conclude
General guidelines for commanders. Even that civilians have directly or actively taken part in
though the principle of distinction is a bedrock prin­ hostilities “to cause actual harm to the personnel and
ciple of the law of war, the number of civilians ac­ equipment of the enemy armed forces.”28
companying the force has steadily increased. In part, Accordingly, the commander must understand
this is because of the personnel reduction and cost- that a real risk exists that civilians for whom he is
cutting efforts the Pentagon has undertaken since responsible will be targeted and, if captured, subject
the early 1990s to privatize and outsource many to trial by the enemy for hostile acts. This reality re­
functions military personnel previously performed. sults from the fact that, aside from the “actual harm
The driving force behind this effort is the assump­ to the enemy” test found in the law of war, there is
tion that civilian contractors can perform certain no bright-line test as to what constitutes direct or
tasks just as or more effectively and efficiently than active participation in hostilities. One commentator
can military combat support or combat service sup­ aptly stated, “The current practice of merely warn­
port personnel, thus preserving military billets for ing commanders with generalities not to jeopardize
“trigger pullers.” For better or for worse, this effort civilian status is insufficient.”29
has “made the Armed Forces dependent on civilian Several policies have been promulgated in an ef­
specialist[s.]”25 fort to prevent civilians accompanying the force from

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 19


becoming direct or active participants in hostilities. of the law of war. Effective, realistic guidance deal­
Joint doctrine dictates that civilians “cannot lawfully ing with this issue remains woefully lacking.
perform military functions and should not be work­
ing in scenarios that involve military combat opera­ Paramilitary Operatives
tions where they might be conceived as combat­ While guidance for commanders pertaining to the
ants.”30 The thrust of this doctrine is to ensure that appropriate missions civilians who accompany the
the first prong of the principle of distinction—the dis­ force can perform lacks clarity, guidance dealing
tinction between civilians and combatants—is hon­ with the use of paramilitary operatives is virtually
ored. nonexistent. The international law landscape be­
From a policy and doctrinal perspective, com­ comes even more treacherous when a civilian is not
manders are to consider, at a minimum, five enu­ accompanying the force but is a paramilitary opera­
merated areas in an effort to ensure that civilians tive intentionally engaging clearly hostile acts.
who accompany the force do not lose their right to During World War II, the Roosevelt Administra­
be accorded POW status and are not subjected to tion created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
trial for engaging in the following hostile acts: the precursor to the CIA. OSS operatives focused
Use of arms. Civilians will not be armed, un­ on “espionage, sabotage, and partisan support.”36
less approved in the limited, by-exception basis of Some operatives, who were military members,
personal defense by the combatant commander.31 worked for the theater commander and, on occa­
Force protection. Civilians will not perform sion, wore civilian clothing when conducting military
force-protection functions like, but not limited to, for­ missions.37 If captured in civilian clothing, regard­
tification construction and guarding checkpoints.32 less of their military or nonmilitary status, these op­
Civilians will be provided and carry on their per­ eratives received few, if any, protections. Their
son a Geneva Convention Identification Card iden­ deaths were virtually certain.
tifying them as civilians “authorized to accompany In 1947, the CIA was created, and according to
military forces in the field and entitling [them] to be its enabling legislation, it can conduct “special ac­
treated, if captured, as prisoners of war.”33 Gener­ tivities approved by the President,” including, but not
ally, civilians will be assigned duties at echelons­ limited to, covert actions; that is, “activity or activi­
above-division in an effort to minimize their expo­ ties of the United States Government to influence
sure to harm.34 Also, civilians will normally not wear political, economic, or military conditions abroad,
distinctive U.S. military uniforms unless the combat­ where it is intended that the role of the United States
ant commander or his service component commander Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
authorizes them to do so. Regardless of their cloth­ publicly.”38
ing, however, civilians will wear a symbol that es­ CIA covert operations have evolved into “military
tablishes their civilian status.35 actions” in the form of CIA paramilitary operations.
The goal of this doctrine is to ensure compliance A driving purpose behind the use of paramilitary op­
with the obligation of distinction; that is, to ensure eratives, much as with civilians accompanying the
the protected status of civilians accompanying the force, is one of perceived effectiveness and effi­
force. The more civilians look like service members ciency. Their use frees up military resources and is
(wearing uniforms, carrying arms, performing assign­ an effective way to gather intelligence and influence
ments near the engagement area, functioning as the enemy. CIA paramilitary operatives, all donning
force providers, or carrying no proof of their status civilian clothing in the conduct of hostilities, have
as civilians accompanying the force), the greater fought in virtually every international conflict since
their risk of losing POW status and becoming liable 1947: the Korean conflict, the Vietnam war, Opera­
to prosecution if they are captured. tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation
These general guidelines, with the possible excep­ Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and most recently,
tion of force protection, address only a civilian’s ap­ Operation Iraqi Freedom.39
pearance, not his actions. The guidance does not ad­ Paramilitary operatives do not meet any of the
dress the functions that a civilian accompanying the prerequisites necessary to be considered lawful com­
force might perform before crossing the line into di­ batants. They are not members of a militia or a re­
rect or active participation in hostilities. As a result, sistance organization because they fail to meet any
civilians accompanying the force, regardless of their of the four defining criteria. Likewise, paramilitary
appearance and documentation, run the risk of en­ operatives are not members of the Armed Forces
gaging in actions that might be viewed as violations and cannot be incorporated into the force by some

20 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD

Military Police and civilian contractors


react to an ambush from anticoalition
forces while traveling in a convoy
through Baghdad, 28 May 2004.
US Army

procedural fiat. Under congressional dicta, an indi­ Paramilitary operatives who take an active and
vidual must meet specific criteria to be a member direct part in hostilities are unlawful combatants; that
of the U.S. Armed Forces and binds himself, via con­ is, civilians illegally committing warlike acts in an in­
tract, to certain obligations.40 Unlike CIA paramili­ ternational armed conflict. As unlawful combatants,
tary operatives, members of the Armed Forces are what protections, if any, do they possess if captured
subject to the worldwide jurisdiction of the Uniform by the enemy? The simple answer is that existing
Code of Military Justice.41 protections are minimal. Paramilitary operatives do
Under international law, if the paramilitary opera­ not receive POW status. Instead, the legal rights to
tive is not a combatant, then he is a civilian. He is be afforded paramilitary operatives are merely pro­
not, however, a civilian accompanying the force, for cedural: they have the right to be tried by “an im­
three separate and distinct reasons: partial and regularly constituted court respecting the
1. The U.S. Government does not assert that generally recognized principles of regular judicial pro­
paramilitary operatives are civilians accompanying cedures.”43 These procedural rights include, at a
the force, as evidenced by the fact that they are not minimum—
issued appropriate identification cards. The right to know the charges against them.
2. Paramilitary operatives do not function in the The right to be presumed innocent until proven
traditional roles of civilians accompanying the force, guilty.
such as supply or system supporters. The right to an attorney.
3. A paramilitary operative’s purpose is to take an The right to a bar against being tried twice for
active or direct part in hostilities, contrary to the the same crime (double jeopardy).
bright-line restriction articulated by the law of war. Paramilitary operatives could be tried in an
Like a civilian in the general population, a para­ enemy’s court system for domestic criminal viola­
military operative who has participated in hostilities tions stemming from their warlike acts. Murder of
by taking up arms can be punished for the sole rea­ an enemy soldier, for example, would constitute a
son of taking up arms: “[A]nyone whose status as domestic-law violation. Also, paramilitary operatives
a member of the Armed Forces is recognized, is en­ could be tried for perfidy, an international-law viola­
titled to be treated as a prisoner of war in the event tion.44 Among other things, perfidy is the treacher­
that he is captured; anyone who takes up arms with­ ous killing, injuring, or capturing of an enemy by
out being able to claim this status will be left to be feigning civilian or noncombatant status. That is,
dealt with by the enemy and its military tribunals in an individual who intentionally feigns civilian status
the event that he is captured.”42 while conducting military operations can be tried for

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 21


US Air Force
Quirin), which the U.S. Supreme Court heard and
decided in the midst of World War II, the accused
were denied POW status.47 In June 1942, eight Nazi
saboteurs came to the U.S. with explosives, fuzes,
and incendiary and timing devices to destroy key rail­
road installations, aluminum factories, power plants,
bridges, and canal locks. The plan, devised by Adolf
Hitler himself, was “to demonstrate America’s vul­
nerability and the reach of Nazi power.”48 The team
of Nazi troopers infiltrated the U.S. and donned ci­
vilian attire, but through a comedy of errors, was
caught by the FBI within days.
In July 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt or­
dered a military commission to try the Nazi sabo­
teurs for, among other crimes, violations of the law
of war for acting as unlawful belligerents. The sabo­
teurs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
found that the conduct of the Nazi saboteurs was a
violation of the law of war and, therefore, neither
POW protections nor combatant immunity applied.
Chief Justice Harlan Fisk Stone wrote for the Court:
“By passing our boundaries for such purposes with­
out uniform or other emblem signifying their bellig­
erent [combatant] status, or by discarding that
means of identification after entry, such enemies be­
An Air Force crew chief and Lock-
come unlawful belligerents subject to trial and pun­
heed Martin contractor repair an

aircraft’s antenna during Operation


ishment.”49
Iraqi Freedom, 11 April 2003.
The Court’s decision did not just decree the Nazi
saboteurs to be stripped of POW status and tried
violating international law, regardless of whether such for their warlike acts, its decision was much more
an action is deemed a domestic-law violation. expansive: individuals who don civilian clothing to
The use of paramilitary operatives to conduct mili­ engage the enemy violate both the law of nations,
tary operations during international armed conflict as codified in the law of war, and U.S. law. The
appears to violate international law. The question re­ Court states, “This precept of law of war had been
mains, however, whether such conduct violates U.S. so recognized in practice both here and abroad, and
law. U.S. courts have had few opportunities to has so generally been accepted as valid by authori­
grapple with the issue of civilians who have com­ ties on international law that we think it must be re­
mitted hostile acts during an armed conflict because garded as a rule or principle of the law of war rec­
U.S. courts normally do not exercise jurisdiction over ognized by this Government” [emphasis added].50
crimes committed outside the borders of the U.S. The breadth of the Court’s decision has two rami­
(where most of the Nation’s wars have been fications: the enemy can try Americans who wear
fought). And even if jurisdiction exists, the question civilian clothing to conduct military operations for vio­
has not often come before the courts because the lating the law of war, regardless of whether their
U.S. has historically provided captives the full pro­ conduct was a violation of the enemy’s domestic law,
tections afforded prisoners of war unless a compe­ and the same individuals would be lawfully subject
tent tribunal (known as an Article 5 Tribunal) deter­ with few protections to the domestic law of the
mines otherwise.45 If the Article 5 Tribunal finds that capturing state.51
an individual in question is an unlawful combatant— In short, conducting hostilities in civilian attire
a civilian committing a warlike act, for example— is a war crime—perfidy. At its essence, this is
he is not accorded POW status.46 the intentional negation of the principle of distinc­
In one landmark case, however, the U.S. courts tion. Many law-of-war scholars conclude that
did exercise jurisdiction because the hostile acts oc­ “any tendency to blur the distinction must be
curred on American soil. In that case (Ex Parte sanctioned heavily by the international community;

22 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD

otherwise the whole system based on the concept the appearance of being civilians; and that they un­
of distinction will break down.”52 derstand that the more involved they become in the
actual prosecution of combat operations, the more
Leadership at Tactical tenuous their postcapture protections.
and Strategic Levels The time has come for military leaders to deal with
The obligation to protect civilians accompanying this fundamentally important issue at the policy-
the force falls mainly to the tactical commander. The development stage, before the tactical execution of
theory behind this obligation is that at the unit level future operations. If U.S. policy focuses only on ap­
the command has the greatest say in which opera­ pearance, military leaders will never grapple with the
tions civilians who accompany the force will be in­ larger policy issue. During military operations, what
volved. The commander can therefore control such type of conduct is off-limits to civilians accompany­
civilians’ appearance and tasks. Yet the international ing the force? The tradeoff is clear, as is the di­
obligation persists: conduct by civilians who accom­ lemma, if civilians’ conduct is restricted to the ex­
pany the force that amounts to direct or active par­ tent that it comports with international law, many of
ticipation in combatant activity is forbidden. their current responsibilities will fall to military mem­
In the absence of specific guidelines that clearly bers. Outsourcing and privatization, even if efficient
delineate this conduct, tactical commanders should and effective, will be curtailed. Such a step, how­
apply a common-sense test: “[C]ivilians may sup­ ever, would require at least a partial reversal of cur­
port and participate in military activities as long as rent trends in U.S. military thinking.
they are not integrated into combat operations.”53 If military leaders need to grapple with policy
Joint doctrine supports this proposed position.54 considerations for civilians accompanying the force,
Moreover, the Navy’s policy closely parallels this then these same leaders need to create a policy for
position, defining more precisely the conduct that trig­ paramilitary operatives. Unlike civilians accompany­
gers the forbidden direct or active participation as ing the force, the tactical commander is not directly
“support by civilians to those actually participating responsible for paramilitary operatives. Military com­
in battle or directly supporting battle action, and mili­ manders do not control the appearance and tasks
tary work done by civilians in the midst of an ongo­ of paramilitary operatives who generally answer to
ing engagement.”55 The Department of Defense’s other U.S. agencies. Yet the danger of intermingling
(DOD’s) Law of War Working Group has offered civilians accompanying the force with paramilitary
a broad reaffirmation of this demarcation: “A civil­ operatives is real: paramilitary operatives eviscerate
ian accompanying the Armed Forces in the field may the line of distinction between civilians and combat­
not engage in or be ordered to engage in activities ants. Eliminating this line leads to two potential un­
inconsistent with his or her civilian status.”56 The desirable results for all civilians; in particular, civil­
Army and Air Force, however, appear to accept the ians who accompany the force. These civilians
notion that civilians can and do perform “duties di­ become lawful targets and, if captured, face crim­
rectly supporting military operations [and thereby] inal prosecution. If U.S. enemies cannot distinguish
may be subject to direct, intentional attack.”57 The between these two groups of civilians during cap­
problem with this position is, of course, that it po­ tivity, they might choose to deny all civilians, includ­
tentially runs afoul of international law: civilians who ing civilians accompanying the force, POW status
trip the “direct or active participation” wire might be and to prosecute all as war or domestic criminals.
targeted and exposed to criminal prosecution if cap­ If the U.S. uses un-uniformed civilians to conduct
tured, and their conduct might also violate interna­ military operations, an enemy might not be able—
tional law. or might not choose—to distinguish a civilian accom­
In his thesis, “Contractors on the Battlefield: Dis­ panying the force from a paramilitary operative. Ab­
tinction Makes a Difference,” Paul E. Kantwell cor­ sent this ability to distinguish between lawful civilians
rectly concludes that “[a]s the trend to replace uni­ and unlawful combatants, an enemy might well be
formed troops with civilian augmentees continues, left with one of two targeting choices: do not en­
the United States must evaluate obligations to those gage any civilians, even though some are engaging
civilians under the principle of distinction.”58 Absent its forces, or engage every enemy civilian on the
more concrete guidance, the most a tactical com­ battlefield. The latter choice will likely prevail. Thus,
mander can do to protect civilians accompanying the through its own actions, the U.S. has vitiated the con­
force is to ensure that, to the extent possible, he does cept of distinction. If asked to justify its conduct, an
not place them in positions of jeopardy; that they give enemy will likely cite the U.S. violation of the prin-

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 23


ciple of distinction and claim a legitimate right of knowledge of the potential dangers posed.
self-defense. The matter our strategic military leaders must deal
The cases of the enemy conducting the criminal with is straightforward: the practice of intermingling
prosecution of a captured civilian who was accom­ paramilitary operatives with U.S. military forces, es­
panying the force on the battlefield and the prosecu­ pecially civilians accompanying the force, in inter­
tion of a paramilitary operative who has no legal sta­ national armed conflict is both illegal and poses sig­
tus are equally problematic. In theory, an enemy must nificant dangers to the civilians concerned. As one
conduct an Article 5 Tribunal to determine a commentator noted, the U.S. “must be careful to
civilian’s status, if this status is in doubt. Unfortu­ maintain a well-delineated separation between the
nately, the civilian accompanying the force might well CIA and DOD when they integrate their battlefield
be faced with evidence that he was engaged in di­ operations.”62
rect or active hostilities—proximity to the conflict; During international armed conflict, national mili­
participating in military operations in which unlaw­ tary leaders must establish a bright-line rule prohib­
ful combatants (paramilitary operatives) were in­ iting the intermingling of paramilitary operatives and
volved; and the U.S. abandonment of the principle traditional military forces. Covert operations might
of distinction. The result could be criminal trials for be effective and efficient and result in benefits to
civilians accompanying the force or, worse yet, the U.S. national interest, but when the U.S. is engaged
treatment of all civilians as unlawful combatants. in an international armed conflict, the law of war,
The rationale offered by an enemy for its actions along with its rules and responsibilities, is triggered.
would be straightforward: U.S. forces are not Once triggered, the U.S., as a Nation based on the
“conduct[ing] operations in accordance with the laws rule of law, must abide by this law.
and customs of war” and, therefore, cannot benefit
from these laws and customs.59 If the U.S. were Scenario Revisited
to object to a civilian’s postcapture treatment, the Returning now to the hypothetical situation of
problem, from the international community’s perspec­ the two captured civilians—one accompanying
tive, would be one of credibility: the U.S. is willing the force, the other a paramilitary operative—
to intentionally violate the principle of distinction (its the question is whether they are to be afforded the
use of CIA paramilitary operatives in military opera­ same protections as Lynch under international law.
tions), yet concurrently, complain bitterly when an­ At the Article 5 Tribunal conducted to determine the
other state violates this same principle (Iraq’s use status of each, the answers are now clearer. The
of fighters dressed in civilian clothing: the Fedayeen paramilitary operative is not immune from being
Saddam militia).60 targeted or from criminal prosecution. Once captured,
Regardless of the benefits the use of paramilitary he can be tried as a domestic criminal (for murder)
operatives might achieve, we must carefully consider or a war criminal (for perfidy). In either case, his
the associated risks posed to civilians accompany­ prosecution and his execution will be rapid and
ing the force and U.S. credibility regarding compli­ certain.
ance to the law. Commanders at every level, with The civilian accompanying the force, on the other
the assistance of their judge advocates, must act to hand, should not be specifically targeted and, once
ensure, to the fullest extent possible, that civilians captured, should be given POW status, unless it can
accompanying the force do not become targets and, be demonstrated that he played an active or direct
if captured, prosecuted. role in ongoing hostilities. He certainly appears to be
If paramilitary operatives who engage in combat a civilian: he carries an official identification card;
activities are assigned to a commander’s area of he wears no military uniform; he carries no weapon.
operation, the affected commander must ensure As for the civilian’s conduct, he maintains a power
that his leadership chain understands the inher­ generator. The Article 5 Tribunal will focus on
ent risks and potential law of war violations as­ this conduct in determining whether it constitutes tak­
sociated with their presence.61 If leaders are will­ ing a direct or active part in hostilities. In this case,
ing to assume these risks, commanders can then the textbook answer to this question should be “no.”
act to minimize the danger to affected nonpar­ The civilian’s act of maintaining a power gener­
amilitary civilians. A risk assessment, although ator was not intended to cause (directly or actively)
only a stopgap measure, will at least ensure that the actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the
placement of civilians accompanying the force enemy armed forces. The bogeyman persists, how­
in the area of operation will be made with the full ever: the lawful civilian was in proximity to an

24 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD

unlawful combatant (the paramilitary operative).63 lation by the U.S. of the principle of distinction.
In this hypothetical situation, the U.S. would A nation’s conduct in war speaks volumes of its
be violating the law by using unlawful combat­ collective character. This conduct is judged, in large
ants. Violating this fundamental principle of dis­ measure, by its adherence to the law of war. Our
tinction, the U.S. would place in jeopardy the status military leaders should not condone operational tac­
claim of any U.S. civilian. Through its apparent tics that trump the law of war. When we use un­
violation of the law of war or, at a minimum, its lawful combatants on the battlefield, regardless of
cavalier approach to using paramilitary personnel, the perceived tactical advantage to be gained, we
the U.S. would be increasing the risk to all mem­ abandon the rule of law and place U.S. civilian per­
bers of the force. Put differently, the presump­ sonnel in jeopardy. Moreover, with this abandonment,
tion of status for many civilians accompanying we lose legal as well as moral authority. The result
U.S. forces under international law might be is a profound and unmistakable loss of U.S. leader­
negated, if not reversed, by the intentional vio- ship within the community of nations. MR
NOTES
1. John M. Broder, “Commandos Rescue P.O.W. and Locate Bodies,” New York “Emergency-Essential (E-E) DOD U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees,” 10 April 1992,
Times, 3 April 2003, A Nation at War Section, 1. P6.9.8.
2. Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 32. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield (Washing­
(1907), in Documents on the Laws of War, ed. Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (Great ton, DC: GPO, January 2003), chap. 6.
Britain: Oxford University Press, 2002), 67-84; Geneva Convention III, relative to the Treat­ 33. Kenneth J. Oscar and Alma B. Moore, “Policy Memorandum—Contractors on the
ment of Prisoners of War (1949), in Documents on the Laws of War, 243-98 [Geneva Battlefield,” 12 December 1997, 3.
Convention III]. 34. Ibid., 1.
3. Geoffrey S. Corn and Michael L. Smidt, “‘To Be or Not to Be, That is the Ques­ 35. JP 4-0, V-7; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, 33.
tion,’ Contemporary Military Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel,” The Army 36. Parks, 532.
Lawyer (June 1999): 13-14. 37. Ibid., 532-35.
4. Commentary to the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Au­ 38. Kathryn Stone, “‘All Necessary Means’—Employing CIA Operatives in a
gust 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, 8 June Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces,” Strategy Research Project for
1977, ed. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmerman (International the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 7 April 2003, 7, on-line at
Committee for the Red Cross), 598 [Commentary to Protocol I]. The U.S. has never ratified <www.fas.org/irp/eprint/stone.pdf>; Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence
the First Additional Protocol of 1977 but considers a number of its provisions to be re­ Activities,” para. 1.8, 46 Federal Register 59941, 1981.
flective of customary international law. The provisions of the Protocol discussed in this 39. Stone, 10, citing Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence—The Secret
paper—Articles [art.] 37, 48, 50, 51(1) through subsection (3), and 75—are considered Side of American History (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 168.
customary international law and accepted, as such, by the U.S. Government. Michael J. 40. U.S. Code, Title 10, chap. 31 (Enlistments), secs. 501-20, 2002.
Matheson, remarks on The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Inter­ 41. Ibid., U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, secs. 801 and others, 2003.
national Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, “The Sixth 42. Commentary to Protocol I, 509, citing Hague Convention.
Annual American Red Cross Washington College of Law Conference on International 43. Protocol I, 464, art. 75(4).
Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols 44. Ibid., 442, art. 37.
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,” The American University Journal of Inter­ 45. Geneva Convention III, 247.
national Law and Policy 2, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 419-27. This speech by then-U.S. State 46. During the Persian Gulf war, for example, Article 5 Tribunals were conducted to
Department Deputy Legal Advisor Matheson enumerated which principles enshrined in verify a captive’s status. Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, Judge Advocate
the First Additional Protocol were considered part of customary international law by the General Operational Law Handbook, ed. William O’Brien (2003), 22, note 2.
U.S. 47. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S.1 (1942).
5. Protocol I, 447. 48. George Lardner, Jr., “Nazi Saboteurs Captured! FDR Orders Secret Tribunal;
6.I bid., 444, art. 43(2). 1942 Precedent Invoked by Bush Against al Qaeda,” Washington Post Magazine (13
7. Corn and Smidt, 9-15. January 2002): 2.
8. Geneva Convention III, 246, art. 4 (A)(2)(a)-(d). 49. Ex Parte Quirin, 37.
9. Protocol I, 444, art. 44(3). 50. Ibid., 35-6.
10. Ibid., 448, art. 50(1). 51. For an excellent discussion of Ex Parte Quirin and perfidy, see William H. Ferrell
11. Geneva Convention IV, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War III, “No Shirt; No Shoes; No Status: Uniforms, Distinction, and Special Operations
(1949), in Documents on the Laws of War, 301-69. in International Armed Conflict,” The Military Law Review 178 (Winter 2003): 94. Ex
12. J.M. Spaight, War Rights on Land (London: MacMillan, 1911), 37, quoted in W. Parte Quirin has been criticized by law of war scholars. The main criticism of the Court’s
Hays Parks, “Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms,” Chicago Journal of In­ “law of war scholarship” has been its nondelineation between military personnel in
ternational Law 4 (Fall 2003): 514. civilian attire and civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. Some scholars contend
13. Declaration to the Effect of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles in Wartime, that military members in civilian attire are not in violation of the law of war. What seems
The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, quoted in the Commentary to Protocol I, 598. not to be in contention from the Court’s decision is that civilians taking a direct part
14. Fritz Kalshoven, The Laws of Warfare (Geneva: A.W. Sijthoff, 1973), 31. in hostilities are in violation of the law of war. This is the standard, both in international
15. Commentary to Protocol I, 615. law circles and, since the law of war is part and parcel of U.S. Federal law, in the U.S.
16. Protocol I, 448, art. 51(2). as well.
17. Commentary to Protocol I, 615. 52. The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, ed. Dieter Fleck, Michael
18. Parks, “Law of War Status of Civilians Accompanying Military Forces in the Field,” Bothe, Horst Fischer, Christopher Greenwood, Karl Josef Partsch, Walter Rabus (Great
Memorandum of Law for the Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, 6 May Britain: Oxford University Press, 1995), 471.
1999, 1. 53. Guillory, 134.
19. Protocol I, 448, art. 51(3). 54. JP 4-0.
20. Commentary to Protocol I, 618. 55. Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Op­
21. Geneva Convention III, 246, art. 4(A)(4). erations, ed. A.R. Thomas and James C. Duncan (1999), 484, note 14.
22. Ibid., 245, art. 3(1). Unlike the Geneva Conventions of 1949’s use of “active,” the 56. Quote from the DOD Working Group is cited by one of its members in the Parks
First Additional Protocol states that civilians cannot take a “direct part in hostilities” (Pro­ Memorandum of Law, 4.
tocol I, 448, art. 51(3)). For the purposes of this paper, the terms “active” and “direct” as 57. Ibid., 4; Lisa L. Turner and Lynn G. Norton, “Civilians at the Tip of the Spear,” Air
synonymous. Geneva Convention III, 246, art. 4(A)(4). Force Law Review 51 (2001): 30-31.
23. Michael E. Guillory, “Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the 58. Paul E. Kantwill, “Contractors on the Battlefield: Distinction Makes a Difference,”
Rubicon?” Air Force Law Review 51 (2001): 115-16. Guillory contains an excellent dis­ unpublished thesis presented to The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, April
cussion of the quasi-combatant status. 1999, 75.
24. Commentary to Protocol I, 515. 59. Geneva Convention III, 246, art. 4(A)(2)(d).
25. Guillory, 111. 60. Bill Gertz, “Fedayeen Saddam ‘Essentially Terrorist,’” Washington Times, 26 March
26. Ibid., 112. 2003, 1. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld correctly concluded: “I’m not going
27. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations to call [the Fedayeen] troops, because they’re traveling in civilian clothes and they’re es­
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 6 April 2000), chap. 5, out­ sentially terrorists.”
lines the three types of contracts for logistics. 61. DODD 5100.77, “DOD Law of War Program,” 9 December 1998, dictates that law
28. Commentary to Protocol I, 618. of war violations be reported up the chain of command.
29. Guillory, 132. 62. Stone, 16.
30. JP 4-0, V-1. 63. Our current detention of alleged hostiles in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from Opera­
31. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Army Contractors Accompanying the tion Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) is but one example of individuals claiming they were
Force (CAF)(AKA Contractors on the Battlefield) Guidebook (Washington, DC: GPO, not committing warlike acts but, rather, were civilians in the wrong place at the wrong
8 September 2003), 33; U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive (DODD) 1404.10, time.

Lieutenant Colonel Mark David “Max” Maxwell, U.S. Army, is the Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate, I Corps and Fort Lewis, Washington. He is a graduate of Duke University
and the University of North Carolina School of Law.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 25


Targeting Decisions
RegardingHumanShields
Captain Daniel P. Schoenekase, U.S. Army National Guard

T HE USE OF human shields on the battlefield


presents problems at all levels for U.S. mili­
tary services. At the strategic level, the theater com­
who find themselves, willingly or unwillingly, in the
power of the enemy and who answer with their free­
dom or their life for compliance with the orders of
mander and his staff must make targeting decisions the latter [the enemy] and for upholding the secu­
after considering political and strategic implications rity of its armed forces.”3
posed by the presence of human shields. This con­ Voluntary human shields. The recent coalition
cern is not unique to major commands, however. war with Iraq witnessed this unique category of hu­
Human shields on the battlefield could directly af­ man shields. Before the war, foreign peace activ­
fect tactical units from battalion to platoon and ists traveled from many nations to Iraq to act as hu­
present individual soldiers with specific targeting de­ man shields. Estimates indicate there were from 100
cisions. to 250 people from as many as 32 countries.4
Some debate has arisen whether voluntary human
Definition and Classification shields have become a form of quasi-combatant by
Human shields are noncombatants whose pres­ their active participation. Human Rights Watch
ence protects certain objects or areas from attack. called on both sides in the conflict to adhere to in­
The use of human shields is illegal under interna­ ternational humanitarian law and said, “Like work­
tional humanitarian law. Considering the political ers in munitions factories, civilians acting as human
ramifications of striking targets where human shields shields, whether voluntary or not, contribute indi­
are present, it might be beneficial to specify the types rectly to the war capability of the state. Their ac­
of human shields employed.1 tions do not pose a direct risk to opposing forces.
Proximity human shields. Proximity human Because they are not directly engaged in hostilities
shields, by their proximity to a legitimate military tar­ against an adversary, they retain their civilian im­
get, present such likelihood for collateral damage that munity from attack. They may not be targeted”
a military planner would have to consider their pres­ [emphasis added].5
ence before striking a target, as for an example, Iraqi Some scholars argue that voluntary human shields
air defenses located in an otherwise civilian neigh­ forfeit immunity. In calling for the protection of
borhood. Usually, proximity human shields have not civilians during the Iraqi conflict, a group of law
been coerced to participate or have not volunteered professors and attorneys wrote, “Death or injury to
to shield defenses. Sometimes, the enemy accom­ human shields, whether Iraqi or non-Iraqi, who vol­
plishes countertargeting by bringing the potential ob­ untarily take up positions at the site of legitimate
ject of the attack to areas where human shields are military objectives, does not constitute civilian col­
present. lateral damage, because those voluntary human
Involuntary human shields/hostages. A sec­ shields have assumed the risk of combat and, to
ond category of human shield is the involuntary use that extent, have compromised their noncombatant
of civilians, noncombatants, or hostages to shield a immunity.”6
legitimate military target, such as when Iraq threat­ The debate is likely moot for a number of rea­
ened to use foreign journalists as human shields dur­ sons. Iraq largely used voluntary human shields to
ing Operation Desert Storm.2 The International Com­ immunize targets that were part of its infrastructure.
mittee of the Red Cross defines hostages as “persons The United States and its coalition partners had little

26 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD

reason to destroy Iraq’s infrastructure, even targets as human shields against government forces. 12
with obvious dual-use potential, because of the rela- Israel charges that Palestinian militants routinely
tively certain outcome of the war and the subse- commingled with civilians to protect themselves from
quent responsibility to attack. When Pales-

Courtesy CNN
rebuild the infrastruc­ tinian gunmen posi­
ture.7 tioned themselves
Given the political among demonstrators
risk involved in doing and began firing on
so, the United States Israeli troops at
is unlikely to apply Qana, Israel’s re­
the principles of tar­ sponse had tragic re­
geting to preclude sults.13
considering the pres­ Chechen rebels
ence of voluntary hu­ used ethnic Russian
man shields. The civilians as human
news media attention shields during the bru­
given to peace activ­ tal war in Chechnya.
ists, their lack of mili­ Also, civil war in Co­
tary importance, and “guests,” unlucky enough to be in Iraq, at selected military and nuclear lombia between the
During Operation Desert Shield, Saddam Hussein placed foreign
U.S. policy makes sites. They were released only when it became clear to him that their National Liberation
this unlikely. 8 captivity might provoke, instead of prevent, Coalition action. Army and paramili­
tary forces support­
Examples of Human Shields ing the Colombian government has raged for a num­
Recently, human shields have been used for a va­ ber of years. Voluntary human shields from the
riety of purposes. Iraq, the most notable violator of London-based Peace Brigade were used to protect
international prohibitions against using human shields, government personnel under the threat of death from
used human shields during the Iran-Iraq war in the the rebels.14
1980s, Operation Desert Storm in 1991, allied bomb­ Some uses of human shields are not as instantly
ings in 1997, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.9 recognizable as the examples in Iraq or Kosovo. A
Bosnian Serbs used human shields strategically to classic example of the passive use of proximity hu­
countertarget NATO forces during Operation Allied man shields is the bloody Rwandan genocide in 1994,
Force and tactically against Muslim and Croat forces when refugees fled the civil war to Zaire. Remnants
to immunize themselves from indirect and direct fire. of the defeated extremist government and militia
The International Tribunal for the former Yugosla­ staged attacks into Rwanda from the camps and
via indicted Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for then sought refuge there using refugees as shields
violations of international humanitarian law around from counterattacks.15
and in Srebrenica in 1995. Zatko Aleksovski was In 1993, the United States attempted to apprehend
also convicted for using detainees as human shields warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid in Somalia in order
and sentenced to 7 years in prison.10 to restore order to the country. During a raid on a
Cambodia violated international humanitarian meeting of Habr Gidr leaders, elements of the 75th
law, including the use of human shields, during Ranger Regiment and Operational Detachment
the Vietnam war. Cambodian government forces Delta were forced to withdraw to the U.S. com­
used ethnic Vietnamese civilians as human shields pound at the Mogadishu airport. Somali gunmen in­
as they advanced on Vietnamese positions.11 U.S. terspersed among the crowd engaged U.S. forces,
forces are likely to encounter this tactical use of stepping out of large crowds of civilians, then retreat­
human shields in future low-intensity conflicts. En­ ing into the crowd, using the civilians as human
emy forces that cannot match U.S. forces’ fire­ shields. The gunmen also used hospitals and other
power, mobility, and technology will rely on U.S. civilian buildings as places from which to direct fire
reluctance to engage civilians except when abso­ at U.S. forces. This engagement underscores the
lutely necessary. unique challenges of military operations on urban ter­
Throughout the civil war in Sierra Leone during rain with an enemy that disregards international hu­
the 1990s, members of the Revolutionary United manitarian law or uses tactics to mitigate U.S. su­
Front routinely abducted children and used them periority.16

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 27


US Army

A Japanese man acting voluntarily as a human


shield during Operation Iraqi Freedom is told that
he is free to return home whenever he likes.

Applicable International tive human shields whether they are considered


Humanitarian Law proximity, involuntary, or voluntary human shields.
Various provisions of treaties and protocols under Article 51 notably does not excuse considering the
international humanitarian law prohibit the use of presence of human shields during the targeting pro­
human shields by a party to a conflict. Article 3 of cess. 21
Geneva Convention III, relative to the Treatment of Article 52(2), General Protection of Civilian Ob­
Prisoners of War, makes the taking of hostages ille­ jects, states that attacks shall be limited strictly to
gal.17 Article 23 specifically states that a prisoner military objectives and defines military objectives as
of war is not to be used “to render certain points or “those objects which by their nature, location, pur­
areas immune from military operations.”18 Article 28 pose or use make an effective contribution to mili­
of Geneva Convention IV, relative to the Protection tary action and whose total or partial destruction,
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, makes the prac­ capture or neutralization, in the circumstances rul­
tice of employing human shields illegal as a matter ing at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”22
of international humanitarian law, stating that “the Article 52(1) says, “Civilian objects are all objects
presence of a protected person may not be used to which are not military objectives as defined in para­
render certain points or areas immune from military graph 2.”23
operations.”19 Article 58, Precautions Against the Effects of At­
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, tacks, creates a duty against the passive creation of
Article 51(7)–Protection of the Civilian Population, proximity human shields: “Parties to a conflict, to the
which contains the key rule regarding human shields, extent feasible, shall remove the civilian population
states, “The presence or movements of the civilian and material under their control from the vicinity of
population or individual civilians shall not be used to military objectives, avoid locating military objectives
render certain points or areas immune from military within or proximate to densely populated areas, and
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military take other necessary precautions to safeguard the
objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede civilian population and civilian objects under their con­
military operations. The parties to the conflict shall trol against the dangers of military operations.”24
not direct the movement of the civilian population The United States is not a signatory to Additional
or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield mili­ Protocol I and, thus, not bound by it, but the United
tary objectives from attacks or to shield military ob­ States has accepted many of its provisions as cus­
jectives.”20 This provision applies to passive and ac­ tomary international law and, therefore, adheres to

28 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD

its norms.25 In 1987, U.S. State Department Deputy have serious consequences. The Rome Statute for
Legal Advisor Michael J. Matheson enumerated the ICC lists “extensive destruction and appropria­
many of the principles in Additional Protocol I that tion of property, not justified by military necessity and
the U.S. considers customary international law, in­ carried out unlawfully and wantonly” as a grave
cluding Articles 51 and 52.26 The 1998 Rome Stat­ breach.32
ute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has the Principle of discrimination (distinction). Com­
jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes, including “uti­ manders must distinguish civilians and civilian objects
lizing the presence of a civilian or other protected from combatants and military objects under the prin­
person to render certain points, areas, or military ciple of discrimination. Civilians enjoy immunity in­
forces immune from military objectives.”27 sofar as they “enjoy general protection against dan­
gers arising from military operations” and “shall not
Targeting Principles be the object of attack.”33 The principle of discrimi­
Given the modern nature of war and the transi­ nation is codified in Additional Protocol I, Articles
tion of most societies to an industrialized economy 51(4-5) and 57(2)(a)(i), which prohibit indiscriminate
with urban centers as their focal point, it seems likely attacks.34 Attacks must be directed at specific mili­
that legitimate military targets will be located near tary objectives and cannot “employ a method or
civilians or civilian objects simply out of efficiency means of combat which cannot be directed at a spe­
or because of urban growth. The Geneva Conven­ cific military objective.”35 Examples of indiscriminate
tions and Additional Protocol I still mandate a duty attacks are carpet bombing and Iraqi Scud launches
on a party to a conflict to remove civilians from such during Operation Desert Storm.
an area, but that might not be practical in all situa­ Principle of humanity. This principle, applicable
tions. Regardless, U.S. war planners confronted with to all targets, simply means parties are forbidden
the enemy’s use of involuntary or voluntary proxi­ from employing arms, projectiles, or materiel calcu­
mate human shields, remain under a duty to apply lated to cause unnecessary suffering. It most closely
basic targeting principles to ensure the minimal loss ties in with the principle of necessity in that it ex­
of civilian life.28 tends to unnecessary destruction of property.36
Targets protected by human shields might still be Principle of proportionality. The U.S. Army’s
attacked subject to the attacking party’s obligations definition of the principle of proportionality states that
under international law to minimize collateral dam­ the “anticipated loss of life and damage to property
age. Collateral damage usually occurs when attacks incidental to attacks must not be excessive in rela­
targeting military objectives cause civilian casualties tion to the concrete and direct military advantage
and damage to civilian objects. It often occurs when expected to be gained.”37 This definition is clearly
military targets are located in urban areas.29 based on Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b),
Principle of military necessity. Any attack must which states that when collateral damage is ex­
be justified by military necessity, which means at­ pected or unavoidable, it must be proportionate to
tacks should be limited to legitimate military targets the military advantages of striking the target.38
such as armed forces and civilian combatants; po­
sitions or installations occupied by armed forces, as Targeting Decisionmaking
well as objectives that are directly contested in battle; When a commander is presented with the deci­
and military installations such as barracks, war min­ sion to strike a target that is being illegally protected
istries, munitions or fuel dumps, storage yards for by human shields, the principles of targeting and in­
vehicles, airfields, rocket launch ramps, and naval ternational humanitarian law mandate a “balancing
bases. Legitimate but not purely military targets are test.” The commander must evaluate—
commonly referred to as dual-use targets and include The mission.
infrastructure, communications, and military-indus­ Time available.
trial, military research, and energy production facili­ Military advantage or purpose for destroying
ties.30 the target.
A more succinct definition of targeting is the use Intelligence available.
of “measures of regulated force not forbidden by in­ Assets available to attack the target.
ternational law which are indispensable for secur­ The political ramifications of striking the
ing the prompt submission of the enemy, with the target.
least possible expenditures of economic re­ All likely collateral damage, including the
sources.”31 Failure to adhere to this principle could human shields likely to be killed in the attack.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 29


Any alternative courses of action (COAs).39 This model might be useful to commanders at bri­
The standard of care a commander must employ gade and higher levels because the assets available
is a reasonable one, and he will be judged by what to them allow for destruction on a larger scale and,
is known at the time of the attack, not what is known concomitantly, greater effect on international hu­
in hindsight, and two questions will be asked regard­ manitarian law because their decisions lead to sys­
ing a commander’s decision to attack. Did the com­ tematic practices.41 The decisions regarding human
mander reasonably gather information to determine shields at these levels differ little from other target­
ing decisions except for pos­

Defense Intelligence Agency


sible media exposure before
the attack.
For units at battalion and
lower levels, however, en­
gagements involving enemy
use of human shields are
more likely to involve single-
event situations that resemble
those in Somalia in 1993. The
most important principle for
the individual soldier is the
right to self-defense. Com­
manders will issue rules of
engagement that will vary de­
pending on the strategic and
tactical situation, but the right
to self-defense remains a con­
stant. Self-defense, the cen­
tral theme of the standing
A pair of 5-mm antiaircraft guns atop a civilian apartment building in Baghdad, 1991.
rules of engagement (SROE)
whether the target was a military objective and that that the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced in 2000, is
the incidental damage would not be disproportion­ addressed to all levels, from national self-defense to
ate, and did the commander act reasonably based individual self-defense.42
40
on available information? The SROE lists two elements of self-defense: ne­
The commander and his staff assess and give a cessity and proportionality. Necessity exists when a
numerical value to individual criteria based on their hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorists ex­
relative significance. The end result is an empirical hibit hostile intent. Proportionality is force used to
analysis to assist in the final decision whether or not counter a hostile act, and demonstrated hostile in­
to attack the target. The higher the overall score, tent must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and
the more confident a commander could be in his magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat
decision to attack the target. The model accounts based on all facts known to the commander at the
for the principle of necessity in the mission and time. Should soldiers encounter a situation as in So­
alternative COA categories. The principle of pro­ malia where enemy forces were shooting from ci­
portionality is analyzed by the collateral dam­ vilian areas or using civilians as human shields, they
age estimate and target composition categories com­ must apply the same principles of international hu­
pared with the mission. The target composition manitarian law and attempt to minimize collateral
evaluation would also ensure that the commander damage.
and his staff take the principle of discrimination into We must inculcate the principles of targeting into
account. The principle of humanity would be con­ soldiers in a similar manner as other skills. Soldiers
sidered through discussion and assignment of assets can be trained to deal with human-shield tactics
available. Political considerations are weighted by the through advanced marksmanship training that em­
international and national support for the war with phasizes target detection, acquisition, discrimination,
the assumption that the higher the level of support and engagement.
for a war, the higher the level of tolerance for col­ The presence of human shields on the battlefield
lateral damage. is a manageable targeting situation for a com­

30 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD

mander; however, it is unique and challenging be­ bate on the quasi-combatant status of human shields,
cause of the media attention they receive and the the requirement to minimize collateral damage to pro­
political visibility involved. The illegal use of human tect civilians has not changed. Perhaps the remedy
shields will not cease because forces with little re­ for the use of human shields lies with the Interna­
sources have little incentive to comply with interna­ tional Criminal Court, which has the power to indict
tional humanitarian law. Although there is some de- and prosecute violators of international law. MR

NOTES
1. Kenneth Anderson, William C. Bradford, Lee A. Casey, Samuel Estreicher, Dou­ cials because the political ramifications of killing a Westerner might result in increased
glas Kmiec, Jerome Marcus, Madeline Morris, Jeremy A. Rabkin, David Rieff, David B. support for the Colombian Government. Apparently, this tactic has placed the human shields
Rivkin, Jr., Abraham D. Sofaer, Don Wallace, Jr., Paul Williams, and Edwin D. at equal risk because the National Liberation Army has declared them to be military tar­
Williamson, “A Public Call for International Attention to Legal Obligations of Defending gets.
Forces as Well as Attacking Forces to Protect Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Crimes of 15. See Robert Block, “Shields,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.
War Project, The War in Iraq, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/ org/thebook/shields.html>, accessed 14 April 2003. NATO’s decision to not strike legiti­
news_iraq3.html>, accessed 19 March 2003. The authors classify human shields as in­ mate military targets where UN hostages were present required a different type of tar­
voluntary and voluntary. I have broken these two categories into further subcategories. geting analysis than was used for analyzing possible U.S. attacks against targets in Iraq
See also Matthew Lippman, “Aerial Attack on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: that were being protected by voluntary human shields.
Technology and Terror from World War I to Afghanistan,” California Western Interna­ 16. See Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down (New York: Penguin Books 2000), 85, 106.
tional Law Journal 33 (2002): 1, 36; Additional Protocol I, Geneva Conventions, 12 Au­ 17. See Geneva Convention III, art. 3; Roberts and Guelff, 245.
gust 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51(7), 18. Geneva Convention III, art. 23, para. 1; Roberts, 254.
8 June 1977; Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 19. Geneva Convention IV, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 449; U.S. Department of Defense 12 August 1949; Roberts and Guelff, 312.
(DOD), Briefing on Human Shields in Iraq, on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/ 20. Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, art. 51(7), “Protection of the Civilian
t02262003_t0226humanasst.html>, accessed 26 February 2003. Population.”
2. See MAJ Ariane L. DeSaussure, “The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During 21. Additional Protocol I, art. 51(8); Roberts and Guelff, 449.
the Persian Gulf War: An Overview,” Air Force Law Review 37 (1994): 41, 52-53. Iraq 22. Additional Protocol I, art. 52(2); Roberts and Guelff, 450.
released the hostages under intense international pressure before hostilities began. 23. Additional Protocol I, art. 52(1); Roberts and Guelff, 449.
3. Sean Maguire, “Hostages,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar. 24. Additional Protocol I, art. 58(a-c); Roberts and Guelff, 453.
org/thebook/hostages.html>, accessed 19 April 2003. 25. See Lippman, “Aerial Attacks on Civilians,” 45.
4. See Scott Peterson, “‘Human shields’ in tug-of-war,” The Christian Science Moni­ 26. Michael J. Matheson, remarks on the U.S. Position on the Relation of Customary
tor, on-line at <www.csmonitor.com/2003/0317/p01s04-woiq.html>, accessed 17 March International Law to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Hu­
2003. man Rights Watch, The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
5. Human Rights Watch, Backgrounder, “International Humanitarian Law Issues in Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International
a Potential War in Iraq,” on-line at <www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm>, Law and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, The American
accessed 20 February 2003. University Journal of International Law and Policy 2, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 419-27.
6. Anderson and others; Peterson. Some volunteer human shields left Iraq before 27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), 17 July 1998;
the war began because they were being located near purely military targets. See Crimes Roberts and Guelff, 678.
of War Project, “In America’s Sights: Targeting Decisions in a War With Iraq,” on-line 28. See W. Hays Parks, “Responding to Rogue Regimes: From Smart Bombs to Smart
at <www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnews/iraq-print.html>, accessed 6 March 2003. Sanctions,” New England Law Review 36 (Summer 2002): 755, 761; Additional Proto­
8. Anderson. col I, art. 58(a); Roberts, 453. See also Krista Nelson, Iraq: Questions Regarding the
9. See Lippman, “Aerial Attacks on Civilians,” 45; James S. Robbins, “War Crimes: Laws of War, Center for Defense Information, on-line at <www.cdi.org/iraq/lawsofwar­
The Case of Iraq,” Fletcher Forum on World Affairs 18 (1994): 45, 49-50; Peterson; LT pr.cfm>, accessed 18 March 2003.
Robert A. Bailey, “Why Do States Violate the Law of War? A Comparison of Iraqi Viola­ 29. See Human Rights Watch. See also Anderson. At least one case from U.S. law
tions in Two Gulf Wars,” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 27 (Winter held a bank negligent when a bank employee fired shots at bank robbers and struck a
2000): 103, 122; Maguire. When Serb forces used captured UN peacekeepers as hu­ human shield. Horst Fischer, “Collateral Damage,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at
man shields in 1995, the UN declared that these persons were hostages. The Interna­ <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/collateral-damage.html>, accessed 19 April 2003.
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) disagreed with this assessment. Because 30. See Gaby Rado, “Legitimate Military Targets,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at
the UN had ordered air strikes and become involved in the Bosnian conflict, the ICRC <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/legit-military-target.html>, accessed 19 April 2003.
saw the hostages as prisoners of war. By either categorization, their use violated inter­ 31. Desaussure, 46, citing U.S. Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law: The
national humanitarian law. Unfortunately, the Serb tactic worked because NATO avoided Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Air
targets shielded by UN peacekeeper hostages. Force, 1976).
10. Tania Voon, “Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the 32. See Victoria Brittain, “Property: Wanton Destruction,” Crimes of War Project, on­
Kosovo Conflict,” American University International Law Review 16 (2001): 1,083, 1,110­ line at <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/property-wanton.html>, accessed 17 April 2003;
1,111. Voon addresses allegations of possible NATO war crimes in the bombing of a Rome Statute, art. 8, “War Crimes,” (2)(iv), on-line at <www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
Korisa Village on 14 May 1999 that killed approximately 87 civilians who might have been romefra.htm>, accessed 8 July 2004.
present at a legitimate military objective; Florence Hartmann, “Bosnia,” Crimes of War 33. See Heike Spieker, “Civilian Immunity,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at
Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/bosnia.html>, accessed 19 April 2003; <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/civilian-immunity.html>, accessed 14 April. See also Pro­
Mohamed S. Elewa, “Genocide at the Safe Area of Srebrenica: A Search for a New Strat­ tocol I, arts. 51-52.
egy for Protecting Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflict,” Michigan State Univer­ 34. Additional Protocol I, art. 51(4)(a) (b); Roberts and Guelff, 448-49.
sity-Detroit College of Law, Journal of International Law 10 (Fall 2001): 429-31; Lippman, 35. Ibid. See also Roy Gutman and Daoud Kuttab, “Indiscriminate Attack,” Crimes of
“Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility,” Tulsa Jour­ War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/indiscriminate-attack.html>, ac­
nal of Comparative & International Law 9 (Fall 2001): 75-76. cessed 19 April 2003.
11. Sydney Schanberg, “Cambodia,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimes 36. See COL Tia Johnson in LCDR William O’Brien, Operational Law Handbook 9
ofwar.org/thebook/cambodia.html>, accessed 14 April 2003. (Charlottesville, VA: International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate
12. Ismene Zarifis, “Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Sol­ General’s Legal Center and School, 2003).
diers,” Humanitarian Rights 9, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 18, 19. Although the Revolutionary 37. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington, DC:
United Front is arguably composed of unprivileged combatants, [forbidding] the use of GPO, 1956), para. 41, change 1.
human shields is considered to be customary international law, and there are clear vio­ 38. Protocol I, art. 51(5)(b); Roberts and Guelff, 449.
lations of Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions III, relative to the Treatment of Prison­ 39. See FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997),
ers of War, 12 August 1949, on-line at <www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>, accessed 1-152. The Army’s definition of targeting is “the process of selecting targets and match­
8 July 2004. Sierra Leone became a signatory to Additional Protocol II, Geneva Conven­ ing the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and
tions, 1949, on 8 June 1977. capabilities. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander’s mission, ob­
13. See also W. Michael Reisman, “The Lessons of Qana,” Yale Journal of Interna­ jectives, and capabilities at the commander’s disposal, to identify and nominate specific
tional Law 22 (1997): 381, 382; Mark Dennis, “Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Laws of War,” vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander’s purpose through de­
Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/expert/arabisrael-print.html>, laying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the en­
accessed 14 April 2003. There are charges that Israel employed snipers in an attempt emy.”
to discriminate between military and civilian targets, but there have been many civilian 40. See Peterson, 9, 10.
deaths as a result of this practice. 41. Targeting analysis might occur in some type of formulaic style, but at the battalion
14. See Barry Renfrew, “Chechnya,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimes level it is usually done with a sole emphasis on the tactical decision rather than consid­
ofwar.org/thebook/chechnya.html>, accessed 19 April 2003; Teun Voeten, “Barran­ eration of any strategic implications.
cabermaja: Murder Capital of the World,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at 42. See Johnson. The actual document is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff In­
<www.crimesofwar.org/colombia-mag/teun-print.html>, accessed August 2001. It was struction 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for U.S. Forces (portions
hoped that the presence of foreigners would limit attacks on Colombian government offi­ of this document are classified SECRET) (Washington, DC: GPO, 15 January 2000).

Captain Daniel P. Schoenekase, U.S. Army National Guard, is the Commander, Com­
pany D, 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, Illinois Army National Guard. He received a B.S.
from Truman State University and a J.D. from Saint Louis University School of Law. He
has served in various active-duty infantry assignments with the 1st Battalion, 27th In­
fantry, 25th Infantry Division, including Rifle Platoon Leader, Rifle Company Executive
Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company Executive Officer, Battalion Mainte­
nance Officer, and Battalion Logistics Officer.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 31


Engaging CivilCenters of

Gravity and Vulnerabilities

Major Richard K. Sele, U.S. Army

I N THE NEXT 15 to 20 years, global political


and military environments will require U.S. Army
doctrine to recognize the existence of a civil center
The military can engage all of these potential civil
COGs, but according to the CIA in Global Trends
2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Non-
of gravity (COG) and related civil vulnerabilities Government Experts, the factors that will most likely
throughout the spectrum of operations. The civil di­ shape world events are people (demographics); natu­
mension is now a primary planning factor in stabil­ ral resources and the environment; and national and
ity operations and support operations as well as of­ international governance.3 These elements will ei­
fensive and defensive operations. Integrating civil ther enhance international cooperation or become
COGs and related vulnerabilities into operational sources of future conflict.
planning focuses mission execution in appropriate Commanders can engage a civil COG or vulner­
terms and facilitates seamless transitions along the ability in a benign or destructive manner. For ex­
spectrum of conflict. ample, as part of the peacekeeping force in East
Integrating these concepts into doctrine will re­ Timor, the Portuguese military provided firefighting
quire a broader definition of the civil COG that is equipment to East Timor’s transitional government
more suitable for emerging doctrine. Civil military in an effort to improve its fire-response capability.
operations (CMOs) or civil affairs activities (CAAs) The Portuguese military, in this example, is a peace­
are the primary ways to engage the civil COG or keeping force engaged in nationbuilding, and the civil
related vulnerabilities. In fact, the Army should prob­ dimension is its priority of effort. Enhancing emer­
ably incorporate CMO and CAA into its list of battle­ gency services to stabilize public safety is a benign
field operating systems. engagement of the civil COG.
Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed During the transition from Serb to Muslim con­
Forces of the United States, defines COGs as trol of the Sarajevo suburb Grbavica in 1996, Serb
“those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from police deliberately set fires on the upper floors of
which a military force derives its freedom of action, apartment buildings beyond the reach of the Sarajevo
physical strength, or will to fight.”1 Military planners Fire Department’s fire trucks. The Serbs destruc­
target enemy COGs in combat and protect their tively engaged a civil COG—the national will—to
own COGs from the enemy. COGs sometimes accomplish the objective of forcing civilians to leave
change during a campaign as a result of an op­ Sarajevo. They were largely successful.
ponent’s actions or reactions. Joint doctrine states Failing to understand and appreciate an enemy’s
that military planners might engage related key ar­ civil COG during mission analysis can have deadly
eas of vulnerability while conducting the campaign.2 consequences. In Chechnya, the Russians underes-
Military planners determine the civil COG or
related vulnerabilities after considering such fac­
tors as—
Demographics. Support Stability
Economics. Operations Operations
Offensive/Defensive
Social constructs. Operations
Political processes.
Political leaders. Civil Center of Gravity Tactical Center of Gravity
Civil-military relationships.
Infrastructure nodes. < Full Spectrum >
Nonstate actors in the area of operations (AO). Related Civil Influences
Civil defense.
Public safety and public health capabilities. The COG and related civil influences
The environment. across the spectrum of operations.

32 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD
US Air Force

Refugees from
Rwanda’s bitter
civil war between
the Hutu and
Tutsi tribes.

timated the will of Chechen guerrillas to fight at all People (Demographics)


costs to protect their homeland.4 This national will, Dislocated civilian (DC) operations occur in a va­
rooted in ancient Chechen clan traditions, was a sig­ riety of circumstances. During a major theater war
nificant source of strength to the Chechens and was, (MTW), refugees, while not being a COG, are cer­
therefore, a civil COG. tainly a civil vulnerability. An opposing force can use
Doctrine for conventional military operations is refugees to disrupt operations by driving them into
often inappropriate for low-intensity conflicts, so it an avenue of approach or by infiltrating agents into
should be redefined. Military strategist Max the DC population to obtain intelligence information.
Manwaring maintains that the military should rede­ Unless the planner considers this civil vulnerability
fine the components of conflict to reflect its chang­ during the planning process, he will find it difficult
ing nature. The enemy is “no longer simply a mili­ to react to and exploit DC movement in the AO.
tary formation but . . . violence and the causes of On the other hand, DC operations might be the
violence itself.”5 According to Manwaring, power priority of effort, and the DC population might in fact
has military, economic, psychological, moral, infor­ be the civil COG, which was the case during Op­
mational, and societal elements causing the center eration Pacific Haven from 1996 to 1997 that in­
of gravity to now be more ambiguous. volved relocating Kurds from northern Iraq and Tur­
In the Naval War College Review article “Com­ key to Guam, where U.S. Government agencies
plex Civil Military Operations, A U.S. Military-Cen­ processed them for asylum before resettling them
tric Perspective,” John Gentry addresses the com­ in the United States. Forces from all services within
plex nature of CMOs and doctrine’s inability to the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) supported
integrate them into operational planning. “Planners,” this effort. Army civil affairs personnel from both
he writes, “try to fit local and international actors into the Active and Reserve Components—
the categories of either friendly or enemy forces, Helped establish DC camps.
which sometimes prevents aspects of the operation Supported U.S. Government agencies in the
from being seen in the proper light. Planning fails if asylum process.
it does not address key issues or addresses them in­ Developed cultural assimilation programs and
appropriately.”6 programs to teach English as a second language.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 33


Educated the joint task force commander about ence could be the military instrument of choice. Re­
DC cultural, religious, and dietary needs. servists with such experience are accustomed to
The COG was clearly the evacuee population, but conflict resolution and skilled in negotiation and ob­
related civil vulnerabilities affected Operation Pacific servation and in applying graduated levels of re­
Haven as well, including— sponse in threatening situations. In Somalia Opera­
Civilian government agencies. tions: Lessons Learned, military analyst Kenneth
Guam’s population. Allard says that, in engaging an urban population,
The media. “the ‘show the flag and kick ass’ approach was not
Political sensitivities. good enough. Instead, tact in applying ROE [rules
Economic effects on the community. of engagement] and weapons-confiscation policies
The source of strength, or civil COG, for those was essential, as was the use of water bottles and
responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was smiles, as basic negotiating tools.”10
the civilian population. Planners of the genocide re­ Access to, and influence over, civilian populations
cruited Hutu Burundi refugees and militias from the is a source of strength for insurgent movements and
lower economic classes. A combination of anti-Tutsi arguably terrorist networks. Appropriate levels of en­
propaganda and physical threats fueled their mas­ gagement with civilian populations before, during, and
sive participation in the slaughter. According to in­ after a conflict mitigate the effect of such threats.
terviews with survivors of the massacres, most of This is the case whether it is postwar Iraq and Af­
the 50,000 recruited killers were peasants just like ghanistan or hunting terrorists in Southeast Asia.
their victims.7 Any organization tasked to stop the Take for example a region not at war but faced
killing would have had to influence the civil COG— with low-level insurgency, piracy, and acts of terror­
the peasant population. ism. The combination of U.S. engagement and co­
Civil vulnerabilities are planning factors in urban operation with the host nation’s civilian law enforce­
operations, which have been increasingly a concern ment agencies and focused efforts to enhance its
for U.S. forces in the last several years. Demo­ emergency response capabilities is a powerful tool
graphic studies indicate an overwhelming trend to­ with which to prevent insurgents and terrorists from
ward urbanization. The UN’s Population Division disappearing into the populace. The host nation’s
forecasts that from 2000 to 2030, the world’s popu­ public safety infrastructure might be a civil COG with
lation will increase by 2 billion persons. Virtually all the civilian population and socioeconomic conditions
of that increase will occur in urban areas, and the being related civil vulnerabilities. Planning and ex­
world will become 60 percent urban by 2030.8 This ecuting appropriate preconflict or preevent opera­
trend will create more competition for jobs, more tions is critical to engaging these civil COGs.
stress on societal infrastructures, and greater strains As missions evolve, so do COGs. A stability op­
on governments’ abilities to provide basic city func­ eration or support operation could quickly transition
tions, which are often the preconditions for insur­ to an MTW if the wrong conditions are in place, but
gency. even when the COG becomes more conventional,
Future conflicts will likely be in urban environ­ the commander must continue to integrate related
ments, which reduce some of the U.S. military’s tac­ civil vulnerabilities in mission planning. Assessing
tical advantage. Military planners can regain some civil infrastructure and coordinating relationships with
of that lost advantage by exploiting the civil dimen­ civil authorities and agencies in the battlespace will
sion of the battlefield. In Somalia, civil affairs per­ hasten the transition to recovery operations after an
sonnel developed a rapport with clan elders, district MTW. Postwar CMOs with the civil COG can help
council chairpersons, and local police after repeated restore local government and simplify the exit strat­
contact with them. The clans gradually developed egy of U.S. forces.
trust in the civil affairs teams, enabling the teams to
defuse potential problems such as sniper attacks, Natural Resources and
work force disputes, and populace control issues.9 the Environment
Depending on the nature of the mission, U.S. Natural resources and the environment are
forces might engage a related civil vulnerability or transnational concerns. Competition for resources
even a civil COG. When public safety issues are the might be a future source of conflict in the Middle
source of conflict in an urban stability operation or East and North Africa as it was in the events lead­
support operation, a civil affairs public safety team ing up to Operations Desert Shield and Desert
of reservists with civilian law enforcement experi­ Storm. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 at least in part

34 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD
US Air Force

A Kurdish family receives immunization shots

during a joint humanitarian operation that evac­


uated over 2,100 Kurds from Northern Iraq

to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam in 1996.

The Kurds were resettled in the United States.

in response to Kuwait’s production and sale of oil bility operation with the potential to escalate into a
at prices low enough to adversely affect Iraq’s regional conflict. Although it is difficult to predict the
economy. Iraq exploited a resource-related civil vul­ level of NATO involvement, given concerns over the
nerability when it set fire to oil wells in Kuwait. The use of weapons of mass destruction and their pro­
U.S. Agency for International Development notes liferation in the Caucasus, the prospect for NATO
that struggles over land use and resources contrib­ and U.S. involvement is strong.13
ute to global pollution, resource degradation, and the According to RAND, the United States must
loss of biological diversity and can lead to conflicts engage the potential threat early by supporting
that threaten U.S. trade interests and that might draw UN and European Union initiatives to mitigate
the United States into regional conflicts.11 conflict in the Caspian Sea area.14 The United
One volatile regional dispute involving resources States should support programs that promote local
is occurring in oil-producing areas around the economic institutions, human rights, and democ­
Caspian Sea. A RAND study notes that Caspian oil racy and provide disaster preparedness, refugee
production is significant because it could reduce U.S. control, and counternarcotics trafficking assistance.
reliance on oil from the Middle East, enable former The U.S. military can support civilian agencies in any
Soviet states to become less dependent on Russia, of these tasks. These missions are stability opera­
and discourage Russian expansionism. 12 The tions and support operations with the priority of
Caspian states are struggling with unstable econo­ effort being to engage the civil COG and related
mies, income disparities, clan and tribal conflicts, po­ vulnerabilities.
litical repression, and a dearth of government insti­ A significant opportunity exists for peacetime en­
tutions. Events in the Caspian Sea region also affect gagement of the civil COG in the environmental field.
Turkey, China, Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Af­ Civil affairs units in USPACOM’s area of opera­
ghanistan. The region is at risk for conflict, and the tions currently conduct disaster preparedness
involvement of Turkish, Russian, or Chinese military mitigation assessments at the request of the Depart­
intervention could draw the United States into a sta­ ment of State (DOS) and country teams in select

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 35


US Air Force
Oil well fires rage outside Kuwait City in the
aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, March, 1991.
Iraqi forces set the wells on fire before they were
ousted from the region by coalition forces.

countries. Task-organized teams of military and ci­ lim, a development that could have derailed the
vilian agencies deploy to these countries to assess peace process. The U.S. military team assigned
their vulnerability to disasters and provide recom­ to support the IPTF recognized this and helped
mendations to remedy their deficiencies. This type the IPTF restructure the BPF so its ethnic com­
of mission clearly engages the civil COG, usually a position was more representative of the prewar
ministry or civil defense agency. state.15 In military terms, ensuring the police
would not become a source of conflict later was
National and International the decisive point in securing Sarajevo’s public
Governance safety. The source of strength, or civil COG, for
Governance is not just a system of government; the Bosnian Government was Muslim dominance
it also includes respect for human rights, civil-mili­ of the Bosnian police force. The U.S. strategy
tary relations, and tolerance of opposition movements was to engage that civil COG and its related vul­
or parties. Most issues related to governance are nerabilities by developing strong working relation­
probably best handled through diplomatic and politi­ ships with area UN elements, DOS representa­
cal channels, but in stability operations and support tives at IPTF, local government leaders, and the
operations, the military must address them whether population.
it wants to or not. Aside from postwar Iraq and Af­ East Timor. U.S. military operations in East
ghanistan, one of the clearest examples of direct Timor also engaged a civil COG. The UN admin­
military involvement in local political processes was istered East Timor under the auspices of the UN
U.S. military support to the UN International Police Transitional Authority-East Timor (UNTAET) un­
Task Force (IPTF) during the transitions of govern­ til the emerging state held elections and became
ment in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. capable of self-administration. U.S. military sup­
Bosnia. The IPTF had the critical task of en­ port was limited to relief and recovery operations,
suring a secure environment during the transitions but the United States engaged the civil COG, in this
from Serb to Muslim control of the local govern­ case the UNTAET, and for force protection and
ment and the creation of the Bosnian Federation practical reasons, coordinated relief efforts with UN
Police (BFP). Under the Bosnian Government’s Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) to ensure its military
transition plan, the ethnic composition of the po­ components were aware of U.S. intentions in the
lice force would have been overwhelmingly Mus­ area. The U.S. Support Group-East Timor estab­

36 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


CIVILIANS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD

lished an ongoing relationship with the PKF civil-mili­ appropriate courses of action, and parameters of suc­
tary affairs office and UNTAET infrastructure di­ cess, the COG is deliberately defined as a broad set
rectorates—the civil COG. of components.
African states. The African Crisis Response Ini­ Related civil vulnerabilities are civil influencers;
tiative is a training assistance program the United that is, peripheral nonmilitary components of the AO
States conducts to help African states become more that indirectly affect mission success. Civil influ­
self-sufficient in regional crises and during peace­ encers are integral to the mission, and the military
keeping operations. Army Special Operations planner must incorporate them into the plan early.
Forces have taken the lead for the U.S. military The influencers might first be peripheral to the mis­
contribution to the instruction package for sion and then become the COG as the mission
peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief missions. evolves. For example, the United States might in­
Other agencies involved include the UN High Com­ vade country X, where the COG is a paramilitary
missioner for Refugees, the International Commit­ organization. Country X’s police, a related civil in­
tee for the Red Cross, the U.S. Agency for Inter­ fluencer, are still in the AO, and do not present a
national Development, World Vision, and many threat, but they are ineffective against the paramili­
humanitarian agencies.16 The COG might differ de­ tary organization. While attacking the paramilitary or­
pending on the instructions. Some instruction is for ganization, the United States should also engage the
military units, such as Special Forces training in Mali police to develop a working relationship as early as
and Senegal. Certain aspects of the instruction, how­ possible. Once hostilities cease, the U.S. objective
ever, are intended for civilian and military leaders, might be to restore law and order to prevent loot­
as for example, when civil affairs personnel con­ ing. The COG then becomes the police force.
ducted classes on the military’s role in a democracy The United States must remain prepared to con­
for Uganda’s Ministry of Defense.17 duct operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.
Traditional doctrine appropriate for conventional op­
Redefining the Civil Dimension erations must evolve to reflect the new environment
The current operational environment requires a of conflict. Low-intensity conflicts, now stability op­
better definition of the civil COG and its related vul­ erations and support operations, have characterized
nerabilities. The civil COG is that broad set of non­ conflicts in the last decade, reflecting the uncertainty
military components in the AO that is the priority of and unpredictability of the geopolitical environment.
effort for the mission and has a direct effect on mis­ An increasingly large number of nonmilitary com­
sion success. The nature of the operation defines ponents of the battlefield exist in conventional op­
the COG, whether the COG is an organization or erations as well. Integrating the civil COG and re­
agency, a group of individuals, an institution, or an lated civil vulnerabilities or influencers into doctrine
infrastructure function. To give the operational plan­ will enhance the Army’s ability to plan both conven­
ner great flexibility in defining his mission, objectives, tional and unconventional operations. MR

NOTES
1. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Wash­ 10. Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington DC: National
ington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 November 2000). Defense University Press, January 1995).
2. Ibid. 11. U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID and the Environment, on-line
3. CIA, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Ex­ at <www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/>, accessed 16 June 2004.
perts (Washington, DC: GPO, December 2000). 12. Richard Sokolsky and Tanya Charlick-Pulley, NATO and Caspian Security: A Mis­
4. Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Com­ sion Too Far? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).
bat,” Parameters (Summer 1999). 13. Ibid.
5. Max G. Manwaring, “Thinking Again about Contemporary Conflict,” The Officer 14. Ibid.
(March 2001). 15. For more detailed information on this mission, see MAJ Richard K. Sele, “Civil
6. John A. Gentry, “Complex Civil-Military Operations: A U.S. Military-Centric Per­ Military Operations in the Post War Sarajevo Region,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law
spective,” Naval War College Review (Autumn 2000). Enforcement (Spring 1999).
7. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis (NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 247. 16. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, African Crisis Response Initiative (May
8. The UN Population Division Report, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1999 2000), on-line at <www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/acri/fact0500.htm>, accessed 16
Revision, on-line at <www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup1999/wup99.htm>, June 2004.
accessed 29 June 2004. 17. News Briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs),
9. CPT Phillip R. Parker, U.S. Army, Counterintelligence and Civil Affairs in Soma­ DOD Briefing on African Crisis Response Initiative, 29 July 1997, transcript on-line
lia and PSYOP and CA Contributions in Somalia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1997/t07311997_tacri.html>, accessed 16 June
Lessons Learned), available to Department of Defense (DOD) personnel on-line at <http:/ 2004.
/call.army.mil>.

Major Richard K. Sele, U.S. Army, is a civil affairs officer with the 351st Civil Affairs Com­
mand, Mountain View, California. He received a B.A. from the University of North Caro­
lina-Greensboro, an M.A. from Salve Regina University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College. His operational experience includes Operation Desert
Storm, Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Pacific Haven, Operation Stabilize, and Op­
eration Enduring Freedom. His article “Civil-Military Operations in the Post-War Sarajevo
Region” appeared in Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement (Spring 1999).

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 37


Blue Force Tracking

A Subset of Combat Identification

Colonel Kurt Dittmer, U.S. Air Force, Retired

A S THE ARMY transforms to lighter, leaner,


more lethal future combat systems, Army
leaders can draw significant parallels from air com­
(JBFSA) of airspace. Airborne fighters with an ad­
vanced interrogation capability can display a piece
of the air picture, although their field of regard lim­
bat when considering new combat identification its them. A fighter’s radar typically only looks in front
(CID) capabilities. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has of the aircraft, and its displays merely overlay the
had Blue Force Tracking (BFT) and Blue Force Situ­ transponder displays with raw radar returns. If an
ational Awareness (BFSA) for decades. Army IFF transponder system is inoperative, the interro­
Transformation planners should consider moving gation will come up negative, indicating “lack of
CID out of the oversight of the Joint Staff Command friendly” (LOF), and the radar return—the IFF—
and Control Functional Control Board to the Force with the wrong code goes into a category called “un­
Application Functional Control Board. known.”
With access to an enemy’s IFF and codes, the in­
Identification, Friend or Foe terrogation of a foe and a subsequent positive re­
The British developed an electronic identification sponse will indicate “presence of enemy” (POE).
device for aircraft during World War II to provide a This does not complete the “kill chain” for engage­
“friendly” reply to a ground radar’s interrogation.1 ment, however. The POE identification must be fur­
The device, appropriately named identification, friend ther assessed to determine whether the aircraft
or foe (IFF), was a combination transmitter and re­ present is a combatant with hostile intent (that is,
ceiver (called a transponder) that used a unique sig­ whether a MiG-29 identified is trying to destroy or
nal to identify the aircraft. Because only friendly or trying to defect).
enemy combatant aircraft were flying over England,
any aircraft not “squawking” was probably a Ger­ Combat Identification
man combatant (or a friendly combatant with mal­ JBFSA interrogation and friendly force response
functioning equipment). With a lethal envelope of has nothing to do with identifying enemy personnel
weapons in the visual arena, verification during en­ or equipment; it is only cooperative identification.
gagement could reduce the chance that a friendly JBFSA feeds the information into CID by providing
aircraft would be shot down. information on friendly troops, but it is really only a
In today’s air combat environment, airspace con­ subset of the overall capabilities required to achieve
tains more commercial and private aircraft, all true CID.
equipped with IFF transponders, which routinely The 2001 CID “Capstone Requirements Docu­
transit airspace or approach combat zones. Because ment” defines CID as “the process of attaining an
the range of air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons accurate characterization of detected objects in the
systems has expanded, lethal engagement envelopes joint battlespace to the extent that high confidence,
have also expanded well beyond visual ranges, and timely application of military options, and weapons
the need for identifying friend from foe has required resources can occur.”3 This definition points toward
more capabilities. the fundamental objective of destroying the enemy,
Transponder modes 1, 2, and 3 on all U.S. mili­ the end result of closing the links of a kill chain. The
tary aircraft provide aircraft, flight, or other group USAF talks about a kill chain as a set of capabili­
or class information. Mode 4, an encrypted code, ties to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess hos­
can only be interrogated by systems with current tile enemy aircraft.
cryptography codes.2 Information from these IFF In the kill-chain sequence, find encompasses
interrogators and transponders feeds the ground and locating friendlies, enemies, and neutrals. Fix is the
air surveillance radar picture for Joint BFSA process of characterizing potential targets with suf­

38 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

Private and commercial aircraft with


IFF transponders regularly approach
or pass through combat zones.

US Army
ficient fidelity for proper weaponeering and engage­ For typical air-to-air rules of engagement (ROE),
ment.4 Fixing includes the precise location as well the logic follows the steps in figure 1. In addition to
as CID of aircraft. Combat identification at this junc­ IFF modes 2, 3, 4, 5, and C (which provides altitude
ture starts with cooperative identification capabilities readouts), the pilot can assess LOF using coopera­
to determine cooperating friends. But CID requires tive identification systems like Link 16, interflight
entirely different capabilities to perform noncoopera­ datalinks, and JBFSA. Noncooperative identification
tive identification. Noncooperative identification ca­ capabilities include noncooperative target recognition,
pabilities must distinguish neutrals from enemies to electronic fingerprinting, a special air-to-air interro­
link up the rest of the kill chain. gator (mode X), and standard JBFSA surveillance
CID is not final as a pilot transitions from fix to capabilities characterizing the unknown radar con­
track to target. With sensors and platforms brought tact.
into the process, the goal continues to be to engage The ROE for the kill chain follows an orderly se­
enemy forces. At any time during this process the quence: determine LOF, determine presence of en­
kill chain can be broken to prevent fratricide. emy, and determine whether the enemy is a com­
The term “fratricide” has taken on disproportion­ batant with hostile intent. The last step, which is not
ate importance because it describes sensitive inci­ often addressed, must account for a clear avenue
dents. But, if the only goal is to prevent fratricide, of fire, or the wingman crossing between friendly
one can do so by never firing a shot. From the stand­ aircraft and the enemy could become a fratricide sta­
point of effectively destroying the enemy, fratricide tistic.
is but one metric by which to measure poor CID. Cooperative identification systems can detect LOF
Procuring capabilities to prevent fratricide is and hostile intent. Noncooperative systems can de­
necessary, but elaborate CID capabilities potentially tect the presence of an enemy or combatant as well
slow down the ability to engage and destroy the as hostile intent. Therefore BFT and JBFSA can
enemy. BFT and JBFSA do not complete the kill only contribute to a portion of CID, which enables
chain; they break the kill chain. With refresh rates completion of the kill chain. Interestingly, BFT and
potentially in the range of several minutes, waiting JBFSA can actually close the kill chain—but only
for a BFT interrogation could actually increase force for an adversary who has gained access to the
vulnerability. friendly aircraft’s information. That adversary has
LOF, POE, and hostile intent information.
Air-to-Air Engagements
The response from a BFT interrogation is either Air-to-Ground Engagements
“positive friendly” or “unknown.” Positive friendly Similar ROE exist for air-to-ground engagements,
breaks the kill chain. An unknown response requires but different technologies are required to complete
continuing the CID process; it does not mean the kill chain (figure 2). The cooperative identifica­
engage. tion systems currently available to provide the

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 39


ground picture to fighters are limited to aircraft and The worst case of fratricide in the Vietnam war
units equipped with situational awareness data links occurred during an artillery exchange when the
and Enhanced Position Location Reporting Systems. wrong powder charge caused long rounds to hit an­
Although Link 16 can share JBFSA with more play­ other U.S. artillery position. The retaliatory
ers, it requires mechanization to work for the fight­ counterbattery fire resulted in 90 Americans killed.6
ers. However, Link 16 to a Patriot would provide Good command and control (C2) could likely have
significant JBFSA for preventing ground-to-air frat­ prevented the incident. Fratricide from ground-to­
ricide right now. ground indirect fires did not occur during Operation
In this matrix, POE requires noncooperative iden­ Desert Storm; the press reported direct-fire fratri­
tification capabilities like electro-optical and infrared cide in ground-to-ground engagements only.
(EO/IR) sensor pods. EO/IR pods with infrared pan­ Can C2-level capabilities like JBFSA and BFT
els on blue vehicles break the kill chain but do not help prevent fratricide in direct-fire engagements?
necessarily contribute to JBFSA because they do not Rather than answer that question, we should ask
feed into the JBFSA ground picture unless the pilot whether C2-level capabilities will destroy the enemy
tags friendly contacts and maintains a fix on them more quickly because the systems that destroy the
for future flights in the battlespace. enemy more quickly allow us to win decisively.
Perhaps the acronym JBFSA is as misleading as
IFF is for friendly identification capabilities. JBFSA Force Application
must have defined requirements to fix and track en­ The Joint Staff is moving CID oversight from J­
emy and neutral contacts to provide situational 85 to Joint Forces Command under the C2 Func­
awareness. This will require additional throughput tional Control Board (FCB). I propose that this
and bandwidth, which is important for the future be­ move should only include a portion of CID capabili­
cause the Air Force, Navy, and Marines are invest­ ties. While JBFSA and BFT belong in the C2 FCB,
ing heavily in capabilities for noncooperative identi­ the overarching capabilities the warfighter needs for
fication on the Joint Strike Fighter. If successful, CID should reside in the Force Application FCB in
unknown contacts will be fixed by type as well as J-8. Force application is where technologies and sys­
specific vehicle identification such as “T-72” (a So­ tems that complete the kill chain need advocacy and
viet tank). Future combat forces will merely have expertise.
to connect to the Global Information Grid with the Force application cannot work in a vacuum be­
right protocols to pull CID information from the single cause the links to C2 must be two-way. If C2 sys­
integrated ground picture. With that type of joint Blue tems can capture identification, this information must
and Red Force situational awareness, closing the kill get to the shooter. Similarly, if a shooter captures
chain only requires the pilot to determine hostile identification without intent to engage, this Red Force
intent. Tracking information should also feed the single in­
tegrated operational picture for future engagements.
Ground-to-Ground Engagements Such connectivity can only happen if C2 and field
A figure depicting ground ROE would likely con­ artillery FCBs work in concert.
tain LOF, POE, hostile action/intent, and a clear CID is more than BFT and BFSA; it is a set of
avenue of fire. JBFSA can contribute to these systems with capabilities for cooperative identifica­
overarching CID capabilities, but even for ground­ tion and noncooperative identification. CID’s goal is
to-ground engagements, the Army will need coop­ not to prevent fratricide; it is to win decisively. MR
erative and noncooperative identification capabilities
to complete the kill chain. JBFSA investments must NOTES
1. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)-Information Systems
be balanced by similar investments for finding and Command (ISC) 537, Who Goes There: Friend or Foe? (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov­
ernment Printing Office [GPO], June 1993), 18.
destroying the enemy. The faster the kill chain is 2. Mode 5 will soon replace the current encryption system and is the future of mili­
completed, the faster the objectives of Field Manual tary IFF. Mode S will be the future for civilian aircraft in the Global Air Traffic Manage­
ment System and will transmit information such as aircraft heading, speed, rate of de­
1, The Army, can be met: scent, and so forth.
3. Joint Forces Command, “CID Capstone Requirements Document,” Joint Staff,
Win on the offense. Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 19 March 2001.
4. Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Global Persistent Attack Risk Assessment Team
Defend well, but win on the offense. Capability Review and Risk Assessment, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Fall 2003.
5. U.S. Army Field Manual 1, The Army (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001).
Initiate combat on our terms—at a time, in a 6. OTA-ISC 537, 11.

place, and with a method of our own choosing, not


the adversary’s. Colonel Kurt Dittmer, U.S. Air Force, Retired, was at
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Combat Force Capability
Gain the initiative, retain it for as long as pos­ Requirements. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Air Force
sible, and never surrender it unless forced to. Academy and an M.A. from American Military University.
Build momentum quickly. He has served in F-16 operational units flying combat in
Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Fox.
Win decisively.5

40 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


Winning the
Warof the Flea
LessonsfromGuerrillaWarfare

Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army

Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the With the right mindset and with a broader, deeper
flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s dis­ knowledge of lessons from previous successes, the
advantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiq­ war against the flea can be won. The Army has suc­
uitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. cessfully fought counterguerrilla wars. However, the
If the war continues long enough—this is the contradiction emanating from America’s unsuccessful
theory—the dog succumbs to exhaustion and expedition in Vietnam is that, because the experi­
anemia without ever having found anything on ence was perceived as anathema to the U.S.
which to close its jaws or to rake with its claws. military’s core culture, hard lessons learned there
—Robert Taber1 about fighting guerrillas were not preserved or rooted
in the Army’s institutional memory. The U.S. mili­

C OUNTERGUERRILLA warfare, or the


“war against the flea,” is more difficult than
operations against enemies who fight according to
tary culture’s efforts to exorcise the specter of Viet­
nam, epitomized by the shibboleth “No More
Vietnams,” also precluded the Army, as an institu­
the conventional paradigm. America’s enemies in the tion, from actually learning from those lessons.
Global War on Terrorism, including those connected The Army’s intellectual renaissance after Vietnam
to “the base” (al-Qaeda), are fighting the war of the has focused almost exclusively on the culturally pre­
flea in Iraq and Afghanistan. Employing terror to at­ ferred, conventional big-war paradigm.2 Army doc­
tack the United States at home and abroad, they trine conceals the term “counterinsurgency” under
strive to disrupt coalition efforts by using guerrilla the innocuous categories of stability operations and
tactics and bombings to protract the war in Iraq and foreign internal defense. Many lessons exist in the
elsewhere and to erode America’s will to persevere. U.S. military’s historical experience with small wars,
The war on al-Qaeda and its surrogates can be but the lessons from Vietnam are the most volumi­
viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the nous—and the least read. The end of the Cold War
United States and its coalition partners endeavor to has made it improbable that conventional or sym­
isolate and eradicate the base and other networked metric war will ever again be the norm, and the
terrorist groups who seek sanctuary, support, and Army is making genuine efforts to transform its cul­
recruits in ungoverned or poorly governed areas ture and mindset. Senior civilian and military lead­
where the humiliated and the have-nots struggle to ers of the Army and the Office of the Secretary of
survive. The U.S. military’s preference for the big- Defense realized a change in military culture was a
war paradigm has heretofore impeded the Army precondition for innovative approaches to a more
from seriously studying counterinsurgency opera­ complex security landscape in which adversaries
tions. As a result, the Army has failed to incorpo­ adopt unorthodox strategies and tactics to undermine
rate many lessons from successful counterin­ U.S. technological superiority in an orthodox or
surgency operations. Because countering insurgents conventional war.
and terrorists remains a central mission of the U.S. Military culture is the sum total of embedded
military for the foreseeable future, it is better to in­ beliefs and attitudes within a military organization
corporate lessons learned than to relearn lessons dur­ that shape that organization’s preference on when
ing combat. and how military force should be used. Cultural

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 41


Indians encamped outside a frontier fort.
(Inset) Major General George Crook.
US Army

propensities can block innovation in ways of war­ unhinge them and to sap their will. This technique
fare that are outside perceived central or core emerged in one form or another in the Philippines,
roles. A preference for a big-war paradigm has during the Banana Wars, and during the Vietnam
hitherto been an obstacle to learning how to fight war.
guerrillas.3 The Army must analyze U.S. involve­ Andrew J. Birtle’s U.S. Army Counterinsur­
ment in, and the nature of, small wars, insurgen­ gency and Contingency Operations Doctrine
cies, and counterinsurgencies. Without some sense 1860-1941, one of the better books on the Army’s
of historical continuity, American soldiers will have role in the Indian wars, describes Captain Randolph
to relearn the lessons of history each time they face B. Marcy’s The Prairie Traveler: A Handbook
a new small war.4 for Overland Expeditions as “perhaps the single
most important work on the conduct of frontier
The Indian Wars and expeditions published under the aegis of the War
Beating Guerrillas Department.”5 In essence, Marcy’s book was a
The Indian wars of the 19th century provide some how-to manual for packing, traveling, tracking, and
counterinsurgency lessons and demonstrate that the bivouacking on the plains and a primer on fighting
guiding principles for fighting insurgents can endure the Indians. In formulating pacification principles,
the test of time. Without codified doctrine and little Marcy looked at his own experiences on the fron­
institutional memory for fighting guerrillas, the late­ tier as well as Turkish and French experiences
19th century Army had to adapt to Indian tactics on pacifying North Africa. He arrived at the follow­
the fly. A loose body of principles for fighting an un­ ing conclusions:
orthodox enemy emerged from the Indian wars, in­ Over-dispersion strips the counterinsurgent
cluding the following: force of initiative, increases its vulnerability, and saps
Ensure close civil-military coordination of the its morale.
pacification effort. Mobility is imperative. (Mounting infantry on
Provide firm but fair paternalistic governance. mules was one way of increasing mobility during
Reform the economic and educational spheres. that era.)
Good treatment of prisoners, attention to Indian Surprise is paramount. Employing mobile
grievances, and avoiding killing women and children mounted forces at night to surprise the enemy at
(a lesson learned by trial and error) were also re­ dawn was the best way to counter the elusive Indi­
garded as fundamental to any long-term solution. ans. The Prairie Traveler conveys one principal
The Army’s most skilled Indian fighter, General message that is still relevant: soldiers must possess
George Crook, developed the tactic of inserting small the self-reliance, the individuality, and the rapid
teams from friendly Apache tribes into insurgent mobility of the insurgent, along with conventional
Apache groups to neutralize and psychologically military discipline.6

42 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

US Army

Filipino scouts and their officer during the Philippine Insurrection.


(Inset) Brigadier General John J. Pershing.

The Philippine Insurgency The U.S. military enhanced the legitimacy of the
During the Philippine Insurgency from 1899 to Filipino regime it supported by allowing former in­
1902, the U.S. military achieved victory and estab­ surgents to organize antiregime political parties. In
lished the foundation for an amicable future between an award-winning study, Max Boot ascribes U.S.
the United States and the Philippines. Guerrilla war success in the Philippines to a measured application
scholar Anthony James Joes notes, “There were no of incentives and disincentives: the U.S. military used
screaming jets accidentally bombing helpless villages, aggressive patrolling and force to pursue and crush
no B-52s, no napalm, no artillery barrages, no col­ insurgents, but it treated captured rebels well and
lateral damage. Instead, the Americans conducted generated goodwill among the population by running
a decentralized war of small mobile units armed schools and hospitals and improving sanitation.8
mainly with rifles and aided by native Filipinos, hunt­ Brigadier General John J. Pershing returned to the
ing guerrillas who were increasingly isolated both by Philippines to serve as military governor of the Moro
the indifference or hostility of much of the popula­ Province from 1909 to 1913. To pacify the Moros,
tion and by the concentration of scattered peasant he applied the lessons he had learned as a captain
groups into larger settlements.”7 during the Philippine Insurrection. He established a
The U.S. military learned to— Philippine constabulary of loyal indigenous troops and
Avoid big-unit search-and-destroy missions did not attempt to apply military force by itself. He
because they were counterproductive in a coun­ “felt that an understanding of Moro customs and
terinsurgency context. habits was essential in successfully dealing with
Maximize the use of indigenous scouts and them, and he went to extraordinary lengths to un­
paramilitary forces to increase and sustain decen­ derstand Moro society and culture.”9
tralized patrolling. Pershing also comprehended the need to have
Mobilize popular support by focusing on the im­ U.S. forces involved at the grassroots level. He un­
provement of hospitals, schools, and infrastructure. derstood the sociopolitical aspects, and he realized

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 43


NVA defectors read one of the 15 million safe-conduct passes
dropped over areas where North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
forces were operating. (Inset) General Creighton Abrams.
tionship with the mass of the population.”13
The manual urges U.S. forces to employ as many
indigenous troops as practical early on to restore law
and order and stresses the importance of focusing
on the social, economic, and political development
of the people more than on material destruction. The
manual also underscores the importance of aggres­
sive patrolling, population security, and denial of
sanctuary to the insurgents. An overarching principle,
though, is not to fight small wars with big-war meth­
ods. The goal is to gain results
with the least application of force
and minimum loss of civilian (non­
combatant) life.
Lessons from Vietnam
When most Americans reflect
on Vietnam, they probably think
of General William C. West­
moreland, the Americanization of
the war, large-scale search-and­
destroy missions, and battles of
US Army

attrition. There was another war, however, a war


of counterinsurgency and pacification in which many
military goals sometimes had to be subordinated to Special Forces (SF), Marines, and other advisers
them. Boot says, “He scattered small detachments employed small-war methods with some degree
of soldiers throughout the interior, to guarantee of success.
peaceful existence of those tribes that wanted to When General Creighton Abrams became the
raise hemp, produce timber, or farm.”10 During commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Pershing’s first tour in the Philippines as a captain, Vietnam (MACV) in 1968, he put an end to the two-
he was allowed inside the Forbidden Kingdom, and war approach by adopting a one-war focus on paci­
the Moros made him a Moro Datu, an honor not fication, although it was too late by then to recover
granted to any other white man.11 the political support for the war squandered during
the Westmoreland years. Still, Abrams’ unified strat­
Latin America and the Caribbean egy to clear and hold the countryside by pacifying
While the Army has had to relearn how to fight and securing the population met with much success.
every new insurgency, the U.S. Marine Corps cap­ Abrams based his approach on A Program for the
tured its guerrilla warfare experiences and distilled Pacification and Long-Term Development of
them in its 1940 Small Wars Manual.12 The les­ South Vietnam, a study prepared by the Army staff
sons Marines learned leading Nicaragua Guardia in 1966.14 The Special Forces’ experiences in
Nacional patrols against Augusto “Cesar” Sandino’s organizing Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
guerrillas might well have served as the foundation (CIDG), the Combined Action Program (CAP), and
for the Marines’ counterinsurgency operations in Abrams’ expansion of the Civil Operations and
Vietnam. Revolutionary (later Rural) Development and Sup­
From experience in Haiti, the Dominican Repub­ port (CORDS) pacification effort offer valuable
lic, and Nicaragua during the first part of the 20th lessons for current and future counterinsurgency
century, the Marines learned that, unlike conventional operations.
war, a small war presents no defined or linear battle For much of the Vietnam war, the 5th SF Group
area or theater of operations. The manual maintains trained and led CIDG mobile strike forces and re­
that delay in the use of force might be interpreted connaissance companies manned by indigenous eth­
as weakness, but the brutal use of force is not ap­ nic minority tribes from mountain and border regions.
propriate either: “In small wars, tolerance, sympa­ These forces conducted small-unit reconnaissance
thy, and kindness should be the keynote to our rela­ patrols and defended their home bases in the bor­

44 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

der areas from Viet Cong (VC) and regular North leadership in an economy of force while maximiz­
Vietnamese Army (NVA) units. ing the use of indigenous troops. A modest invest­
From 1966 to 1967, U.S. field commanders in­ ment of U.S. forces at the village level yielded ma­
creasingly employed SF-led units in long-range re­ jor improvements in local security and intelligence.16
connaissance missions or as economy-of-force se­ Even though CORDS was integrated under
curity elements for regular units. Other CIDG-type MACV in 1967, Abrams and William Colby, Direc­
forces, called mobile guerrilla forces, raided enemy tor of CORDS, expanded the program and invested
base areas and employed hit-and-run guerrilla tac­ it with good people and resources. Under Abrams’
tics against regular enemy units. The SF also re­ one-war approach to Vietnam, CORDS provided
cruited extensively among Nung tribes for the Delta, oversight of the pacification effort. After 1968,
Sigma, and Omega units, which were SF-led recon­ Abrams and Colby made CORDS and pacification
naissance and reaction forces. the principal effort. A rejuvenated civil and rural de­
The CIDG program made a significant contribu­ velopment program provided increased support, ad­
tion to the war effort. The approximately 2,500 sol­ visers, and fundings to police and territorial forces
diers assigned to the 5th SF Group essentially raised (regional forces and popular forces). The new em­
and led an army of 50,000 tribal fighters to operate phasis on rural development allowed military and ci­
in some of the most difficult and dangerous terrain vilian advisers from the U.S. Agency for Interna­
in Vietnam. CIDG patrols of border infiltration ar­ tional Development to work better with their
eas provided reliable tactical intelligence, and the Vietnamese counterparts at the provincial and vil­
CIDG secured populations in areas that might have lage levels to improve local security and develop in­
been otherwise conceded to the enemy.15 frastructure.
The Marine Corps’ CAP was another initiative Eliminating the VC infrastructure was critical to
that significantly improved the U.S. military’s capac­ pacification. Colby’s approach—the Accelerated
ity to secure the population and to acquire better tac­ Pacification Campaign—included the Phoenix
tical intelligence. Under CAP, a Marine rifle squad (Phuong Hoang) program to neutralize VC infra­
assisted a platoon of local indigenous forces. This structure. Although the program received some bad
combined Marine and indigenous platoon trained, press, its use of former VC and indigenous Provi­
patrolled, defended, and lived together in the sional Reconnaissance Units to root out the enemy’s
platoon’s village. CAP’s missions were to— secret underground network was quite effective.
Destroy VC infrastructure within the village or The CORDS Accelerated Pacification Campaign fo­
hamlet area of responsibility. cused on territorial security, neutralizing VC infra­
Provide public security and help maintain law structure, and supporting self-defense and self-gov­
and order. ernment at the local level.17
Protect friendly infrastructure. Begun in November 1968, the Accelerated Paci­
Protect bases and communications within the fication Campaign helped the Government of Viet­
villages and hamlets. nam (GVN) control most of the countryside by late
Organize indigenous intelligence nets. 1970. The “other war”—pacification—had been
Participate in civic action and conduct propa­ practically won. The four million members of the
ganda against the VC. People’s Self-Defense Force, armed with some
Civic action played an important role in efforts 600,000 weapons, were examples of the population’s
to destroy the VC because it brought important commitment to the GVN. Regional and popular
intelligence about enemy activity from the local pop­ forces also experienced significant improvements.
ulation. Because CAP protected the villagers from Under CORDS, these forces provided close-in se­
reprisals, it was ideal for acquiring intelligence curity for the rural population. Although imperfect
from locals. The Marines’ focus on pacifying highly and quantitative, MACV’s Hamlet Evaluation Sys­
populated areas prevented guerrillas from coerc­ tem showed that between 1969 and 1970 CORDS
ing the local population into providing rice, intel­ efforts contributed to the pacification of 2,600 ham­
ligence, and sanctuary. The Marines would clear lets (three million people).
and hold a village in this way and then expand the Other more practical measures of the Acceler­
secured area. ated Pacification Campaign’s success were a reduc­
CAP units accounted for 7.6 percent of the en­ tion in VC extortion and recruitment in South Viet­
emy killed while representing only 1.5 percent of the nam and a decrease in food provisions taken from
Marines in Vietnam. CAP employed U.S. troops and the villagers. To be fair, however, other factors also

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 45


contributed to GVN control of the countryside. The fective. In some instances the effects of CAPs were
Tet Offensive in January 1968 and Mini-Tet in May transitory at best because the villagers became de­
1968 resulted in devastating losses to VC forces in pendent on them for security. In other cases, espe­
the south, allowing MACV/CORDS to intensify paci­ cially before Abrams emphasized training popular
fication. Moreover, the enemy’s brutal methods (in­ forces, poor equipment and training made them mis­
cluding mass murder in Hue) during Tet shocked erably incapable of defending the villages without the
South Vietnam’s civilian population and created a Marines. What’s more, until 1967, CORDS was not
willingness to accept more aggressive conscription. integrated under MACV, which seriously undermined
Ho Chi Minh’s death in September 1969 might have any prospect of actually achieving unity of effort and
also had an effect on the quality and direction of purpose. Abrams’ influence resolved this by allow­
NVA leadership.18 ing MACV to oversee CORDS as well as regular
CIDG, CAP, and CORDS expanded the quality military formations.20
and quantity of the forces available to conduct coun­
terinsurgency, improved small-unit patrolling, and Staving Off Defeat
consequently improved the content, scope, and qual­ Today, the Army is prosecuting three coun­
ity of intelligence. One can only speculate how the terinsurgencies and learning to adapt to insurgency
war might have gone if CAP and CIDG had been and counterinsurgency in contact. This is a genu­
integrated under MACV and CORDS in 1964, with inely compelling reason to expand the Army’s depth
Abrams and Colby in the lead. The lessons of these and breadth of knowledge about counterinsur­
programs are relevant today. Improving the quan­ gency operations. The U.S. military, particularly
tity and capabilities of indigenous forces; establish­ the Army, must develop a culture that emphasizes
ing an integrated and unified civil-military approach; stability operations and counterinsurgency among
and increasing the security of the population con­ its core missions.
tinue to be central goals in Afghanistan and Iraq.19 The global war against the flea will be protracted,
These Vietnam-era programs were not without but it will be won. The rule of law, democracy, and
flaws, however. Two persistent problems plagued civilization will prevail over chaos, theocracy, and
the CIDG program. Hostility between the South barbarism. As Mao Tse Tung said, “Although guer­
Vietnamese and ethnic minority groups comprising rilla operations are the cosmic trap of military strat­
the CIDG strike forces impeded U.S. efforts to have egy, the muck, the quicksand in which a technologi­
Republic of Vietnam Special Forces take over the cally superior military machine bogs down in
program. As a result, the 5th SF Group failed to time-consuming futility, they cannot in and of them­
develop an effective counterpart organization. selves win wars. Like mud, they can stave off de­
Even the Marines’ CAPs were not completely ef­ feat, but, like mud, they cannot bring victory.”21 MR

NOTES
1. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice 12. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government
(New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1965), 27-28. Printing Office, 1940), 1-1-1-31; USMC Combat Development Command, Small Wars
2. See Robert M. Cassidy, “Prophets or Praetorians: The Uptonian Paradox and the (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marines Corps, 2004 Draft), iii-iv; Boot, “A Century of Small Wars
Powell Corollary,” Parameters (Autumn 2003): 132-33. Shows They Can Be Won,” New York Times Week in Review, 6 July 2003.
3. For a short discussion on military culture and big-war preferences, see Cassidy, 13. Ibid.
Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of 14. U.S. Department of the Army, A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term De­
Asymmetric Conflict (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 8, 54­ velopment of South Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1966), 1-9;
60. Lewis Sorley, A Better War (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1999), 10-125.
4. Sam C. Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and 15. Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years (Washington, DC: U.S.
Lessons for the Future (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 245. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 196-207.
5. Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doc­ 16. Frank Pelli, “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Marines in Vietnam,” unpub­
trine 1860-1941 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 55-92; lished paper, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1990, 13-16; Brooks
CPT Randolph B. Marcy, The Prairie Traveler: A Handbook in Overland Expeditions R. Brewington, “Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement,” unpub­
(Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, January 1988). lished paper, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1996, 13-19.
6. Birtle, 64-65. 17. Sorley, 22-23, 64-67.
7. Anthony James Joes, America and Guerrilla Warfare (Lexington: University Press 18. Ibid., 64-67, 72-73, and 217-24.
of Kentucky, 2000), 120-23. 19. Ibid., 1.
8. Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power 20. Clarke, 207; Keith F. Kopets, “The Combined Action Program: Vietnam,” Military
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), 126. Review (July-August 2002): 78-79.
9. Sarkesian, 178-180. 21. Mao Tse-Tung, cited in E.L. Katzenbach, Jr., “Time, Space, and Will: The Politi­
10. Ibid. cal-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung” in The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, ed. T.N.
11. Ibid. Greene (New York: Praeger, 1962), 17.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, is a member of the U.S. Army Eu­
rope Commanding General’s Initiatives Group, Heidelberg, Germany. He received a B.A.
from Fitchburg State College, an M.A. from Boston University, and an M.A.L.D. and a
Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has served in various com­
mand and staff positions in the continental United States and Germany. His article “Re­
naissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight” appeared in the July-August 2003
issue of Military Review.

46 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


Winning the
Nationbuilding War
Staff Sergeant George E. Anderson III, U.S. Army National Guard, Ph.D.

W HILE I WAS in Samac, Bosnia, an Assis­


tant Secretary of Defense visited my unit—
A Troop, 1st Squadron, 104th Cavalry, Pennsylva­
ment made by many of those critical of the nu­
merous peacekeeping operations throughout the
globe is that it is not.
nia Army National Guard. One of the things he said The military’s role in peacekeeping is to maintain
was, “We have gotten pretty good at killing people.” a safe, secure environment. Little else is asked.
In retrospect, this was an understatement. As Nationbuilding is seen as a separate, distinct diplo­
Saddam Hussein found out, the United States can matic enterprise. Given the current structure and
reach almost any corner of the world with real manning of the military force, this seems like a ra­
power. Unfortunately, it does not seem to be quite tional division of responsibility.
as efficient at nationbuilding. Unfortunately, as former U.S. Congressman Tho­
Construction is more difficult than destruction, and mas P. (Tip) O’Neill once said, “All politics is local!”
nationbuilding operations can be long, complex, and Most human interactions during nationbuilding occur
expensive. America’s mission in Bosnia has lasted between members of the Armed Forces and the lo­
several years, and no U.S. official has yet mentioned cal community. Few Iraqis have encountered Coa­
terminating operations. U.S. forces also are still in lition Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul
Afghanistan, and U.S. forces in Iraq have suffered Bremmer, but many have had interactions with U.S.
more casualties since the end of major military op­ soldiers. The millions of interactions Iraqis have with
erations than during initial operations. the Armed Forces create lasting impressions about
As a Vietnam-era veteran, I doubt the United Americans, and the impressions either support or di­
States has the financial capability or the political will minish U.S. efforts.
to occupy large segments of the world semiper­ The ultimate goal of nationbuilding is to establish
manently. Yet, the potential costs of not engaging in a self-sustaining country friendly to the United
nationbuilding might be horrific. How can we shorten States. To do so, the U.S. military must use all its
the commitment and reduce the cost of nationbuild­ assets effectively. The United States should struc­
ing? How can the U.S. military be as efficient at ture, man, and employ forces to ensure the peace
nationbuilding as it is at killing people? The answer and optimize nationbuilding through quality inter­
is to have the right tools, the right people, and the actions with civilian populations. Soldiers must go
right processes for the job at hand. beyond being peacekeepers and become na­
tionbuilders.
The Right Process Up, not down. Ford’s assembly line and the
Before World War II, the Germans reorganized Army’s rigid top-down command structure are good
their army in a new way and, in doing so, changed examples of the top-down approach to management
the nature of war. The blitzkrieg was highly effi­ that dominated the latter half of the 19th century and
cient and effective. Today, little doubt exists that all of the 20th century. All organizational actions,
the U.S. Army has the structure and processes in down to the most elemental movements of the
place for victory in any conventional conflict, workforce, were controlled from the top. In com­
but when the contest has less to do with destruc­ bat operations, this type of management philosophy
tive power than with winning hearts and minds, has proven highly effective.
is the Army organized and manned in the most Unfortunately, the top-down system has been less
efficient, effective manner to win? The assess­ successful in nationbuilding. Top-down management

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 47


author photo

During SFOR 12, Apache 12 patrolled the Bosnian city of Samac.

Principally Serb, Samac had a reputation for being anti-American.

encourages exaggerating good news and minimiz­ Did the villager blame me personally? No, but he
ing bad news. Run that tendency through several concluded that Americans had little interest in his
layers of command and the chance is slim of higher concerns. The United States missed a chance to
headquarters understanding what is important in any make a friend and an opportunity to shorten our
exchange between a nationbuilder and a civilian. stay in Bosnia.
A Vietnam war story provides one example of fail­ Bottom-up success. The weapons harvest is a
ure of the top-down command structure. The com­ semiannual event in Bosnia in which the Stabiliza­
mand decided that building local schools would be a tion Force (SFOR) attempts to remove military-
good hearts and minds thing to do. Military forces grade weapons from the civilian population. Differ­
went into local villages and built schools. Ceremo­ ent units take different approaches. My unit took a
nies were conducted to celebrate the wonderful ad­ positive, supporting approach. The local authorities
vance the new schools represented. Pictures were were in charge. We would help. They set the dates
taken. Speeches were made. Officers congratulated and locations for action and coordinated the effort.
each other. And, shortly thereafter, the Vietnamese We did not threaten or intimidate the civilian popu­
burned the schools down. lace, and by taking this approach, we secured sev­
The decision to construct schools was a top-down eral antitank weapons; hundreds of automatic weap­
decision. No one asked the villagers what they ons, grenades, and rocket-propelled grenades; and
thought about it. The villagers were not involved hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition.
in the decision or the construction. As a result, they Other SFOR contingents took a top-down ap­
saw the school not as a benefit, but as a tool of proach. With minimal coordination with local authori­
repression. ties, SFOR soldiers searched local homes with or
During my tour of duty in Bosnia, my unit met an without owners’ consent. One unit that had taken
older gentleman who asked us for help. We went this intrusive approach confiscated only an old pis­
to his home where he pointed out a man-size pit in tol and one hand grenade after several weeks of
his back yard, which he believed was an unmarked work. The skills required to conduct a successful mili­
grave. He asked for help to investigate the situation tary operation are not the skills required for
and hopefully bring closure to some family’s grief. nationbuilding.
I promised to see if I could get some help, and I The small hammer. When my unit arrived in
reported the situation up my chain of command. Bosnia, we spent 2 weeks with the unit we were
I reported it four times, but I never found out any replacing to learn the mission. My predecessor told
information for the villager. My superiors took no me he would introduce me to the mayor of the lo­
action or allowed me to do so; it was not a com­ cal village in our area of responsibility. He explained
mand priority. We did nothing other than embarrass that the mayor was a difficult man who dodged
ourselves. meetings, did not like Americans, and only tolerated

48 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

Apache 12-B poses next to a minefield near Samac.


Ten years after the war, danger zones were clearly
marked and easy to avoid. Unfortunately, the real
job of understanding the people was not as easy.
author photo

our presence. When we arrived at the townhall, a specific knowledge. The ability to speak the local
secretary informed us the mayor was in a meeting language is critical to the ability to communicate. The
and would be unable to see us. My predecessor an­ use of interpreters is a poor substitute for commu­
nounced, “I am SFOR! The mayor will see me nicating directly. Speaking the language immediately
now!” We then stomped up the stairs and barged confers a status far beyond simple communication
into the mayor’s meeting. I do not speak Serbo- and is the first big step toward trust. Communica­
Croatian, but I could read the mayor’s body language: tion skills can be learned. The sales industry has de­
he was quite unhappy with the intrusion. My veloped countless communication models that can
predecessor’s problem was less the mayor’s dislike be adapted easily to communication in nationbuilding.
for Americans than his dislike for a particular Amer­ After all, the United States is attempting to “sell”
ican. However, my predecessor executed the some of its basic beliefs.
mission the way he had been instructed. His only The Reserve Component contains a reservoir of
requirement was to maintain a safe, secure environ­ uncataloged civilian skills. Making a living as an ar­
ment. Unfortunately, he acted more like a conqueror chitect has little application in combat operations, but
than a nationbuilder. the same ability could have great application in
A few weeks later, I went back to the townhall nationbuilding. The Army should catalog and certify
and asked for an appointment to see the mayor at such reservist civilian skills and use them when ap­
his convenience. Then I made sure I was there propriate.
when he was willing to see me. I did so because it The great Broadway show The Music Man opens
was good manners and because my unit would be with the musical number “You Gotta Know the Ter­
both safer and more effective with the mayor as an ritory!” Knowing the territory is vital and entails more
ally, not an adversary. Eventually, the mayor and I than understanding geography; it entails appreciat­
were able to work well together. He was not anti- ing how the locals think of themselves as a group.
American. He simply wanted to be treated with the Not many people wake up in the morning and say,
respect he deserved as the town’s mayor. Good My culture and I are worthless and insignificant.
manners go a long way in any culture. People need to respect themselves, especially in un­
Uncommon task training. The skills nation- certain times. Every group has some accomplish­
builders need to be effective, which are not now in ment it can point to with pride. The way to create
common task training manuals, fall into two cat­ support for nationbuilding is to respect, appreci­
egories: interpersonal communication skills and area- ate, and acknowledge the local people’s historic

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 49


contributions. Area-specific knowledge should in­ to communicate with. We want nationbuilders who
clude understanding local customs; cultural and po­ understand and care about the locals. We want
litical history; and the current political situation. nationbuilders to dialogue first and rely on force only
Understanding the current situation entails under­ as a last resort.
standing people. Who are the significant players in We want our soldiers to have none of these quali­
the area who shape opinion—the employers, the ties. The U.S. soldier should be the wrath of God,
clergy, the head of the local education system? able to bring death and destruction anywhere at any
Who is in charge of utilities, police, and insurance? time. Let the nationbuilder be the good guy and the
Who controls the media? Where do they live? soldier the bad guy. Attempting to have the same
What are they trying to achieve professionally and people in the same uniforms perform both roles con­
personally? All politics is local. The discovery and fuses those around us as well as ourselves.
effective handoff of such information is vital to We must invest more instruction in cultural stud­
nation-building. ies and communications techniques. We must recruit
My predecessor in Bosnia did as he had been the type of individuals we want and retain them. At
taught. The transition briefing book he provided con­ the end of combat operations, nationbuilder units
tained pictures of significant locations, the townhall, would deploy to the country to take over first-line
the police station, and local churches and mosques. responsibility. Combat units would be kept in reserve
Unfortunately, it contained not one word on the for a period of time in case of emergency.
townspeople. In less than a week, I knew where As nationbuilding progressed, the nature and size
every building was. Six months later, I was still learn­ of reserve combat forces could be altered without
ing about the people. One man had just lost his wife any noticeable change to the level of engagement.
of 30 years. Another wrote poetry. One individual Finally, as efforts matured, the nationbuilders would
liked chocolate. Another was threatening his neigh­ phase themselves out and local authorities would
bors. An effective nationbuilder must understand assume control.
people and relate to them, not buildings. The brief­ The Benefits
ing book we gave our successors was 20 percent A bottom-up command structure with properly
locations and 80 percent personalities. The book gave trained, proactive nationbuilders would—
our successors a real resource on which to build in Improve U.S. standing in-country.
dealing with people. Unfortunately, I believe we Increase the effectiveness of diplomatic efforts
were the exception rather than the rule. and the safety of the troops.
The Army should develop current civil affairs units Decrease the costs of operations and unit for­
into highly effective, efficient nationbuilding units by mation.
building on their existing base of expertise and train­ Reduce engagement time.
ing them for region-specific nationbuilding missions, Improve the readiness of conventional forces.
including training in the language, customs, culture, History is full of examples of countries that have
history, and significant individuals in their areas. won the conventional war, but lost the nationbuilding
These units would differ from today’s civil affairs war. In Vietnam, we learned that you do not win a
units in several ways. They would not be nation- person’s heart and mind by kicking him in the butt.
builders; they would be new units with a unique des­ Unfortunately, we have yet to learn the most effi­
ignation and unique uniforms, demonstrating to the cient way to win hearts and minds.
world that the United States has moved from fight­ Nationbuilding’s effect on a client state can be pro­
ing to nationbuilding. found and more enduring than that achieved solely
Unlike current civil affairs units that provide tech­ through diplomatic efforts. A properly trained
nical expertise, future nationbuilders would assist and nationbuilding force cannot supplant traditional dip­
provide governance. Soldiers need to know how to lomatic efforts, but it can greatly enhance them. MR
destroy targets. Nationbuilders need to know how
to create good impressions and build formidable re­ Staff Sergeant George E. Anderson III, U.S. Army
lationships. They are one part diplomat and one part National Guard, Ph.D., is with the 56th Brigade, 6th
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Pennsylvania Army
soldier. We want first-line nationbuilders to be smart, National Guard. He is the head of the Business De­
educated, and capable of assessing situations and partment of Valley Forge Military College, Wayne,
taking independent actions within the general guide­ Pennsylvania. He received a B.S. from The Citadel
and the Military College of South Carolina and an
lines set forth by the higher command. We want our M.S. from the University of Southern California.
nationbuilders to be open, approachable, and easy

50 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


Terrorist Threat in
the Tri-Border Area:
Myth or Reality?
Lieutenant Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army

L ATIN AMERICA’s Tri-Border Area (TBA),


bounded by Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad
del Este, Paraguay; and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, is an
ist unit, says terrorists partly finance their operations
by remitting dollars from Ciudad del Este to the
Middle East.2
ideal breeding ground for terrorist groups. The TBA Ambassador Philip Wilcox, former Department of
is a lawless area of illicit activities that generate bil­ State (DOS) Coordinator for Counterterrorism, tes­
lions of dollars annually in money laundering, arms tified before the International Relations Committee
and drug trafficking, counterfeiting, document fal­ of the U.S. House of Representatives that Hezbollah
sification, and piracy. The TBA offers terrorists activities in the TBA have involved narcotics, smug­
potential financing; access to illegal weapons and ad­ gling, and terrorism. Many believe the TBS’s Arab
vanced technologies; easy movement and conceal­ and Muslim community contains hardcore terrorist
ment; and a sympathetic population from which to sympathizers with direct ties to Hezbollah, the pro-
recruit new members and spread global messages. Iranian, Lebanese Shiite terrorist group; Hamas, the
While the TBA is not currently the center of grav­ Palestinian fundamentalist group; the Egyptian group
ity in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), it has Islamic Jihad; and even al-Qaeda.3 However, Arab
an important place in the strategy for combating and Muslim TBA leaders claim their community
terrorism. members are moderates who have lived in harmony
with the rest of the population for many years and
The TBA and Global Terrorism have rejected extremist views and terrorism. Most
The TBA, South America’s busiest contraband of the TBA’s 20,000 Arabs and Muslims say it
and smuggling center, is home to a large, active Arab would be impossible for terrorists to hide in their
and Muslim community consisting of a Shi’a major­ midst and deny remittances sent abroad go to
ity, a Sunni minority, and a small population of Chris­ Hezbollah. A minority of Arabs and Muslims, how­
tians who emigrated from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and ever, make no secret about their sympathy and fi­
the Palestinian territories about 50 years ago. Most nancial support for Hezbollah, which they say is a
of these Arab immigrants are involved in commerce legitimate Lebanese political party.
in Ciudad del Este but live in Foz do Iguacu on the Argentine officials believe Hezbollah is ac­
Brazilian side of the Iguacu River. tive in the TBA. They attribute the detonation of
According to international terrorism expert John a car bomb outside Israel’s embassy in Buenos
Price, “The economy of Ciudad del Este is domi­ Aires on 17 March 1992 to Hezbollah extrem­
nated by illegal activity focused on smuggling con­ ists. Officials also maintain that with Iran’s as­
traband products, pirating software and music, and sistance, Hezbollah carried out a car-bomb attack
money laundering of cocaine production revenue.”1 on the main building of the Jewish Community
Even though it has a population of only 300,000, Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires on 18 July 1994 in
Ciudad del Este has approximately 55 different banks protest of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement
and foreign exchange shops. The United States es­ that year.4
timates that $6 billion a year in illegal funds are laun­ In May 2003, Argentine prosecutors linked Ciudad
dered there, an amount equivalent to 50 percent of del Este and Foz do Iguacu to the AMIA bombing
the official gross domestic product of Paraguay. and issued arrest warrants for two Lebanese citi­
Carlos Altemberger, chief of Paraguay’s antiterror­ zens in Ciudad del Este. An Iranian intelligence

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 51


officer who defected to Germany told
Argentine prosecutors that Imad
Mugniyah was the principal suspect in
the Buenos Aires bombings.5 U.S. of­
ficials consider Mugniyah the master­
mind of the 1983 suicide bombing of
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which sug­
gests he has direct ties to Hezbollah
and Iran.6 Argentine Jews (and many
non-Jews) reportedly feel former Ar­
gentine President Carlos Saul Menem,
of Syrian ancestry, accepted a bribe
to conceal Iran’s role in the bomb­
ings.7 Although we cannot confirm
the growing radicalization of Islamic
communities in the TBA, we must
take the possibility into account and
closely monitor the situation.
Al-Qaeda is a network of terrorist
groups scattered all over the world
with a presence in practically every
country. Are Osama bin-Laden’s
operatives also present in the TBA?
Local and international media have The population in the Tri-Border Area is concentrated in three border cities: Ciudad
written about al-Qaeda and other Is­ del Este, Paraguay; Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil; and Iguazu, Argentina. The Arab
lamist terrorist groups setting up train­ community of immigrants that represents a slice of the urban population in the
area, mainly Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, is estimated to be nearly 30,000.
ing camps in the TBA and even hav­
ing secret summit meetings in the area, although less scrutinized locations in Latin America. This is
intelligence and law-enforcement officials have not not to suggest, however, that Argentina, Brazil, and
corroborated these reports. The governments of the Paraguay’s counterterrorism efforts have eliminated
three TBA countries say terrorism is not a problem terrorism in the TBA.
in the region and emphasize that they have never
detected terrorist activity or cells there.8 In Decem­ Latin American Links
ber 2002, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and the United to Global Terrorism
States agreed that “no concrete, detailed tactical in­ Terrorist groups seek target-rich environments
formation . . . support[s] the theory that there are for financial support, safe haven, and recruitment.
terrorist sleeper cells or al-Qaeda operatives in the Six million Muslims inhabit Latin American cities,
TBA.”9 which are ideal centers for recruiting and hiding
Even so, U.S. and regional officials worry that il­ terrorists. Ungoverned areas, primarily in the Ama­
legal activity and commerce in the area fund ter­ zon regions of Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Co­
rorist groups, primarily Hezbollah and Hamas. lombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, present
Hezbollah relies extensively on Islamic money easily exploitable terrain over which to move people
through the common Arab community practice of and material. Over-populated Latin American cities
remitting funds to relatives in the Middle East. In ad­ are home to many disenfranchised groups and
dition, with the complicity of corrupt local officials, marginalized communities capable of supporting
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia terrorist activities or fomenting homegrown terror­
(FARC) paid Brazilian and Paraguayan organized ism. The Free Trade Zones of Iquique, Chile;
criminal groups to obtain weapons and equipment Maicao, Colombia; and Colon, Panama, can gener­
in exchange for cocaine. ate undetected financial and logistical support for ter­
After 11 September 2001, the TBA attracted so rorist groups. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru offer co­
much attention from local law-enforcement groups, caine as a lucrative source of income. In addition,
intelligence agencies, and the international media that Cuba and Venezuela have cooperative agreements
many regional experts believe terrorists moved to with Syria, Libya, and Iran.10

52 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

Terrorist groups are flexible, patient, and use glo­ territories. Economic interdependence among TBA
balization to achieve their objectives. Unless its lead­ nations further complicates matters. For example,
ers cooperate with the U.S. National Strategy for each day, 30,000 people cross the International
Combating Terrorism, Latin America will remain a Friendship Bridge that connects Brazil and Para­
lucrative target for terrorist funding, recruiting, and guay. Tight security measures and better enforce­
safe haven.11 ment of the laws on contraband hurt commerce and
anger tourists, consumers, and business people.
Counterterrorism and Representatives from Mercosur (the Latin Ameri­
Regional Cooperation can common market) have discussed ways to in­
The Organization of American States (OAS) fos­ crease security and facilitate the movement of
ters international cooperation to counter terrorism. people and commerce between member countries.14
A 1998 Argentine initiative created the Inter-Ameri­ In 2002, the Mercosur countries signed an agree­
can Committee to Combat Terrorism, and shortly ment making it easier for their citizens to travel and
after 11 September 2001, the OAS created the In- obtain resident visas. The agreement also permits
ter-American Committee Against Terrorism to en­ inspection-free transportation of commercial contain­
hance hemispheric security through improved re­ ers. Such open borders make the region inviting for
gional cooperation. The committee established terrorists and make an already difficult law-enforce­
financial intelligence units to collect, analyze, and dis­ ment situation worse.
seminate information on terrorist offenses and im­
proved border control measures to detect and pre­ Regional Capabilities
vent movement of terrorists and terrorist-related to Combat Terrorism
materials.12 On 28 September 2001, the UN Secu­ Latin America must use the economic, political,
rity Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, intelligence-gathering, and military elements of na­
requiring states under international law to deny fi­ tional power to cut off terrorism’s life-blood—financ­
nancing, support, and safe harbor of terrorists.13 ing and state support. However, most countries in
Regrettably, a huge gap often exists between a the region cannot afford to control their borders,
government’s good intentions and its ability or politi­ deny terrorists safe haven in ungoverned territories,
cal will to act. Most countries in Latin America sup­ eliminate money laundering, or restrict terrorists’
port international counterterrorism efforts in open abilities to operate.
fora, but do little to control their porous borders; Resource needs are great, fiscal challenges se­
crack down on illegal arms shipments and illegal vere, and available funding insufficient. Latin Ameri­
immigration; or tighten weak financial controls. Full can militaries and law-enforcement agencies are not
cooperation between and among nations is quite suitably organized for or adequately used to confront
minimal. terrorist networks. The constitutions of many Latin
Several Latin American countries do not consider American countries prohibit using military forces for
the GWOT their war and do not actively participate internal security. Memories of the military dictator­
in it. Preoccupied with pressing social issues like pov­ ships of the 1970s and 1980s have not been forgot­
erty and unemployment, most Latin American gov­ ten, and the people are afraid such dictatorships
ernments are reluctant to support what they perceive might return if the military’s role expands. Law-
as a politically unpopular cause. Only the Domini­ enforcement agencies are not well funded and
can Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicara­ trained and are notoriously corrupt. Distrust between
gua provided troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom’s the military and law-enforcement institutions im­
international stabilization force. Some regional politi­ pedes routine coordination.
cal leaders even denounced preemptive U.S. mili­
tary action against suspected terrorist threats, al­ U.S. Efforts
though many high-ranking military officers privately U.S. policymakers have not attacked the condi­
expressed their support of and willingness to pro­ tions that attract people to terrorism. The United
vide troops for Operations Enduring Freedom and States and its allies can win spectacular military
Iraqi Freedom. victories; freeze terrorists’ bank accounts and cut
Many Latin American governments do not have off their weapons supplies; and capture or kill
the legal infrastructure to counter transnational terrorist masterminds, but such triumphs are not
threats or the law-enforcement, intelligence, or mili­ enough to eliminate an entire generation of brain­
tary capabilities to assert effective control over their washed extremists who have a profound hatred

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 53


of the West and a determination
Ciudad del Este, Paraguay
to attack it.15 To get at the source
of terrorism, the United States and
its allies must ensure their count­
erterrorism policies and strategies
are balanced and clearly articu­
lated.
The National Strategy for Com­
bating Terrorism aims to identify
and eliminate terrorist threats
before they reach U.S. borders.
The document states, “The intent
of this strategy is to stop terrorist revistaturismo.com

attacks against the United States,


its citizens, its interests, and its
allies and, ultimately, to create an
international environment inhos-
pitable to terrorists and those who
support them.”16 To accomplish these tasks, the large, the United States does not consider Latin
United States and its allies must act to— American militaries to be key players on the world
Defeat terrorists and their organizations by us­ scene, although some participated in the Persian Gulf
ing all elements of national power: diplomatic, eco­ war, United Nations peacekeeping operations, and
nomic, information, law enforcement, military, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although the DOS has
intelligence. concluded that Latin America has suffered nearly
Deny terrorists the sponsorship, support, and 40 percent of all terrorist attacks in the Western
sanctuary that enable them to exist, gain strength, Hemisphere, Latin America (except for Colombia)
train, plan, and execute their attacks, and cut off remains a low priority in the U.S. counterterrorism
their access to territory, funds, equipment, training, strategy.
technology, and unimpeded transit.
Reduce the underlying conditions that terror­ Future Trends
ists seek to exploit, such as poverty, deprivation, so­ The world is confronting a new brand of terror­
cial disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and ism based on religious-sectarian-nationalist convic­
regional disputes. tions.19 While terrorist movements have had hun­
Defend U.S. sovereignty, territory, and national dreds or even thousands of members in the past,
interests at home and abroad.17 these new terrorist groups have only a few mem­
U.S. counterterrorism strategy toward Latin bers.
America has essentially adopted the rollback ap­ The new terrorism is more radical, irrational, and
proach the Reagan Administration used against left­ difficult to detect. Clear dividing lines once separated
ists and communists. The strategy does not ad­ terrorists from guerrillas or criminals and homegrown
equately address the underlying conditions that terrorists from state-sponsored terrorists, but these
terrorists exploit. This preemptive, zero-tolerance lines have become blurred.20 Terrorist groups like al-
strategy calls on regional leaders to adopt U.S. se­ Qaeda now likely have access to weapons of mass
curity interests as their own.18 destruction and use extreme methods, as observed
From a military perspective, the most important during attacks on the World Trade Center and the
responsibility is executing the GWOT Strategic Pentagon.
Campaign Plan. Through combatant commanders’ Economically marginalized and disenfranchised
theater security cooperation plans, military-to-military groups are made-to-order for terrorists to exploit.
contacts foster bilateral and multilateral cooperation The piqueteros (picketers) in Argentina, cocaleros
to promote U.S. security interests. (cocaine dealers) in Bolivia, Movimento Sem Terra
The United States has worked with Colombia to (Movement of Those Without Land) in Brazil, and
protect the latter’s strategically important oil fields the Pachakutik indigenous peoples in Ecuador, the
from FARC sabotage, but the U.S has no long-term Bolivarian Circles in Venezuela, and peasants’ groups
plans to work with Latin American militaries. By and in Paraguay are ethnically and economically op­

54 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

pressed groups whose destabilizing power is grow­ terrorism does not directly affect them, nations in the
ing, whose leaders are gaining political prominence, TBA will place economic considerations ahead of
and who could be susceptible to terrorism’s appeals. security concerns, seek economic prosperity, and
The TBA’s exact role in attracting terrorist groups remain reluctant to tighten border controls or place
is not entirely clear, but Ciudad del Este’s Arab and new restrictions on commerce and transportation.
Muslim community has raised funds through money The potential for terrorism in the TBA and else­
laundering, illicit drug and weapons trafficking, smug­ where in Latin America is clearly no myth. The TBA
gling, and piracy, with some of the funds reportedly and several other tri-border areas in Latin America
going to Hezbollah and Hamas to support terrorist will emerge as ideal breeding grounds for terrorists
acts against Israel. The FARC also reportedly main­ and those groups that support them, unless countries
tains a fundraising presence in the TBA. This ex­ in the region make changes in their judicial systems,
tensive terrorist financial network also stretches to improve their law-enforcement and military capabili­
Margarita Island, Panama, and the Caribbean. ties, take effective anticorruption measures, and co­
The TBA’s dangerous combination of vast ungov­ operate with each other. The potential for Middle
erned areas, poverty, illicit activity, disenfranchised East terrorists to operate in the TBA and elsewhere
groups, ill-equipped law-enforcement agencies and in Latin America warrants closer scrutiny.
militaries, and fragile democracies is an open invi­ The United States can only win the GWOT if it
tation to terrorists and their supporters. Undeterred has regional partners ready and willing to take pre­
criminal activity, economic inequality, and the rise of emptive action and not just wait for the United
disenfranchised groups with the potential to collabo­ States to act. Closing down charities that fund ter­
rate with terrorists present a daunting challenge. rorism, rounding up suspected terrorists, and de­
Terrorism today is transnational and decentralized. nouncing terrorism is in the regional partners’ self­
International support of a multidimensional counter­ interest.21 Only effective diplomacy can bring this
terrorism strategy is necessary to defeat it. to pass. According to Ambassador J. Cofer Black,
Colombia’s less-than-successful counternarcotics DOS Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “[Diplo­
strategy demonstrates that unilateral action does not macy] is the instrument of power that builds politi­
necessarily eradicate or eliminate drug trafficking. cal will and strengthens international cooperation.
The same is true of terrorism. Unilateral action in Through diplomatic exchanges, we promote
Afghanistan has not eliminated the global terrorist counterterrorism cooperation with friendly nations,
threat. Without multilateral, cooperative deterrence, enhance the capabilities of our allies, take the war
terrorist organizations will simply migrate across po­ to the terrorists, and ultimately cut off the resources
rous borders to less scrutinized areas. As long as they depend on to survive.”22 MR

NOTES
1. John Price, “International Terrorism in Latin America, a Broad and Costly Secu­ storyid=342429>, accessed 2 August 2004.
rity Risk,” InfoAmericas, October 2001, on-line at <http://tendencias.infoamericas.com/ 11. The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, on­
article_archive/ 2001/1001/1001_regional_trends.htm>, accessed 2 August 2004. line at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_
2. Rex Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) terrorism_strategy.pdf>, accessed 2 August 2004.
of South America, Federal Research Division, The Library of Congress (Washington, 12. Department of State (DOS), Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, “Latin
DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], July 2003), 53. American Overview,” Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001).
3. Anthony Faiola, “U.S. Terrorist Search Reaches Paraguay: Black Market Border 13. DOS, Fact Sheet on Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, Washington,
Hub Called Key Finance Center for Middle East Extremists,” Washington Post, 13 Oc­ D.C., 31 May 2002, on-line at <http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/Inter-Ameri
tober 2001, A21. can_Convention.html>, accessed 2 August 2004.
4. Mario Daniel Montoya, “Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area,” Jane’s 14. Mercosur, the Common Market of South America, has four permanent members
Intelligence Review 13, December 2001, 13-14. (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and three associate members (Bolivia, Chile,
5. Mike Boettcher, “South America’s Tri-Border Back on Terrorism Radar,” CNN, and Peru).
8 November 2002, on-line at <www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/americas/11/07/terror. 15. Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Ter­
triborder/>, accessed 2 August 2004. rorism (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2003), 184.
6. Ibid. 16. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.
7. Chris Moss, “Latin America’s First Mega-Mosque Opens Eyes to Islam,” on-line 17. Ibid.
at <http://hispanicmuslims.com/articles/other/openseyes.html>, accessed 16 August 18. Charles Knight, “Essential Elements Missing in the National Security Strategy of
2004. 2002,” Commonwealth Institute, Project on Defense Alternatives Commentary, Cambridge,
8. Horacio Verbitsky, Pagina 12, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 26 January 2003, 124, MA, November 2002, on-line at <www.comw.org/qdr/0210knight.html>, accessed 16 Au­
Internet version. (No other publishing information given.) gust 2004.
9. J. Cofer Black, Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony 19. Ibid.
to the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, 20. Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruc­
Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., tion (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 251.
26 March 2003, on-line at <wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/blac0326.htm>, 21. Thomas Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes: The World in the Age of Terrorism
accessed 16 August 2004. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 236.
10. Martin Arostegui, “Chavez Plans for Terrorist Regime,” Insight, 24 December 22. Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., “Foreign Terrorist List Vital in Global War on Terror­
2002, on-line at <www.insightmag.com/global_user_elements/printpage.cfm? ism,” DOS, 5 January 2004.

Lieutenant Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army, is Army Section Chief, United States
Military Group, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. He received a B.A. from Norwich University,
an M.A. from Kansas University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the con­
tinental United States, Latin America, and Europe.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 55


Tactical Information

Operations in Kosovo

Major Marc J. Romanych, U.S. Army, Retired, and


Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Krumm, U.S. Army

I NFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) are the


employment of the core capabilities of electronic
warfare, computer network operations, psychologi­
rate societies, each with its own institutions. These
two societies were in direct conflict with each other
along “ethnic fault lines,” which were geographic
cal operations (PSYOP), military deception, and op­ areas where both ethnic groups separately existed
erations security, along with specified supporting and but came into direct and often hostile contact. Ex­
related capabilities, to affect or defend information tremist elements frequently used the friction created
and information systems, and to influence decision­ along such fault lines to instigate interethnic violence
making.1 Information operations are enabling opera­ and to threaten Kosovo’s fragile peace. The irrec­
tions that support offensive and defensive operations, oncilable differences between these two societies af­
stability operations, and support operations. Conse­ fected every aspect of UNMIK’s civilian and
quently, they are primarily shaping operations that KFOR’s military missions.
create and preserve opportunities for decisive op­ Within MNB(E)’s AOR, the populace was ap­
erations. Information operations are a key com­ proximately 90 percent Albanian (around 400,000
ponent of the commander’s effort to achieve infor­ people) and 10 percent Serb (perhaps 20,000
mation superiority, which is an operational advantage people). Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs had quite dif­
derived from the ability to collect, process, and dis­ ferent perceptions of reality, particularly in regard to
seminate an uninterrupted flow of information while each other. For example, Albanians saw all Serbs
exploiting or denying the adversary’s ability to do the as aggressors, occupiers, and war criminals who
same.2 deliberately sought a greater Serbia. Kosovar-Alba­
In support of the Multi-National Brigade—East nians asserted that independence was the only pos­
MNB(E) peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, the sible solution to their problems.
Army conducted information operations to affect the For their part, Serbs saw Albanians as enemies
flow and content of information in the area of re­ who wanted to create a greater Albania at the ex­
sponsibility (AOR) and achieved information supe­ pense of the Serbs. The Serbs claimed Albanians
riority by disseminating timely, truthful information were criminals and terrorists responsible for civil war
to key local leaders and populace groups. The op­ and intent on expelling all Serbs from Kosovo.
erational advantage gained by information superior­ Kosovar-Serbs wanted Kosovo to return to direct
ity was the local populace’s support for MNB(E) Serbian government control. Each group claimed vic­
operations.3 tim status at the hands of the other, and both groups
believed they had been unjustly persecuted in recent
The Operating Environment history.4 These beliefs manifested themselves in vari­
The situation in Kosovo presented a challenge to ous ways, from nationalistic rhetoric and propaganda
the international community (IC). The UN Interim to ethnic intimidation and even violence.
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO’s Kosovo Without a functioning government, Albanians and
Force (KFOR) were faced with the absence of Serbs relied on societal institutions to provide struc­
an effective, central government. Without state ture and direction. Political, religious, and criminal
institutions, Kosovo’s two primary ethnic groups— organizations served as a form of command and con­
Albanians and Serbs—developed parallel but sepa­ trol for the populace. To influence the populace,

56 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

UNMIK and KFOR US and Russian soldiers block an angry mob waving the Albanian
had to influence Albanian flag, Domorovce, Kosovo, 14 August 2000. After two Serbian men
disappeared, Serbians believed Albanians abducted the men
and Serb organizations and began to make threats and block roads. The Albanians then
and the individuals and began to form a mob to confront the Serbians.
groups within them. De­
pending on the extent
and character of their in­
fluence, these individuals
and groups were either
supportive of or threaten­
ing to MNB(E)’s mis­
sion.
To further complicate
the matter, neither Alba­
nian nor Serbian societ­
ies were monolithic en­
tities. Kosovo’s Albanian
society was individualis­
tic and decentralized. At
the local level, family re­
lationships dominated
formal and informal

US Army
power structures. At the
municipal and provincial
levels, political, paramili­
tary, and organized crime organizations were influ­ way struggle among the IC, Albanians, and Serbs.
ential. On the other hand, Kosovo’s Serbian society To accomplish the mission, UNMIK and KFOR had
was collectivist or centralized. Concentrated into eth­ to gain and maintain support of the populace.
nic enclaves, the populace lacked any formal struc­ Other important characteristics of the information
ture other than the Serbian Orthodox Church. environment that affected KFOR’s mission were the
Serbian and Albanian factions competed for con­ dilapidated state of Kosovo’s information infrastruc­
trol of their respective communities and, in the case ture (for example, the power grid and public tele­
of the Albanians, for the entire province as well. phone system) and the media’s biased reporting,
Armed Albanian insurgent groups, supported by ex­ which was either pro-Albanian or pro-Serb. Most
tremist elements within Kosovo, desired to expand of Kosovo’s information environment was not un­
Kosovo’s current boundaries to the east and south. der the IC’s direct control, which limited UNMIK’s
The factionalism produced a complex, multidimen­ and KFOR’s abilities to communicate with the
sional operating environment. populace.
Information was an important part of KFOR’s
operating environment, and the most significant char­ MNB(E) Operations
acteristic of the information environment was people. The MNB(E)’s mission was to maintain a safe,
Conceptually, Kosovo’s populace (both Albanian and secure environment. Its AOR, in the southeast cor­
Serb) was considered the information environment’s ner of Kosovo, was some 30 kilometers wide and
key terrain; that is, an entity the control of which 80 kilometers long, or approximately 2,300 square
afforded a marked advantage to either IC (that is, kilometers. The AOR was subdivided into six bat­
UNMIK and KFOR) or Albanian and Serb factions. talion task force (TF) sectors, three of which were
The presence of the international community re­ U.S.-supervised and three multinational (Russian,
strained Albanian and Serb factions and compelled Greek, and Polish-Ukrainian).
them to compete in the information environment To provide a safe, secure environment, MNB(E)
rather than on the battlefield. planned and executed tactical operations within a
Each faction used information to build legitimacy framework of maneuver, civil-military, and informa­
and power by shaping the populace’s perceptions tion operations. Because the populace and KFOR
and attitudes. This information conflict was a three- troops resided in the physical environment (vice the

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 57


seminate truthful, factual information. By doing so,

US Army
MNB(E) retained the moral high ground within the
information environment, ensuring legitimacy for its
forces and activities. Both offensive and defensive
information operations activities accomplished this.
Offensively, MNB (E) leaders and soldiers engaged
key Albanian and Serb leaders (organization
decisionmakers) and discrete population groups, such
as communities near ethnic faultlines. Truthful infor­
mation was also disseminated to target audiences to
influence certain segments of the populace. All in­
formation operations were integrated and synchro­
nized with civil-military and nonlethal maneuver op­
erations.
Defensively, information operations protected
MNB(E)’s intentions and freedom of operation by
U.S. soldiers
question an countering misinformation and propaganda, particu­
Albanian family larly that disseminated through local and regional me­
during a cordon
and search dia. By actively disseminating MNB(E)’s point of
mission, Crnilo, view regarding critical events and issues in the AOR,
Kosovo, August
2000. information operations limited and, as possible, neu­
tralized the effects of inflammatory rhetoric and anti-
UNMIK and KFOR propaganda. Operations secu­
rity supported this effort by denying specific
forewarning of MNB(E) intentions.
information environment), maneuver operations were Information operations activities were organized
decisive, and information operations supported them. into two synchronized operations: one to shape the
Maneuver operations controlled the AOR through operating environment for future operations; the
troop presence and noncombat activities. Troop pres­ other to provide direct support to battalion TFs. The
ence included manning fixed sites to guard Serb primary difference between these two operations
enclaves and patrimonial sites; establishing check­ was timing and intended effects. Both used the same
points to control populace activity and flow; and pa­ assets and means, and both sought to modify the
trolling to demonstrate commitment and resolve. Non­ populace’s perceptions, attitudes, and behavior.
combat operations included cordons and searches The shaping operation was analogous to the deep
to seize weapons caches; reconnaissance and sur­ battle in conventional conflict. MNB(E) targeted key
veillance to guide future operations; and security Albanian and Serb leaders and influential populace
operations to control the AOR’s boundaries. Much groups throughout the AOR to modify attitudes and
of MNB(E)’s maneuver elements’ attention and ef­ behavior well before a critical event occurred. For
fort was fixed on ethnic faultline activity and bound­ example, during the campaigning phase of provin­
ary operations. The constraint to use lethal force only cial elections, MNB(E) personnel engaged key po­
in self-defense and the need to remain impartial gov­ litical leaders in face-to-face meetings to avoid po­
erned maneuver operations. litical violence.
Civil-military operations provided humanitarian and Information operations support to the battalion
civic assistance to gain and maintain the support of TFs was analogous to the close battle. In reaction
the populace and support maneuver operations by to events unfolding in the AOR, the MNB(E) allo­
directing resources and aid to cooperative populace cated IO-capable assets to maneuver elements, and
groups. Such aid included humanitarian assistance, battalion TFs engaged local leaders and the popu­
infrastructure rehabilitation, short-term employment lace. For example, grenade attacks and house bomb­
projects, school visits, and medical assistance pro­ ings near an ethnic faultline could result in face-to­
grams. Civil-military operations were a positive, tan­ face meetings with local leaders, distribution of
gible means of influencing the populace. PSYOP handbills to local residents, and increased
To gain information superiority, MNB(E) had to patrols—all intended to prevent the continuance or
maintain credibility with the populace and quickly dis­ renewal of violence.

58 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

Information Operations Capabilities activities such as cordons and searches.


MNB(E) operations were constrained to non­ Command and staff elements, who engaged
lethal means. To support maneuver operations, key civil, political, and religious leaders in face-to­
MNB(E) employed tactical PSYOP teams, a pub­ face meetings to influence their attitudes and behav­
lic affairs detachment, civil affairs (CA) tactical sup­ ior and gauge their opinions. Senior leaders also en­
port teams, combat camera teams, medical treat­ gaged population groups during town meetings, public
ment teams, unit commanders, and unit patrols. gatherings, and media opportunities such as radio talk
These dissimilar IO assets used disparate means, shows.
such as PSYOP loudspeaker operations and hand­ Maneuver units, whose tasks varied accord­
bills; radio broadcasts; press releases and media ing to each unit’s organic assets and the troop-con­
events; medical assistance programs; reconstruction tributing nations’ policies. Battalion commanders and
and short-term employment projects; face-to-face staff engaged municipal leaders; company com­
meetings; and force presence. The challenge of in­ manders engaged local village leaders. Junior lead­
formation operations was to translate these means ers and soldiers disseminated messages to local lead­
into focused capabilities that fulfilled the com­ ers and the populace during the conduct of daily
mander’s intent. missions. Force presence demonstrated KFOR
MNB(E)’s primary IO-capable assets were— resolve and eased ethnic tensions.
A PSYOP company, which focused on influ­
encing the attitudes, perceptions, and behavior of The Information
Kosovo’s indigenous populace. Tactical PSYOP Operations Staff Section
teams conducted loudspeaker operations and face­ The MNB(E) information operations staff section
to-face and other direct PSYOP product dissemi­ was part of the G3 staff. The head of the section
nation. The company’s PSYOP dissemination de­ served as the MNB(E) information operations of­
tachment produced handbills, posters, and other print ficer, or information operations coordinator and was
products as well as radio and TV programming. the primary staff proponent for all IO activities. As­
A CA battalion, which, in support of informa­ sisting the IO officer were a planner and an opera­
tion operations, directed resources and activities to tions officer, a target analyst, and a noncommissioned
gain and maintain the support of local leaders and officer. The primary functions of the IO staff sec­
populations. Tactical support teams coordinated civil tion were to plan; coordinate; integrate and synchro­
and humanitarian assistance, performed population nize; and monitor execution of the information op­
assessments, and conducted face-to-face meetings eration.
with local leaders, populace groups, and international Plan. Information operations are integral to the
organizations. overall operation, not separate or parallel opera­
A mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD), tions. As such, information operations were
which facilitated media operations and produced in­ planned using the same processes the MNB(E)
ternal information products. The public affairs officer battle staff used—the military decisionmaking pro­
(PAO) publicized KFOR’s position and countered cess (MDMP), intelligence preparation of the battle­
misinformation through local and international me­ field (IPB), and targeting.
dia by press releases, media events, and press con­ The base intelligence document for IO planning
ferences. For each information operation , the PAO was a current IPB of the information environment—
released information and provided information op­ a specialized application of IPB that followed the
portunities for media sources popular with the in­ process outlined in Field Manual (FM) 34-130,
tended target audience. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.5 The
Medical units, whose personnel provided medi­ information-focused IPB defined the information en­
cal and dental care to communities in the AOR to vironment in MNB(E)’s AOR, determined its ef­
influence the attitudes and behavior of local leaders fects on operations, evaluated the information threat,
and the populace. Criteria for providing medical care and determined how that threat would attempt to use
included need as well as the attitude and behavior information to attain its objectives.6
of the populace. The IO staff section developed and maintained
Combat camera teams, which documented the information IPB, but the MNB(E) validated it.
activities and events for exploitation by PSYOP MNB(E) used the targeting process to focus non­
and public affairs and provided direct support to lethal maneuver and civil-military and IO-capable
battalion TFs during potentially confrontational assets into an operation that shaped the environment

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 59


US Army
Pennsylvania Guardsmen talk

with a school principal in Gonji

Livocto, Kosovo, to find out how

many of the school’s children are

Serbian, 23 September 2003. The

school teaches both Serbian and

Albanian children, but the majority

of students are Albanian.

for future operations. Procedurally, the process fol­ responsibility. The IO section also synchronized
lowed the decide, detect, deliver, and assess meth­ the MNB(E) information operation with the in­
odology in FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and formation activities of KFOR, UNMIK, and the ad­
Procedures for the Targeting Process.7 However, jacent Multi-National Brigade. At the battalion
to integrate MNB(E)’s various and nonlethal assets TFs, information operations integration and syn­
and means into a cohesive effort, the process ex­ chronization was the responsibility of the IO of­
panded to include nonlethal targeting objectives (re­ ficer. Synchronization of the various assets in sec­
duce, minimize, increase) and effects (inform, influ­ tor included not only organic TF assets, but also
ence, warn, co-opt). Each targeting cycle produced MNB(E) assets such as civil affairs, PSYOP, com­
a target synchronization matrix that directed nonle­ bat camera, and medical teams operating in the TF
thal engagement of key leaders and populace sector.
groups.8 The fire support element led the targeting Monitor execution. MNB(E) directed informa­
effort. tion operations through execution, target synchroni­
Coordinate. MNB(E)’s information operations zation matrixes (TSMs), and battle drills. Depend­
staff was the focal point for information operations. ing on the tempo of operations, TSMs were issued
Day-to-day IO activities were coordinated within the either weekly or every other week. The TSMs co­
command group, battle staff, and subordinate units ordinated IO activities across the AOR by assign­
in regularly scheduled staff meetings or by direct ing a task and purpose to each MNB(E) asset
staff coordination. An IO working group served as (PSYOP, CA, and public affairs) and the subordi­
a forum for the IO staff to monitor and coordinate nate battalion TFs. The activities directed by the
the information operations of MNB(E)-level assets TSM shaped the operating environment through non­
and subordinate battalions TFs. Meeting attendees lethal engagement of specific leaders and popula­
included the IO staff, battalion TF information op­ tion groups. In response to unplanned critical events
erations officers, and representatives from G2, G3, that occurred in the AOR, such as a violent dem­
command surgeon, combat camera, MPAD, G5, and onstration or act of violence against KFOR soldiers,
PSYOP sections.9 the IO staff used battle drills to plan and rapidly
Integrate and synchronize. Information op­ coordinate employment of IO-capable assets.
erations were integrated into the maneuver plan Each drill included a proposed IO concept of em­
through the MDMP and targeting process. At the ployment, a desired end state, and generic tasks to
MNB(E) level, this was the IO staff section’s those assets the MNB(E) commander normally em­

60 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


WINNING THE FIGHT

ploys. During crisis-action planning, the commander conducted a weekly analysis of local and regional
and staff refined the concept and tasks to address media reporting. The analysis examined media re­
the situation at hand. porting of events in the AOR to identified subject
matter broadcast to the populace and to detect pro­
Assessment paganda directed against segments of the populace
Assessing information operations during peace and KFOR. The staff assessed media reports as
operations was a challenge. Without quantifiable positive; neutral; or negative and factual; or non-
physical evidence, IO effects were subtle—a tar­ factual. A summary of the results helped determine
get audience’s response or nonresponse, changes in the main topics and themes Kosovo’s Albanian and
efforts and techniques, or an absence of activity. In­ Serbian media disseminated.
formation operations effects also manifested as As part of MNB(E), the 1st Armored Division
trends, activities, and patterns in the operational en­ (1AD), employed tactical information operations
vironment. Overcoming these imprecise effects re­ from June 2000 to May 2001 during Operation Joint
quired a thorough understanding of the operating en­ Guardian in Kosovo. Based on existing doctrine and
vironment. tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), the 1AD
The effectiveness of MNB(E)’s information op­ used information operations to shape the perceptions,
eration was determined by analyzing trends within attitudes, and behavior of the adversary and the
the AOR, unit assessment reporting, and media re­ populace in the AOR.
porting. Trend analysis data from unit intelligence The 1AD’s experience in Kosovo confirmed the
summaries and operations reports identified, evalu­ value of information operations to peace operations.
ated, and categorized incidents as either negative or The MNB(E)’s information operations successfully
positive. Negative incidents were those that were shaped the environment for its day-to-day operations
counter to a safe, secure environment, such as in­ and defused several potentially volatile situations.
terethnic violence, anti-KFOR propaganda, and Success was possible because the MNB(E) inte­
populace interference with UNMIK and KFOR ac­ grated information operations into the overall mis­
tivities. Positive incidents were those that supported sion instead of regarding them as separate, parallel
the KFOR mission. Examples included interethnic operations. Building on the previous experiences of
cooperation or observance of the rule of law. The U.S. forces in the Balkans, the 1AD expanded and
occurrence of these incidents was tracked to deter­ refined existing information operations TTP to include
mine trends by time, ethnicity, and geographic loca­ integration and synchronization of information opera­
tion. tions within the maneuver operation. Using standard
Unit assessments analyzed the information envi­ processes—the MDMP, IPB, and targeting—the IO
ronment in the TF sectors and the IO effects on the staff visualized Kosovo’s information environment
target audiences. Daily and weekly reporting of bat­ and developed a focused, integrated operation to
talion TFs, CA battalions, and PSYOP detachments shape the operating environment and support
presented a detailed assessment of the entire AOR. battalion TF efforts to maintain public safety and
The IO staff section, with the MPAD and G2, security. MR

NOTES
1. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, July 1994).
Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 6. LTC David C. Grohoski and MAJ Marc J. Romanych, “Templating the Informa­
28 November 2003), 1-13. tion Threat,” Cyber Sword: The Professional Journal of Joint Information Operations
2. FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001), 11-2. (Summer 2001): 5-8.
3. Steven M. Seybert, “Shaping the Environment for Future Operations: Experiences 7. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process
with Information Operations in Kosovo” in Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience, (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 May 1996).
ed. Larry K. Wentz, Department of Defense (DOD) Command and Control Research 8. CWO2 Richard L. Gonzales and MAJ Marc J. Romanych, “Nonlethal Targeting
Program Publication Series, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Assistant Revisited,” Field Artillery (May-June 2001): 6-10.
Secretary of Defense (C3I), DOD, Washington, D.C., July 2002. 9. Each battalion TF in MNB(E) had an IO officer. In U.S. Army battalions, the fire
4. Drita Perezic, “Kosovo Primer,” unpublished manuscript, New York, March 2001. support officer generally filled the IO position. In non-U.S. battalions, the IO officer was
5. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 usually an officer on the operations staff.

Major Marc J. Romanych, U.S. Army, Retired, works for JBM, Inc., contracted to the
U.S. Army 1st Information Operations Command. He received a B.A. from Syracuse
University, a B.A. from the University of Maryland, and an M.A. from St. Mary’s Uni­
versity of San Antonio. He has served in various command and staff positions in the
continental United States, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.
LTC Kenneth M. Krumm, U.S. Army, is assigned to the Combined Arms Center G7
Information Operations Office and serves as the U.S. Army IO Specified Proponent. He
received a B.A. from Northern State University, an M.A. from Webster University, and
he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 61


Military Application of
Performance-Enhancement
Psychology
Nathaniel Zinsser, Ph.D.; Colonel Larry D. Perkins, U.S. Army, Retired;

Major Pierre D. Gervais, U.S. Army; and Major Gregory A. Burbelo, U.S. Army

T HE U.S. Military Academy’s (USMA) Cen­


ter for Enhanced Performance has developed
a program to improve performance in military train­
marksmanship, combat diving, and parachuting;
and in academic excellence.
CEP, the only center in the Army dedicated
ing. Many of the program’s elements, particularly to training the mental-toughness aspect of perfor­
teambuilding, have implications for the 21st-century mance, follows an educational rather than a clinical
Army. model with performance improvement as the major
Performance enhancement is the deliberate cul­ goal of all education and training. In cases where
tivation of an effective perspective on achievement performance problems manifest themselves as clini­
and the systematic use of effective cognitive skills. cal issues, referral to qualified counseling services
A soldier can maximize performance by mastering is initiated.
thinking habits and emotional and physical states.
These training methods, derived from applied sport Enhanced-Performance Elements
psychology used in training professional and Olym­ The USMA Performance Enhancement Program
pic athletes, are also applicable in other human- integrates five key elements of applied psychology
performance contexts. into a systematic approach to empower individuals
Using the mind’s power to find a competitive edge and organizations, including—
has become an indispensable element in training Cognitive foundations. Understanding the psy­
modern athletes. Army Transformation is similar in chology of high performance (what athletes describe
many respects to changes in sport, but no physical as being in the zone) and knowing how the mind
facility or group of trainers existed to train the men­ works allows performers to gain confidence and op­
tal science of warfighting—until now. erate in the most effective manner. Skills include
The USMA Performance Enhancement Center controlling self-talk, restructuring ineffective beliefs,
(PEC), a state-of-the-art facility for training in ap­ and cultivating a powerful self-image.
plied sport psychology, was established in 1989 to Goal setting. Goal setting is the process of iden­
educate and train West Point cadets in performance- tifying the underlying rationale for work/participation
enhancement techniques to foster their full devel­ and long-term performance objectives, then creat­
opment as leaders of character. In 1992, the ing action plans for goal attainment.
Academy’s Reading and Study Skills Program Attention control. Attention control includes se­
joined PEC to form the Center for Enhanced Per­ lectively attending to important cues, shifting one’s
formance (CEP). field of awareness, and developing simple standard
CEP offers cadets a unique “student success operating procedures and routines that streamline the
course,” which combines instruction in applied execution of repetitive tasks to attain optimum fo­
sport psychology topics such as goal setting, cog­ cus and concentration.
nitive control, and stress management with study Stress management. Understanding how stress
skills such as textbook marking, test preparation, operates in the human system and mastering tech­
and note taking. CEP also offers performance- niques of recovery and energy management is an
enhancement training in the areas of academic, antidote to burnout and fatigue.
athletic, and leadership performance. Each year Imagery and visualization. The process of see­
over 300 cadets voluntarily participate in this train­ ing, feeling, and experiencing desired outcomes and
ing, seeking the mental edge for success in com­ taking actions to attain them builds confidence and
petitive sports; in military applications such as a readiness to move forward.

62 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

These competencies improve individual and team apart from their peers. The top recruiters confirmed
performance by empowering individuals to— the results during a feedback presentation. This valu­
Create effective thinking habits and perform able information revealed that noncommissioned of­
with confidence. ficers’ intangible characteristics and skills can be
Improve attention to important details. crystallized, shared, and implemented and that ap­
Control physical, emotional, and mental plied performance psychology has occupational uses.
responces to high-performance demands.
Operate with a sense of clarity regarding im­ Teambuilding
mediate actions and their long-term results. Because the team is important to successful re­
Those who train in the full performance-enhance­ cruiter performance, CEP personnel conducted
ment curriculum maximize their training and readi­ teambuilding seminars with recruiting battalions to
ness for competition. Cadets also engage in training help build a culture of success and to sustain ex­
to improve physical skills, gain confidence, or learn ceptional recruiter performance. One of the meth­
self-regulation skills. ods CEP used to build team cohesion was the Great
Teams and units also use the Performance En­ Teams exercise, which included the following steps:
hancement Program. Military competition teams 1. Identify the traits of great teams. This involves
have used video analysis of stream-crossing and introspection and disclosure of each team member’s
wall-climbing strategies to ensure smooth, coordi­ experience of being on a great team. Commonly
nated movement. Entire cadet corps teams have identified traits such as focus, strong work ethic, one
participated in teambuilding sessions to establish heart, and so forth are often identified as qualities
standards of behavior for the coming season and to that give a team its unique identity and account for
set goals as a group. its great success.
The Performance Enhancement Program oper­ 2. Select traits to apply to the team. Once a list
ates out of six staff office/training rooms equipped of great team traits has been brainstormed, team
with audiovisual and biofeedback equipment and members select three to five traits from the list that
ergonomically designed chairs for relaxation train­ would be most beneficial to the present team.
ing. A conference room, classroom, and a “Kines­ 3. Obtain consensus on key team traits. The en­
thetic Room” with life-size projection video equip­ tire team discusses how to align the team around
ment for motor-control training and an audio/video selected traits.
production studio also support every phase of the 4. Identify behavioral indicators of key traits. This
program. process translates the great team traits into specific
Pre- and postprogram measures of self-reported observable, verifiable behaviors and actions. Team
coping skills and optimism levels show significant members specify what a neutral observer of the
gains as a result of participation in the program. Ca­ team will see or hear that unambiguously demon­
dets who trained at CEP accounted for a dispropor­ strates each trait.
tionately high number of postseason performance- 5. Demonstrate key traits through small- and
award winners. Hundreds of enthusiastic testimonials large-group exercises. The team uses innovative
from cadets indicate that many took their athletic, exercises to demonstrate selected traits under un­
academic, and military performance to new levels. usual constraints. The exercises reveal team tenden­
cies to fall back into familiar behavioral patterns
Army Recruiting Command when under stress but facilitate adopting new pat­
and Unit Training terns.
The CEP has expanded performance-enhance­ 6. Create a poster-size written mission statement
ment training beyond the USMA with tailored out­ incorporating traits and action steps.
reach programs to the U.S. Army Recruiting Com­ The first five steps identify traits or characteris­
mand (USAREC), the World Class Army Program tics and corresponding behavior the team could edit
(WCAP), the Army Marksmanship Unit, Stryker into a 3- to 4-paragraph team contract—a cross be­
Brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Wain­ tween a command philosophy and an Army creed—
wright, Alaska, and most recently, the 3d Infantry as a visible reminder of the team’s uniqueness and
Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. commitment to its mission.
The top 150 Army recruiters in the United States The team contract provides a clear sense of the
participated in a CEP study that used survey ques­ unit’s importance, unique capabilities, and dedica­
tionnaires to gather critical information about stellar tion to professionalism. Because the team contract
recruiters’ intangible thinking and beliefs. The data was developed from the bottom up, it facilitates to­
revealed common mental strategies that contributed tal buy-in and allows everyone to see organizational
to participants’ success and allowed them to stand standards.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 63


might learn new methods of salesmanship to
The addition
sign up recruits.
of GPS, night
Because goal setting works well in other pro­
vision tech
-
nology, and
fessional endeavors, its application to the military
even low-tech
is certainly a viable option and should be more
items such as
widely embraced. The USMA Performance En­
knee pads

(used here in
hancement Program includes goal-setting pro­
Afghanistan),
cedures for individuals or teams to develop action
all enhance

soldier confi­ plans and to help identify behaviors and compe­


fidence.
tencies that need improvement.
Training to Enhance Confidence
Training to maximize individual confidence is criti­
cal to performance enhancement. Confidence is a
crucial yet poorly understood intangible that influ­
Unit Marksmanship Training ences every aspect of human performance. Train­
CEP recently expanded its role within USAREC ing to enhance confidence begins with the realiza­
through performance-enhancement training with the tion that individual perception of oneself and one’s
Army’s top marksmen at Fort Benning. Class pre­ situation, not previous success or positive reinforce­
sentations and individual one-on-one training sessions ment, produces confidence.
explored confidence, goal setting, and concentration Two complementary types of self-discipline, re­
strategies. ferred to as mindsets, are the major components in
Goal setting facilitates reaching full potential and confidence training. The first is the discipline to
establishes the dream, but more important, it con­ physically “train.” The second is the discipline to un­
structs the path or process to get to that dream. conditionally trust what has been trained. Confidence
U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, Leadership, states, is gained through the correct application and blend­
“Goal setting is a critical part of leadership. The ul­ ing of these two mindsets.
timate goal is to ensure that every soldier and unit The self-discipline to work physically on the tech­
is properly trained, motivated, and prepared to win nical and tactical fundamentals of warfighting is nec­
in war. Achieving this objective will normally require essary to advance from the beginner level. These
that you and your subordinates jointly establish and fundamentals can seem repetitive and mundane, but
develop goals.”1 the self-discipline to work diligently and persistently
Setting goals has helped athletes and soldiers is essential. A commitment to spending countless
make steady progress. Having produced their own hours learning fundamentals and persevering through
roadmap to success, and thus having something con­ accompanying discomfort will develop technical and
crete to work for, athletes or soldiers who success­ tactical efficiency to rely on in war. This self-disci­
fully employ goal setting get the most out of their pline is the training mindset.
teams’ and their own abilities. Studies in industrial, The trusting mindset takes one the rest of the way
academic, and athletic settings reveal that goal set­ to or beyond the standard. In performance enhance­
ting improves performance in the following ways: ment, CEP trains individuals to trust their abilities.
Goals focus the performers’ attention and ac­ Soldiers, who want to become as good as they can
tion on important aspects of the task. For example, be, must free their minds when intense need arises,
an infantryman focuses on improving such skills as as in battle. Precisely when the rest of the world
correct breathing and target specification for marks­ thinks they should focus their minds on techniques
manship qualification standards. and the results of their actions, great athletes and
Goals help the performer mobilize effort. By soldiers trust completely in their abilities and prepa­
setting a series of practice goals, a soldier will ex­ ration. When they let themselves become totally
hibit greater practice effort in attempting to achieve caught up in what is happening now, their true level
personal objectives. of talent and training emerges.
Goals help prolong effort and increase persis­ In an April 2001 memorandum, Chief of Staff of
tence as well as immediate effort. A soldier might the Army General Eric K. Shinseki wrote, “Every­
lose intensity and focus during training. Increasing thing we are called upon to do in the Army requires
persistence with a number of short-range goals can teamwork, and teamwork is built on a foundation of
help break up periods of boredom. trust and confidence within units—between soldier
Setting goals helps performers develop and use and soldier, between leader and led, and between
new learning strategies.2 For example, a recruiter units who see themselves serving side by side. That

64 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

trust and confidence emerges from our daily com­ achieve any task requested of them.
mitment to our Army values: loyalty, duty, respect, Gives soldiers the mindset to trust their abili­
selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal cour­ ties and allow for instinctual release of their skills,
age. Without trust, there can be no dignity and re­ bringing out their best consistently without thinking.
spect for the individual soldier, and cohesion and Encourages soldiers to listen; focus; manage
morale in our units would suffer.”3 Shinseki’s state­ their time and energy; and see the battlefield as their
ment mandates the Army to explore performance arena and the outcomes as successful.
psychology as a training resource. Shinseki said, “[The Army Vision] is not just about
The CEP has created a mobile training team of people or equipment. It is about an investment in fu­
officers trained in performance enhancement. The ture American leadership and security. . . . We will
team provides introductory and advanced perfor­ repay America’s investment in its Army with qual­
mance psychology training to Army units. To date, ity people, warfighting readiness, and . . . a land force
the 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the 1st transformed to meet threats all across the spectrum
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division have participated in of operations. . . . Achieving this vision will enable
full-day training sessions to familiarize all leaders— our Army to better meet the diverse and complex
from squad leader to brigade staff—with the key demands of tomorrow’s security environment [and
concepts, terminology, and training methods of per­ will give] the Nation an array of deployable, agile,
formance enhancement. The 3d Infantry Division is versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable forma­
participating in this training throughout the fall of tions, which are affordable and capable of revers­
2004. The CEP training teams provide each unit with ing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and re­
guided visualization audio CDs that enable soldiers solving conflicts decisively. The Army’s deployment
to mentally rehearse common tasks such as cordon is the surest sign of America’s commitment to
and search, react to contact, and react to ambush. accomplish[ing] any mission that occurs on land.
Implications [We] know we must change; we have an idea of
The uses for performance-enhancement training what we want to be—we don’t know all the an­
in the versatile and ever-changing Army are many. swers, but we’re asking the right questions and we’ll
With new types of weapons systems, equipment, and go where the answers are.”4 One of those answers
organizations appearing at an almost unfathomable is performance-enhancement training at all levels in
pace, the U.S. soldier remains at the forefront of the U.S. Army. MR
change and must meet or exceed high performance
standards despite obstacles and distractions. The NOTES
1. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100, Leadership (Washington, DC:
Army can benefit from training that— Government Printing Office, 1990), 46.
2. Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham, A Theory of Goal-Setting and Task Perfor­
Quantifies and makes tangible, to all Army mance (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990).
leaders, that confidence and composure in any situ­ 3. GEN Eric K. Shinseki, “Dignity and Respect,” on-line at <www.army.mil/ig>,
accessed 14 July 2004.
ation is a skill. 4. Shinseki, “The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in
Peace, Invincible in War,” speech at the annual meeting of the Association of the United
Creates a belief in soldiers, squads, platoons, States Army, Washington, D.C., 12 October 1999, on-line at <www.usarpac.army.mil/
OLD_WEBPAGE_JUNE2003/docs/transformation/Gen%20Shinseki%20
and higher level commands and instills the power to transfor mation%20speech.htm>, accessed 4 August 2004.

Nathaniel Zinsser, Ph.D., is Director, Performance Enhancement Program, U.S. Mili­


tary Academy (USMA). He received a B.A. from Hampshire College, an M.S. from Co­
lumbia University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. He has provided sports
psychology training for Olympic athletes in the Army’s World Class Athlete Program, and
he is a contributor to textbooks on gaining confidence.
Colonel Larry D. Perkins, U.S. Army, Retired, was the Director, Center for Enhanced
Performance, USMA. He received a B.S. from Kansas State University, an M.Ed. from Bos­
ton University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col­
lege (CGSC). He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental
United States (CONUS) and Europe.
Major Pierre D. Gervais, U.S. Army, formerly Executive Officer, Center for Enhanced
Performance, USMA, received a B.S. from Norwich University, an M.S. from Springfield
College, and is a graduate of CGSC. He has served in various command and staff posi­
tions in CONUS and was an intelligence officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Major Gregory A. Burbelo, U.S. Army, formerly Assistant Director, Center for Enhanced
Performance, USMA, is Operations Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (Mecha­
nized), in Korea. He received a B.S. from the University of Rhode Island, an M.Ed. from
Springfield College, and is a graduate of CGSC.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 65


3d Place 2001 MacArthur Writing Award Winner

Zero-Defect Leaders:
No Second Chance?

Major Claire E. Steele, U.S. Army

Pervasive zero-defect mentality; it is a destroyer command was unusual. Nimitz’s con­


a cancer that is eating us all temporaries, future admirals Raymond A. Spruance,
—General James L. Jones, Jr.1 Bill Halsey, and Ernest King, commanded destroy­

I N THE AGE of the so-called zero-defect mili­


tary, senior officers increasingly recognize that
pursuing perfection in officer performance hurts the
ers when they were between the ages of 26 and
36.4 Harris recognized Nimitz’s competence as a
naval officer and entrusted him with an early de­
military services. In an address to the U.S. Army stroyer command.
Command and General Staff Officer’s Course in On 7 July 1908, when the Decatur entered
2001, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Batangas Harbor in the Philippines, Nimitz carelessly
James L. Jones, Jr., stated, “Today, standards are estimated the Decatur’s position instead of taking
incredibly high. . . . I never would have made it past his bearings and failed to check the tide’s direction.
major if I had been held to the same standard as The Decatur ran aground on a mud bank, and a
you.”2 Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General John small steamboat rescued it the next day. Nimitz re­
M. Keane recently sent a letter to senior command­ ported the incident in detail to the Navy and as­
ers in the field concerning junior officer retention, sumed full responsibility. The Navy court-martialed
which said in part, “We hear from . . . captains that him on a reduced charge because of his spotless
they are frustrated by what they perceive as a ‘zero­ record and the poor condition of the Batangas Har­
defect’ mentality and a resulting culture of micro- bor charts. The Navy court-martial board found
management. They came into the Army to lead sol­ Nimitz guilty of “neglect of duty” and gave him a
diers and to willingly shoulder the immense public reprimand. Two weeks later, Nimitz was re­
responsibility that goes with command; however, lieved of command of the Decatur.5
they tell us that this responsibility has been taken Eighteen months later, a Navy selection board pro­
away from them by leaders more concerned with moted Nimitz to lieutenant, advancing him beyond
making sure nothing goes wrong on their watch.”3 the next immediate rank of lieutenant junior grade.
While today’s military leaders recognize the symp­ Thirty-three years later, in December 1941, Nimitz
toms of the zero-defect cancer, they must look back became Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pa­
in history to find the cure. Four prominent leaders cific Ocean Areas, where he served throughout
from the past were actors in incidents that would World War II. In 1944, he was advanced to the
have ended their careers today or at least prevented newly created rank of Fleet Admiral, and on 2 Sep­
promotions, but each worked for superiors who un­ tember 1945 aboard the battleship USS Missouri
derstood them and allowed them to recover from in Tokyo Bay, Nimitz was the U.S. signatory to
their mistakes. Perhaps the real heroes are the four Japan’s surrender terms. Thirty-seven years after
illustrious officers’ bosses: Rear Admiral U.R. Har­ the incident, Nimitz became Chief of Naval Opera­
ris, Brigadier General Charles Heywood, Major Gen­ tions.
eral William R. Smith, and General Ewing E. Booth, Commandant John A. Lejeune, U.S. Marine
who mentored their officers and did not destroy their Corps. Lejeune’s first sea assignment was on the
careers when they made mistakes. USS Bennington in 1891. One of 10 officers on the
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy. ship and the only Marine officer, he commanded 28
As a 22-year old ensign, Nimitz took command of Marines out of a crew of 192. Lejeune was bored
the USS Decatur, the first destroyer commissioned by his less-than-demanding duties in the South At­
in the U.S. Navy. For someone so young to be given lantic, but his commanding officer, Royal B.

66 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

Bradford, captain of the Bennington, thought the postwar Army. Patton was unpopular with the
Lejeune was a poor performer. On Lejeune’s first division staff and brigade commanders because he
fitness report, Bradford evaluated Lejeune as “good consistently wrote papers and after-action reports
in professional ability and general conduct . . . ex­ that admonished subordinate commanders and units
cellent in sobriety and health [but] not good in at­ and described them as incompetent. Major General
tention to duty and efficiency of William R. Smith, the Hawaiian
US Marine Corps

the men under his command.”6 Division’s commander, yielded to


Bradford explained his substan­ pressure from his brigade com­
dard evaluation of Lejeune in the manders and relieved Patton, say­
remarks block of the fitness re­ ing he was “too positive in his
port: “The men under this officer thinking and too outspoken.”10
[Lejeune] are not trustworthy as Smith administratively reassigned
sentries and are not tidy and sol­ Patton as the division intelligence
dierly in appearance. The officer officer, but notably, did not end his
is apparently too indolent and career.
lacking in zeal; he does not give In August 1943, while com­
the personal attention to his men manding the Seventh Army,
that he should; the result is a Patton encountered two privates
want of efficiency in the guard.”7 John A.
suffering from battle fatigue. Mis­
Even when Lejeune received a Lejeune takenly believing they were cow­
second poor fitness report from ards and malingerers because they
Bradford, he did not appeal. had no visible signs of wounds,
Commandant of the Marine Corps Brigadier Gen­ Patton lost his temper, screamed at them, and
eral Charles Heywood counseled Lejeune sternly in slapped them both in the face.11 Patton’s superior,
a letter: “[These reports have] greatly disappointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower, reprimanded Patton
me both as regards to you and the fact that the Corps in writing, but he did not order Patton to apologize
has been so poorly represented on board the to every soldier in Seventh Army in formation, as
Bennington, and your record as an officer will be he had originally planned. Eisenhower’s letter of rep­
greatly affected unless you pay closer attention to rimand directed only that Patton “make in the form
your duties.”8 of apology or otherwise such personal amends to
Lejeune received two more mediocre evaluations the individuals concerned as may be within [his]
from Bradford, although his performance had appar­ power.”12
ently improved somewhat: he was rated “tolerable” Patton went on to become a four-star general. As
instead of “not good” and received no more corre­ commander of the Third Army, he played a key role
spondence from Heywood. After 1894, while he was in the defeat of Nazi Germany.
stationed at the Marine Barracks in Norfolk, Vir­ General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, U.S. Army
ginia, Lejeune’s fitness reports improved consider­ Air Forces. In January 1917, when Arnold was the
ably.9 supply officer at the Signal Corps Aviation School
Despite his poor fitness reports, Lejeune was pro­ in San Diego, two pilots disappeared during a train­
moted to first lieutenant while on the Bennington. ing flight. The base commander, Colonel W.A.
Twenty-five years later, as a major general, Lejeune Glassford, did not approve the dispatch of a search
commanded the 4th Marine Brigade in France dur­ party until 6 days later. Three days after that, search­
ing World War I. Later that year, General John J. ers found the pilots alive, but in poor condition. Arnold
Pershing appointed Lejeune commander of the 2d and the school’s training officer, Captain H.A.
Infantry Division. Twenty-seven years after his poor Dargue, demanded an army investigation into the
officer evaluations on the Bennington, Lejeune be­ delay in dispatching the search party and testified
came Commandant of the Marine Corps, a position against their senior officers. Glassford immediately
he held for 9 years. transferred Darque and Arnold to non-Army Air
General George S. Patton, Jr., U.S. Army. In Corps jobs.13 When Arnold arrived at his new duty
1926, Patton was the operations officer of the Ha­ station, his commander, General Clarence Edwards,
waiian Division, later the 24th and 25th Infantry Di­ greeted him and then referred to Arnold’s most re­
visions. Although he held the rank of colonel during cent evaluation report: “It’s so rotten, it makes you
World War I, Patton had been demoted to major in stink.”14

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 67


In February 1926, while stationed at the Air Ser­ lieved from duty, or having derogatory evaluation re­
vice Headquarters in Washington, D.C., Arnold pub­ ports. But should there be? How many of us would
licly petitioned congressmen for a separate air force select an officer to captain a ship when he had al­
and drew news media attention. After Brigadier Gen­ ready run one aground? We might hire an officer
eral Billy Mitchell’s December 1925 court-martial for with derogatory evaluation reports or even one who
unauthorized remarks about airpower, the General was relieved, but would we offer him a command?
Staff forbade young officers to lobby for a separate What would happen today if a general officer
air force publicly. Major Gen­ slapped a soldier? The ser­
eral Mason M. Patrick, Henry H. Arnold,
vices’ tolerance for errors is
Chief of the Army Air circa 1918 much smaller today than 60
Corps, accused Arnold of at­ years ago. Nevertheless, the
tempting to “influence legis­ leadership and tolerance that
lation in a manner forbidden mentors Harris, Heywood,
by regulations and otherwise Smith, and Booth showed
decidedly objectionable.”15 to Nimitz, Lejeune, Patton,
Patrick offered Arnold a and Arnold should still ap­
choice—resign or face a ply today.
US Centennial of Flight Commission

court-martial. Arnold chose Today’s zero-defect mili­


the court-martial. He had tary is based on the officer
good reason; he was to be fitness or Officer Evaluation
court-martialed for some­ Report. A poor evaluation on
thing Patrick had once asked the report is a fatal blow to
him to do. Two years earlier, an officer’s career. Many
Patrick had asked Arnold to officers do not even try to
influence a California con­ recover from a poor evalua­
gressman to vote in favor of tion, so good officers are lost
a bill the Air Service wanted passed into law. Patrick to corporate America because no one took the
chose not to request Arnold’s court-martial. He re­ time to coach, teach, and mentor them properly.
assigned Arnold to Fort Riley—but not before hold­ Many officers believe that one mediocre rating—
ing a press conference and denouncing Arnold pub­ much less a derogatory one—will end their careers.
licly. Arnold left Washington, D.C., in disgrace.16 So, instead of working together, they compete with
Arnold prepared for a tepid reception at Fort each other to curry favor from their superiors.
Riley, but General Ewing E. Booth, the post com­ Unlike with Lejeune or Arnold, when today’s officer
mander, who had been a member of the board at receives a mediocre or derogatory evaluation, he
Mitchell’s court-martial, welcomed Arnold: “Arnold, immediately begins to plan for a career other than
I’m glad to see you. I’m proud to have you in this military service. He gives little thought to redeem­
command. I know why you’re here, my boy. And ing himself because he thinks trying to do so is
as long as you’re here, you can write and say any pointless.
damned thing you want. All I ask is that you let me Senior officers in all services are concerned about
see it first.”17 the adverse effects of the zero-defect mentality.
Twelve years later, Arnold became Chief of the Each service recently changed its evaluation report­
Army Air Corps, thus taking over Patrick’s former ing system for the same reason: the zero-defect
job. Arnold retired in 1945 as Commander of the mentality had corrupted the system. The services’
Army Air Forces. In 1949, President Harry S. goals are to eliminate severe competition among jun­
Truman appointed Arnold the first (and still the only) ior officers and to encourage them to apply them­
permanent five-star general of the Air Force.18 selves to learning their jobs instead of constantly
competing with their peers.
The Zero-Defect Military After 1997, the Army began removing second
and Fitness Reports lieutenants’ evaluation reports from their official mili­
In today’s military, Nimitz, Lejeune, Patton, and tary personnel files when they attained the rank of
Arnold would probably not have attained flag officer captain.19 Historically, 95 percent of lieutenants be­
rank because the U.S. military has no room at the come captains. Removing earlier reports means an
top for officers found guilty at a court-martial, re­ officer’s first few evaluation reports are not a fac­

68 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

US Army
Colonel George S. Patton, Jr.,
during World War I. Patton
reverted to his regular rank of
major in the postwar Army and
was relieved of a divisional
staff position after writing
papers and after-action
reports that strongly
admonished subordinate
commanders and units he
found incompetent.

tor in future promotions. The lieutenant is free to fo­ a mark of Promotable is perceived as disenfranchis­
cus on learning his job instead of vying for the top ing junior officers, thereby shifting their focus from
block within the battalion. earning warfare qualifications to competing with
In 1988, the Air Force attempted to change its peers. [E]arly competition in the initial period of of­
reputation as the “one-mistake Air Force” by rede­ ficer development is counterproductive and not in the
signing its evaluation system. The Air Force mea­ Navy’s best interest, particularly for officers who
sures officers on six standards with each officer ei­ have not reached their minimum service obliga­
ther meeting or not meeting the standard.20 An tion.”24
officer’s senior rater completes a separate promo­ The Marine Corps has changed its system as well,
tion recommendation form and forwards it to a cen­ allowing one rater to numerically rank all officers in
tral selection board with his recommendation of a the same grade under his supervision. Now, the rater
promotion category of “Definitely Promote,” “Pro­ ranks each officer against all others of the same
mote,” or “Do Not Promote.” The “Definitely Pro­ grade that he has rated in his career. The rater is
mote” category has a fixed number of openings for not allowed to restart his profile and must keep the
officers at the rank of major and above. Junior of­ same rating standards, which reduces cutthroat com­
ficers do not compete against each other for “Defi­ petition among officers within the same command.25
nitely Promote” rankings.21 In 1999 and 2000, four Navy amphibious ships,
Navy regulations forbid the numerical ranking of the USS Underwood, Shreveport, Oak Hill, and
peers on all evaluation reports, either direct or im­ LaMoure County, ran aground. Two commanders
plied.22 Instead, raters rank officers as “Early Pro­ were relieved, one “disciplined,” and one remained
mote,” “Must Promote,” “Promotable,” “Progress­ in command and continued his mission.26 Will their
ing,” or “Significant Problems.” Limits exist on how supervisors remember that Nimitz once also ran a
many officers the Navy can place in the top cat­ ship aground? Will the Navy promote any of the four
egory.23 In 1998, the Navy decided that ensigns and to the next rank? How many will attend the War
lieutenants junior grade would not be rated higher College? Only time will tell.
than “Promotable,” saying, “Forced ranking of jun­ Officers’ supervisors can determine the future
ior officers has been a major concern voiced by se­ course of their careers. The Air Force aptly defines
nior officers. . . . With the current ranking scheme, rating supervisors as “those who know the officer

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 69


best.”27 Procedures are in place in all services to enced lieutenant had been set up for failure because
ensure that the leader who knows the officer best he had received no training. He simply did not know
is the one who counsels him. However, a recent that if the increments were wet, they would not
survey of students at the U.S. Army Command and work. The company commander thought the new
General Staff Officers Course showed that such lieutenant and staff sergeant were scapegoats for
counseling does not always occur.28 In the end, only superior officers in their chain of command. The
a senior officer’s conscience determines whether company commander gained the support of the bat­
or not he creates an environment in which junior talion commander, and they salvaged the lieutenant’s
officers can excel. career. He was selected for augmentation, promoted
to captain, and became a successful company com­
A Recent Example mander.
Examples exist today of leaders who have sal­ But, the story does not end there. The staff ser­
vaged subordinates abandoned by their chain of com­ geant worked at the battalion headquarters for about
mand. A Marine Corps company commander 6 months, attended mortar and machinegun leader
thought a lieutenant under his command was a su­ courses, earned honors, and was assigned to the
perb officer even though he had been relieved of weapons platoon in the new company commander’s
duty. The company commander decided to investi­ unit. He applied himself with a vengeance, dili­
gate the conditions of the lieutenant’s relief and dis­ gently studied the company’s heavy weapons sys­
covered that as a new, inexperienced weapons pla­ tems, and soon became the battalion’s weapons
toon commander, the lieutenant had supervised an expert. The Marine Corps removed his derogatory
equally inexperienced platoon sergeant who had not fitness report from his records and promoted him
received proper weapons training. Their chain of to gunnery sergeant.29
command had placed the two new leaders, the lieu­
tenant and the sergeant, in charge of a combined Is There Hope?
range, with the lieutenant as the safety officer. Be­ One hopes that the military can cure the zero-de­
cause of their inexperience, an incident occurred. It fect cancer. The services have taken a step in the
was raining, and the platoon’s ammunition got wet. right direction by changing their evaluation systems
As a result, a 60-millimeter mortar charge went to protect new junior officers from a zero-defect
off, but not the increments. The weapon fired, environment. Senior leaders are aware of the zero-
but the round only traveled 60 to 90 feet to a loca­ defect mentality and are teaching officers to pre­
tion dangerously close to the soldiers on the range. vent it through lenience and tolerance. Given a
Fortunately, the round did not explode, but both choice of tolerance versus zero defects, tolerance
the lieutenant and staff sergeant were relieved of must win because one day one of us could be
their duties and received derogatory fitness reports. supervising the next Nimitz, Lejeune, Patton, or
The company commander felt that the inexperi­ Arnold. MR

NOTES
1. GEN James L. Jones, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, speech to the U.S. Army Com­ 18. Ibid., 386.
mand and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) class of 2001, Fort Leavenworth, 19. U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 623-105, The Officer Evaluation Report­
Kansas, 1 December 2000. ing System “In Brief” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 Oc­
2. Ibid. tober 1997), 1.
3. GEN John M. Keane, letter to senior commanders concerning junior officer re­ 20. U.S. Air Force (AF) Pamphlet (Pam) 36-2404, Guide to the Officer Evaluation Sys­
tention, 2000. No further information given. tem (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 December 1996), 26.
4. Dede W. Casad and Frank A. Driskill, Chester W. Nimitz, Admiral of the Hills (Aus­ 21. Ibid, 37.
tin, TX: Eakin Press, 1983), 75. 22. Navy BUPERSINST 1610.10, Navy Performance Evaluation and Counseling Sys­
5. Ibid., 78-79. tem (2 August 1995), A-11. No further publishing information given.
6. Merrill L. Bartlett, “An Era of Candor: John A. Lejeune’s First Series of Bad Fit­ 23. Ibid., A-12.
ness Reports,” Marine Corps Gazette (November 1994): 76. 24. NAVADMIN 276/98, Interim Change to Navy Performance Evaluation and Coun­
7. Ibid, 77. seling System Instruction (221546Z DEC 98). No further publishing information given.
8. Ibid. 25. U.S. Marine Corps Order P1610.7E with Erratum and Changes 1-2, Performance
9. Ibid. Evaluation System (1 January 1999), Appendix G. No further publishing information
10. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 341. given.
11. Ibid., 533-35. 26. Jack Dorsey, “Norfolk-Based Navy Ship Hits Reef Off Coast of Chile,” The Vir­
12. Ibid., 536. ginian-Pilot, 13 September 2000.
13. Thomas M. Coffey, Hap (New York: The Viking Press, 1982), 4. 27. AF Pam 36-2404, 26.
14. Ibid., 89. 28. CGSOC 2001-Staff Group 4B, leadership discussion during C700, Fundamentals
15. Ibid., 5. of Excellence, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS,
16. Ibid., 127. September 2000.
17. Ibid., 128. 29. Personal conversation with a Marine Corps officer, 10 January 2001.

Major Claire E. Steele, U.S. Army, is a Congressional Fellow in the Congressional


Fellowship Program under the administration of the U.S. Department of the Army. She
received a B.S. from Siena College, an M.A. from Webster University, and an M.M.A.S.
from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

70 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


Machines,
the Military, and
Strategic Thought
Colonel Antonio M. Lopez, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.;
Colonel Jerome J. Comello, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.; and
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Cleckner, U.S. Army, Retired

We have to think differently. The enemy who cisionmaking.3 The Semantic Web will be another
appeared on September 11th seeks to evade our step forward in the military use of intelligent-agent
strength and constantly searches for our weak­ technology.4
nesses. So America is required once again to The Semantic Web is the envisioned end state for
change the way our military thinks and fights. the movement of the World Wide Web from words,
—President George W. Bush1 images, and audio understood only by humans to the
same data “wrapped in” organizing concepts and

H ISTORICALLY, real-world events trigger


innovative thought, as for example, the
challenge from President John F. Kennedy to land
relationships that intelligent agents as well as humans
can understand.5 In the not too distant future, intel­
ligent-agent technology and military thinking will
men on the moon and return them safely to earth combine to use the Semantic Web to understand the
by the end of the 1960s. The more dramatic the strategic contexts of situations based on knowledge
event, the more we recognize the need for thinking and inference.6
differently. History shows, however, that nondra­ As we wage the Global War on Terrorism
matic advances in technology often produce inno­ (GWOT), we must rethink old concepts. Humans
vations in thought we do not recognize until some and intelligent agents together will have to learn new
dramatic human tragedy catapults the innovative concepts. In the words of author Peter Paret, “Each
thinking into the spotlight. age has its own strategy. The strategies of 1806, of
The U.S. Army must continue to change the way 1870, of 1914 were the products of their own times,
it thinks. In today’s world, information is multiplying certainly paying some attention to history, but pri­
even as it is becoming obsolete, and ideas are con­ marily attempting with varying degrees of success
tinually restructured, retested, and rethought. The to use and respond to the economic, social, tech­
Army cannot survive if it uses only one way of think­ nological, and political conditions of their day.”7
ing; it must continually adapt to match the thinking Our age is now. How should we think differently
of opposing forces, enhance its strategic thinking, about strategy?
make better use of current technologies, and take
advantage of near-future technologies. Machine Thinking
Intelligent-agent technology, which stems from Artificial intelligence is approaching adolescence.
research in artificial intelligence (AI), has advanced Its childhood years were filled with “wide-eyed
significantly since the late 1980s. An intelligent agent dreaming and wild speculation.”8 Some early AI
is a computer program that perceives its environ­ consumers believed childish promises about AI and
ment, reasons about it, then acts on it as would a were quite disappointed when it failed to deliver.
human subject matter expert (SME).2 The Persian Many still remember the experience and say, “AI.
Gulf war accelerated the U.S. military’s use of Wasn’t that the thing we talked about a decade ago,
intelligent-agent technology in operational de­ and didn’t it fail?”9 Far from being a failure, AI has

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 71


become strategically important to the military and and future use by subject matter experts.
to corporate America in the search for advantages DARPA and AFOSR supported the development
over adversaries. of Disciple-RKF and approved the domain of appli­
The Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool cation—determining and analyzing an opposing
(DART) is an AI-based decision-support system force’s center of gravity (COG). Prussian strategist
installed at the U.S. Transportation Command Carl von Clausewitz described the COG as “the hub
and U.S. European Com­ of all power and movement,
mand within 3 months of on which everything de­
its conception and used pends.”13 Today, the Army
throughout the Persian Gulf defines the COG as “those
war. DART solved the logis­ characteristics, capabilities,
tical nightmare of moving or localities from which a
military assets from Europe military force derives its
to Saudi Arabia. The money freedom of action, physical
DART saved reportedly strength, or will to fight.”14
offset all funds the Defense In 2000, LALAB joined
Advanced Research Pro­ forces with the Center for
jects Agency (DARPA) had Strategic Leadership at the
funneled into AI research in U.S. Army War College
the previous 30 years.10 (AWC) to conduct AI re­
After the Persian Gulf search and COG analysis
war, AI researchers devel­ and to use intelligent agents
oped intelligent systems to in education. 15 The team
capture lessons learned used a COG monograph to
through firsthand human develop a knowledge-inten­
experience. One such de­ sive COG analysis prob­
ployed system is the U.S. Air Carl von Clausewitz lem.16 Students studying the
Force’s Air Campaign Plan­ COG concept in depth could
ning Advisor, which is a Web-based system linked take an elective course titled Case Studies in Cen­
to a performance support system.11 ter of Gravity Determination. Students used Disciple-
DARPA, whose focus is on areas in which AI RKF/COG to elicit scenarios and model military
techniques help obtain reasonable solutions to com­ campaigns. Students in the Military Applications of
plicated, real-world military problems, has supported Artificial Intelligence (MAAI) course completed the
development of intelligent-agent technology through training of Disciple-RKF/COG agents. After 2 years
several of its programs. DARPA, the Air Force Of­ of development and refinement, Disciple-RKF/COG
fice of Scientific Research (AFOSR), and the Air became part of AWC’s COG and MAAI elective
Force Research Laboratory of the Air Force Ma­ courses.17
teriel Command supported the Learning Agent Labo­ To make web content more accessible and un­
ratory (LALAB) at George Mason University in de­ derstandable to intelligent agents, DARPA funded
veloping “Disciple”—a theory, methodology, research in languages, tools, infrastructure, and ap­
and intelligent-agent shell SMEs can use to rap­ plications. 18 The DARPA Markup Language
idly develop knowledge bases in specific domains. (DAML) is the language autonomous intelligent
The SMEs required only limited assistance from agents use to understand Semantic Web pages. The
computer professionals specializing in knowledge Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence
engineering. communities are pushing for computer systems
The Disciple approach successfully solved based on Semantic Web principles.19
“challenge problems” in DARPA’s High Perfor­ Ontologies are the key to the Semantic Web be­
mance Knowledge Bases program.12 DARPA’s cause they promise a shared understanding of a
follow-on program, Rapid Knowledge Formation domain that can be communicated between people
(RKF), addressed a decades-old bottleneck caused and intelligent agents.20 An ontology is a logical
by the need for SMEs to repeatedly explain theory that gives an explicit, partial account of
problem-solving techniques to knowledge engi­ a conceptualization; it is an intentional seman­
neers who, in turn, encoded them for validation tic structure that encodes the implicit rules that

72 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS
constrain the structure of a piece of reality.21 gon and what many historians and theorists call
Developing an ontology for Disciple-RKF/COG grand strategy overlap policy. Distinguishing be­
was essential, but that ontology was based on his­ tween and among the three concepts is difficult.27
torical case studies with state actors and militaries, To do so, Columbia University professor Richard
governments, alliances, and coalitions with hierarchi­ Betts suggests that the military think of strategy as
cal structures.22 On a Semantic Web scale, people the bridge between policy and operations.28 This be­
around the world will de­ ing the case, determining the
velop and use ontologies to SCOG requires knowledge
convey the meaning of their from the military domain
web pages. The real power (operations) and from the
of ontologies will be realized economic, political, psycho­
when people create intelli­ social, historic, and interna­
gent agents that use ontolo­ tional domains (policy).
gies to collect web content, SCOG analysis is quite
process the information, and scenario-dependent because
exchange the results with it deals with specific adver­
other intelligent agents and saries and their goals and
humans.23 capabilities. When perform­
Artificial intelligence is ing SCOG analysis, senior
coming of age. Soon, we military officers rely on their
might see the Semantic experience and intuitions,
Web and intelligent-agent usually without following a
technology enhance our rigorous analytical method­
ability to respond to eco­ ology or reflecting thought­
nomic, social, technological, fully on Clausewitz. In the
and political conditions. Is Napoleon Bonaparte
GWOT, however, a new di­
the military prepared to use mension of difficulty is
such tools to think differently? Adapting such tools added, one in which the experience and intuition of
into our thinking process will improve the correct, military leaders is deficient.
timely identification of the strategic COG (SCOG). Instead of state actors with military components
organized hierarchically, the U.S. military must con­
Military Thinking front nonstate opponents who have no traditional
Since its inception, the AWC has put a premium military units and are part of a global network that
on thinking and innovation and promoted the use of can easily include or exclude other organizations. The
technology, even experimental technology, so its stu­ military assumption that an opposing force will have
dents and future military and civilian leaders could central control over its components clashes with the
better inform themselves about how new technol­ reality that globally coherent activity can emerge in
ogy will affect them. One of the more difficult chal­ the absence of centralized authority or control.29
lenges military and civilian leaders face at the stra­ Disciple-RKF/COG has been an unquestionable
tegic level of war is to determine and analyze the success, but SMEs and knowledge engineers work­
SCOG for friendly and enemy forces. The trouble ing at the AWC recognized the need for its further
begins with the overused word “strategy.” The DOD development before the tragic events of 11 Septem­
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms de­ ber 2001. In summer 2001, they examined events
fines national strategy, military strategy, national mili­ that occurred in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 in terms
tary strategy, and theater strategy.24 There is even of strategic and operational COG concepts.30 In
a distinction between grand strategy, which has a their scenario, Somalia was not a state, but a geo­
practical level of influence on the “economy, indus­ graphical area in which many different clans oper­
trial structure, demography, sociology, strategic [sic], ated independently, often in open conflict with each
and culture,” and strategy, which has a practical level other. The clans, operating in more of a network than
of influence with “services, army groups, fleets,” and a hierarchical structure, came together for a com­
so on.25 In some circles, the word strategy has be­ mon purpose and cut off ties completely when the
come synonymous with foreign policy.26 Further­ purpose no longer existed. The on-again, off-again
more, what is called national strategy in the Penta- UN operations in Somalia from December 1992 to

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 73


May 1993 demonstrated the complexity of the situ­ past and present realities to show “how one thing is
ation and the UN’s sluggishness in developing a vi­ related to another; [to] keep the important and un­
able plan of action. U.S. frustration with UN inac­ important separate; to reach the irreducible elements
tion led to a more direct U.S. role, which culminated of the phenomenon of war; and to discover the logi­
in the Unified Task Force. Unknown then, the stage cal and dynamic links that bind them into compre­
was being set for the paradigm shift to today’s Glo­ hensible structure.”32 An ontology used by intelligent
bal War on Terrorism. agents explicitly represents these concepts and their
relationships, and the Semantic Web will help sepa­
Strategic Thinking and rate important concepts from unimportant ones. The
the Three-Step Program intelligent agent determines logical, dynamic links that
Throughout history, the military has built and used bind concepts into a comprehensible structure.
machines to gain operational or tactical advantage Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is nothing but the
over opponents. Recently, the military has used com­ continuation of policy with other means” illustrates
puters in smart weaponry and battlefield digitization. the first step in our program.33 Published on the Se­
The military can now think differently by adapting mantic Web, Clausewitz’s work might have the on­
intelligent-agent technology to support military think­ tological representation found in figure 1(a), but writ­
ing at a much higher level of thought than ensuring ten in DAML. Assuming that Betts’s paper,
bombs are on target or knowing unit battlefield expressing the view that strategy is the bridge be­
locations. tween policy and operations, was also published on
The United States must combine intelligent-agent the Semantic Web using DAML with an ontologi­
technology and the looming Semantic Web to gain cal representation such as that in figure 1(b), then
strategic advantage over opponents such as al- an intelligent agent would conclude that Betts’s writ­
Qaeda. Paret prophetically pointed out, “Often—as ing is consistent with Clausewitz’s dictum.
in significant phases of the First World War—a strat­ The intelligent agent would understand that Betts
egy lags behind contemporary reality. Napoleon, by added more explicit concepts and relationships to
contrast, developed strategies that were attuned to Clausewitz’s concepts of policy and war. On the
the possibilities of his age, and for some years suc­ Semantic Web, the posted writings that disagree with
ceeded in exploiting them fully. As the conditions that Clausewitz’s dictum could be separated out. The in­
he understood and had mastered began to change, telligent agent could also follow hyperlinks to the pa­
sometimes in response to his own actions, his stra­ pers Betts referenced and to papers written by oth­
tegic concept, too, had to change or become out­ ers who referenced Betts’s paper. Unlike today’s
dated.”31 As Napoleon changed his strategic con­ web crawlers and search engines that use keywords
cepts based on changing conditions, we must change to determine patterns, the intelligent agent on the Se­
based on the contemporary realities of our age— mantic Web would use ontological representations
intelligent-agent technology, networked nonstate en­ written in DAML to understand a document’s con­
emies, and a Semantic Web that both humans and tent.
machines will understand. Can we develop a strat­ The second step is to use intelligent-agent tech­
egy that fully exploits these realities? nology to enhance thinking. For an intelligent agent
To support change in to do its work (that is,
strategic thinking, we of­ provokes understand its environ­
fer a three-step program policy war ment, reason [think], and
to exploit current tech­ (a) Clausewitz take action based on its
nologies and to position understanding and rea­
us to further exploit near- soning), it must have an
future technologies. The provokes ontology, a theory that
first step is to get a clear policy war
allows humans to share
understanding of the con­ knowledge with ma­
cepts and their relation­ invokes a part of chines and vice versa.
ships. Clausewitz laid the Having military minds
foundation for this step dicates build ontologies for
strategy operations
when he wrote that the GWOT is true to Claus­
cognitive function of (b) Betts
ewitz’s view of theory’s
theory is to structure Figure 1. Ontological representations. pedagogic function to

74 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

global war on terrorism


freedom from fear of terrorist attack

a kind of
a kind of

provokes
policy war
NSCT
NSCT military operations
invokes a part of
a kind of
a kind of
strategy dictates
operations
a kind of
NSCT strategic goal

has a kind of NSCT CIA operations

a kind of
instance of strategic goal a part of
NSCT FBI operations

NSCT strategic goal 1 has

produces

strategic objective operational goal a kind of


a kind of has NSCT FBI operational goal

NSCT strategic objective operational objective


a kind of instance of
instance of instance of
NSCT FBI operational objective

NSCT strategic objective 1.1 NSCT FBI operational goal 1.1.2

NSCT FBI operational goal 1.1.1

Figure 2. Additional ontological expansion.


(Shaded areas are present-age concepts).

“help the student organize and develop his ideas of Objective 1.1. Identify terrorists and terrorist or­
war, which he draws from experience, study, and ganizations.
history [so] the exploration of the past extends the Objective 1.2. Locate terrorists and their organi­
reality that any one individual can experience.”34 Ex­ zations.
perience and the past are important, but the need to Objective 1.3. Destroy terrorists and their orga­
understand more precisely how economic, religious, nizations.36
and ideological factors affect war is becoming just Can the ontological representations in figure 1 in­
as important. corporate the reasoning expressed here? We believe
When conditions Napoleon understood and had they can and that they can help the military orga­
mastered began to change, he had to change his nize and develop ideas about this type of war.
strategic concepts. When a network of terrorist Expansion of the previous ontological represen­
organizations and cells confronts the United States, tation is possible at a higher level of abstraction. An
how does the military organize and develop new intelligent agent could read the NSCT on the Seman­
ideas? Consider the National Strategy for Com­ tic Web and begin to understand the specifics of the
bating Terrorism (NSCT).35 U.S. policy is for its strategy (the what) but would have to look elsewhere
citizens and other civilized people around the world on the web for operations (the how).
to lead lives free of fear from terrorist attacks. Suppose the FBI, the CIA, and other government
Based on this policy, the NSCT presents several stra­ agencies create Semantic Web pages that present
tegic goals, each having its own objectives. For ex­ their goals for conducting the GWOT. For example,
ample, the objectives of goal 1—to defeat terror­ the FBI identifies terrorist cells and organizations op­
ists and their organizations—might include the erating within U.S. borders, and the CIA identifies
following: them outside U.S. borders. If it knows the strategy,

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 75


global war on terrorism

provokes

a part of freedom from fear of terrorist attack a part of

invokes

dictates dictates
NSCT FBI operations NSCT NSTC military operations

a part of has a part of


NSCT strategic goal
NSCT FBI operational goal
has NSCT military operational goal

produces produces
has SCT strategic objective has

NSCT FBI operational objective NSCT military operational objective

Figure 3. Machine and military thinking combining into strategic thinking.


the intelligent agent can link operational goals to stra­ The final step is to use military and machine think­
tegic objectives. Expanding the enumeration system ing to gain a comprehensive understanding of war.
results in the following: Clausewitz admonished, “Theory must be compre­
Operational goal 1.1.1. The FBI will identify ter­ hensive; that is, it must be able to accommodate all
rorist cells within U.S. borders. aspects of its subject, whether of the present or of
Operational goal 1.1.2. The FBI will identify ter­ other times. It must be based on the constants and
rorist organizations within U.S. borders. absolutes of its subject, not phenomena that might
Operational goal 1.1.3. The CIA will identify ter­ be temporary, even if currently these phenomena
rorist cells outside U.S. borders. seem to dominate war.”38
Operational goal 1.1.4. The CIA will identify ter­ We have worked with the COG theory as it ap­
rorist organizations outside U.S. borders. plies to war between states even when they are part
Now, the intelligent agent can search for the op­ of coalitions or alliances. Identifying and determin­
erational objectives for each of the operational goals. ing the SCOG in these cases has focused on the
Figure 2 depicts higher-level concepts and adds Clausewitzian trinity of government, military, and
war, policy, strategy, operations, and a good deal people. The current phenomenon is war with a
more. The concepts in gray are those the military nonstate opponent organized in a decentralized net­
strategist provided in an ontology of war. An intelli­ work, however. In this phenomenon, the SCOG still
gent agent can use the ontology and the Semantic exists, but government and a military organization
Web to find the shaded concepts for a specific war. are no longer critical to its identification. We believe
This synergy of military and machine thinking pro­ the COG theory must be extended by adding goals
duces a better understanding for both humans and and objectives to the constants and absolutes of war
machines. in a way similar to Betts’s extension of Clausewitz’s
Figure 3 offers a view of the GWOT without its dicta.
theoretical underpinning (the concepts in gray in fig­ In time, the Semantic Web will enhance under­
ure 2). Lest we forget, Clausewitz would remind us: standing of the world. Intelligent agents will use it
“Theory can never lead to complete understanding, to read documents, filter information, and infer
which is an impossibility, but it can strengthen and knowledge faster than humans can. As Clausewitz
refine judgment.”37 wrote, “If war was meant to achieve a political pur­

76 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

pose, everything that entered into war—social and prepare for the future use of the Semantic Web.
economic preparation, strategic planning, the conduct Creating new ontologies, if nothing else, will help
of operations, the use of violence on all levels— clarify military thinking. Furthermore, we can
should be determined by this purpose, or at least in use such ontologies to expand the understanding
accord with it.”39 of agents such as Disciple-RKF/COG. Having
Thinking differently does not begin with an in­ an intelligent agent with knowledge of the COG
telligent agent; it begins with the agent’s intelligent theory and traditional warfare is a significant advan­
partner—the SME who sees into the future and tage. As different military thought patterns evolve
develops the needed ontologies. The military needs for a new, global, networked model, they can be tried
a new model to update and expand Clausewitz’s on the intelligent agent and reviewed to see which
COG theory at the strategic level. The model are helpful in finding the SCOG for the new en­
should use existing intelligent-agent technology and vironment. MR

NOTES
1. George W. Bush, speech at The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 11 Decem­ 18. Deborah L. McGuinness, Richard Fikes, James Hendler, and Lynn Andrea Stein,
ber 2001. “DAML + OIL: An Ontology Language for the Semantic Web,” IEEE Intelligent Systems
2. Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Up­ (September-October 2002): 72-80.
per Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995). 19. Kenyon, 60.
3. William Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000). 20. John Davis, Dieter Fensel, and Frank van Harmelen, Towards the Semantic Web:
4. Henry S. Kenyon, “Computer Language Seeks Deeper Meaning,” Signal (June Ontology-Driven Knowledge Management (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).
2003): 59-61. 21. Nicola Guarino and Pierdaniele Giaretta, “Ontologies and Knowledge Bases: To­
5. Tim Berners-Lee, James Hendler, and Ora Lassila, “The Semantic Web,” Scien­ wards a Terminological Clarification,” in Towards Very Large Knowledge Bases: Knowl­
tific American (May 2001): 34-43. edge Building and Knowledge Sharing, ed. N.J.I. Mars (Amsterdam: ISO Press, 1995),
6. Otis Port, “The Next Web: Think the World Wide Web is a Godsend? By 2005, 25-32.
Tim Berners-Lee aims to be replacing it with the Semantic Web, which will understand 22. Michael Bowman; Antonio M. Lopez, Jr.; and Gheorghe Tecuci, “Ontology Devel­
human language,” Business Week, 4 March 2002, 96-102. opment for Military Applications,” Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual ACM South­
7. Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age east Conference, New York, ACM Press, 2001, 112-17.
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 141. 23. Benners-Lee, 42.
8. James Allen, “AI Growing Up,” AI Magazine (Winter 1998): 13-23. 24. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and
9. Frederick Hayes-Roth, “Artificial Intelligence: What Works and What Doesn’t?” Associated Terms (Washington DC: GPO, 12 April 2001), on-line at <www.dtic.mil/
AI Magazine (Summer 1997): 99-113. doctrine/jel/doddict>.
10. Sarah Reese Hedberg, “DART: Revolutionizing Logistics Planning,” IEEE Intel­ 25. Ian Roxborough, “From Revolution to Transformation: The State of the Field,” Joint
ligent Systems (May-June 2002): 81-83. Forces Quarterly 32 (2002): 68-75.
11. Christopher R. Johnson, Larry Birnbaum, Ray Bareiss, and Tom Hinrichs, “War 26. Richard K. Betts, “The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations,”
Stories: Harnessing Organizational Memories to Support Task Performance,” Intelli­ Joint Forces Quarterly 29 (2002): 23-30.
gence (April 2000): 17-31. 27. Ibid., 24.
12. Gheorghe Tecuci, Mihai Boicu, Michael Bowman, and Dorin Marcu, “An Innova­ 28. Ibid.
tive Application from the DARPA Knowledge Bases Programs: Rapid Development of a 29. Duncan J. Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (New York: W.W.
High Performance Knowledge Base for Course of Action Critiquing,” AI Magazine Norton & Company, 2003), 51.
(March 2001): 43-61. 30. Christopher Fowler; William Cleckner; Antonio M. Lopez, Jr.; Gheorghe Tecuci;
13. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret and Jerome Comello, “Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis for Operations Other Than
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595. War Through Learning Agent Technologies,” Proceedings from the Forty-First Meet­
14. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print­ ing of the Army Operations Research Society, 2002, CD-ROM: Special Session 2, The
ing Office [GPO], 2001). Application of Information Technology on the Battlefield, Fort Lee, Virginia, Center for
15. Antonio M. Lopez, Jr.; Jerome J. Comello; Michael Bowman; James J. Donlon; Army Analysis, U.S. Army Logistics Management College, 2002.
and Gheorgh Tecuci, “Clausewitz Meets Learning Agent Technology,” Military Review 31. Paret, 141.
(November-December 2002): 10-17. 32. Ibid., 193.
16. P.K. Giles and T.R. Calvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Appli­ 33. Clausewitz, 69.
cation (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996, updated 34. Paret, 193.
2002). 35. The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC:
17. Gheorghe Tecuci; Mihai Boicu; Dorin Marcu; Bogdan Stanescu; Cristina Boicu; 2003), on-line at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/
Jerome J. Comello; Antonio M. Lopez, Jr.; James J. Donlon; and William Cleckner, “De­ counter_terrorism_ strategy.pdf>, accessed 16 July 2004.
velopment and Deployment of a Disciple Agent for Center of Gravity Analysis,” Proceed­ 36. Ibid., 15-16.
ings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the Fourteenth 37. Paret, 193.
Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Menlo Park, CA, AAAI 38. Ibid.
Press, 2002, 853-60. 39. Clausewitz, 6.

Colonel Antonio M. Lopez, Jr., U.S. Army Reserve, Retired, Ph.D., holds the
Conrad N. Hilton Endowed Chair in computer science at Xavier University of Loui­
siana. He received a B.S. from Loyola University, an M.S. and a Ph.D. from Clemson
University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col­
lege (CGSC). He has served in various positions in the continental United States (CO­
NUS), Kuwait, and Qatar.
Colonel Jerome J. Comello, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D., is a professor of military
studies at the U.S. Army War College (AWC). He received a B.S. from the U.S. Mili­
tary Academy (USMA), an M.S. from George Washington University, and a Ph.D.
from Temple University. He is a graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff
and the National War College. He has served in various positions in CONUS, Viet­
nam, and Germany.
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Cleckner, U.S. Army, Retired, is a professor of op­
erational research at the AWC. He received a B.S. from the USMA, an M.S. from the
Naval Postgraduate School, and he is a graduate of CGSC. He has served in vari­
ous positions in CONUS and Germany.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 77


Mentorship
Growing Company
Grade Officers
Major Nate Hunsinger, U.S. Army

I N 1985, CHIEF OF STAFF of the Army (CSA)


General John A. Wickham, Jr., designated “lead­
ership” as that year’s Army theme and addressed
ment.”5 Mentoring is different from coaching in that
“coaching focuses on here-and-now performance
and is the responsibility of immediate superiors. Su­
a framework designed to produce more effective periors are the mentors and they are concerned with
Army leaders. The benchmark for the framework assessing potential and developing the capabilities and
revolved around senior leaders challenging all lead­ frames of reference that will be required in the fu­
ers within the Army to be mentors to their sub­ ture.”6 The pamphlet pointed out that mentoring
ordinates. Mentoring immediately became an could not be imposed as a requirement. Conse­
Army paradigm. quently, “executive leaders are responsible only for
Wickham quickly generated tremendous support establishing and reinforcing a mentoring structure
for the concept of mentoring, and “[m]entoring through the organization by setting the example.”7
emerged as a primary concept in all leadership Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, ad­
courses throughout the Army’s professional edu­ dresses mentorship to a degree and provides guid­
cation system.”1 The term “mentoring” began to ance on the skills and competencies an effective
appear in official Army publications, and most of­ leader needs. However, the manual falls short in ad­
ficers included “mentoring of subordinates as a ma­ dressing mentoring to prepare leaders for future ser­
jor objective on their Officer Evaluation Support vice. Herein lies the problem: the Army lacks policy
Form.”2 for a formal mentoring program for company grade
officers or that provides senior leaders the frame­
Problem Statement work in which to grow them for future service.
According to Wickham, “the problem was that the
Army had not formulated an official definition of Literature Review
mentoring nor had it established any guidelines for As 21st-century senior leaders face challenges
instituting a mentoring program.”3 This lack of a complicated by rapid technological, economic, and
widely accepted, clear definition of mentoring and social changes, the requirement to find and develop
the absence of an approved mentoring program cre­ future senior leaders of wisdom, vision, intelligence,
ated a void in Army policy, much ambiguity, and was and devotion to the Army and the Nation has never
the beginning of many different interpretations of been greater. Once the Army identifies potential lead­
mentoring and diverse ideas about how to implement ers, an important developmental task is for senior
a mentoring program. Consequently, mentoring came leaders to mentor them and adequately prepare
to mean different things to different people, causing them to meet future challenges.
considerable misunderstanding. Mentoring is a unique, often-misunderstood pro­
During this CSA initiative, U.S. Army publications cess. From a historical perspective, “the term ‘men­
provided minimal coverage of mentoring. Field tor’ is derived from both the Greek language and
Manual (FM) 22-103, Leadership and Command mythology. Mentor was the friend and counselor of
at Senior Levels, did not specifically mention Ulysses, who during his 10-year Odyssey raised
mentoring; however, “it did discuss coaching, teach­ Ulysses’ son.”9 However, mentorship is a dynamic,
ing, and role modeling in the leader development pro­ time-consuming relationship in which the person
cess.”4 mentored matures professionally and personally un­
Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80, Ex­ der the mentor’s tutelage so he can “innovate, think,
ecutive Leadership, provided the best description and adapt to the demands of a fast-paced, highly
of mentoring, defining mentoring as a “process used stressful, rapidly changing environment.”10 For an
to develop the thinking skills and frames of refer­ Army mentoring policy to be effective, the Army
ence for sequential and progressive leader develop­ must first understand what mentorship is.

78 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

In Mentoring at Work: Developmental Rela­ 6. Validating—goal setting.


tionships in Organizational Life, Kathy E. Kram 7. Counseling—emotional support.
describes four common characteristics found in 8. Motivating—encouragement to move on and
mentorships:11 accomplish goals.
1. Individuals (mentees) are allowed to “address 9. Protecting—providing an environment allow­
concerns about self, career, and family by providing ing risk taking; buffer.
opportunities to gain knowledge, skills, and compe­ 10. Communicating—candid, frank interchange of
tence (from their mentors) and to address personal ideas.14
and professional dilemmas (with their mentors).” Kram put the functions of the characteristics best
2. Both participants benefit since the relationships suited for senior leaders into a mentorship model con­
“respond to current needs and concerns of the two sisting of two subgroups: career and psychosocial
people involved.” (figure 1). Career functions are “those aspects of
3. The relationships “occur in an organizational the relationship that enhance career development,
context that greatly influences when and how they while the psychosocial functions enhance the sense
unfold.” of competence, identity, and effectiveness in a pro­
4. These relationships “are not readily available fessional role. If the mentor is two or more levels
to most people in organizations.”12 above his mentee in the organization, his experience,
During the mid-1980 Armywide leadership initia­ rank, and influence within the organization make the
tive, Lieutenant General Charles W. Bagnal coau­ career functions possible. If the mentor is 8 to 15
thored an article called “Leaders as Mentors,” in years older than the mentee, a peer-like relationship
which “[t]he authors supported the common char­ is avoided. . . ; with mutual trust and increasing inti­
acteristics of mentorship by defining the mentor’s macy, the psychosocial functions become more pos­
functions as helping the mentee do the following: sible.”15 One could certainly add Jolemore’s
Clarify career goals and develop a long-term mentoring characteristics to those of Kram’s, but her
strategy for career planning and advancement. list fits his model admirably.
Develop short-term individual development Kram further illustrates that mentorship can be
plans. divided into four phases: initiation, cultivation, sepa­
Develop technical as well as leadership and ration, and redefinition (figure 2). Kram said, “The
management skills through instruction and knowl­ initiation phase averages six months to a year with
edge sharing. the identification of the mentee as one whose po­
Develop the frame of reference, values, and tential is worthy of developing. Contact between the
skills required at higher organizational levels. two reinforces the idea that the mentor relationship
Deal with job-related or personal problems is possible whereby it then becomes important to
through counseling. both participants.”16
Receive the assignments and experience re­ The cultivation phase generally lasts from 2 to 5
quired for advancement through visibility and, as nec­ years. “During this phase, the range of career . . .
essary, intervention.”13 and psychosocial functions that characterize a
Major General Kenneth A. Jolemore offered an­ mentor relationship peaks. Generally, career
other approach to identifying the characteristics of functions emerge first as the mentor provides
mentorship in his July 1986 Military Review article, challenging work, coaching, exposure and visibil­
“The Mentor: More than a Teacher, More than a ity, protection, and/or sponsorship. As the inter­
Coach,” in which he listed 10 mentor functions: personal bond strengthens with time, psycho­
1. Teaching—skills for job performance and fu­ social functions emerge. Sometimes they include
ture growth. primarily role modeling
2. Guiding—unwritten Career Psychosocial and acceptance—confir­
rules, interface with impor­ Functions Functions mation. In instances of
tant people, organizational greater intimacy, they in-
and social behavior. Sponsorship Role modeling clude counseling and friend­
3. Advising—experience ship as well. While career
of a mentor 8 to 15 years Exposure Acceptance functions depend on the
older; wisdom. and visibility and confirmation mentor’s organizational
4. Sponsoring—opportu­ rank, tenure, and experi-
Coaching Counseling
nities for mentee’s growth. ence, psychosocial func­
5. Role modeling behav- Protection Friendship tions depend on the degree
ior—common values wor­ of trust, mutuality, and in-
thy of emulation. Figure 1. Mentoring functions. timacy that characterize

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 79


the relationship.”17 The relationship during this that if one accepts the premise that the true goal of
phase will change as the mentee grows in compe­ a mentor is not to further his mentee’s career, “but
tence and self-worth. This phase ends when to help make the Army better by allowing mentees
changes in individual needs or organizational re­ to develop to their full potential, then both
quirements occur. mentorships, although very different, were success­
The separation phase in Kram’s research gener­ ful.”22 Both mentorships were successful because
ally lasts from 6 months to 2 years “after a signifi­ the mentor helped the mentee develop to his full po­
cant change in the structural role relationship or in tential, and the mentee subsequently served with dis­
the emotional experience of the relationship.”18 In tinction in a position of great responsibility.
the Army, this phase, which normally begins with the The mentorship of Marshall by Pershing comes
permanent change of station of one of the partici­ closest to Kram’s model. The full range of
pants, is an adjustment period because “career and mentorship functions occurred throughout distinct
psychosocial functions can no longer continue in their mentorship phases. The Marshall-Eisenhower rela­
previous form; the loss of some functions, and the tionship was not a classic one. The cultivation and
modification of others, ultimately leads to a redefi­ separation phases were merged into one because
nition of the relationship.”19 of wartime requirements; however, the relationship
Kram says, “The redefinition phase covers an in­ ran the gamut of the mentoring functions—some
definite period after the separation phase. The rela­ stronger than others. Since these historical examples
tionship either ends or develops significantly differ­ support Kram’s mentorship model, one could argue
ent characteristics evolving into a more peer-like that if it worked for Marshall, Pershing, and
friendship. While some functions stop or decrease, Eisenhower, then the model can be written into Army
sponsorship from a distance, occasional counseling policy and used as a standard for senior leaders to
and coaching, and friendship normally continue.”20 use to develop subordinates. Opponents of this model
During this phase, the mentee might be promoted say otherwise, however.
to the same or higher rank in the organization as the Patterson once defined mentorship as a “service
mentor. Kram’s mentorship model is well suited for performed in an atmosphere of mutual trust, profes­
use by Army senior leaders. The model, which de­ sional respect, and comradeship in which selected
fines the phases of mentorship and the functions that senior soldiers share experiences, knowledge, and
can occur within those phases, is dynamic enough challenges with selected junior soldiers, with the goal
to accommodate differences in personalities, posi­ of improving the Army through increased individual
tions, circumstances, and other variables. maturity, higher and deeper levels of knowledge, and
According to Kram, a classic mentorship relation­ the full achievement of potential.”23 He says, “The
ship between two individuals would provide the full chain of command depends on leadership, so lead­
range of the functions and phases described here. ers designate official time for their leadership activi­
However, many such relationships might contain only ties. Leadership has a legal base in the Uniform
a portion of the full range of functions and possibili­ Code of Military Justice, the oath of commission,
ties. The key point is that each mentorship relation­ and the [U.S.] Constitution. The ‘authority’ for
ship will be different because of the varying person­ mentorship, however, is personal consent.”24
alities, backgrounds, capabilities, and talents of the Patterson contends that not everyone can become
individuals involved. a mentor or a mentee. If mentorship were struc­
The absence of one or more of the functions above tured into a formalized program, it would fail.
does not disqualify the relationship from being clas­ Mentorship is simply too idiosyncratic in its approach
sified as a mentorship, however. An example illus­ and far too select in its applicability to be institution­
trative of this and well known throughout military his­ alized. He holds that “the essence of mentorship is
tory is the mentor relationship between General of to improve the force in the long term.”25
the Armies John J. Pershing, Mentoring receives mini-
who mentored General Phase Time Span mal exposure in structured
George C. Marshall, who in classroom instruction in the
turn, mentored General of Initiation 6 months to 2 years Army’s formal military edu­
the Army and later Presi­ cational system. During
dent Dwight D. Eisen­ Cultivation 2 to 5 years leadership instruction at the
hower.” 21 All three men Separation 6 months to 2 years U.S. Military Academy, the
served as Army chief of Command and General
staff. In his article, “Defin- Redefinition Indefinite Staff College, and the Army
ing Mentorship,” Major War College, the concept of
James O. Patterson says Figure 2. Mentorship phases. mentoring is mentioned

80 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


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only along with subjects like coaching, teaching, and Vincenza, Italy, approximately 20 U.S. military of­
counseling. Instructors make no attempt to explore ficers from various career disciplines—fighter pilots,
the concept in depth. The only documented curricu­ navigators, airlifters, air defenders, and so forth—
lum on mentorship I found was at the Infantry formed the “Douhet Society,” named after Italian
School. During the mid-1980s, the leadership cur­ General Giulio Douhet, author of The Command of
riculum at the Infantry Officer Advanced Course the Air.28
defined a mentor as “a trusted counselor and a As the society took shape, many officers dis­
guide, teacher, a coach, and more. He [has] the com­ played great interest by writing papers, establishing
mitment of a guardian and the duty of a tutor. He reading lists, and holding discussions based on their
has a personal stake in the positive development of personal experiences. In the foreword to USAF
his subordinates and is considered an expert in his Pamphlet 36-13, Officer Professional Develop­
field.”26 ment Guide, former USAF Chief of Staff General
The U.S. Navy takes a similar position. In 1999, Larry Welch says professional development is a
691 active and retired admirals were asked for rec­ “daily business.”29 USAF Manual 1-1, Basic Aero­
ommendations for improving the mentoring process space Doctrine of the United States Air Force,
in the Navy. They responded emphatically that they gives officers the “vector” to develop themselves and
did not want a formalized system. Although they en­ their subordinates professionally.30 The Douhet So­
dorsed the value and importance of mentoring, they ciety is a tool that commanders, units, or groups of
believed such relationships must develop spontane­ interested officers can use to achieve that end. In
ously and that senior officers must choose carefully the absence of a written policy, it provides mutually
those they wish to mentor. directed guidance that can enhance an organization’s
In the article, “Does Mentoring Foster Success,” combat effectiveness organization while profession­
Brad Johnson and others say, “True mentorship can­ ally developing its members.
not be ordered, forced, or taught. It is a natural re­ At the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S.
sult of harmonious rapport inherent in the people Marine Corps (USMC) introduced the TEAM Prin­
themselves and the relationship they develop. It is a ciple—a model to train, empower, acknowledge, and
natural process that needs no planned process. If mentor its junior leaders. This simple, but effective
you are good, you will be recognized, and if you are principle teaches young marines to become techni­
fortunate, your superiors will have the opportunity cally and tactically proficient through tough, realis­
to assist in your career development. Mentoring is tic training on how to be successful on the battle­
a natural process; don’t mess with it.”27 field. Giving them the responsibility and authority to
In 1993, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) took another carry out assigned missions fosters trust and respect
approach to mentoring. At Headquarters, Fifth Al­ that enhances and furthers mission accomplishment.
lied Tactical Air Force, a NATO headquarters in The Society rewards Marines with ribbons at the

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 81


end of each exercise and provides on-the-spot feed­ cializing, and training [and] being for that individual
back so participants know what they need to im­ a role model, teacher, coach, adviser, and guide.”34
prove on. The Society uses a mentoring aspect to Of those surveyed, 88 percent agreed that the of­
open lines of communication between leaders to ficer should first be a role model and then a mentor
share knowledge with subordinates. and that commanders should be evaluated on the
Some USMC officers believe mentoring is an art extent to which they develop the officers serving un­
that cannot be formalized; others believe mentoring der them. General officers felt the professional de­
is a science that should be formalized. The TEAM velopment of subordinates was just as much a
principle recommends that mentoring never become leader’s responsibility as accomplishing an organi­
formalized because mentoring is simply expressing zational mission. However, 59 percent of the par­
a personal or professional experience that might en­ ticipants said they had not had a mentor.
hance another person’s job performance. The study also found that mentorship was the de­
Mentoring is not just top down or bottom up; it is sired style of leadership in the Army. A mentorship
also side to side and should not be formalized but style of leadership “is characterized by open com­
open and continuous. Many years ago, General John munication with subordinates, role modeling of ap­
Lejeune wrote, “The young American responds propriate values, effective use of counseling for sub­
quickly and readily to the exhibition of qualities of ordinate development, and sharing of the leader’s
leadership on the part of his officers.”31 In a recent frame of reference with subordinate leaders.”35
article, Captain Chris S. Richie says, “All leaders, An in-depth survey of Army and civilian litera­
regardless of their charisma or natural abilities to ture on mentoring, with a careful analysis of studies
lead, can enhance their effectiveness through sci­ on mentoring in the military, supports the generally
entific application of the TEAM principle. I adhered accepted view that the primary purpose of mentoring
to the TEAM principle during a challenging leader­ is to develop future leaders. For the most part, the
ship event in my career and found that the Marines Army agrees with the theories, ideas, and opinions
became more committed to the exercise and to one of civilian academia.
another than to themselves. The TEAM principle In spite of the findings from across the services,
works. Military leaders who use it will grow as lead­ most of the research can be assembled into a fairly
ers. They will also have the satisfaction of knowing cohesive application of mentorship. The application
that they contributed to the retention of fine young also fits nicely into Kram’s characteristics and func­
Americans we are privileged and entrusted to tions model. Each description of an agreed-on
lead.”32 mentorship program can be broken down into ca­
reer and psychosocial functions. Although Kram’s
Problem Analysis mentorship phases vary from mentor to mentee, she
In 1985, Wickham directed a study to determine concludes that leaders often disagree over which
whether or not to institute an Armywide formal or functions are most important. However, the study
informal mentoring program. Bagnal tasked the study found that current Armywide mentorship functions
group to look at the entire Army and make recom­ include role modeling, teaching, advising, sponsoring,
mendations for an officer professional development counseling, guiding, motivating, and protecting.
program to year 2025. The study was the first to Because leaders’ ideas vary about what exactly
address mentoring as a tool for improving the lead­ mentorship is, a mentorship program is not clearly
ership and professional development of officers. conceptualized; this leads to confusion about what
The group examined all aspects of the officer pro­ mentorship does and how the process works.
fessional development system examined in what be­ Mentoring appears to mean one thing to some, an­
came known as the Professional Development Of­ other thing to others. Teaching, sponsoring, counsel­
ficer Study. The study, which included a review of ing, role modeling, coaching, and protecting are not
officer professional development through education, mentoring as traditionally defined. Rather, they rep­
training, and socialization within the Army, collected resent only some of the many functions the mentor
data from over 14,000 officers and included more performs. The current functions are simply charac­
than half of the serving general officers. As a re­ teristics required of any good leader.
sult of the findings, the “professional development The Pershing-Marshall and Marshall-Eisenhower
framework was designed which depicted profes­ mentor-mentee relationships demonstrate that a spe­
sional development occurring throughout an officer’s cial professional relationship exists that exhibits most
career in both peace and war.”33 of the characteristics of the traditional model of
Mentoring is one of the many issues the study ad­ mentoring. Both relationships were idiosyncratic:
dressed. The study group defined mentor as “a they were not products of a formalized mentoring
leader involved in developing through education, so­ program. Both relationships were strictly voluntary:

82 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

each was initiated because of a mutual need and tains to the limit of their experience; brigade com­
desire and developed according to individual lead­ manders can mentor captains in how to become suc­
ership styles. The success of the relationship resulted cessful company commanders.
from the mentor’s exceptional ability, self-confidence, 5. [T]he goal of any mentorship should be to al­
commitment, dedication, and experience and the low the mentee to develop to his or her full poten­
mentees’ uniquely great potential. It follows then that tial, thereby making the Army better, rather than just
the traditional model of mentorship is available and furthering the mentee’s career.”37
applicable to only a select few.
In March 1989, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Wil­ Possible Solutions
son, referencing the Marshall example, wrote a pa­ There are three possible courses of action
per on the application of mentorship at the Army War (COAs) to implement a viable mentorship program
College, addressing five steps that must occur for a in the Army, each having its pros and cons.
mentorship to take place where a traditional model COA 1. Develop and implement a mentorship
is not present:36 policy from the top down that uses researched
1. “[T]he mentor must invest a great deal of time metrics for every commander to use as a bench­
and energy into his mentee’s development. The vo­ mark for mentoring.
luminous correspondence between Marshall and Pros. The program can—
Eisenhower during World War II speaks highly of Fill the current void that exists in Army policy
their commitment to success and the importance by defining mentorship and by providing guidance on
they attached to the relationship. how to be an effective mentor.
2. [T]he mentor cannot expect the mentee to be­ Be subject to revision based on feedback from
come his clone. One of the prominent features of the field.
the Marshall relationships was that neither [were] Be used as a teaching tool in the service
characterized by the mentor actively trying to shape schools instead of the minimal coverage that
his mentee into a mirror image of himself. mentorship presently receives.
3. [B]oth parties must benefit from the experi­ Give junior leaders guidance on how to be ef­
ence. Pershing and Marshall derived great satisfac­ fective mentors as their experience begins to build.
tion not just from the fact that their mentees suc­ Instill trust and confidence that senior leaders
ceeded but that they succeeded while reinforcing the recognize the need for a formal program and are
values of their mentors. willing to address it.
4. [S]uccessful mentorship can occur at any level Cons. A formal mentorship program might result
in the Army. Colonels can effectively mentor cap­ in ambiguity because the definition and practice of

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 83


mentorship vary from leader to leader, and— to each unit’s mission and training goals. Field
Resentment can cause the program to be “just manuals and publications are a guide for command­
another check-the-block” program. ers to use in the decisionmaking process. A
Officers will only get out of the program what mentorship program tailored in this regard should
they put into it. be no different. The resources that create this
Measuring the program’s effectiveness might mentorship model can be acquired through study
be difficult because it is subjective. and research.
COA 2. Require commanders to institute a bot­ The key to the mentorship program’s success is
tom-up mentorship program that follows mentor­ command emphasis and accurate and timely feed­
ship’s basic tenets set by a new Army policy and, back through the chain of command to ensure its
subsequently, require them to report milestones. continued success, beginning with the CSA and end­
Pros: This approach— ing with the second lieutenant in charge of a pla­
Gives commanders and junior leaders the flex­ toon. The Army is a hierarchal organization. For a
ibility to develop tailor-made programs. mentorship program to succeed, it must be devel­
Decentralizes the program with reoccurring oped from the top down.
oversight to monitor progress. A mentorship program must be broad enough to
Can instill trust and confidence in company grant commanders the freedom to develop junior
grade leaders that senior leaders recognize the need leaders as they see fit from the bottom up yet be
for a formal program and are willing to address it. direct enough that adequate boundaries and defini­
Fosters professional growth because the pro­ tions are provided to achieve stated goals. The ba­
gram is driven from the bottom up. sic tenets of the traditional mentorship model—role
Cons: In this approach— modeling, coaching, teaching, advising, sponsoring,
Measuring performance of each program counseling, guiding, motivating, and protecting—
would be subjective, not quantifiable. should be included in Army doctrine for leader de­
There would be no Department of the Army velopment. However, fostering those tenets should
standard to use as a benchmark. be up to battalion and brigade commanders in the
Every unit would have a different definition of field. Their challenge will be to develop a results-
how to conduct mentoring, which could cause oriented approach to mentoring that can be mea­
confusion when the officer departs for the next duty sured over time. This program can mirror the char­
station. acteristics of any self-directed team found in any
COA 3. Leave FM 22-100 as it is and do noth­ high-performance organization.
ing. I believe the combination of centralized planning
Pros: Leaving things as they are— and decentralized execution will provide the neces­
Would allow commanders to define and imple­ sary framework to set boundaries from which field
ment mentorship programs as they see fit and when commanders can have the flexibility to establish
they see fit. mentorship programs as they see fit. In turn, the
Does not force commanders to pursue men­ framework will provide senior Army leaders a foun­
tor relationships. dation on which to build and implement a program
Cons: If things are left as they are— beneficial across the force.
Company grade officers would not benefit by Eric and Bud Van Slyke are managing directors
learning from senior leaders in structured mentorship of HR Alliance, a human resources consulting firm
programs. in Greensboro, North Carolina. They suggest a 7­
Company grade leaders would lose faith and step, results-oriented, business approach to mentoring
trust in senior leaders because mentorship would I feel would be effective in implementing such a pro­
be provided to only a select few. gram. The Army could tailor these steps to meet its
The officer corps would shrink because of needs. The steps are as follows:
a lack of faith and trust. 1. “Identify potential at all levels. Earmark pro­
Mentorship would be found by way of luck fessionally trained college graduates who are per­
and timing of assignments. ceived to have management potential. Develop a
greater variety of employees. Nurture that potential
Solution and Implementation to ensure that all employees meet organizational ob­
I recommend that a formalized Army mentor- jectives and individual goals so to become an inte­
ship policy combine COAs 1 and 2. I advocate grated part of the culture.”
centralized planning of a mentorship model from 2. “Develop the right skills. Traditional mentoring
the Department of the Army with decentralized taught employees how to ‘play the game.’ New
execution at battalion and brigade levels tailored mentoring must be linked to performance-based

84 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MENTAL PREPAREDNESS
competencies. They must learn how to interpret and guidance and direction for senior Army leaders while
use the information that flows through the work­ providing commanders the flexibility to tailor their
place. They must develop their people skills when unit’s individual mentorship program within that
dealing with a diverse group of organizational stake­ framework. An Army mentorship policy would pro­
holders.” vide the standard from which all commanders could
3. “Protect your people investment. Mentorship derive their unit’s specific mentorship programs.
can retain the workforce so attrition is reduced and
job satisfaction increased.” Justification
4. “Develop individual employability. Mentoring The results of a 2001 report on captain attrition
should focus on developing and broadening individual indicate company grade officer attrition in the Army
skill sets that create maximum flexibility and personal could be attributed to lack of communication be­
responsibility for meeting the demands of the work­ tween junior officers and their immediate supervi­
place.” sors.39 Drawing on a variety of sources and other
5. “Foster communication. Mentoring needs to in­ research, Colonel Albert Johnson concluded,
tegrate the individual employee into the core orga­ “Recent initiatives for reducing attrition would fail
nization, not just in his department but companywide unless midlevel managers—majors and lieutenant
from suppliers to customers to senior executives. A colonels—do a better job of communicating with
more informed employee is a more effective and lieutenants and captains.”40
productive one.” Johnson also says, “The lack of communication
6. “Break down boundaries affecting high perfor­ with junior officers results in those officers trying to
mance. Encourage mentoring relationships across di­ figure out a direction for their careers without guid­
versity lines and functional areas to reinforce the ance, leadership, or mentoring. Combine that with a
team concept. Mentoring must go beyond just im­ robust economy, and officers who believe they are
proving morale and attitudes. Use it to reduce stove­ not going to be challenged and led will feel they may
pipe thinking and individual focus.” as well go elsewhere and earn more money.”41
7. “Reinforce organizational mission, vision, and To do nothing and leave mentorship up to luck and
values. Ultimately, mentoring should improve produc­ timing of assignments would be a disservice to
tivity by reinforcing job objectives, organizational the Army’s company grade leaders and would
goals, and modes of interaction.”38 not allow us to earmark and retain quality person­
These steps, when used with Kram’s model, nel. Traditional mentoring means are inadequate and
could serve as the framework for the Army staff will not suffice to develop a self-aware, adaptive
to use to write a mentorship policy that provides force. MR

NOTES
1. John C. Krysa, “Mentoring—More Than Just Another Trendy Concept,” Field Ar­ 23. Ibid., 37.
tillery Journal (November-December 1985): 17. 24. Ibid., 36-37.
2. U.S. Department of the Army (DA), “Results of the Professional Development of 25. Ibid., 39.
Officers Study (PDOS) Group Report,” Washington, D.C., February 1985, 8. 26. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Officer Advanced Course Leadership Core
3. GEN John A. Wickham, Jr., letter to the Army’s General Officers, 8 November Curriculum,” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1984, 7-12.
1985. (No other publishing data given.) 27. W. Brad Johnson, Jennifer M. Huwe, Anne M. Fallow, LCDR Rakesh Lall, CPT
4. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Lev­ Elizabeth K. Holmes, and William Hall, “Does Mentoring Foster Success,” Proceed­
els (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], June 1987), 9-10. ings (December 1999): 46.
5. DA Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989). 28. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1984);
6. Ibid. LTC Kimble D. Stohry, “The Douhet Society,” Airpower Journal (Spring 1993): 22.
7. Ibid., 50. 29. GEN Larry Welch, in U.S. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 36-2611 (formerly AFP
8. FM 22-100, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: GPO, August 1999). 36-13), Officer Professional Development Guide, foreword. (No other publishing data
9. LTG Charles W. Bagnal, Earl C. Pence, and LTC Thomas N. Meriwether, “Lead­ given.)
ers as Mentors,” Military Review (July 1985): 6. 30. U.S. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air
10. Ibid., 5. Force (March 1984, revised March 1992). (No other publishing data given.)
11. Kathy E. Kram, Mentoring at Work: Developmental Relationships in Organizational 31. MG John A. Kejeune, Marine Corps Manual, quoted in Marine Corps Reference
Life (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1985), 2. Publication 6-11B, Marine Corps Values: A Users Guide for Discussion Leaders (Wash­
12. Ibid. ington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 20 October 1998), 20-1.
13. Bagnal and others, 7. 32. CPT Chris S. Richie, “Try the TEAM Principle,” Proceedings (July 2001): 77.
14. MG Kenneth A. Joelmore, “The Mentor: More Than a Teacher, More Than a 33. DA, PDOS Report, 52.
Coach,” Military Review (July 1986): 8-10. 34. Ibid., C4.
15. Kram, 23. 35. Ibid., 5.
16. Ibid., 51-53. 36. LTC Stephen E. Wilson, “Senior Leader Mentorship,” Study Project, U.S. Army
17. Ibid., 53. War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 1989, 25-26.
18. Ibid., 49. 37. Ibid., 25-26.
19. Ibid., 56-57. 38. Erik J. Van Slyke, Bud Van Slyke, “Mentoring: A Results Oriented Approach,” HR
20. Ibid., 49. Focus (February 1998): 14.
21. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (New 39. Jim Tice, “Junior Officers want more communication, new report says,” Army Times,
York: The Viking Press, 1973), 483. 11 June 2001, 14.
22. MAJ James O. Patterson, “Defining Mentorship,” Armor (November-December 40. COL Albert Johnson, quoted in Tice.
1985): 38. 41. Ibid.

Major Nathan B. Hunsinger, Jr., U.S. Army, is the Operations Officer, Division Mate­
riel Management Center of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York. He received
a B.A. from DeSales University, an M.S. from Webster University, and he is a graduate of
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command
and staff positions in Germany, Bosnia, Jordan, Iraq, and the continental United States.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 85


2d Place 2004 MacArthur Writing Award Winner

From One to Three Sixty

Assessing
Leaders
Major Craig Whiteside, U.S. Army

The efficiency report is the most disturbing ad­ review others’ perceptions of their leadership abili­
ministrative farce in the Army. It is the measure ties and characteristics and could spur self-reflec­
of “following” and not leading. Its weight in tion when their self-perception differs from others’.
“tickets of success” allows officers of incompe­ Does the Army really need a 360-degree evalua­
tence in leadership to advance. tion system? The Army recently revamped the Of­
—anonymous Army captain, U.S. Army War Col­ ficer Evaluation System with an emphasis on more
lege Study on Military Professionalism, 1970 senior-to-subordinate counseling and Officer Evalu­
The General Officers in the U.S. Army would ation Report (OER) counseling at the end of the rat­
gain much from having instruction and develop­ ing period. This has improved the dialogue from se­
ing an understanding on “selfless service” ver­ niors to subordinates, especially since the new OER
has blocks in which to report mandatory counseling
sus “selfish service.” Most are preoccupied with
meetings. In addition to counseling, the Army’s
their careers. Unfortunately, this is the type of leader-development program is an effective process
officer the system moves along. that provides periodic feedback for subordinates to
—anonymous Army major, U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College Survey, 2000 improve over time.1 Yet all these programs are
senior-to-subordinate-intensive. None give raters a

T HE U.S. ARMY celebrated the arrival of the


21st century with a much-needed Transfor­
mation effort that applies to everything from force
feel for what subordinates or peers think about the
leader, if that is indeed important.
The first chapter of Field Manual (FM) 22-100,
structure to logistics. Leader education schools are Army Leadership, quoting Confederate Colonel
changing to reflect new demands on junior and Albert G. Jenkins, alludes to the subordinate’s role
midlevel leaders in response to the changing opera­ in leadership and command: “To our subordinates
tional environment. Yet a common theme, as seen we owe everything we are or hope to be. For it is
in the two quotes given, reveals what the Army as our subordinates, not our superiors, who raise us to
an institution has yet to address—how subordinates the dizziest of professional heights, and it is our sub­
or peers evaluate their leaders. A 360-degree leader- ordinates who can and will, if we deserve it, bury
evaluation tool would provide a substantial improve­ us in the deepest mire of disgrace. When the chips
ment for the Future Force in its mission to produce are down and our subordinates have accepted us
the best leaders to face current and future chal­ as their leader, we don’t need any superior to tell
lenges. us; we see it in their eyes and in their faces in the
A 360-degree evaluation system elicits and pro­ barracks, on the field, and on the battle line. And on
vides feedback about leaders—supervisors, peers, that final day when we must be ruthlessly demand­
or subordinates. With the supervisor’s comments ing, cruel and heartless, they will rise as one to do
being an exception, feedback is anonymous to elimi­ our bidding, knowing full well that it may be their
nate possible retribution. The rater’s comments are last act in this life.”2
part of developmental counseling, which includes a I believe subordinates do have a vote, especially
detailed account of another’s strengths and weak­ on the battlefield. But do they have anything worth­
nesses and perceived methods for possible improve­ while to contribute to the leadership development of
ment. A 360-degree system would allow subjects to their leaders? In the past 30 years, two Army sur­

86 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


ASSESSING LEADERS

US Military Academy
An engineering instructor working with
cadets at the U.S. Military Academy. Twice a
semester, cadets submit reports on super­
visors, selected peers, and all subordinates
for review by company tactical officers
responsible for cadet development.

veys have touched on subordinates’ perceptions of development program as found in the earlier AWC
leaders, with some disturbing conclusions. study.5 Little progress had been made in standard­
In 1970, the Army fought one war in Vietnam izing a leader-development process outside of com­
while also preparing for a possible war with the So­ missioning sources or education systems.
viet Union. Chief of Staff of the Army General Wil­ In contrast, since 1970, the proliferation of the
liam C. Westmoreland tasked the U.S. Army War 360-degree evaluation tool in the private sector has
College (AWC) to conduct a study of Army pro­ been spectacular. Many leading Fortune 500 com­
fessionalism. Many of the comments the report cap­ panies use some form of 360-degree feedback in
tured reflected a decline in standards of ethics and their sophisticated leader-development and fast-track
leadership that threatened Army professionalism. programs. In a business environment where orga­
The report made dozens of recommendations to nizations fight to keep highly trained and motivated
Army leaders to help address junior officers’ con­ workers from moving to rival companies, CEOs
cerns. One recommendation was to implement “as have a vested interest in knowing what subordinates
a supplementary input to officer efficiency files, the feel about midlevel managers and which ones are
results of peer ratings which would be compiled from accomplishing organizational goals and objectives
periodic solicitations . . . of comments by selected while maintaining a productive work environment.
officers on those contemporaries with whom they Consulting organizations such as the Center for Cre­
have served.”3 Another recommendation was to ative Leadership offer clients many versions of 360­
have “students at the [U.S. Army Command and degree systems.6
General Staff College] and [the U.S. Army War Many Army schools that use the 360-degree as­
College] submit confidential comments on prospec­ sessment system have a high reputation for leader
tive selectees to brigadier general [to] the president development. The U.S. Army Ranger School has
of the board to use as he [saw] fit.”4 The study long used a combination of evaluated patrols by lane
found one source of problems to be the promotion walkers and peer reports to determine whether a
of officers whose superiors viewed them much student should continue to the next phase of the
more positively than did their subordinates. course. Infantry School leaders apparently believe
In the spring of 2000, Chief of Staff of the Army peer rankings and comments are important in a
General Eric K. Shinseki initiated a review of Army course that demands close teamwork and a combi­
leadership as part of the Transformation effort. nation of leadership and service to other leaders.
Shinseki’s Army Training and Leader Development Another leadership institution, the U.S. Military
Panel study revealed some of the same shortcom­ Academy (USMA), uses a 360-degree assess­
ings in the area of “senior-subordinate confidence ment process as an integral part of the leader de­
and contact” and the lack of a functional leader- velopment of cadets each year. Twice a semester,

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 87


cadets submit reports on supervisors, selected peers, nately, these subordinate evaluations are not anony­
and all subordinates on an electronic form synthe­ mous to the “big boss,” and I knew who had sub­
sized and data-organized for review by company tac­ mitted the comments. I shared the feedback with
tical officers (commissioned officers responsible for the first sergeant (without revealing the subordinate’s
cadet development in a cadet company). The com­ identity) to see what her reaction would be. She re­
pany tactical officers incorporate feedback into bi­ sponded quite well, considering. Later, I called in the
annual counseling for cadets. Most officers deduce cadet and his squad leader. I read several of his sub­
trends from the comments and relay this informa­ missions and asked what he was trying to prove.
tion to the cadets. Other cadets might receive cop­ He was ashamed and eventually apologized face­
ies of anonymous raw comments. The USMA has to-face to everyone he had maligned. I wondered
used this 360-degree assessment since the late whether he apologized because he thought I would
1980s when leaders first incorporated the Cadet reveal his identity to others, or because he felt it was
Leader Development System. How well does such the right thing to do. But the incident illustrates that
a system work? subordinates cannot subvert the evaluation process
From 2000 to 2003, while I was a company tac­ if it is conducted properly.
tical officer, I doubted the feasibility of a 360-degree I believe the best benefit of a 360-degree system
assessment within a large organization and did not is that it gives supervisors a different perspective
use the 360-degree assessments much. Many of the about those with whom they work. I used the 360­
computer-generated evaluations were obviously per­ degree system to examine discrepancies between
functory entries, involving little to no effort. The what I thought of a subordinate and what everyone
evaluations, which were ungraded, were not a top else did. It is easy to become too confident in one’s
priority for the cadets, and they provided little use­ judgment or the belief that one cannot be fooled.
ful information. Eventually, however, I realized what Someone else might view the workhorse you rely
a good tool evaluations could be if used correctly. on and admire greatly in a much different way than
One method was to include all leader evaluations you do, especially subordinates who might be doing
signed by their subordinates in cadet counseling the work but not getting the credit. I suspect this is
packets, which made the evaluations items to be what is at the root of most problems with the
inspected. Army’s promotion system—a single officer or non­
Another method was to use the feedback during commissioned officer’s perspective does not really
cadets’ biannual professional counseling sessions, tell the whole story. A proper balance between be­
which focused on overall cadet development; future ing highly thought of by superiors and having the re­
plans and goals; branch and post selections; future spect and (sometimes grudging) admiration of sub­
leadership positions; and so on. At the end of the ordinates and peers is desirable.
sessions, I gave each cadet a specially selected (and The new force-stabilization policies, which will
anonymous) cross-section of comments about them­ keep soldiers and young officers in the same units
selves and asked them what they thought. I was not for many years, provide great opportunities for lead­
sure this tactic was helpful until I dismissed one ca­ ers to get to know subordinates and to conduct ef­
det from a lengthy counseling session during which fective, long-term leader-development practices. To
I forgot to include subordinate and peer comments. do this, the Army needs more than one perspec­
The cadet returned later and asked for this feed­ tive—and a 360-degree evaluation system. MR
back, having heard from others about it. This com­
ment spoke volumes to me about cadets’ desires to NOTES
1. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: U.S.
find out what their strengths and weaknesses were Government Printing Office, August 1999).
2. COL Albert G. Jenkins, Confederate States of America, quoted in Ibid., 1-15.
and what others felt about them. Many were sur­ 3. U.S. Army War College (AWC), Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle, PA:
prised by what they learned, especially the cocky AWC, 1970), vii.
4. Ibid.
ones who thought they were “already there”—fin­ 5. William M. Steele and Robert P. Walters, Jr., “Training and Developing Army
Leaders,” Military Review (July-August 2001): 6.
ished with leader development and ready to be lieu­ 6. For information about the Center for Creative Leadership, see on-line at
<www.ccl.org/CCLCommerce/index.aspx>, accessed 29 June 2004.
tenants.
Those not in favor of 360-degree feedback worry Major Craig A. Whiteside, U.S. Army, is G3, Op­
that people can abuse these evaluations to target erations, at U.S. Army, Alaska. He received a B.S.
leaders who are actually doing the right things. A from the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), an M.A.
from Long Island University, and he is a graduate
leader who is attuned to the unit’s environment can of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col­
identify this threat easily. In one case, a sophomore lege (CGSC). He has served in various positions in
wrote sarcastic, unprofessional comments about the the 24th Infantry Division, the 82d Airborne Divi­
company first sergeant, such as, “She motivates sion, and the USMA. He is the 2004 second-place
winner of the CGSC MacArthur Writing Award.
me . . . to want to punch her in the face.” Fortu­

88 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


Swiss Armed Forces
and the Challenges of
the 21st Century
Lieutenant Colonel Laurent Michaud, Swiss Army

M ILITARY transformation, which is an on­


going process in most Western countries, re­
quires much effort and engenders significant debate
The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the emer­
gence of asymmetrical threats caused the Swiss
Government and its citizen-soldiers to reflect on a
and controversy. Despite its small, uniquely geopo­ national defense strategy. The Armed Forces trans­
litical sphere of influence and its traditional political formation has since become a subject of permanent
neutrality, Switzerland finds itself engaged in military discussion in the media and on the political scene.
reform similar to that of other Western countries.
Throughout the Cold War, Switzerland maintained Armed Forces of ‘95
a defensive capability and, like no other country in For centuries, Switzerland has been a multicultural
Europe, prepared itself to defeat a Warsaw Pact of­ democracy enjoying military neutrality.1 This type of
fensive. The principles of the Swiss Armed Forces, system made it difficult to initiate change. For ex­
by which the country gained independence in 1648, ample, Switzerland took more than 5 years to draft
were applied to Swiss political, economic, and mili­ the first military reform program in response to the
tary structures. changing global environment. The military’s size and
After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Switzerland its close integration into society contributed to de­
mobilized its forces within 24 hours and fielded laying the reform, and political insecurity associated
650,000 soldiers in days. The forces were organized with a lengthy voting process concerning military is­
into 4 army corps equipped with 1,000 tanks, 1,500 sues exacerbated the situation. The process even­
armored personnel carriers, 1,300 105- and 155-mil­ tually resulted in the approval of sustaining 34 com­
limeter artillery pieces, 1,500 antitank guns, and 2,000 bat fighter planes and the refusal to commit troops
antiaircraft guns. In addition, Switzerland’s air forces under UN authority.
mobilized 300 aircraft. In total, 10 percent of the Political decisions made before the first military
population was prepared to ardently defend Swiss transformation initiative included troop cutbacks from
territories. 650,000 to 400,000 soldiers, basic training reduced
As early as the 1950s, the national defense plan from 17 to 15 weeks, and the mandatory retirement
included destroying key strategic infrastructures and age lowered from 55 to 42. These measures did not
constructing private and public shelters to protect the take into consideration all the Armed Forces’ re­
population against nuclear, biological, and chemical quirements, however. They sacrificed the military’s
attacks. All bridges, tunnels, and highways and most maneuver flexibility for the benefit of political con­
of the industrial base could be destroyed within a sensus, which resulted in the reform campaign slo­
few hours with explosive charges pre-positioned in gan: “More muscles and less fat.” The Armed
the immediate vicinity. Even 19th-century landmark Forces of ‘95 reform led to an organization focused
tunnels—St. Gotthard and Simplon—would have almost exclusively on high-intensity conflicts,
been destroyed without any reservation. leaving little flexibility with which to deal with

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 89


low-intensity and nonconventional threats. The need to develop a new military doctrine is
The reform revealed the military’s inability to clear; it is fundamental for the “Swiss Armed Forces
transform and questioned the use of World War II- XXI” transformation. Presently, the Swiss Armed
vintage doctrine. Since 1997, Switzerland has elimi­ Forces are prepared to defend their homeland us­
nated obsolete systems such as Bloodhound missiles, ing reserve components, collaborating with neighbor­
unmotorized artillery, and tanks without stabilized tur­ ing countries on a limited basis, and deploying op­
rets, but true transformation of the Swiss military erational elements abroad. The security policy report
requires more fundamental reforms. calls for a military capable of providing security for
its strategic environment, a credible force that is
Four Steps to Transformation ready to engage, and one that is capable of support­
The Swiss Federal Council envisioned a four-step
ing a deployed national military force integrated with
transformation process to take place between 1996
a larger multinational effort. Switzerland should pre­
and 2003. The first step was to establish a long-term
pare itself for a war against an identified enemy with
perspective with the 1996 Brunner Commission,
known capabilities and adopt a more global perspec­
which included politicians, economists, scientists, and
tive in which only a small military force would be
other well-known people. The Commission’s purpose
was to analyze the geostrategic situation, identify required.
potential threats for the next 20 to 25 years, and rec­ The Swiss Armed Forces received three strate­
ommend future policy. gic missions that had significant changes from the
After 18 months of hearings and visits to numer­ 1990 NSS draft, including the following:
ous governmental organizations and foreign coun­ Peace support and crisis management. The
tries, the Commission delivered a 30-page report, military became a key component in preserving
which included 19 recommendations.2 The report Swiss interests. By participating in international
asked how the Swiss could best defend the country peace support and crisis management, Switzerland
under then-current circumstances and still promote committed to the stability of the strategic environ­
peace and democracy in the world. With this in mind, ment by deploying military assets for stabilization and
the Swiss know the importance of— international crisis management operations under
Engagement in joint efforts for peace as an ex­ mandates covered by international law, preparing for
pression of visible solidarity. such operations in multinational or bilateral coopera­
Cooperation with neighboring countries and tion with other armed forces.
other alliances working for peace, because the Swiss Protection and defense (homeland defense).
cannot counter all threats and dangers on their own. This mission protects the population with a major
Continuous adaptation of security arrangements conventional force. Below the threshold of war, the
to meet the everchanging nature of global threats. Swiss Armed Forces protect strategically important
Maintaining a militia (reserve component), even areas and contribute to security and stability within
though reduced in size, that could be expanded at Switzerland and the region. In case of a military
any time. threat, the Armed Forces are to defend the popula­
The raison d’être of neutrality is increasingly be­ tion, the territory, and the airspace and provide maxi­
ing questioned. Nevertheless, it retains its place in the mum freedom of action for the government. If nec­
Swiss collective mind. Federal authorities, therefore, essary, federal authorities can authorize the Armed
should continue applying neutrality pragmatically and Forces to conduct defensive operations as part of
with flexibility. Neutrality must never adversely af­ an alliance with another state.
fect security. Neutrality has always been a means Prevention and management of existential dan­
to promote Swiss interests, not an end in itself. gers by participating in disaster relief, humanitarian
The second step was to define a national secu­ assistance, and civil security operations (such as pro­
rity strategy (NSS) adapted to contemporary and tecting specific installations and easing the burden
future threats. The June 1999 “Report of the Feder­ on the police or the Frontier Guards Corps). The
al Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Armed Forces will have only a subsidiary role, with
Policy of Switzerland” (equivalent to the U.S. NSS) operational responsibility remaining with civilian au­
gave a precise scope and defined its strategy on a thorities. The Armed Forces would be used prima­
fundamental concept, reuniting actions, and princi­ rily when civilian assets are insufficient. The armed
pal behavior on the questions of the politics of se­ forces become part of the comprehensive and flex­
curity.3 ible security cooperation.4

90 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


SWISS TRANSFORMATION

US Air Force

A Swiss soldier briefs Ukranian delegation members


on a telephone microwave link during the U.S. European
Command-sponsored exercise Combined Endeavor
2004, Lager Aulenbach, Germany , 17 May 2004.

The third step was to conduct a legal review with Militia officers and Swiss Department of Defense
the support of Parliament—as well as the popula­ professional officers and civilians say the success
tion—to allow for a flexible transformation. of Armed Forces XXI will be based on the ability
The fourth step was to develop a new doctrine to operate under an autonomous national or inter­
and corresponding force structure based on the 2004 national command structure. But, Armed Forces can
Armed Forces White Paper.5 In the security policy be international partners only if they are credible and
report, the Federal Assembly opted for several po­ if credibility is based on—
litical choices to lead the Swiss Armed Forces XXI The ability to identify common threat or equiva­
transformation to— lent readiness standards with benchmarking force­
Construct future Armed Forces on the prin­ on-force exercises with foreign formations and a
ciples of a militia system. Mandatory military ser­ relative certification process. The goal is to attain
vice is anchored in the federal constitution, as well interoperability.
as Swiss society itself.6 The capability to respond after an initial warn­
Support the new engagement policy. Active ing to a threat. A risk analysis, similar to those of
units should be available at all times. The increase other neutral countries, shows that conventional war
in active units is a sine qua non for the success of is only one potential scenario and that other impor­
the reform. tant asymmetrical threats should be taken into con­
Guarantee good military basic training. Improv­ sideration.
ing the Armed Forces’ multifunctional and interna­ The capability to cooperate with other Armed
tional interoperability would increase the number of Forces while helping stabilize the Swiss strategic en­
professional soldiers (instructors).7 vironment by promoting peace.
To secure the Armed Forces transformation, Armed Forces XXI strategic doctrine brings a dif­
Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Hans- ferent concept into the sectors where the means
Ulrich Scherrer imposed a new philosophy cemented must be engaged. Being exclusively centered on the
by U.S. Army General Gordon R. Sullivan’s “doc­ national territory for centuries, the Swiss Armed
trine and design,” imperatives: quality people, leader Forces must distinguish three zones:
development, modern equipment, doctrine, force mix, 1. The strategic environment (essentially in Eu­
and training.8 rope) in which Swiss Armed Forces contribute to

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 91


US Army
Soldiers of the 503d Infantry (Airborne) move
toward a Swiss Air Force AS-332 Super Puma
that will extract them from Heritage Drop Zone
near Klina, Kosovo, during Rapid Guardian 03.

promoting peace and obtaining interoperability with creased military training cooperation. On 2 Decem­
other Armed Forces. ber 2001, 78 percent of the population defeated a
2. The operative terrain, where Armed Forces proposal to eliminate the Armed Forces. On 3 March
XXI should cooperate with the concerned countries 2002, with 54.6 percent of the vote, Switzerland ap­
(in the case of preparation) and after the decision proved the people’s initiative for Switzerland’s mem­
of the political authorities (in the case of defense). bership in the UN.10 The votes show distrust and
3. The regional area, where Swiss Armed Forces doubt concerning the Armed Forces and the Fed­
are free to prepare the country’s defense using ex­ eral Council’s “security through cooperation.” At the
isting infrastructure. same time, however, the military has the support of
The Armed Forces must perform their required the majority of citizens. The Federal Assembly ac­
tasks with a $3 billion annual defense budget. They cepted the transformation and the Armed Forces
must make up lost ground in the area of armament White Paper in September 2002, foreseeing person­
investment because last decade’s budget cuts were nel strength decreasing from 400,000 to 200,000 and
made more quickly than they could be implemented. reserve forces decreasing to an end-state strength
Consequently, the proportion of the defense budget of 80,000.
spent on operating costs rose while arms procure­ Readiness. The structure of the Swiss Armed
ment dropped.9 Forces can be described as basic. As soon as there
is a specific task demanding operational readiness,
Contours of Armed Forces XXI the brigades and the territorial regions can be struc­
Elements of the national strategy that deal with tured to undertake the task. The operational struc­
politics and security had to overcome opposition in ture will then transition to a core mission-fulfillment
the Parliament and with the public. On 26 Novem­ process. Mission-fulfillment leads from the Armed
ber 2000, 62.5 percent of the population opposed a Forces’ resources to specific required missions, in­
socialists initiative asking for a 50 percent defense cluding:
cut to pay for social programs. On 10 June 2001, Generating basic readiness based on general
51 percent of the population opposed a double ref­ staff directives. Each service generates basic readi­
erendum by nationalists and antimilitarists against the ness. The Army attaches reserve component bat­
arming of soldiers in missions abroad and against in­ talions to brigade and territorial region commands for

92 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


SWISS TRANSFORMATION
training purposes. The Air Force attaches reserve possible to increase the staying power for area pro­
components to air base commands. tection. If the security situation in Europe changed
Generating operational readiness. As soon as so radically that a concrete threat against Switzer­
there is a specific mission, the Armed Forces com­ land became acute, Swiss Armed Forces would have
mand staff issues an operational order, allowing the to be adapted to the situation. This process is called
single service commander to validate the unit’s ability force generation.
to meet mission requirements. Head of the Armed Forces. Currently, the
Implementing the operation plan. The Armed Swiss military is shifting from the primus inter pares
Forces command staff commands and controls the command concept to a single military command con­
implementation of the operation plan by the single cept. A single commander will be responsible for the
services. development and command of the Army and the Air
The force structure will change from 9 infantry Force, the senior training command, and the general
divisions, 4 territorial divisions, 2 territorial brigades, staff. The commander will hold the rank of lieuten­
5 tank brigades, and 2 fortress brigades for a total ant general but should not be confused with the su­
of 10 brigades, including 7 infantry, 2 armored, 1 lo­ preme commander, who is chosen by Parliament only
gistic, 1 special operations forces regiment, and 3 during wartime.
military police battalions. Ten percent of the military Training. The aim for military training is opera­
forces must serve a mandatory 10-month period in tional readiness. The content of all training activity
the infantry to ensure troops are available to sup­ is directed toward the Armed Forces’ core capa­
port civil authorities. bilities. New training requirements stemming from
Force generation. Predeployment training var­ technological advances, higher standards and new
ies in length based on the mission and enables op­ command and control doctrine at the tactical level
erational readiness according to missions and per­ demand basic training to be substantially extended
formances. The consequence is a system of to 21 weeks of school for combat and combat sup­
graduated readiness, which provides the differing re­ port troops and 18 weeks for combat service sup­
source potential for the respective time segments. port troops. This additional time will allow collective
Military conscripts who complete military service training to occur.
within a single period are assigned to special standby During the six or seven annual refresher cour­
units after basic training and are immediately avail­ ses of 3 to 4 weeks, combined arms warfare will
able. The next availability group includes military pro­ be built up so brigade exercises can be held peri­
fessionals and militia personnel who commit them­ odically. This number represents the optimum com­
selves to military service for a limited period promise between what is a necessity and what
(contracted military personnel) as well as civilian is realistically achievable given the current social poli­
employees. (Their numbers are limited.) tical climate. MR
A second priority for immediate response will be
NOTES
deploying troops engaged in training. Only troops in 1. Neutrality carries a number of legal obligations, which the Hague Accords of 1907
defined, on the rights and duties of neutral states in land and naval warfare and the pre­
their final phase of basic unit training or engaged in cedents set in international law.
2. Report of the Study Commission on Strategic Issues (Brunner Commission),
refresher courses will be available. Their units will Berne, Switzerland, 26 February 1998, on-line at <www.tagesanzeiger.ch/steh/
bericht_e.htm>, accessed 9 August 2004.
be capable of executing a broader scope of missions 3. See on-line <www.vbs.ch>, accessed 9 August 2004.
4. Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of
including support operations or reinforcement of the Switzerland, 7 June 1999, 45.
5. Plan Directeur de l’Armée/Armeeleitbild, Berne, 24 October 2002.
units already committed. 6. Swiss Federal Constitution, Article 58, states that Switzerland’s Armed Forces
will be militia organized.
After a few months, all units in refresher courses 7. Multifunctionality implies the ability to accomplish several different missions. The
Armed Forces as a whole are multifunctional; however, multifunctionality covering the
will also be available. In addition, these troops will full spectrum of missions is neither possible nor necessary at the individual soldier or
unit level. In adopting the concept and increasing the degree of interoperability, the Armed
be able to conduct area protection operations. Units Forces creates the necessary preconditions for multinational collaboration.
8. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan with Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not a Method: Busi­
for international peace support and crisis manage­ ness Leaders Can Learn from America’s Army (New York: Broadway Books, 1997).
9. The 2001 armaments program includes the procurement of equipment valued at
ment, which consist of military professionals, con­ approximately $650 million.
10. The President of the Swiss Confederation and the Federal Chancellor signed the
tracted military personnel, and (voluntary) single- request for Swiss membership into the UN on 20 June 2002. The membership request
contained a declaration in which Switzerland accepted the obligations contained in the
term conscripts, will require a medium period of UN Charter and a declaration of Switzerland’s of continued neutrality. The General As­
sembly duly admitted Switzerland in a resolution adopted by acclamation on 10 Septem­
preparation. ber 2002. Switzerland became the 190th member of the UN.
After several months of preparation, reservists will
also be available. To allow time for their mobiliza­ Lieutenant Colonel Laurent Michaud, Swiss
tion process, these units must be activated as soon Army, attended the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College in 2003.
as possible. Longer periods of training will make it

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 93


Mountain Warfare–
The Need for
Specialized Training
Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army

M OUNTAIN WARFARE is specialized com­


bat with unique characteristics. Military
leaders and soldiers need training and experience to
and unforgiving terrain require a high level of physical
fitness for long-distance climbing and walking, and
the physical fitness required for mountainous terrain
understand the peculiarities of mountainous environ­ must be developed at high altitude. But being physi­
ments and how they affect combat. Armies that train cally fit does not necessarily mean soldiers will be
for mountain combat perform much better than able to perform adequately at high elevations. U.S.
those that do not. soldiers selected to attend the mountain-warfare
During World War II, the German Army raised school in Kakul, Pakistan, required additional climb­
an entire corps of elite mountain troops called ing time to attain the desired level of physical fit­
“gebirgs jaeger” (mountain troops). Although not all ness. The body must adjust to the thin mountain air,
of these troops were used in the mountains, they and climbing muscles must be developed.3
demonstrated superior abilities in almost all theaters Mountainous terrain can be an ally or a danger­
in which they were used. The German Fifth Gebirgs ous adversary. In Kashmir each year, thousands of
Division marched more than 248 miles, crossed troops are introduced to the mountainous environ­
mountain passes above 6,500 feet, and secured well- ment to help them understand and appreciate it. A
entrenched defenses on the Mestksas Line.1 Other marked difference exists in the performance of units
gebirgs jaeger captured most of the Caucasus moun­ that have conducted vigorous acclimatization train­
tain region in the summer of 1942. ing and those that have not. Weather and terrain-
The U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, trained related casualties are a big indicator. During initial
in the mountains of Colorado during World War II, training in Colorado during the early 1940s, the U.S.
captured Riva Ridge in northern Italy. U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division suffered more casualties
Field Manual (FM) 3-97.6, Mountain Operations, from weather-related injuries than from actual moun­
cites this action as as clearly demonstrating the value tain combat in Italy.4
of superior skills in mountain warfare.2 The impor­ Field Manual 3-97.6 defines high mountains as
tance of preparing leaders and soldiers for high- those above 3,000 feet; however, it does not fully
altitude combat cannot be overemphasized. explain the high-altitude environment. Despite the
The Pakistan Army has been in Kashmir for fact the Pakistan Army has been fighting in Kash­
more than 50 years and has a great deal of experi­ mir for a long time, operations at higher altitudes
ence in fighting in mountainous, glaciated terrain. (18,000 to 22,000 feet) were not fully understood
While the U.S. Army has quality training institu­ before the Siachen conflict between India and Pa­
tions for mountain warfare, it does not have many kistan in 1984.5 During the conflict, frostbite, sun­
troops with extensive, current mountain-combat ex­ burn, and other high-altitude sicknesses caused large
perience. A comparison of the training techniques numbers of casualties. Such incidences are now
of U.S. and Pakistan armies provides insight into rare, however, because troops and commanders are
preparing for mountain combat. trained to take precautionary measures.
In Kashmir, stone or wooden bunkers, which
Training Prerequisites double as living accommodations and fighting bun­
for Mountain Warfare kers, are found at posts below 13,000 feet, but at
Physical fitness is the first prerequisite of moun­ high altitudes, stone structures are not practical. Ce­
tain-warfare training. The effects of cold weather ment will not bind, and the underlying glacier is al­

94 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MOUNTAIN WARFARE

ways moving. Instead, prefabricated, synthetic Physiological and psychological effects become
domes (igloos) are used.6 The domes are easy to more pronounced at altitudes above 8,000 feet. Sol­
carry and assemble even at 18,000 feet and above. diers must take preventive measures and be trained
They can be retrieved from even large amounts of to detect signs of illness in colleagues. Common
snow and set up again quickly. symptoms include severe, persistent headaches;
Soldiers must also be trained to wear proper cloth­ coughing; difficulty in breathing; and aloofness. Other
ing. Loose-fitting layers and insulated and polypro­ symptoms might include swelling around the eyelids,
pylene clothing that does not allow perspiration to incoherent speech, intolerance, and even outright
accumulate close to the body are best. Developing aggressiveness.13
frostbite from touching metal equipment with one’s Many problems, including altitude sickness, can
bare hands is possible when temperatures drop to occur during the initial stages of a soldier’s arrival
minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit. Pressurized sleeping at high altitude. The biggest killer, cerebral or pul­
bags help stabilize soldiers suffering from altitude- monary edema, is difficult to detect, but often de­
related sicknesses.7 velops if soldiers stay too long at high altitude.14
Basic mountaineering and high-altitude skills are The normal practice in glaciated areas is to not
vital for soldiers to develop confidence and survive keep soldiers above 19,000 feet for more than 3 to
in mountainous environments and essential in com­ 4 weeks before returning them to lower elevations.
bat. As mountain height increases, so does the re­ If soldiers experience any signs of altitude illnesses,
quired skill level. At altitudes below 13,000 feet, it commanders must evacuate them promptly. For most
might be enough for soldiers to understand climbing mountain illnesses, evacuation to below at least 3,000
techniques, navigation, route selection, the use of feet is the first requirement for saving a person’s
ropes, and procedures to avoid landslides and snow life.15 Delaying evacuation might not only cost the
avalanches, but at high altitudes, soldiers must learn soldier’s life, but imperil the lives of the soldiers who
more complex techniques, such as those required for might have to conduct evacuation procedures dur­
mountain expeditions.8 ing bad weather.
Because it is not always possible to transport ma­ Replacements being sent to high-altitude environ­
terial by helicopter, troops are often required to carry ments must have operated at heights similar to those
awkward loads, including kerosene oilcans, rations, to which they are being sent for at least 10 to 15
and building materials for bunkers. The Soviets days. If not, they could quickly become casualties
learned this lesson while fighting in difficult terrain themselves. Well-trained, acclimatized troops must
in Afghanistan.9 be available to replace those at higher altitudes.
At high altitudes, where it is difficult to keep High-altitude environments can take heavy physi­
weapons functioning, covering and protecting weap­ cal and mental tolls on soldiers. While in the
ons and equipment against snow and ice is a ne­ Caucasus, the Germans learned that troops wore
cessity. Batteries often will not perform optimally in down much faster in mountains despite the fact they
the cold, and complicated mechanisms, such as those were elite troops, picked for their mental abilities and
in surface-to-air missiles, can easily malfunction. physical prowess. Operations in such environments
Also, artillery shells sometimes behave erratically involve extreme physical exertion.16 Living condi­
because of thin air and gusting winds.10 tions in mountainous terrain can be difficult. At times
Surviving and operating in mountainous terrain re­ all movement is stopped, soldiers do not receive mail,
quires more energy than usual. A soldier who needs and replacements might not arrive on time. These
3,000 to 4,000 calories under normal circumstances factors can lead to depression and boredom and a
will require 6,000 or more calories in the mountains. sharp decrease in fighting spirit. Simple tasks such
To complicate the situation, high altitude adversely as manning weapons, sentry duty, and patrolling re­
affects a person’s appetite. Soldiers tend to eat and quire determination.
drink less in high altitudes, which reduces morale and Offensive actions in mountainous terrain are dif­
fighting capabilities and makes them more suscep­ ficult and costly. Not only must soldiers fight the en­
tible to mountain-related illnesses.11 U.S. soldiers emy, they must also brave the elements of harsh ter­
conducting mountain-warfare training at Abbotabad, rain, which are equally formidable. These conditions
Pakistan, which is at 4,000 feet, lost approximately call for strong leadership by junior leaders, who must
25 pounds during a 3-week training period.12 Com­ physically lead and be mentally tough.
manders must ensure soldiers consume proper di­ Leadership. Mountainous and high-altitude en­
ets and are well-hydrated. vironments are extremely demanding and require a

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 95


Soldiers from the 101st Airborne
Division conducting a sensitive-
site exploitation mission near the
Pakistan border in Afghanistan.

US Army
high level of leadership at the small-unit level as well overwhelming odds. Such leadership inspires subor­
as at higher levels. Leaders must understand the dinates and raises the morale of the entire unit.
constraints placed on their soldiers’ performances At high altitudes, small-unit leaders must be
and should include terrain and weather in planning trained to recognize and address physical and psy­
and executing actions to avoid miscalculating the chological fatigue in their soldiers, including loneli­
timeframe, logistic requirements, and force capa­ ness, depression, and violent mood swings. The re­
bility. lationship between officers and troops is more
Mountain combat is decentralized and often takes intimate than under normal circumstances, so lead­
place at the platoon or squad level. The quality of ers should be able to identify signs of deterioration
junior leadership is decisive. The Russians observed in soldiers before they become pronounced.
in Afghanistan that even a small unit, maneuvering Decisions at higher levels influence the conduct
boldly, could decide the outcome of a battle.17 of tactical actions. The German Army emphasized
A hallmark of German alpine troops during World the importance of meticulous planning and prepara­
Wars I and II was the quality of their leadership. tion even for small-scale operations.18
German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who began Field Manual 3-97.6 emphasizes realistic time­
his career in a German mountain regiment during tables based on reconnaissance and the com­
World War I, relentlessly advanced his small detach­ mander’s practical knowledge of the mountain battle­
ment in difficult terrain capturing one hilltop after field.19 Planners must understand that mountainous
another. terrain adversely affects time and space calcula­
Mountainous environments demand that junior tions—an important lesson learned during the U.S.
leaders set the example of physical fitness and en­ Marine Corps (USMC) exercise Alpine Warrior at
durance. During the Pakistan-India conflict at Kargill Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, in 1986.20
in northern Kashmir in 1998, Captain Sher Khan Cost-effective mountain combat requires skilled
was posthumously awarded the “Nishan-E-Haider,” and well-trained troops. Soldiers cannot be sent into
Pakistan’s highest military award, for conducting a fight at high altitude at the last moment. Doing so
daring raids with a handful of men against enemy could invite disaster. One example of such an ac­
patrols and convoys. His last action included a suc­ tion is the employment of the 7th Indian Brigade
cessful counterattack to recapture a post against against the Chinese in the 1962 Himalayan con­

96 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MOUNTAIN WARFARE

flict.21 The brigade had not been stationed in the and lines of communication by strongpoints. An in­
mountains previously, and when things began going tegrated defense is not possible in cut up, mountain­
badly, the brigade was moved from the plains straight ous terrain. During training, commanders need to
into mountain combat. The soldiers, who had not understand the techniques of defense with all-around
been acclimatized or equipped to fight in the moun­ protection and emplacement of direct fighting weap­
tains, suffered heavy casualties because of frostbite, ons. Field Manual 3-97.6 highlights that reserves
edema, and other high-altitude-induced illnesses. must be closer to important defense locations be­
Communications. Terrain and unpredictable cause reaction times in mountainous terrains are
weather conditions affect communications at high longer than usual, which could require several small
altitudes. Satellite communications and the use of rather than one large centralized reserve.26
command and control (C2) aircraft can offset some Mountainous terrain offers opportunities for infil­
terrain limitations and reduce reliance on bulky ra­ tration, requiring defenders to be aggressive at all
dio equipment. Crews responsible for installing and times. Aggressive patrolling enhances security and
maintaining retransmission stations—often situated keeps soldiers active and sharp. In Kashmir this
on the highest peaks to provide adequate range and helped prevent a bunker mentality. Although sensors
coverage—must be well trained in mountain-survival provide some protection, mountainous terrain is too
techniques. Also, these isolated stations are targets compartmentalized for complete electronic surveil­
for guerrilla bands, as the Soviets discovered when lance. Combat service support (CSS) elements must
they tried to protect similar sites in Afghanistan.22 provide their own protection and must train in pa­
Fire support. Mountainous terrain significantly trolling and perimeter defense while developing a
influences artillery fire support. Targets are located mindset focused on constant vigilance.
on peaks, in ravines, and on reverse slopes; no con­ Offensive operations require meticulous planning
tinuous front exists; and weather conditions are un­ and preparation because of the inherent strength
predictable. Undulating terrain and intervening crests mountainous terrain provides to the defender. Train­
require a large number of observers located on ing plays a vital role in ensuring an edge for the at­
dominating heights to cover the entire area of op­ tackers. Since the defender has an advantage, suc­
erations. Gun positions that are ideal for range and cessful attacks should isolate the defender and keep
coverage might not be suitable because of intervening him under constant pressure. The Soviets laid great
features and masking fire. At other times a location emphasis on junior leaders and company-level moun­
might be tactically sound but will be an area prone tain operations, advocating envelopment by smaller,
to avalanches or flash floods. Once guns are de­ autonomous groups.
ployed, major engineering and logistical efforts might During Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, U.S.
be necessary to shift them to alternate locations in forces used more decentralized combat than on nor­
a timely fashion. mal terrain. Junior leaders’ initiative and skill is vital
Air burst and variable time fuzes are more effec­ to the mission’s success, especially in security and
tive than point-detonating artillery rounds. Howitzers reconnaissance missions. Mountainous terrain and
and mortars are more effective because of their abil­ bad weather provide opportunities for small forces
ity to engage targets on reverse slopes. The Taliban to concentrate and achieve surprise. Russian and
used mortars to hit U.S. troops successfully during Afghan government forces suffered heavily when
operations in Afghanistan.23 they neglected this aspect of the battlefield environ­
Maneuver. Mountainous terrain is ideally suited ment.27
for the defense. During World War II, some of the The Soviets used helicopters in Afghanistan to air­
heaviest casualties in the Italian Theater occurred lift troops and supplies into battle.28 Helicopter gun­
during an attempt to overcome German defenses at ships effectively supported ground operations until
Mount Casino. In Afghanistan, the Russians attacked the Mujahideen obtained Stinger missiles, which tilted
the strategic Panjshir Valley repeatedly but were the situation in their favor.
unable to clear it despite their advantage in firepower U.S. forces also rely on helicopters for transpor­
and mobility.24 The line of control in Kashmir in 2003 tation and movement in the mountains, requiring
was not much different from the cease-fire line of aviation planners to be involved in the planning pro­
the India-Pakistan war in 1949.25 Both Indian and cess early. With beyond-line-of-sight and precision-
Pakistan forces found that an assault on well- guided munitions, aviation and air assets
defended positions was extremely costly. Defense have neutralized many inherent problems in moun­
requires the control of dominating heights, passes, tain warfare, but they have not eliminated the need

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 97


Soldiers from the 101st Air­
borne Division perpare to
move out after having been
dropped off at a battle zone
during Operation Anaconda,
5 March 2002.

US Army
for specialized training. Because mountain combat ited and often do not support vehicles that require
tends to be decentralized, control of supporting fire large turning radii. Many roads do not permit two-
is more difficult. Tight control of jet aircraft and hel­ way traffic.
icopter gunships is necessary to avoid fratricide. While tactical plans take into account main roads,
Logistics. Logistics support in the mountains is tactical engagements do not usually occur close to
difficult and time-consuming. In Kashmir, a variety roadheads. At Siachen, the Pakistan Army built
of transport is used for logistical support, road trans­ roads near forward defenses, but the real challenge
port being the most reliable and cost-effective. At was in transporting supplies across the last few miles
higher altitudes where tracks cannot be maintained from roadheads to forward posts.
because of snow and difficult terrain, mules are a The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
preferred means of transport.29 At altitudes where analysis of the operation in Afghanistan recognized
even mules cannot go, porters can. Porters are lo­ the need to have logistics as far forward as possible:
cal people capable of carrying heavy loads across “It might require additional staff work from the lo­
difficult terrain. gisticians to deploy the logistics to the work area (like
In the Caucasus Campaign, the German army rations to the platoons, mortar rounds to the mor­
used sleds, mules, and horses in addition to trucks.30 tars), but the advantage is reduced expenditure of
Recently, despite technological advances, the U.S. energy for those on the ground.”32
Army had to use horses and mules in Afghanistan. Logistics estimates and loads must be customized
Helicopters are a quick, versatile means of trans­ for the mountainous environment. For example, us­
portation, but at higher altitudes their lift capability ing mules requires loads be broken up according to
is severely limited. The French Alouette helicopter their carrying capacity. Also, overages must be built
can fly higher than U.S helicopters can, but even it into supply estimates because there is always a need
can deliver only about 180 pounds above 20,000 feet. for a large reserve of items that wear out quickly,
Because helicopters cannot be used in adverse such as boots, jackets, and gloves. If soldiers use
weather, a mixture of resources is necessary to en­ improper or worn clothing for even a short time, the
sure reliability and flexibility.31 chance of developing altitude and cold-related sick­
The road network in the mountains is generally a nesses increases significantly. In addition, combat
logistician’s nightmare. Main supply routes are lim­ casualty evacuation involves many challenges. Air

98 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MOUNTAIN WARFARE

evacuation remains the preferred method, but be­ cross crevasses. They then move in stages from
cause of the dispersed nature of troops, expert medi­ 13,000 feet to forward posts at heights up to 21,000
cal help might not be available quickly. Therefore, feet. The basic principle is to bivouac one night for
self-aid, buddy help, and the availability of more com­ about every 3,000-foot increase in altitude. Troops
bat life savers in the unit is important.33 returning from leave must repeat the process.
Canadian small-unit support vehicles, specially de­ Because the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division
signed for restrictive terrain, were particularly use­ is not stationed in a high-altitude environment and
ful for logistics support at high altitude in Afghani­ its soldiers are not acclimatized, deployment to high
stan, whereas the bulky ground-held laser designating mountains would require an additional 2 to 3 weeks
system was not. Soldiers’ personal loads of more of acclimatization. This also applies to units that have
than 50 pounds were too heavy at high altitudes. conducted mountain-warfare training but are not
Equipment must be upgraded for future mountain currently stationed at high altitudes. Physical condi­
warfare.34 tioning is essential to mountain combat in Afghan­
istan.38
Training for Mountain Warfare Leadership training. Leadership training is ex­
Recent operations by U.S. and other Allied forces tremely important for mountain warfare. During
confirm the need for specialized mountain-warfare World War II, German alpine troops displayed strong
training. CALL’s analysis recognizes that soldiers leadership traits based on their culture of auftrags­
with mountain experience exhibit exceptional morale, taktik.39 In the Pakistan Army, mountain training is
physical stamina, and technical competence in de­ considered part of overall training. The Soviet Army
cisive combat operations. The analysis also recog­ recognized the critical importance of junior-leader
nizes that coalition forces specially trained in moun­ initiative during its experiences in Afghanistan.40 The
tainous environments are better trained overall.35 U.S. Army focuses on leadership, but it does not
Acclimatization training. Mountain troops have a package designed specifically for training at
should be stationed at high altitudes to maintain a different levels of leadership in mountainous envi­
high standard of physical fitness and acclimatization. ronments. Mountain leadership training should be
Before World War I, German alpine troops were sta­ based on the unique characteristics and demands
tioned in the Bavarian Alps.36 In Transcaucasia at placed on leaders.
6,500 feet, Soviet troops occupied ideal terrain to train Junior leader training requires initiative, personnel
soldiers.37 Pakistan and India maintain a large num­ management, and mental toughness. In the Pakistan
ber of troops on the line of control in Kashmir. This Army, most of these skills are learned through ex­
automatically provides ample opportunities for ac­ perience and exposure to tough environments. Dur­
climatization. The U.S. 10th Mountain Division, how­ ing mountain-combat deployment, junior-leaders
ever, is stationed at Fort Drum, New York, which is often conduct patrols, lead expeditions, and direct
not in high mountains. command posts, despite sometimes having to endure
Although troops need to be acclimatized for any heavy artillery shelling and adverse living and
kind of mountainous terrain, the duration depends on weather conditions. The U.S. Army Mountain War­
the altitude at which the unit must operate. Ac­ fare School emphasizes gaining mountaineering
climatization for mountains below 13,000 feet takes skills rather than training combat leaders. The U.S.
3 to 4 weeks. Pakistan troops train by bivouacking Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Center has a
at high altitudes and conducting routine administra­ mountain leader course designed for junior leaders,
tive activities and route marches. Each week they but it is heavily skills-oriented.41
conduct hill climbing at increasingly higher altitudes Mountain leader training should begin with an in­
to increase their ability to function. The rigorous troduction to issues and problems unique to moun­
training also helps identify soldiers who have medi­ tainous terrain. Practical exercises and historical
cal problems. case studies increase leader awareness. Training
Acclimatization for higher altitudes is rigid, and the outdoors in command positions with specific tasks,
length of training cannot be shortened without seri­ such as navigation, patrolling, raids, and ambushes,
ous consequences. Although the pattern of training should be conducted at altitudes above 8,000 feet.
remains the same, troops are trained at an altitude of Simulations that force junior leaders to make tough
between 8,000 and 10,000 feet for 2 weeks, followed choices between their soldiers’ physical capabilities
by 1 month’s training at 11,000 feet. The troops con­ and mission accomplishment are essential to moun­
duct route marches, fire weapons, climb rocks, and tain leader training.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 99


Marines of the 2d Division’s
light armored reconnaissance
element practice climbing at
the Mountian Warfare Training
Center, Bridgeport, California.
US Army

Many senior leaders consider themselves well- treme terrain and weather conditions in the moun­
equipped to plan and conduct operations in any en­ tains. Physical conditioning is the first prerequisite
vironment, but commanders who have served in the of mountain warfare. Training should be progressive,
mountains as young leaders are far better at under­ starting with light physical exertion followed by route
standing and planning for such environments. marches and mountain climbing, culminating in test
Wargames and live exercises are valuable tools to exercises in difficult terrain. Most schools have simi­
help senior leaders understand mountain warfare. lar programs for this purpose. Although training in­
Live exercises illustrate human limitations in such an dividuals at heights up to 10,000 feet can achieve a
environment. great deal, to develop high-altitude skills, some train­
Individual/team training. Most armies from ing should occur above 13,000 feet.
countries with mountainous terrain have well-estab­ The ability to navigate and move across difficult
lished training institutions. Location of training insti­ terrain builds confidence and enables soldiers to plan
tutions is an important consideration for mountain and execute maneuvers across seemingly impen­
training. The Pakistan Army’s High-Altitude School, etrable and inhospitable terrain. The small-unit moun­
at Rattu in Northern Kashmir, is an ideal location tain operation exercise the U.S. Army Mountain
on the confluence of the Hindukush, Himalayas, and Warfare School conducts is a good example.43 Par­
Karakorum ranges. The school conducts training ticipants must navigate to six different sites within a
throughout the year and includes mountain climbing set time. The exercise incorporates various skills sol­
on peaks ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 feet and sur­ diers need to complete actions successfully in a time-
vival on glaciated terrain and in snowy and icy con­ compressed, competitive environment. Some skills
ditions. The Indian Army’s high-altitude warfare frequently required during mountain warfare include
school is at Gulmarg, which is at 8,000 feet.42 The using rope bridges and vertical haul lines and medi­
U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School is located in cal evacuation. Mobility in winter has several pre­
Vermont, while the USMC Mountain Warfare requisites, including using snowshoes, skiing, climb­
School is located in Bridgeport, California, which is ing ice, crossing crevasses, and detecting avalanche
at 9,000 feet. hazards.
The purpose of these training institutions is to train A key training objective in mountain training is
individuals to survive and take advantage of the ex­ properly using winter clothing, weapons, and equip­

100 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MOUNTAIN WARFARE

ment and recognizing and preventing cold-weather ing is primarily mission-centric, based on the nature
injuries. Such skills are especially important for of­ of tasks assigned to the units, and includes offen­
ficers and noncommissioned officers who must en­ sive and defensive tasks and small-unit actions.
force these practices. Lectures, demonstrations, and The U.S. Army does not conduct collective train­
practical experience can help address these prob­ ing in mountain warfare; it focuses more on survival
lems. The Pakistan Army’s standard training proce­ training rather than high-altitude combat.45 The
dures cover most safety issues, such as frostbite pre­ USMC conducts infantry battalion training, but the
vention, high-altitude sickness, and pulmonary and training does not include artillery, engineers, aviation,
cerebral edema. or other supporting arms.46 Considering the unique
The U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School teaches requirements of mountainous and high-altitude en­
winter sustainment using the Akhio tent and stove vironments, these can be serious limiting factors for
group. The Akhio sledge contains a 10-man arctic coordinating and synchronizing the combined arms
tent, a diesel-fired stove, fuel, and other basic sup­ fight and can easily lead to faulty planning and wrong
plies. Kashmir tents have a short lifespan because assumptions about each other’s capabilities and limi­
of the wear and tear from blizzards and heavy tations.
snowfall. Stone structures and synthetic igloos are Operation Anaconda demonstrated that fighting in
the preferred structures. In noncontiguous and non­ the mountains is not a special operation or exclu­
linear battlefield environments, soldiers must build sively an infantry domain.47 Mountain warfare in­
protective shields around winter shelters to avoid volves logistics, aviation, artillery, communications,
becoming targets for raiding parties and artillery fire. and air assets. With the level of sophistication in these
Once trainees understand mountainous terrain and branches and services, there is an even greater need
its effects on combat, the next step is to conduct for collective training in order to use their unique
small exercises involving patrolling, raids, and am­ characteristics fully.
bushes. These exercises should incorporate moun­ Branch-specific training. All branches and ser­
taineering skills in situations that tests trainees’ abili­ vices need to train for mountain combat to under­
ties to modify traditional tactics to mountainous stand the capabilities and limitations of their equip­
terrain. These exercises build leadership skills, ini­ ment. Aviation is critical to mobility, timely logistics,
tiative, flexibility, and team spirit. Although no oppos­ and precision firepower. Pilots should be well trained
ing force (OPFOR) exists in the Pakistan Army’s in mountain flying and in understanding an
High-Altitude School or at the U.S. Army Moun­ infantryman’s problems in mountainous terrain. The
tain Warfare School, an OPFOR is necessary for Pakistan Army’s 8th Aviation Squadron supports op­
creating a realistic environment and developing erations in Kashmir. Pilots have hundreds of hours
mountain warfare skills. of combat flying experience and understand the
U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School instructors mountainous environment.
are topnotch mountaineers. However, most do not With the enhanced capabilities of Apache helicop­
have actual mountain-combat experience.44 Posting ters to acquire and engage targets beyond visual
officers who served in Afghanistan to the Mountain range, U.S. Army pilots, in conjunction with ground
Warfare School might address this problem. troops, need to practice firing in the mountain. The
Collective training. Collective training is an op­ Russians recognized the need for close coordination
portunity to test units and formations in actual moun­ between aviation and ground troops during their war
tainous environments, reinforcing and building on in Afghanistan.48 The U.S experience in Afghani­
skills gained through acclimatization and individual stan highlighted the need for attack aviation to train
training and allowing commanders to check the vi­ with Special Operations Forces and to practice us­
ability of their assumptions and plans in a realistic ing night-vision devices.49 Pilots for cargo and troop-
setting. Synchronization and coordination between carrying helicopters also need to train in mountains
fighting and supporting arms and among all the battle­ in various weather conditions. High-altitude training
field operating systems are also key elements of this combining attack and cargo helicopters is essential
training. for high-altitude combat.50
Collective training in winter and summer environ­ The U.S. Army has a variety of sophisticated
ments is a regular part of the Pakistan Army’s moun­ communication equipment. Although some equipment
tain training. Because altitude is an important con­ works well in the mountains, some requires impro­
sideration, reserve units train at heights equivalent visation and alternatives because FM communi­
to those at which they are expected to fight. Train- cations are often ineffective at high altitudes and

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 101


distances impeded by mountainous terrain.51 Shift­ important. The Mujahideen often successfully at­
ing retransmission stations and using equipment in tacked and destroyed Soviet logistic bases in Af­
various weather conditions is essential to providing ghanistan.52
a variety of options to communication providers and Doctors and medical staff also need special train­
users. ing in recognizing and treating high-altitude-related
Engineers, who are key to mobility, countermo­ injuries and illnesses. In Kashmir, doctors are fairly
bility, and survivability, must also train and work in confident in dealing with them. During World War
high-altitude conditions. Constructing shelters, laying II, medics accompanying German mountain troops
minefields, providing clean water supplies, and con­ were experts at treating frostbite, snow blindness,
structing bridges and roads require different consid­ and other problems.53 The Soviet Army instituted
erations in the mountains. Training in a mountain­ more than 100 hours of training through a special
ous environment is the only way to ascertain the type course for doctors and their staffs.54
and quantity of materials and equipment needed.
Artillery units need to train in mountains to en­ Contemporary
sure optimum fire support under all circumstances High-Altitude Operations
and all weather conditions. Selecting gun positions The U.S. Army had a distinguished history of
and shifting and readjusting guns by air, as well as mountain operations during World War II. The 10th
ground transport, to support various tactical contin­ Mountain Division proved its utility as an elite moun­
gencies require training and experience, as do ob­ tain-trained force during the Italian Campaign. More
servation and fire direction. than 50 years later, Operation Anaconda in Afghani­
In mountainous environments, CSS elements also stan highlighted the continued need for specialized
need to learn how best to use trucks, aircraft, por­ training in mountain warfare. The Army has em­
ters, and mules. Training under real mountain con­ barked on an impressive Transformation intended to
ditions helps them identify the differences in logisti­ meet the challenges of the 21st century; expert
cal calculations for mountainous environments. Other mountain troops available for deployment on a short
issues, such as protecting logistic bases, are equally notice should be a part of this Transformation. MR

NOTES
1. James Lucas, Alpine Elite: German Mountain Troops of World War II (London: 24. Robert F. Baumann, “Russian Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central
Janes, 1980), 13, 130. Asia, and Afghanistan,” Leavenworth Papers 20, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November
2. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-97.6, Mountain Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 2000, 141.
Government Printing Office [GPO], 28 November 2000). 25. Ahmed Ashfaq, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen (Rawalpindi: Pak American
3. CPT John Clearwater, Above and Beyond, on-line at <www.pakmil/com/army/insti/ Commercial, 1991), 25.
highalti.html>, 1, accessed 12 September 2002. 26. FM 3-97.6, 3-29.
4. Bruce C. Patton, Cold Casualties and Conquests: The Effects of Cold on War­ 27. Sray, 16-18, Grau and Ali a Jalali, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen
fare, 23, on-line at <www.Armymedicine.Mil/history/Borden/medaspofharshenvrnmnts>, Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Washington, DC, GPO), 187.
accessed 29 November 2002. 28. Gerhard Sheppe, Mountain Warfare in Europe (Kingston, Canada, 1983), 37.
5. FM 3-97.6. At 18,000 to 22,000 feet, the glaciated area in northern Kashmir is 29. Fedarko, 50.
considered the highest battleground in the world. 30. Lucas, 130.
6. Brigadier Ghazanfar Ali and A. Ghani, Siachen: The World’s Highest Battle­ 31. Ali and Ghani, 3; FM 3-97.6, 5-7.
field, on-line at <www.Pakdef.info/pakmil/army/siachen/>, 3, accessed 2 December 32. Mordica, 9.
2002. 33. Ibid., 5-13.
7. CPT John R. Ballard, “Training an Arctic Raid Force,” Marine Corps Gazette 34. Ibid., 4-5.
(February 1987): 64; LTC Salman Beg, “Operations in Glaciated Areas,” Pakistan Army 35. Ibid., 4.
Journal (Spring 1994): 3. 36. Ibid.
8. Kevin Fedarko, “War at 21,000 Feet,” Outside Magazine (April 2002): 41, 44. 27. Sheppe, 35.
9. LTC John E. Sray, Mountain Warfare: The Russian Perspective (Washington, DC: 38. Mordica, 4.
GPO, March 1994), 20, on-line at <www.fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fsmopubs/issues/ 39. Lucas, 197.
mountain>, accessed 12 September 2002. 40. Sheppe, 35.
10. Ali and Ghani, 4. 41. Grau, interview by author, January 2003.
11. Ibid. 42. Indian Armed Forces, Training Institutions, on-line at <www.indianarmedforces.
12. Clearwater, 2. com/def/army/def9.html>, 6, accessed 12 September 2002.
13. Lester W. Grau and William K. Jorgensen, “Medical Implications of High Altitude 43. Grau and Jorgensen, 5.
Combat,” U.S. Army Medical Journal (April 2002): 1; Ali and Ghani, 3. 44. Grau interview.
14. Fedarko, 50. 45. Major John G. Bechtol, “Fighting the Cold: The Need for Standing Cold Weather
15. LT Craig M. Banull, “High Altitude Medicine: Case Report,” Navy Medicine (Janu­ Combat Capabilities,” unpublished article, Naval War College, 4 February 2002.
ary-February 2000): 27. 46. Grau interview.
16. Ibid., 48. 47. Mordica, 4-5.
17. Sray, 1. 48. Sray, 20.
18. Lucas, 196. 49. Mordica, 4-5.
19. FM 3-97.6, 2-15. 50. Ibid, 8.
20. Ballard, 63. 51. Ibid, 9.
21. MG D.K. Palit, War in High Himalaya (London: Lancer International, 1991), 205. 52. Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
22. Sray, 8. (Collingsdale, PA: Diane Publishing Co, March 1996), 128.
23. George J. Mordica, High Altitude Operations, on-line at <http//call.army.mil/ 53. Lucas, 210.
products/trngqtr/tq4-02/mordica>, accessed 2 December 2002, 7. 54. Grau and Jorgensen, 5.

Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army, received an M.M.A.S. from the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College. He also attended the Command and Staff
College, Quelta, Pakistan. He has served as Brigade Major of an Infantry Brigade; an
instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul; a company commander of an Infantry
Company, Siachen Glacier, Kashmir; aide-de-camp to the corps commander; and a pla­
toon commander and adjutant of the 12th Baloch Regiment, Infantry, Kashmir.

102 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


A Strategy for the

Korean Peninsula

Beyond the
Nuclear Crisis
Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S.Army

T HE ENTIRE international community faces a


twofold crisis on the Korean Peninsula—the
erosion of the 50-year Republic of Korea-United
the ROK during the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop­
eration Summit in Thailand in 2003.3 This situation
must be corrected. With a strong alliance, the United
States (ROK-US) alliance and the development of States and the ROK could focus on using the
the nuclear weapons program in the Democratic alliance’s elements of national power to develop and
Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). All eyes are execute a combined, synchronized strategy to
on the “6 Party Talks,” which include the United achieve a mutually agreed-on end state. This com­
States, the DPRK, the ROK, Japan, China, and Rus­ bined strategy would have to accomplish the follow­
sia, to decide whether the DPRK will become a ing goals:
member of the “nuclear club” and whether it might Forestall conflict or regime collapse until the
provide nuclear capabilities to rogue states and ROK is prepared for reunification.
nonstate terrorist organizations. Manage near-term crises caused by the KFR
This crisis is only one problem that exists on the and its attempts to use provocation and blackmail
divided Korean Peninsula. The world is faced with to achieve political and economic concessions.
this threat solely because of the Kim Family Regime Prepare the population in the North for even­
(KFR), established by Kim Il Sung and now led by tual reunification.
his son Kim Jong Il.1 This approach assumes no combination of co­
ercion or engagement would cause the KFR to al­
The Korea Question ter its goals or change its behavior; that negotia­
The United States needs to do two things to fore­ tions by the 6 parties would ultimately fail; and
stall conflict and help the people on the Korean Pen­ that the efforts of the United States, ROK, and
insula solve the “Korea question.”2 The first priority United Nations would not lead to a peaceful
would be to repair the relationship between alli­ settlement of the Korea question. This strategy
ance partners to ensure an effective defensive ca­ would not conflict with any attempts to negotiate
pability remains in place to deter an attack by the or try to change regime behavior that would cause
DPRK, to defeat an attack from the North if de­ it to acquiesce to the goals of the allies and the
terrence fails, and respond to the chaos and in­ major powers. In fact, a major part of this strategy
stability that is likely to result when the KFR relies on negotiation, talks, and engagement. If
collapses. the assumption proves false, and the DPRK ac­
The problem with the alliance was evident when quiesces and becomes a normal member of the
U.S. President George W. Bush decided not to visit international community, the result will be peace

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 103


“In the course of this
US Army

struggle against fac­


tional opponents, for
the first time Kim be­
gan to emphasize na­
tionalism as a means
of rallying the popula­
tion to the enormous
sacrifices needed for
post-war recovery.
This was a nationalism
that first took shape in
the environment of the
anti-Japanese guerrilla
movement and devel­
oped into a creed
through the destruc­
tion of both the non-
Workers from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.
Communist nationalist
forces and much of
and stability, with the ROK and DPRK coexisting the leftist intellectual tradition of the domestic Com­
for an indefinite period, which is unlikely. munists. Kim’s nationalism did not draw inspira­
Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, authors tion from Korean history, nor did it dwell on past
of Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, assume that cultural achievements, for the serious study of his­
the DPRK will change its behavior and will be tory and traditional culture soon effectively ceased
coaxed out of its nuclear weapons program.4 They in the DPRK. Rather, DPRK nationalism drew in­
argue that a comprehensive approach to issues spiration from the Spartan outlook of the
should go beyond the nuclear program to bring an former Manchurian guerrillas. It was a harsh nation­
end to DPRK’s nuclear program. David Kang and alism that dwelt on past wrongs and promises of ret­
Victor Cha, authors of Nuclear North Korea: A ribution for ‘national traitors’ and their foreign back­
Debate on Engagement Strategies, take a differ­ ers. DPRK nationalism stressed the ‘purity’ of all
ent approaches.5 Kang minimizes DPRK’s nuclear things Korean against the ‘contamination’ of foreign
threat, but Cha takes a hardline view. Both agree ideas, and inculcated in the population a sense of fear
that to achieve resolution engagement is needed. and animosity toward the outside world. Above all,
I feel that the assumption that the KFR will change DPRK nationalism stressed that the guerrilla ethos
its behavior and turn its back on 55 years of a con­ was not only the supreme, but also the only legiti­
sistent strategy is flawed. However, many of the el­ mate basis on which to reconstitute a reunified
ements in the books have merit and should be in­ Korea.” 7
corporated into a new strategy.
To understand why the DPRK would not change Chuche (Self Reliance)
its behavior, we must understand the nature of the Understanding Kim Il Sung’s unique philosophy of
regime and its strategy. When trying to recommend Chuche is important. Chuche is a Confucian ethic
a strategy, most outsiders violate Sun Tzu’s dictum on which Korean society has been based, but which
to “know the enemy and know yourself.”6 By not has been turned into a method of controlling the
understanding the KFR’s fundamental nature, out­ North’s population. Raised to religious stature,
siders fail in their attempts to deal with the DPRK Chuche teaches that to give one’s life for the fa­
in the conventional sense, where negotiations are therland will bring immortality. In the Chuche phi­
in good faith and with some semblance of trans­ losophy, the KFR has been deified.8
parency. Chuche can best be summed up as “Dear Leader
Author Adrian Buzo’s book about the KFR, The Absolutism,” a term coined by Hwang Jang Yop,
Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in who defected from the North in 1997. Yop actually
North Korea, describes how Kim Il Sung consol­ developed the Chuche idea for Kim Il Sung, but
idated his power to become the Great Leader: after his defection, he wrote, “The fundamental

104 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


BEYOND THE
NUCLEAR CRISIS
reason for human rights being
Korean People’s Army guards
trampled in North Korea lies in the march to their posts at the Pan­
‘Dear Leader Absolutism’ dicta­ munjom Joint Security Area.
torship. There can be no human
rights for the people in North Ko­
rea where the greatest morality
and absolute law is giving one’s
mind and body to the Dear
Leader; and living as a slave who
obeys completely and uncondition­
ally the Dear Leader—it is the
only life permitted the North Ko­
rean People.”9
Dear Leader Absolutism, the
Chuche ideology, and a guerrilla
mindset are the DRK’s funda­
mental principles and the concepts

US Army
from which the KFR gains its le­
gitimacy. When comparing these
ideas with the free market system and ROK’s lib­ the regime has set for itself by resting its legitimacy
eral semi-democracy, it is easy to see how the two on the Chuche ideology and the deification of Kim
systems are mutually exclusive. For the DPRK, re­ Il Sung.12
10
unification is a zero-sum game. The DPRK is in a no-win situation, one that has
Four simple concepts or national objectives sum no good options. It needs to reform its economic sys­
up DPRK’s strategy: tem to be self-sufficient and to ensure its survival.
1. The survival of the Kim family regime— However, doing so would undermine the KFR’s le­
a vital national interest. gitimacy, implying that the system Kim Il Sung built
2. Reunification of the Korean Peninsula — was flawed and that reform would lead to more
a strategic aim. North Koreans being exposed to information outside
3. Recognition of the DPRK as a world power— the inner KFR’s inner circle, which would expose
a strategic objective. the myth of the regime and its bankrupt ideology. If
4. Removal or neutralization of U.S. forces from the regime is undermined and faced with imminent
the Korean Peninsula—a required condition to collapse, it might turn to its only option—the use of
achieve the strategic aim. military force—to reunify the Peninsula to ensure
The DPRK has been following this strategy since the regime’s survival.13
1948. The regime’s survival is paramount, and the An important part of the DPRK’s efforts has
regime makes all decisions. Reunification under the been to use Sun Tzu’s strategy of splitting alliances.14
DPRK system ensures regime survival. The regime The DPRK has attempted to capitalize on the de­
has sought to be the leader in the nonaligned move­ teriorating relations between the ROK and United
ment, and both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have States, which were worsened by the tragic accident in
demonstrated that they want North Korea to be June 2002 in which two teenage Korean girls were
recognized as a world power. Finally, because re­ hit and killed by a U.S. armored vehicle during a rou­
unification under regime control can only happen tine training exercise, and by U.S. initiatives to relo­
through a force of arms, the DPRK needs U.S. cate U.S. forces farther south on the Peninsula.
forces to either withdraw or be neutralized so the The DPRK has attempted to win the hearts and
DPRK will have the correlation of forces necessary minds of the ROK people by supporting family re­
to be successful.11 unions, agreeing to open economic corridors, and re­
Academics and media pundits question how a establishing rail links between North and South.
country as bankrupt as the DPRK can do anything These attempts have led the younger generation par­
except attempt economic reforms. How can a coun­ ticularly to view the DPRK more favorably. The
try that cannot feed its people embark on such an DPRK’s goal is for the ROK and America to con­
ambitious and expensive project as developing clude that the United States no longer belongs on
nuclear weapons? The answer lies in the trap that the Peninsula.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 105


If America withdraws its forces, the DPRK term end state. The United States must recognize
achieves a key advantage in achieving reunification that the ROK is the key to the Peninsula’s future
on its terms. Because of this strategy, the KFR and must play the major role in determining the out­
would not negotiate in good faith. While an agree­ come of the Korea question, assuring the ROK that
ment could be reached, as for example the 1994 it would undertake no unilateral action on the Pen­
Agreed Framework with the United States or the insula. The relocation of U.S. forces should not oc­
1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, cur unless the ROK and the United States agree
and Exchanges (ARNE) with the ROK, the KFR that such relocation would support the strategy to
might not live up to its agreements. In fact, the KFR deal with the DPRK. Without a strong alliance, no
has violated these agreements as well as the Non­ strategy would be successful.
proliferation Treaty.15 The publicly stated end state would be a stable,
The DPRK believes it needs nuclear weapons as secure, peaceful, economically viable, nonnuclear
a deterrent against the United States. At a minimum, Peninsula. The ROK and the United States should
the nuclear-capability threat is a useful tool in black­ work toward a reunified Peninsula that is under a
mailing the international community to try to gain liberal constitutional and democratic form of govern-
political and economic concessions,
which plays well with the regime’s A member of the ROK Army keeps
ideology. The DPRK tells its people a watchful eye on North Korea
that the food aid that they have from an observation post in
the Demilitarized Zone.
been receiving from the interna­
tional community is a “tribute” to
the KFR because its military ca­
pabilities are so feared, which fits
nicely with DPRK’s “military first”
policy.16
The United Stetes needs to de­
velop a new strategy using two
pieces of wisdom from U.S. North
Korea Policy Coordinator William
Perry: “We have to deal with the
DPRK as it is and not as we
would wish it to be, borrowing
from [President John F. Kennedy],
‘Let us never negotiate out of fear.

US Army
But let us never fear to negoti­
ate’”17 Although we should not as­
sume that the DPRK would negotiate as we would ment. Given the dangers of regime collapse and the
like them to, this does not mean that negotiation potential for war, Kim Jong Il’s survival illusion
should not be an important element of the new should remain alive.18 As long as Kim Jong Il be­
strategy. lieves he will survive and has the possibility to
achieve reunification under his terms, he can be de­
Priorities terred from attacking.
Any strategy we choose should give the KFR two To sustain this illusion, the United States and ROK
of its four national objectives—ensure the regime’s must initiate an information operations program. As
survival and recognize it as a world power. Reunifi­ an example, the ROK and United States would
cation by force would not be an option, and the project a withdrawal date for U.S. forces to fore­
United States would not withdraw forces from the stall Kim Jong Il from any deliberate attack and to
Peninsula until the situation was resolved. This could buy the alliance a few years to execute its long-term
be demonstrated through a peace treaty between the strategy.
ROK and the DPRK. Although it seems counterintuitive, the regime
The United States’ first priority must be to rebuild needs to have a strong ROK-US alliance with a mili­
its alliance with the ROK through close consulta­ tary capability on the Peninsula to support the
tions and working toward a mutually agreed on long- DPRK’s military-first policy to allow it to continue

106 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


BEYOND THE
NUCLEAR CRISIS
its people’s “Spartan

US Air Force
existence.”19 U.S. for­
ces would actually en­
hance the regime’s le­
gitimacy.
The United States
and the ROK should
immediately normalize
relations with the
DPRK. Despite the
regime’s repulsiveness,
normalizing relations
helps maintain perma­
nent communications
channels. More impor­
tant, normalized rela­
tions might provide the
potential for increased
access to the regime
and to the population.
Members of the 2d Infantry
Normalization must be Division refill their truck from
comprehensive and a creek during a nuclear, bio­
logical, and chemical exercise.
include the removal of
all barriers to trade.
As part of normalization, the U.S. should reex­ trade and counterfeiting, which would reduce the in­
amine the 1953 Armistice Agreement and initiate a centive to proliferate weapons of mass destruction.
negotiation process for a formal peace treaty with­ An economic investment would promote outside
out consideration of the DPRK nuclear development contact for the country and its population. Initially,
program. A key factor in influencing the regime to Kim Jong Il would resist this contact, and when there
negotiate might be to recognize that the DPRK was too much contact, he would likely provoke a
possesses a nuclear capability and that the ROK, crisis that would cause a reduction in investment and
the United States, and the United Nations are will­ contact. With persistent attempts to invest in the
ing to negotiate a peace treaty disconnected to DPRK, however, Kim Jong Il might eventually
DPRK’s nuclear capability. Kim Jong Il would likely relent as he began to enjoy the “profits” he was
be viewed as a world power with significant influ­ receiving.
ence. Although this could be a long process, along
with normalization, it could serve to maintain a Changing the Outlook
dialogue and access to the regime and, potentially, Contact with the outside world could be instru­
to many officials in the middle and upper levels of mental in changing the outlook of the population and
the party. would lay the foundation for two important future
The critical aspect of the strategy is unconditional events. The population has been long-suffering un­
engagement.20 Although the ROK has undertaken der the yoke of the Chuche ideology. If reunifica­
a fairly aggressive economic engagement approach, tion occurs, knowledge of the outside world could
especially under the Kim Dae Jung administration ease the eventual integration process with the ROK.
with its “Sunshine Policy,” U.S. corporations, the Eu­ Outside knowledge could provide a catalyst for the
ropean Union, the Association of Southeast Asian people to undermine the regime and solve the Ko­
Nations, and other nations throughout the interna­ rea question internally.
tional community, must authorize and encourage There will be extreme danger when the KFR is
economic investment. This strategy’s purpose is faced with the potential for collapse. The alliance
threefold: it sustains the illusion that the regime can must continue to plan for the spectrum of conflict
survive; its economic investment would strengthen from a deliberate attack to spill over from civil war
its ability to control the nation; and legitimate prof­ and chaos that would occur if Kim’s governing ability
its would offset illegal activities, such as the drug eroded. A strong, well-trained, integrated force

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 107


would have to remain on the Peninsula until reunifi­ survival of his regime through reunification of the
cation, first to deal with conflict, then to deal with a Peninsula on his terms. The only alternative would
prolonged occupation. be that regime change would have to occur. The
In executing this long-term strategy, the ROK only way a regime change could occur is if Kim Il
would have to prepare for reunification, refining plans Sung were to initiate an attack on the ROK or if
for the integration of a potentially hostile population. the people of the DPRK were to cause a regime
The government would also have to prepare finan­ change themselves. In essence, this proposed strat­
cially to handle the huge costs of reuni-fication. egy is designed to manage the tensions on the Pen­
As access to the outside world increased, the insula while forestalling conflict and giving the tools
United States would have to attempt to contact key to the Korean people to allow them to determine
military commanders of the Korean People’s Army their own destiny and rid themselves of the tyrant
(KPA), particularly frontline commanders of the 4th, who is enslaving them.
2d, 1st, and 5th Armies from west to east respec­ If the strategy’s fundamental assumption is
tively. These commanders would need personal se­ flawed, the alliance would have to handle a worst-
curity guarantees by the ROK and the United States. case scenario and be militarily prepared to defend
When issued an order to attack from Kim Jong Il the ROK in case of attack. On the positive side, if
or when faced with internal instability and the col­ the KFR were willing to reform, the strategy could
lapse of the regime, these commanders would have provide a blueprint, through unconditional engage­
to be promised security if they are to maintain con­ ment, for that to happen.
trol of their forces and weapons of mass destruc­ The situation on the Peninsula is dangerous, and
tion. In fact, maintaining the cohesion of KPA units the threat Kim Jong Il poses is real. The alliance
would be key to reducing instability following a col­ would have to manage the situation while preparing
lapse or conflict. for the ultimate outcome. For a lasting peace to oc­
The fundamental assumption is that Kim Jong Il cur, the people of the DPRK must execute regime
would not alter the pursuit of his ultimate goal—the change. MR

NOTES
1. Stephen Bradner, Commander in Chief, UN Command Special Adviser in Korea 10. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs: America and
uses the term “Kim Family Regime” extensively in UN Command/Combined Forces the World, Debating the New Shape of International Politics, Council of Foreign Rela­
Command/U.S. Forces, Korea, briefings. See Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy,” tions, 2002, 137, n 4.
presentation at the third Nonproliferation Policy Education Center/Institute for National 11. Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, DC: AEI Press), 1999,
Security Studies/Army War College, Arlington, Virginia, 12-14 June 2000. See on­ 28-40. Eberstadt’s is one of the best analyses of KFR strategy; Bradner, n 2.
line at <www.npec-web.org/essay/Bradner.htm>, accessed 11 May 2004. For more 12. Thomas J. Belke, Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea’s State Religion
detailed information on the Kim Family Regime and its origins, see Adrian Buzo, (Bartlesville, OK: Living Sacrifice Press, 1999) and “The Spirit of Human Bombs.” (No
The Guerrilla Dynasty Politics and Leadership in North Korea (Boulder CO: Westview publishing data given).
Press, 1999); Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: 13. Robert Collins, “Patterns of Collapse in North Korea,” The Combined Forces Com­
Columbia University Press, 1988), and Sydney A. Seiler, Kim Il Song 1941-1948: The mand C5 Civil Affairs Newsletter, Seoul, January 1996, 2-12.
Creation of a Legend, the Building of a Regime (Lanham, MD: University Press of 14. Sun Tzu, 78.
America, 1994). 15. See on-line at <www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/koreaaf.htm>, accessed
2. The phrase “Korea question” is from the 1953 Armistice Agreement, sect. IV, para. on 11 May 2004. The United States brokered the Agreed Framework to “freeze” the DPRK
60. For more information, see on-line at <www.intellnet.org/resources/korean_war_docs/ nuclear program in 1994. The agreement called for the DPRK to receive two light water
armistic.htm>, accessed 11 May 2004. The Korea question refers to a final political so­ reactors (LWR) by 2003; 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year; and that both sides would
lution about how the people of Korea will choose to govern themselves. move toward full normalization and reduction of trade barriers. See also “Agreement on
3. Richard Halloran, “Bush’s Skipping South Korea Points To Shaky Relations,” Ho­ Reconciliation, Nonagression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and
nolulu Advertiser, 19 October 2003. the North,” on-line at <www.intellnet.org/resources/korean_war_docs/arne.htm>, ac­
4. Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochhizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninusla (New cessed 11 May 2004.
York: McGraw Hill, 2003), 83-112. 16. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, “Military-First Ideol­
5. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engage­ ogy is an Ever-Victorious, Invincible Banner for Our Era’s Cause of Independence,” Nau­
ment Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 161-65. tilus Institution, 11 April 2003, on-line at <www.nautilus.org/pub/ftp/napsnet/
6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University special_reports/MilitaryFirstDPRK.txt>, accessed 11 May 2004.
Press, 1963), 84. 17. William Perry, lecture, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 24 January 2003.
7. Buzo, 27. 18. Colonel Rick Gribling, Chief, Plans Division, CJ3, UN Command/Combined
8. Han S. Park, ed., North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Forces Command, Korea/U.S. Forces, Korea, coined the phrase “sustaining the illu­
Prentice Hall, 1996), 15. Park describes Chuche (Juche) as theology. See also KukPang sion that Kim Jong Il will survive” during a crisis-action planning session in June 1997.
Ilbo, editorial, Korea, 15 March 1999, 6. Chuche’s basic concept is, “Man rules all things; 19. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report.
man decides all things.” 20. Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Engaging Problem Countries,”
9. Chosen Ilbo, on-line at “North Korean Human Rights/HwangJong-yop, <www. Brookings Policy Brief #61, June 2000, on-line at <www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/
chosen.com/w21data/html/news/199912/19991202034.ht>, accessed 2 December 1999. pb61.htm>, accessed 11 May 2004.

Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S. Army, is a student at the National War Col­
lege, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. He received a B.A. from Miami University,
Oxford, Ohio, and an M.M.A.S. from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, School of Advanced Military Studies. He has held various command and
staff positions in the continental United States, Germany, Korea, Okinawa, and
the Philippines. His next assignment will be Chief of Staff, Special Operations
Command-Korea.

108 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MR
Review Essay
Osama bin-Laden Interview, June 1999:
Entering the Mind of an Adversary
Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Osama bin-Laden’s news medium phone. Ismail was taken to many safe undertook the construction of the
of choice, the Al-Jazeera television houses and never knew if he was prophet’s mosque in Medina. When
network, has enabled him to con­ temporarily stopping for a rest or if the Jordanian government an­
verse in a religious style of Arabic this was the place his interview nounced a bid to renovate the Dome
used by learned men of theology in would occur. It took 16 months to of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem,
Saudi Arabia. Al-Jazeera correspon­ secure a face-to-face interview with he gathered all his architects and
dent Jamal Abdul-Latif Ismail, author Bin-Laden. Bin-Laden no longer engineers and asked them to place a
of Bin Laden, Al-Jazeera, and I (Bin grants personal interviews, no doubt bid without any profit. They insisted
Laaden wa al-Jazeerah wa Ana) con­ because al-Qaeda used a hit team that they could submit a competitive
ducted a most insightful interview posing as a television crew on 9 Sep­ bid and make a little profit on this
with Bin-Laden in 1999.1 This essay tember 2001 to assassinate Northern project. So, may Allah have mercy
focuses on excerpts from this inter­ Alliance commander Ahmed Shah on his soul, he further reduced the
view and helps the reader understand Masood in Afghanistan. Bin-Laden bid in order to guarantee serving
the meaning behind Bin-Laden’s now videotapes his messages. this project. It is with Allah’s grace
words. Interview and Assessment that he would occasionally pray in
Getting the Interview Ismail’s interview affords much all three mosques in one day. It is
Ismail begins his book by describ­ insight into Bin-Laden’s ego, mind, no secret that he was one of the
ing how he obtained interviews with and psyche. Bin-Laden uses sym­ founders of the Kingdom of Saudi
Bin-Laden and the number two al- bols and imagery that requires inter­ Arabia’s infrastructure.
Qaeda leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. pretation and chooses words care­ After this I studied in the Hijaz and
Getting to Bin-Laden involved many fully to create a mystique and image majored in economics at Jeddah Uni­
false starts and required working for Arab audiences. Excerpts from the versity or what is called King Abdul-
with contacts in London, Cairo, and interview follow: Aziz University, I learned early the
Peshawar: an al-Qaeda operative Ismail: Who is Osama bin-Laden, inner-workings of my father’s com­
would set up an interview with Ismail and what does he want? pany, may Allah bless him, despite
then abruptly cancel it. It is impor­ Bin-Laden: Praise be to Allah, the fact that my father died when I
tant to understand that Ayman Al- Usama bin Muhammed bin Awad bin was 10 years old, this is briefly who
Zawahiri and members of his Egyp­ Laden was by Allah’s grace born to Osama bin-Laden is.
tian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) orchestrated Muslim parents on the Arabian Assessment: What Bin-Laden
media events. Al-Zawahiri, who has Peninsula in the Malaaz District of does and does not reveal about him­
a keen understanding of the power Riyadh in the year 1377 Hejirah self speaks volumes. He opens his
of media, imagery, and slogans, is a [1957]. With Allah’s grace, we went interview by giving his full name,
prolific writer about the past and fu­ to Medina 6 months after my birth. which establishes his Arab and Is­
ture of Islamic militancy. His book I then spent my entire life in the lamic bloodline. He never mentions
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner Hijaz between Mecca, Medina, and Saudi Arabia by name; he refers to
is required reading for those who Jeddah. the country as the Arabian Penin­
wish to understand al-Qaeda.2 The My father Sheikh Muhammed sula. Bin-Laden wants his audience
book explains the rationale behind Al­ bin Awad bin Laden was born in to understand that he grew up in the
Zawahiri’s strategic shift from attack­ Hadramaut and left to work in the Hijaz province, where Islam was
ing Egypt to directly attacking the Hijaz over 70 years ago. With Allah’s founded 14 centuries ago.
United States. grace, he was given an honor not Bin-Laden is tremendously proud
Ismail dealt with several al-Qaeda bestowed on any contractor and that of his father but purposefully does
front men before landing the inter­ is the building of the holy mosque not mention his mother, a Syrian
view with Bin-Laden. Meetings at in Mecca, which contains the bless­ woman who did not remain married
hotels and telephone calls at speci­ ed Kaaba. [Muslims believe this is to his father for long. Bin-Laden did
fied times finally resulted in Ismail’s the first House of God established not want to detract from his image
contact with Al-Zawahiri via tele­ by the Prophet Abraham.] He then as a pure Arab fighter by disclosing

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 109


that his mother was Syrian. An Arab the Western view of international Hiroshima after Japan surrendered
in Bin-Laden’s mind is defined not by human rights. Militants will feign and World War II was beginning its
language, but by religion and geog­ democracy and petition for freedom conclusion. Despite this, America
raphy. An Arab is one who is from to seek power, but once in power, insisted on striking nations [their]
the Arabian Peninsula—a Sunni impose a religious dictatorship. Bin- fathers, children, women, and elderly.
Muslim—everyone else (Egyptians, Laden makes clear his goals to insti­ The truth must be revealed that any
Iranians, and Syrians) being less gate an Islamic militant revolution attack today against any nation in the
pure. against the United States and Israel. Islamic world is in reality an attack
When Bin-Laden mentions that Bin-Laden believes the United States [orchestrated] by Israel and that
his father died when Bin-Laden was and Israel are in collusion to domi­ people must awake to this reality.
a child, he sends the message to lis­ nate the Islamic world. “There is no People must organize large popu­
teners that he became independent power except for Allah,” is an old lar movements to bring down world
at an early age. In Arabian society saying that denotes the helplessness organizations that have enslaved
the loss of a father is significant be­ of Muslims. Bin-Laden uses his mes­ and maintained their positions at the
cause he is the chief patriarch. Much sages of violent jihad as the remedy expense of Islam and the Muslims.
attention is given to the fact that the for this helplessness. America has divorced itself from this
Prophet Muhammed was orphaned Ismail: [Ismail asks Bin-Laden popular discontent, for the Jews
at a young age and needed an elder about recent attacks by British and have been able to direct the Chris­
to protect him. Bin-Laden might have U.S. forces against Iraq during Op­ tians from among the Americans and
modeled himself after Muhammed or eration Desert Fox.] English to encourage the strike
hidden the fact that his older brother Bin-Laden: Praise be to Allah, the against Iraq. It is the Israeli influence
took care of his mother and him until last attack [1999] that occurred a few and Jewish influence inside the
Bin-Laden was able to inherit his days ago in Iraq was directed by White House that has become clear.
father’s funds. America and Britain. This confirms For the Defense Secretary is Jewish,
Ismail: What do you want? many meanings that are both danger­ the Secretary of State is Jewish, the
Bin-Laden: What we want and ous and significant. We will not dis­ head of the CIA and national secu­
what we are demanding are the rights cuss here the material and human rity, [all of] the highest officials are
of every living being. We demand losses, the killing of our Muslim Jews. They have encouraged the
that our land be freed from our en­ brothers from among the Iraqi people Christians to clip the wings of the
emies, and that our land be freed from but will discuss the proofs [rationale] Islamic world and the real objective
Americans. For these living creatures behind these attacks. America ac­ is not Saddam Hussein but the de­
were given by God a protective in­ cuses Iraq of using poison gasses on velopment of the Islamic world as an
stinct that refused to be intruded its own people and against the emerging world power [sic]. They
upon. For these, may Allah praise Kurds. America accuses Iraq of us­ have struck Iraq, encircled Libya be­
you, are like the chickens. When an ing its destructive weapons against fore, or if [the Americans] strike the
armed person enters a chicken’s Iran. What is significant and what Al-Shifa factory in Sudan, and it was
home, it attacks [the assailant], and people should stop and take note of a plant that made medicine, are all
it is only a chicken. is that America did not speak of clear signs of recent events [sic].
We demand the rights for every these things at that juncture, America It has become clear that no Mus­
living creature, specifically human at that time aided [Iraq], who was lim should and every sane person
rights and in particular the [rights] of subsidized by many agents in the not go to the United Nations. Mus­
Muslims. There were aggressions on region. lims legally must not succumb to this
the lands of Islam, particularly the It [Iraq] became the largest Arab organization that is heretical. We will
holy shrines, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, [military] power in the region threat­ tell those intelligent non-Muslims not
the first center [qibla] in which ening the security of the Jews and to go to this organization, for look at
Prophet Muhammed, peace be upon Israeli security that has occupied the North Korea, for [would] any sane
him [PBUH], directed his prayers. legacy [Al-Aqsa Mosque] left us by person go to an infidel to receive
This aggression continued with the our holy prophet [PBUH]. It was judgment[?]
alliance between crusaders and Jews when [this threat to Israel] appeared Assessment: Bin-Laden finishes
that is led by America and Israel, in that it began making an issue of this section by railing about the
which they have taken the land of the these things [Iraq’s weapons capa­ United Nations, America’s control of
two holy mosques [reference to bility]. It [America] claims to hold the organization, and its right to veto
Saudi Arabia], and there is no power them [Israel] accountable, [America on the Security Council. He accuses
except by Allah. We desire to insti­ says]: correct, there are advanced Muslims who wish to divide the
gate the community [of Muslims] to weapons and weapons of mass de­ Muslims for their own gain or those
undertake the liberation of their land struction in Israel, but Israel has who participate in the United Na­
and fight for the sake of Allah, most never used them, but Iraq uses them; tions as not understanding their own
high, so that Islamic law and Allah’s this talk is redundant. America also faith.
are raised high. possesses these weapons and has Bin-Laden’s claim that the United
Assessment: Bin-Laden’s demand deployed them hitting entire nations States dropped the atomic bomb af­
for human rights is classic mimicry of in the Far East in Nagasaki and ter Japan surrendered displays his

110 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


REVIEW ESSAY

incredible misunderstanding of the against this obscene occupation. For from his belief that any cleric who
events of World War II. He has no it is up to Muslims, particularly the does not espouse Bin-Laden’s reli­
comprehension of World War II, Ahl al-Hal Wal-Aqd [those leaders gious view is being paid by Arab
Operation Olympic, or U.S. President that loosen and bind communities]; regimes. He considers the Saudi
Harry S. Truman’s decision to use the those of truthful Ulama, believing Council of Ulama a mouthpiece of
atomic bomb to shorten the war.3 Bin­ merchants, and heads of tribes must the government. Bin-Laden admires
Laden’s reference to World War II immigrate for Allah’s sake and find militant Saudi clerics like Sheikh Safar
and his manipulation of Islamic his­ for themselves a place where they Al-Hawali, whose sermons about an
tory and the law shows how he takes can raise the banner of [offensive] inevitable clash between Islam and
pieces of history and alters them to jihad. To make their umma [commu­ the West are widely disseminated by
justify his arguments. He views the nities] aware of [the importance of] cassette tape. Al-Hawali’s diatribes,
Japanese self-sacrifice and kamikaze preserving their religion and dignity, which appeal to many young Saudi
ethic from a jihadist perspective. otherwise all shall be lost. They must students, offer an alternate and mili­
Bin-Laden’s vehement anti- reflect on what has happened to our tant explanation to the perceived im­
Semitism is a staple of many Islamic brothers in Palestine . . . the Pales­ potence of the Saudi regime during
militant groups but also shows his tinian nation used to be famous for Operation Desert Storm. Al-Hawali’s
fixation on Israel and the demonizing its agricultural prowess. . . . This radical speeches include diatribes
of Jews, partly because of the Wah­ nation today has made refugees un­ about a worldwide conspiracy
habi doctrine by which he was welcome and rejected around the against Islam by the United States
raised. It is not to Bin-Laden’s advan­ world. . . . Why is there no response and Israel.
tage to reveal Muhammed’s relation­ when the Holy Mosque in Jerusalem There are indications that the reli­
ship with the Jews in Medina, where is under attack, what will make 1.2 gious and political views of the 15
there was a societal compact be­ billion Muslims move? This is some­ Saudis among the terrorists who at­
tween Muslims and Jews to live as thing that is incredulous that must be tacked the World Trade Center were
one community. It is also not in Bin­ addressed. . . . Anyone believing that shaped by Al-Hawali’s tapes. An­
Laden’s interest to mention that early [America will not] strike is living in a other popular militant Saudi cleric,
Christians helped sustain early Islam. fantasy. Skeikh Salman Al-Auda, has written
One must also remember Bin-Laden’s Assessment: Bin-Laden’s refer­ a book, The End of History, which
religious education is steeped in the ence to immigrating to a place where highlights the decay of Western civi­
teachings of Wahhabism. Wahhab­ a banner of jihad can be raised is lization and uses Muslims to accel­
ism’s founder, Muhammed bin intended to encourage Muslims to erate the collapse of the West.5
Abdul-Wahab, in Kitab al-Tawheed join him in Afghanistan. Playing on Ismail: Will there be a response to
wrote, “The ways of the people of Islamic history once again, Bin-Laden the cruise-missile attacks on Af­
the book (Jews and Christians) are describes how Muhammed was ghanistan of 1998?
condemned as polytheist.”4 Abdul­ forced to leave Mecca to go to Bin-Laden: With Allah’s grace we
Wahab’s Islam is far more intolerant Medina, where he established the have formulated with many of our
than 7th-century Muslim doctrine. first Muslim society. Bin-Laden takes brothers around the globe the World
Bin-Laden’s focus is on incitement at this hijra (withdrawal) out of context. Islamic Front for the Jihad Against
all costs, and he prefers a simple ex­ Muhammed was ordered to leave the Jews and Crusaders. The Front’s
planation of a world in which Mus­ Mecca to spare Muslims from geno­ organization and coordination is
lims are perpetual victims and self- cide. Bin-Laden also conveniently coming along in an exceptional man­
examination is discouraged. excludes how Muhammed peacefully ner. It will have a wider ability to
Ismail: What impact did the Brit­ interacted with non-Muslims in move and achieve victory for the
ish and American strikes on Baghdad Medina and how he attempted to faith and take revenge on the Jews,
have on anti-American sentiments in construct a single community made Christians, and Americans.
the region, and [do you] see military up of Muslims, Jews, and other non- Assessment: Bin-Laden’s re­
responses curbing [your] terrorist Muslims. sponse demonstrates his patience
efforts? Bin-Laden’s idea of migration and and unwillingness to strike without
Bin-Laden: Praise Allah, what waging offensive jihad was also careful planning and coordination.
must be understood regarding this used in the 1970s and 1980s by an This is not the answer of an impul­
question is that the Muslim nations Egyptian terrorist group called Takfir sive person.
after this attack are nations that are wal Hijrah whose followers left Cairo Ismail points out to Bin-Laden
not in control of its destiny. Our en­ and traveled to remote regions of that there have been no operations
emies roam freely and with conceit southern Egypt to wage war against carried out since the announcement
through our homes, lands, and air Egyptian authorities. No doubt Bin- at the World Islamic Front.
space. They strike [Muslims] without Laden and his Egyptian ideologue, Bin-Laden: [This organization]
seeking anyone’s permission and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, have discussed has not gained firm roots, and its
especially during this attack. . . . The many Islamic militant movements and members come from varied back­
current [Arab] regimes are in a deep their tactics. grounds around the world. They
conspiracy [with the adversary, and Bin-Laden’s reference to truthful have wide activities within the move­
have lost the] ability to do anything Ulama (religious scholars) comes ment. It is also not necessary to

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 111


announce every operation they have ing refugees and deter warlords from 2001 world, the United States must
attempted or succeeded in. using food as a weapon to control find the logic behind Bin-Laden’s
them. diatribe to begin the process of dis­
Important Lessons crediting it Islamically and intellectu­
from the Interview Bin-Laden’s Views ally. In the end we will capture the
Several concepts contained in on Petro-Politics likes of Bin-Laden and Al-Zawahiri,
Bin-Laden’s interview must be high­ Ismail describes Bin-Laden’s belief but their writings, commentaries, and
lighted to help the reader understand that America robs Saudi Arabia of its speeches will outlive them. Disman­
the rationale behind Bin-Laden’s oil wealth. Bin-Laden explains that tling their arguments is an important
thoughts. He claims that 75 percent during the reign of King Faisal, the aspect in this war on terrorism.
of Americans supported President United States paid only 70 cents per Fifty years from now when young
Bill Clinton’s 1998 and 1999 opera­ barrel [of oil]. In the 1973 oil crisis, Muslims read Bin-Laden and Al­
tions against Afghanistan and Iraq. the Muslims asserted their economic Zawahiri’s works, they will hopefully
He considers U.S. civilians and sol­ power using oil as a weapon, and reflect on how not to lapse into Is­
diers to be one and the same, prices began to rise to $40 per bar­ lamic militancy, much like Adolf
thereby justifying killing U.S. civil­ rel. When the [oil] prices leveled off Hitler’s Mein Kampf is viewed as a
ians. Bin-Laden admits that he set up to $36, the United States pressured lesson on how not to lapse into fas­
military training camps and trained Gulf countries to increase their pro­ cism.6 From a military education per­
over 15,000 men—the majority from duction to lower prices. Bin-Laden spective, the United States has spent
Arab countries—during the Soviet labels this “the great swindle.” Do­ hours discussing the ideology and
occupation of Afghanistan. ing basic math, Bin-Laden explains military tactics of the Vietnamese; a
Ismail asked Bin-Laden about his that from $36 the price was lowered new corpus of literature must be de­
being implicated in Sheikh Abdullah to $9 per barrel, he relates the retail veloped for this new adversary. MR
Azzam’s assassination. Bin-Laden price at $144 per barrel, or a loss of
never directly answered this ques­ $135. He multiplied $135 by the 30 NOTES
tion but, instead, lavished praise on million barrels produced in the Islamic 1. Bin Laaden wa al-Jazeerah wa Ana (Bin Laden, Al-
Azzam as a key leader in the Islamic world daily, totaling a loss of $4.5 Jazeera, and I) (Casablanca, Morocco: Dar-al-Najaah Al-
Jadeedah, 2001).
militant movement. Azzam organized billion per day for Muslim nations. 2. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Knights Under the Prophet’s Ban­
ner,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, London, 2 December 2001.
the first Arab resistance against the He breaks down the loss over 25 3. For more information about Operation Olympic, see on­
Soviet Union during the invasion years to $30,000 for every Muslim line at <www.ibiblio.org/pha/war.term/Olympic.html>, ac­
cessed 23 June 2004.
of Afghanistan. Azzam’s Maktab-al­ man, woman, and child. Although 4. Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahab, Kitab al-Tawheed (Mis­
cellaneous Pakistani Publisher). Kitab al-Tawheed is an 18th­
Khadamat-al-Mujahidden (Mujah­ this is an oversimplification of petro­ century tenets of faith book.
ideen Services Office) also known as leum production and evolution of 5. Salman bin Fahed al-Auda, The End of History (No
publishing data given.)
Al-Qaeda al-Sulba (the firm base) agreements between oil companies 6. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (My struggles) (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin, 1999).
became the core of Bin-Laden’s or­ and oil-producing nations, it is high­
ganization. lighted to demonstrate the skill with Lieutenant Commander Youssef
When asked about his health, Bin- which Bin-Laden panders to the dis­ H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy, is a Mid­
Laden said he could ride a horse 70 enfranchised, giving them an alter­ dle East-North Africa Foreign Area
kilometers without needing a rest. Officer. He received a B.B.A. from
nate history. the University of Mississippi, an
This statement is meant to appeal to Aside from exporting atrocities M.B.A. and M.H.S.A from the Uni­
the romantic image of Arabs as war­ around the world, Bin-Laden exports versity of Arkansas, and an M.S.
riors and skilled horsemen. Bin-Laden from the Joint Military Intelligence
alternative messages that must be College. He is the Director for North
says it is the right of Muslims to discredited. He has a skill at taking Africa and Egypt, and the Assistant
acquire nuclear technology and that World War II history out of context Director for the Arabian Peninsula,
the West can no longer monopo­ and packaging Quranic verses, pro­ at the Office of the Secretary of De­
lize it. He believes veterans of the So­ fense for International Security Af­
phetic sayings, and Islamic militant fairs. He has served in various com­
viet war against Afghanistan bear a writings from the 13th through the mand and staff positions in the con­
high responsibility. With only small 20th century and passing them off as tinental United States, Bosnia,
numbers of rocket-propelled gre­ Liberia, and the Middle East.
theology. In a post-11 September
nades, Kalshnikovs, and antitank

?
mines, they were able to crush the
greatest superpower known to
mankind. Bin-Laden is convinced
that the United States is weaker than Considering Writing
the former Soviet Union, citing the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Somalia as a sign of American weak­
for MilitaryReview
Send a double-spaced, typed manuscript with your name and title at the top of page
ness. He has created an alternate one. Also include an electronic version on a 3.5-inch disk in MS Word format.
history that claims that U.S. forces, Typical articles run between 3,000 and 3,500 words or about 15-18 double-spaced pages.
under the banner of the United Please use endnotes rather than footnotes for documentation and ensure there are
no embedded notes or figures within the document.
Nations, killed 13,000 Somalis. Bin-
Send submissions to Military Review, 294 Grant Ave., Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027­
Laden refuses to believe that U.S. 1254, or call (913) 684-9327 for more information.
forces were in Somalia to feed starv­

112 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


MR
Book Reviews
THE LIBERTY INCIDENT: The 1967 cludes works by conscientious ob­ verse that emerges into the fore­
Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy jectors and other war-resisters such ground of military victory to ask un­
Ship, A. Jay Cristol, Brassey’s Inc, as Robinson Jeffers and William answered questions about race and
Herndon, VA, 2002, 294 pages, $27.50.
Stafford. The contributors, all cred­ class. Compelling examples are Witter
On 9 June 1967, Israel’s Air Force ible objectivists and imagists, are “fol­ Bynner’s “Defeat” and Gwendolyn
and Navy attacked the USS Liberty lowers of the formal school of South­ Brook’s “Negro Hero.”
(a U.S. Navy Intelligence ship). Sev­ ern verse and dense rhetoric.” For poetry enthusiasts and stu­
eral conclusions about why it was at­ Editor Harvey Shapiro, an Ivy dents of how war relates to literature
tacked have been put forward since League-educated poet and a veteran and the arts, Shapiro’s book is an ex­
then, but I believe A. Jay Cristol has of 35 combat missions as a B-17 tail emplary, diverse collection and a per­
ended the controversy about the in­
gunner, sets a solemn tone, stating fect companion to Leon Stokes­
cident with his new book, The Lib­
that although the Allies are victori­ bury’s Articles of War: A Collection
erty Incident: The 1967 Israeli At­
ous, “the sight of dead bodies is of American Poetry About World War
tack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship.
scattered among these poems the 2 (University of Arkansas Press,
Cristol, a retired navy aviator, who
way bodies were washed up on the Fayetteville, 1990). Poets of World
is a federal judge, spent a decade
shores of invasion beaches.” His War II includes an introduction by
conducting over 500 interviews; re­
purpose for compiling the anthology Shapiro and a helpful biographical
searching hundreds of articles and
was “to demonstrate that the Ameri­ section.
dozens of books, studying thou­
can poets of the war produced a Ever since Plato’s Cratylus (circa
sands of pages of official U.S. and
body of work that has not yet been 360 B.C.) scholars have debated how
Israeli investigations, and assem­
recognized for its clean and power­ poetry closes the aesthetic space be­
bling his research into an outstand­
ful eloquence.” tween the reader’s expectations and
ing book.
Shapiro gathered some of the best the poet’s ability to meet them. This
Was the Liberty’s attack inten­
poetry of the war, including infre­ work accomplishes that closure quite
tional or a mistake? How did the
quently published but no less majes­ effectively even though six decades
United States and Israel contribute to
tically poignant, air war poems by have passed since the end of World
the incident? What was the Liberty
doing in the area? Was there a cover- John Ciardi, James Dickey, Richard War II.
up? Is there validity in any of the Eberhart, Randall Jarrell, Howard MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF,
conspiracy theories? Cristol analyzes Nemerov, and Richard Hugo (al­ Ramstein AB, Germany
these and many other questions with though his opus magnum, “Mission
evidence and unbiased thinking. to Linz,” does not appear here). Some
of the best poems of ground com­ FACTORIES OF DEATH: Japanese
LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA, Retired, Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas bat are by Louis Simpson, George American Cover-Up, Sheldon H. Harris,
Oppen, and Anthony Hecht. Several Routledge, New York, 2002, 385 pages,
poems are quite moving, such as $24.95.
POETS OF WORLD WAR II, James Tate’s “The Lost Pilot,” writ­ From 1931 to 1945 the Japanese
Harvey Shapiro, ed., The Library of
America, New York, 2003, 304 pages, ten for his father who was killed in Army engaged in biological warfare
$20.00. action when Tate was 5 months old, (BW) and chemical warfare (CW)
Was it so hard, Achilles, So very and Peter Viereck’s “‘Vale’ from experiments using live human sub­
hard to die—Patrick Shaw-Stewart, Carthage,” which he wrote on the jects, which led to the first wide­
Gallipoli, 1917. occasion of his brother’s death in the spread use of bacteriological agents
This anthology is one in a series European theater. in the war. This definitive work about
published by the American Poets There are sublime elegies like Unit 731 (the Japanese Army’s bac­
Project, an effort intended to produce Vladimir Nabokov’s “When he was teriological warfare center) and its
a first-time “compact national library small, when he would fall” and Rich­ commander, Lieutenant General Ishii
of poets.” Poets of World War II con­ ard Eberhart’s “A Ceremony by the Shiro, is the result of more than 20
sists of 120 poems by 62 poets, 42 Sea.” Many poets achieve a power­ years of research, including 12 field
from veterans, making it similar in ful austerity through just a few lines, trips to China.
concept to kindred anthologies such as Samuel Menashe does in his 18­ Biological warfare was part of
as Jan Barry’s Peace is Our Profes­ syllable, 5-line poem, “Beachhead.” Japan’s search for relatively cheap,
sion: Poems and Passages of War The poems are not solely about war-winning weapons. Intertwined
Protest (East River Anthology, combat and its effects. They also in­ with this was a debate over World
Perkasie, PA, 1981). The book in­ form the wider ontology of war in War I lessons and the ways Japan

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 113


could survive in a social Darwinian use what was discovered to fashion against Japan, chemical warfare, ur­
world surrounded by hostile powers. biological weapons, and Americans ban combat, and a linkup with Soviet
Author Sheldon H. Harris draws to­ shielded these war criminals while forces. A concept of civil war is nec­
gether numerous strands of intellec­ using Japanese research to supple­ essary to understand the PLA. The
tual, social, and scientific history, re­ ment their own. The picture of offi­ Chinese war in Tibet, the military
vealing that Japanese doctors were cial obfuscation and mendacity is not actions against the excesses of the
blind to their work’s ethical and moral pretty. cultural revolution, and the current
implications because of the fashion For years, Japan denied Unit 731 Chinese actions against guerrillas in
in which they were educated and existed or that experiments even oc­ Xinjiang Province are also not dis­
trained. He explains that the wide­ curred. The U.S. Government simul­ cussed.
spread interest in biological and taneously covered up and stone­ This book is about Chinese mili­
chemical warfare was a result of its walled investigations. Japan refused tary actions against other countries.
being seen as a “higher form of kill­ to admit that its Army and Navy com­ China’s domestic use of the military
ing” or a more humane form of war­ mitted war crimes, including the use is not discussed at all. Seeing how
fare. Harris’s descriptions of experi­ of civilians as comfort women (sex the Communist Party, which began
ments are unpleasant, and the reader slaves). Japan’s treatment of World its climb to power as a guerrilla force,
shares Harris’s disgust for the War II history in its textbooks is dealt with conflicting guerrilla forces
perpetrator’s moral lapses. questionable. Japan remembers the and internal dissent would have
Although the atrocities occurred atomic bombings, but not the events been interesting. The invasion of
in Manchuria, the only country to leading up to them. This willful am­ Tibet also clearly deserved inclusion.
hold war crime trials was the Soviet nesia extends to the Nanjing Massa­ The book deals with operational
Union, and this was done in a low- cre, which Japanese revisionists still and strategic levels of Chinese con­
key manner. China has placed a wall deny ever happened. flict but occasionally dips into the
of secrecy around the subject, partly Four days before Harris’s death tactical level, which remains terra in­
because of the place Manchuria on 31 August 2002, a Japanese court cognita to most of us. Chinese
holds in the founding mythology of admitted Japan had conducted bio­ Warfighting is clearly a book for the
the People’s Republic as explicated in logical warfare in China, but the court military professional. Editors David
Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: rejected surviving victims’ claims to M. Finkelstein and Michael A.
Nationalism, Resistance and Col­ compensation. The court’s decision McDevitt’s essays are well written,
laboration in Modern China ended more than 5 decades of denial. and the military reader is rewarded
(Berkeley: University of California Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., for his time.
Press, 2000). Huntsville, Alabama LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired,
Factories of Death: Japanese Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and CHINESE WARFIGHTING: The
the American Cover-Up is unpleas­ PLA Experience Since 1949, Mark A. THE BATTLE OFTHEATLANTIC:
ant to read because it deals with a Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael Hitler’s Gray Wolves of the Sea and
distasteful subject. Harris gathers A. McDevitt, eds., M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, the Allies’ Desperate Struggle to De­
particularly damning evidence and New York, 2003, 319 pages, $69.95. feat Them, Andrew Williams, Basic Book,
presents Ishii Shiro and his col­ Books in English about Chinese Cambridge, MA, 2003, 320 pages, $30.00.
leagues as amoral monsters who ex­ warfighting are rare; most date from “The U-boat attack was the only
perimented on human beings to cre­ the Korean war. Therefore, any new thing that ever really frightened me
ate new weapons of war. The book’s book on the subject is welcome. during the war,” said British Prime
two parts, “Japanese Factories of Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Expe­ Minister Winston Churchill. Coming
Death” and “American Cover-Up,” rience Since 1949 is an essay col­ from a man who lived through one
are meticulously researched with the lection that includes discussions on of the most storied air battles in his-
results presented in an outraged patterns of warfare, doctrine, China’s tory—the Battle of Britain—as well
tone, which leads to this important post-World War II civil war, the at­ as the nightmare of never-before­
book’s one minor flaw—its shrill tempts to take Taiwan, the Korean seen rocket attacks, such a comment
tone. war, the Sino-Indian war, the Sino- gives one pause. Why, with the ma­
Harris shows how the U.S. Army Soviet border conflicts, the Sino-Viet­ jor defeats Great Britain and her al­
used the Japanese war criminals’ namese war, the People’s Liberation lies suffered in Africa and Europe
meticulously kept records to advance Army (PLA), the Navy, and the PLA and the harrowing escape from
its own BW and CW studies. The Air Force. Dunkirk, was Churchill only fright­
Army classified the records and de­ Also of interest is what is not in ened of the U-boat war? The reason
layed Harris’s Freedom of Informa­ the book, such as the Chinese civil is the U-boat war gave the Nazis their
tion Act requests. What emerges is war, which shaped the PLA and pro­ greatest hope for defeating the Brit­
a picture of Japanese and American duced its leaders through the 1980s. ish. Surprisingly, few knew then how
governments at their worst. The Japa­ The book only covers the civil war close Great Britain was to defeat.
nese government condoned or did after 1949, but that war was seminal, Unfortunately, fewer know now.
not want to know the details of the ran the gamut from guerrilla to con­ As an island nation, Great Britain
experiments, although it attempted to ventional war, and included a war depended on imports for its eco­

114 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


BOOK REVIEWS

nomic, social, and military survival. show Hitler the devastation he had rable. Bradley writes, “Looking into
Britain’s life blood depended on its created diminished his argument for the eyes of arguably the most accom­
ability to trade with and receive sup­ more and better boats versus the plished and successful man alive,” he
port from the United States and Luftwaffe’s argument for more air­ saw the same survivor’s guilt he had
Canada. Britain’s leaders knew this, craft. The inability to visualize the observed in other veterans. The
and so did many Nazi leaders, includ­ effect of the U-boat battle on both former president said he “thinks
ing German Admiral Karl Donitz. Us­ sides of the channel bought time for about those guys all the time.”
ing the U-boat, Donitz developed the Allies to reverse their fortunes. Although Flyboys tells the avia­
tactics, techniques, and procedures Williams does an excellent job tors’ stories, readers looking for an
to sever Britain’s lifeline. bringing the battle to life once again. exact replica of Flags of Our Fathers
Donitz’s crews saw themselves as The reader is introduced to both pro­ might be disappointed. Bradley ex­
elites and members of a family sav­ tagonists, and shown how they lived, pands on this story much more than
ing the German Fatherland. Working fought, and often died. The Allies’ in his previous book and uses the
tirelessly to find technological advan­ desperation is palpable, and emo­ story of the eight aviators to explore
tages to keep ahead of the Allies, tions ranging from arrogance to de­ the evolution of Japanese militarism
Donitz devised a plan for U-boat spair on the part of Germany are eas­ and the underlying reasons behind
warfare to strangle and starve Great ily felt. the bushido code, the Japanese per­
Britain and cause its downfall. He LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC, spective on expansion in China, and
almost succeeded. Retired, Camp Pendleton, California the Japanese philosophy toward kill­
From the war’s beginning, the ing and atrocities. Bradley writes that
German U-boat campaign achieved the Japanese viewed America as
remarkable success. By the war’s end, FLYBOYS: A True Story of Courage, hypocritical because of U.S. atroci­
Allied losses amounted to approxi­ James Bradley, Little Brown and Company, ties during previous wars and during
New York, 400 pages, $25.95.
mately 50,000 men and 15 million tons the country’s Westward expansion.
of materiel. Losses reached such a Flyboys, a great, haunting work, Bradley tells the story of the Doolittle
level that Great Britain was using and quickly engages readers. James Bra­ raid and how fire-bombing the Japa­
losing more supplies and food than dley, the bestselling author of Flags nese mainland led to Japan’s hatred
it could replace. Stocks were at such of Our Fathers (Bantam, New York, of aviators and its desire for revenge,
minimal levels that nationwide star­ 2000) tells the remarkable tale of avia­ a desire that resulted in the deaths
vation was only weeks away. The tors and their courage in the Pacific of over 250,000 Chinese and the pas­
course of the war was hanging in the during World War II. Bradley con­ sage of the Enemy Airmens’Act that
balance, and victory was within the tacted Bill Doran who attended the led to the execution of three Doolittle
grasp of the Third Reich. Great Brit­ trials of the Japanese defendants fol­ flyers.
ain, however, prevailed, and the Na­ lowing the war. Doran had signed a Bradley’s storytelling style allows
zis were defeated. How was such a nondisclosure statement following readers to get to know the people he
reversal of fortunes possible? the proceedings, but he always be­ writes about. He interviews friends
The Allies worked just as hard to lieved the aviator’s story needed to and family and describes the capture
fight the U-boat menace as the Ger­ be told. With the information declas­ of the seven aviators and their inter­
mans did in preparing it. Technologi­ sified, he could. rogations, beatings, and interactions
cal advances, such as sonar and ra­ The story began on the island of with the Japanese. Bradley also
dar, combined with convoy tactics Chichi Jima. Bradley details the back­ describes how each aviator faced
and aggressive long-range air cover grounds, missions, capture, and sub­ execution, why Japanese command­
effectively combated the early advan­ sequent execution of seven Navy ers ordered the executions, why the
tages U-boats enjoyed. The success­ and Marine Corps aviators just as the subordinates who carried them out
ful efforts of code breakers was also battle of Iwo Jima was raging to the had a misguided sense of honor and
important in the course of the battle. south. The shape of Chichi Jima warrior spirit, and describes the hor­
Yet, all this took time. How was Great made bombing runs hazardous, yet ror and barbarity that occurred after
Britain able to buy the time needed the communications stations on the the executions. Readers will be left
to counteract the effects of the U- island had to be destroyed. Bombing wondering how men could do such
boat battle? missions cost many aviators their things to other men.
The battles between U-boats and lives and caused the capture of sev­ The book includes the poignant
Allied shipping took place outside eral more. Bradley recounts one re­ story of the aviators’ families who
the public’s view. There were no hor­ markable story of a naval aviator who were first told their sons were miss­
rific photographs of destroyed build­ was shot down. The pilot was res­ ing, then that the men were killed in
ings and cities in flames and no cued by a U.S. submarine before the action, but the families were never
stream of refugees reciting the hor­ Japanese could attempt capture. The told the details of their deaths. The
rors of war and spreading fear and aviator’s name was George H.W. family’s emotional journeys and the
panic. Great Britain’s government Bush. effect their loved ones’ deaths had on
kept the devastation from the pub­ Bush’s insights and emotions their lives are compelling. The later
lic, minimizing its psychological ef­ about being shot down and the loss war crimes trials on Chichi Jima were
fect. That Donitz was never able to of his two crew members are memo­ conducted in secret, partly to spare

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 115


the families the horrific details of overthrown; Germany unified itself complishments is his contemporary
their sons’ deaths. When the media around upstart Prussia, and the old interpretation of the battle. Most ob­
finally reported the details, the fami­ Austrian empire began its long skid servers missed the significance of
lies were understandably inconsol­ to the trash heap of history. In time, Von Moltke’s brilliant operational
able. Königgrätz would be seen as the scheme and the command and con­
Bradley admits he doubts justice beginning of Europe’s “German prob­ trol system that brought it to fruition
was served — a conviction that lem,” a problem that needed two at Königgrätz. The majority of pun­
comes through in his writing. He ex­ world wars to resolve. dits cite the Dreyse needle gun as the
plores why the United States did not The battle changed power relation­ secret of the Prussian victory, but in
bring some of the Japanese war crimi­ ships and warfare itself. With each emphasizing the role of new technol­
nals to justice, especially the Japa­ combatant deploying a quarter-mil­ ogy, they overlooked the conceptual
nese Emperor. Bradley’s conclusions lion soldiers, the Battle of Königgrätz and organizational innovations that
raise important questions about the became the largest battle to that time were the real secret to Von Moltke’s
U.S. sense of justice and U.S. con­ in history. Helmuth von Moltke, the success. The Prussian plan, the Prus­
cessions to Japan. architect of victory, showed the sian system, and Prussian staffs were
I highly recommend this interest­ world that an elite group of highly what put the Prussian needle guns
ing, compelling, thought-provoking educated officers could guide. The in position to win the battle. When
story about courage, honor, and group became the modern general contemporary pundits give technol­
sacrifice. staff. And, by overthrowing the Aus­ ogy too much credit, they fall into a
LTC Robert J. Rielly, USA, trians in a brilliant, 7-week campaign, trap into which many others have
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas chief of staff Von Moltke developed also stumbled.
a military system that became the Most history books have a viable
model for the rest of the world’s shelf life of 7 to 8 years before more
NAPOLEON’S GLANCE: The Se­ armies.
cret of Strategy, William Duggan, current scholarship supplants them.
Thunder’s Mouth Press, New York, 2003, Given the importance of the After almost 30 years, Craig’s König­
280 pages, $24.95. events of 1866, the story of the grätz still has much to offer. I highly
Were you ever engaged in solv­ “Seven Weeks War” deserves the recommend it.
ing a perplexing problem when the scholarship and writing skills of a LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,
solution suddenly became as obvi­ first-rate historian. For that reason, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
ous as daylight? If so, you have ex­ military history students will be grati­
perienced what led Napoleon to suc­ fied with the reprint of Gordon Craig’s
Königgrätz, Prussia’s Victory over ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PAST:
cess—sudden insight—intuition, The Lives and Works of the World
based on experience, says author of Austria, 1866. When the book first War II Generation of Historians, Wil­
Napoleon’s Glance: The Secret of appeared in 1964, it became the stan­ liam Palmer, The University Press of
Strategy, William Duggan. While this dard English-language work on the Kentucky, Lexington, 2001, 372 pages,
might at first appear too simplistic, subject. Since then, others have of­ $32.00.
Duggan details vignettes about the fered new, more-detailed interpreta­ There are three kinds of historians:
sudden insights of Pablo Picasso; tions of the campaign, most con­ lumpers, who use highly technical
Saint Paul; civil and suffrage rights spicuously Geoffrey Wawro’s 1996 terminology; splitters, who catalog
activists Ella Baker and Alice Paul; book, The Austro-Prussian War: broad similarities among various
and a third-world banker, among oth­ Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy events and people; and those who
ers. Napoleon’s Glance gives read­ in 1886 (Cambridge University Press, record the differences. William Palmer
ers an enjoyable series of vignettes, New York, 1997), but Craig’s account is a lumper. Engagement with the
but it will not be particularly reward­ still represents the best entry point Past: The Lives and Works of the
ing to serious readers. for readers new to the wars of Ger­ World War II Generation of Histori­
COL Arley H. McCormick, USA, man Unification. ans is Palmer’s history of 23 promi­
Retired, Huntsville, Alabama The book is old-fashioned military nent 20th-century U.S. and British
history, although it did not have to historians, including Eric Hobsbawm,
be, given Craig’s impressive schol­ Richard Hofstadter, and C. Vann
THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ: arly credentials. He chose to focus Woodward, who rank among the gi­
Prussia’s Victory over Austria, 1866, ants of their profession.
Gordon A. Craig, University of Pennsyl­ squarely on armies, commanders, and
vania Press, Philadelphia, 2003 (first battles, but if this emphasis is “old Palmer, however, fails to unite his
printing 1964), 224 pages, $14.95. fashioned,” one can hardly call the diverse subjects in any meaningful
In 1866, news of Prussia’s dra­ book “drums and bugles” history. way. As young adults, these histori­
matic victory over Austria at König­ Craig balances crisp battle narratives ans lived through the Depression
grätz caused the papal secretary to with plenty of thoughtful analysis. and World War II, but despite the
exclaim “Casca il mondo!” (the world The book leads to a clear understand­ subtitle, Palmer does not attempt to
is collapsing). After the Battle of ing of what Dennis Showalter has re­ depict the scholars as the “greatest
Königgrätz, nothing would be the cently called the “Prusso-German generation” of historians. (An equal­
same again. Suddenly, the balance Revolution in Military Affairs.” ly accomplished score of Anglo-
of power in Central Europe was One of Craig’s most significant ac­ American historians, Frederick Jack­

116 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


BOOK REVIEWS

son Turner, Charles Beard, and Perry der. This is unfortunate, because the ment, the military can conduct a revo­
Miller, were born in the first quarter book does not really discuss typical, lution in the way America wages war.
of the last century.) He could have lesser-known hate criminals. Gaylin America could transform its military
labeled the scholars the “Cold War does complete his mission of show­ into a smaller, more flexible and lethal,
generation” because they published ing why passionate attachment turns and less expensive force. He devel­
their most important works in the into large-scale hatred and violence. ops his argument with historical ex­
decades after 1945. Palmer set himself One of the book’s weaker points amples of how failure to adapt force
an almost impossible task in trying to is a blanket and all-too-simple as­ structure, doctrine, and tactics, and
sort through an entire generation of sumption that some hatred, such as training new technology, led to de­
historians. The scope of the subjects’ against Israel, is caused by the com­ feat for France in the Franco-Prussian
collective scholarship is as stagger­ mon emotion, jealousy. This is some­ War, for the Confederacy at Gettys­
ing as its quality, encompassing vir­ what disappointing considering burg, and, he argues, for NATO in its
tually every facet of modern history. Gaylin’s credentials and his handling air war over Kosovo and Yugoslavia.
The first half of the book sketches of most of the controversial issues. To Owens, the largest obstacle to
the historians’ personal and profes­ Perhaps, the subject is so broad one change is not the American public or
sional lives. Palmer’s recitation of might assume Gaylin had to crunch America’s policymakers, but the
ancient academic catfights and other some of his theories because of armed services themselves. What is
tribal lore are numbingly familiar to space. most needed, he argues, is a trans­
any history graduate student and While he offers little hope of a formation in the zero-sum mindset of
completely uninteresting to anyone solution, the fascinating tales of well- America’s military leaders.
not a member of the guild. The sec­ known incidents and what probably True military Transformation might
ond half examines the scholars’ led to the mindset that caused them mean the loss or realignment of the
works. Palmer opines that the book makes this book worth reading. services’ traditional roles and mis­
shares as a central theme, a new “no­ Stephanie B. Mojica, sions, resulting in fewer budget dol­
tion of submerged reality. . . . Histori­ Los Angeles, California lars for the losing service. Military
cal truth, like an iceberg, is never leaders, primarily concerned with or­
what it appears on the surface.” But, LIFTING THE FOG OF WAR, ganizational survival in a fiscally con­
Palmer claims too much here. He over­ Admiral Bill Owens, with Ed Offley, The strained environment, impede the
reaches when he asserts his subjects John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, military’s transformation into a truly
were first to move decisively beyond MD, 2001, 296 pages, $16.95. joint force that could best and least
mere narrative history to richer the­ In Lifting the Fog of War, Admiral expensively leverage the Nation’s
matic analyses, as his own discus­ Bill Owens, former Vice Chairman of information technology advantages
sion of the scholars’ mentors reveals. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states that to pursue national objectives.
The preceding generation of histori­ few Americans, including few Ameri­ Owens skillfully portrays the state
ans framed highly sophisticated ana­ can policymakers, have personal of America’s military and offers con­
lytical histories that engage to this experience with our all-volunteer mili­ crete steps to solve its problems. I
day. tary. When watching CNN news re­ recommend the book to senior mili­
Other superior group portraits of ports of America’s easy military tary leaders, civilian policymakers,
past masters are in print, and several successes in the Persian Gulf, Koso­ and civilians who wonder, “If it ain’t
of those profiled by Palmer have writ­ vo, and Afghanistan, Americans broke, why fix it?”
ten autobiographies. Readers would might think that their military is suf­ MAJ Robert P. Mooney, Jr., USA,
be better served by reading the origi­ ficiently strong to dominate all con­ Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
nal masterpieces composed by these flicts for the foreseeable future.
great historians. When defense budget discussions
COL Alan Cate, USA, arise, they might ask, “If the military TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania ain’t broke, why spend all those bil­ AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY, F.
Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Santa
lions to fix it?” Monica, CA, RAND (National Security
Owens shows that, while appear­ Research Division), 2003, 217 pages,
HATRED: The Psychological Descent ing formidable, America’s military is, $24.00.
into Violence, Willard Gaylin, Public-
Affairs, New York, 2003, 256 pages, in fact, “running on empty.” Because Nations act in accordance with
$24.00. of force reductions, frequent deploy­ self-interest. When nations refine
Written by Willard Gaylin, a pro­ ments, and aging combat systems those interests, however, their allies
fessor of clinical psychology, Ha­ fast approaching obsolescence, and partners must be attentive to the
tred: The Psychological Descent America’s military is in danger of intensity and direction of change.
into Violence is a worthwhile book imploding. This is particularly true of Turkey,
with few flaws. Gaylin uses a clinical Owens offers a relatively inex­ whose role and identity has changed
model to discuss modern problems. pensive fix. By integrating advanced more than once during the 20th
Looking into the roles of fanatical information technology into rede­ century. Today, Turkey’s regional
social and religious leaders, Gaylin signed force structures and by devel­ and bilateral relationships are more
suggests hatred is not necessarily an oping innovative doctrine, tactics, complex and changeable than ever.
emotion, but a psychological disor­ and training to govern their employ­ According to F. Stephen Larrabee

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 117


and Ian O. Lesser, one lesson of the Island survivors, whose personal Roosevelt. Three essays debate the
recent war in Iraq is that we should accounts he gathered. Kaiser’s role before and during World
reevaluate assumptions about Tur­ The stories begin with the well- War I.
key. We cannot take for granted organized Japanese assault against The essays fill significant gaps in
Turkey’s assumed role as anchor of Wake Island in December 1941. current scholarship regarding Ger­
NATO’s southern flank and equal Hearing that Pearl Harbor had many before World War I, particularly
participant in the fight against Iraq. been bombed, U.S. troops on Wake the evaluation of Wilhelm’s role in
Larrabee and Lesser discuss what Island set up forces to protect them­ Germany’s involvement in the war.
Turkey might do in the future, its selves and the island, not knowing For those interested in the origins of
opportunities, and the risks it is will­ that they were vastly outnumbered. World War I and German history in
ing to take. Turkey’s actions then Despite their valiant effort, they general, this book has much to offer.
become much clearer. eventually surrendered to the over­ David J. Schepp,
Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age whelming Japanese force, beginning Columbus, Georgia
of Uncertainty, which is an excellent an odyssey that lasted almost 4
introduction to the complexities of years. STRATEGIC ASIA 2003-04: Fragil­
Turkish foreign relations, begins with Individual accounts describe the ity and Crisis, Richard J. Ellings and
themes and definitions necessary for suffering and wretched conditions Aaron L. Friedberg, eds. with Michael
any analysis of Turkey’s foreign re­ endured on the prison ships and at Wills. National Bureau of Asian Research,
lations. Larrabee and Lesser analyze prison camps. Japan claimed its Seattle, WA, 2003, 526 pages, $24.95.
Turkey’s changing domestic situa­ prison conditions were adequate, yet Strategic Asia 2003-04: Fragility
tion and its influence on self-defini­ the prisoners became extremely weak and Crisis is the third volume in
tion and its future goals. Through­ from a lack of food and an over­ an annual collection of essays in
out the book, the authors stress the whelming workload. They built war which well-known Asian special­
importance of internal factors, includ­ items for the enemy and suffered ists address the region’s near-term
ing Islamist political parties and their because of their comrades’ military outlook. Divided into sections of in­
potential effects on the secular Turk­ successes, but this only buoyed their dividual country studies, regional
ish state, Turkey’s troubled econ­ morale. overviews, and specific subject ar­
omy, its orientation toward Europe, Cunningham’s brother never eas, the book analyzes recent devel­
and its national cohesion, given its spoke of the tremendous hardships opments from a U.S. policy perspec­
large Kurdish population. he faced. Only after his death did tive. Regional overviews include
The authors discuss Turkey’s en­ Cunningham learn of his brother’s Northeast, Southeast, and Central
try into the European Union, its rela­ suffering. By chronicling the tales of Asia, while South Asia is covered in
tionships with Europe, and its impor­ these heroic men, Cunningham has chapters on India and Pakistan. The
tant bilateral relationships with preserved his brother’s memory well. book’s contributors are primarily
Greece and the United States, the 1LT Rene De La Rosa, USA, scholars from academia and think
Balkans, Eurasia, Mediterranean, and Fort Sam Houston, Texas tanks rather than being government
the Middle East. While the book officials.
clearly expresses cause and effect, Most of the analyses are standard
THE KAISER: New Research on geopolitical fare, although many es­
readers unfamiliar with the region Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Ger­
might find the book difficult to fol­ many, Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm says focus on economics. An appen­
low, but the benefits from under­ Deist, eds., Cambridge University Press, dix containing the region’s statistical
standing what Larrabee and Lesser New York, 2003, 299 pages, $60.00. data complements the text, and an on­
refer to as this “pivot State” are The aim of The Kaiser: New Re­ line database provides further infor­
worth the effort. Ample footnotes search on Wilhelm II’s Role in Im­ mation.
and a good bibliography guide the perial Germany is to add to the Essayist Zachary Abuza de­
reader toward more reading. field of scholarship on the am­ scribes the depth of penetration and
Robert Stacy, biguous reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II the degree of cooperation among
Leominster, Massachusetts and to honor Wilhelm II’s biographer, radical Islamic groups in the region
John Röhl. The essays, which are and profiles the history, organization,
applicable to Russia’s military and and leadership of the Jemaah Islam­
HELL WOULDN’T STOP: An Oral
History of the Battle of Wake Island, diplomatic history, are a cooperative iya terrorist network. Nicholas Eber­
Chet Cunningham, Carroll & Graf Publish­ effort and offer a spectrum of ap­ stadt argues that China’s state pen­
ers, New York, 2002, 283 pages, $26.00. proaches. Topics range from unre­ sion severely constrains plans for an
Chet Cunningham, author of Hell stricted submarine warfare to Walther increasingly elderly population. He
Wouldn’t Stop: An Oral History of the Rathenau’s relationship with the also describes the difficulty of work­
Battle of Wake Island, is the brother Kaiser. Two essays have special ing past retirement age in labor-
of a Wake Island survivor who never appeal, one dealing with the inter­ intensive China. The lack of quality
discussed his harrowing experiences, national intervention in China’s health care could also pose potential
but who did write about them in pri­ Boxer Rebellion, the other with the social stresses. Such stressors, he
vate notes. Cunningham used the personal relationship between Wil­ writes, could strain the economy,
notes to connect with other Wake helm II and U.S. President Theodore leading to political pressures that

118 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW


BOOK REVIEWS

might affect China’s market reforms Graham’s career effectively covered targets during the Vietnam war, but
and democratization. ACDA history, the reader is led President Bill Clinton’s National Se­
Current through July-August though the bureaucratic machina­ curity Advisor, Tony Lake, kept
2003, the book serves as a handy tions that occurred from administra­ Clinton out of the room to avoid any
reference with well-presented statis­ tion to administration on the role public perception of a crisis.
tical data that combines mainstream, ACDA would play. The adminis­ Nerve Center discusses critical
short-term analysis of the region’s trative history of an independent events through the years, key deci­
major actors. ACDA ended when it was folded sions made, and the people involved.
Clifton W. Sherrill, Ph.D., into the U.S. Department of State in Photographs and floor plans supply
Tallahassee, Florida 1999. a visual perspective. The book also
The book, laden with jargon, is at provides a good historical back­
DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: times quite technical. A detailed glos­ ground—with one drawback. The fi­
Three Decades of Arms Control and sary would have helped those not nal chapter is a fictional account of
International Law, Thomas Graham, Jr., conversant with the names of the a future crisis and how the room’s
University of Washington Press, Seattle, Soviet missiles or acronyms for trea­ duty staff might respond. Bohn tries
2002, 362 pages, $35.00. ties or arms control initiatives. Be­ to show how advanced computer
Thomas Graham, Jr., contends that cause the book is a personal recol­ and communications might work and
Disarmament Sketches: Three De­ lection, it contains no footnotes or suggests the staff’s human side
cades of Arms Control and Interna­ bibliography. These are minor criti­ would remain the same.
tional Law was written as a personal cisms, however, when compared to I recommend this book to anyone
account of his 27 years of experi­ the book’s value. Those specializing interested in knowing what goes on
ences at the Arms Control and Dis­ in arms control should read this in the White House situation room,
armament Agency (ACDA), not as book; it is a valuable beginning its limitations, and its capabilities.
an exhaustive history of arms control. primer on the subject. COL Robert S. Driscoll, USA,
In truth, however, it is much closer John C. Binkley, Ph.D., Retired, Washington, D.C.
to the latter than the former. Because Adelphi, Maryland
of Graham’s involvement in all as­ MARINE RIFLEMAN: Forty-Three
pects of arms control, including be­ NERVE CENTER: Inside the White Years in the Corps, Wesley L. Fox,
ing the general counsel and acting House Situation Room, Michael K. Brassey’s Inc., Dulles, VA, 2002, 395
director of ACDA, this personal ac­ Bohn, Brassey’s Inc., Dulles, VA, 2003, pages, $27.95.
count becomes a history of arms 239 pages, $24.95. An old axiom says that in every
control policy development within The Situation Room is a series of life there is a story to tell. Whether
the U.S. Government as well as a his­ rooms in the West Wing’s basement that is true for every life is debatable,
tory of the ACDA. staffed by members of government but the axiom holds true for the life
Instead of approaching the sub­ agencies responsible for national of Wesley L. Fox. Marine Rifleman:
ject as a straight-line chronological security. After working in the U.S. Forty-Three Years in the Corps is
narrative, Graham builds his work Army Europe’s (USAREUR) War proof. Recipient of the Medal of
around the key arms control initia­ Room and the National Military Com­ Honor, two Legion of Merit awards,
tives that occurred from the time of mand Center in the Pentagon (and a Bronze Star with a Combat V (with
President Richard M. Nixon’s admin­ watching NBC’s West Wing), I valor), and three Purple Heart med­
istration to that of President Bill thought I had an idea of what the als, Fox—a man who consistently
Clinton. Of value is an insider’s ex­ White House Situation Room looked aspired to follow a code of honor and
planation of the internal and bureau­ like. I was wrong. ethics—inspires military and civilians
cratic debates that surrounded those Michael K. Bohn, the director of alike.
initiatives and how policies devel­ the Situation Room during President Fox tells the story of his life as he
oped. The reader receives a com­ Ronald Reagan’s administration, dis­ lived it, from the influences of his
plete understanding of how interpre­ pels “Sit Room” myths that show it mother and father and 9 siblings, to
tations of the Antiballistic Missile as an underground command center his 43 years in the Marine Corps,
Treaty became a point of contention with big-screen monitors and military culminating with his retirement in
when President Ronald Reagan’s personnel in direct communication 1993 at age 62. Fox then served as
administration opined that a broad with fighter planes. His book, Nerve Deputy Commandant of Cadets at
reading of the treaty allowed for de­ Center Inside the White House Situ­ Virginia Tech, a position he held un­
veloping and testing “Star Wars.” ation Room, looks at the room from til his retirement in 2001. A “gungy
The reader also receives an apprecia­ when President John F. Kennedy cre­ Marine” who did it all from Korea to
tion for the debate’s intensity. Gra­ ated it in May 1961 to President Vietnam and beyond, Fox would
ham was deeply involved in all these George W. Bush’s use of it after the have been forgiven for his autobiog­
policies, so he gives depth to key September 2001 terrorist attacks. raphy being a bit self-congratulatory,
American and Russian players’ per­ Every president who used the but he has not snared himself in such
sonalities. room, used it differently. President a trap and avoids hyperbole. Doing
The policy discussions are only Lyndon Johnson met in the room so makes the story all the more re­
one aspect of this work. Because daily with military planners to select markable.

MILITARY REVIEW September - October 2004 119


Using an interesting literary de­
vice, Fox names the chapters of the
book by his military rank—Private,
Letters continued from page 4
Private First Class, Corporal, Ser­ concept and that it is finally getting not personally sailed on these ves­
geant. Perhaps he did this to help his the support it needs. sels, but former classmates who
memory; perhaps he did it as an easy I would like to add some clarifica­ have support the published view. In
way to catalog his experiences, but tion of my own. Current MPF is made support of Weaver’s view, a legacy
whatever his reason, it helps the up of three Maritime Pre-positioning MPF MPSRON, when married or in­
reader follow his growth and career. Squadrons (MPSRONs), with each corporated into the current sea-base,
The changes in rank correspond MPSRON made up of Maritime Pre- supports a Marine Expeditionary Bri­
nicely with changes in responsibility positioning Ships (MPS). Currently, gade-size Marine Air Ground Task
and experiences, and the reader can 16 ships carry Marine Corps Cargo: Force.
see the changes every rank caused 5 MPS in MPSRON One, 5 in I would also like to thank Weaver
in his life. At the end of every chap­ MPSRON Two, and 6 in MPSRON for suggesting some exceptional
ter he lists lessons learned. Three. Additional ships are under the websites that provide additional in­
This unpretentious book does not MPSRON’s command and control, formation on sea-basing concepts. I
attempt to be more than it is—an but they are not part of the MPF. encourage Weaver to incorporate his
easy, enjoyable account of a life well They are part of the Combat Pre- ideas into a future paper on the vir­
lived. Marines will find it especially positioning Force, which carries an tues of sea-basing and MPF(F). Do­
interesting, and some might find sto­ Army Heavy Brigade, and Logistic ing so will stimulate future discus­
ries about Marines they know. Fox PFSs, which carry Defense Logistics sions in the joint force, which will be
describes what it means to be a Agency fuels, Air Force and USN beneficial to the general understand­
Marine better than any slogan or ad­ ammunition, and USMC aviation ing of the MPF(F) and how to use it
vertising campaign ever could. support equipment. [For more infor­ in future sea-based engagements.
LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC, mation, see on-line at <www.msc. An increased interest will make sea-
Retired, Camp Pendleton, California navy.mil/ factsheet/apf.asp>.] I have basing a truly joint concept.

120 September - October 2004 MILITARY REVIEW

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