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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
B Y
AHMAD ZAKI MANSUR HAMMAD
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MARCH 1987
PART 2
T HE COMPASSIONATE
301
INVOCATION
All praise be to Allâh, the Almighty, the All-Powerful; the
Protector, the Helper; the Subtle, the Overwhelming; the
Avenger, the All-Forgiving; the Inner, the Outer; the
First, the Last; He who made the mind the most
important of treasures and provisions; and has made learning
the most profitable of all trades and gains, the most eminent
of honors and glory, and the most praiseworthy of
journeys and retreats. Thus, by recording it, pens
and inkwells have become distinguished. And by
hearing it, minbars and mihrabs have become
ornamented. Books and papers are graced by its
marks. Because of its honor, the young have
prevailed over the old. Faces and hearts have been
illuminated by its brilliance. Souls and insights glow with
its splendor. The radiance of the shining sun on the
swirling stars is humiliated in its light. Its inner lighting belittles
the gleam in pupils and eyes. And when sights become fatigued
and the curtains and veils are thickened, a host of thoughts
penetrate by its light the depths of the greatest
obscurities. Blessings be upon Muh ammad, His
Messenger, whose origin is pure, whose glory broke
through, whose eminence triumphed, the one of raining
generosity who is raised as a giver of good tidings to the
believers and an admonisher to the disbelievers, abolishing
with his Sharî`a all ancient and elapsing religions,
the one supported by the glorious Qur'ân, which
bores neither its listener nor transmitter. No poet nor
writer can ever comprehensively fathom its abundant
[wisdom]. Nor can a describer's description, or a
relator's mention, exhaust its wonders. Every
rhetorician falls short of tasting comprehension of its
manifest secrets. And upon his family and
Companions, lavish peace—uncountable within the
lifetime of anyone.
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PREFACE
Now to proceed. The judge of reason, the ruler which has been
neither deposed nor changed, and the evidence of the Sharî`a1,
which is credible and just, have spoken. This world is the abode
of deceit, not the dwelling place of pleasure. It is the arena of
action, not the bedstead of laziness. It is a station of transit, not
a park of lasting amusement. It is only a trading post, not an
abode of everlasting residence. It is a market place whose
commodity is obedience [to Allâh], the profit of which consists
of success on the Day of Reckoning.
Obedience is of two types: practice and knowledge. Knowledge
is the most profitable and prosperous part of it, for it is also a
kind of practice. But it is the act of the heart which is the most
valuable of the faculties of the body. It is the endeavor of
reason which is the noblest of things, for it is the vehicle of
religion and the bearer of trust, the trust offered by Allâh to the
Earth, the Mountains, and the Heavens. But they were afraid to
bear it and resolutely refused.
Further, knowledge is of three kinds: One is the purely rational,
which the Sharî `a neither incites nor invites to; such as,
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and other such kinds of
learning. This is situated between false uncertainties, which are
unworthy—"indeed, some conjecture is sin"2—and that
knowledge which is true but has no benefit. We seek refuge in
Allâh from knowledge which has no benefit. Benefit does not
reside in the satisfaction of worldly passions and luxurious
blessings, for these are transitory and must pass. On the
contrary, benefit is the reward of the Hereafter.
Another [kind] is the purely traditional sciences—like hâdîth
[prophetic traditions], and tafsîr [the Qur'ân's commentary],
which are not difficult matters. For each one, young and old,
can know them sufficiently because all that is required in
traditional knowledge is the power of memory, where there is
no role for reason. 302
EXORDIUM
or not this term truly reflects what "`Ilm al-kalâm ' signifies is a question
raised by many. Yet theology has been widely used to describe kalâm
among Islamicists, despite the diversity of its technical application in
English. I have selected to use the English term interchangeably with the
Arabic. It may be helpful to consult for the definition of kalâm L. Gardet's
article, as well as R. J. McCarthy, The Theology of Al-Ash'arî (Beirut: n.p.,
1953); and J. Windrow Sweetman, Islâm and Christian Theology (London;
Redhill, 1945).
5 Ahmad Zaki Ḥammad,Al-khilâf fi Ḏaw' al-Nusûs al-Shar`iyya,
(Bloomington: Râbiṯat al-Shabâb Muslim al-`Arabî, 1401/1981).
6 See Ghazali's definition of qiyâs, al-Mustasfâ, 2:28.
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310
7 It is worthy to note that Abû Ya`la al-Farrâ' (d. 458 H.), a Ḥanbalite legist,
considered only these three sources and made reference to istishab al-hâl
[maintaining the primacy of nonobligation]. Also, al-Khaṯîb al-Baghdâdî (d.
463 H.), who like Ghazâlî is al-Shâfi`ite, limited the sources to three in his
legal work Kitab al-Faqîh wa al-Mutafaqqih, 2 vols. 2nd edition ed. Ismâ`îl al-
Ansârî (Beirut: Dâr al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyya, 1980), 1:54, and stated that qiyâs,
instead of being considered a source, is the activity of the one who applies
it.
8 Compare with Ghazâlî's division of sciences in his Ihya', 1:12-41.
general of things, namely existence. He first classifies existents 312
into the eternal and the originated. He then divides the
originated into substance and accident. /1:6/ And he divides
accidents into those [attributes] which are dependent upon life,
such as knowledge, will, power, speech, hearing, and seeing,
and those which are needless [of life], such as color, odor, and
flavor. He then divides substances into animal, plant, and
inorganic matter and explains whether their differences are due
to their speciation or due to accident.
Next, he focuses on the Eternal being, explaining that He can
be neither multiple nor divisible, as are originated beings.
Rather, He must be 'one,' distinguished from originated beings
by certain attributes which are necessarily His, other
characteristics which are impossible for Him, still other
characteristics which are possible for Him but neither necessary
nor impossible. He further distinguishes between what is
possible, impossible, necessary or absurd concerning Him. Then
he explains that the principle of acting is possible for Him and
that the world is His possible act—and it is because of its
possibility that it requires an originator. Also, sending
messengers is among the possible acts on His part. He is
capable of this and of demonstrating their truthfulness through
miracles. Furthermore, this possibility has occurred.
Here, the discussion of the mutakallim ends, and the influence
of reason stops. Thus, reason can lead one to the truthfulness
of the Prophet but then abdicates itself, acknowledging that it
receives with acceptance from the Prophet what he says
concerning Allâh, the Last Day, and other things that reason
cannot independently comprehend, nor determine its
impossibility. For the Sharî`a may come with that which reason
falls short of knowing independently because reason does not
independently know that obedience is a cause for bliss in the
Hereafter and that disobedience is a cause for misery. Yet it
cannot decide upon its impossibility either.
Furthermore, it necessarily concludes the truth of him [the
Prophet] whose truthfulness has been demonstrated by
miracle. So when the Prophet speaks on His behalf, reason
attests to it in this way. This, then, is the content of the science
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of kalâm.
Now you have known from this that the inquiry of the
theologian begins with the most general of subjects, namely
existence. He then gradually descends into the details which
we have mentioned, and there establishes the principles of the
other religious sciences, such as the Book and the Sunna, as
well as the truth of the Prophet.
Thus, a mufassir takes a particular subject from the totality of
the mutakallim's inquiry, namely the Book, and looks into its
commentary. Similarly, the muhaddith takes one particular
[subject], the Sunna, and discusses the manners of its
establishment. The faqîh takes one particular subject, the act of
the locus of obligation, and then examines its relation to the
Sharî`a address as far as obligatoriness, prohibition, and
lawfulness [are concerned]. The usûlî takes one particular
aspect, and that is the statements of the Prophet—whose
truthfulness has been demonstrated by the mutakallim—then
inquires into the way in which it conveys the rules [ahkâm],
either through their explicit, implicit, or logical meanings and
extractions. The inquiry of the jurist does not go beyond the
utterances of the Messenger, ﷺ, and his actions, for even the
Book of Allâh he hears only by his utterance. Ijmâ` too is
established based on his utterances.
Now, the sources are only the Book, the Sunna, and Ijmâ`. The
truthfulness and validity of the statements of the Prophet are
established in the science of kalâm, which undertakes to
establish the principles of all the religious sciences, which are
therefore particular /1:7/ [sciences] relative to kalâm.
Therefore, theology is the highest ranking science, for to arrive
at these details one must start with it.
If it is said:9 It should be conditional then for the faqîh, the
mufassir, and the muhaddith to have acquired the science of
kalâm; for before finishing with the higher and universal
[science], how could one descend to the lower and detailed
[sciences]?
mix parts of grammar with usûl. Thus, they mention about the
meanings of prepositions and inflections certain things which
specially pertain to the science of grammar, just as the love for
fiqh has led a group of legists from Transoxiana, namely Abû
Zayd [al-Dabbûsî], ﺭﺣﻤﻪﺍﻟﻠﻪ,14 and his followers, to mix many
questions about the details of fiqh with its principles. Although
they brought this by way of examples to illustrate how a
principle leads to certain detailed legal points, they did so in
excess.
The mutakallims' justification for stating the definitions of
knowledge, discursive thought, and proof in the science of usûl
al-fiqh is more acceptable than their justification for
constructing demonstrative evidence to establish them. For
definition affirms in the mind the forms of these things; at the
least, one conceptualizes them, when the discourse relates to
them, just as one cannot be content with less than the
conceptualization of Ijma` and qiyâs on the part of those who
study fiqh. But knowing the authority of Ijma` and qiyâs is
particular to usûl al-fiqh.
But bringing the argument for knowledge and discursive
thought against those denying them is to drag theological
discussion into usûl, just as a discussion of the authority of
Ijma`, qiyâs and solitary report in fiqh is to bring the usûl
[principles] into their details.
However, after we have made you aware of their excessiveness
in this mixing, we still do not think that this book should be
completely devoid of things of this sort, for weaning one from
what he is accustomed to is difficult and human minds shun the
novel. But we shall be content, with regard to this matter, with
things whose benefit is obvious to all sciences in general—such
as defining intellectual cognition and how it gradually descends
from self-evident truths to speculative thoughts—in a way that
clarifies the essence of knowledge, discursive thought, proof,
and their divisions and arguments, in a profound exposition not
14 See my library paper, "Abû Zayd al-Dabbûsî," for the Near Eastern
Languages and Civilizations Department, University of Chicago, supervised
by Fazlur Rahman.
to be found even in the texts of kalâm15.
17 Walî refers to the supporter, loving friend, ally, etc., of Allâh, one who is
chosen for his preeminent holiness and extraordinary piety and virtue. For
the linguistic and, technical meaning of walî, see B. Manzur, Lisân al-`Arab,
15:406-415, Mustafâ, Mu'jam al-Wasît, 2:1070; and The Shorter
Encyclopedia of Islam, 1953 ed., s.v. "Walî."
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335
We shall say: No. Rather, reason knows the way of safety, then
human nature impels to follow that path since every person is
naturally disposed to love himself and hate pain. So you have
made a mistake in saying that reason is a cause. Rather, it is a
guide, while the incentives and motives that emanate from
human nature follow the command of reason. You are also
mistaken in saying that he is rewarded for gratitude and
knowledge in particular; for this notion is based on imagining a
want out of gratitude that distinguishes it from unbelief, while
they are equal with regard to the greatness of Allâh, ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ.
Indeed, if the door of illusions is opened, then it may occur to
him that Allâh may punish him even if he is grateful to Him. So
he reflects on this because He has provided him with means of
obtaining blessings. Perhaps He has created him to live
comfortably and pleasantly. Thus, his exerting himself to be
grateful may be manipulation in His kingdom without His
permission.
They [Mu'tazilites] have two obscure arguments:
The first of them is their saying that the unanimity of rational
beings on the good of gratitude and bad of ingratitude has no
way of being denied. This we concede, but [only] with regard to
them because they are excited and comforted with gratitude
and are grieved by ingratitude. But with respect to the Lord,
ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ, both are equal. So, [for example], obedience and
disobedience are equal with respect to Him.
This is supported in two ways. One of them is that a person
seeking nearness to /1:62/ the Sultan by means of moving his
finger tip in a corner of his home or in his room is, in fact,
demeaning himself. Yet the people's worship in relation to the
greatness of Allâh is even less in degree than this.
The second is that of a starving person to whom the king gives
a crumb of bread for charity who goes about in the land
shouting in public his gratitude [to the king]. This would be, in
relation to the king, bad and disgraceful. But all the blessings of
Allâh, ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ, upon his servants, with respect to His capabilities, is
even less than that [crumb] in relation to the king's treasures,
for the king's treasures come to an end by giving similar
crumbs because it is finite. But the capabilities of Allâh, ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ,
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