THE TRANSCENDENTALITY OF BEAUTY

IN THOMAS AQUINAS
By FRANCIS J. KOVACH

Whether Thomas Aquinas held the transcendentality of beauty is

a very controversial question. In the last 100 years it has divided the
Thomists into three groups: the transcendentalists, the anti-transcen-
dentalists, and the undecided.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: to show reasons for the
transcendentalistic position and to argue against the opposite view.

I.
The root of the difficulty is that pulchrum is neither explicitly
included in the corpus of De veritate, q. 1. a. 1., nor, unlike the other
transcendental properties1, ever called a transcendental. This fact
alone, however, constitutes an argument against Thomas having
held the transcendentality of beauty only for those who do not seek
other texts in Thomas' works. For there are passages that can
well be used as arguments for the Thomistic doctrine of transcendental
beauty.
(1) One argument for this can be formed from Thomas' metaphysical
definition of beauty: beauty is that which necessitates integrity,
proportion, and splendor2. For, since integrity is identical with perfec-
tion3 and perfection with goodness4, which is a transcendental, Thomas'
first requirement for beauty is in some way fulfilled by every being6.
Similarly, there is proportion, Thomas asserts, in God6 as well as
between potency and act7, hence, in some way, in all beings8. Finally,
since form itself is beauty9 and also produces beauty by clarity10,
1
E. g., res: In I. Sent. 2, 1, 6, ad 2; unum: Sum. Theol. (= ST) I, 30, 3c; bonum:
In II. Sent. 34, 1, 2, ad 1.
2
5 Γ I, 39, 8 c. Cf. In I. Sent. 31, 2, 1. sol.
8
In I. De Caelo, L. 2. n. 16, ST I, 39, 8 c.
* Sum. c. Gent (= ScG) I. 38, ST I, 5, 1.
6
Cf. De Malo, I, 4 c., ST I, 6, 3 c.
• In I. Sent. 31, 2, 1, sol., De Pot. 10, 3 c.
7
In II. Sent. 1, 2, 4, ad 3., In I. Phys. L. 10. n. 78, ST I, 12, 1, ad 4.
8
Cf. In III. Sent. 23, 1, 1, sol. As to its synonym, convenientia, cf. ST I—II, 9, 2 c;
85, 6, sed c. 2a., In Col. I: 16, L. 4.
9
In Ps. XXVI: 3.
10
In III. Sent. 23, 1, 1, sed c. 2a, ST I, 5, 4, ad 1, In I. Cor. XV: 4, L. 6.

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 The Transcendentality of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas 387

both God11 and all creatures12 fulfill the final and formal requirement
for beauty. Consequently, Thomas holds the transcendentality of
beauty in virtue of his metaphysical definition of beauty and of the
essential principles of beauty.
(2) A second argument can be construed from the predicability of
beauty of all beings. For all beings obviously stands for God and every
creature. But God is often said by Thomas to be beautiful13 and so
are all creatures14.
One also may argue thus: Thomas holds that God loves all His
creatures15 and that only the beautiful and the good can be loved16
— or, that everything God creates is lovable17 and that only the
beautiful and good is lovable18; — since, then, God and all creatures
are beautiful, all beings are beautiful and beauty is predicable of
every being and is, therefore, transcendental.
If one argues that being includes not only God and things per-
taining to the category of substance, but also things belonging to
the categories of accident or that a concept is transcendental only
if predicable of God and of all ten categories19, the defender of the
transcendentality of beauty can do two things. First, he may point
out that Thomas explicitly mentions the beauty of, or beautiful things
under, practically all the categories of accident: quantity20, quality21,
action22, where23, and habitus24. Second, he may argue that, although
Aquinas concedes that material substances may lack accidental beauty
in varying degrees25, according to his metaphysics any given accident
11
Resp. ad loan. Verc. de art. CVIII, q. 57. n. 884, De Pot. 6, 6, 6a, In PS. XLIV: 2
12
De div. Norn. 4, 5, 337 and 340; 4, 21, 554; 8, 4, 775, In Ps. XXVI: 3, In lob. 40
L. 1.
13
E. g., In I. Senf. 46, 1, 1 a and ad l, De div. Norn. 1, 2, 59; 1, 3, 98, ST I 36, 2c;
II, II, 145, 2 c, Comp. Theol. p. II. c. 9. n. 591.
14
De div. Norn. 4,5, 337; 339f.; 355; 11,4, 938, De Pot. 4, 2 ad 31, In Symb. Ap.a.l.
n. 878.
16
De div. Norn. 4, 10. 437,
le
Ibid. 4, 9, 425.
17
Ibid. 4, 10, 440.
18
Ibid. n. 441.
19
Cf., De Ver. 21, 1 c., Scg. II, 41.
20
De div. Norn. 4. 2. 301; 4, 5, 339, De Pot. 1, 2 c.
21
Potency: Cat. aur. in Luc. VI: 3. — Habit: De Male, 4, 2, 17 a, In II. Pol. L. 4.
n. 200. — Color: De Ver. 25, 1 c., In II. De An. L. 22. n. 520, ST III, 87, 2, ad 3. —
Figure: De div. Norn. 4, 2, 301, ST I, 39, 2 c; I, II, 49, 2, ad l, De Regno II, 3.
22
Operation: In II. Sent. 27, 1, 4, sol.; 28, 1, 2, sol.. In Ps. XXV: 5, ST III, 44, 3,
ad 2, Quodl. VIII, 9, 1 c. — Movement: In I. Cor. XII: 23, L. 3, In Rom. X: 15, L. 2.
23
De div. Norn. 4, 5, 339, In Ps. XVIII: 3, ST I, 62, 6 c; I, II, 4, 1, ad 3.
24
De Pot. 4, 2, ad 30, In I. Cor. XII: 23, L. 3, In I. Tim. II: 9f. L. 2, In loan.
XIII: 1, L. 3, etc.
25
In IV. Sent. 50, 2, 4, sol. I. ad 2, De div. Norn. 4, 21, 554; 22, 572, De Malo, 2, 6,
8 a and ad 8; 2, 9 c.
25*

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388 Francis J. Kovach

consists of essence (form)26 and existence27. Consequently, in the

accident there is, by necessity, integrity (of what is required by a
real accident28), proportion (between its essence as potency and its
existence as act29), metaphysical splendor or clarity arising out of
this proportionate and integral unity30, and, through these three,
beauty.
(3) A third and peremptory argument can be formulated from the
relation Thomas asserts to stand between beauty and goodness.
According to Thomas, transcendental property is defined as
a concept that expresses a general mode of being31 or as one predic-
able of all beings. This means co-extension32 or real identity of a
virtual difference33 and convertibility with being and with each
other34. Consequently, all concepts really identical and convertible
with being and with each other are transcendentals and no non-
transcendental concept is really identical or convertible with the
same. But Thomas also asserts that the beautiful and the good are
really identical and only ratione different35 and that the beautiful
converts with the good36.
Thereby the transcendental character of beauty is so clearly stated
that still to withhold assent to Thomas having taught the transcen-
dentality of beauty is an implicit accusation that he contradicted
himself and that a statement from him like pulchrum est transcendens
would be merely a verbal reaffirmation of this doctrine. In fact, some
contemporary Schoolmen use this argument to prove that the transcen-
dentality of beauty was held by Thomas37 as well as by others, like
Alexander of Hales38.
Nevertheless, some commentators on Thomas as well as numerous
Neo-Thomists seem to have overlooked the esthetic — metaphysical
28
De ente et ess. c. 2 princ.
27
In Boeth. Dr. Trin. c. 2. q. 2 a, 3 c. — Cf. ST, 28, 2 c; III, 77, 6, ad 3; ScG. II, 26.
28
Cf., ST I, 4, l c, De Sp. Great. 8.
29
Cf. ST I, 12, 1, ad 4.
30
Cf. Quodl. VI, 1, 1 c, 5Γ I, 8, 2, ad 3.
81
De Ver. 1, 1 c.
32
Cf. De Pot. 9, 7, ad opp.
33
De Ver. 21, 1 c, DePot. 9, 7 c and ad 6, In IV. Met. L. 2. n. 553; InXI. Met. L. 3.
n. 2199.
34
In I. Sent. 8, 1, 3, sol.; 19, 5, 1, ad 3, ST I, 48, 2, 2 a. In I. Perih. 8, 2; 3, 5, De
Ver. 21, 2, etc.
36
De div. Nom. 4, 5, 355; 356; ST I, 5, 4, ad 1; I, 11,27, 1, ad 3.
36
De div. Nom. 4, 22, 590.
37
J. MARITAIN, Art and Scholasticism, tr. J. F. SCANLAN. London, 1932, P. 172.
Others using this proof are G. B. PHELAN, C. A. HART, L. DE RAEYMAEKER, J.FEARON,
etc.
38
Cf., A. B. WOLTER, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaph. of
Duns Scotus. The Caih. Univ. of Am. Press. Washington D. C., 1946. P. 100.

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 The Transcendentality of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas 389

implication of the real identity of pulchrum and bonum. Even more,

there have always been Thomists listing various reasons for denying
that Thomas held the transcendentality of beauty. For this reason,
in the second part of this paper I shall attempt to answer the most
significant counterarguments and, thereby, defend the above conclu-
sion.

II.
The arguments to be listed seem all to have one thing in common;
they stem from the failure to consider Thomistic texts other than
those used for the argument or from the misinterpretation of the
text on which the argument is based.
a — Among the arguments of the former type, Cajetan's is the old-
est and most wide-spread39, whereas Steenberghen's seems to be
rather isolated.
(1) Cajetan's position can be stated thus: Beauty, according to
Thomas' Sum Theol. I—II, q. 27. a. 1. ad 3., is a species of goodness40.
But a species is less extensive than its genus. Therefore, to Thomas'
mind, beauty could not possibly be a transcendental. — In addition
to the quoted passage, this view receives further support from Thomas'
doctrine that pulchrum has the (generic) properties of bonum41, as
any species has those of its genus. The correctness of this position
is, however, merely apparent for several reasons.
Logical reasons: 1. The phrase cuius ipsa apprehensio could be
taken as a specific difference only if bonum were defined in the text
quoted as quod placet instead of quod simpliciter placet, for, if cuius
apprehensio makes a specific difference, so could the phrase simplici-
ter. — 2. If pulchrum is a species of bonum, there should be at least one
more species under the genus bonum42, for there is no genus without
at least two species. But there is no such second species in Thomas'
philosophy. — If one argued that bonum (speciale) and pulchrum,
meaning quod simpliciter placet and quod per apprehensionem placet,
resp., are two species under the genus bonum (generale) as meaning
quod placet, i. e., appetibile43, this may be conceded; yet, this ex-
planation is based on texts other than the one interpreted by Cajetan
and, above all, even this interpretation fails to prove Cajetan's position
for textual reasons.
39
Neo-scholastic authors sharing Cajetan's view are J. KLEUTGEN, J. J. URRABURU,
J. GREDT, C. BOYER, R. P. PHILLIPS, H. GRENIER, H. J. KOREN, fi. GILSON, etc.
40
Comm. in THOMAS' ST I—II, 27, 1, ad 3, reprinted in the Leonine-ed., v. VI, 192.
41
E. g.. De div. Norn. 4, 13, 463; 4, 9, 400; 4, 5, 355.
42
Cf. In II. Sent. 34, 1, 2, ad 1, In V. Met. L. 12. n. 917, ST I, 13, 5 c; 30, 4, ad 3.
43
Cf. In I. Eth. L. 1. n. 9; L. 2. n. 21, ST I, 5, 1 c, etc.

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390 Francis J. Kovach

Textual reasons: I.Thomas repeatedly states that "verum est bonum

intellectus"43». This statement expresses that the true is a species of
the good more clearly than the passage Cajetan used, that "pulchrum
est speciesboni." Thus, Cajetan and his disciples have two alternatives:
either they should deny the transcendentality of verum, too, (for
being said to be the species of bonum) or they should realize that
pulchrum still can be a transcendental (if otherwise provable), even
though it is said to be the species of bonum. — 2. Thomas declares in
several texts that "verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam
verum"44. This contention must be even more shocking to the followers
of Cajetan's view since it seems to say that both verum and bonum
are species, and the species of the other at that! Of course, Aquinas
has an explanation for this statement: "Verum et bonum in se in vicem
coincidunt"45, hence each one can be considered in the order of the
other: "in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut universale, et verum
ut particulare; in ordine autem intelligibilium est e converse46". Still,
Cajetan's followers are faced with the same alternatives mentioned
above. On the other hand, to those who grasp the implication of the
texts just cited, it will be clear that the text interpreted by Cajetan is,
really, a reaffirmation of the real identity of pulchrum and bonum
(as two that coincidunt) that admits, if properly understood (in terms
of contractio entis et boni), not only the phrase, pulchrum est species
boni, but also, pulchrum est bonum intellectus (or veri)47, or even
bonum est species pulchri (i. e., pulchrum in as much as it delights,
for, as Thomas puts it, "Unde quicumque appetit bonum, appetit
hoc ipso pulchrum"48), without impairing the transcendentality of
beauty as held by Thomas.
(2) Another argument is used by F. van Steenberghen. He points
out that "on the metaphysical level, the beautiful is identified with
the good and therefore does not constitute an attribute distinct from
the desirability of being"49. Clearly, this is merely another version
of Cajetans' position (just as it resembles J. Jungmann's view50),
stated in a more vulnerable manner. For Thomas makes quite clear
that, on the metaphysical level, not only the beautiful and the good
but all transcendentals are really (in subiecto) identical with each
4S
* E. g., ScG. I, 59, 61f., 71; De Ver. 1, 10, ad 4; In VI. Met. L. 4. n. 1230; ST
I—II, 56, 4c; 57, 2, ad 3; 64, 3c, Quodl. 4, 9, 1, ad 1, etc.
44
De Ver. 3, 3, ad 9, De Mala, 6, l c. De Viri. in comm. 1, 6, ad 6, etc.
45
De Ver. 3, 3, ad 9.
46
ST I, 16, 4, ad 1.
47
Another paraphrase of ST I—II, 27, 1, ad 3, used by A. LITTLE, The Nature of Art
or the Shield of Pallas. London: Longmans & Greene, 1946, 18.
48
De Ver. 22,1, ad 12.
49
Ontology, tr. M. J. FLYNN. New York: J. F. Wagner. 65.
60
Aesthetik. Freib. i. Breisg., 1884. 161ff.

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 The Transcendentality of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas 391

other; yet, that they are also virtually (ratione) different. Hence,
either there is but one transcendental concept, that is, being, or else
pulchrum qualifies as well as bonum or all the others and, in the
latter case, pulchrum qualifies not despite but precisely because of
its real identity with bonum and the other transcendentals.
b — Turning now to arguments against Thomas' transcendental
beauty, which seem to misinterpret the texts they are based upon,
we find at least three fairly popular ones.
(1) D. Card. Mercier's argument is simply this: In Thomas' system
of transcendentals, as expounded in De verifate, q. 1. a. 1., there is no
room left for any further transcendental, such as beauty. The implica-
tion is, thus, that Thomas himself could not possibly hold the trans-
cendentality of beauty.
Mercier seems, however, to overlook the fact that a dialectical
argument, like his, can often be proved wrong in the same manner,
dialectically51. As a matter of fact, a crucial passage in the quoted
article itself suggests such a possibility. For, while going over from
the absolute to the relative transcendentals, Thomas points out the
soul as a suitable terminus to which being can be referred in such a
way as to produce further transcendentals. Thus, he refers being first
to the cognitive and next to the appetitive power of the soul, thereby
deriving verum and bonum. Since, however, both of these faculties
are rooted in the one soul62, logically there is no reason why being
could not be referred to these two faculties jointly, and not only
separately. Thus, one may say in accordance with Thomas' mind that
being, as considered in its convenientia to the soul's faculties taken
separately, is contracted, as to the intellect, into verum; as to the
will, into bonum; yet, as considered in its convenientia to the soul's
faculties taken conjointly, being is contracted, as to the intellect and
the will, into pulchrum, thereby doing full justice to Thomas' dictum:
"pulchrum addit supra bonum, ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam."63Conse-
quently, th ere is room in Thomas' system for beauty as a transcendental54.
(2) This argumentation gives the answer also to those who claim
that beauty, in Thomas' mind, is, at best, a quasi-transcendental56.
This view is difficult to fight because of the obscurity of this term
"quasi-transcendental". However, to Thomas, it can mean only one
81
An analogous answer can be given to Jungmann: Beauty must be listed separately
because it refers to the intellect and the will.
82
Cf. ST I—II, 77, 1 c., Quodl. X, 3, l, De Spir. Great. 11.
83
De div. Nom. 4, 5, 356. — Also: ST I, 5, 4, ad 1 and I—II, 27, 1, ad 3.
84
Cf., C. A. HART, Metaph. for the Many, A Thomist. Inq. into the Act of Existing.
Wash. D. C., 1957. 240.
66
E. g., C. R. BASCHAB, A Manual ofNeo-Schol. Phil. St. Louis, Mo.-London, 1937.
373. All those who prefer not to list beauty separately belong to this group whether or
not they use this term.

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392 Francis J. Kovach

of these: transcendental in the improper sense or a unique sort of

transcendental in the proper sense. Now, beauty cannot mean the
first. For, transcendental in the improper sense means to Thomas
either a concept predicable of none of the categories (God66), or a
concept predicable of more than one, but not of all categories57, hence,
a concept that does not convert with being. But pulchrum does —
according to Thomas58. Therefore, beauty may be said to be a quasi-
transcendental only in the sense of a unique transcendental in the
proper sense: in the proper sense, because it is not one in the improper
sense; and unique, to justify the phrase "quasi". In fact, there are two
reasons for calling beauty a unique transcendental. For beauty is the
only relative transcendental of two termini (the intellect and the will59)
and the only transcendental that includes all the other transcenden-
tals60. But, if interpreted this way, the quasi-transcendentality of
beauty asserts rather than denies the transcendentality of beauty.
(3) Urraburu attacks the idea of transcendental beauty by stating
that the convertibility of pulchrum with bonum means merely that
"omne pulchrum est bonum", but not that also "omne bonum est
pulchrum"61.
This argument ignores three facts: one, that the Aristotelian meaning
of conversion as the exchange of the subject and the predicate of
the proposition62 was fully accepted by Thomas63; second, that the
convertibility with being is to Thomas the criterion par excellence of
transcendental property in general64 and so is the mutual convertibility
of any two transcendentals as such65; and third, that there are texts
in Thomas' works indicating that not only is all beauty good, but
also that every good is beautiful66.
One can, therefore, rightly conclude that the transcendentality of
beauty is a doctrine of Thomas Aquinas that can be upheld and de-
fended against all the counter-arguments of subsequent — modern
and contemporary — Thomists.
66
ScG. I, 25, De div. Norn. 1, 1, 14; 5, 1, 611, De Pot. 1, 3, ST I, 3, 6.
67
E. g.. multitude: ST I, 30, 3 c. and motus: In III. Phys. L. 3 n. 552.
58
De div. Norn. 4, 22, 690, De Malo, 2, 5, ad 2.
69
De div. Nom. 4, 5, 356, ST I, 5, 4, ad 1; I—II, 27, 1, ad 3.
60
De Ver. 21, 3 c; 1, 1 c. Cf. J. MARITAIN, op. cit. 172. The only exception is aliquid
for its negative relative character.
61
Op. cit. 536—540.
62
ARIST. Pr. An. I, 2, 2. 25 a, 14—25; Post. An. I, 19, 82 a, 15—18.
63
In /. Post. An. L. 31 k (n. 13). — Cf.. In II. Sent. 35, 1, 2, 2 a, De Pot. 9, 2. 12 a,
ST I, 33, 3, ad 1; III, 60, 2, sed c.
64
Res: ST I, 48, 2, 2 a. Unum: In I. Perih. L. 8 a (n. 2), Quodl. X, 1, 1 c and ad 3.
Verum: In I. Perih. L. 3 b (n. 5); L. 4e (n. 13). Bonum: De Ver. 21, 2.
85
ST, II—II. 109, 2, ad 1.
ββ
Unde quicumque appetit bonum, appetit hoc ipso pulchrum (De Ver. 22,1, ad
12). — Cf., bonum laudatur ut pulchrum (ST I, 6, 4, ad 1).

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