the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A).
Before said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the
Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole
and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second
paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director
of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a
private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title
issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay
plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and
every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that
the land in question was a property of the Government of the United
States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with
law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the
plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs
against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The
holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the
plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question
is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to
recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale
made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that
the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of
Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3)
the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold
the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the
same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about
eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for
the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a
firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at
action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and
(Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the
Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the
C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of
the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had
administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff,
opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the
of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said
document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without
forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being
one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then
brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions
raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and
publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880,
that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry
case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to
Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession
thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession
thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years.
And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made
said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can
hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the
period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory.
These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of
Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER
CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in
favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land
measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as
amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial
court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance
with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23,
1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was
ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on
October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935
is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or
sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the
present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October
29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant
to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land
occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has
introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos
worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the
Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela,
have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from
the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during
their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except
as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have
been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable
law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition
not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when
Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was
reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48,
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of
the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were,
by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48
of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is
there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the
Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands
under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of
its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not
the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981
when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands
at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If
they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in
the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private
lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company
vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In
that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than
60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in
1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had
been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of
the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title
to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical
person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural
persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public
land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the
dismissal. It was held that:
 ..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public
land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still
public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified
to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's
application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition
makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an
imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the
public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not
make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to
alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured
under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of
cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down
to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed
what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident
from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It
was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to
those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we
do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were
in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected
from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in
more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin
Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If
by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question
by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director
of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had
no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void
and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned,
likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi
doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942,
which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land
Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified
in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length
of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of possession became complete. As
was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration
was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force
(or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private
lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public"
land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious
question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there
also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public
land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was
that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance
that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that
the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no
retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated
by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
 The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights.
'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by
the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except
in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase
the land in question had become fixed and established and was
no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for
the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said
land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of
that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted
by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the
right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there
being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels,
under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in
themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the
letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds,
that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the
line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical
person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title
under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application
on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of
the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error not having filed the application for registration in the name
of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it
is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition
against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural
persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein
provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through
all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in
their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now.
(See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to
conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and
who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of
title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to
the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of
title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in
empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application
of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the
dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of
comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent,
but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the
soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and
inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority
opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando
and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition
that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from
applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973
Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited
to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be
considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment
of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed,
without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and,
therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting
opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the
correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession
of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under
the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally
and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain
and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old
above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in
the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in
amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors
"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land
in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the
public domainand had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree
and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten),
as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect
of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and
related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was
consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision
was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure
or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a
certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain
and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As
stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly
held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring
title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion,
for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land
from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations
holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial,
respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in
1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the
townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the
land of the Infiels had beenipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization
and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the
filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly
reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and
grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact.
Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively
extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957,
then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976
and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply
thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of
procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis
mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be
served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting
the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court
would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-
transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao,where the legal question raised, instead of
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By
legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that
the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the
application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who
I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos,
now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in
effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of
substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of
the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such
applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and
open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year
period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that
only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands
for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or
corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons
have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act
confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is
preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications
for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred
their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should
not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited
opinions, that the lands are already private lands because ofacquisitive
prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic
solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed
by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by
operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation.
The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the
private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a
round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the
private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the
decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose
of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons
file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold
such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional
provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1).
It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as
follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of
title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land
to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be
allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should
first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title
to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a
dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on
the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of
the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost
of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory
provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates
of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits
corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State
Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73
Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a
vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general
principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so
interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to
give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former
construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the
enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the
meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words
used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied,
where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is
necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456,
143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a
public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in
the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a
construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco
vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and,
therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting
opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the
correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession
of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under
the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally
and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain
and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old
above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in
the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in
amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors
"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land
in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the
public domainand had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree
and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten),
as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect
of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and
related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was
consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision
was promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands
takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a
prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of
the public domain and becomes private property, which may be
lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as
respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application
for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly
held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring
title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion,
for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land
from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations
holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial,
respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in
1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the
townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the
land of the Infiels had beenipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization
and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the
filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly
reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and
grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact.
Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively
extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957,
then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976
and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply
thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of
procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis
mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be
served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting
the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court
would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-
transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao,where the legal question raised, instead of
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By
legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that
the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the
application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who
I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos,
now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in
effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of
substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of
the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such
applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and
open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year
period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that
only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands
for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or
corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons
have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act
confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is
preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications
for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred
their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should
not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited
opinions, that the lands are already private lands because ofacquisitive
prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic
solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed
by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by
operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation.
The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the
private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a
round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the
private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the
decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose
of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons
file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold
such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional
provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1).
It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as
follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of
title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land
to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be
allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should
first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title
to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a
dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on
the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of
the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost
of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory
provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates
of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits
corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State
Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73
Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a
vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general
principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so
interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to
give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former
construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the
enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the
meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words
used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied,
where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is
necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456,
143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a
public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in
the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a
construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco
vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON
NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999,
and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas,
Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for
registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the
respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married
to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a
petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy.
Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049,
Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP – 060414-014779, and contains an
area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial
confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose
Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the
petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a
formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to
the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano
(Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9,
1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to
the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to
Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who
thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel
Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut
and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were
then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the
subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly
and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor
manifested that the government did not intend to present any
evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs
of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On
September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the
subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property
Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the
title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG
stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from
Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the court
denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18,
1998.81awphi1.nét
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the
MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the
RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the
appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the
Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law
was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that
the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for
the government’s prior release of the subject lot from the public
domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the
meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of
Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even
start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the
subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit
could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable,
the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original
registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question
is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June
12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies
its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation
nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes
the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not
yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession
even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of
Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."15In that case, the subject land had been
certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the
Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by
the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land
even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of
the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that
the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and
disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in
possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question
were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at
registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had
filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case,
where the application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not
apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form
part of a reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of
which cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is
not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property
in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable;
hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts
on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration
proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives
from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant
with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands
of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the
term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be
noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the
subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such property may now
fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2),
and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945,
and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then
the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been
planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent
nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable,
hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit
had been in possession in the concept of owner for the required
period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the
assertion—shown earlier to be unfounded—that there could have
been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject
land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration
owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-
interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily
factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by
lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through
proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit
purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano
in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that
the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the
respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest
which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed
beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which
may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner,
open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any
private person and the government itself makes her right thereto
undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID
HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,[2]granting
the application for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers,
Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a
single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422
and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots).
They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which
they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application for
registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of
respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No.
8423, in the name of respondent David;[4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyors
Certificates for the Subject Lots;[6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the
absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;[7]
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that
the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;[8]
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No.
8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the
name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994;[9] and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses
Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject
Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and
respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No.
8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
David.[10]
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents application for
registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to
comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots
required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine
and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part
of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to
private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30
a.m.[12] All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent
copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also
posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as
well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion,
Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.[14] Finally, the Notice was
also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999[15] and The
Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued
an Order of Special Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic opposing
the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents,
through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary
evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk
of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to
submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment
ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent
Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423.
It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its
Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a
decree of registration for the Subject Lots.[18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, to the Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC
Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be
registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable
zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the
Civil Code, respectively provides that All things which are within the
commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial
character shall not be the object of prescription and that Ownership
and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents
already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this
application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted
it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated
December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein
appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and
possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that
appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from
the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and
disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold
water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as
shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object
of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express
provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right,
entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of
P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided
by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should
only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the
subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the
subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an
owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for
registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no
reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.[20]
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November
2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June
1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the
Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining
compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963,
per CENROs certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in
applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked
the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of
land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the
same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal
infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of
land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner
Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to
land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a
single application only in case they are co-owners. While an application
may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject
parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the
subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same
province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by
a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory,
it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void.
Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings
held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction
over it.
I action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the
MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from
those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the
Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents
Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity
committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the
MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement
in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-
compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said
defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction
to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining
jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not
been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null
and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this
regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should
not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their
application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly
allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by
several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of
land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single application
for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are
located within the same province.[25] The Property Registration Decree
is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants
filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the
separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such
a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine
the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration
Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land
registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict
accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of
action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by
the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of
registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately,
should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a
question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the
case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal
thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes
of action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts
jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the
motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the
severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said
misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on
motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the
MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for
registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the
petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by
filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising
the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree,
thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land
registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the
present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land
registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a
defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the
MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive
seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the
public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the
following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of
initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including
the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern.
Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court
at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said
application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1)
of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication
in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands
v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly
confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and
described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and
posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements,
including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general
circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied
with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the
compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all
of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in
its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach
the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any
other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against
the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as
wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC,
and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the
Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02
August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in
Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the
rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than
three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of
the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective.
Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat
News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process
for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day
of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application for
registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such
claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor
fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would
be in default and would forever be barred from contesting
respondents application for registration and even the registration
decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue
an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all,
having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the
publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application
for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title
of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000,
declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and
directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the
Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC
without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of
the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for
registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the
legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to
public land.
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the
statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged
therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25
June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his
parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an
owner since 1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by
respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and
Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion,
Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated
June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga
Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932
dated June 29, 1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the
public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June
1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government;[34] and it is indispensable that the person
claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired
from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public
domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-
owned lands which reverted to the State.[36] It explicitly enumerates
the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters
of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and
application procedure for every mode.[38] Since respondents herein
filed their application before the MTC,[39] then it can be reasonably
inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization
of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete
title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may be availed of by
persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities,
respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now
requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and
disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the
date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable
is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into
ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto.[41] It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete
title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals
was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were
claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration
Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree
allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It
then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June
1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have
acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under
Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.[42]
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the
Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is
confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State,
and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the
same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and
notorious possession.[43] As established by this Court in the preceding
paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are
undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and
respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions
of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though
respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject
Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial
confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the
Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act
reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or
successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the
provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to
the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the
alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be
issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44]
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject
Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements
under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of
ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of land,
while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public
domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be
considered a special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil
Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction
that between a general law and a special law, the special law
prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the
MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December
1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND
VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence
their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of
land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more
than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his
title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated
June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad
452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters
as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under
FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in
the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the
CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan.
Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any
period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to
March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA,
his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine
especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that
the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years.
According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of
the application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari
because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence
possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part
of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the
mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be
deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.
Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith
that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners
of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article
1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned
from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and
disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit
and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates
its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land
subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to
discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing
applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public
dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land
belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public service
forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws
of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain
were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or
timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may
be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of
public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to
wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or
timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act
of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and
the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is
vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify
lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no
longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by
which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of
Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of
the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the
law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b)
to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations
under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest,
has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June
12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural
land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with
the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to
apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies,
and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and
disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification
required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land
as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been
made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land
prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects.
It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized
or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social
policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be
respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning
point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be
left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified
the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land
subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property
subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not
the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property
by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of
this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain
for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership,
by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that
the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of
the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the State.
The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only
a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant
be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof
for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed,
we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress
enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize
stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable
public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands,
subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration
of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into
patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can
now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
 are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the
mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an
imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to
the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence
to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration
of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land
as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time)
of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for
review filed by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.
Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for
registration of a vast tract of land1 located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and
Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva
Ecija on August 12, 1976.2 She alleged that she possessed the land as
owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products
and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more
or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in
question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR),
established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)3 in
1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled
in Director of Lands v. Reyes4 that the property subject of Garcia’s
application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation.
Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216
(allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March
5, 1895), on which therein respondent Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not
proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was
declared null and void.
Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor in a
decision5 dated July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court
of Appeals (CA). In its decision6 dated February 26, 1992, penned by
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7 the appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found
that Reyes was applicable to petitioner’s case as it involved the same
property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in
question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to
the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of
the possessory information title the probative value of which had
already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the
land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that
she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and
was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G.
Diaz.81avvphi1
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision.
While the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion
for recall of the records from the former CFI. Without acting on the
motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice Mendoza
as ponente, issued a resolution9 upholding petitioner’s right to recall
the records of the case.
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an
amicable settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient
time to draft and finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the
Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares
supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her
application for the portion of the property inside the military
reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable
settlement in the CA.10
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise
agreement.11 On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration
Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in
petitioner’s favor.12
However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S.
Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution
ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG informed
the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable
settlement was still within the military reservation.
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended
resolution)13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into
between the parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the
resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) x x x x x x
(2) x x x x x x
(3) x x x x x x
(4) x x x x x x
(5) x x x x x x
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court
approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed
between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia
Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18,
1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and
Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is
hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General and, consequently,SET ASIDE the Resolution
dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a
certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia
Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject property in consonance
with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 approved by the
Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the
May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated
 September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999
Resolution; and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992
dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz’ registration herein.
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed
the validity of the Mendoza decision – the February 26, 1992 decision
adverted to in the CA’s amended resolution. She alleged that Justice
Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during the initial stages of
the land registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore
should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His
failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her
constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should
be declared null and void. The motion was denied.14
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari15 in this
Court. It was denied for raising factual issues.16 She moved for
reconsideration.17 This motion was denied with finality on the ground
that there was no substantial argument warranting a modification of
the Court’s resolution. The Court then ordered that no further
pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of
judgment to be made in due course.18
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of
judgment and motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme Court en
banc.19 The Court denied20 it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21 Furthermore, the motion to
refer the case to thebanc was likewise denied as the banc is not an
appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may
be appealed.22 We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings
would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due
course.
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first
addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief
Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.23 The body
of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion for
reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect
the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence,"
that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer,
January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and
my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court
to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from
the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our
Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice
so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I
hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea.
For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as
Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court
involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of
Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza
in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the
minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to
render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became
the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of
the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor
General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic,
as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in
which he lost.
In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the
very same case.
In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the
actions of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple
resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice.
In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my
constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional,
for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very
decision in which he had lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater
spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must
confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however
believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even
destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually
lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral
decadence, in which we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to
fight the dark forces that surround us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such
as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice
will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our
judicial system.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).
The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly
veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court
into giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm
compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified in the media and by
the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioner’s
letter/third motion for reconsideration.
APPLICABILITY OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that Reyes is applicable
to this case.
To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 24
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with.
However, petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite,
particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for review
filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the two
cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be
determined independently of each other.25
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v.
Director of Lands.26 In that case, Quintin Tañedo endeavored to secure
title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof
under CA 141. When the case eventually reached this Court, we
affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the proceedings as the
property in question was part of the public domain. Quintin’s
successor-in-interest, Florencia Tañedo, who despite knowledge of the
proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same
property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered
in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was
whether our decision in the case in which another person was the
applicant constituted res judicataas against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed
under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation
of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application
for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain
constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons.27
We also declared in Aquino that:
From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become
the "law of the case" or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis.
That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It
was taken and should be taken as the authoritative view of the highest
tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration
of justice especially by a court of last resort that a question once
deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled
and closed to further argument. x x x28
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its
decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes,
already made an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed
realty was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Thus,
petitioner’s argument that the findings of fact of the trial court on her
registrable title are binding on us – on the principle that findings of fact
of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this Court –
is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect
this Court’s ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings
in Reyes (which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first
place), the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and
disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land as
forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the commerce
of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the
decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of
discretion.29 Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of
discretion is void and does not exist in legal contemplation.30
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought
to be reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the
Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a
conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the interrelation
and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently declared by Justice
J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all
other courts should take their bearings."31
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes
that its effectivity is "subject to private rights, if any there be."
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property
where the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the
land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of
fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately
13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)32
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that
forest lands are not registrable under CA 141.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area
covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is
incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such
title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present
Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. (Emphasis
supplied).33
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have
been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical
manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head
who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands)34coupled with
possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-
interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce
such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her
predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the
subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as
alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be
counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession
requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public
Land Act.35 This was our ruling in Almeda v. CA.36 The rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released through an official proclamation to
that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.37
Coming now to petitioner’s contention that her "private rights" to the
property, meaning her and her predecessors’ possession
thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected,
the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already recognized the
same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established.
To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the
land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact,
at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957
hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could
never ripen to ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before
it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still
a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and
her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we
noted:
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five
(5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not
have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years
after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage
Law.
xxx
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was
cleared and cultivated under the ‘kaingin’ system, while some portions
were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla,
caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for
the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x
xxx
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and
the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious
as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of
dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing
livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long
the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for
the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.38
xxx
Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which
petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent
in Reyes,39 thus rendering its probative value suspect, further militates
against granting her application for registration.
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the
CA that the same was null and void.
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of
a contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article
1318 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the
Republic, through the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management
Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office of the President,
was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement with
her.40 The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the
compromise agreement between the parties null and void because
although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases
involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the
scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the
Philippines.41
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for
respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter
into a compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the
provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires
"special authority" for attorneys to bind their clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation
thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their client’s litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis
supplied).
Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject
matter of a contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable.
Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights
which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
(Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation
contrary to law and against public policy. The agreement provided
that, in consideration of petitioner’s withdrawal of her application for
registration of title from that portion of the property located within the
military reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that part
of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic could not
validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter of the
agreement was outside the commerce of man.
PETITIONER’S CONTEMPT OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot
reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes
under attack.
That petitioner’s letter-motion constitutes an attack against the
integrity of this Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter
innocently enough by stating:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect
the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence,"
that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer,
January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for
what she perceived as this Court’s failure to exercise "utmost
prudence" in rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case.
Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and
my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court
to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from
the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of
our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice
so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I
hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last
plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as
Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court
involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of
Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza
in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the
minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to
render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became
the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of
the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor
General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic,
as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in
which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she
has no choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza
decision to the media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater
spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I
however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and
even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again,
so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain
and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.
When required to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt for her baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner
answered:
xxx
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in
response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution.
Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" case
and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also
enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts
of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the
lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the appellate
court and ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in
clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play –
for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without
transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.
Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery
of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are
irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has
offended your honors’ sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment,
and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion – as
her letter to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of
threatening the Court.
xxx
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and
correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never
meant as a threat.
The Court now puts an end to petitioner’s irresponsible insinuations
and threats of "going public" with this case. We are not blind to
petitioner’s clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false
concern for the reputation of this Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered
justice with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was
arrived at after a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this
case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in
fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner were passed
upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this Court
in their respective resolutions.
As to petitioner’s complaint regarding this Court’s denial of her
petition through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived
her of due process as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision
stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the
Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the
justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias,
extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its
authority, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis
exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon
orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed
decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal
conclusions, are deemed sustained.42
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by
filing three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-
motion subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings
that "no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her
unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of this Court’s
orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her
thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public
sympathy – although the tone of petitioner’s compliance with our
show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to her earlier
letters – constitutes contempt of court.
In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held:
A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be
entertained is a declaration that the Court has already considered all
issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case
with finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from filing any
further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court, it must be
strictly observed by the parties. It should not be circumvented by filing
motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.
A FEW OBSERVATIONS
If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her
constitutional right to due process, then why did she question the
validity of the Mendoza decision late in the proceedings, that is, only
after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent
annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious
that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present
counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to
resuscitate his client’s lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is
evident from a statement in her petition to this Court that:
It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of
the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the
entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition
of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of
applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty.
Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando
A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia’s successor-in-
interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44 (Emphasis supplied).
The above cited statement does not help petitioner’s cause at all. If
anything, it only proves how desperate the case has become for
petitioner and her counsel.
WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner
is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration.
The motion is DENIED considering that a third motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks
merit.
Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of
Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days
from receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any
repetition hereof shall be dealt with more severely.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the
petitioners, spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision
dated May 16, 20052 and the resolution dated June 27, 20063 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and
set aside the decision dated May 7, 20014 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 2372.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for
registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457,
situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was
filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by
Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children,
Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication
dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No.
4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of
Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the
spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and
submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and
certificate of assessment.
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
opposed the application,5 it did not present any evidence in support of
its opposition. Since no private opposition to the registration was filed,
the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996
against the whole world, except the Republic.6
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for
registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that
"[the spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession, including
that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be
registered, has been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the
whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period
of over fifty (50) years."8
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the
spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the
government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortuna’s evidence –
Tax Declaration No. 8366 – showed that possession over the lot dates
back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off
period provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to
establish the alienable and disposable nature of the land,10 they failed
to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law
requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic’s
argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses
Fortuna’s predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in
possession of the land only since 1948.
The CA denied the spouses Fortuna’s motion for reconsideration of its
decision in its resolution dated June 27, 2006.11
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the
CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by
requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the
public domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No.
1073 and instead required that the possession should be since June 12,
1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in
Section 14(1) of the PRD.12
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January
25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on
June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the
Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,13 they allege
that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May
24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim
to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No.
1942 amendment because Pastora’s possession dates back, at the
latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948,
this does not contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457
before 1948. The failure to present documentary evidence proving
possession earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records
Officer of the Provincial Assessor’s Office, who testified that the
records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War
II.
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than
1948, the spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that
Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No.
8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration.
Second, the annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366
states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]"14 Since Tax
Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration
No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947, indicating that there was
already an owner and possessor of the lot before 1948. Third, they rely
on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373
was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462,
27066, and 27098,15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and
are adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was
born in 1926 and resided in a place a few meters from the three lots.
She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her way to school
since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because the
latter’s family had constructed a house and planted fruit-bearing trees
thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis of Macaria’s
testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the RTC
granted the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of Lot Nos.
4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of January 3, 2005.16 The RTC’s
decision has lapsed into finality unappealed.
The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria’s testimony in LRC No. 2373
should be considered to prove Pastora’s possession prior to 1948.
Although LRC No. 2373 is a separate registration proceeding, it
pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot No. 4457, and
belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure
to present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC No. 2372,
the spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of evidence x
x x that [they] were able to trace and establish the identity and
competency of Macaria[.]"17
Commenting on the spouses Fortuna’s petition, the Republic relied
mostly on the CA’s ruling which denied the registration of title and
prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently
prove their compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to
alienable lands of the public domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned
by the State.18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands,
forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks, only
agricultural lands may be alienated.19 Public land that has not been
classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of
title to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the
alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the
grant and disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11
and 48(b), will find application only from the time that a public land
has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and
disposable.
20
Under Section 6 of the PLA, the classification and the reclassification
of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The
President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can
classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public
domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.21
Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for
registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present
incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of
the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was
established by the notation in the survey plan,22 which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13
L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or
military reservation.23
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that
"there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title
previously issued for the subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find that
neither of the above documents is evidence of a positive act from the
government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the
covered properties’ alienable and disposable character.25 These
notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved alienable and
disposable area per verification through survey by the proper
government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy
of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable
land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,27 the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO28 or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the
land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary,
or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that
the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the
public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these
documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public
land as alienable and disposable.29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has
been reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
though a positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses
Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA
should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish
the alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as
sufficient ground to deny the petition and terminate the case, we
deem it proper to continue to address the other important legal issues
raised in the petition.
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and
disposition of alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA,
alienable lands of the public domain may be disposed of, among
others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This
mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the
original version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a
30-year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the
PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942, read:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and
underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of
possession by requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD
No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru
his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years –
from 1945 up to its enactment in 1977 – is required. This effectively
impairs the vested rights of applicants who had complied with the 30-
year possession required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but
whose possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12,
1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this,
the Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa30 that "Filipino citizens who by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may
apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title
under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was considered as the
cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from
January 25, 1977 – the effectivity date of PD No. 1073.
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073
was enacted; based on the certification from the National Printing
Office,31 PD No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official
Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This
uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications
for judicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the
PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take
effect upon its promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al.
v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.32 that the publication of laws is an
indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be
understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its
publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date
for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words,
applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove
that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses
Fortuna’s application for registration of title would still not prosper for
failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8,
1947.
The spouses Fortuna’s allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the
notation stating that Tax Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax
Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed the land
prior to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No. 4457 when she
Declaration No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner that said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.
was subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While these circumstances may
indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none proves that it commenced The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding
as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the tax declaration Pastora's possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of
indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the nature of the spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-
Pastora’s possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of 1278 and 2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially
possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the reclassified as alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one and duration of Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the PLA,
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation thus, failing to convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law consider their merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing Santiago v. De las Santos:38
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must
would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not
not be a mere fiction."35 Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To
that Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as
be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible
cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described as evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming,
"cogonal."36 there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to
No. 8366 by relying on Macaria’s testimony in a separate land the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights
registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged that she passed over the same as do minus.
by Pastora’s lots on her way to school, and she saw Pastora’s family
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005
construct a house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area. and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
However, the Court is not convinced that Macaria’s testimony
G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the
constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of
cases of this nature. title on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs against the
The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining spouses Fortuna.
parcels of land, all of which are claimed to have previously belonged to
SO ORDERED.
Pastora. These parcels of land were covered by three separate
applications for registration, to wit:
a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total
area of 2,961 sq. m., commenced by Emeteria;
b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098,
with a total area of 4,006 sq. m., commenced by the
spouses Fortuna; and
c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457,
with a total area of 2,597 sq. m.
As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to
the same predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the
final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373,37 upholding Pastora’s
ownership, be taken into account in resolving the present case.
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to
have previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an
area for the Court to consider that Pastora’s claimed acts of possession
and occupation (as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety
of the lots. Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21
in 1947) could competently assess and declare that its entirety
belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of possession and
occupation in what must have been but a limited area. As mentioned,
Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus,