1.PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A.

ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, respondents. / G.R. No. 84818 / December 18, 1989 / REGALADO, J.:

Facts:

The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Alcuaz of the NTC, dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction
of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen
percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as
well as substantive, due process of law.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish,
construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station
or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under
this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities
as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and
ground terminal or terminals."

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the
then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No.
196 petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including
all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196,
respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to
charge rates therefor.

Petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to
continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing
since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Petitioner was
granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it
was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. The NTC order now in controversy
had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted
from but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen
percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction
on the following ground:

The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after
an initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers
Authorization Department of the financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a
REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to further reductions, should the
Commission finds (sic) in its further evaluation that more reduction should be
effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization or in the final consideration
of the case.

Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing
for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No.
196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent
NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While
petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of legislative power, it
subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain
rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the
exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

Issue:

Whether NTC has the power to fix the rates of the petitioner.

Ruling:

YES.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among
others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications
which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith.
And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective
competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section
6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national
economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems
contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth
analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the
exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a
valid delegation of legislative power.

Requisites

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both
be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In
case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.

Classification of Rate-fixing Power

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission,9 we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is
legislative, thus:

Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when
such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the
nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner
herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report
submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more
 than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is
entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to
refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making
said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial
character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

NOTE: NTC lost the case on due process grounds for failure to give PHILCOMSAT notice and
hearing.

2.MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. AIRSPAN CORPORATION,

LBC EXPRESS INC., A. SORIANO AVIATION, INC., FLYING MEDICAL SAMARITANS, INC., ABOITIZ
AIR TRANSPORT CORP., ASIA AIRCRAFT OVERSEAS PHILS., INC., ASIAN AEROSPACE
CORP., PACIFIC JET MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC., GENERAL AVIATION SUPPLIES
TRADING, INC., AIRWORKS AVIATION CORP., FEDERATION OF AVIATION ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE PHILS., INC., SUBIC INTERNATIONAL AIR CHARTER, INC., NORMAL HOLDINGS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and COLUMBIAN MOTOR SALES
CORPORATION, respondents. / G.R. No. 157581 / December 1, 2004 / QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner MIAA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by Executive Order
No. 778. It owns, operates, and managesNAIA. Petitioners properties, facilities, and services are
available for public use subject to such fees, charges, and rates as may be fixed in accordance with
law. Herein respondents are the users, lessees and occupants of petitioners properties, facilities,
and services.
The schedule of aggregate dues collectible for the use of petitioners properties, facilities, and
services are divided into: (1) aeronautical fees; (2) rentals; (3) business concessions; (4) other
airport fees and charges; and (5) utilities.
On May 19, 1997, petitioner issued Resolution No. 97-51announcing an increase in
the rentals of its terminal buildings, VIP lounge, other airport buildings and land, as well as check-in
and concessions counters. Business concessions, particularly concessionaire privilege fees, were
also increased.
On April 2, 1998, petitioner passed Resolution No. 98-30adopting twenty percent (20%) of the
increase recommended by Punongbayan and Araullo, to take effect immediately on June 1, 1998.
Thus, petitioner issued the corresponding Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998 to reflect the
new schedule of fees, charges, and rates.
On February 5, 1999, petitioner issued Resolution No. 99-11, which further increased the other
airport fees and charges, specifically for parking and porterage services, and the rentals for hangars.
Accordingly, petitioner amended Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998.
Respondents requested that the implementation of the new fees, charges, and rates be
deferred due to lack of prior notice and hearing.The request was denied. Petitioner likewise refused
to renew the identification cards of respondents personnel, and vehicle stickers to prevent entry to
the premises.

Issue:

Whether MIAA is authorize to increase its fees, charges, and rates?

Ruling:
NO.
Under the original Charter of the MIAA, petitioner was given blanket authority to adjust its fees,
charges, and rates. However, E.O. No. 903 limited such authority to a mere recommendatory power.
Hence, petitioner’s Charter itself, as amended, directly vests the power to determine revision of fees,
charges, and rates in the “ministry head” and even requires approval of the Cabinet. Worth noting,
its Charter established MIAA as an attached agency of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications (now Department of Transportation and Communications). Hence, the “ministry
head” who has the power to determine the revision of fees, charges, and rates of the MIAA is now
the DOTC Secretary. Clearly, petitioner has no authority to increase its fees, charges, or rates as the
power to do so is vested solely in the DOTC Secretary, although petitioner’s prerogative to
recommend possible increases thereon is of course recognized. As an attached agency of the
DOTC, the MIAA is governed by the Administrative Code of 1987. The Administrative Code
specifically requires notice and public hearing in the fixing of rates.

3.HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs.HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as

Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents. /G.R. No. 81510 / March 14, 1990 / SARMIENTO, J.:

Facts:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed a sworn statement filed with the POEA charged petitioner
Hortencia Salazar with Illegal Recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On
the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency
being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as
the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and

Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the

New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under

existing laws.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.

On January 26, 1988 Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 was implemented. The group which was
tasked to implement was assisted by policemen and mediamen.

On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA a letter which states that he has not been given any
prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. That the said Closure and Seizure
also violates Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose." And that the premises invaded are the private residence of
the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging
to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation,
together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile
under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:

Whether Administrator of the POEA/Secretary of labor may issue search and seizure warrant.

Ruling:

NO

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the latePresident Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential
Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we
declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (ChuocoTiaco vs. Forbes, 228
U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive
“when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.” Justice
Johnson’s opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued
presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, “he may, even in the absence of express
law, deport them.” (Forbes vs. ChuocoTiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch
Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

4.BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION),

BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R.
SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding
Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN,respondents. / G.R. Nos. 95122-23 /
May 31, 1991

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD

OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO,
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC
Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN,
KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.

WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et
al., respondents./ G.R. Nos. 95612-13 / May 31, 1991

BIDIN, J.:

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino Citizen. He also testified that he had 5 children with his
wife Chu Gim Tee: Jose, Gloria, Francisco (William’s father), Elena, and Benjamin. On June 27,
1961, then 12-year old William arrived in Manila from Hongkong with Gloria, Francisco, and
Johnson Gatchalian with Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On July
12, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry admitted William and his companions as Filipino Citizens.
On July 6, 1962 the Board of Commissioners, after reviewing the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of respondent
Gatchalian. In 1967, in the case of Arocha v Vivo it sustained the validity of said order. In 1973
Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a motion for re-hearing with the
Board of Special Inquiry. Acting Commissioner Nituda later issued an order recalling the warrant
of arrest against Gatchalian. In 1990 acting director of NBI wrote to the DOJ recommending that
Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of exclusion be charged with violation of the
Immigration act. The Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation and a mission order
was issued by Commissioner Domingo of the CID ordering the arrest of Gatchalian. Hence,
Gatchalian filed the present civil cases that are being assailed in the case at bar.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of Immigration was valid.

Ruling:

NO.

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the
Immigration Act of 1940, reads: “Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien.” From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of
implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the
Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for
purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being
unconstitutional.

Moreover, the mission ordered issued by petitioner only for purposes of investigation. The
mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final
order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
Petitioners also omitted the fact that Acting Commissioner Nituda issued a memorandum in
1973 that recommended the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of
Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 and the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants.

Such was the last official act of the government that is the basis of which
respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the
present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent
William Gatchalian.

Also took note that the basis for the warrant of exclusion is that the cablegram issued by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs was forged. Even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the
mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country.

5.THE INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE PAÑGIL
FEDERATION OF LABOR, respondent. / G.R. No. L-47178 / November 25, 1940 / LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

On June 2, 1939, the Secretary of Labor certified to the CIR that an Industrial dispute existed
between the petitioner and certain of its employees who are members of respondent union, and that
the controversy was a proper one to be dealt with by said Court in the public interest under section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 103.

The said industrial dispute referred to certain demands made by the respondent on the petitioner,
among which were to set the minimum daily wages of common laborers at one peso, devise a
proper schedule of rate of wages for all labourers, the rate of wages for the mountain camps should
be higher by 20 per cent over those given in the town.

On June 2, 1939, and for some years prior thereto, the minimum wage paid by the petitioner to its
employees was P0.70 a day regardless of whether the laborer was employed in the poblaciones of
the towns of Pañgil and Famy, or in the mountain camps.

The Honorable Rovira, one of the judges of the CIR granted the respondent’s demand.

On October 17, 1939, the petitioner filed a motion with the CIR en banc praying for reconsideration
of the DECISION ADICIONAL of the Honorable Rovira. While this motion for reconsideration was
pending resolution by the Court, the petitioner, on November 28. 1939, filed a motion praying that
said Court hold itself without jurisdiction to decide the question relating to demands alleging (1) that
the CIR has no authority to determine minimum wages for an individual employer in connection with
a particular and specific industrial dispute under the provisions of section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103; (2) that such authority would constitute an undue delegation of legislative power to the
Court of Industrial Relations and would deny the petitioner the equal protection of the laws, thus
rendering said section unconstitutional and void.

On December 23, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations, by resolution in banc, denied the motion
for reconsideration as well as the motion of November 28, 1939. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the CIR has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual employer in
connection with an industrial dispute under provisions of Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
and if it has, whether or not such grant of power is unconstitutional and void.

Ruling:

The Court of Industrial Relations has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual
employee in connection with an industrial dispute which said court might take cognizance of under
the provisions of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and such grant of power is constitutional.
Under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the Court of Industrial Relations is empowered to
"take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision, and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lock-out, arising from differences as regards
wages, shares or compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or suspensions of employees or laborers,
tenants or farm-laborers, hours of labor, or conditions of tenancy or employment, between em-
ployers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers." Under
section 1, the court has "jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to the provisions of this Act (as amended by Com. Act No. 254) ; and by
section 13, it is provided that "in making an award, order or decision, under the provisions of section
four of this Act, the court shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the
parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural dispute." Section 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the court shall act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms.
The National Assembly has by this section furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be
guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before it, and
we have already ruled that the discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does
not infringe upon the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of
legislative function, and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.